Section H - Why do anarchists oppose state socialism?

H.1 Have anarchists always opposed state socialism?
	H.1.1 What was Bakunin's critique of Marxism?
	H.1.2 What are the key differences between Anarchists and Marxists?
	H.1.3 Why do anarchists wish to abolish the state "overnight"?
	H.1.4 Do anarchists have "absolutely no idea of what the proletariat 
      	will put in its place"?
	H.1.5 Why do anarchists reject "utilising the present state"?
	H.1.6 Why do anarchists try to "build the new world in the 
      	shell of the old"?
	H.1.7 Haven't you read Lenin's "State and Revolution"?

H.2 What parts of anarchism do Marxists particularly misrepresent?
      H.2.1 Do anarchists reject defending a revolution?
      H.2.2 Do anarchists reject the need for collective working 
            class struggle?
	H.2.3 Does anarchism "yearn for what has gone before"?
      H.2.4 Do anarchists think "the state is the main enemy" rather 
            than just "one aspect" of class society? 
      H.2.5 Do anarchists think "full blown" socialism will be 
            created overnight?
      H.2.6 How do Marxists misrepresent Anarchist ideas on mutual aid?
      H.2.7 Who do anarchists see as their "agents of social change"?
      H.2.8 What is the relationship of anarchism to syndicalism?
	H.2.9 Do anarchists have "liberal" politics?
      H.2.10 Are anarchists against leadership?
      H.2.11 Are anarchists "anti-democratic"?
	H.2.12 Does anarchism survive only in the absence of a strong
             workers' movement?       
	H.2.13 Do anarchists reject "political" struggles and action?
      H.2.14 Are anarchist organisations either "ineffective," "elitist" 
             or "downright bizarre"?
      H.2.15 Do anarchists reject discipline?
      H.2.16 Does the Spanish Revolution show the failure of anarchism?

H.3 What are the myths of state socialism?
      H.3.1 Do Anarchists and Marxists want the same thing?
      H.3.2 Is Marxism "socialism from below"?
      H.3.3 Is Leninism "socialism from below"?
      H.3.4 Don't anarchists just quote Marxists selectively?
      H.3.5 Has Marxism appropriation of anarchist ideas changed it?
      H.3.6 Is Marxism the only revolutionary politics which 
            have worked?
      H.3.7 What is wrong with the Marxist theory of the state?
      H.3.8 What is wrong with the Leninist theory of the state?
      H.3.9 Is the state simply an agent of economic power?
      H.3.10 Has Marxism always supported the idea of workers' 
             councils?
      H.3.11 Does Marxism aim to place power into the hands 
             of workers organisations? 
      H.3.12 Is big business the precondition for socialism?
      H.3.13 Why is state socialism just state capitalism?
      H.3.14 What is wrong with Marxist economics?

H.4 Didn't Engels refute anarchism in his essay "On Authority"?
	H.4.1 Does organisation imply the end of liberty?
      H.4.2 How does free love versus marriage indicate the weakness
	      of Engels' argument?
      H.4.3 How do anarchists propose to run a factory?
      H.4.4 How does the class struggle refute Engels' arguments 
            that industry required leaving "all autonomy behind"?
      H.4.5 Is the way industry operates "independent of all
             social organisation"?
      H.4.6 Why does Engel's "On Authority" harm Marxism?
      H.4.7 Why does Engels' argument that revolution is "the most
             authoritarian thing there is" totally miss the point?

H.5 What is vanguardism and why do anarchists reject it?
      H.5.1 Why are vanguard parties anti-socialist?
      H.5.2 Have vanguardist assumptions been validated?
      H.5.3 Why does vanguardism imply party power?
      H.5.4 Did Lenin abandon vanguardism?
      H.5.5 What is "democratic centralism"?
      H.5.6 Why do anarchists oppose "democratic centralism"?
      H.5.7 Is the way revolutionaries organise important?
      H.5.8 Are vanguard parties effective?
      H.5.9 What are vanguard parties effective at?
      H.5.10 Why does "democratic centralism" produce "bureaucratic
             centralism"?
      H.5.11 Can you provide an example of the negative nature of
             vanguard parties?

Section H - Why do anarchists oppose state socialism?

The socialist movement has been continually divided, with various
different tendencies and movements. Two of the main tendencies of
socialism are state socialism (Marxism, Leninism, Maoism and so on)
and libertarian socialism (anarchism in all its many forms). The
conflict and disagreement between anarchists and Marxists is
legendary. As Benjamin Tucker noted:

"[I]t is a curious fact that the two extremes of the [socialist
movement] . . . though united . . . by the common claim that labour
should be put in possession of its own, are more diametrically 
opposed to each other in their fundamental principles of social 
action and their methods of reaching the ends aimed at than
either is to their common enemy, existing society. They are
based on two principles the history of whose conflict is almost
equivalent to the history of the world since man came into it . . .

"The two principles referred to are AUTHORITY and LIBERTY, and
the names of the two schools of Socialistic thought which fully
and unreservedly represent one or the other are, respectively,
State Socialism and Anarchism. Whoso knows that these two
schools want and how they propose to get it understands the
Socialistic movement. For, just as it has been said that there
is no half-way house between Rome and Reason, so it may be said
that there is no half-way house between State Socialism and
Anarchism." [_The Individualist Anarchists_, pp. 78-9]

In addition to this divide between libertarian and authoritarian
forms of socialism, there is another divide between reformist and
revolutionary wings of these two tendencies. "The term 'anarchist,'"
Murray Bookchin writes, "is a generic word like the term 'socialist,'
and there are probably as many different kinds of anarchists are
there are socialists. In both cases, the spectrum ranges from 
individuals whose views derive from an extension of liberalism (the 
'individualist anarchists', the social-democrats) to revolutionary 
communists (the anarcho-communists, the revolutionary Marxists, 
Leninists and Trotskyites)." [_Post-Scarcity Anarchism_, p. 214f]

In this section of the FAQ we concentrate on the conflict between
the revolutionary wings of both movements. Here we discuss why
communist-anarchists, anarcho-syndicalists and other revolutionary
anarchists reject Marxist theories, particularly the revolutionary
ideas of Leninists and Trotskyites. We will concentrate almost
entirely on the works of Marx, Lenin and Trotsky as well as the
Russian Revolution. This is because many Marxists reject the Chinese,
Cuban and other revolutions as being infected by Stalinism. In 
contrast, there is a general agreement in Marxist circles that
the Russian Revolution was a true socialist revolution and the 
ideas of Lenin (and usually Trotsky) follow in Marx's footsteps.
What we say against Marx and Lenin is also applicable to their
more controversial followers, therefore we ignore them. We also 
dismiss out of hand any suggestion that the Stalinist regime was 
remotely socialist. Unfortunately many serious revolutionaries 
consider Lenin's regime to be a valid example of a valid socialist 
revolution so we have to discuss why it was not. 

As noted, two main wings of the revolutionary socialist movement, 
anarchism and Marxism, have always been in conflict. While, with 
the apparent success of the Russian revolution, the anarchist 
movement was overshadowed by its authoritarian name-sake in many 
countries, this situation has been changing. In recent years anarchism 
has seen a revival as more and more people recognise the fundamentally 
anti-socialist nature of the Russian "experiment" and the politics that 
inspired it. With this re-evaluation of socialism and the Soviet Union, 
more and more people are rejecting Marxism and embracing libertarian 
socialism. As can be seen from the press coverage from such events as 
the anti-Poll Tax riots in the UK at the start of the 1990s, the J18 
and N30 anti-capitalist demonstrations in 1999, anarchism has become
synonymous with anti-capitalism. 

Needless to say, the self-proclaimed "vanguard(s) of the proletariat" 
become worried and hurriedly write patronising articles on "anarchism" 
(without bothering to really understand it or its arguments against 
Marxism). These articles are usually a mishmash of lies, irrelevant
personal attacks, distortions of the anarchist position and the 
ridiculous assumption that anarchists are anarchists because no one
has bothered to inform of us of what "Marxism" is "really" about. We 
do not aim to repeat such "scientific" analysis in our FAQ so we shall 
concentrate on politics and history. By so doing we will indicate that 
anarchists are anarchists because we understand Marxism and reject it 
as being unable to lead to a socialist society.

It is unfortunately common for many Marxists, particularly Leninist 
influenced ones, to concentrate on personalities and not politics 
when discussing anarchist ideas. Albert Meltzer put it well when he
argued that it is "very difficult for Marxist-Leninists to make an 
objective criticism of Anarchism, as such, because by its very nature 
it undermines all the suppositions basic to Marxism. If Marxism is 
held out to be indeed *the* basic working class philosophy, and the 
proletariat cannot owe its emancipation to anyone but itself, it 
is hard to go back on it and say that the working class is not yet 
ready to dispense with authority placed over it. Marxists therefore, 
normally refrain from criticising anarchism as such -- unless driven 
to doing so, when it exposes its own authoritarianism . . . and 
concentrates its attack not on *anarchism*, but on *anarchists*" 
[_Anarchism: Arguments For and Against_, p. 37]

This can be seen, for example, when many Leninists attempt to "refute" 
the whole of anarchism, its theory and history, by pointing out the 
personal failings of specific anarchists. They say that Proudhon was 
anti-jewish and sexist, that Bakunin was racist, that Kropotkin 
supported the Allies in the First World War and so anarchism is 
flawed. All these facts about Proudhon, Bakunin and Kropotkin are 
true and they are all irrelevant to a critique of anarchism. Such a 
"critique" does not address anarchist ideas, all of which are ignored 
by this approach. In other words, they attack anarchists, not anarchism. 

Even taken at face value, you would have to be stupid to assume that 
Proudhon's misogyny or Bakunin's racism had equal weighting with Lenin's 
and the Bolsheviks' behaviour (for example, the creation of a party 
dictatorship, the repression of strikes, free speech, independent 
working class organisation, the creation of a secret police force, 
the attack on Kronstadt, the betrayal of the Makhnovists, the violent
repression of the Russian anarchist movement, etc.) in the league 
table of despicable activity. It seems strange that personal bigotry 
is of equal, or even more, importance in evaluating a political 
theory than its practice during a revolution.

Moreover, such a technique is ultimately dishonest. Looking at 
Proudhon, for example, Proudhon's anti-semitic outbursts remained 
unpublished in his note books until well after his ideas and, as 
Robert Graham points out, "a reading of _General Idea of the 
Revolution_ will show, anti-semitism forms no part of Proudhon's 
revolutionary programme." ["Introduction", _The General Idea of 
the Revolution_, p. xxxvi] Similarly, Bakunin's racism is an 
unfortunate aspect of his life, an aspect which is ultimately
irrelevant to the core principles and ideas he argued for. 
Moreover, Bakunin and his associates totally rejected Proudhon's 
sexism and argued for complete equality between the sexes. Why
mention these aspects of their ideas at all? They are irrelevant
to evaluating anarchism as a viable political theory. To do so
is to dishonestly imply that anarchism is racist and sexist,
which it is not.

If we look at Kropotkin's support for the Allies in the First World 
War we discover a strange hypocrisy on the part of Marxists as well 
as an attempt to distort history. Why hypocrisy? Simply because Marx 
and Engels supported the Prussian during the Franco-Prussian war (in 
contrast, Bakunin argued for a popular uprising and social revolution
to stop the war). As Marx wrote to Engels on July 20th, 1870:

"The French need to be overcome. If the Prussians are victorious, 
the centralisation of the power of the State will be useful for 
the centralisation of the German working class. Moreover, German 
ascendancy will transfer the centre of gravity of the European 
worker's movement from France to Germany . . . On a world scale,
the ascendancy of the German proletariat the French proletariat
will at the same time constitute the ascendancy of *our* theory 
over Proudhon's." [quoted by Arthur Lehning, _Michael Bakunin:
Selected Writings_, p. 284]

Marx, in part, supported the deaths of working class people in war
in order to see *his* ideas become more important than Proudhon's! 
At least Kropotkin supported the allies because he was against the
dangers to freedom implied by the German military state. The hypocrisy
of the Marxists is clear -- if anarchism is to be condemned for
Kropotkin's actions, then Marxism must be equally condemned for
Marx's.

This analysis also rewrites history as the bulk of the Marxist
movement supported their respective states during the conflict.
A handful of the parties of the Second International opposed the
war (and those were the smallest ones as well). The father of
Russian Marxism, George Plekhanov, supported the Allies. The 
German Social Democratic Party (the jewel in the crown of
the Second International) supported the war (a small minority
of it did not). There was just one man in the German Reichstag 
in August 1914 who did not vote for war credits (and he did not
even vote against them, he abstained). And many of the anti-war
minority went along with the majority of party in the name of
"discipline" and "democratic" principles.

In contrast, only a *very* small minority of anarchists supported 
any side during the conflict. The bulk of the anarchist movement 
(including such leading lights as Malatesta, Rocker, Goldman and 
Berkman) opposed the war, arguing that anarchists must "capitalise 
upon every stirring of rebellion, every discontent in order to 
foment insurrection, to organise the revolution to which we look 
for the ending of all of society's iniquities." [_No Gods, No 
Masters_, vol. 2., p. 36] As Malatesta noted at the time, the
"pro-war" anarchists were "not numerous, it is true, but [did
have] amongst them comrades whom we love and respect most."
He stressed that the "almost all" of the anarchists "have
remained faithful to their convictions" namely "to awaken
a consciousness of the antagonism of interests between
dominators and dominated, between exploiters and workers,
and to develop the class struggle inside each country, and
solidarity among all workers across the frontiers, as against
any prejudice and any passion of either race or nationality."
[_Life and Ideas_, p. 243, p. 248 and p. 244]

By pointing to Kropotkin, Marxists hide the fact that it was
the official Marxist movement which betrayed the cause of 
internationalism, not anarchism. Indeed, the betrayal of the
Second International was the natural result of the "ascendancy" 
of Marxism over anarchism that Marx had hoped. The rise of Marxism,
in the form of social-democracy, ended as Bakunin predicted, with the 
corruption of socialism in the quagmire of electioneering and statism.
As Rudolf Rocker correctly argues, "the Great War of 1914 was the 
exposure of the bankruptcy of political socialism." [_Marx and
Anarchism_]

We will not follow this common Marxist approach here as the failings of 
Marxism, particularly in its Leninist form, come not from the personal 
failings of individuals but from their politics and how they would work 
in practice. No one ever lives up totally to their ideals in practice, 
we are all human and pointing out individual faults does not undermine 
the theory they contributed to. If this was the case then Marxism would 
be "refuted" because of Marx and Engel's anti-Slav feelings and their 
support for the German State during the Franco-Prussian war of 1871.

Rather, we will analyse Marxism in terms of its theories and how
these theories worked in practice. Thus we will conduct a scientific
analysis of Marxism, looking at its claims and comparing them to
what they achieved in practice. Few, if any, Marxists present such
an analysis of their own politics, which makes Marxism more a belief 
system rather than analysis. For example, many Marxists point to
the success of the Russian Revolution and argue that while anarchists
attack Trotsky and Lenin for being statists and authoritarians, that
statism and authoritarianism saved the revolution.

In reply, anarchists point out that the Marxist revolution did,
in fact, *fail.* After all, the aim of those revolutions was to create 
a free, democratic, classless society of equals. In fact it created a 
one party dictatorship based around a class system of bureaucrats 
exploiting and dominating working class people and a society lacking 
equality and freedom. As the stated aims of the Marxist revolution 
failed to materialise, anarchists would argue that those revolutions 
failed even though a "Communist" Party remained in power for over 
70 years. And as for statism and authoritarianism "saving" the 
revolution, they saved it for Stalin, not socialism. That is nothing 
to be proud of.

From an anarchist perspective, this makes perfect sense as "[n]o
revolution can ever succeed as factor of liberation unless the
MEANS used to further it be identical in spirit and tendency
with the PURPOSE to be achieved." [Emma Goldman, _Patterns of
Anarchy_, p. 113] In other words, statist and authoritarian means
will result in statist and authoritarian ends. Calling a new state 
a "workers state" will not change the state's nature as a form of 
minority (and so class) rule. It has nothing to do with the ideas
or nature of those who gain power, it has to do with the nature of
the state and the social relationships it generates. The state
structure is an instrument of minority rule, it cannot be used by 
the majority because it is based on hierarchy, centralisation and
the empowerment of the minority at the top at the expense of 
everyone else. States have certain properties *just because they
are states.* They have their own dynamics which place them outside
popular control and are not simply a tool in the hands of the
economically dominant class. Making the minority Socialists 
within a "workers' state" does not change the fundamental nature 
of the state as an instrument of minority rule -- it just
changes the minority in charge, the minority exploiting and
oppressing the majority.

Similarly, in spite of over 100 years of socialists and radicals
using elections to put forward their ideas and the resulting 
corruption of every party which has done so, most Marxists still
call for socialists to take part in elections. For a theory which
calls itself scientific this ignoring of empirical evidence, the
facts of history, is truly amazing. Marxism ranks with economics 
as the "science" which most consistently ignores history and 
evidence. 

Indeed, this refusal to look at factual evidence can be seen from
the common comment Marxists make of anarchists, namely that we
are "petty-bourgeois." For anarchists, such comments indicate that,
for many Marxists, class is more a source of insults than analysis.
This can be seen when Marxists state that, say, Kropotkin or Bakunin
was "petty-bourgeois." As if a member of the Russian ruling class
could be petty-bourgeois! If we look at class as an socio-economic
fact and a social relationship (which it is) rather than an insult, 
then we discover if Bakunin and Kropotkin were "petty-bourgeois" then 
so was Marx, for they both shared the same socio-economic situation! 
Nor can it explain how Marx (a member of the petty-bourgeois, an 
independent journalist, when he worked at all) and Engels (an 
*actual* bourgeois, a factory owner!) could have created a 
"proletarian science." After all, in order to be a "proletarian" 
theory it must be developed by working class people in struggle. 
It was not. Albert Meltzer explains the problems Marxists face when 
they call us "petty-bourgeois":

"This leads them into another difficulty: How can one reconcile the
existence of anarcho-syndicalist unions with 'petty bourgeois' origins
-- and how does one get over the fact that most Marxist-Leninists
of today are professional ladies and gentlemen studying for or
belonging to the professions? The answer is usually given that
*because* anarchism is 'petty bourgeois' those embracing it --
'whatever their occupation or social origins' must also be 
'petty bourgeois.' Thus because 'Marxism is working class', its
adherents must be working class 'at least subjectively.' This is
a sociological absurdity, as if 'working class' meant an
ideological viewpoint. It is also a built in escape clause."
[Op. Cit., p. 39]

As this section of the FAQ will make clear, this name calling
and concentration on the personal failings of individual anarchists
by Marxists is not an accident. If we take the ability of a theory
to predict future events as an indication of its power then it soon 
becomes clear that anarchism is far more useful a tool in working
class struggle than Marxism. After all, anarchists predicted with
amazing accuracy the future development of Marxism. Bakunin argued
that electioneering would corrupt the socialist movement, making it
reformist and just another bourgeois party (see section J.2). This 
is what in fact happened to the Social-Democratic movement across 
the world by the turn of the twentieth century (the rhetoric remained 
radical for a few more years, of course). Murray Bookchin's comments 
about the German Social Democrats are appropriate here:

"[T]he party's preoccupation with parliamentarism was taking it
ever away from anything Marx had envisioned. Instead of working
to overthrow the bourgeois state, the SPD, with its intense
focus on elections, had virtually become an engine for getting
votes and increasing its Reichstag representation within the
bourgeois state . . . The more artful the SPD became in there
realms, the more its membership and electorate increased and,
with the growth of new pragmatic and opportunistic adherents, 
the more it came to resemble a bureaucratic machine for 
acquiring power under capitalism rather than a revolutionary
organisation to eliminate it." [_The Third Revolution_, vol. 2,
p. 300]

The reality of working within the state soon transformed the
party and its leadership, as Bakunin predicted. If we look at
the 1920s, we discover a similar failure to consider the
evidence:

"From the early 1920s on, the Leninist attachment to pre-WWI
social democratic tactics such as electoral politics and political
activity within pro-capitalist labour unions dominated the
perspectives of the so-called Communist. But if these tactics
were correct ones, why didn't they lead to a less dismal
set of results? We must be materialists, not idealists. What
was the actual outcome of the Leninist strategies? Did
Leninist strategies result in successful proletarian revolutions,
giving rise to societies worthy of the human beings that live
in them? The revolutionary movement in the inter-war period
was defeated. . ." [Max Anger, "The Spartacist School of
Falsification", _Anarchy: A Journal of Desire Armed_, no. 43,
Spring/Summer 1997, pp. 51-2]

As Scottish Anarchist Ethel McDonald argued in 1937, the
tactics urged by Lenin were a disaster in practice:

"At the Second Congress of the Third International, Moscow, a
comrade who is with us now in Spain, answering Zinoview, urged
faith in the syndicalist movement in Germany and the end of
parliamentary communism. He was ridiculed. Parliamentarianism,
communist parliamentarianism, but still parliamentartarianism
would save Germany. And it did. . . Saved it from Socialism.
Saved it for Fascism." ["The Volunteer Ban", _Workers City_,
Farquhar McLay (ed.), p. 74]

When the Nazi's took power in 1933 in Germany the 12 million 
Socialist and Communist voters and 6 million organised workers 
took no action. In Spain, it was the anarcho-syndicalist CNT
which lead the battle against fascism on the streets and helped
create one of the most important social revolutions the world
has seen. The contrast could not be more clear. And many Marxists 
urge us to follow Lenin's advice today!

If we look at the "workers' states" created by Marxists, we
discover, yet again, anarchist predictions proved right. Bakunin
argued that "[b]y popular government they [the Marxists] mean
government of the people by a small under of representatives
elected by the people. . . [That is,] government of the vast
majority of the people by a privileged minority. But this
minority, the Marxists say, will consist of workers. Yes, 
perhaps, of *former* workers, who, as soon as they become
rulers or representatives of the people will cease to be
workers and will begin to look upon the whole workers' world
from the heights of the state. They will no longer represent
the people but themselves and their own pretensions to govern
the people." [_Statism and Anarchy_, p. 178] The history of
every Marxist revolution proves Bakunin was right.

Due to these "workers' states" socialism has become associated
with repressive regimes, with totalitarian regimes the total
opposite of what socialism is actually about. Nor does it
help when self-proclaimed socialists (such as Trotskyites)
"obscenely describe regimes that exploit, imprison and
murder wage labourers in Cuba, North Korea, and China as
'workers' states'" [Max Anger, Op. Cit., p. 52] Little wonder
many anarchists do not use the terms "socialist" or "communist"
and just call themselves "anarchists." They are associated with 
regimes which have nothing in common with our ideas, or, indeed, 
the ideas of socialism as such.

This does not mean that anarchists reject everything Marx wrote. 
Far from it. Much of his analysis of capitalism is acceptable to 
anarchists, for example (both Bakunin and Tucker considered Marx's 
economic analysis as important). Indeed, there are some schools
of Marxism which are very libertarian and are close cousins to
anarchism (for example, council communism and autonomist Marxism
are close to revolutionary anarchism). Unfortunately, these forms
of Libertarian Marxism are a minority current within that movement.

In other words, Marxism is not all bad -- unfortunately the vast
bulk of it is and those elements which are not are found in 
anarchism anyway. For most, Marxism is the school of Marx, Engels,
Lenin and Trotsky, not Marx, Pannekoek, Gorter, Ruhle and Mattick.
The minority libertarian trend of Marxism is based, like anarchism,
on a rejection of party rule, electioneering and creating a "workers'
state." They also, like anarchists, support direct action, self-managed 
class struggle, working class autonomy and a self-managed socialist 
society. These Marxists oppose the dictatorship of the party over 
the proletariat and, in effect, agree with Bakunin when he argued
against Marx that socialists should "not accept, even in the process
of revolutionary transition, either constituent assemblies, 
provisional governments or so-called revolutionary dictatorships;
because we are convinced that revolution is only sincere, honest
and real in the hands of the masses, and that when it is
concentrated in those of a few ruling individuals it inevitably
and immediately becomes reaction." Like Bakunin, they think
that "a free federation of agricultural and industrial associations 
. . . organised from the bottom upwards" will be the basis of a new 
society (Libertarian Marxists usually call these associations workers' 
councils). [_Michael Bakunin: Selected Writings_, p. 237 and p. 172]

These libertarian forms of Marxism should be encouraged 
and not tarred with the same brush as Leninism and social 
democracy (indeed Lenin commented upon "the anarchist 
deviation of the German Communist Workers' Party" and other 
"semi-anarchist elements," the very groups we are referring
to here under the term "libertarian Marxism." [_Marx, Engels
and Lenin, _Anarchism and Anarcho-Syndicalism_, p. 333 and 
p. 338]). Over time, hopefully, such comrades will see that 
the libertarian element of their thought outweighs the 
Marxist legacy. So our comments in this section of the 
FAQ are mostly directed to the majority form of Marxism, 
not to its libertarian wing.

One last point. We should point out that in the past many leading 
Marxists have argued that anarchism and socialism were miles apart: 
indeed, that anarchism was not a form of socialism. The leading American 
Marxist Daniel De Leon took this line, along with many others. This is 
true, in a sense, as anarchists are not *Marxian* socialists -- we reject 
such "socialism" as deeply authoritarian. However, all anarchists *are* 
members of the socialist movement and we reject attempts by Marxists to 
monopolise the term. Be that as it may, sometimes in this section we 
may find it useful to use the term socialist/communist to describe "state 
socialist" and anarchist to describe "libertarian socialist/communist." 
This in no way implies that anarchists are not socialists. It is purely 
a tool to make our arguments easier to read.

In the sections that follow we will discuss Marxism and the practice
of Marxists in power. This will indicate why anarchists reject it in 
favour of a *libertarian* form of socialism. 

H.1 Have anarchists always opposed state socialism?

Yes. Anarchists have always argued that real socialism cannot be
created using a state. The basic core of the argument is simple.
Socialism implies equality, yet the state signifies inequality --
inequality in terms of power. As we argued in section B.2, anarchists
consider one of the defining aspects of the state is its hierarchical
nature. In other words, the delegation of *power* into the hands of
a few. As such, it violates the core idea of socialism, namely
social equality. Those who make up the governing bodies in a state 
have more power than those who have elected them. 

Hence these comments by Malatesta and Hamon:

"It could be argued with much more reason that we are the most
logical and most complete socialists, since we demand for every
person not just his [or her] entire measure of the wealth of
society but also his [or her] portion of social power." [_No Gods,
No Masters_, vol. 2, p. 20]

It is with this perspective that anarchists have combated the idea
of state socialism and Marxism (although we should stress that
libertarian forms of Marxism, such as council communism, have
strong similarities to anarchism). This opposition to authoritarian
socialism is a core aspect of anarchism, an opposition which has
been consistent and strong. While it is sometimes argued by some 
on the right that libertarian socialists and anarchists only 
started voicing their opposition to Marxism and Leninism after 
the Soviet Union collapsed, the truth is totally different. 
Anarchists, we must stress, have been opposed to all forms of 
state socialism from the start (in the case of the Russian
Revolution, the anarchists were amongst the first on the left
to be suppressed by the Bolsheviks). Indeed, the history of Marxism 
is, in part, a history of its struggles against anarchists just
as the history of anarchism is also, in part, a history of its
struggle against the various forms of Marxism and its offshoots.
To state, or imply, that anarchists have only lately opposed
Marxism is false -- we have been arguing against Marxism since
the start. 

While both Stirner and Proudhon wrote many pages against the
evils and contradictions of state socialism, anarchists have
only really been fighting the Marxist form of state socialism
since Bakunin. This is because, until the First International,
Marx and Engels were relatively unknown socialist thinkers.
Proudhon was aware of Marx (they had meant in France in the
1840s and had corresponded) but Marxism was unknown in France
during his life time and so Proudhon did not directly argue
against Marxism (he did, however, critique Louis Blanc and
other French state socialists). Similarly, when Stirner wrote
_The Ego and Its Own_ Marxism did not exist bar a few works
by Marx and Engels. Indeed, it could be argued that Marxism
finally took shape after Marx had read Stirner's classic and
produced his notoriously inaccurate diatribe _The German
Ideology_ against him. However, like Proudhon, Stirner 
attacked *other* state socialists and communists.

Before discussing Bakunin's opposition and critique of Marxism
in the next section, we should consider the thoughts of
Stirner and Proudhon on state socialism. These critiques contain
may important ideas and so are worth summarising. However, 
it is worth noting that when both Stirner and Proudhon were 
writing communist ideas were all authoritarian in nature.
Libertarian communism only developed after Bakunin's death in
1876. This means that when Proudhon and Stirner were critiquing
"communism" they were attacking a specific form of communism,
the form which subordinated the individual to the community.
Anarchist communists like Kropotkin and Malatesta also opposed
such kinds of "communism" (as Kropotkin put it, "before and in 
1848" communism "was put forward in such a shape as to fully
account for Proudhon's distrust as to its effect upon liberty.
The old idea of Communism was the idea of monastic communities
. . . The last vestiges of liberty and of individual energy
would be destroyed, if humanity ever had to go through
such a communism." [_Act for Yourselves_, p. 98]). Of course,
it may be likely that Stirner and Proudhon would have rejected
libertarian communism as well, but bear in mind that not all
forms of "communism" are identical.

For Stirner, the key issue was that communism (or socialism),
like liberalism, looked to the "human" rather than the unique.
"To be looked upon as a mere *part*, part of society," asserted
Striner, "the individual cannot bear -- because he is *more*;
his uniqueness puts from it this limited conception." [_The
Ego and Its Own_, p. 265] As such, his protest against
communism was similar to his protest against liberalism 
(indeed, he drew attention to their similarity by calling
socialism and communism "social liberalism").

Stirner was aware that capitalism was not the great defender
of freedom it was claimed to be by its supporters. "Restless
acquisition," he argued, "does not let us take breath, take
a claim *enjoyment*: we do not get the comfort of our
possessions." Communism, by the "organisation of labour,"
can "bear its fruit" so that "we come to an agreement about
*human* labours, that they may not, as under competition,
claim all our time and toil." However, communism "is silent"
over "for whom is time to be gained." He, in contrast, stresses 
that it is for the individual, "[t]o take comfort in himself as 
the unique." [Op. Cit., pp. 268-9] Thus state socialism does 
not recognise that the purpose of association is to free the 
individual and instead subjects the individual to a new 
tyranny:

"it is not another State (such as a 'people's State') that
men aim at, but their *union,* uniting, this ever-fluid
uniting of everything standing -- A State exists even
without my co-operation . . . the independent establishment
of the State founds my lack of independence; its condition
as a 'natural growth,' its organism, demands that my nature
do not grow freely, but be cut to fit it." [Op. Cit., p. 224]

Similarly, Stirner argued that "Communism, by the abolition 
of all personal property, only presses me back still more 
into dependence on another, to wit, on the generality or
collectivity . . . [which is] a condition hindering my free
movement, a sovereign power over me. Communism rightly revolts
against the pressure that I experience from individual proprietors;
but still more horrible is the might that it puts in the hands of
the collectivity." [_The Ego and Its Own_, p. 257]

History has definitely confirmed this. By nationalising property,
the various state socialist regimes turned the worker from a 
servant of the capitalist into a serf of the state. In contrast, 
communist-anarchists argue for free association and workers' 
self-management as the means of ensuring that socialised 
property does not turn into the denial of freedom rather 
than as a means of ensuring it. As such, Stirner's attack
on what Marx termed "vulgar communism" is still important
and finds echoes in communist-anarchist writings as well as
the best works of Marx and his more libertarian followers.

To show the difference between the "communism" Stirner attacked
and anarchist-communism, we can show that Kropotkin was not 
"silent" on why organising production is essential. Like 
Stirner, he thought that under libertarian communism the 
individual would "discharge his [or her] task in the field, 
the factory, and so on, which he owes to society as his 
contribution to the general production. And he will employ 
the second half of his day, his week, or his year, to 
satisfy his artistic or scientific needs, or his hobbies." 
[_Conquest of Bread_, p. 111] In other words, he considered 
the whole point of organising labour as the means of providing 
the individual the time and resources required to express 
their individuality. As such, anarcho-communism incorporates
Stirner's legitimate concerns and arguments.

Similar arguments to Stirner's can be found in Proudhon's 
works against the various schemes of state socialism that 
existing in France in the middle of the nineteenth century. 
He particularly attacked the ideas of Louis Blanc. Blanc, 
whose most famous book was _Organisation du Travail_ 
(_Organisation of Work_, published in 1840) argued that 
social ills could be solved by means of government initiated 
and financed reforms. More specifically, he argued that it was
"necessary to use the whole power of the state" to ensure the
creation and success of workers' associations (or "social 
workshops"). Since that "which the proletarians lack to free 
themselves are the tools of labour," the government "must 
furnish them" with these. "The state," in short, "should place
itself resolutely at the head of industry." Capitalists would
be encouraged to invest money in these workshops, for which
they would be guaranteed interest. Such state-initiated workshops
would soon force privately owned industry to change itself
into social workshops, so eliminating competition. [quoted by 
K. Steven Vincent, _Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and the Rise
of French Republican Socialism_, p. 139]

Proudhon objected to this scheme on many levels. Firstly, he
argued that Blanc's scheme appealed "to the state for its silent
partnership; that is, he gets down on his knees before the
capitalists and recognises the sovereignty of monopoly."
Given that Proudhon saw the state as an instrument of the
capitalist class, asking that state to abolish capitalism
was illogical and impossible. Moreover, by getting the funds
for the "social workshop" from capitalists, Blanc's scheme
was hardly undermining their power. "Capital and power,"
Proudhon argued, "secondary organs of society, are always
the gods whom socialism adores; if capital and power did
not exist, it would invent them." [quoted by Vincent,
Op. Cit., p. 157] He stressed the authoritarian nature of
Blanc's scheme:

"M. Blanc is never tired of appealing to authority, and 
socialism loudly declares itself anarchistic; M. Blanc 
places power above society, and socialism tends to 
subordinate it to society; M. Blanc makes social life 
descend from above, and socialism maintains that it 
springs up and grows from below; M. Blanc runs after 
politics, and socialism is in quest of science. No more 
hypocrisy, let me say to M. Blanc: you desire neither 
Catholicism nor monarchy nor nobility, but you must 
have a God, a religion, a dictatorship, a censorship, a 
hierarchy, distinctions, and ranks. For my part, I deny 
your God, your authority, your sovereignty, your judicial 
State, and all your representative mystifications."
[_System of Economical Contradictions_]

Equally, Proudhon opposed the "top-down" nature of Blanc's
ideas. Instead of reform from above, Proudhon stressed the 
need for working class people to organise themselves for their
own liberation. As he put it, the "problem before the labouring 
classes . . . [is] not in capturing, but in subduing both 
power and monopoly, -- that is, in generating from the bowels 
of the people, from the depths of labour, a greater authority, 
a more potent fact, which shall envelop capital and the state 
and subjugate them." For, "to combat and reduce power, to 
put it in its proper place in society, it is of no use to 
change the holders of power or introduce some variation into 
its workings: an agricultural and industrial combination must 
be found by means of which power, today the ruler of society, 
shall become its slave." [_System of Economical Contradictions_, 
p. 398 and p. 397] Proudhon stressed in 1848 that "the 
proletariat must emancipate itself without the help of 
the government." [quoted by George Woodcock, _Pierre-Joseph 
Proudhon: A Biography_, p. 125] This was because the state 
"finds itself inevitably enchained to capital and directed 
against the proletariat." [Proudhon, _System of Economical 
Contradictions_, p. 399] In addition, by guaranteeing interest 
payments, Blanc's scheme insured the continued exploitation of 
labour by capital. 

Proudhon, in contrast, argued for a two-way approach to 
undermining capitalism from below: the creation of workers 
associations and the organisation of credit. By creating mutual 
banks, which provided credit at cost, workers could create 
associations to compete with capitalist firms, drive them
out of business and so eliminate exploitation once and for 
all by workers' self-management. In this way, the working class
would emancipate itself from capitalism and build a socialist
society from below upwards by their own efforts and activities.
Proudhon, as Marxist Paul Thomas notes, "believed fervently
. . . in the salvation of working men, by their own efforts,
through economic and social action alone . . . Proudhon
advocated, and to a considerable extent inspired, the
undercutting of this terrain [of the state] from without
by means of autonomous working-class associations." [_Karl
Marx and the Anarchists_, pp. 177-8]

Rejecting violent revolution (and, indeed, strikes as counter
productive) he argued for economic means to end economic
exploitation and, as such, he saw anarchism come about by
reform via competition by workers' associations displacing
capitalist industry (unlike later anarchists, who were 
revolutionaries that argued that capitalism cannot be 
reformed away and so supported strikes and other forms of
collective working class direct action, struggle and 
combative organisation). Given that the bulk of the French 
working class was artisans and peasants, such an approach 
reflected the social context in which it was proposed. 

It was this social context, this predominance of peasants
and artisans in French society which informed Proudhon's
ideas. He never failed to stress that association would be 
tyranny if imposed upon peasants and artisans (rather, he
thought that associations would be freely embraced by these
workers if they thought it was in their interests to). He also 
stressed that state ownership of the means of production 
was a danger to the liberty of the industrial worker and,
moreover, the continuation of capitalism with the state as
the new boss. As he put it in 1848, he "did not want to see
the State confiscate the mines, canals and railways; that
would add to monarchy, and more wage slavery. We want the
mines, canals, railways handed over to democratically
organised workers' associations . . . these associations
[will] be models for agriculture, industry and trade,
the pioneering core of that vast federation of companies
and societies woven into the common cloth of the
democratic social Republic." [_No Gods, No Masters_,
vol. 1, p. 62] Workers' associations would be applied for 
those industries which objectively needed it (i.e. 
capitalist industry) and for those other toilers who 
desired it. 

Marx, of course, had replied to Proudhon's work _System of 
Economic Contradictions_ with his _Poverty of Philosophy_. 
Marx's work aroused little interest when published, although 
Proudhon did carefully read and annotate his copy of Marx's 
work, claiming it to be "a libel" and a "tissue of abuse, 
calumny, falsification and plagiarism" (he even called Marx
"the tapeworm of Socialism.") [quoted by George Woodcock, 
_Proudhon_, p. 102] Sadly, Proudhon did not reply to Marx's 
work due to an acute family crisis and then the start of 
the 1848 revolution in France. However, given his views of 
Louis Blanc and other socialists who saw socialism being 
introduced after the seizing of state power, he would hardly 
have been supportive of Marx's ideas. 

So while none of Proudhon's and Stirner's arguments are 
directly aimed at Marxism, their ideas are applicable
to much of mainstream Marxism as this inherited many of
the ideas of the state socialism they attacked. Thus they 
both made forceful critiques of the socialist and communist 
ideas that existed during their lives. Much of their analysis 
was incorporated in the collectivist and communist ideas of 
the anarchists that followed them (some directly, as from 
Proudhon, some by co-incidence as Stirner's work was quickly 
forgotten and only had an impact on the anarchist movement 
when George Henry MacKay rediscovered it in the 1890s). This
can be seen from the fact that Proudhon's ideas on the management 
of production by workers' associations, opposition to 
nationalisation as state-capitalism and the need for action 
from below, by working people themselves, all found their place 
in communist-anarchism and anarcho-syndicalism and in their
critique of mainstream Marxism (such as social democracy) and 
Leninism.

Echoes of these critiques can be found Bakunin's comments of
1868:

"I hate Communism because it is the negation of liberty
and because for me humanity is unthinkable without 
liberty. I am not a Communist, because Communism 
concentrates and swallows up in itself for the benefit
of the State all the forces of society, because it
inevitably leads to the concentration of property in
the hands of the State . . . I want to see society
and collective or social property organised from below
upwards, by way of free associations, not from above
downwards, by means of any kind of authority whatsoever
. . . That is the sense in which I am a Collectivist
and not a Communist." [quoted by K.J. Kenafick,
_Michael Bakunin and Karl Marx_, pp. 67-8]

It is with Bakunin that Marxism and Anarchism came into direct
conflict. It was Bakunin who lead the struggle against Marx 
in the _International Workingmen's Association_ between 1868 
and 1872. It was in these exchanges that the two schools of
socialism (the libertarian and the authoritarian) clarified
themselves. With Bakunin, the anarchist critique of Marxism 
(and state socialism in general) starts to reach its finalised
form. Needless to say, this critique continued to develop
after Bakunin's death (particularly after the experiences
of actual Marxist movements and revolutions). However, much
of this involved expanding upon many of Bakunin's original
predictions and analyses.

We will discuss Bakunin's critique in the next section.

H.1.1 What was Bakunin's critique of Marxism?

Bakunin and Marx famously clashed in the first _International
Working Men's Association_ between 1868 and 1872. This 
conflict helped clarify the anarchist opposition to the ideas
of Marxism and can be considered as the first major theoretical
analysis and critique of Marxism by anarchists. Later critiques
followed, of course, particularly after the degeneration of
Social Democracy into reformism and the failure of the Russian 
Revolution (both of which allowed the theoretical critiques to 
be enriched by empirical evidence) but the Bakunin/Marx conflict 
laid the ground for what came after. As such, an overview of
Bakunin's critique is essential.

First, however, we must stress that Marx and Bakunin had many
similar ideas. They both stressed the need for working people
to organise themselves to overthrow capitalism. They both argued
for a socialist revolution from below. They argued for collective
ownership of the means of production. They both constantly stressed
that the emancipation of the workers must be the task of the
workers themselves. They differed, of course, in exactly how
these common points should be implemented in practice. Both,
moreover, had a tendency to misrepresent the opinions of the
other on certain issues (particularly as the struggle reached
its climax). Anarchists, unsurprisingly, argue Bakunin has been 
proved right by history, so confirming the key aspects of his 
critique of Marx.

So what was Bakunin's critique of Marxism? There are five main
areas. Firstly, there is the question of current activity (i.e. 
whether the workers' movement should participate in "politics"
and the nature of revolutionary working class organisation).
Secondly, there is the issue of the form of the revolution (i.e.
whether it should be a political *then* an economic one, or
whether it should be both at the same time). Thirdly, there 
is the issue of the "dictatorship of the proletariat." Fourthly, 
there is the question of whether political power *can* be seized 
by the working class as a whole or whether it can only be 
exercised by a small minority. Fifthly, there was the issue 
of whether the revolution be centralised or decentralised in 
nature. We shall discuss each in turn.

On the issue of current struggle, the differences between Marx
and Bakunin were clear. For Marx, the proletariat had to take
part in bourgeois elections as an organised political party.
As the resolution of the (gerrymandered) Hague Congress of
First International put it, "[i]n its struggle against the
collective power of the possessing classes the proletariat
can act as a class only by constituting itself a distinct
political party, opposed to all the old parties formed by
the possessing classes . . . the conquest of political
power becomes the great duty of the proletariat." [Marx,
Engels, Lenin, _Anarchism and Anarcho-Syndicalism_, p. 85]

This political party must stand for elections and win 
votes. As Marx argued in the preamble of the French Workers' 
Party, the workers must turn the franchise "from a means of 
deception . . . into an instrument of emancipation." This 
can be considered as part of the process outlined in the 
_Communist Manifesto_, where it was argued that the 
"immediate aim of the Communists is the same as that of 
all the other proletarian parties," namely the "conquest 
of political power by the proletariat," the "first step
in the revolution by the working class" being "to raise
the proletariat to the position of ruling class, to win
the battle of democracy." Engels latter stressed (in 1895) 
that the "_Communist Manifesto_ had already proclaimed the 
winning of universal suffrage, of democracy, as one of the 
first and most important tasks of the militant proletariat" 
and that German Social Democracy had showed workers of all 
countries "how to make use of universal suffrage." [_Marx 
and Engels Reader_, p. 566, p. 484, p. 490 and p. 565]

With this analysis in mind, Marxist influenced political
parties have consistently argued for and taken part in
election campaigns, seeking office as a means of spreading
socialist ideas and as a means of pursuing the socialist
revolution. The Social Democratic parties which were the
first Marxist parties (and which developed under Marx
and Engels watchful eyes) saw revolution in terms of 
winning a majority within Parliamentary elections and 
using this political power to abolish capitalism (once
this was done, the state would "wither away" as classes
would no longer exist). In effect, these parties aimed to 
reproduce Marx's account of the forming of the Paris 
Commune on the level of the national Parliament. Marx 
in his justly famous work _The Civil War in France_ 
reported how the Commune "was formed of the municipal 
councillors" who had been "chosen by universal suffrage 
in the various wards of the town" in the municipal 
elections held on March 26th, 1871. This new Commune 
then issued a series of decrees which reformed the 
existing state (for example, by suppressing the 
standing army and replacing it with the armed people,
and so on). This Marx summarised by stating that "the
working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made
state machinery, and wield it for its own purposed."
[Marx and Engels, _Selected Works_, p. 287 and p. 285]

As Engels put it in a latter letter, it was "simply a 
question of showing that the victorious proletariat 
must first refashion the old bureaucratic, 
administratively centralised state power before 
it can use it for its own purposes." [quoted by 
David P. Perrin, _The Socialist Party of Great Britain_, 
p. 64] He repeated this elsewhere, arguing that "after the
victory of the Proletariat, the only organisation
the victorious working class finds *ready-made* for
use is that of the State. It may require adaptation to
the new functions. But to destroy that at such a moment
would mean to destroy the only organism by means of which
the victorious working class can exert its newly conquered
power, keep down its capitalist enemies and carry out . . .
economic revolution." [our emphasis, Marx, Engels and 
Lenin, _Anarchism and Anarcho-Syndicalism_, p. 173]

Bakunin, in contrast, argued that while the communists
"imagine they can attain their goal by the development
and organisation of the political power of the working
classes . . . aided by bourgeois radicalism" anarchists
"believe they can succeed only through the development
and organisation of the non-political or anti-political
power of the working classes." The Communists "believe 
it necessary to organise the workers' forces in order 
to seize the political power of the State," while
anarchists "organise for the purpose of destroying 
it." Bakunin saw this in terms of creating new organs
of working class power in opposition to the state,
organised "from the bottom up, by the free association
or federation of workers, starting with the associations,
then going on to the communes, the region, the nations,
and, finally, culminating in a great international
and universal federation." [_Bakunin on Anarchism_,
pp. 262-3 and p. 270] In other words, a system of
workers' councils. As such, he constantly argued for 
workers, peasants and artisans to organise into unions 
and join the _International Workingmen's Association_, 
so becoming "a real force . . . which knows what to do 
and is therefore capable of guiding the revolution in 
the direction marked out by the aspirations of the 
people: a serious international organisation of workers' 
associations of all lands capable of replacing this 
departing world of *states.*" [Op. Cit., p. 174] 

To Marx's argument that workers should organise politically,
and send their representations to Parliament, Bakunin argued 
that when "the workers . . . send common workers . . . to 
Legislative Assemblies . . . The worker-deputies, transplanted 
into a bourgeois environment, into an atmosphere of purely 
bourgeois ideas, will in fact cease to be workers and, 
becoming Statesmen, they will become bourgeois . . . For men 
do not make their situations; on the contrary, men are made 
by them." [_The Basic Bakunin_, p. 108]

As far as history goes, the experience of Social Democracy
confirmed Bakunin's analysis. A few years after Engels death
in 1895, German Social Democracy was racked by the "revisionism"
debate. This debate did not spring from the minds of a few
leaders, isolated from the movement, but rather expressed 
developments *within* the movement itself. In effect, the
revisionists wanted to adjust the party rhetoric to what the 
party was actually doing and so the battle against the revisionists
basically represented a battle between what the party said it
was doing and its actual practice. As one of the most distinguished 
historians of this period put it, the "distinction between the 
contenders remained largely a subjective one, a difference of 
ideas in the evaluation of reality rather than a difference in 
the realm of action." [C. Schorske, _German Social Democracy_, 
p. 38] Even Rosa Luxemburg (one of the fiercest critics of 
revisionism) acknowledged in _Reform or Revolution_ that it 
was "the final goal of socialism [that] constitutes the only 
decisive factor distinguishing the social democratic movement 
from bourgeois democracy and bourgeois radicalism." [_Rosa 
Luxemburg Speaks_, p. 36] As such, the Marxist critics of 
"revisionism" failed to place the growth in revisionist ideas
in the tactics being used, instead seeing it in terms of a 
problem in ideas. By the start of the First World War, the 
Social Democrats had become so corrupted by its activities in
bourgeois institutions it supported its state (and ruling class)
and voted for war credits rather than denounce the war as 
Imperialist slaughter for profits (see also section J.2.6 for 
more discussion on the effect of electioneering on radical
parties). Clearly, Bakunin was proved right.

However, we must stress that because Bakunin rejected 
participating in bourgeois politics, it did not mean 
that he rejected "politics" or "political struggle" in 
general (also see section J.2.10). As he put it, "it is 
absolutely impossible to ignore political and philosophical 
questions" and "the proletariat itself will pose them" in 
the International. He argued that political struggle will 
come from the class struggle, as "[w]ho can deny that out 
of this ever-growing organisation of the militant 
solidarity of the proletariat against bourgeois 
exploitation there will issue forth the political 
struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie?" 
Anarchists simply thought that the "policy of the 
proletariat" should be "the destruction of the State" 
rather than working within it. [_Bakunin on Anarchism_, 
p. 301, p. 302 and p. 276] As such, the people "must 
organise their powers apart from and against the State." 
[_The Political Philosophy of Bakunin_, p. 376] 

As should be obvious by now, the difference between Marx
and Bakunin on the nature of working class organisation
in the struggle reflected these differences on political
struggle. Bakunin clearly advocated what would later
by termed a syndicalist strategy based on direct action 
(in particular strikes) and workers' unions which would 
"bear in themselves the living seeds of the new society 
which is to replace the old world. They are creating not 
only the ideas, but also the facts of the future itself." 
[_Bakunin on Anarchism_, p. 255] This union movement would 
be complemented by a specific anarchist organisation which 
would work within it to influence it towards anarchist aims 
by the "natural influence" of its members (see section 
J.3.7 for a fuller discussion of this). Marx argued for 
political parties, utilising elections, which, as the 
history of Social Democracy indicates, did not have quite 
the outcome Marx would have liked. Section J.2 discusses
direct action, electioneering and whether anarchist
abstentionism implies disinterest in politics in more
detail.

Which brings us to the second issue, namely the nature
of the revolution itself. For Bakunin, a revolution meant 
a *social* revolution from below. This involved both the 
abolition of the state *and* the expropriation of capital. 
In his words, "the revolution must set out from the first
[to] radically and totally to destroy the State." The 
"natural and necessary consequences" of which will be
the "confiscation of all productive capital and means
of production on behalf of workers' associations, who
are to put them to collective use . . . the federative
Alliance of all working men's associations . . . will
constitute the Commune." There "can no longer be any
successful political . . . revolution unless the 
political revolution is transformed into social
revolution." [_Michael Bakunin: Selected Writings_,
p. 170 and p. 171] 

Which, incidentally, disproves Engels' claims that Bakunin 
considered "the *state* as the main evil to be abolished." 
[_Marx and Engels Reader_, p. 728] Clearly, Engels assertions 
misrepresent Bakunin's position, as Bakunin always stressed 
that economic and political transformation should occur at 
the same time during the revolutionary process. Given that 
Bakunin thought the state was the protector of capitalism, 
no economic change could be achieved until such time as it 
was abolished. This also meant that Bakunin considered a 
political revolution before an economic one to mean the 
continued slavery of the workers. As he argued, "[t]o win
political freedom first can signify no other thing but to
win this freedom only, leaving for the first days at least
economic and social relations in the same old state, --
that is, leaving the proprietors and capitalists with
their insolent wealth, and the workers with their poverty."
[_The Political Philosophy of Bakunin_, p. 294] With
capitalists' economic power intact, could the workers' 
*political* power remain strong? As such, "every political
revolution taking place prior to and consequently without
a social revolution must necessarily be a bourgeois 
revolution, and a bourgeois revolution can only be 
instrumental in bringing about bourgeois Socialism 
-- that is, it is bound to end in a new, more hypocritical
and more skilful, but no less oppressive, exploitation
of the proletariat by the bourgeois." [Op. Cit., p. 289]

Did Marx and Engels hold this position? Apparently so. Discussing 
the Paris Commune, Marx noted that it was "the political form
at last discovered under which to work out the economic
emancipation of labour," and as the "political rule of the
producer cannot coexist with the perpetuation of his social
slavery" the Commune was to "serve as a lever for uprooting the
economic foundations upon which rests the existence of classes." 
[Marx and Engels, _Selected Writings_, p. 290] Engels argued 
that the "proletariat seizes the public power, and by means 
of this transforms the . . . means of production . . . into
public property." [_The Marx-Engels Reader_, p. 717] In the 
_Communist Manifesto_ they argued that "the first step in 
the revolution by the working class" is the "rais[ing] the 
proletariat to the position of ruling class, to win the 
battle of democracy." The proletariat "will use its political 
supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeois, 
to centralise all instruments of production in the hands of 
the State, i.e. of the proletariat organised as the ruling 
class." [_Manifesto of the Communist Party_, p. 52]

Similarly, when Marx discussed what the "dictatorship of the 
proletariat" meant, he argued (in reply to Bakunin's question 
of "over whom will the proletariat rule") that it simply meant 
"that so long  as other classes continue to exist, the 
capitalist class in particular, the proletariat fights it 
(for with the coming of the proletariat to power, its 
enemies will not yet have disappeared), it must use 
measures of *force*, hence governmental measures; if it
itself still remains a class and the economic conditions on
which the class struggle and the existence of classes have not
yet disappeared, they must be forcibly removed or transformed,
and the process of their transformation must be forcibly
accelerated." [_The Marx-Engels Reader_, pp. 542-3] Note, 
"capitalists," not "former capitalists," so implying that 
the members of the proletariat are, in fact, still 
proletariats after the "socialist" revolution and so still
subject to wage slavery by capitalists. 
 
Clearly, then, Marx and Engels considered the seizing of 
state power as the key event and, later, the expropriation 
of the expropriators would occur. Thus the economic power of 
the capitalists would remain, with the proletariat utilising 
political power to combat and reduce it. Anarchists argue that
if the proletariat did not hold economic power, its political 
power would at best be insecure and would in fact degenerate. 
Would the capitalists just sit and wait while their economic 
power was gradually eliminated by political action? And what 
of the proletariat during this period? Will they patiently
obey their bosses, continue to be oppressed and exploited 
by them until such time as the end of their "social slavery"
has been worked out (and by whom)? As the experience of the 
Russian Revolution showed, Marx and Engels position proved to
be untenable. 

As we discuss in more detail in section H.6, the Russian
workers initially followed Bakunin's path. After the 
February revolution, they organised factory committees 
and raised the idea and practice of workers self-management 
of production. The Russian anarchists supported this movement 
whole-heartedly, arguing that it should be pushed as far as
it would go. In contrast, Lenin argued for "workers' control 
over the capitalists." [_Will the Bolsheviks Maintain Power?_, 
p. 52] This was, unsurprisingly, the policy applied immediately 
after the Bolshevik seizure of power. However, as one Leninist 
writer admits, "[t]wo overwhelmingly powerful forces obliged 
the Bolsheviks to abandon this 'reformist' course." One was 
the start of the civil war, the other "was the fact that the 
capitalists used their remaining power to make the system 
unworkable. At the end of 1917 the All Russian Congress of 
employers declared that those 'factories in which the control 
is exercised by means of active interference in the administration 
will be closed.' The workers' natural response to the wave of 
lockouts which followed was to demand that their [sic!] state 
nationalise the factories." [John Rees, "In Defence of 
October", pp. 3-82, _International Socialism_, no. 52,
p. 42] By July 1918, only one-fifth of nationalised firms 
had been nationalised by the central government (which,
incidentally, shows the unresponsiveness of centralised
power). Clearly, the idea that a social revolution can come
after a political was shown to be a failure -- the capitalist
class used its powers to disrupt the economic life of Russia.

Faced with the predictable opposition by capitalists to their
system of "control" the Bolsheviks nationalised the means of
production. Sadly, *within* the nationalised workplace the 
situation of the worker remained essentially unchanged. 
Lenin had been arguing for one-man management (appointed
from above and armed with "dictatorial" powers) since late 
April 1918. This aimed at replacing the capitalist managers
with state managers, *not* workers self-management:

"On three occasions in the first months of Soviet power, 
the [factory] committees leaders sought to bring their 
model [of workers' self-management of the economy] into 
being. At each point the party leadership overruled them. 
The Bolshevik alternative was to vest both managerial *and* 
control powers in organs of the state which were subordinate 
to the central authorities, and formed by them." [Thomas F. 
Remington, _Building Socialism in Bolshevik Russia_, p. 38] 

Bakunin's fear of what would happen if a political revolution 
preceded a social one came true. The working class continued 
to be exploited and oppressed as before, first by the 
bourgeoisie and then by the new bourgeoisie of state appointed 
managers armed with all the powers of the old ones (plus a few 
more). Russia confirmed Bakunin's analysis that a revolution 
must immediately combine political and economic goals in order 
for it to be successful. 

Which brings us to the "dictatorship of the proletariat." While 
many Marxists basically use this term to describe the defence 
of the revolution and so argue that anarchists do not see the
need to defend a revolution, this is incorrect. Anarchists 
from Bakunin onwards have argued that a revolution would have 
to defend itself from counter revolution and yet we reject the 
term totally (see sections H.2.1, I.5.14 and J.7.6 for a 
refutation of claims that anarchists think a revolution does 
not need defending). So why did Bakunin reject the concept? To 
understand why, we must provide some historical context -- 
namely the fact that at the time he was writing the 
proletariat was a minority of the working masses. 

Simply put, anarchists in the nineteenth century rejected
the idea of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" simply
because the proletariat was a *minority* of working
people at the time. As such, to argue for a dictatorship 
of the proletariat meant to argue for the dictatorship 
of a *minority* class, a class which excluded the majority 
of toiling people. When Marx and Engels wrote the _Communist 
Manifesto_, for example, over 80% of the population of France 
and Germany were peasants or artisans -- what Marx termed 
the "petit-bourgeois" and his followers termed the 
"petty-bourgeois." This fact meant that the comment in 
the _Communist Manifesto_ that the "proletarian movement
is the self-conscious, independent movement of the immense
majority, in the interests of the immense majority" was
simply not true. Rather, for Marx's life-time (and for
many decades afterwards) the proletarian movement was
like "[a]ll previous movements," namely "movements of
minorities, or in the interests of minorities." [_The
Marx-Engels Reader_, p. 482]

Not that Marx and Engels were unaware of this. In the
Manifesto they note that "[i]n countries like France" 
the peasants "constitute far more than half of the
population." In his famous 1875 work "Critique of the 
Gotha Program," Marx noted that "the majority of the 
'toiling people' in Germany consists of peasants, and 
not of proletarians." He stressed elsewhere around the 
same time that "the peasant . . . forms a more of less 
considerable majority . . . in the countries of the West 
European continent." [Op. Cit., p. 493, p. 536 and p. 543] 

Clearly, then, Marx and Engels vision of proletarian
revolution was one which involved a minority dictating
to the majority. As such, Bakunin rejected the concept.
He was simply pointing out the fact that a "dictatorship 
of the proletariat," at the time, actually meant a 
dictatorship by a *minority* of working people and 
so a "revolution" which excluded the majority of 
working people (i.e. artisans and peasants). As he
argued in 1873:

"If the proletariat is to be the ruling class . . .
then whom will it rule? There must be yet another
proletariat which will be subject to this new rule,
this new state. It may be the peasant rabble . . .
which, finding itself on a lower cultural level,
will probably be governed by the urban and factory
proletariat." [_Statism and Anarchy_, pp. 177-8]

Bakunin continually stressed that the peasants "will
join cause with the city workers as soon as they
become convinced that the latter do not pretend to
impose their will or some political or social order
invented by the cities for the greater happiness of
the villages; they will join cause as soon as they
are assured that the industrial workers will not
take their lands away." As such, as noted above,
while the Marxists aimed for the "development and 
organisation of the political power of the working 
classes, and chiefly of the city proletariat," 
anarchists aimed for "the social (and therefore 
anti-political) organisation and power of the 
working masses of the cities and villages." 
[_The Political Philosophy of Bakunin_, p. 401 
and p. 300]

For Bakunin, to advocate the "dictatorship of the
proletariat" in an environment where the vast majority
of working people were peasants would be a disaster.
It is only when we understand this social context that 
we can understand Bakunin's opposition to Marx's 
"dictatorship of the proletariat" -- it would be a 
dictatorship of a minority class over the rest of
the working population (he took it as a truism
that the capitalist and landlord classes should 
be expropriated and stopped from destroying the
revolution!). For Bakunin, when the industrial
working class was a minority, it was essential to 
"[o]rganise the city proletariat in the name of 
revolutionary Socialism, and in doing this, unite it 
into one preparatory organisation together with the 
peasantry. An uprising by the proletariat alone would 
not be enough; with that we would have only a political
revolution which would necessarily produce a natural 
and legitimate reaction on the part of the peasants, 
and that reaction, or merely the indifference of the 
peasants, would strangle the revolution of the cities." 
[Op. Cit., p. 378] 

This explains why the anarchists at the St. Imier
Congress argued that "every political state can
be nothing but organised domination for the benefit
of one class, to the detriment of the masses, and
that should the proletariat itself seize power, it
would in turn become a new dominating and exploiting
class." As the proletariat was a minority class at 
the time, their concerns can be understood. For
anarchists then, and now, a social revolution has
to be truly popular and involve the majority of
the population in order to succeed. Unsurprisingly,
the congress stressed the role of the proletariat
in the struggle for socialism, arguing that "the
proletariat of all lands . . . must create the
solidarity of revolutionary action . . . independently
of and in opposition to all forms of bourgeois
politics." Moreover, the aim of the workers'
movement was "free organisations and federations
. . . created by the spontaneous action of the
proletariat itself, [that is, by] the trade
bodies and the autonomous communes." [as cited in 
_Bakunin on Anarchism_, p. 438, p. 439 and p. 438]

Hence Bakunin's comment that "the designation of
the proletariat, the world of the workers, as 
*class* rather than as *mass*" was "deeply 
antipathetic to us revolutionary anarchists who
unconditionally advocate full popular emancipation."
To do so, he argued, meant "[n]othing more or less than
a new aristocracy, that of the urban and industrial
workers, to the exclusion of the millions who make
up the rural proletariat and who . . . will in effect
become subjects of this great so-called popular
State." [_Michael Bakunin: Selected Writings_, 
pp. 253-4]

Again, the experiences of the Russian Revolution tend
to confirm Bakunin's worries. The Bolsheviks implemented
the dictatorship of the city over the countryside, with
disastrous results (see section H.6 for more details).

One last point on this subject. While anarchists reject 
the "dictatorship of the proletariat" we clearly do not 
reject the key role the proletariat must play in any social 
revolution (see section H.2.2 on why the Marxist assertion 
anarchists reject class struggle is false). We only reject 
the idea that the proletariat must dictate over other 
working people like peasants and artisans. We do not reject
the need for working class people to defend a revolution,
nor the need for them to expropriate the capitalist class
nor for them to manage their own activities and so society.

Then there is the issue of whether, even if the proletariat 
*does* seize political power, whether the whole proletariat 
can actually exercise it. Bakunin raising the obvious
questions: 

"For, even from the standpoint of that urban proletariat
who are supposed to reap the sole reward of the seizure
of political power, surely it is obvious that this power
will never be anything but a sham? It is bound to be
impossible for a few thousand, let alone tens or hundreds
of thousands of men to wield that power effectively. It
will have to be exercised by proxy, which means entrusting
it to a group of men elected to represent and govern them,
which in turn will unfailingly return them to all the
deceit and subservience of representative or bourgeois
rule. After a brief flash of liberty or orgiastic 
revolution, the citizens of the new State will wake up
slaves, puppets and victims of a new group of ambitious
men." [Op. Cit., pp. 254-5]

He repeated this argument in _Statism and Anarchy_, where
he asked "[w]hat does it mean, 'the proletariat raised to
a governing class?' Will the entire proletariat head the
government? The Germans number about 40 million. Will all
40 millions be members of the government? The entire nation
will rule, but no one will be ruled. Then there will be
no government, no state; but if there is a state, there
will also be those who are ruled, there will be slaves."
Bakunin argued that Marxism resolves this dilemma "in a
simple fashion. By popular government they mean government
of the people by a small number of representatives elected
by the people. So-called popular representatives and rulers
of the state elected by the entire nation on the basis
of universal suffrage -- the last word of the Marxists,
as well as the democratic school -- is a lie behind which
lies the despotism of a ruling minority is concealed, a
lie all the more dangerous in that it represents itself
as the expression of a sham popular will." [_Statism and
Anarchy_, p. 178]

So where does Marx stand on this question. Clearly, the 
self-proclaimed followers of Marx support the idea of 
"socialist" governments (indeed, many, including Lenin and 
Trotsky, went so far as to argue that party dictatorship 
was essential for the success of a revolution -- see next 
section). Marx, however, is less clear. He argued, in 
reply to Bakunin's question if all Germans would be 
members of the government, that "[c]ertainly, because the 
thing starts with the self-government of the township." 
However, he also commented that "[c]an it really be 
that in a trade union, for example, the entire union forms 
its executive committee," suggesting that there *will* be 
a division of labour between those who govern and those who 
obey in the Marxist system of socialism. [_The Marx-Engels 
Reader_, p. 545 and p. 544] Elsewhere he talks about "a 
socialist government . . . com[ing] into power in a country." 
["Letter to F. Domela-Nieuwenhuis," Eugene Schulkind (ed.),
_The Paris Commune of 1871: The View from the Left_, p. 244]

As such, Bakunin's critique holds, as Marx and Engels clearly 
saw the "dictatorship of the proletariat" involving a socialist
government having power. For Bakunin, like all anarchists, 
if a political party is the government, then clearly they 
are in power, not the mass of working people they claim 
to represent. Anarchists have, from the beginning, argued 
that Marx made a grave mistake confusing workers' power 
with the state. This is because the state is the means 
by which the management of people's affairs is taken 
from them and placed into the hands of a few. It 
signifies delegated *power.* As such, the so-called 
"workers' state" or "dictatorship of the proletariat" 
is a contradiction in terms. Instead of signifying the 
power of the working class to manage society it, in 
fact, signifies the opposite, namely the handing over 
of that power to a few party leaders at the top of a 
centralised structure. This is because "all State rule,
all governments being by their very nature placed outside
the people, must necessarily seek to subject it to customs
and purposes entirely foreign to it. We therefore declare
ourselves to be foes . . . of all State organisations as
such, and believe that the people can be happy and free,
when, organised from below upwards by means of its own
autonomous and completely free associations, without the
supervision of any guardians, it will create its own life."
[_Marxism, Freedom and the State_, p. 63] Hence Bakunin's 
constant arguments for decentralised, federal system of 
workers councils organised from the bottom-up. Again,
the transformation of the Bolshevik government into a
dictatorship *over* the proletariat during the early
stages of the Russian Revolution supports Bakunin's
critique of Marxism.

Which brings us to the last issue, namely whether the revolution
will be decentralised or centralised. For Marx, the issue is
somewhat confused by his support for the Paris Commune and its
federalist programme (written, we must note, by a follower of 
Proudhon). However, in 1850, Marx stood for extreme 
centralisation of power. As he put it, the workers "must not
only strive for a single and indivisible German republic, but
also within this republic for the most determined centralisation
of power in the hands of the state authority." He argued that
in a nation like Germany "where there is so many relics of the
Middle Ages to be abolished" it "must under no circumstances
be permitted that every village, every town and every province
should put a new obstacle in the path of revolutionary activity,
which can proceed with full force from the centre." He stressed
that "[a]s in France in 1793 so today in Germany it is the
task of the really revolutionary party to carry through the
strictest centralisation." [_The Marx-Engels Reader_, 
p. 509-10] Lenin followed this aspect of Marx's ideas,
arguing that "Marx was a centralist" and applying this
perspective both in the party and once in power [_The 
Essential Works of Lenin_, p. 310]

Ironically, it is Engels note to the 1885 edition of Marx's work
which shows the fallacy of this position. As he put it, "this
passage is based on a misunderstanding" and it "is now . . . 
[a] well known fact that throughout the whole revolution . . . 
the whole administration of the departments, arrondissements
and communes consisted of authorities elected by the respective
constituents themselves, and that these authorities acted with
complete freedom . . . that precisely this provincial and
local self-government . . . became the most powerful lever
of the revolution." [_The Marx-Engels Reader_, p. 510f] Marx's 
original comments imply the imposition of freedom by the centre 
on a population not desiring it (and in such a case, how could
the centre be representative of the majority in such a case?).
Moreover, how could a revolution be truly social if it was
not occurring in the grassroots across a country? Unsurprisingly,
local autonomy has played a key role in every real revolution.

As such, Bakunin has been proved right. Centralism has always
killed a revolution and, as he always argued, real socialism 
can only be worked from below, by the people of every village, 
town, and city. The problems facing the world or a revolution 
cannot be solved by a few people at the top issuing decrees. 
They can only be solved by the active participation of the 
mass of working class people, the kind of participation 
centralism and government by their nature exclude. As such,
this dove-tails into the question of whether the whole class
exercises power under the "dictatorship of the proletariat."
In a centralised system, obviously, power *has to be* exercised
by a few (as Marx's argument in 1850 showed). Centralism, by 
its very nature excludes the possibility of extensive 
participation in the decision making process. Moreover, 
the decisions reached by such a body could not reflect 
the real needs of society. In the words of Bakunin:

"What man, what group of individuals, no matter how great their
genius, would dare to think themselves able to embrace and 
understand the plethora of interests, attitudes and activities
so various in every country, every province, locality and
profession." [_Michael Bakunin: Selected Writings_, p. 240]

He stressed that "the revolution should be and should everywhere
remain independent of the central point, which must be its
expression and product -- not its source, guide and cause . . .
the awakening of all local passions and the awakening of
spontaneous life at all points, must be well developed in 
order for the revolution to remain alive, real and powerful." 
[Op. Cit., pp. 179-80] This, we must stress, does not imply 
isolation. Bakunin always stressed the importance of federal 
organisation to co-ordinate struggle and defence of the revolution. 
As he put it, all revolutionary communes would need to federate 
in order "to organise the necessary common services and
arrangements for production and exchange, to establish the
charter of equality, the basis of all liberty -- a charter
utterly negative in character, defining what has to be
abolished for ever rather than the positive forms of
local life which can be created only by the living 
practice of each locality -- and to organise common
defence against the enemies of the Revolution." [Op. Cit.,
p. 179]

In short, anarchists should "not accept, even in the 
process of revolutionary transition, either constituent 
assemblies, provisional governments or so-called revolutionary 
dictatorships; because we are convinced that revolution 
is only sincere, honest and real in the hands of the masses, 
and that when it is concentrated in those of a few ruling 
individuals it inevitably and immediately becomes reaction." 
Rather, the revolution "everywhere must be created by the
people, and supreme control must always belong to the people
organised into a free federation of agricultural and 
industrial associations . . . organised from the bottom 
upwards by means of revolutionary delegation". [Op. Cit., 
p. 237 and p. 172]

Given Marx's support for the federal ideas of the Paris Commune, 
it can be argued that Marxism is not committed to a policy of 
strict centralisation (although Lenin, of course, argued that
Marx *was* a firm supporter of centralisation). What is true 
is, to quote Daniel Guerin, that Marx's comments on the Commune 
differ "noticeably from Marx's writings of before and after
1871" while Bakunin's were "in fact quite consistent with
the lines he adopted in his earlier writings." [_No Gods,
No Masters_, vol. 1, p. 167] Indeed, as Bakunin himself
noted, while the Marxists "saw all their ideas upset by
the uprising" of the Commune, they "found themselves 
compelled to take their hats off to it." [_Michael Bakunin:
Selected Writings_, p. 261] This modification of ideas by 
Marx was not limited just to federalism. Marx also praised 
the commune's system of mandating recallable delegates, a 
position which Bakunin had been arguing for a number of 
years previously.  In 1868, for example, he was talked about 
a "Revolutionary Communal Council" composed of "delegates . . . 
vested with plenary but accountable and removable mandates." 
[Op. Cit., pp. 170-1] As such, the Paris Commune was a 
striking confirmation of Bakunin's ideas on many levels, 
*not* Marx's (who adjusted his ideas to bring them in line 
with Bakunin's!).

In summary, Bakunin argued that decentralisation of power was
essential for a real revolution that achieves more than changing
who the boss it. A free society could only be created and run
from below, by the active participation of the bulk of the
population. Centralisation would kill this participation and
so kill the revolution. Marx and Engels, on the other hand, 
while sometimes supporting federalism and local self-government,
had a centralist streak in their politics which Bakunin thought
undermined the success of any revolution.

Since Bakunin, anarchists have deepen this critique of Marxism
and, with the experience of Bolshevism, argue that he predicted
key failures in Marx's ideas. Given that his followers, particularly
Lenin and Trotsky, have emphasised (although, in many ways, changed 
them) the centralisation and "socialist government" aspects of 
Marx's thoughts, anarchists argue that Bakunin's critique is 
as relevant as ever. Real socialism can only come from below.
 
H.1.2 What are the key differences between Anarchists and Marxists?

There are, of course, important similarities between anarchism and
Marxism. Both are socialists, oppose capitalism and the current
state, support and encourage working class organisation and action
and see class struggle as the means of creating a social revolution
which will transform society into a new one. However, the differences
between these socialist theories are equally important. In the
words of Errico Malatesta:

"The important, fundamental dissension [between anarchists and 
Marxists] is [that] . . . [Marxist] socialists are authoritarians, 
anarchists are libertarians.

"Socialists want power . . . and once in power wish to impose 
their programme on the people. . . Anarchists instead maintain, 
that government cannot be other than harmful, and by its very 
nature it defends either an existing privileged class or creates 
a new one; and instead of inspiring to take the place of the
existing government anarchists seek to destroy every organism
which empowers some to impose their own ideas and interests on
others, for they want to free the way for development towards
better forms of human fellowship which will emerge from
experience, by everyone being free and, having, of course,
the economic means to make freedom possible as well as a
reality." [_Life and Ideas_, p. 142]

The other differences derive from this fundamental one. 
So while there are numerous ways in which anarchists and 
Marxists differ, their root lies in the question of power. 
Socialists seek power (in the name of the working class 
and usually hidden under rhetoric arguing that party and 
class power are the same). Anarchists seek to destroy 
hierarchical power in all its forms and ensure that 
everyone is free to manage their own affairs (both 
individually and collectively). From this comes the 
differences on the nature of a revolution, the way the 
working class movement such organise and the tactics it 
should apply and so on. A short list of these differences 
would include the question of the "dictatorship of the 
proletariat", the standing of revolutionaries in elections, 
centralisation versus federalism, the role and organisation 
of revolutionaries, whether socialism can only come "from 
below" or whether it is possible for it come "from below" 
and "from above" and a host of others (i.e. some of the 
differences we indicated in the last section during our 
discussion of Bakunin's critique of Marxism). Indeed, there
are so many it is difficult to address them all here. As
such, we can only concentrate on a few in this and the 
following sections.

One of the key issues is on the issue of confusing party power
with popular power. The logic of the anarchist case is simple. 
In any system of hierarchical and centralised power (for example, 
in a state or governmental structure) then those at the top are 
in charge (i.e. are in positions of power). It is *not* "the 
people," nor "the proletariat," nor "the masses," it is those 
who make up the government who have and exercise real power. As 
Malatesta argued, government means "the delegation of power, 
that is the abdication of initiative and sovereignty of all 
into the hands of a few" and "if . . . , as do the 
authoritarians, one means government action when one talks 
of social action, then this is still the resultant of 
individual forces, but only of those individuals who form 
the government." [_Anarchy_, p. 40 and p. 36] Therefore, 
anarchists argue, the replacement of party power for working 
class power is inevitable because of the nature of the state. 
In the words of Murray Bookchin:

"Anarchist critics of Marx pointed out with considerable effect 
that any system of representation would become a statist interest 
in its own right, one that at best would work against the interests 
of the working classes (including the peasantry), and that at worst 
would be a dictatorial power as vicious as the worst bourgeois state 
machines. Indeed, with political power reinforced by economic power 
in the form of a nationalised economy, a 'workers' republic' might 
well prove to be a despotism (to use one of Bakunin's more favourite 
terms) of unparalleled oppression."

He continues:

"Republican institutions, however much they are intended to express 
the interests of the workers, necessarily place policy-making in the 
hands of deputies and categorically do not constitute a 'proletariat 
organised as a ruling class.' If public policy, as distinguished from 
administrative activities, is not made by the people mobilised into 
assemblies and confederally co-ordinated by agents on a local, regional, 
and national basis, then a democracy in the precise sense of the term 
does not exist. The powers that people enjoy under such circumstances 
can be usurped without difficulty. . . [I]f the people are to acquire 
real power over their lives and society, they must establish -- and in 
the past they have, for brief periods of time established -- well-ordered 
institutions in which they themselves directly formulate the policies of 
their communities and, in the case of their regions, elect confederal 
functionaries, revocable and strictly controllable, who will execute 
them.  Only in this sense can a class, especially one committed to 
the abolition of classes, be mobilised as a class to manage society."
[_The Communist Manifesto: Insights and Problems_]

This is why anarchists stress direct democracy (self-management)
in free federations of free associations. It is the only way to
ensure that power remains in the hands of the people and is not
turned into an alien power above them. Thus Marxist support for
statist forms of organisation will inevitably undermine the
liberatory nature of the revolution. 

Thus the *real* meaning of a workers state is simply
that the *party* has the real power, not the workers. After
all, that is nature of a state. Marxist rhetoric tends to
hide this reality. As an example, we can point to Lenin's
comments in October, 1921. In an essay marking the fourth
anniversary of the 1917 October Revolution, Lenin stated
that the Soviet system "provides the maximum of democracy 
for the workers and peasants; at the same time, it marks a 
break with *bourgeois* democracy and the rise of a new, 
epoch-making type of democracy, namely, proletarian 
democracy, or the dictatorship of the proletariat."
["Fourth Anniversary of the October Revolution," 
_Collected Works_, vol. 33, p. 55] Yet this was written
years after Lenin had argued that "[w]hen we are reproached
with having established a dictatorship of one party . . .
we say, 'Yes, it is a dictatorship of one party! This is
what we stand for and we shall not shift from that position
. . .'" [Op. Cit., vol. 29, p. 535] And, of course, they
did not shift from that position! Indeed, Lenin's comments
came just a few months after all opposition parties and 
factions within the Communist Party had been banned and 
after the Kronstadt rebellion and a wave of strikes calling 
for free soviet elections had been repressed. Clearly, the 
term "proletarian democracy" had a drastically different 
meaning to Lenin than to most people!

Indeed, the identification of party power and working class
power reaches its height (or, more correctly, depth) in the
works of Lenin and Trotsky. Lenin, for example, argued that
"the correct understanding of a Communist of his tasks" lies
in "correctly gauging the conditions and the moment when the
vanguard of the proletariat can successfully seize power,
when it will be able during and after this seizure of power
to obtain support from sufficiently broad strata of the
working class and of the non-proletarian toiling masses,
and when, thereafter, it will be able to maintain, 
consolidate, and extend its rule, educating, training and
attracting ever broader masses of the toilers." Note, the
vanguard (the party) seizes power, *not* the masses. Indeed, 
he stressed that the "very presentation of the question --
'dictatorship of the Party *or* dictatorship of the class,
dictatorship (Party) of the leaders *or* dictatorship 
(Party) of the masses?' is evidence of the most incredible
and hopeless confusion of mind" and "[t]o go so far . . . 
as to draw a contrast in general between the dictatorship 
of the masses and the dictatorship of the leaders, is 
ridiculously absurd and stupid." [_Left-Wing Communism: 
An Infantile Disorder_, p. 35, p. 27 and p. 25]

Lenin stressed this idea numerous times. For example, in
1920 he argued that "the dictatorship of the proletariat 
cannot be exercised through an organisation embracing the 
whole of the class, because in all capitalist countries 
(and not only over here, in one of the most backward) the 
proletariat is still so divided, so degraded, and so 
corrupted in parts . . . that an organisation taking in 
the whole proletariat cannot directly exercise proletarian 
dictatorship. It can be exercised only by a vanguard
. . . Such is the basic mechanism of the dictatorship
of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the essentials
of transitions from capitalism to communism . . . for 
the dictatorship of the proletariat cannot be exercised 
by a mass proletarian organisation." [_Collected Works_, 
vol. 32, p. 21]

Trotsky agreed with this lesson and argued it to the end
of his life:

"The revolutionary dictatorship of a proletarian party is for 
me not a thing that one can freely accept or reject: It is an 
objective necessity imposed upon us by the social realities -- 
the class struggle, the heterogeneity of the revolutionary 
class, the necessity for a selected vanguard in order to 
assure the victory. The dictatorship of a party belongs to the 
barbarian prehistory as does the state itself, but we can not 
jump over this chapter, which can open (not at one stroke) 
genuine human history. . . The revolutionary party 
(vanguard) which renounces its own dictatorship surrenders 
the masses to the counter-revolution . . . Abstractly 
speaking, it would be very well if the party dictatorship 
could be replaced by the 'dictatorship' of the whole toiling 
people without any party, but this presupposes such a high 
level of political development among the masses that it can 
never be achieved under capitalist conditions. The reason 
for the revolution comes from the circumstance that 
capitalism does not permit the material and the moral 
development of the masses." [_Writings 1936-37_, pp. 513-4]

This point is reiterated in his essay, "Stalinism and 
Bolshevism" (again, written in 1937) when he argued that:

"Those who propose the abstraction of Soviets to the 
party dictatorship should understand that only thanks to 
the party dictatorship were the Soviets able to lift 
themselves out of the mud of reformism and attain the
state form of the proletariat." [_Stalinism and 
Bolshevism_]

How soviet democracy can exist within the context of
a party dictatorship is left to the imagination of the
reader! Rather than the working class as a whole seizing 
power, it is the "vanguard" which takes power -- "a 
revolutionary party, even after seizing power . . . is 
still by no means the sovereign ruler of society." 
[Op. Cit.] Needless to say, he was just repeating
the same arguments he had made while in power during the
Russian Revolution (see section H.6 for details). Nor
was he the only one. Zinoviev, another leading Bolshevik, 
argued in 1920 along the same lines:

"soviet rule in Russia could not have been maintained for 
three years -- not even three weeks -- without the iron 
dictatorship of the Communist Party. Any class conscious 
worker must understand that the dictatorship of the 
working class can by achieved only by the dictatorship 
of its vanguard, i.e., by the Communist Party . . . All 
questions of economic reconstruction, military organisation, 
education, food supply -- all these questions, on which 
the fate if the proletarian revolution depends absolutely, 
are decided in Russia before all other matters and mostly 
in the framework of the party organisations . . . Control 
by the party over soviet organs, over the trade unions, 
is the single durable guarantee that any measures taken 
will serve not special interests, but the interests of 
the entire proletariat." [quoted by Oskar Anweiler, 
_The Soviets_, pp. 239-40]

How these positions, clearly argued as inevitable for *any*
revolution, can be reconciled with workers' democracy,
power or freedom is not explained. As such, the idea that
Leninism (usually considered as mainstream Marxism) is 
inherently democratic or a supporter of power to the people
is clearly flawed. The leading lights of Bolshevism argued
that the dictatorship of the proletariat could only be
achieved by the dictatorship of the party. Indeed, the
whole rationale for party dictatorship came from the 
fundamental rationale for democracy, namely that any
government should reflect the changing opinions of the 
masses. In the words of Trotsky:

"The very same masses are at different times inspired 
by different moods and objectives. It is just for this 
reason that a centralised organisation of the vanguard 
is indispensable. Only a party, wielding the authority 
it has won, is capable of overcoming the vacillation 
of the masses themselves." [_The Moralists and Sycophants_,
p. 59]

This position has its roots in the uneven political 
development within the working class (i.e. that the
working class contains numerous political perspectives
within it). As the party (according to Leninist theory)
contains the most advanced ideas (and, again according
to Leninist theory, the working class cannot reach 
beyond a trade union consciousness by its own efforts), 
the party must take power to ensure that the masses do not 
make "mistakes" or "waver" ("vacillation") during a 
revolution. From such a perspective to the position
of party dictatorship is not far (and a journey that
all the leading Bolsheviks, including Lenin and Trotsky, 
we must note, did in fact take).

In contrast, anarchists argue that precisely because of 
political differences we need the fullest possible democracy 
and freedom to discuss issues and reach agreements. Only 
by discussion and self-activity can the political 
perspectives of those in struggle develop and change. In 
other words, the fact Bolshevism uses to justify its 
support for party power is the strongest argument against 
it. For anarchists, the idea of a revolutionary government 
is a contradiction. As Italian anarchist Malatesta put it, 
"if you consider these worthy electors as unable to look 
after their own interests themselves, how is it that they 
will know how to choose for themselves the shepherds who 
must guide them? And how will they be able to solve this 
problem of social alchemy, of producing a genius from the 
votes of a mass of fools?" [_Anarchy_, p. 53]

As such, anarchists think that power should be in the 
hands of the masses themselves. Only freedom or the 
struggle for freedom can be the school of freedom. That 
means that, to quote Bakunin, "since it is the people 
which must make the revolution everywhere . . . the ultimate 
direction of it must at all times be vested in the people 
organised into a free federation of agricultural and 
industrial organisations . . . organised from the bottom up 
through revolutionary delegation." [_No God, No Masters_,
vol. 1, pp. 155-6]

Clearly, then, the question of state/party power is one dividing
anarchists and most Marxists. These arguments by leading 
Bolsheviks confirm Bakunin's fear that the Marxists aimed
for "a tyranny of the minority over a majority in the name
of the people -- in the name of the stupidity of the many
and the superior wisdom of the few." [_Marxism, Freedom
and the State_, p. 63] Again, though, we must stress that
libertarian Marxists like the council communists agree with
anarchists on this subject and reject the whole idea that
dictatorship of a party equals the dictatorship of the
working class. As such, the Marxist tradition as a whole
does not confuse this issue, although the majority of it
does. We must stress that not all Marxists are Leninists. 
A few (council communists, situationists, autonomists, and 
so on) are far closer to anarchism. They also reject the idea 
of party power/dictatorship, the use of elections, for direct 
action, argue for the abolition of wage slavery by workers'
self-management of production and so on. They represent 
the best in Marx's work and should not be lumped with the 
followers of Bolshevism. Sadly, they are in the minority.

Finally, we should indicate other important areas of difference. 
Some are summarised by Lenin in his work _The State and 
Revolution_:

"The difference between the Marxists and the anarchists is this: 1) the former, while aiming at the complete abolition
of the state, recognise that this aim can only be achieved
after classes have been abolished by the socialist revolution,
as the result of the establishment of socialism which leads
to the withering away of the state. The latter want to abolish
the state completely overnight, failing to understand the
conditions under which the state can be abolished 2) the 
former recognise that after the proletariat has conquered 
political power it must utterly destroy the old state machine 
and substitute it for it a new one consisting of the 
organisation of armed workers, after the type of the 
Commune. The latter, while advocating the destruction of 
the state machine, have absolutely no idea of *what* the 
proletariat will put in its place and *how* it will use 
its revolutionary power; the anarchists even deny that 
the revolutionary proletariat should utilise its state 
power, its revolutionary dictatorship; 3) the former demand 
that the proletariat be prepared for revolution by utilising 
the present state; the latter reject this." [_Essential 
Works of Lenin_, p. 358]

We will discuss each of these points in the next three
sections. Point one will be discussed in section H.1.3,
the second in section H.1.4 and the third and final one in
section H.1.5. 

H.1.3 Why do anarchists wish to abolish the state "overnight"?

As indicated at the end of the last section, Lenin argued that
while Marxists aimed "at the complete abolition of the state"
they "recognise that this aim can only be achieved after 
classes have been abolished by the socialist revolution"
while anarchists "want to abolish the state completely 
overnight." This issue is usually summarised by Marxists
arguing that a new state is required to replace the destroyed 
bourgeois one. This new state is called by Marxists "the 
dictatorship of the proletariat" or a workers' state. Anarchists 
reject this transitional state while Marxists embrace it. Indeed, 
according to Lenin "a Marxist is one who *extends* the acceptance 
of the class struggle to the acceptance of the *dictatorship
of the proletariat*." [_Essential Works of Lenin_, p. 358
and p. 294]

So what does the "dictatorship of the proletariat" actually 
mean? Generally, Marxists seem to imply that this term 
simply means the defence of the revolution and so the
anarchist rejection of the dictatorship of the proletariat 
means the rejection of the defence of a revolution. Anarchists, 
they argue, differ from Marxist-communists in that we reject 
the need for the dictatorship of the proletariat, where the 
formerly oppressed use coercion to ensure that remnants of 
the oppressing classes do not resurrect the old society. This
particular straw man was used by Lenin in _State and Revolution_
when he quoted Marx to suggest that anarchists would "lay down
their arms" after a successful revolution. Such a "laying down
of arms" would mean the "abolition of the state" while defending
the revolution by violence would mean "giv[ing] the state a
revolutionary and transitory form." [Op. Cit., p. 315]

That such an argument can be made, never mind repeated, suggests
a lack of honesty. It assumes that the Marxist and Anarchist
definitions of "the state" are identical. They are not. As such,
it is pretty meaningless to argue, as Lenin did, that when 
anarchists talk about abolishing the state they mean that they
will not defend a revolution. As Malatesta put it, some "seem 
almost to believe that after having brought down government 
and private property we would allow both to be quietly built 
up again, because of respect for the *freedom* of those who 
might feel the need to be rulers and property owners. A 
truly curious way of interpreting our ideas." [_Anarchy_, 
p. 41]

For anarchists the state, government, means "the delegation
of power, that is the abdication of initiative and sovereignty
of all into the hands of a few." [Malatesta, Op. Cit., p. 40] 
For Marxists, the state is "an organ of class *rule*, an organ 
for the *oppression* of one class by another." [Lenin, Op. Cit., 
p. 274] That these definitions are in conflict is clear and
unless this difference is made explicit, anarchist opposition
to the "dictatorship of the proletariat" cannot be clearly
understood.

Anarchists, of course, agree that the current state is the
means by which the bourgeois class enforces its rule over
society. In Bakunin's words, "the political state has no
other mission but to protect the exploitation of the people
by the economically privileged classes." [_The Political
Philosophy of Bakunin_, p. 221] Under capitalism, as Malatesta
succulently put, the state is "the bourgeoisie's servant and
*gendarme*." [Op. Cit., p. 20] The reason why the state is
marked by centralised power is due to its role as the protector
of (minority) class rule. As such, a state cannot be anything but 
a defender of minority power as its centralised and hierarchical
structure is designed for that purpose. If the working class
really was running society, as Marxists claim they would be in
the "dictatorship of the proletariat," then it would not be
a state. As Bakunin argued, "[w]here all rule, there are no 
more ruled, and there is no State." [Op. Cit., p. 223]

As such, the idea that anarchists, by rejecting the "dictatorship
of the proletariat," also reject defending a revolution is false.
We do not equate the "dictatorship of the proletariat" with the 
need to defend a revolution or expropriating the capitalist 
class, ending capitalism and building socialism. Anarchists 
from Bakunin onwards have taken both of these necessities 
for granted (also see sections H.2.1, I.5.14 and J.7.6). As 
he stressed, "the sole means of opposing the reactionary forces 
of the state" was the "organising of the revolutionary force of 
the people." This revolution involve "the free construction of 
popular life in accordance with popular needs . . . from below 
upward, by the people themselves . . . [in] a voluntary
alliance of agricultural and factory worker associations, 
communes, provinces, and nations." [_Statism and Anarchy_, 
p. 156 and p. 33]

As we discuss this particular Marxist straw man in section H.2.1,
we will leave our comments at this. Clearly, then, anarchists do
not reject defending a revolution. We argue that the state must
be abolished "overnight" as any state is marked by hierarchical
power and can only empower the few at the expense of the many.
The state will not "wither away" as Marxists claim simply because
it excludes, by its very nature, the active participation of the
bulk of the population and ensures a new class division in society:
those in power (the party) and those subject to it (the working
class). 

Georges Fontenis sums up anarchist concerns on this issue:

"The formula 'dictatorship of the proletariat' has been used 
to mean many different things. If for no other reason it 
should be condemned as a cause of confusion. With Marx it 
can just as easily mean the centralised dictatorship of 
the party which claims to represent the proletariat as it 
can the federalist conception of the Commune.

"Can it mean the exercise of political power by the victorious 
working class? No, because the exercise of political power in 
the recognised sense of the term can only take place through 
the agency of an exclusive group practising a monopoly of 
power, separating itself from the class and oppressing it. 
And this is how the attempt to use a State apparatus can 
reduce the dictatorship of the proletariat to the dictatorship 
of the party over the masses.

"But if by dictatorship of the proletariat is understood 
collective and direct exercise of 'political power', this 
would mean the disappearance of 'political power' since its 
distinctive characteristics are supremacy, exclusivity and 
monopoly. It is no longer a question of exercising or seizing 
political power, it is about doing away with it all together!

"If by dictatorship is meant the domination of the majority 
by a minority, then it is not a question of giving power to 
the proletariat but to a party, a distinct political group. 
If by dictatorship is meant the domination of a minority by 
the majority (domination by the victorious proletariat of 
the remnants of a bourgeoisie that has been defeated as a 
class) then the setting up of dictatorship means nothing 
but the need for the majority to efficiently arrange for 
its defence its own social organisation.

[...]

"The terms 'domination', 'dictatorship' and 'state' are as 
little appropriate as the expression 'taking power' for the 
revolutionary act of the seizure of the factories by the workers.

We reject then as inaccurate and causes of confusion the 
expressions 'dictatorship of the proletariat', 'taking political 
power', 'workers state', 'socialist state' and 'proletarian state'."
[_Manifesto of Libertarian Communism_, pp. 22-3]

In summary, anarchists argue that the state has to be abolished
"overnight" simply because a state is marked by hierarchical
power and the exclusion of the bulk of the population from
the decision making process. It cannot be used to implement
socialism simply because it is not designed that way. To extend
and defend a revolution a state is not required. Indeed, it is
a hindrance:

"The mistake of authoritarian communists in this connection is the 
belief that fighting and organising are impossible without 
submission to a government; and thus they regard anarchists . . . 
as the foes of all organisation and all co-ordinated struggle. We, 
on the other hand, maintain that not only are revolutionary 
struggle and revolutionary organisation possible outside and in 
spite of government interference but that, indeed, that is the 
only effective way to struggle and organise, for it has the active 
participation of all members of the collective unit, instead of 
their passively entrusting themselves to the authority of the 
supreme leaders.

"Any governing body is an impediment to the real organisation of 
the broad masses, the majority. Where a government exists, then 
the only really organised people are the minority who make up the 
government; and . . . if the masses do organise, they do so 
against it, outside it, or at the very least, independently of it. 
In ossifying into a government, the revolution as such would fall 
apart, on account of its awarding that government the monopoly of 
organisation and of the means of struggle." [Luigi Fabbri, "Anarchy 
and 'Scientific' Communism", in _The Poverty of Statism_, pp. 13-49, 
Albert Meltzer (ed.), p. 27]

For anarchists, the abolition of the state does not mean rejecting
the need to extend or defend a revolution (quite the reverse!). It
means rejecting a system of organisation designed by and for minorities
to ensure their rule. To create a state (even a "workers' state") 
means to delegate power away from the working class and eliminate
their power in favour of party power. In place of a state anarchists'
argue for a free federation of workers' organisations as the means
of conducting a revolution (and the framework for its defence). 

As we discuss in the next section, anarchists see this federation of
workers' associations and communes (the framework of a free society)
as being based on the organisations working class people create in 
their struggle against capitalism. These self-managed organisations,
by refusing to become part of a centralised state, will ensure the
success of a revolution.

H.1.4 Do anarchists have "absolutely no idea" of what the proletariat 
      will put in place of the state?

Lenin's second claim is that anarchists, "while advocating the 
destruction of the state machine, have absolutely no idea of 
*what* the proletariat will put in its place" and compares 
this to the Marxists who argue for a new state machine 
"consisting of armed workers, after the type of the Commune." 
[_Essential Works of Lenin_, p. 358] For anarchists, Lenin's 
assertion simply shows his unfamiliarity with anarchist 
literature and need not be taken seriously -- anyone 
familiar will anarchist theory would simply laugh at such 
comments. Sadly, most Marxists are *not* familiar with 
that theory, so we need to explain two things. Firstly, 
anarchists have very clear ideas on what to "replace" 
the state with (namely a federation of communes based 
on working class associations). Secondly, that this idea 
is based on the idea of armed workers, inspired by the 
Paris Commune (although predicted by Bakunin). 

Moreover, for anarchists Lenin's comment seems somewhat 
incredulous. As George Barrett puts it, in reply to the 
question "if you abolish government, what will you put it 
its place," this "seems to an Anarchist very much as if a 
patient asked the doctor, 'If you take away my illness, 
what will you give me in its place?' The Anarchist's 
argument is that government fulfils no useful purpose 
. . . It is the headquarters of the profit-makers, the 
rent-takers, and of all those who take from but who do 
not give to society. When this class is abolished by 
the people so organising themselves to run the factories 
and use the land for the benefit of their free communities, 
i.e. for their own benefit, then the Government must also 
be swept away, since its purpose will be gone. The only 
thing then that will be put in the place of government 
will be the free organisation of the workers. When 
Tyranny is abolished, Liberty remains, just as when 
disease is eradicated health remains." [_Objections
to Anarchism_]

However, Barrett's answer does contain the standard anarchist
position on what will be the basis of a revolutionary society,
namely that the "only thing then that will be put in the place 
of government will be the free organisation of the workers." This
is a concise summary of anarchist theory and cannot be bettered.
This vision, as we discussed in section I.2.3 in some detail, 
can be found in the work of Bakunin, Kropotkin, Malatesta and
a host of other anarchist thinkers. Since anarchists from Bakunin 
onwards have stressed that a federation of workers' associations 
would constitute the framework of a free society, to assert 
otherwise is little more than a joke or a slander. To quote
Bakunin:

"the federative alliance of all working men's associations . . . 
[will] constitute the Commune . . . [the] Communal Council [will 
be] composed of . . . delegates  . . . vested with plenary but
accountable and removable mandates. . . all provinces, communes 
and associations . . . by first reorganising on revolutionary lines 
. . . [will] constitute the federation of insurgent associations, 
communes and provinces . . . [and] organise a revolutionary force 
capable defeating reaction . . . [and for] self-defence . . . 
[The] revolution everywhere must be created by the people, and 
supreme control must always belong to the people organised into a 
free federation of agricultural and industrial associations . . . 
organised from the bottom upwards by means of revolutionary 
delegation. . ." [_Michael Bakunin: Selected Writings_, pp. 170-2]

And:

"The future social organisation must be made solely from the 
bottom up, by the free association or federation of workers, 
firstly in their unions, then in the communes, regions, 
nations and finally in a great federation, international 
and universal." [Op. Cit., p. 206]

Similar ideas can easily be found in the works of other anarchists.
While the actual names and specific details of these federations
of workers' associations may change (for example, the factory
committees and soviets in the Russian Revolution, the collectives
in Spain, the section assemblies in the French Revolution are
a few of them) the basic ideas are the same. Bakunin also pointed
to the means of defence, a workers' militia (the people armed,
as per the Paris Commune):

"While it [the revolution] will be carried out locally everywhere,
the revolution will of necessity take a federalist format. 
Immediately after established government has been overthrown,
communes will have to reorganise themselves along revolutionary
lines . . . In order to defend the revolution, their volunteers 
will at the same time form a communal militia. But no commune can 
defend itself in isolation. So it will be necessary for each of 
them to radiate outwards, to raise all its neighbouring communes 
in revolt . . . and to federate with them for common defence." 
[_No Gods, No Masters_, vol. 1, p. 142]

A major difference between anarchism and Marxism which Lenin 
points to is, clearly, false. Anarchists are well aware of what
should "replace" the bourgeois state and have always been so.
The *real* difference is simply that anarchists say what they
mean while Lenin's "new" state did not, in fact, mean working
class power but rather party power. We discussed this issue in
more detail in section H.1.2, so we will not do so here.

As for Lenin's comment that we have "absolutely no ideas" of how 
the working class "will use its revolutionary power" suggests 
more ignorance, as we have urged working people to expropriate 
the expropriators, reorganise production under workers' 
self-management and start to construct society from the bottom 
upwards (a quick glance at Kropotkin's _Conquest of Bread_,
for example, would soon convince any reader of the inaccuracy 
of Lenin's comment). This summary by the anarchist Jura Federation 
(written in 1880) gives a flavour of anarchist ideas on this
subject:

"The bourgeoisie's power over the popular masses springs from
economic privileges, political domination and the enshrining
of such privileges in the laws. So we must strike at the 
wellsprings of bourgeois power, as well as its various
manifestations.

"The following measures strike us as essential to the welfare
of the revolution, every bit as much as armed struggle against
its enemies:

"The insurgents must confiscate social capital, landed estates,
mines, housing, religious and public buildings, instruments of
labour, raw materials, gems and precious stones and manufactured
products:

"All political, administrative and judicial authorities are
to be abolished.

". . . What should the organisational measures of the revolution
be?

"Immediate and spontaneous establishment of trade bodies:
provisional assumption by those of . . . social capital . . .:
local federation of a trades bodies and labour organisation:

"Establishment of neighbourhood groups and federations of same . . .

[. . .]

"[T]he federation of all the revolutionary forces of the insurgent
Communes . . . Federation of Communes and organisation of the
masses, with an eye to the revolution's enduring until such
time as all reactionary activity has been completely eradicated.

[. . .]

"Once trade bodies have been have been established, the next step
is to organise local life. The organ of this life is to be the
federation of trades bodies and it is this local federation which
is to constitute the future Commune." [_No Gods, No Masters_, 
vol. 1, pp. 246-7]

Clearly, anarchists do have some ideas on what the working 
class will "replace" the state with and how it will use its 
"revolutionary power"!

Similarly, Lenin's statement that "the anarchists even deny 
that the revolutionary proletariat should utilise its state 
power, its revolutionary dictatorship" again distorts the
anarchist position. As we argued in section H.1.2, our 
objection to the "state power" of the proletariat is
precisely *because* it cannot, by its very nature as a
state, actually allow the working class to manage society
directly (and, of course, it automatically excludes other
sections of the working masses, such as the peasantry and
artisans). We argued that, in practice, it would simply
mean the dictatorship of a few party leaders. This position, 
we must stress, was one Lenin himself was arguing in the 
year after completing _State and Revolution_. Ironically,
the leading Bolsheviks (as we have seen in section H.1.2) 
confirmed the anarchist argument that the "dictatorship 
of the proletariat" would, in fact, become a dictatorship 
*over* the proletariat by the party.

Italian anarchist Camillo Berneri sums up the differences well:

"The Marxists . . . foresee the natural disappearance of the State 
as a consequence of the destruction of classes by the means of 
'the dictatorship of the proletariat,' that is to say State 
Socialism, whereas the Anarchists desire the destruction of the 
classes by means of a social revolution which eliminates, with the 
classes, the State. The Marxists, moreover, do not propose the 
armed conquest of the Commune by the whole proletariat, but the 
propose the conquest of the State by the party which imagines that 
it represents the proletariat. The Anarchists allow the use of 
direct power by the proletariat, but they understand by the organ 
of this power to be formed by the entire corpus of systems of 
communist administration-corporate organisations [i.e. industrial 
unions], communal institutions, both regional and national-freely 
constituted outside and in opposition to all political monopoly by 
parties and endeavouring to a minimum administrational 
centralisation." ["Dictatorship of the Proletariat and State 
Socialism", _Cienfuegos Press Anarchist Review_, no. 4, p. 52]

Clearly, Lenin's assertions are little more than straw men.

H.1.5 Why do anarchists reject "utilising the present state"?

Lastly, there is the question of Marxists demanding (in 
the words of Lenin) "that the proletariat be prepared for 
revolution by utilising the present state" while anarchists 
"reject this." Today, of course, this has changed. 
Libertarian Marxists, such as council communists, also 
reject "utilising the present state" to train the 
proletariat for revolution (i.e. for socialists to stand 
for elections). For anarchists, the use of elections does
not "prepare" the working class for revolution (i.e. managing
their own affairs and society). Rather, it prepares them to
follow leaders and let others act for them. In the words of
Rudolf Rocker:

"Participation in the politics of the bourgeois States has not 
brought the labour movement a hair's-breadth nearer to Socialism, 
but thanks to this method, Socialism has almost been completely 
crushed and condemned to insignificance. . . Participation in 
parliamentary politics has affected the Socialist Labour movement 
like an insidious poison. It destroyed the belief in the necessity 
of constructive Socialist activity, and, worse of all, the impulse 
to self-help, by inoculating people with the ruinous delusion 
that salvation always comes from above." [_Anarcho-Syndicalism_, 
p. 49] 

While electoral ("political") activity ensures that the masses
become accustomed to following leaders and letting them act
on their behalf, anarchists' support direct action as "the
best available means for preparing the masses to manage their
own personal and collective interests; and besides, anarchists
feel that even now the working people are fully capable of
handling their own political and administrative interests."
[Luigi Galleani, _The End of Anarchism?_, pp. 13-4]

Anarchists, therefore, argue that we need to reclaim the power 
which has been concentrated into the hands of the state. That 
is why we stress direct action. Direct action means action by 
the people themselves, that is action directly taken by those 
directly affected. Through direct action, the people dominate 
their own struggles, it is they who conduct it, organise it, 
manage it. They do not hand over to others their own acts and 
task of self-liberation. That way, we become accustomed to 
managing our own affairs, creating alternative, libertarian, 
forms of social organisation which can become a force to 
resist the state, win reforms and, ultimately, become the 
framework of a free society. In other words, direct action 
creates organs of self-activity (such as community assemblies, 
factory committees, workers' councils, and so on) which, to
use Bakunin's words, are "creating not only the ideas but 
also the facts of the future itself."

In other words, the idea that socialists standing for elections
somehow prepares working class people for revolution is simply 
wrong. Utilising the state, standing in elections, only prepares 
people for following leaders -- it does not encourage the 
self-activity, self-organisation, direct action and mass 
struggle required for a social revolution. Moreover, as we
noted in the section H.1.1, use of elections has a corrupting
effect on those who use it. The history of radicals using
elections has been a long one of betrayal and the transformation
of revolutionary parties into reformist ones (see section J.2.6
for more discussion). Thus using the existing state ensures
that the division at the heart of existing society (namely a
few who govern and the many who obey) is reproduced in the
movements trying to abolish it. It boils down to handing effective
leadership to special people, to "leaders," just when the
situation requires working people to solve their own problems
and take matters into their own hands. Only the struggle for
freedom (or freedom itself) can be the school for freedom,
and by placing power into the hands of leaders, utilising 
the existing state ensures that socialism is postponed rather
than prepared for.

Moreover, Marxist support for electioneering is somewhat at odds 
with their claims of being in favour of collective, mass action. 
There is nothing more isolated, atomised and individualistic than 
voting. It is the act of one person in a box by themselves. 
It is the total opposite of collective struggle. The individual 
is alone before, during and after the act of voting. Indeed, 
unlike direct action, which, by its very nature, throws up 
new forms of organisation in order to manage and co-ordinate 
the struggle, voting creates no alternative organs of working 
class self-management. Nor can it as it is not based on nor 
does it create collective action or organisation. It simply 
empowers an individual (the elected representative) to act on 
behalf of a collection of other individuals (the voters). Such 
delegation will hinder collective organisation and action as 
the voters expect their representative to act and fight for 
them -- if they did not, they would not vote for them in the 
first place!

Given that Marxists usually slander anarchists as "individualists" 
the irony is delicious!

If we look at the Poll-Tax campaign in the UK in the late 1980s
and early 1990s, we can see what would happen to a mass movement 
which utilised electioneering. The various left-wing parties, 
particularly Militant (now the Socialist Party) spent a lot of 
time and effort lobbying Labour Councillors not to implement 
the tax (with no success). Let us assume they had succeeded 
and the Labour Councillors had refused to implement the tax 
(or "socialist" candidates had been elected to stop it). What 
would have happened? Simply that there would not have been 
a mass movement or mass organisation based on non-payment, 
nor self-organised direct action to resist warrant sales, 
nor community activism of any form.  Rather, the campaign 
would have consisted to supporting the councillors in their 
actions, mass rallies in which the leaders would have 
informed us of their activities on our behalf and, perhaps, 
rallies and marches to protest any action the government had 
inflicted on them. The leaders may have called for some form 
of mass action but this action would not have come from below 
and so not a product of working class self-organisation, 
self-activity and self-reliance. Rather, it would have been 
purely re-active and a case of follow the leader, without 
the empowering and liberating aspects of taking action by 
yourself, as a conscious and organised group. It would have
replaced the struggle of millions with the actions of a
handful of leaders.

Of course, even discussing this possibility indicates how 
remote it is from reality. The Labour Councillors were not 
going to act -- they were far too "practical" for that. 
Years of working within the system, of using elections, 
had taken their toll decades ago. Anarchists, of course, 
saw the usefulness of picketing the council meetings, of 
protesting against the Councillors and showing them a 
small example of the power that existed to resist them 
if they implemented the tax. As such, the picket would 
have been an expression of direct action, as it was based 
on showing the power of our direct action and class 
organisations. Lobbying, however, was building illusions 
in "leaders" acting for us to and based on pleading rather 
than defiance. But, then again, Militant desired to replace 
the current leaders with themselves and so would not object 
to such tactics. 

Unfortunately, the Socialists never really questioned *why* 
they had to lobby the councillors in the first place -- 
if utilising the existing state *was* a valid radical 
or revolutionary tactic, why has it always resulted in 
a de-radicalising of those who use it? This would be 
the inevitable results of any movement which "complements" 
direct action with electioneering. The focus of the 
movement will change from the base to the top, from 
self-organisation and direct action from below to 
passively supporting the leaders. This may not happen 
instantly, but over time, just as the party degenerates
by working within the system, the mass movement will be 
turned into an electoral machine for the party -- even 
arguing against direct action in case it harms the 
election chances of the leaders. Just as the trade 
union leaders have done again and again.

All in all, the history of socialists actually using elections
has been a dismal failure. Rather than prepare the masses
for revolution, it has done the opposite. As we argue in
section J.2, this is to be expected. That Lenin could still
argue along these lines even after the betrayal of social
democracy indicates a lack of desire to learn the lessons
of history.

H.1.6 Why do anarchists try to "build the new world in the 
      shell of the old"?

Another key difference between anarchists and Marxists is on 
how the movement against capitalism should organise in the 
here and now. Anarchists argue that it should prefigure the 
society we desire -- namely it should be self-managed, 
decentralised, built and organised from the bottom-up in 
a federal structure. This perspective can be seen from the 
justly famous "Circular of the Sixteen":

"The future society should be nothing but a universalisation 
of the organisation which the International will establish for 
itself. We must therefore take care to bring this organisation 
as near as possible to our ideal . . . How could one expect an 
egalitarian and free society to grow out of an authoritarian 
organisation? That is impossible. The International, embryo of 
the future human society, must be, from now on, the faithful 
image of our principles of liberty and federation." [quoted by
Marx, _Fictitious Splits in the International_]

This simply echoes Bakunin's argument that the "organisation 
of the trade sections, their federation in the International, 
and their representation by the Chambers of Labour, not only 
create a great academy, in which the workers of the International, 
combining theory and practice, can and must study economic science, 
they also bear in themselves the living germs of *the new social 
order,* which is to replace the bourgeois world. They are creating 
not only the ideas but also the facts of the future itself." 
[quoted by Rocker, _Anarcho-Syndicalism_, p. 45] Anarchists apply
this insight to all organisations they take part in, stressing
that the only way we can create a self-managed society is by
self-managing our own struggles and organisations today. In this
way we turn our class organisations (indeed, the class struggle 
itself) into practical and effective "schools of anarchism" in 
which we learn to manage our own affairs without hierarchy and 
bosses.

Marxists reject this argument. Instead they stress the importance
of centralisation and consider the anarchist argument as utopian.
For effective struggle, strict centralisation is required as the
capitalist class and state is also centralised. In other words, to 
fight for socialism there is a need to organise in a way which the
capitalists have utilised -- to fight fire with fire. Unfortunately
they forget to extinguish a fire you have to use water. Adding more
flame will only increase the combustion, *not* put it out!

Of course, Marx misrepresented the anarchist position. He argued
that the Paris Communards "would not have failed if they had 
understood that the Commune was 'the embryo of the future human 
society' and had cast away all discipline and all arms -- that is, 
the things which must  disappear when there are no more wars!"
[Ibid.] Needless to say this is simply a slander on the anarchist
position. Anarchists, as the Circular makes clear, recognise that
we cannot totally reflect the future and so the current movement
can only be "as near as possible to our ideal." Thus we have to
do things, such as fighting the bosses, rising in insurrection,
smashing the state or defending a revolution, which we would not 
have to do in a socialist society. Such common sense, unfortunately,
is lacking in Marx who instead decides to utter nonsense for a
cheap polemical point. He never answered the basic point -- how do
people become able to manage society if they do not directly manage 
their own organisations and struggles? How can a self-managed
society come about unless people practice it in the here and
now? Can people create a socialist society if they do not implement
its basic ideas in their current struggles and organisations?

Ironically enough, given his own and his followers claims of 
his theory's proletarian core, it is Marx who was at odds with 
the early labour movement, *not* Bakunin and the anarchists. 
Historian Gwyn A. Williams notes in the early British labour 
movement there were "to be no leaders" and the organisations 
were "consciously modelled on the civil society they wished 
to create." [_Artisans and Sans-Culottes_, p. 72] Lenin, 
unsurprisingly, dismissed the fact that the British workers 
"thought it was an indispensable sign of democracy for all 
the members to do all the work of managing the unions" as 
"primitive democracy" and "absurd." He also complained about 
"how widespread is the 'primitive' conception of democracy 
among the masses of the students and workers" in Russia. 
[_Essential Works of Lenin_, pp. 162-3] Clearly, the anarchist
perspective reflects the ideas the workers' movement before it
degenerates into reformism and bureaucracy while Marxism reflects
it during this process of degeneration. Needless to say, the 
revolutionary nature of the early union movement compared to 
the reformism and bureaucratic control of the ones with 
"full-time professional officers" clearly shows who was correct!

Related to this is the fact that Marxists (particularly Leninists)
favour centralisation while anarchists favour decentralisation
within a federal organisation. As such, anarchists do not think
that decentralisation implies isolation or narrow localism. We 
have always stressed the importance of *federalism* to 
co-ordinate decisions. Power would be decentralised, but 
federalism ensures collective decisions and action. Under
centralised systems, anarchists argue, power is placed into
the hands of a few leaders. Rather than the real interests 
and needs of the people being co-ordinated, centralism simply
means the imposition of the will of a handful of leaders,
who claim to "represent" the masses. Co-ordination, in other
words, is replaced by coercion in the centralised system and
the needs and interests of all are replaced by those of a few
leaders at the centre. 

Similarly, anarchists and Marxists disagree on the nature of the
future economic and social system of socialism. While it is a
commonplace assumption that anarchists and Marxists seek the
same sort of society but disagree on the means, in actuality
there are substantial differences in their vision of a socialist
society. While both aim for a stateless communist society, the
actual structure of that society is different. Anarchists see it
as fundamentally decentralised and federal while Marxists tend
to envision it as fundamentally centralised. Moreover, Marxists 
such as Lenin saw "socialism" as being compatible with one-man 
management of production by state appointed "directors," armed 
with "dictatorial" powers (see section H.6.10 for further discussion). 
As such, anarchists argue that the Bolshevik vision of "socialism" 
is little more than state capitalism -- with the state replacing 
the boss as exploiter and oppressor of the working class. As we 
discuss this issue in sections H.3.13 and H.6, we will not do so 
here.

By failing to understand the importance of applying a vision of
a free society to the current class struggle, Marxists help ensure
that society never is created. By copying bourgeois methods within
their "revolutionary" organisations (parties and unions) they ensure
bourgeois ends (inequality and oppression).

H.1.7 Haven't you read Lenin's "State and Revolution"?

This question is often asked of people who critique Marxism,
particularly its Leninist form. Lenin's _State and Revolution_
is often considered his most democratic work and Leninists
are quick to point to it as proof that Lenin and those who
follow his ideas are not authoritarian. As such, its an
important question. So how do anarchists reply when people 
point them to Lenin's work as evidence of the democratic 
(even libertarian) nature of Marxism? Anarchists reply 
in two ways. 

Firstly, we argue many of the essential features of Lenin's 
ideas are to be found in anarchist theory. These features 
had been aspects of anarchism for decades *before* Lenin 
put pen to paper. Bakunin, for example, talked about 
mandated delegates from workplaces federating into 
workers' councils as the framework of a (libertarian)
socialist society in the 1860s. In the same period he also 
argued for popular militias to defend a revolution. Hence 
Murray Bookchin:

"much that passes for 'Marxism' in _State and Revolution_ 
is pure anarchism -- for example, the substitution of 
revolutionary militias for professional armed bodies and 
the substitution of organs of self-management for parliamentary 
bodies. What is authentically Marxist in Lenin's pamphlet is 
the demand for 'strict centralism,' the acceptance of a 'new' 
bureaucracy, and the identification of soviets with a state." 
[_Post-Scarcity Anarchism_, p. 213]

That this is the case is hidden in Lenin's work as he 
deliberately distorts anarchist ideas in it (see 
sections H.1.3 and H.1.4 for examples). Therefore, 
when Marxists ask whether anarchist have read Lenin's
_State and Revolution_ we reply by arguing that most
of Lenin's ideas were first expressed by anarchists
(while Lenin hide this fact). All in all, Lenin's work just 
strikes anarchists as little more than a re-hash of many 
their own ideas but placed in a statist context which 
totally and utterly undermines them in favour of party rule.

Secondly, anarchists argue that regardless of what Lenin
argued for in _State and Revolution_, he did not apply 
those ideas in practice (indeed, he did the exact opposite).
Therefore, the question of whether we have read Lenin's work
simply drives how the ideological nature and theoretical
bankruptcy of Leninism in all its many forms. This is because
the person asking this kind of question is asking you to 
evaluate their politics based on what they say rather than
on what they do, like any politician.

To use an analogy, what would you say to a politician who 
has cut welfare spending by 50% and increased spending on
the military and who argues that this act is irrelevant and
that you should look at their manifesto which states that 
they were going to do the opposite? Simply put, you would
consider this argument as laughable and them as liars as
you would evaluate them by their actions, not by what they 
say. Yet supporters of Leninism cannot do this (and, ironically 
enough, often quote Marx's words that it is impossible to 
judge either parties or peoples by what they say or think 
about themselves, you have to look at what they do). 
Leninists, by urging you to read Lenin's "State and 
Revolution" are asking you to evaluate them by what 
their manifesto says and ignore what they did. Anarchists, 
on the other hand, ask you to evaluate the Leninist manifesto 
by comparing it to what they actually did in power. Such an 
evaluation is the only means by which we can judge the 
validity of Leninist claims and politics.

As we discuss the Russian Revolution in more depth in
section H.6.4, we will not provide a summary of Lenin's 
claims in his famous work _State and Revolution_ and what
he did in practice here. However, we will say here that the 
difference between reality and rhetoric was extremely large 
and, therefore, it is a damning indictment of Bolshevism. 
Simply put, if the _State and Revolution_ is the manifesto 
of Bolshevism, then not a single promise in that work was 
kept by the Bolsheviks when they got into power. As such, 
Lenin's work cannot be used to evaluate Bolshevism ideology 
as Bolshevism paid no attention to it once it had taken state 
power. While Lenin and his followers chant rhapsodies about
the Soviet State (this 'highest and most perfect system of
democracy") they quickly turned its democratic ideas into a 
fairy-tale, and an ugly fairy-tale at that, by simply ignoring 
it in favour of party power (and party dictatorship). 

To state the obvious, to quote theory and not relate 
it to the practice of those who claim to follow it is 
a joke. It is little more than sophistry. If you look 
at the actions of the Bolsheviks after the October
Russian Revolution you cannot help draw the conclusion that 
Lenin's _State and Revolution_ has nothing to do with Bolshevik 
policy and presents a false image of what Leninists desire.
As such, we must present a comparison between rhetoric and
realty.

It will be objected in defence of Leninism that it is unfair
to hold Lenin responsible for the failure to apply his ideas
in practice. The terrible Civil War, in which Soviet Russia
was attacked by numerous armies, and the resulting economic
chaos meant that the objective circumstances made it impossible
to implement his democratic ideas. This argument contains
three flaws. Firstly, as we indicate in section H.8.3, the 
undemocratic policies of the Bolsheviks started *before* 
the start of the Civil War (so suggesting that the hardships 
of the Civil War were not to blame). Secondly, Lenin at no 
time indicated in _State and Revolution_ that it was 
impossible or inapplicable to apply those ideas during 
a revolution in Russia (quite the reverse!). Given that 
Marxists, including Lenin, argue that a "dictatorship of the 
proletariat" is required to defend the revolution against
capitalist resistance it seems incredulous to argue that Lenin's
major theoretical work on that regime was impossible to
apply in precisely the circumstances it was designed for.
Lastly, of course, Lenin himself in 1917 mocked those who 
argued that revolution was out of the question because 
"the circumstances are exceptionally complicated." He 
noting that any revolution, "in its development, would 
give rise to exceptionally complicated circumstances" 
and that it was "the sharpest, most furious, desperate 
class war and civil war. Not a single great revolution 
in history has escaped civil war. No one who does not 
live in a shell could imagine that civil war is conceivable 
without exceptionally complicated circumstances. If there 
were no exceptionally complicated circumstances there 
would be no revolution." [_Will the Bolsheviks Maintain 
Power?_, p. 80 and p. 81] As such, to blame difficult
objective circumstances for the failure of Bolshevism
to apply the ideas in _State and Revolution_ means to
argue that those ideas are inappropriate for a revolution
(which, we must stress, is what the leading Bolsheviks
actually *did* end up arguing by their support for party
dictatorship).

All in all, discussing Lenin's _State and Revolution_ without 
indicating that the Bolsheviks failed to implement its ideas
(indeed, did the exact opposite) suggests a lack of honesty.
It also suggests that the libertarian ideas Lenin appropriated
in that work could not survive being grafted onto the statist
ideas of mainstream Marxism. As such, _The State and Revolution_ 
laid out the foundations and sketched out the essential features 
of an alternative to Leninist ideas -- namely anarchism. Only the 
pro-Leninist tradition has used Lenin's work, almost to quiet 
their conscience, because Lenin, once in power, ignored it 
totally. The Russian Revolution shows that a workers state, 
as anarchists have long argued, means minority power, not
working class self-management of society. As such, Lenin's
work indicates the contradictory nature of Marxism -- while
claiming to support democratic/libertarian ideals they 
promote structures (such as centralised states) which undermine
those values in favour of party rule. The lesson is clear, only
libertarian means can ensure libertarian ends and they have
to be applied consistently within libertarian structures to
work. To apply them to statist ones will simply fail.

H.2 What parts of anarchism do Marxists particularly misrepresent?

Many people involved in politics will soon discover that Marxist
groups (particularly Leninist and Trotskyist ones) organise
"debates" about anarchism. These meetings are usually entitled
"Marxism and Anarchism" and are usually organised after anarchists
have been active in the area or have made the headlines somewhere.

These meetings, contrary to common sense, are usually not 
a debate as (almost always) no anarchists are invited to 
argue the anarchist viewpoint and, therefore, they present 
a one-sided account of "Marxism and Anarchism" in a 
manner which benefits the organisers. Usually, the format 
is a speaker distorting anarchist ideas and history for a 
long period of time (both absolutely in terms of the length 
of the meeting and relatively in terms of the boredom 
inflicted on the unfortunate attendees). It will soon 
become obvious to those attending that any such meeting is 
little more than an unprincipled attack on anarchism with 
little or no relationship to what anarchism is actually 
about. Those anarchists who attend such meetings usually 
spend most of their allotted (usually short) speaking time 
refuting the nonsense that is undoubtedly presented. Rather 
than a *real* discussion between the differences between
anarchism and "Marxism" (i.e. Leninism), the meeting simply
becomes one where anarchists correct the distortions and
misrepresentations of the speaker in order to create the
basis of a real debate. If the reader does not believe 
this summary we would encourage them to attend such a 
meeting and see for themselves.

Needless to say, we cannot hope to reproduce the many distortions
produced in such meetings. However, when anarchists do hit the
headlines (such as in the 1990 poll tax riot in London and the
in current anti-globalisation movement), various Marxist papers 
will produce articles on "Anarchism" as well. Like the meetings,
the articles are full of so many elementary errors that it 
takes a lot of effort to think they are the product of ignorance
rather than a conscious desire to lie (the appendix "Anarchism
and Marxism" contains a few replies to such articles and other
Marxist diatribes on anarchism). In addition, many of the 
founding fathers of Marxism (and Leninism) also decided to
attack anarchism in similar ways, so this activity does have
a long tradition in Marxist circles (particularly in Leninist
and Trotskyist ones). Sadly, Max Nettlau's comments on Marx
and Engels are applicable to many of their followers today.
He argued that they "acted with that shocking lack of honesty
which was characteristic of *all* their polemics. They worked
with inadequate documentation, which, according to their custom,
they supplemented with arbitrary declarations and conclusions
-- accepted as truth by their followers although they were 
exposed as deplorable misrepresentations, errors and unscrupulous
perversions of the truth." [_A Short History of Anarchism_, p. 132]
As the reader will discover, this summary has not lost its
relevance today. If they read Marxist "critiques" of anarchism
they will soon discover the same repetition of "accepted" truths,
the same inadequate documentation, the same arbitrary declarations
and conclusions as well as an apparent total lack of familiarity
with the source material they claim to be analysing.

This section of the FAQ lists and refutes many of the most
common distortions Marxists make with regards to anarchism. As 
will become clear, many of the most common Marxist attacks
on anarchism have little or no basis in fact but have simply
been repeated so often by Marxists that they have entered 
the ideology (the idea that anarchists think the capitalist
class will just disappear being, probably, the most famous
one, closely followed by anarchism being in favour of 
"small-scale" production). We will not bother to refute the 
more silly Marxist assertions (such as anarchists are against 
organisation or are not "socialists"). Instead, we will 
concentrate on the more substantial and most commonly 
repeated ones. Of course, many of these distortions and 
misrepresentations coincide and flow into each other, but 
there are many which can be considered distinct issues and 
will be discussed in turn.

Moreover, Marxists make many major and minor distortions of
anarchist theory in passing. For example, Engels asserted in his
infamous diatribe "The Bakuninists at work" that Bakunin "[a]s
early as September 1870 (in his *Lettres a un francais* [Letters
to a Frenchman]) . . . had declared that the only way to drive
the Prussians out of France by a revolutionary struggle was to
do away with all forms of centralised leadership and leave
each town, each village, each parish to wage war on its own."
[Marx, Engels and Lenin, _Anarchism and Anarcho-Syndicalism_, 
p. 141] In fact, the truth is totally different. 

Bakunin does, of course, reject "centralised leadership" as it 
would be "necessarily very circumscribed, very short-sighted, 
and its limited perception cannot, therefore, penetrate the 
depth and encompass the whole complex range of popular life." 
However, it is a falsehood to state that he denies the need for 
co-ordination of struggles and federal organisations from the 
bottom up. As he puts it, the revolution must "foster the 
self-organisation of the masses into autonomous bodies, 
federated from the bottom upwards." With regards to the 
peasants, he thinks they will "come to an understanding, and 
form some kind of organisation . . . to further their mutual 
interests . . . the necessity to defend their homes, their 
families, and their own lives against unforeseen attack . . . 
will undoubtedly soon compel them to contract new and mutually 
suitable arrangements." The peasants would be "freely organised 
from the bottom up." ["Letters to a Frenchman on the present
crisis", _Bakunin on Anarchism_, p. 196, p. 206 and p. 207] In 
this he repeated his earlier arguments concerning social revolution 
-- arguments that Engels was well aware of. In other words, Engels 
deliberately misrepresented Bakunin's political ideas.

Similarly, we find Trotsky asserting in 1937 that anarchists are
"willing to replace Bakunin's patriarchal 'federation of free 
communes' by the more modern federation of free soviets." 
[_Stalinism and Bolshevism_] It is hard to know where to start 
in this incredulous rewriting of history. Firstly, Bakunin's 
federation of free communes was, in fact, based on workers' 
councils ("soviets"). As he put it, "the federative Alliance of 
all working men's associations . . . will constitute the Commune"
and "revolution everywhere must be created by the people, and 
supreme control must always belong to the people organised
into a free federation of agricultural and industrial
associations . . . organised from the bottom upwards by
means of revolutionary delegation." [_Michael Bakunin: 
Selected Writings_, p. 170 and p. 172] The similarities 
with workers councils are clear. Little wonder historian
Paul Avrich summarised as follows:

"As early as the 1860's and 1870's, the followers of
Proudhon and Bakunin in the First International were
proposing the formation of workers' councils designed
both as a weapon of class struggle against capitalists 
and as the structural basis of the future libertarian
society." [_The Russian Anarchists_, p. 73]

As for the charge of supporting "patriarchal" communes,
nothing could be further from the truth. In his discussion
of the Russian peasant commune (the mir) Bakunin argued
that "patriarchalism" was one of its "three dark features,"
indeed "the main historical evil . . . against which we are
obliged to struggle with all our might." [_Statism and
Anarchy_, p. 206 and pp. 209-10] 

As can be seen Trotsky's summary of Bakunin's ideas is
totally wrong. Not only did his ideas on the organisation
of the free commune as a federation of workers' associations
predate the soviets by decades (and so much more "modern"
than Marxist conceptions), he also argued against patriarchal
relationships and urged their destruction in the Russian 
peasant commune (and elsewhere). Indeed, if any one fits
Trotsky's invention it is Marx, not Bakunin. After all,
Marx came round (eventually) to Bakunin's position that
the peasant commune could be the basis for Russia to jump 
straight to socialism (and so by-passing capitalism) but 
without Bakunin's critical analysis of that institution
and its patriarchal and other "dark" features. Similarly,
Marx never argued that the future socialist society would 
be based on workers' associations and their federation (i.e. 
workers' councils). His vision of revolution was formulated 
in typically bourgeois structures such as the Paris Commune's 
municipal council.

We could go on, but space precludes discussing every example.
Suffice to say, it is not wise to take any Marxist assertion
of anarchist thought or history at face value. A common technique
is to quote anarchist writers out of context or before they
become anarchists. For example, Marxist Paul Thomas argues
that Bakunin favoured "blind destructiveness" and yet quotes
more from Bakunin's pre-anarchist works (as well as Russian
nihilists) than Bakunin's anarchist works to prove his claim.
[_Karl Marx and the Anarchists_, pp. 288-90] Similarly, he
claims that Bakunin "defended the *federes* of the Paris 
Commune of 1871 on the grounds that they were strong enough
to dispense with theory altogether," yet his supporting quote
does not, in fact say this. [Op. Cit., p. 285] What Bakunin 
was, in fact, arguing was simply that theory must progress 
from experience and that any attempt to impose a theory on 
society would be doomed to create a "Procrustean bed" as no 
government could "embrace the infinite multiplicity and 
diversity of the real aspirations, wishes and needs whose 
sum total constitutes the collective will of a people." He
explicitly contrasted the Marxist system of "want[ing] to
impose science upon the people" with the anarchist desire
"to diffuse science and knowledge among the people, so that
the various groups of human society, when convinced by
propaganda, may organise and spontaneously combine into
federations, in accordance with their natural tendencies
and their real interests, but never according to a plan
traced in advance and *imposed upon the ignorant masses*
by a few 'superior' minds." [_The Political Theory of
Bakunin_, p. 300] A clear misreading of Bakunin's argument 
but one which fits nicely into Marxist preconceptions of 
Bakunin and anarchism in general.

This tendency to quote out of context or from periods when
anarchists were not anarchists probably explains why so
many of these Marxist accounts of anarchism are completely
lacking in references. Take, for example, the British SWP's
Pat Stack who wrote one of the most inaccurate diatribes
against anarchism the world has had the misfortunate to
see (namely "Anarchy in the UK?" which was published in
issue no. 246 of _Socialist Review_). There is not a single 
reference in the whole article, which is just as well, given
the inaccuracies contained in it. Without references, the
reader would not be able to discover for themselves the
distortions and simple errors contained in it. For example,
Stack asserts that Bakunin "claimed a purely 'instinctive 
socialism.'" However, the truth is different and this quote 
from Bakunin is one by him comparing himself and Marx in 
the 1840s! 

In fact, the *anarchist* Bakunin argued that "instinct 
as a weapon is not sufficient to safeguard the proletariat 
against the reactionary machinations of the privileged 
classes," as instinct "left to itself, and inasmuch as 
it has not been transformed into consciously reflected, 
clearly determined thought, lends itself easily to 
falsification, distortion and deceit." [_The Political 
Philosophy of Bakunin_, p. 215] Bakunin saw the process of
class struggle as the means of transforming instinct into
conscious thought. As he put it, the "goal, then, is to make
the worker fully aware of what he [or she] wants, to unjam
within him [or her] a steam of thought corresponding to
his [or her] instinct." This is done by "a single path,
that of *emancipation through practical action*," by
"workers' solidarity in their struggle against the bosses,"
of "collective struggle of the workers against the bosses."
This would be complemented by socialist organisations
"propagandis[ing] its principles." [_The Basic Bakunin_,
p. 102, p. 103 and p. 109] Clearly, Stack is totally
distorting Bakunin's ideas on the subject.

This technique of quoting Bakunin when he spoke about (or when
wrote in) his pre-anarchist days in the 1840s, i.e. nearly 
20 years *before* he became an anarchist, or from Proudhon's 
posthumously published work on property (in which Proudhon saw
small-scale property as a bulwark against state tyranny) to
attack anarchism is commonplace. As such, it is always wise to 
check the source material and any references (assuming that they 
are provided). Only by doing this can it be discovered whether
a quote reflects the opinions of individuals when they were 
anarchists or whether they are referring to periods when they
were no longer, or had not yet become, anarchists.

Ultimately, though, these kinds of articles by Marxists
simply show the ideological nature of their own politics
and say far more about Marxism than anarchism. After all,
if their politics were so strong they would not need to
distort anarchist ideas! In addition, these essays are
usually marked by a lot of (usually inaccurate) attacks on
the ideas (or personal failings) of individual anarchists 
(usually Proudhon and Bakunin and sometimes Kropotkin). No 
modern anarchist theorist is usually mentioned, never mind 
discussed. Obviously, for most Marxists, anarchists must 
repeat parrot-like the ideas of these "great men." However, 
while Marxists may do this, anarchists have always rejected 
this approach. We deliberately call ourselves *anarchists* 
rather than Proudhonists, Bakuninists, Kropotkinists, or 
after any other person. As Malatesta argued in 1876 (the
year of Bakunin's death) "[w]e follow ideas and not men, 
and rebel against this habit of embodying a principle in 
a man." [_Life and Ideas_, p. 198]

Therefore, anarchists, unlike many (most?) Marxists do not 
believe that some prophet wrote down the scriptures in past 
centuries and if only we could reach a correct understanding 
of these writings today we would see the way forward. Chomsky 
put it extremely well when he argued that: 

"The whole concept of Marxist or Freudian or anything like 
that is very odd. These concepts belong to the history of 
organised religion. Any living person, no matter how gifted, 
will make some contributions intermingled with error and 
partial understanding. We try to understand and improve on 
their contributions and eliminate the errors. But how can you 
identify yourself as a Marxist, or a Freudian, or an X-ist,
whoever X may be? That would be to treat the person as a God 
to be revered, not a human being whose contributions are to be 
assimilated and transcended. It's a crazy idea, a kind of 
idolatry." [_The Chomsky Reader_, pp. 29-30]

This means that anarchists recognise that any person, no matter
how great or influential, are just human. They make mistakes,
they fail to live up to all the ideals they express, they are
shaped by the society they live in, and so on. Anarchists 
recognise this fact and extract the positive aspects of past
anarchist thinkers, reject the rest and develop what we consider 
the living core of their ideas. We develop the ideas and analyses
of these pioneers of the anarchist ideal, reject the rubbish
and embrace the good, learn from history and constantly try 
to bring anarchist ideas up-to-date (after all, a lot has
changed since the days of Proudhon, Bakunin and Kropotkin
and this has to be taken into account). As Max Nettlau put it
with regards to Proudhon, "we have to extract from his work
useful teachings that would be of great service to our modern
libertarians, who nevertheless have to find their own way
from theory to practice and to the critique of our present-day
conditions, as Proudhon did in his time. This does not call
for a slavish imitation; it implies using his work to inspire
us and enable us to profit by his experience." [_A Short
History of Anarchism_, pp. 46-7] Similarly for other anarchists
-- we see them as a source of inspiration upon which to build
rather than a template which to copy. This means to attack
anarchism by, say, attacking Bakunin's or Proudhon's personal
failings is to totally miss the point. While anarchists may be
inspired by the ideas of, say, Bakunin or Proudhon it does
not mean we blindly follow all of their ideas. Far from it!
We critically analysis their ideas and keep what is living
and reject what is useless or dead. Sadly, such common sense
is lacking in many who critique anarchism.

However, the typical Marxist approach does have its benefits 
from a political perspective. As Albert Meltzer pointed out, 
"[i]t is very difficult for Marxist-Leninists to make an 
objective criticism of Anarchism, as such, because by its 
nature it undermines all the suppositions basic to Marxism. 
If Marxism is held out to be indeed *the* basic working class 
philosophy, and the proletariat cannot owe its emancipation to 
anyone but itself, it is hard to go back on it and say that the 
working class is not yet ready to dispense with authority placed
over it. Marxism therefore normally tries to refrain from
criticising anarchism as such -- unless driven to doing so,
when it exposes its own authoritarian . . . and concentrates
its attacks not on *anarchism,* but on *anarchists.*" 
[_Anarchism: Arguments for and Against_, p. 37] Needless to
say, this technique is the one usually applied by Marxists 
(although, we must stress that often their account of the 
ideas of Proudhon, Bakunin, and Kropotkin are so distorted 
that they fail even to do this!).

So anarchist theory has developed since Proudhon, Bakunin and
Kropotkin. At each period in history anarchism advanced in its 
understanding of the world, the anarchism of Bakunin was a 
development of that of Proudhon, these ideas were again 
developed by the anarcho-communists of the 1880s and by
the syndicalists of the 1890's, by the Italian Malatesta,
the Russian Kropotkin, the Mexican Flores Magon and many other 
individuals and movements. Today we stand on their shoulders, 
not at their feet.

As such, to concentrate on the ideas of a few "leaders" misses 
the point totally. Ideas change and develop and anarchism has 
changed as well. While it contains many of the core insights 
of, say, Bakunin, it has also developed them and added to them. 
It has, concretely, taken into account, say, the lessons of the 
Russian and Spanish revolutions and so on. As such, even assuming 
that Marxist accounts of certain aspects of the ideas of Proudhon, 
Bakunin and Kropotkin were correct, they would have to be shown to 
be relevant to modern anarchism to be of any but historical interest.
Sadly, Marxists generally fail to do this and, instead, we are
subject to a (usually inaccurate) history lesson.

In order to understand, learn from and transcend previous theorists 
we must honestly present their ideas. Unfortunately many Marxists 
do not do this and so this section of the FAQ involves correcting 
the many mistakes, distortions, errors and lies that Marxists have
subjected anarchism to. Hopefully, with this done, a real dialogue
can develop between Marxists and anarchists. Indeed, this has 
happened between libertarian Marxists (such as council communists
and Situationists) and anarchists and both tendencies have benefited
from it. Perhaps this dialogue between libertarian Marxists and
anarchists is to be expected, as the mainstream Marxists have often
misrepresented the ideas of libertarian Marxists as well!

H.2.1 Do anarchists reject defending a revolution?

According to many Marxists anarchists either reject the idea 
of defending a revolution or think that it is not necessary.

The Trotskyists of _Workers' Power_ present a typical Marxist
account of what *they* consider as anarchist ideas on this
subject:

"the anarchist conclusion is not to build any sort of state
in the first place -- not even a democratic workers' state.
But how could we stop the capitalists trying to get their 
property back, something they will definitely try and do?

"Should the people organise to stop the capitalists raising
private armies and resisting the will of the majority? If
the answer is yes, then that organisation - whatever you
prefer to call it -- is a state: an apparatus designed to
enable one class to rule over another.

"The anarchists are rejecting something which is necessary
if we are to beat the capitalists and have a chance of
developing a classless society." ["What's wrong with 
anarchism?", _World Revolution: PragueS26 2000_, pp. 12-13,
p. 13]

It would be simple to quote Malatesta on this issue and leave
it at that. As he argued in 1891, some people "seem almost to 
believe that after having brought down government and private 
property we would allow both to be quietly built up again, 
because of respect for the *freedom* of those who might feel 
the need to be rulers and property owners. A truly curious way 
of interpreting our ideas." [_Anarchy_, p. 41] Pretty much
common sense, so you would think! Sadly, this appears to not 
be the case. As Malatesta pointed out 30 years latter, the 
followers of Bolshevism "are incapable of conceiving freedom 
and of respecting for all human beings the dignity they expect,
or should expect, from others. If one speaks of freedom they
immediately accuse one of wanting to respect, or at least
tolerate, the freedom to oppress and exploit one's fellow
beings." [_Life and Ideas_, p. 145] As such, we have to 
explain anarchist ideas on the defence of a revolution and 
why this necessity need not imply a state and, if it does,
then it signifies the end of the revolution.

The argument by _Workers' Power_ is very common with the Leninist
left and contains numerous fallacies and so we shall base our
discussion on it. This discussion, of necessity, implies three
issues. Firstly, we have to show that anarchists have always
seen the necessity of defending a revolution. This shows that
the anarchist opposition to the "democratic workers' state"
(or "dictatorship of the proletariat") has nothing to do with
beating the ruling class and stopping them regaining their
positions of power. Secondly, we have to discuss the anarchist
and Marxist definitions of what constitutes a "state" and
show what they have in common and how they differ. Thirdly,
we must summarise why anarchists oppose the idea of a "workers'
state" in order for the *real* reasons why anarchists oppose it
to be understood. Each issue will be discussed in turn.

For revolutionary anarchists, it is a truism that a revolution
will need to defend itself against counter-revolutionary threats.
Bakunin, for example, while strenuously objecting to the idea
of a "dictatorship of the proletariat" (see section H.1.1 for
details) also thought a revolution would need to defend itself.
In his words:

"Immediately after established governments have been overthrown, 
communes will have to reorganise themselves along revolutionary 
lines . . . In order to defend the revolution, their volunteers 
will at the same time form a communal militia. But no commune
can defend itself in isolation. So it will be necessary to
radiate revolution outward, to raise all of its neighbouring
communes in revolt . . . and to federate with them for common
defence." [_No Gods, No Masters_, vol. 1, p. 142]

And:

"the Alliance of all labour associations . . . will constitute
the Commune . . . there will be a standing federation of the
barricades and a Revolutionary Communal Council . . . [made
up of] delegates . . . invested with binding mandates and
accountable and revocable at all times . . . all provinces,
communes and associations . . . [will] delegate deputies
to an agreed place of assembly (all . . . invested with 
binding mandated and accountable and subject to recall), in 
order to found the federation of insurgent associations,
communes and provinces . . . and to organise a revolutionary
force with the capacity of defeating the reaction . . . it
is through the very act of extrapolation and organisation of
the Revolution with an eye to the mutual defences of insurgent
areas that the universality of the Revolution . . . will
emerge triumphant." [Op. Cit., vol. 1, pp. 155-6]

Malatesta agreed, arguing for the "creation of voluntary
militia, without powers to interfere as militia in the
life of the community, but only to deal with any armed
attacks by the forces of reaction to re-establish themselves,
or to resist outside intervention." The workers must "take
possession of the factories" and "federate amongst themselves"
and only "the people in arms, in possession of the land, the
factories and all the natural wealth" could defend a revolution 
[_Life and Ideas_, p. 166, p. 165 and p. 170] Alexander
Berkman concurred: "The armed workers and peasants are the
only effective defence of the revolution. By means of their
unions and syndicates they must always be on guard against
counter-revolutionary attack." [_ABC of Anarchism_, p. 82]
Emma Goldman clearly and unambiguously stated that she
had "always insisted that an armed attack on the Revolution
must be met with armed force" and that "an armed 
counter-revolutionary and fascist attack can be met in
no way except by an armed defence." [_Vision on Fire_,
p. 222 and p. 217]

Clearly, anarchism has always recognised the necessity of
defending a revolution and proposed ideas to ensure it (ideas
applied with great success by, for example, the Makhnovists
in the Ukrainian Revolution and the C.N.T militias during
the Spanish). As such, any assertion that anarchism rejects
the necessity of defending a revolution are simply false.

Which, of course, brings us to the second assertion, namely
that any attempt to defend a revolution means that a state
has been created (regardless of what it may be called). For 
anarchists, such an argument simply shows that Marxists do 
not really understand what a state is. While the Trotskyist 
definition of a "state" is "an apparatus designed to enable 
one class to rule another," the anarchist definition is 
somewhat different. Anarchists, of course, do not deny
that the modern state is (to use Malatesta's excellent
expression) "the bourgeoisie's servant and *gendarme*." 
[_Anarchy_, p. 20] Every state that has ever existed has
defended the power of a minority class and, unsurprisingly,
has developed certain features to facilitate this. The
key one is centralisation of power. This ensures that the
working people are excluded from the decision making process
and power remains a tool of the ruling class. As such, the
centralisation of power (while it may take many forms) is
the key means by which a class system is maintained and,
therefore, a key aspect of a state. As Kropotkin put, the
"state idea . . . includes the existence of a power 
situated above society . . . a territorial concentration
as well as the concentration of many functions of the
life of societies in the hands of a few." [_Selected
Writings on Anarchism and Revolution_, p. 213] This was 
the case with representative democracy:

"To attack the central power, to strip it of its prerogatives,
to decentralise, to dissolve authority, would have been to abandon
to the people the control of its affairs, to run the risk of a
truly popular revolution. That is why the bourgeoisie sought to
reinforce the central government even more. . ." [Kropotkin,
_Words of a Rebel_, p. 143]

This meant that the "representative system was organised by 
the bourgeoisie to ensure their domination, and it will 
disappear with them. For the new economic phase that is about 
to begin we must seek a new form of political organisation, 
based on a principle quite different from that of representation. 
The logic of events imposes it." [Op. Cit., p. 125] So while 
we agree with Marxists that the main function of the state is 
to defend class society, we also stress the structure of the 
state has evolved to execute that role. In the words of Rudolf 
Rocker:

"[S]ocial institutions . . . do not arise arbitrarily, but
are called into being by special needs to serve definite
purposes . . . The newly arisen possessing classes had
need of a political instrument of power to maintain their
economic and social privileges over the masses of their
own people . . . Thus arose the appropriate social conditions
for the evolution of the modern state, as the organ of
political power of privileged castes and classes for the
forcible subjugation and oppression of the non-possessing
classes . . . Its external forms have altered in the course
of its historical development, but its functions have always
been the same . . . And just as the functions of the bodily
organs of . . . animals cannot be arbitrarily altered, so
that, for example, one cannot at will hear  with his eyes 
and see with his ears, so also one cannot at pleasure
transform an organ of social oppression into an instrument
for the liberation of the oppressed. The state can only
be what it is: the defender of mass-exploitation and 
social privileges, and creator of privileged classes." 
[_Anarcho-Syndicalism_, p. 20]

As such, a new form of society, one based on the participation 
of all in the affairs of society (and a classless society can be 
nothing else) means the end of the state. This is because it has
been designed to *exclude* the participation a classless society
needs in order to exist. In anarchist eyes, it is an abuse of
the language to call the self-managed organisations by which 
the former working class manage (and defend) a free society a 
state. If it *was* simply a question of consolidating a revolution
and its self-defence then there would be no argument:

"But perhaps the truth is simply this: . . . [some] take the 
expression 'dictatorship of the proletariat' to mean simply 
the revolutionary action of the workers in taking possession 
of the land and the instruments of labour, and trying to 
build a society and organise a way of life in which there 
will be no place for a class that exploits and oppresses the 
producers.

"Thus constructed, the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' would 
be the effective power of all workers trying to bring down 
capitalist society and would thus turn into Anarchy as soon 
as resistance from reactionaries would have ceased and no one 
can any longer seek to compel the masses by violence to obey 
and work for him. In which case, the discrepancy between us 
would be nothing more than a question of semantics. Dictatorship 
of the proletariat would signify the dictatorship of everyone,
which is to say, it would be a dictatorship no longer, just as 
government by everybody is no longer a government in the 
authoritarian, historical and practical sense of the word.

"But the real supporters of 'dictatorship of the proletariat'
do not take that line, as they are making quite plain in 
Russia. Of course, the proletariat has a hand in this, just
as the people has a part to play in democratic regimes,
that is to say, to conceal the reality of things. In reality,
what we have is the dictatorship of one party, or rather,
of one' party's leaders: a genuine dictatorship, with its
decrees, its penal sanctions, its henchmen and above all its
armed forces, which are at present [1919] also deployed in
the defence of the revolution against its external enemies,
but which will tomorrow be used to impose the dictator's
will upon the workers, to apply a break on revolution,
to consolidate the new interests in the process of emerging
and protect a new privileged class against the masses." 
[Malatesta, _No Gods, No Masters_, vol. 2, pp. 38-9]

The question is, therefore, one of *who* "seizes power" -- will 
it be the mass of the population or will it be a party claiming 
to represent the mass of the population. The difference is vital 
and it confuses the issue to use the same word "state" to describe 
two such fundamentally different structures as a "bottom-up" 
self-managed communal federation and a "top-down" hierarchical
centralised organisation (such as has been every state that has
existed). This explains why anarchists reject the idea of 
a "democratic workers' state" as the means by which a revolution
defends itself. Rather than signify working class power or
management of society, it signifies the opposite -- the seizure
of power of a minority (in this case, the leaders of the 
vanguard party).

Anarchists argue that the state is designed to exclude the
mass of the population from the decision making process. This, 
ironically for Trotskyism, was one of the reasons why leading
Bolsheviks (including Lenin and Trotsky) argued for a workers 
state. The centralisation of power implied by the state was
essential so that the vanguard party could ignore the "the 
will of the majority." This particular perspective was clearly 
a lesson they learned from their experiences during the Russian 
Revolution. 

As noted in section H.1.2, Lenin was arguing in 1920 that "the 
dictatorship of the proletariat cannot be exercised through an 
organisation embracing the whole of the class, because in all 
capitalist countries (and not only over here, in one of the 
most backward) the proletariat is still so divided, so degraded, 
and so corrupted in parts . . . that an organisation taking 
in the whole proletariat cannot directly exercise proletarian 
dictatorship. It can be exercised only by a vanguard . . . 
Such is the basic mechanism of the dictatorship of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, and the essentials of 
transitions from capitalism to communism . . . for the 
dictatorship of the proletariat cannot be exercised by a 
mass proletarian organisation." [_Collected Works_, vol. 32, 
p. 21]

This argument, as can be seen, was considered of general
validity and, moreover, was merely stating mainstream Bolshevik 
ideology. It was repeated in March 1923 by the Central Committee 
of the Communist Party in a statement issued to mark the 25th 
anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party. This
statement summarised the lessons gained from the Russian 
revolution. It stated that "the party of the Bolsheviks 
proved able to stand out fearlessly against the vacillations 
within its own class, vacillations which, with the slightest 
weakness in the vanguard, could turn into an unprecedented 
defeat for the proletariat." Vacillations, of course, are 
expressed by workers' democracy. Little wonder the statement 
rejects it: "The dictatorship of the working class finds 
its expression in the dictatorship of the party." ["To the 
Workers of the USSR" in G. Zinoviev, _History of the Bolshevik 
Party_, p. 213, p. 214] It should be noted that this Central
Committee included Trotsky who, in the same year, was stating 
that "[i]f there is one question which basically not only does 
not require revision but does not so much as admit the thought 
of revision, it is the question of the dictatorship of the 
Party." [_Leon Trotsky Speaks_, p. 158]

Needless to say, _Workers' Power_ (like most Trotskyists) blame
the degeneration of the Russian revolution on the Civil War
and its isolation. However, as these statements make clear,
the creation of a party dictatorship was not seen in these
terms. Rather, it was considered a necessity to suppress
democracy and replace it by party rule. Indeed, as noted in
section H.1.2, Trotsky was still arguing in 1937 for the 
"objective necessity" for the "dictatorship of a party" due 
to the "heterogeneity" of the working class. [_Writings 
1936-37_, pp. 513-4] Moreover, as we discuss in detail in 
section H.6, the Bolshevik undermining of working class 
autonomy and democracy started *well* before the outbreak 
of civil war, thus confirming anarchist theory. These 
conclusions of leading Leninists simply justified the
actions undertaken by the Bolsheviks from the start.

This is why anarchists reject the idea of a "democratic workers'
state." Simply put, as far as it is a state, it cannot be
democratic and in as far as it is democratic, it cannot be a
state. The Leninist idea of a "workers' state" means, in fact,
the seizure of power by the party. This, we must stress, naturally
follows from the idea of the state. It is designed for minority
rule and excludes, by its very nature, mass participation. As can
be seen, this aspect of the state is one which the leading lights
of Bolshevik agreed with. Little wonder, then, that in practice 
the Bolshevik regime suppressed of any form of democracy which 
hindered the power of the party (see section H.6). Maurice 
Brinton sums up the issue well when he argued that "'workers' 
power' cannot be identified or equated with the power of the 
Party -- as it repeatedly was by the Bolsheviks . . . What 
'taking power' really implies is that the vast majority of the 
working class at last realises its ability to manage both 
production and society -- and organises to this end." [_The 
Bolsheviks and Workers' Control_, p. xiv] 

In summary, therefore, anarchists reject the idea that the
defence of a revolution can be conducted by a state. As
Bakunin once put it, there is the "Republic-State" and
there is "the system of the Republic-Commune, the
Republic-Federation, i.e. the system of *Anarchism.* This 
is the politics of the Social Revolution, which aims at 
the abolition of the *State* and establishment of the 
economic, entirely free organisation of the people -- 
organisation from bottom to top by means of federation." 
[_The Political Philosophy of Bakunin_, p. 314] Indeed, 
creating a new state will simply destroy the most important
gain of any revolution -- working class autonomy -- and its
replacement by another form of minority rule (by the party).
Anarchists have always argued that the defence of a revolution
must not be confused with the state and so argue for the
abolition of the state *and* the defence of a revolution 
(also see section H.1.3 for more discussion). Only when 
working class people actually run themselves society will 
a revolution be successful. For anarchists, this means 
that "effective emancipation can be achieved only by the 
*direct, widespread, and independent action* . . . *of 
the workers themselves*, grouped . . . in their own 
class organisations . . . on the basis of concrete action 
and self-government, *helped but not governed*, by 
revolutionaries working in the very midst of, and not above 
the mass and the professional, technical, defence and other 
branches." [Voline, _The Unknown Revolution_, p. 197] This 
means that anarchists argue that the capitalist state cannot 
be transformed or adjusted, but has to be smashed by a 
social revolution and replaced with organisations and 
structures created by working class people during their 
own struggles (see section H.1.4 for details).

For a further discussion of anarchist ideas on defending a 
revolution, please consult sections I.5.14 and J.7.6.

H.2.2 Do anarchists reject "class conflict" as "the motor 
      of change" and "collective struggle" as the "means"? 

Of course not. Anarchists have always taken a keen interest in
the class struggle, in the organisation, solidarity and actions
of working class people. Indeed, class struggle plays a key
role in anarchist theory and to assert otherwise is simply to 
lie about anarchism. Sadly, Marxists have been known to make
such an assertion.

For example, Pat Stack of the British SWP argued that anarchists
"dismiss . . .  the importance of the collective nature of
change" and so "downplays the centrality of the working class" 
in the revolutionary process. This, he argues, means that for
anarchism the working class "is not the key to change." He 
stresses that for Proudhon, Bakunin and Kropotkin "revolutions 
were not about . . . collective struggle or advance." Indeed,
that anarchism "despises the collectivity." Amazingly he 
argues that for Kropotkin, "far from seeing class conflict 
as the dynamic for social change as Marx did, saw co-operation 
being at the root of the social process." Therefore, "[i]t follows 
that if class conflict is not the motor of change, the working 
class is not the agent and collective struggle not the means. 
Therefore everything from riot to bomb, and all that might 
become between the two, was legitimate when ranged against 
the state, each with equal merit." ["Anarchy in the UK?",
_Socialist Review_, no. 246] Needless to say, he makes the
usual exception for anarcho-syndicalists, thereby showing
his total ignorance of anarchism *and* syndicalism (see 
section H.2.8).

Indeed, these assertions are simply incredible. It is hard to believe
that anyone who is a leading member of a Leninist party could write
such nonsense which suggests that Stack is aware of the truth and
simply decides to ignore it. All in all, it is *very* easy to refute 
these assertions. All we have to do is, unlike Stack, to quote from 
the works of Bakunin, Kropotkin and other anarchists. Even the
briefest familiarity with the writings of revolutionary anarchism
would soon convince the reader that Stack really does not know 
what he is talking about.

Take, for example, Bakunin. Rather than reject class conflict,
collective struggle or the key role of the working class, Bakunin
based his political ideas on all three. As he put it, there was,
"between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, an irreconcilable 
antagonism which results inevitably from their respective stations
in life." He stressed "war between the proletariat and the
bourgeoisie is unavoidable" and would only end with the "abolition
of the bourgeoisie as a distinct class." In order the worker to
"become strong" they "must unite" with other workers in "the
union of all local and national workers' associations into a
world-wide association, *the great International Working-Men's
Association.*" It was only "through practice and collective
experience . . . [and] the progressive expansion and development
of the economic struggle [that] will bring [the worker] more
to recognise his [or her] true enemies: the privileged classes,
including the clergy, the bourgeoisie, and the nobility; and the
State, which exists only to safeguard all the privileges of those
classes." There was "but a single path, that of *emancipation
through practical action* . . . [which] has only one meaning.
It means workers' solidarity in their struggle against the
bosses. It means *trades-unions, organisation, and the
federation of resistance funds.*" Then, "when the revolution 
-- brought about by the force of circumstances -- breaks out, 
the International will be a real force and know what it has to 
do . . . take the revolution into its own hands . . . [and
become] an earnest international organisation of workers'
associations from all countries [which will be] capable of
replacing this departing political world of States and
bourgeoisie." ["The Policy of the International", _The Basic 
Bakunin_, pp. 97-8, p. 103 and p. 110]

Hardly the words of a man who rejected class conflict, the 
working class and the collective nature of change! Nor is
this an isolated argument from Bakunin, they recur continuously
throughout Bakunin's works. For example, he argued that
socialists must "[o]rganise the city proletariat in the
name of revolutionary Socialism, and in doing this unite
it into one preparatory organisation together with the
peasantry." [_The Political Philosophy of Bakunin_, p. 378] 
Similarly, he argued that "equality" was the "aim" of the
International Workers' Association and "the organisation
of the working class its strength, the unification of the
proletariat the world over . . . its weapon, its only
policy." He stressed that "to create a people's force
capable of crushing the military and civil force of the
State, it is necessary to organise the proletariat." 
[quoted by K.J. Kenafick, _Michael Bakunin and Karl Marx_, 
p. 95 and p. 254] 

Strikes played a very important role in Bakunin's ideas (as 
they do in all revolutionary anarchist thought). He saw the 
strike as "the beginnings of the social war of the proletariat 
against the bourgeoisie . . . Strikes are a valuable instrument 
from two points of view. Firstly, they electrify the masses 
. . . awaken in them the feeling of the deep antagonism which 
exists between their interests and those of the bourgeoisie
. . . secondly they help immensely to provoke and establish 
between the workers of all trades, localities and countries 
the consciousness and very fact of solidarity: a twofold 
action, both negative and positive, which tends to constitute 
directly the new world of the proletariat, opposing it almost 
in an absolute way to the bourgeois world." [cited in Caroline 
Cahm, _Kropotkin and the Rise of Revolutionary Anarchism
1872-1886_, pp. 216-217] 

Indeed, for Bakunin, strikes train workers for social revolution 
as they "create, organise, and form a workers' army, an army 
which is bound to break down the power of the bourgeoisie and 
the State, and lay the ground for a new world." [Bakunin, _The Political Philosophy of Bakunin_, pp. 384-5] Moreover, when
"strikes spread from one place to another, they come close
to turning into a general strike. And with the ideas of
emancipation that now hold sway over the proletariat, a
general strike can result only in a great cataclysm which
forces society to shed its old skin." The very process of
strikes, as noted, would create the framework of a socialist
society as "strikes indicate a certain collective strength
already" and "because each strike becomes the point of
departure for the formation of new groups." [_The Basic
Bakunin_, pp. 149-50] Thus the revolution would be "an 
insurrection of all the people and the voluntary organisation 
of the workers from below upward." [_Statism and Anarchy_,
p. 179] 

As we argue in sections H.1.4 and I.2.3, the very process 
of collective class struggle would, for Bakunin and other
anarchists, create the basis of a free society. Thus, in
Bakunin's eyes, the "future social organisation must be 
made solely from the bottom upwards, by the free association 
or federation of workers, firstly in their unions, then in 
the communes, regions, nations and finally in a great 
federation, international and universal." He saw the free 
society as being based on "the land, the instruments of work 
and all other capital [will] become the collective property 
of the whole of society and be utilised only by the workers, 
in other words by the agricultural and industrial 
associations." [_Michael Bakunin: Selected Writings_,
p. 206 and p. 174] In other words, the basic structure 
created by the revolution would be based on the working 
classes own combat organisations, as created in their
struggles within, but against, oppression and exploitation.

The link between present and future would be labour unions 
(workers' associations) created by working people in their
struggle against exploitation and oppression.  These played 
the key role in Bakunin's politics both as the means to abolish 
capitalism and the state and as the framework of a socialist 
society (this support for workers' councils predates Marxist 
support by five decades, incidentally). When he became an
anarchist, Bakunin always stressed that it was essential to 
"[o]rganise always more and more the practical militant 
international solidarity of the toilers of all trades and 
of all countries, and remember . . . you will find an immense, 
an irresistible force in this universal collectivity." [quoted 
by Kenafick, Op. Cit., p. 291] Quite impressive for someone 
who was a founding father of a theory which, according to 
Stack, downplayed the "centrality of the working class," 
argued that the working class was "not the key to change,"
dismissed "the importance of the collective nature of change"
as well as "collective struggle or advance" and "despises 
the collectivity"! Clearly, to argue that Bakunin held any
of these views simply shows that the person making such 
statements does not have a clue what they are talking about. 

The same, needless to say, applies to all revolutionary anarchists.
Kropotkin built upon Bakunin's arguments and, like him, based
his politics on collective working class struggle and organisation.
He consistently stressed that "the Anarchists have always advised 
taking an active part in those workers' organisations which carry 
on the *direct* struggle of Labour against Capital and its protector
-- the State." Such struggle, "better than any other indirect means, 
permits the worker to obtain some temporary improvements in the 
present conditions of work, while it opens his eyes to the evil done 
by Capitalism and the State that supports it, and wakes up his 
thoughts concerning the possibility of organising consumption, 
production, and exchange without the intervention of the capitalist 
and the State." [_Evolution and Environment_, pp. 82-3] In his
article on "Anarchism" for the _Encyclopaedia Britannica_, he
stressed that anarchists "have endeavoured to promote their
ideas directly amongst the labour organisations and to induce
those unions to a direct struggle against capital, without
placing their faith in parliamentary legislation." [_Kropotkin's
Revolutionary Pamphlets_, p. 287]

Far from denying the importance of collective class struggle, he 
actually stressed it again and again. As he once wrote, "to make 
the revolution, the mass of workers will have to organise 
themselves. Resistance and the strike are excellent means of 
organisation for doing this." He argued that it was "a question
of organising societies of resistance for all trades in each
town, of creating resistance funds against the exploiters, of
giving more solidarity to the workers' organisations of each
town and of putting them in contact with those of other towns,
of federating them . . . Workers' solidarity must no longer
be an empty word by practised each day between all trades and
all nations." [quoted by Caroline Cahm, Op. Cit., pp. 255-6]
Kropotkin could not have been clearer.

Clearly, Kropotkin was well aware of the importance of popular,
mass, struggles. As he put it, anarchists "know very well that 
any popular movement is a step towards the social revolution. It 
awakens the spirit of revolt, it makes men [and women] accustomed 
to seeing the established order (or rather the established 
disorder) as eminently unstable." [_Words of a Rebel_, p. 203]
As regards the social revolution, he argues that "a decisive
blow will have to be administered to private property: from
the beginning, the workers will have to proceed to take over
all social wealth so as to put it into common ownership. This
revolution can only be carried out by the workers themselves."
In order to do this, the masses have to build their own
organisation as the "great mass of workers will not only have 
to constitute itself outside the bourgeoisie . . . it will have
to take action of its own during the period which will precede
the revolution . . . and this sort of action can only be
carried out when a strong *workers' organisation* exists."
This meant, of course, it was "the mass of workers we have to
seek to organise. We . . . have to submerge ourselves in the
organisation of the people . . . When the mass of workers is
organised and we are with it to strengthen its revolutionary
idea, to make the spirit of revolt against capital germinate
there . . . then it will be the social revolution." [quoted
by Caroline Cahm, Op. Cit., pp. 153-4]

He saw the class struggle in terms of "a multitude of acts
of revolt in all countries, under all possible conditions:
first, individual revolt against capital and State; then
collective revolt -- strikes and working-class insurrections
-- both preparing, in men's minds as in actions, a revolt
of the masses, a revolution." Clearly, the mass, collective
nature of social change was not lost on Kropotkin who pointed
to a "multitude of risings of working masses and peasants"
as a positive sign. Strikes, he argued, "were once 'a war
of folded arms'" but now were "easily turning to revolt, and
sometimes taking the proportions of vast insurrections."
[_Kropotkin's Revolutionary Pamphlets_, p. 144] 

And Pat Stack argues that Kropotkin did not see "class conflict 
as the dynamic for social change," nor "class conflict" as "the 
motor of change" and the working class "not the agent and 
collective struggle not the means"! Truly incredible and a
total and utter distortion of Kropotkin's ideas on the subject.

As for other anarchists, we discover the same concern over
class conflict, collective struggle and organisation and the
awareness of a mass social revolution by the working class.
Emma Goldman, for example, argued that anarchism "stands for
direct action" and that "[t]rade unionism, the economic
area of the modern gladiator, owes its existence to direct
action . . . In France, in Spain, in Italy, in Russian, nay
even in England (witness the growing rebellion of English
labour unions), direct, revolutionary economic action has
become so strong a force in the battle for industrial
liberty as to make the world realise the tremendous 
importance of labour's power. The General Strike [is]
the supreme expression of the economic consciousness of
the workers . . . Today every great strike, in order to
win, must realise the importance of the solidaric general
protest." [_Anarchism and Other Essays_, pp. 65-6] She
places collective class struggle at the centre of her
ideas and, crucially, she sees it as the way to create an
anarchist society:

"It is this war of classes that we must concentrate upon,
and in that connection the war against false values, against
evil institutions, against all social atrocities. Those who
appreciate the urgent need of co-operating in great struggles
. . . must organise the preparedness of the masses for the
overthrow of both capitalism and the state. Industrial and
economic preparedness is what the workers need. That alone
leads to revolution at the bottom . . . That alone will give
the people the means to take their children out of the slums,
out of the sweat shops and the cotton mills . . . That alone
leads to economic and social freedom, and does away with all
wars, all crimes, and all injustice." [_Red Emma Speaks_, 
pp. 309-10]

For Malatesta, "the most powerful force for social transformation
is the working class movement . . . Through the organisations
established for the defence of their interests, workers
acquire an awareness of the oppression under which they
live and of the antagonisms which divide them from their
employers, and so begin to aspire to a better life, get
used to collective struggle and to solidarity." This meant
that anarchists "must recognise the usefulness and importance
of the workers' movement, must favour its development, and
make it one of the levers of their action, doing all they
can so that it . . . will culminate in a social revolution."
Anarchists must "deepen the chasm between capitalists and
wage-slaves, between rulers and ruled; preach expropriation
of private property and the destruction of State." The new
society would be organised "by means of free association
and federations of producers and consumers." [_Life and 
Ideas_, p. 113, pp. 250-1 and p. 184] Alexander Berkman,
unsurprisingly, argued the same thing. As he put it,
only "the worst victims of present institutions" could
abolish capitalism as "it is to their own interest to
abolish them. . . labour's emancipation means at the same
time the redemption of the whole of society." He stressed
that "*only the right organisation of the workers* can
accomplish what we are striving for . . . Organisation from
the bottom up, beginning with the shop and factory, on the
foundation of the joint interests of the workers everywhere
. . . alone can solve the labour question and serve the
true emancipation of man[kind]." [_The ABC of Anarchism_,
p. 44 and p. 60

As can be seen, the claim that Kropotkin or Bakunin, or 
anarchists in general, ignored the class struggle and 
collective working class struggle and organisation is 
either a lie or indicates ignorance. Clearly, anarchists
have placed working class struggle, organisation and
collective direct action and solidarity at the core of
their politics (and as the means of creating a libertarian
socialist society) from the start.

Also see section H.2.8 for a discussion of the relationship 
of anarchism to syndicalism.

H.2.3 Does anarchism "yearn for what has gone before"?

Pat Stack states that one of the "key points of divergence"
between anarchism and Marxism is that the former, "far from 
understanding the advances that capitalism represented, tended 
to take a wistful look back. Anarchism shares with Marxism an 
abhorrence of the horrors of capitalism, but yearns for what 
has gone before." ["Anarchy in the UK?", _Socialist Review_, 
no. 246]

Like his other "key point" (namely the rejection of class 
struggle -- see last section), Stack is simply wrong. Even 
the quickest look at the works of Proudhon, Bakunin and 
Kropotkin would convince the reader that this is simply 
distortion. Rather than look backwards for their ideas of 
social life, anarchism has always been careful to base its 
ideas on the current state of society and what anarchist
thinkers considered positive current trends within society. 

The dual element of progress is important to remember. Capitalism 
is a class society, marked by exploitation, oppression and various 
social hierarchies. In such a society progress can hardly be neutral. 
It will reflect vested interests, the needs of those in power, the 
rationales of the economic system (e.g. the drive for profits) and 
those who benefit from it, the differences in power between nations 
and companies and so on. Equally, it will be shaped by the class 
struggle, the resistance of the working classes to exploitation 
and oppression, the objective needs of production, etc. As such, 
trends in society will reflect the various class conflicts, social 
hierarchies, power relationships and so on which exist within it.

This is particularly true of the economy. The development of
the industrial structure of a capitalist economy will be based
on the fundamental need to maximise the profits and power of
the capitalists. As such, it will develop (either by market
forces or by state intervention) in order to ensure this.
This means that various tendencies apparent in capitalist
society exist specifically to aid the development of capital.
This means that it does not follow that because a society which 
places profits above people has found a specific way of organising
production "efficient" it means that a socialist society will do.
As such, anarchist opposition to specific tendencies within
capitalism (such as the increased concentration and centralisation
of companies) does not mean a "yearning" for the past. Rather,
it shows an awareness that capitalist methods are precisely that
and that they need not be suited for a society which replaces 
the profit system with human and ecological need as the criteria 
for decision making.

For anarchists, this means questioning the assumptions of 
capitalist progress. This means that the first task of a 
revolution after the expropriation of the capitalists and
the destruction of the state will be to transform the 
industrial structure and how it operates, not keep it as 
it is. Anarchists have long argued that that capitalist methods 
cannot be used for socialist ends. In our battle to democratise 
and socialise the workplace, in our awareness of the importance 
of collective initiatives by the direct producers in transforming 
their work situation, we show that factories are not merely 
sites of production, but also of reproduction -- the reproduction 
of a certain structure of social relations based on the division 
between those who give orders and those who take them, between 
those who direct and those who execute. Equally, the structure of
industry has developed to maximise profits. Why assume that this
structure will be equally as efficient in producing useful products
by meaningful work which does not harm the environment?

A further aspect of this is that many of the struggles today, from 
the Zapatistas in Chiapas to those against Genetically Modified (GM) 
food and nuclear power are precisely based on the understanding that 
capitalist 'progress' can not be uncritically accepted. To resist 
the expulsion of people from the land in the name of progress or 
the introduction of terminator seeds is not to look back to "what 
had gone", although this is also precisely what the proponents of 
capitalist globalisation often accuse us of. It is to put "people 
before profit." 

As such, only a sophist would confuse a critical evaluation of
trends within capitalism with a yearning for the past. It means
to buy into the whole capitalist notion of "progress" which has
always been part of justifying the inhumanities of the status
quo. Simply put, just because a process is rewarded by the
profit driven market it does not mean that it makes sense from
a human or ecological perspective. For example, as we argue in
section J.5.11, the capitalist market hinders the spread of
co-operatives and workers' self-management in spite of their 
well documented higher efficiency and productivity. From the 
perspective of the needs of the capitalists, this makes perfect 
sense. In terms of the workers and efficient allocation of 
resources, it does not. Would Marxists argue that because 
co-operatives and workers' self-management of production are
marginal aspects of the capitalist economy it means that they 
will play no part in a sane society or that if a socialist
expresses interest in them it means that are "yearning" for
a past mode of production? We hope not. 

This common Marxist failure to understand anarchist investigations 
of the future is, ironically enough, joined with a total failure
to understand the social conditions in which anarchists have
put forward their ideas. Ironically, for all his claims that 
anarchists ignore "material conditions," it is Pat Stack (and
others like him) who does so in his claims against Proudhon. 
Stack argues that Proudhon (like all anarchists) was "yearning 
for the past" when he advanced his mutualist ideas. Nothing,
however, could be further from the truth. This is because the 
society in which the French anarchist lived was predominately 
artisan and peasant in nature. This was admitted by Marx and 
Engels in the _Communist Manifesto_ ("[i]n countries like 
France" the peasants "constitute far more than half of the 
population." [_The Marx-Engels Reader_, p. 493]). As such, 
for Proudhon to incorporate the aspirations of the majority 
of the population is not to "yearn for what has gone before" 
but rather an extremely sensible position to take. 

Therefore, it is hardly an example of Proudhon "yearning for
the past" for Stack to mention that Marx dubbed Proudhon ("the 
founder of modern anarchism") as "the socialist of the small 
peasant or master craftsman." It is simply unsurprising, a
simple statement of fact, as the French working classes were, 
at the time, predominately small peasants or master craftsmen 
(or artisans). As K. Steven Vincent points out Proudhon's 
"social theories may not be reduced to a socialism for only 
the peasant class, nor was it a socialism only for the petite 
bourgeois; it was a socialism of and for French workers. And 
in the mid-nineteenth century . . . most French workers were 
still artisans." Indeed, "[w]hile Marx was correct in 
predicting the eventual predominance of the industrial 
proletariat vis-a-vis skilled workers, such predominance was 
neither obvious nor a foregone conclusion in France during 
the nineteenth century. The absolute number of small 
industries even increased during most of the century."
[_Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and the Rise of French Republican 
Socialism_, p. 5 and p. 282] Proudhon himself noted in 1851
that of a population of 36 million, 24 million were peasants
and 6 million were artisans. Of the remaining 6 million,
these included wage-workers for whom "workmen's associations"
would be essential as "a protest against the wage system,"
the "denial of the rule of capitalists" and for "the 
management of large instruments of labour." [_The General
Idea of the Revolution_, pp. 97-8]

To summarise, if the society in which you live is predominately 
made-up of peasants and artisans then it is hardly an insult to 
be called "the socialist of the small peasant or master 
craftsman." Equally, it can hardly represent a desire for "what 
has gone before" to tailor your ideas to the actual conditions 
in the country in which you live! And Stack accuses *anarchists* 
of ignoring "material conditions"! 

Neither can it be said that Proudhon ignored the development 
of industrialisation in France during his lifetime. Quite the 
reverse, in fact, as indicated above. Proudhon did *not*
ignore the rise of large-scale industry. He argued that
such industry should be managed by the workers' themselves
via workers associations. As he put it, "certain industries"
required "the combined employment of a large number of
workers" and so the producer is "a collectivity." In such
industries "we have no choice" and so "it is necessary to
form an *association* among the workers" because "without
that they would remain related as subordinates and superiors,
and there would ensue two industrial castes of masters and
wage-workers, which is repugnant to a free and democratic
society." [Op. Cit., pp. 215-6]

All in all, Stack is simply showing his ignorance of both 
Proudhon's ideas *and* the society (the "material conditions") 
in which they were shaped and were aimed for. As can be seen,
Proudhon incorporated the development of large-scale industry
within his mutualist ideas and so the need to abolish wage
labour by workers' associations and workers' control of
production. Perhaps Stack can fault Proudhon for seeking the 
end of capitalism too soon and for not waiting patiently will 
it developed further (if he does, he will also have to attack 
Marx, Lenin and Trotsky as well for the same failing!), but 
this has little to do with "yearn[ing] for what has gone before."

After distorting Proudhon's ideas on industry, Stack does the same
with Bakunin. He asserts the following:

"Similarly, the Russian anarchist leader Bakunin argued that it 
was the progress of capitalism that represented the fundamental 
problem. For him industrialisation was an evil. He believed it 
had created a decadent western Europe, and therefore had held 
up the more primitive, less industrialised Slav regions as the 
hope for change."

Now, it would be extremely interesting to find out where, exactly,
Stack discovered that Bakunin made these claims. After all, they
are at such odds with Bakunin's anarchist ideas that it is temping 
to conclude that Stack is simply making it up. This, we suggest, 
explains the total lack of references for such an outrageous 
claim. Looking at his main source, we discover Paul Avrich 
writing that "[i]n 1848" (i.e. nearly 20 years *before* Bakunin 
became an anarchist!) Bakunin "spoke of the decadence of Western 
Europe and saw hope in the primitive, less industrialised Slavs 
for the regeneration of the Continent." [Op. Cit., p. 8] The
plagiarism, again, is obvious, as are the distortions. Given
that Bakunin became an anarchist in the mid-1860s, how his
pre-anarchist ideas are relevant to an evaluation of anarchism
escapes logic. It makes as much sense as quoting Marx to refute
fascism as Mussolini was originally the leader of the left-wing
of the Italian Socialist Party! 

It is, of course, simple to refute Stack's claims. We simply 
need to do that which he does not, namely quote Bakunin. For 
someone who thought "industrialisation was an evil," a key
aspect of Bakunin's ideas on social revolution was the seizing
of industry and its placing under social ownership. As he put
it, "capital and all tools of labour belong to the city 
workers -- to the workers associations. The whole organisation
of the future should be nothing but a free federation of workers
-- agricultural workers as well as factory workers and 
associations of craftsmen." [_The Political Philosophy of
Bakunin_, p. 410] Bakunin argued that "to destroy . . . all the 
instruments of labour . . . would be to condemn all humanity -- 
wwhich is infinity too numerous today to exist. . . on the simple 
gifts of  nature. . . -- to. . . death by starvation. Thus
capital cannot and must not be destroyed. It must be preserved." 
Only when workers "obtain not individual but *collective* 
property in capital" and when capital is no longer 
"concentrated in the hands of a separate, exploiting class" 
will they be able "to smash the tyranny of capital." [_The 
Basic Bakunin_, pp. 90-1] He stressed that only "associated
labour, this is labour organised upon the principles of
reciprocity and co-operation, is adequate to the task of
maintaining the existence of a large and somewhat civilised
society." Moreover, the "whole secret of the boundless 
productivity of human labour consists first of all in
applying . . . scientifically developed reason . . . and
then in the division of that labour." [_The Political
Philosophy of Bakunin_, pp. 341-2] Hardly the thoughts of
someone opposed to industrialisation!

Rather than oppose industrialisation and urge the destruction
of industry, Bakunin considered one of the first acts of the 
revolution would be workers' associations taking over the means 
of production and turning them into collective property managed 
by the workers themselves. Hence Daniel Guerin's comment: 

"Proudhon and Bakunin were 'collectivists,' which is to say they 
declared themselves without equivocation in favour of the common 
exploitation, not by the State but by associated workers of the 
large-scale means of production and of the public services. 
Proudhon has been quite wrongly presented as an exclusive 
enthusiast of private property." ["From Proudhon to Bakunin", 
_The Radical Papers_, Dimitrios I. Roussopoulos (ed.), p.32]

Clearly, Stack does not have the faintest idea of what he is
talking about! Nor is Kropotkin any safer than Proudhon or 
Bakunin from Stack's distortions. He claims that:

"Peter Kropotkin, another famous anarchist leader to emerge in 
Russia, also looked backwards for change. He believed the ideal 
society would be based on small autonomous communities, devoted 
to small scale production. He had witnessed such communities 
among Siberian peasants and watchmakers in the Swiss mountains."

First, we must note the plagiarism. Stack is summarising Paul 
Avrich's summary of Kropotkin's ideas. [_Anarchist Portraits_,
p. 62] Rather than go to the source material, Stack provides an
interpretation of someone else's interpretation of someone else's
ideas! Clearly, the number of links in the chain means that
something is going to get lost in the process and, of course,
it does. The something which "gets lost" is, unfortunately, 
Kropotkin's ideas.
 
Ultimately, Stack is simply showing his total ignorance of Kropotkin's 
ideas by making such a statement. At least Avrich expanded upon his
summary to mention that Kropotkin's positive evaluation of using
modern technology and the need to apply it on an appropriate level 
to make work and the working environment as pleasant as possible. 
As Avrich summarises, "[p]laced in small voluntary workshops, 
machinery would rescue human beings from the monotony and toil
of large-scale capitalist enterprise, allow time for leisure
and cultural pursuits, and remove forever the stamp of inferiority
traditionally borne by manual labour." [Op. Cit., p. 63] Hardly
"backward looking" to desire the application of science and
technology to transform the industrial system into one based on
the needs of people rather than profit!

Stack must be hoping that the reader has, like himself, not read 
Kropotkin's classic work _Fields, Factories and Workshops_ for if 
they have then they would be aware of the distortion Stack subjects 
Kropotkin's ideas to. While Avrich does present, in general, a
reasonable summary of Kropotkin's ideas, he does place it into 
a framework of his own making. Kropotkin while stressing the
importance of decentralising industry within a free society
did not look backward for his inspiration. Rather, he looked
to trends within existing society, trends he thought pointed
in an anti-capitalist direction. This can be seen from the fact
he based his classic work _Field, Factories and Workshops_ on 
detailed analysis of current developments in the economy and 
came to the conclusion that industry would spread across the 
global (which has happened) and that small industries will 
continue to exist side by side with large ones (which also 
has been confirmed). From these facts he argued that a 
socialist society would aim to decentralise production, 
combining agriculture with industry and both using modern 
technology to the fullest. 

As we discuss the fallacy that Kropotkin (or anarchists in
general) have argued for "small autonomous communities, 
devoted to small scale production" in section I.3.8, we
will not do so here. Suffice to say, Kropotkin's vision 
was one of federations of decentralised communities in
which production would be based on the "scattering of 
industries over the country -- so as to bring the factory 
amidst the fields . . . agriculture . . . combined with 
industry . . . to produce a combination of industrial with 
agricultural work." He considered this as "surely the next 
step to be made, as soon as a reorganisation of our present 
conditions is possible." Indeed, he though that this step
"is imposed by the very necessity of *producing for the
producers themselves.*" Kropotkin attempted to show, based 
on a detailed analysis of modern economic statistics and 
trends, a vision of a decentralised, federated communal 
society  where "the workers" were "the real managers of 
industries" and what this would imply once society was
free of capitalism. Needless to say, he did not think
that this "next step" would occur until "a reorganisation
of our present conditions [was] possible." [_Fields, 
Factories and Workshops Tomorrow_, pp. 157-8] In other
words, until after a social revolution which expropriated 
industry and the land and placed social wealth into the 
hands of the producers. Until then, the positive trends he 
saw in modern society would remain circumcised by the 
workings of the capitalist market. 

He did not, as is often asserted, argue for "small-scale 
production" (he still saw the need for factories, for 
example) but rather for production geared to *appropriate*
levels, based on the objective needs of production (without
the distorting effects generated by the needs of capitalist
profits and power) and, of necessity, the needs of those
who work in and live alongside industry (and today we
would add, the needs of the environment). In other words, 
the transformation of capitalism into a society human 
beings could live full and meaningful lives in. Part of 
this would involve creating an industry based on human 
needs. "Have the factory and the workshop at the gates 
of your fields and gardens and work in them," he argued. 
"Not those large establishments, of course, in which huge 
masses of metals have to be dealt with and which are better 
placed at certain spots indicated by Nature, but the countless
variety of workshops and factories which are required to
satisfy the infinite diversity of tastes among civilised
men [and women]." The new factories and workplaces would
be "airy and hygienic, and consequently economical, . . .
in which human life is of more account than machinery and
the making of extra profits." [Op. Cit., p. 197] Under 
capitalism, he argued, the whole discourse of economics 
(like industrial development itself) was based on the 
logic and rationale of the profit motive:

"Under the name of profits, rent and interest upon capital,
surplus value, and the like, economists have eagerly
discussed the benefits which the owners of land or capital,
or some privileged nations, can derive, either from the
under-paid work of the wage-labourer, or from the
inferior position of one class of the community towards
another class, or from the inferior economical development
of one nation towards another nation. . . 

"In the meantime the great question -- 'What have we to
produce, and how?' necessarily remained in the background
. . . The main subject of social economy -- that is, the
*economy of energy required for the satisfaction of human
needs* -- is consequently the last subject which one
expects to find treated in a concrete form in economical
treatises." [Op. Cit., p. 17]

Kropotkin's ideas were, therefore, an attempt to discuss
how a post-capitalist society could develop, based on an
extensive investigation of current trends within capitalism,
and reflecting the needs which capitalism ignores. As noted 
above, current trends within capitalism have positive 
(socialistic) and negative (capitalistic) aspects as 
capitalist industry has not developed neutrally (it has 
been distorted by the twin requirements to maintain 
capitalist profits and power). 

For this reason Kropotkin considered the concentration of 
capital (which most Marxists base their arguments for 
socialism on) did not, in fact, represent an advance for
socialism as it was "often nothing but an amalgamation of 
capitalists for the purpose of *dominating the market*, 
not for cheapening the technical process." [_Fields, 
Factories and Workshops Tomorrow_, p. 154] Indeed, by
basing themselves on the trends of capital towards big
business, Leninism simply locks itself into the logic
of capitalism and, by implication, sees a socialist 
society which will basically be the same as capitalism, 
using the technology, industrial structure and industry 
developed under class society without change. After all, 
did Lenin not argue that "Socialism is merely state 
capitalist monopoly made to benefit the whole people"? 

Rather than condemn Kropotkin, Stack's comments (and those
like them) simply show the poverty of the Leninist critique 
of capitalism and its vision of the socialist future.

All in all, anyone who claims that anarchism is "backward looking"
or "yearns for the past" simply has no idea what they are talking
about.

H.2.4 Do anarchists think "the state is the main enemy" rather 
      than just "one aspect" of class society?

Pat Stack argues that "the idea that dominates anarchist thought" 
is "that the state is the main enemy, rather than identifying the 
state as one aspect of a class society that has to be destroyed."
["Anarchy in the UK?", _Socialist Review_, no. 246]] Paul Thomas
states that "Anarchists insist that the basis source of social
injustice is the state." [_Karl Marx and the Anarchists_, p. 2] 

On the face of it, such assertions make little sense. After
all, was not the first work by the first self-declared anarchist
called _What is Property?_ and contain the revolutionary maxim
"property is theft"? Surely this fact alone would be enough to 
put to rest the notion that anarchists view the state as the
main problem in the world? Obviously not. Flying in the face
of this well known fact as well as anarchist theory, Marxists 
have constantly repeated the falsehood that anarchists consider
the state as the main enemy. Indeed, Stack and Thomas are simply 
repeating an earlier assertion by Engels:

"Bakunin has a peculiar theory of his own, a medley of Proudhonism
and communism. The chief point concerning the former is that he
does not regard capital, i.e. the class antagonism between
capitalists and wage workers which has arisen through social
development, but the *state* as the main enemy to be abolished.
. . . our view [is] that state power is nothing more than the
organisation which the ruling classes -- landowners and capitalists
-- have provided for themselves in order to protect their social
privileges, Bakunin [on the other hand] maintains that it is the
*state* which has created capital, that the capitalist has his
capital *only be the grace of the state.* As, therefore, the
state is the chief evil, it is above all the state which must
be done away with and then capitalism will go to blazes of
itself. We, on the contrary, say: Do away with capital, the
concentration of all means of production in the hands of a
few, and the state will fall of itself. The difference is an
essential one . . . the abolition of capital *is* precisely
the social revolution." [Marx, Engels and Lenin, Op. Cit., 
p. 71]

As will come as no surprise, Engels did not bother to indicate 
where he discovered Bakunin's ideas on these matters. Similarly,
his followers raise this kind of assertion as a truism, apparently
without the need for evidence to support the claim. This is
hardly surprising as anarchists, including Bakunin, have expressed 
an idea distinctly at odds with Engels' claims, namely that the 
social revolution would be marked by the abolition of capitalism 
and the state at the same time. Indeed, this vision of a *social*
revolution (i.e. one that combined political, social *and* 
economic goals) occurred continuously throughout Bakunin's
writings when he was an anarchist. Indeed, to claim that he,
or anarchists in general, just opposed the state suggests a
total unfamiliarity with anarchist theory. For Bakunin, like all
anarchists, the abolition of the state occurs at the same time
as the abolition of capital. This joint abolition *is* precisely
the social revolution.

In 1865, for example, we discover Bakunin arguing that anarchists
"seek the destruction of all States" in his "Program of the
Brotherhood." Yet he also argued that a member of this association
"must be socialist" and see that "labour" was the "sole producer
of social assets" and so "anyone enjoying these without working
is an exploiter of another man's labour, a thief." They must also
"understand that there is no liberty in the absence of equality"
and so the "attainment of the widest liberty" is possible only
"amid the most perfect (de jure and de facto) political, 
economic and social equality." The "sole and supreme objective"
of the revolution "will be the effective political, economic
and social emancipation of the people." This was because political
liberty "is not feasible without political equality. And the
latter is impossible without economic and social equality."
This mean that the "land belongs to everyone. But usufruct of
it will belong only to those who till it with their own hands."
As regards industry, "through the unaided efforts and economic
powers of the workers' associations, capital and the instruments
of labour will pass into the possession of those who will apply
them . . . through their own labours." He opposed sexism, for
women are "equal in all political and social rights." Ultimately,
"[n]o revolution could succeed . . . unless it was simultaneously
a political and a social revolution. Any exclusively political
revolution . . . will, insofar as it consequently does not have
the immediate, effective, political and economic emancipation
of the people as its primary objective, prove to be . . . illusory,
phony . . . The revolution should not only be made for the
people's sake: it should also be made by the people and can
never succeed unless it implicates all of the rural as well as
the urban masses" [_No Gods, No Masters_, vol. 1, pp. 134-41]

In 1868, Bakunin was arguing the same ideas. The "Association
of the International Brethren seeks simultaneously universal,
social, philosophical, economic and political revolution, so
that the present order of things, rooted in property,
exploitation, domination and the authority principle" will
be destroyed. The "revolution as we understand it will . . .
set about the . . . complete destruction of the State . . .
The natural and necessary upshot of that destruction" will
include the "[d]issolution of the army, magistracy, bureaucracy,
police and clergy" and "[a]ll productive capital and instruments
of labour . . . be[ing] confiscated for the benefit of
toilers associations, which will have to put them to use in
collective production" as well as the "[s]eizure of all Church
and State properties." The "federated Alliance of all labour
associations . . . will constitute the Commune." The people
"must make the revolution everywhere, and . . . ultimate
direction of it must at all times be vested in the people
organised into a free federation of agricultural and
industrial associations . . . organised from the bottom up."
[Op. Cit., pp. 152-6]

As these the words of a person who considered the state as
the "chief evil" or "that the state is the main enemy"? Of
course not, rather Bakunin clearly identified the state as 
one aspect of a class society that has to be destroyed. As
he put it, the "State, which has never had any task other
than to regularise, sanction and . . . protect the rule of
the privileged classes and exploitation of the people's
labour for the rich, must be abolished. Consequently, this
requires that society be organised from the bottom up
through the free formation and free federation of worker
associations, industrial, agricultural, scientific and
artisan alike, . . . founded upon collective ownership of
the land, capital, raw materials and the instruments of
labour, which is to say, all large-scale property . . . 
leaving to private and hereditary possession only those
items that are actually for personal use." [Op. Cit., 
p. 182] 

In summary, rather than seeing the state as the main evil to be 
abolished, Bakunin always stressed that a revolution must be
economic *and* political in nature, that it must ensure political,
economic and social liberty and equality. As such, he argued
for both the destruction of the state and the expropriation of
capital (an act conducted, incidentally, by a federation of
workers' associations or workers' councils). While the apparatus
of the state was being destroyed ("Dissolution of the army, 
magistracy, bureaucracy, police and clergy"), capitalism was
also being uprooted and destroyed ("All productive capital and 
instruments of labour . . . confiscated for the benefit of
toilers associations"). To assert that Bakunin ignored the 
necessity of abolishing capitalism and the other evils of
the current system while focusing exclusively on the state,
is simply distorting his ideas.

Kropotkin, unsurprisingly, argued along identical lines as
Bakunin. He stressed that "the revolution will burn on until 
it has accomplished its mission: the abolition of property-owning 
and of the State." This revolution, he re-iterated, would be a 
"mass rising up against property and the State." Indeed, Kropotkin 
always stressed that "there is one point to which all socialists 
adhere: the expropriation of capital must result from the coming 
revolution." This mean that "the area of struggle against capital, 
and against the sustainer of capital -- government" could be one 
in which "various groups can act in agreement" and so "any struggle 
that prepares for that expropriation should be sustained in unanimity 
by all the socialist groups, to whatever shading they belong." 
[_Words of a Rebel_, p. 75 and p. 204] Little wonder Kropotkin 
wrote his famous article "Expropriation" on this subject! As he 
put it:

"Expropriation -- that is the guiding word of the coming
revolution, without which it will fail in its historic
mission: the complete expropriation of all those who have
the means of exploiting human beings; the return to the
community of the nation of everything that in the hands of
anyone can be used to exploit others." [Op. Cit., pp. 207-8]

Strange words if Marxist assertions were true. As can be seen,
Kropotkin is simply following Bakunin's ideas on the matter.
He, like Bakunin, was well aware of the evils of capitalism 
and that the state protects these evils: 

"When a workman sells his labour to an employer and knows perfectly well 
that some part of the value of his produce will be unjustly taken by 
the employer; when he sells it without even the slightest guarantee 
of being employed so much as six consecutive months, it is a sad 
mockery to call that a free contract. . .  As long as three-quarters 
of humanity are compelled to enter into agreements of that description, 
force is of course necessary, both to enforce the supposed agreements
and to maintain such a state of things. Force -- and a great deal of 
force -- is necessary to prevent the labourers from taking possession 
of what they consider unjustly appropriated by the few; and force is 
necessary to continually bring new 'uncivilised nations' under the 
same conditions." [_Kropotkin's Revolutionary Pamphlets_, p. 69]

Little wonder he called anarchism "the no-government system of
socialism." [Op. Cit., p. 46] For Kropotkin, the "State is there 
to protect exploitation, speculation and private property; it is 
itself the by-product of the rapine of the people. The proletariat
must rely on his own hands; he can expect nothing of the State. 
It is nothing more than an organisation devised to hinder 
emancipation at all costs." [_Words of a Rebel_, p. 27] Rather
than see the state as the main evil, he clearly saw it as the
protector of capitalism -- in other words, as one aspect of
a class system which needed to be replaced by a better society. 

Similarly with all other anarchists. Emma Goldman, for
example, summarised for all anarchists when she argued that
anarchism "stands for . . . the liberation of the human body
from the domination of property; liberation from the shackles 
and restraint of government." [_Anarchism and Other Essays_,
p. 62] Errico Malatesta in the "Anarchist Programme" he 
drafted listed "Abolition of private property" before 
"Abolition of government" and argued that "the present state of
society" was one in "which some have inherited the land and all
social wealth, while the mass of the people, disinherited in all
respects, is exploited and oppressed by a small possessing class."
It ends by arguing that anarchism wants "the complete destruction
of the domination and exploitation of man by man" and for 
"expropriation of landowners and capitalists for the benefit
of all; and the abolition of government." [_Life and Ideas_, 
p. 184, p. 183, p. 197 and p. 198] Nearly three decades 
previously, we find Malatesta arguing the same idea. As he
put it in 1891, anarchists "struggle for anarchy, and for
socialism, because we believe that anarchy and socialism must
be realised immediately, that is to say that in the revolutionary
act we must drive government away, abolish property . . .
human progress is measured by the extent government power
and private property are reduced." [_Anarchy_, pp. 53-4] He 
stressed that, for "all anarchists," it was definitely a case
that the "abolition of political power is not possible without
the simultaneous destruction of economic privilege." [_Life
and Ideas_, p. 158]

As Brian Morris correctly summarises:

"Another criticism of anarchism is that it has a narrow view 
of politics: that it sees the state as the fount of all evil, 
ignoring other aspects of social and economic life. This is a 
misrepresentation of anarchism. It partly derives from the way 
anarchism has been defined, and partly because Marxist historians 
have tried to exclude anarchism from the broader socialist movement. 
But when one examines the writings of classical anarchists. . .
as well as the character of anarchist movements. . . it is 
clearly evident that it has never had this limited vision.
It has always challenged all forms of authority and exploitation, 
and has been equally critical of capitalism and religion as it 
has been of the state." ["Anthropology and Anarchism," _Anarchy: 
A Journal of Desire Armed_, no. 45, p, p. 40]

All in all, Marxist claims that anarchists view the state as
the "chief evil" or see the destruction of the state as the
"main idea" of anarchism are simply talking nonsense. In 
fact, rather than anarchists having a narrow view of social 
liberation, it is, in fact, Marxists who do so. By concentrating
almost exclusively on the (economic) class source of exploitation,
they blind themselves to other forms of exploitation and
domination that can exist independently of economic class
relationships. This can be seen from the amazing difficulty
that many of them got themselves into when trying to analyse
the Stalinist regime in Russia. Anarchists are well aware that
the state is just one aspect of the current class system. We
just recognise that all the evils of that system must be 
destroyed at the same time to ensure a *social* revolution
rather than just a change in who the boss is. 

H.2.5 Do anarchists think "full blown" socialism will be 
      created overnight?

Another area in which Marxists misrepresent anarchism is in the 
assertion that anarchists believe a completely socialist society 
(an ideal or "utopian" society, in other words) can be created 
"overnight." As Marxist Bertell Ollman puts it, "[u]nlike 
anarcho-communists, none of us [Marxists] believe that 
communism will emerge full blown from a socialist revolution. 
Some kind of transition and period of indeterminate length for 
it to occur are required." [Bertell Ollman (ed.), _Market 
Socialism: The Debate among Socialists_, p. 177] This assertion, 
while it is common, fails to understand the anarchist vision of 
revolution. We consider it a *process* and not an event -- as 
Malatesta argued, "[b]y revolution we do not mean just the 
insurrectionary act." [_Life and Ideas_, p. 156] 

Once this is understood, the idea that anarchists think
a "full blown" anarchist society will be created "overnight"
is a fallacy. As Murray Bookchin pointed out, "Bakunin,
Kropotkin, Malatesta were not so naive as to believe that
anarchism could be established overnight. In imputing this
notion to Bakunin, Marx and Engels wilfully distorted the
Russian anarchist's views." [_Post-Scarcity Anarchism_,
p. 213]

Indeed, Kropotkin stressed that anarchists "do not believe that in 
any country the Revolution will be accomplished at a stroke, in the 
twinkling of a eye, as some socialists dream." Moreover, "[n]o 
fallacy more harmful has ever been spread than the fallacy of 
a 'One-day Revolution.'" [_The Conquest of Bread_, p. 81] Bakunin
argued that a "more or less prolonged transitional period" would
"naturally follow in the wake of the great social crisis" implied
by social revolution. [_The Political Philosophy of Bakunin_, 
p. 412] The question, therefore, is not whether there will be
a "transitional" society after a revolution but what *kind*
of transition will it be. 

As such, anarchists are aware that a "full blown" communist 
society will not come about immediately. Rather, the creation of
such a society will be a *process* which the revolution will start
off. As Alexander Berkman put it, "you must not confuse the social 
revolution with anarchy. Revolution, in some of its stages, is a 
violent upheaval; anarchy is a social condition of freedom and 
peace. The revolution is the *means* of bringing anarchy about 
but it is not anarchy itself. It is to pave the road for anarchy, 
to establish condition which will make a life of liberty possible." 
However, the "end shapes the means" and so "to achieve its purpose 
the revolution must be imbued with and directed by the anarchist 
spirit and ideas .  . . the social revolution must be anarchist 
in method as in aim." [_ABC of Anarchism_, p. 81]

In his classic introduction to anarcho-communist ideas, Alexander 
Berkman also acknowledged that "full blown" communism was not 
likely after a successful revolution. "Of course," he argued, 
"when the social revolution has become thoroughly organised and 
production is functioning normally there will be enough for 
everybody. But in the first stages of the revolution, during 
the process of re-construction, we must take care to supply 
the people as best we can, and equally, which means rationing."
[Op. Cit., p. 67] Clearly, in such circumstances "full blown"
communism would be impossible and, unsurprisingly, Berkman
argues that would not exist. However, the principles that
inspire communism and anarchism could be applied immediately.
This meant that both the state and capitalism would be 
abolished. While arguing that "[t]here is no other way of 
securing economic equality, which alone is liberty" than
communist anarchism, he also states that it is "likely . . . 
that a country in social revolution may try various economic
experiments . . . different countries and regions will probably 
try out various methods, and by practical experience learn the 
best way. The revolution is at the same time the opportunity 
and justification for it . . ." Rather that dictate to the 
future, Berkman argued that his "purpose is to suggest, in 
board outline the principles which must animate the revolution, 
the general lines of action it should follow if it is to 
accomplish its aim  -- the reconstruction of society on a 
foundation of freedom and equality." [Op. Cit., p. 80]

As regards Malatesta, he argued along similar lines.
While arguing for the "complete destruction of the
domination and exploitation of man by man" by the
"expropriation of landlords and capitalists for the
benefit of all" and "the abolition of government," he
recognised that in "the post-revolutionary period, in the
period of reorganisation and transition, there might be
'offices for the concentration and distribution of the
capital of collective enterprises', that there might or
might not be titles recording the work done and the 
quantity of goods to which one is entitled." However,
he stressed that this "is something we shall have to wait
and see about, or rather, it is a problem which will have
many and varied solutions according to the system of
production and distribution which will prevail in the
different localities and among the many . . . groupings
that will exist." He argued that while, eventually, all
groups of workers (particularly the peasants) while
eventually "understand the advantages of communism or
at least of the direct exchange of goods for goods,"
this may not happen "in a day." If some kind of money 
was used, then it people should "ensure that [it] truly 
represents the useful work performed by its possessors" 
rather than being "a powerful means of exploitation and 
oppression" is currently is. [_Life and Ideas_, pp. 198-9
and pp. 100-1]

Rather than seeing a "full blown" communist society appearing 
instantly from a revolution, anarcho-communists see a period of 
transition in which the degree of communism in a given community 
or area is dependent on the objective conditions facing it. 
This period of transition would see different forms of social 
experimentation but the desire is to see libertarian communist 
principles as the basis of as much of this experimentation as 
possible. To claim that anarcho-communists ignore reality and 
see communism as being created overnight is simply a distortion 
of their ideas. Rather, they are aware that the development 
towards communism is dependent on local conditions, conditions 
which can only be overcome in time and by the liberated community
re-organising production and extending it as required.

Clearly, our argument contradicts the widely held view that 
anarchists believed an utopian world would be created instantly
after a revolution. Of course, by asserting that anarchists think 
"full blown communism" will occur without some form of transitional
period, Marxists paint a picture of anarchism as simply utopian, 
a theory which ignores objective reality in favour of wishful 
thinking. However, as seen above, such is not the case. Anarchists 
are aware that "full blown communism" is dependent on objective 
conditions and, therefore, cannot be implemented until those 
conditions are meet. Until such time as the objective conditions
are reached, various means of distributing goods, organising and
managing production, and so on will be tried. Such schemes will
be based as far as possible on communistic principles.

Therefore, immediately after a successful revolution a period 
of reconstruction will begin in which society is slowly 
transformed towards "full blown" communism. The speed and
nature of this transformation will, of course, depend on local
conditions and needs. However, unlike Marxists, such a period 
of transition would be based on libertarian and communist
principles. The organisation of society would be anarchist
-- the state would be abolished and replaced by a free
federation of workers and community associations. The economic
structure would be socialist -- production would be based on 
self-managed workplaces and the principles of distribution 
would be as communistic as possible under the existing 
objective conditions.

It also seems strange for Marxists to claim that anarchists
thought a "full blown" communist society was possible "over-night" 
given that anarchists had always stressed the difficulties facing 
a social revolution. Kropotkin, for example, continually stressed 
that a revolution would face extensive economic disruption.
In his words:

"A political revolution can be accomplished without shaking the
foundations of industry, but a revolution where the people lay
hands upon property will inevitably paralyse exchange and 
production . . . This point cannot be too much insisted upon; 
the reorganisation of industry on a new basis . . . cannot be 
accomplished in a few days; nor, on the other hand, will people 
submit to be half starved for years in order to oblige the 
theorists who uphold the wage system. To tide over the period 
of stress they will demand what they have always demanded in 
such cases -- communisation of supplies -- the giving of 
rations." [_The Conquest of Bread_, pp. 72-3]

The basic principles of this "transition" period would, 
therefore, be based on the "socialising of production, 
consumption and exchange." The state would be abolished 
and "federated Communes" would be created. The end of 
capitalism would be achieved by the "expropriation" of 
"everything that enables any man -- be he financier, 
mill-owner, or landlord - - to appropriate the product 
of others' toil." Distribution of goods would be based 
on "no stint or limit to what the community possesses 
in abundance, but equal sharing and dividing of those 
commodities which are scare or apt to run short." [Op. Cit., 
p. 136, p. 61 and p. 76] Clearly, while not "full blown"
communism by any means, such a regime does lay the ground
for its eventual arrival. As Max Nettlau summarised, 
"[n]othing but a superficial interpretation of some of
Kropotkin's observations could lead one to conclude that
anarchist communism could spring into life through an act
of sweeping improvisation, with the waving of a magic
wand." [_A Short History of Anarchism_, p. 80]

This was what happened in the Spanish Revolution, for example.
Different collectives operated in different ways. Some tried
to introduce free communism, some a combination of rationing
and communism, others introduced equal pay, others equalised
pay as much as possible and so on. Over time, as economic 
conditions changed and difficulties developed the collectives
changed their mode of distribution to take them into account.
These collectives indicate well the practical aspects of
anarchist and its desire to accommodate and not ignore reality.

Lastly, and as an aside, it this anarchist awareness of the 
disruptive effects of a revolution on a country's economy which, 
in part, makes anarchists extremely sceptical of pro-Bolshevik
rationales that blame the difficult economic conditions facing 
the Russian Revolution for Bolshevik authoritarianism (see
section H.8.1 for a fuller discussion of this). If, as Kropotkin 
argued, a social revolution inevitably results in massive 
economic disruption then, clearly, Bolshevism should be 
avoided if it cannot handle such inevitable events. In such 
circumstances, centralisation would only aid the disruption, 
not reduce it. This awareness of the problems facing a social 
revolution also led anarchists to stress the importance of 
local action and mass participation. As Kropotkin put it, the 
"immense constructive work demanded by a social revolution 
cannot be accomplished by a central government . . . It has 
need of knowledge, of brains and of the voluntary collaboration
of a host of local and specialised forces which alone can
attack the diversity of economic problems in their local
aspects." [_Kropotkin's Revolutionary Pamphlets_, pp. 255-6]
Without this local action, co-ordinated joint activity would 
remain a dead letter. 

In summary, anarchists acknowledge that *politically* there is 
no transitional period (i.e. the state must be abolished and 
replaced by a free federation of self-managed working class
organisations). Economically anarchists recognise that different 
areas will develop in different ways and so there will be various
economical transitional forms. Rather than seeing "full blown
communism" being the instant result of a socialist revolution,
anarchist-communists actually argue the opposite -- "full blown
communism" will develop only after a successful revolution and
the inevitable period of social reconstruction which comes after
it. A "full blown" communist economy will develop as society becomes
ready for it. What we *do* argue is that any transitional economic
form must be based on the principles of the type of society
it desires. In other words, any transitional period must be
as communistic as possible if communism is your final aim and,
equally, it must be libertarian if your final goal is freedom.

Also see section I.2.2 for further discussion on this issue.

H.2.6 How do Marxists misrepresent Anarchist ideas on mutual aid?

Anarchist ideas on mutual aid are often misrepresented by
Marxists. Looking at Pat Stack's "Anarchy in the UK?" article,
for example, we find a particularly terrible misrepresentation
of Kropotkin's ideas. Indeed, it is so incorrect that it is
either a product of ignorance or a desire to deceive (and
as we shall indicate, it is probably the latter). Here is
Stack's account of Kropotkin's ideas:

"And the anarchist Peter Kropotkin, far from seeing class 
conflict as the dynamic for social change as Marx did, saw 
co-operation being at the root of the social process. He 
believed the co-operation of what he termed 'mutual aid' 
was the natural order, which was disrupted by centralised 
states. Indeed in everything from public walkways and 
libraries through to the Red Cross, Kropotkin felt he was 
witnessing confirmation that society was moving towards 
his mutual aid, prevented only from completing the journey 
by the state. It follows that if class conflict is not the 
motor of change, the working class is not the agent and 
collective struggle not the means." ["Anarchy in the UK?",
_Socialist Review_, no. 246]

There are three issues with Stack's summary. Firstly, Kropotkin 
did not, in fact, reject class conflict as the "dynamic of social 
change" nor reject the working class as its "agent." Secondly, 
all of Stack's examples of "Mutual Aid" do not, in fact, appear 
in Kropotkin's classic book _Mutual Aid_. They do, however, 
appear in other works by Kropotkin's, but *not* as examples 
of "mutual aid." Thirdly, in _Mutual Aid_ Kropotkin discusses
such aspects of working class "collective struggle" as strikes
and unions. All in all, it is Stack's total and utter lack of 
understanding of Kropotkin's ideas which immediately stands 
out from his comments.

As we have discussed how collective, working class direct action,
organisation and solidarity in the class struggle was at the
core of Kropotkin's politics in section H.2.2, we will not do
so here. Rather, we will discuss how Stack lies about Kropotkin's
ideas on mutual aid. As just noted, the examples Stack lists
are not to be found in Kropotkin's classic work _Mutual Aid_.
Now, *if* Kropotkin *had* considered them as examples of "mutual
aid" then he would have listed them in that work. This does
not mean, however, that Kropotkin did not mention these examples.
He does, but in other works (notably his essay _Anarchist
Communism_) and he does *not* use them as examples of mutual 
aid. Just as Stack's examples are not mentioned in _Mutual Aid_, 
so Kropotkin fails to use the words "mutual aid" in his essay 
_Anarchist-Communism: Its Basis and Principles_. Here is 
Kropotkin's own words as regards Stack's "examples":

"We maintain, moreover, not only that communism is a desirable 
state of society, but that the growing tendency of modern
society is precisely towards communism -- free communism -- 
notwithstanding the seemingly contradictory growth of
individualism. In the growth of individualism . . . we see 
merely the endeavours of the individual towards emancipating
himself from the steadily growing powers of capital and the
State. But side by side with this growth we see also . . .  
the latent struggle of the producers of wealth to maintain 
the partial communism of old, as well as to reintroduce 
communist principles in a new shape, as soon as favourable 
conditions permit it. . .  the communist tendency is 
continually reasserting itself and trying to make its way 
into public life. The penny bridge disappears before the
public bridge; and the turnpike road before the free road. The 
same spirit pervades thousands of other institutions. Museums,
free libraries, and free public schools; parks and pleasure 
grounds; paved and lighted streets, free for everybody's use; 
water supplied to private dwellings, with a growing tendency 
towards disregarding the exact amount of it used by the individual;
tramways and railways which have already begun to introduce the 
season ticket or the uniform tax, and will surely go much
further in this line when they are no longer private property: 
all these are tokens showing in what direction further progress is
to be expected. 

"It is in the direction of putting the wants of the individual 
*above* the valuation of the service he has rendered, or might 
render, to society; in considering society as a whole, so 
intimately connected together that a service rendered to any 
individual is a service rendered to the whole society." 
[_Kropotkin's Revolutionary Pamplets_, pp. 59-60]

As is clear, the examples Stack selects have nothing to do with 
mutual aid in Kropotkin's eyes. Rather, they are examples of 
communistic tendencies within capitalism, empirical evidence
that can be used to not only show that communism can work but
also that it is not a utopian social solution but an expression
of tendencies within society. Simply put, he is using examples
from existing society to show that communism is not impossible.

Similarly with Stack's other examples. Kropotkin argued that:

"we are struck with the infinitesimal part played by government in 
our life. . .  [A] striking feature of our century tells in favour 
of the . . . no-government tendency. It is the steady enlargement of
the field covered by private initiative, and the recent growth of 
large organisations resulting merely and simply from free agreement. 
The railway net of Europe -- a confederation of so many scores of 
separate societies -- and the direct transport of passengers and 
merchandise over so many lines which were built independently and 
federated together, without even so much as a Central Board of 
European Railways, is a most striking instance of what is already 
done by mere agreement. . . . 

"But there also is no lack of free organisations for nobler pursuits. 
One of the noblest achievements of our century is undoubtedly the 
Lifeboat Association. . . . The Hospitals Association and hundreds 
of like organisations, operating on a large scale and covering each 
a wide field, may also be mentioned under this head.  . .  hundreds 
of societies are constituted every day for the satisfaction of some 
of the infinitely varied needs of civilised man. . . in short, there 
is not a single direction in which men exercise their faculties 
without combining together for the accomplishment of some common 
aim. Every day new societies are formed, while every year the old 
ones aggregate together into larger units, federate across the 
national frontiers, and co-operate in some common work. . . One of 
the most remarkable societies which has recently arisen is undoubtedly 
the Red Cross Society . . . 

"These facts -- so numerous and so customary that we pass by without 
even noticing them -- are in our opinion one of the most prominent 
features of the second half of the nineteenth century. The just-mentioned 
organisms grew up so naturally, they so rapidly extended and so easily 
aggregated together, they are such unavoidable outgrowths of the 
multiplication of needs of the civilised man, and they so well replace 
State interference, that we must recognise in them a growing factor of 
our life. Modern progress is really towards the free aggregation of 
free individuals so as to supplant government in all those functions 
which formerly were entrusted to it, and which it mostly performed so 
badly." [Op. Cit., pp. 65-7]

As is clear, Kropotkin was using these examples *not* as expressions
of "mutual aid" but rather as evidence that social life can be organised
without government. Just as with communism, he gave concrete examples
of libertarian tendencies within society to prove the possibility of
an anarchist society. And just like his examples of communistic 
activities within capitalism, his examples of co-operation without
the state are not listed as examples of "mutual aid."

All this would suggest that Stack has either not read Kropotkin's 
works or that he has and consciously decided to misrepresent his 
ideas. In fact, its a combination of the two. Stack (as proven 
by his talk at _Marxism 2001_) gathered his examples of "mutual 
aid" from Paul Avrich's essay "Kropotkin's Ethical Anarchism" 
contained in his _Anarchist Portraits_. As such, he has not
read the source material. Moreover, he simply distorted what
Avrich wrote. In other words, not only has he not read Kropotkin's
works, he consciously decided to misrepresent the secondary
source he used. This indicates the quality of almost all Marxist 
critiques of anarchism.

For example, Avrich correctly notes that Kropotkin did not 
"deny that the 'struggle for existence' played an important
role in the evolution of species. In _Mutual Aid_ he declares 
unequivocally that 'life *is* struggle; and in that struggle
the fittest survive.'" Kropotkin simply argued that co-operation
played a key role in determining who was, in fact, the fittest.
Similarly, Avrich lists many of the same examples Stack presents 
but not in his discussion of Kropotkin's ideas on mutual aid. 
Rather, he correctly lists them in his discussion of how 
Kropotkin saw examples of anarchist communism in modern
society and was "manifesting itself 'in the thousands of
developments of modern life.'" This did not mean that Kropotkin 
did not see the need for a social revolution, quite the reverse. 
As Avrich notes, Kropotkin "did not shrink from the necessity 
of revolution" as he "did not expect the propertied classes 
to give up their privileges and possession without a fight." 
This "was to be a *social* revolution, carried out by the 
masses themselves" achieved by means of "expropriation" of
social wealth. [Paul Avrich, _Anarchist Portraits_, p. 58, 
p. 62 and p. 66]

So much for Stack's claims. As can be seen, they are not only
a total misrepresentation of Kropotkin's work, they are also
a distortion of his source! 
 A few more points need to be raised on this subject. 

Firstly, Kropotkin never claimed that mutual aid "was the natural 
order." Rather, he stressed that Mutual Aid was (to use the 
subtitle of his book on the subject) "a factor of evolution." 
Never denying the importance of struggle or competition as a 
means of survival, he argued that co-operation within a species
was the best means for it to survive in a hostile environment.
This applied to life under capitalism. In the hostile environment
of class society, then the only way in which working class people
could survive would be to practice mutual aid (in other words,
solidarity). Little wonder, then, that Kropotkin listed strikes
and unions as expressions of mutual aid in capitalist society.
Moreover, if we take Stack's arguments at face value, then he
clearly is arguing that solidarity is not an important factor
in the class struggle and that mutual aid and co-operation 
cannot change the world! Hardly what you would expect a socialist
to argue. In other words, his inaccurate diatribe against 
Kropotkin backfires on his own ideas.

Secondly, Stack's argument that Kropotkin argued that co-operation
was the natural order is in contradiction with his other claims
that anarchism "despises the collectivity" and "dismiss[es] the 
importance of the collective nature of change." How can you have
co-operation without forming a collective? And, equally, surely
support for co-operation clearly implies the recognition of the
"collective nature of change"? Moreover, if Stack had bothered
to *read* Kropotkin's classic he would have been aware that he
listed both unions and strikes as expressions of "mutual aid" 
(a fact, of course, which would undermine Stack's argument that
anarchists reject collective working class struggle and 
organisation). 

Thirdly, _Mutual Aid_ is primarily a work of popular science 
and not a work on revolutionary anarchist theory like, say, 
_The Conquest of Bread_ or _Words of a Rebel_. As such, it
does not present a full example of Kropotkin's revolutionary
ideas and how mutual aid fits into them. However, it does
present some insights on the question of social progress
which indicate that he did not think that "co-operation" 
was "at the root of the social process," as Stack claims.
For example, he notes that "[w]hen Mutual Aid institutions
. . . began . . . to lose their primitive character, to be
invaded by parasitic growths, and thus to become hindrances
to process, the revolt of individuals against these institutions
took always two different aspects. Part of those who rose up
strove to purify the old institutions, or to work out a
higher form of commonwealth." But at the same time, others
"endeavoured to break down the protective institutions of
mutual support, with no other intention but to increase their
own wealth and their own powers." In this conflict "lies the
real tragedy of history." He also noted that the mutual aid 
tendency "continued to live in the villages and among the 
poorer classes in the towns." Indeed, "in so far as" as new 
"economical and social institutions" were "a creation of the 
masses" they "have all originated from the same source" of 
mutual aid. [_Mutual Aid_, pp. 18-9 and p. 180]

Kropotkin was well aware that mutual aid (or solidarity) 
could not be applied between classes in a class society.
Indeed, his chapters on mutual aid under capitalism 
contain the strike and union. As he put it in an earlier
work:

"What solidarity can exist between the capitalist and the
worker he exploits? Between the head of an army and the
soldier? Between the governing and the governed?" [_Words
of a Rebel_, p. 30]

In summary, Stack's assertions about Kropotkin's theory of
"Mutual Aid" are simply false. He simply distorts the source
material and shows a total ignorance of Kropotkin's work (which
he obviously has not bothered to read before criticising it).
A truthful account of "Mutual Aid" would involve recognising
that Kropotkin show it being expressed in both strikes and
labour unions and that he saw solidarity between working 
people as the means of not only surviving within the hostile
environment of capitalism but also as the basis of a mass
revolution which would end it. 

H.2.7 Who do anarchists see as their "agents of social change"?

It is often charged, usually without any evidence, that
anarchists do not see the working class as the "agent"
of the social revolution. Pat Stack, for example, states
"the failure of anarchism [is] to understand the centrality 
of the working class itself." He argues that for Marx, "the 
working class would change the world and in the process 
change itself. It would become the agent for social advance 
and human liberty." For Bakunin, however, "skilled artisans 
and organised factory workers, far from being the source of 
the destruction of capitalism, were 'tainted by pretensions 
and aspirations'. Instead Bakunin looked to those cast aside 
by capitalism, those most damaged, brutalised and marginalised. 
The lumpen proletariat, the outlaws, the 'uncivilised, 
disinherited, illiterate', as he put it, would be his agents 
for change." ["Anarchy in the UK?", _Socialist Review_, no. 
246] He fails to provide any references for his accusations. 
This is unsurprising, as to do so would mean that the reader 
could check for themselves the validity of Stack's claims.

Take, for example, the quote "uncivilised, disinherited, 
illiterate" Stack uses as evidence. This expression is
from an essay written by Bakunin in 1872 and which expressed
what he considered the differences between his ideas and
those of Marx. The quote can be found on page 294 of
_Bakunin on Anarchism_. On the previous page, we discover
Bakunin arguing that "for the International to be a real
power, it must be able to organise within its ranks the
immense majority of the proletariat of Europe, of America,
of all lands." [_Bakunin on Anarchism_, p. 293] This is
the context in which Bakunin made the comments Stack quotes.
As such, he clearly is quoting out of context in terms of
Bakunin's article. Moreover, as we will indicate, Stack's
also quotes them outside the historical context as well as
Bakunin's ideas taken as a whole.

Let us begin with Bakunin's views on "skilled artisans and 
organised factory workers." In _Statism and Anarchy_, for 
example, we discover Bakunin arguing that the "proletariat 
. . . must enter the International [Workers' Association] 
en masse, form factory, artisan, and agrarian sections, and 
unite them into local federations" for "the sake of its own
liberation." [_Statism and Anarchy_, p. 51] This perspective
is the predominant one in Bakunin's ideas. For example, he
argued that anarchists saw "the new social order" being
"attained . . . through the social (and therefore
anti-political) organisation and power of the working
masses of the cities and villages." He argued that "only
the trade union sections can give their members  . . .
practical education and consequently only they can draw 
into the organisation of the International the masses of 
the proletariat, those masses without whose practical
co-operation . . . the Social Revolution will never be
able to triumph." The International, in Bakunin's words,
"organises the working masses . . .  from the bottom
up" and that this was "the proper aim of the organisation
of trade union sections." He stressed that revolutionaries
must "[o]rganise the city proletariat in the name of
revolutionary Socialism . . . [and] unite it into one
preparatory organisation together with the peasantry."
[_The Political Philosophy of Bakunin_, p. 300, p. 310, 
p. 319 and p. 378]

This support for organised workers and artisans can also be 
seen from the rest of the essay in which Bakunin discusses 
the "flower of the proletariat." He goes on to discuss the 
policy that the _International Workingmen's Association_ 
should follow (i.e. the organised revolutionary workers).
He argued that its "sections and federations [must be]
free to develop its own policies . . . [to] attain real
unity, basically economic, which will necessarily lead to 
real political unity . . . The foundation for the unity of 
the International . . . has already been laid by the common 
sufferings, interests, needs, and real aspirations of the 
workers of the whole world." He stressed that "the 
International has been . . . the work of the proletariat 
itself . . . It was their keen and profound instinct as 
workers . . . which impelled them to find the principle
and true purpose of the International. They took the common 
needs  already in existence as the foundation and saw the
*international organisation of economic conflict against 
capitalism* as the true objective of this association. In 
giving it exclusively this base and aim, the workers at 
once established the entire power of the International. 
They opened  wide the gates to all the millions of the 
oppressed and exploited." The International, as well as 
"organising local, national and international strikes" 
and "establishing national and international trade unions," 
would discuss "political and philosophical questions." The 
workers "join the International for one very practical purpose:
solidarity in the struggle for full economic rights against the 
oppressive exploitation by the bourgeoisie." [_Bakunin on 
Anarchism_, pp. 297-8, pp. 298-9 and pp. 301-2]

All this, needless to say, makes a total mockery of Stack's claim 
that Bakunin did not see "skilled artisans and organised factory 
workers" as "the source of the destruction of capitalism" and 
"agents for change." Indeed, it is hard to find a greater
distortion of Bakunin's ideas. Rather than dismiss "skilled 
artisans" and "organised factory workers" Bakunin desired to 
organise them along with agricultural workers into unions and 
get these unions to affiliate to the _International Workers' 
Association_. He argued again and again that the working class, 
organised in workers associations, were the means of making a 
revolution (i.e. "the source of the destruction of capitalism," 
to quote Stack). 

Only in *this* context can we understand Bakunin's comments 
as any apparent contradiction generated by quoting out of
context is quickly solved by looking at Bakunin's work. This 
reference to the "uncivilised, disinherited, illiterate" comes 
from a polemic against Marx. From the context, it can quickly 
be seen that by these terms Bakunin meant the bulk of the 
working class. In his words:

"To me the flower of the proletariat is not, as it is to the 
Marxists, the upper layer, the aristocracy of labour, those 
who are the most cultured, who earn more and live more 
comfortably that all the other workers. Precisely this 
semi-bourgeois layer of workers would, if the Marxists
had their way, constitute their *fourth governing class.*
This could indeed happen if the great mass of the proletariat
does not guard against it. By virtue of its relative well-being 
and semi-bourgeois position, this upper layer of workers is 
unfortunately only too deeply saturated with all the political 
and social prejudices and all the narrow aspirations and 
pretensions of the bourgeoisie. Of all the proletariat, this 
upper layer is the least socialist, the most individualist.

"By the *flower of the proletariat*, I mean above all that great 
mass, those millions of the uncultivated, the disinherited, the 
miserable, the illiterates . . . I mean precisely that eternal 
'meat' (on which governments thrive), that great *rabble of the 
people* (underdogs, 'dregs of society') ordinarily designated by 
Marx and Engels by the phrase . . . Lumpenproletariat" [_Bakunin 
on Anarchism_, p. 294]

Thus Bakunin contrasted a "semi-bourgeois" layer to the "great 
mass of the proletariat." In a later work, _Statism and Anarchy_, 
Bakunin makes the same point. He argues there was "a special 
category of relatively affluent workers, earning higher wages,
boasting of their literary capacities and . . . impregnated
by a variety of bourgeois prejudices . . . in Italy . . . 
they are insignificant in number and influence . . . In Italy 
it is the extremely poor proletariat that predominates. Marx 
speaks disdainfully, but quite unjustly, of this 
*Lumpenproletariat.* For in them, and only in them, and not 
in the bourgeois strata of workers, are there crystallised 
the entire intelligence and power of the coming Social 
Revolution." [Op. Cit., p. 334] Again it is clear that 
Bakunin is referring to a small minority within the working 
class and *not* dismissing the working class as a whole. He 
explicitly pointed to the "*bourgeois-influenced* minority
of the urban proletariat" and contrasted this minority to 
"the mass of the proletariat, both rural and urban." 
[_Michael Bakunin: Selected Writings_, p. 254]

Clearly, Stack is distorting Bakunin's ideas on this subject 
when he claims that Bakunin thought *all* workers were "tainted 
by pretensions and aspirations." In fact, like Marx, Engels 
and Lenin, Bakunin differentiated between different types of 
workers. This did not mean he rejected organised workers or 
skilled artisans nor the organisation of working people into 
revolutionary unions, quite the reverse. As can be seen, 
Bakunin argued there was a group of workers who accepted 
bourgeois society and did relatively well under it. It was 
*these* workers who were "frequently no less egoistic than 
bourgeois exploiters, no less pernicious to the International 
than bourgeois socialists, and no less vain and ridiculous 
than bourgeois nobles." [_The Basic Bakunin_, p. 108] It is 
comments like this that Marxists quote out of context and 
use for their claims that Bakunin did not see the working 
class as the agent of social change. However, rather than 
refer to the whole working class, Stack quotes Bakunin's 
thoughts in relation to a minority strata within it. Clearly, 
from the context, Bakunin *did not* mean *all* working class 
people. 

Also, let us not forget the historical context. After all,
when Bakunin was writing, the vast majority of the working 
population across the world was, in fact, illiterate and
disinherited. To get some sort of idea of the numbers of 
working people who would have been classed as "the 
uncultivated, the disinherited, the miserable, the 
illiterates" we have to provide some numbers. In Spain, 
for example, "in 1870, something like 60 per cent of the 
population was illiterate." [Gerald Brenan, _The Spanish 
Labyrinth_, p. 50] In Russia, in 1897 (i.e. 21 years after 
Bakunin's death), "only 21% of the total population of 
European Russia was literate. This was mainly because of 
the appallingly low rate of literacy in the countryside -- 
17% compared to 45% in the towns." [S.A. Smith, _Red 
Petrograd_, p. 34] Stack, in effect, is excluding the 
majority of the working masses from the working class 
movement *and* the revolution in the 1860-70s by his 
comments. Little wonder Bakunin said what he said. By 
ignoring the historical context (as he ignores the context 
of Bakunin's comments), Stack misleads the reader and 
presents a distinctly distorted picture of Bakunin's 
thought.

In other words, Bakunin's comments on the "flower of the
proletariat" apply to the majority of the working class 
during his lifetime and for a number of decades afterwards
and *not* to an underclass, not to what Marx termed the 
"lumpenproletariat". As proven above, Bakunin's idea of 
what the "lumpenproletariat" is not what Marxists mean by 
the term. If Bakunin had meant the same as Marx by the 
"lumpenproletariat" then this would not make sense as the 
"lumpenproletariat" for Marx were not wage workers. This 
can best be seen when he argues that the International
must organise this "flower of the proletariat" and conduct 
economic collective struggle against the capitalist class. 
In his other works (and in the specific essay these quotes
are derived from) Bakunin stressed the need to organise all 
workers and peasants into unions to fight the state and bosses 
and his arguments that workers associations should not only
be the means to fight capitalism but also the framework of 
an anarchist society. Clearly, Sam Dolgoff's summary of 
Bakunin's ideas on this subject is the correct one:

"Bakunin's *Lumpenproletariat* . . . was broader than Marx's, 
since it included all the submerged classes: unskilled, 
unemployed, and poor workers, poor peasant proprietors, 
landless agricultural labourers, oppressed racial minorities, 
alienated and idealistic youth, declasse intellectuals, and 
'bandits' (by whom Bakunin meant insurrectionary 'Robin Hoods' 
like Pugachev, Stenka Razin, and the Italian Carbonari)." 
["Introduction", _Bakunin on Anarchism_, pp. 13-4]

Nor is Stack the only anarchist to make such arguments as
regards Bakunin. Paul Thomas quotes Bakunin arguing that the 
working class "remains socialist without knowing it" because 
of "the very force of its position" and "all the conditions 
of its material existence" and then, incredulously, adds that 
"[i]t is for this reason that Bakunin turned away from the 
proletariat and its scientific socialism" towards the 
peasantry. [_Karl Marx and the Anarchists_, p. 291] A more
distorted account of Bakunin's ideas would be hard to find (and
there is a lot of competition for that particular honour). The
quotes Thomas provides are from Bakunin's "The Policy of the
International" in which he discusses his ideas on how the
International Working-Men's Association should operate (namely
"the collective struggle of the workers against the bosses"). 
At the time (and for some time after) Bakunin called himself 
a revolutionary socialist and argued that by class struggle,
the worker would soon "recognise himself [or herself] to be
a revolutionary socialist, and he [or she] will act like
one." [_The Basic Bakunin_, p. 103] As such, the argument
that the social position workers are placed makes them 
"socialist without knowing" does not, in fact, imply that
Bakunin thought they would become Marxists ("scientific
socialism") and, therefore, he turned against them. Rather,
it meant that, for Bakunin, anarchist ideas were a product
of working class life and it was a case of turning instinctive
feelings into conscious thought by collective struggle. As 
noted above, Bakunin did not "turn away" from these ideas nor 
the proletariat. Indeed, Bakunin held to the importance of 
organising the proletariat (along with artisans and peasants)
to the end of his life. Quite simply, Thomas is distorting 
Bakunin's ideas.

Lastly, we have to point out a certain irony (and hypocrisy) in 
Marxist attacks on Bakunin on this subject. This is because Marx, 
Engels and Lenin held similar views on the corrupted "upper strata" 
of the working class as Bakunin did. Indeed, Marxists have a
specific term to describe this semi-bourgeois strata of workers,
namely the "labour aristocracy." Marx, for example, talked about
the trade unions in Britain being "an aristocratic minority"
and the "great mass of workers . . . has long been outside"
them (indeed, "the most wretched mass has never belonged.")
[Marx-Engels, _Collected Works_, vol. 22, p. 614] 

Engels also talked about "a small, privileged, 'protected' minority"
within the working class, which he also called "the working-class
aristocracy." [Op. Cit., vol. 27, p. 320 and p. 321] Lenin quotes
him arguing that the "English proletariat is actually becoming
more and more bourgeois, so that this most bourgeois of all nations
is apparently aiming at the possession of . . . a bourgeois 
proletariat *alongside* the bourgeoisie." [quoted by Lenin, 
_Collected Works_, vol. 22, p. 283] Like Lenin, Engels explained
this by the dominant position of Britain within the world market.
Indeed, Lenin argued that "a section of the British proletariat
becomes bourgeois." For Lenin, imperialist "superprofits" make it
"*possible to bribe* the labour leaders and the upper stratum of
the labour aristocracy." This "stratum of workers-turned-bourgeois,
or the labour aristocracy, who are quite philistine in their
mode of life, in the size of their earnings and in their entire
outlook . . . are the real *agents of the bourgeoisie in the
working-class* movement, the labour lieutenants of the capitalist
class." [Op. Cit., p. 284 and p. 194]

As can be seen, this is similar to Bakunin's ideas and, ironically 
enough, nearly identical to Stack's distortion of those ideas 
(particularly in the case of Marx). However, only someone with a 
desire to lie would suggest that any of them dismissed the working 
class as their "agent of change" based on this selective quoting. 
Unfortunately, that is what Stack does with Bakunin. Ultimately,
Stack's comments seem hypocritical in the extreme attacking 
Bakunin while remaining quiet on the near identical comments 
of his heroes.

All in all, once a historic and textual context is placed on
Bakunin's words, it is clear which social class was considered
as the social revolution's "agents of change": the working class
(i.e. wage workers, artisans, peasants and so on). In this,
other revolutionary anarchists follow him. For anarchists, the
social revolution will be made by the working class. Ultimately,
for anyone to claim that Bakunin, for any social anarchist,
rejects the working class as an agent of social change simply
shows their ignorance of the politics they are trying to attack.

H.2.8 What is the relationship of anarchism to syndicalism?

One of the most common Marxist techniques when they discuss
anarchism is to contrast the likes of Bakunin and Kropotkin 
to the revolutionary syndicalists. The argument runs along 
the lines that "classical" anarchism is individualistic and 
rejects working class organisation and power and syndicalism 
is a step forward from it (i.e. a step closer to Marxism). 
Sadly, such arguments simply show the ignorance of the author
rather than any form of factual basis. When the ideas of
revolutionary anarchists like Bakunin and Kropotkin are
compared to revolutionary syndicalism, the similarities are
soon discovered. 

This kind of argument can be found in Pat Stack's essay "Anarchy 
in the UK?" After totally distorting the ideas of anarchists like 
Bakunin and Kropotkin, Stack argues that anarcho-syndicalists 
"tended to look to the spontaneity and anti-statism of anarchism, 
the economic and materialist analysis of Marxism, and the 
organisational tools of trade unionism. Practically every serious 
anarchist organisation came from or leant on this tradition . . . 
The huge advantage they had over other anarchists was their 
understanding of the power of the working class, the centrality 
of the point of production (the workplace) and the need for 
collective action." [_Socialist Review_, no. 246]

Given that Stack's claims that anarchists reject the "need for
collective action," do not understand "the power of the working
class" and the "centrality" of the workplace are simply inventions, 
it would suggest that Stack's "huge advantage" does not, in fact, 
exist and is pure nonsense. Bakunin, Kropotkin and all revolutionary 
anarchists, as proven in section H.2.2, already understood all this 
and based their politics on the need for collective working class 
struggle at the point of production. As such, by contrasting 
anarcho-syndicalism with anarchism (as expressed by the likes of
Bakunin and Kropotkin) Stack simply shows his utter and total
ignorance of his subject matter.

Moreover, if he bothered to read the works of the likes of Bakunin 
and Kropotkin he would discover that many of their ideas were
identical to those of revolutionary syndicalism. For example,
Bakunin argued that the "organisation of the trade sections, 
their federation in the International, and their representation 
by Chambers of Labour, . . . [allow] the workers  . . . [to] 
combin[e] theory and practice . . . [and] bear in themselves 
the living germs of *the social order*, which is to replace the 
bourgeois world. They are creating not only the ideas but also 
the facts of the future itself." [quoted by Rudolf Rocker, 
_Anarcho-Syndicalism_, p. 45] Like the syndicalists, he argued 
"the natural organisation of the masses . . . is organisation 
based on the various ways that their various types of work 
define their day-to-day life; it is organisation by trade 
association" and once "every occupation . . . is represented
within the International [Working-Men's Association], its
organisation, the organisation of the masses of the people
will be complete." Moreover, Bakunin stressed that the working 
class had "but a single path, that of *emancipation through
practical action*" which meant "workers' solidarity in their 
struggle against the bosses" by "*trades-unions, organisation, 
and the federation of resistance funds*" [_The Basic Bakunin_, 
p. 139 and p. 103]

Like the syndicalists, Bakunin stressed working class self-activity
and control over the class struggle:

"Toilers count no longer on anyone but yourselves. Do not demoralise
and paralyse your growing strength by being duped into alliances
with bourgeois Radicalism . . . Abstain from all participation in
bourgeois Radicalism and organise outside of it the forces of the
proletariat. The bases of this organisation are already completely
given: they are the workshops and the federation of workshops, the
creation of fighting funds, instruments of struggle against the
bourgeoisie, and their federation, not only national, but
international.

"And when the hour of revolution sounds, you will proclaim the
liquidation of the State and of bourgeois society, anarchy,
that is to say the true, frank people's revolution . . . 
and the new organisation from below upwards and from the
circumference to the centre." [quoted by K.J. Kenafick, 
_Michael Bakunin and Karl Marx_, pp. 120-1]

This new society would be organised "by free federation, from
below upwards, of workers' associations, industrial as well
as agricultural . . . in districts and municipalities at
first; federation of these into regions, of the regions
into nations, and the nations into a fraternal Internationalism."
Moreover, "capital, factories, all the means of production and
raw material" would be owned by "the workers' organisations"
while the land would be given "to those who work it with their
own hands." [quoted by Kenafick, Op. Cit., p. 241 and p. 240]

The similarities with revolutionary syndicalism could not be
clearer. Little wonder that all serious historians see the 
obvious similarities between anarcho-syndicalism and Bakunin's 
anarchism. For example, George R. Esenwein's (in his study of
early Spanish anarchism) comments that syndicalism "had deep 
roots in the Spanish libertarian tradition. It can be traced 
to Bakunin's revolutionary collectivism." He also notes that 
the class struggle was "central to Bakunin's theory." 
[_Anarchist Ideology and the Working Class Movement in Spain, 
1868-1898_, p. 209 and p. 20] 

Caroline Cahm, likewise, points to "the basic syndicalist ideas 
of Bakunin" and that he "argued that trade union organisation 
and activity in the International [Working Men's Association] 
were important in the building of working-class power in the 
struggle against capital . . . He also declared that trade union 
based organisation of the International would not only guide the 
revolution but also provide the basis for the organisation of the 
society of the future." Indeed, he "believed that trade unions had 
an essential part to play in the developing of revolutionary
capacities of the workers as well as building up the organisation 
of the masses for revolution." [_Kropotkin and the Rise of 
Revolutionary Anarchism_, p. 219, p. 215 and p. 216]

Paul Avrich, in his essay "The Legacy of Bakunin," agrees. 
"Bakunin," he argued, "perhaps even more than Proudhon, was a 
prophet of revolutionary syndicalism, who believed that a free 
federation of trade unions would be the 'living germs of a new 
social order which is to replace the bourgeois world.'" 
[_Anarchist Protraits_, pp. 14-15] Bertrand Russell (in his 
justly famous discussion of socialism, anarchism and syndicalism) 
noted that "[h]ardly any of these ideas [associated with 
syndicalism] are new: almost all are derived from the Bakunist 
[sic!] section of the old International" and that this was "often 
recognised by Syndicalists themselves." [_Roads to Freedom_, 
p. 73]

Needless to say, anarchists agree with this perspective. Arthur 
Lehning, for example, summarises the anarchist perspective when
he commented that "Bakunin's collectivist anarchism . . . 
ultimately formed the ideological and theoretical basis of 
anarcho-syndicalism." ["Introduction", _Michael Bakunin: 
Selected Writings_, p. 29] Kropotkin argued that syndicalism 
"is nothing other than the rebirth of the International -- 
federalist, worker, Latin." [quoted by Martin A. Miller, 
_Kropotkin_, p. 176] Malatesta stated in 1907 that he had 
"never ceased to urge the comrades into that direction which 
the syndicalists, forgetting the past, call *new*, even though
it was already glimpsed and followed, in the International,
by the first of the anarchists." [_The Anarchist Reader_,
p. 221] Little wonder that Rudolf Rocker stated the following 
in his classic introduction to anarcho-syndicalism:

"Modern Anarcho-syndicalism is a direct continuation of those
social aspirations which took shape in the bosom of the First
International and which were best understood and most strongly
held by the libertarian wing of the great workers' alliance."
[_Anarcho-Syndicalism_, p. 49]

Murray Bookchin just states the obvious: 

"Long before syndicalism became a popular term in the French
labour movement of the late [eighteen]nineties, it already
existed in the Spanish labour movement of the early seventies.
The anarchist-influenced Spanish Federation of the old IWMA
was . . . distinctly syndicalist." ["Looking Back at Spain," 
pp. 53-96, _The Radical Papers_, p. 67]

Perhaps, in the face of such evidence (and the writings of
Bakunin himself), Marxists could claim that the sources we 
quote are either anarchists or "sympathetic" to anarchism. 
To counter this is very easy, we need only quote Marx and 
Engels. Marx attacked Bakunin for thinking that the "working 
class . . . must only organise themselves by trades- unions" 
and "not occupy itself with *politics.*" Engels argued along
the same lines, having a go at the anarchists because in the 
"Bakuninist programme a general strike is the lever employed 
by which the social revolution is started" and that they 
admitted "this required a well-formed organisation of the 
working class" (i.e. a trade union federation). Indeed, he
summarised Bakunin's strategy as being to "organise, and
when *all* the workers, hence the majority, are won over,
dispose all the authorities, abolish the state and 
replace it with the organisation of the International." 
[Marx, Engels and Lenin, _Anarchism and Anarcho-Syndicalism_, 
p. 48, p. 132, p. 133 and p. 72] Ignoring the 
misrepresentations of Marx and Engels about the ideas of 
their enemies, we can state that they got the basic point 
of Bakunin's ideas -- the centrality of trade union 
organisation and struggle as well as the use of strikes 
and the general strike. Therefore, you do not have to read 
Bakunin to find out the similarities between his ideas and
syndicalism, you can read Marx and Engels. Clearly, most
Marxist critiques of anarchism haven't even done that!

Latter anarchists, needless to say, supported the syndicalist
movement and, moreover, drew attention to its anarchist roots.
Emma Goldman noted that in the First International "Bakunin and
the Latin workers" forged ahead "along industrial and Syndicalist
lines" and stated that syndicalism "is, in essence, the economic
expression of Anarchism" and that "accounts for the presence of
so many Anarchists in the Syndicalist movement. Like Anarchism,
Syndicalism prepares the workers along direct economic lines,
as conscious factors in the great struggles of to-day, as well
as conscious factors in the task of reconstructing society." 
After seeing syndicalist ideas in action in France in 1900,
she "immediately began to propagate Syndicalist ideas." 
[_Red Emma Speaks_, p. 66, p. 68 and p. 67]

Kropotkin argued anarchist communism "wins more and more ground 
among those working-men who try to get a clear conception as to
the forthcoming revolutionary action. The syndicalist and 
trade union movements, which permit the workingmen to realise 
their solidarity and to feel the community of their interests 
better than any election, prepare the way for these conceptions."
[_Kropotkin's Revolutionary Pamphlets_, p. 174] His support
for anarchist participation in the labour movement was strong,
considering it a key method of preparing for a revolution and
spreading anarchist ideas amongst the working classes. As he
put it:

"The *syndicat* is absolutely necessary. It is the sole force
of the workers which continues the direct struggle against
capital without turning to parliamentarism." [quoted by
Miller, Op. Cit., p. 177]

"Revolutionary Anarchist Communist propaganda within the
Labour Unions," he argued, "had always been a favourite
mode of action in the Federalist or 'Bakuninist' section
of the International Working Men's Association. In Spain
and in Italy it had been especially successful. Now it
was resorted to, with evident success, in France and
_Freedom_ [the British Anarchist paper] eagerly advocated
this sort of propaganda." [_Act For Yourselves_, pp. 119-20]
Caroline Cahm notes in her excellent account of Kropotkin's
ideas between 1872 and 1886, he "was anxious to revive the
International as an organisation for aggressive strike action
to counteract the influence of parliamentary socialists on
the labour movement." This resulted Kropotkin advocating a
"remarkable fusion of anarchist communist ideas with both
the bakuninist [sic!] internationalist views adopted by
the Spanish Federation and the syndicalist ideas developed 
in the Jura Federation in the 1870s." This included seeing
the importance of revolutionary labour unions, the value of
the strikes as a mode of direct action and syndicalist action
developing solidarity. [Cahm, Op. Cit., p. 257]

Clearly, any one claiming that there is a fundamental difference
between anarchism and syndicalism is talking nonsense. Syndicalist
ideas were being argued by the likes of Bakunin and Kropotkin
before syndicalism emerged in the French CGT in the 1890s as
a clearly labelled revolutionary theory. Rather than being in 
conflict, the ideas of syndicalism find their roots in the ideas 
of Bakunin and "classical" anarchism. This would be quickly seen 
if the actual writings of Bakunin and Kropotkin were consulted. 
There *are,* of course, differences between anarchism and 
syndicalism, but they are *not* those usually listed by
Marxists. Section J.3.9 discusses these differences. As will
quickly be discovered, they are *not* based on a rejection of
working class organisation, direct action, solidarity and
collective struggle! 

Indeed, rather than acknowledge these similarities to Bakunin's
ideas, Stack prefers to rewrite history by claiming (at his
meeting on "Marxism and Anarchism" at the SWP's _Marxism 2001_ 
conference) that Georges Sorel was the father of syndicalism!
Any one familiar with the history of syndicalism and the ideas
of Sorel would, of course, know the syndicalist movement had 
been in existance for a number of years before Sorel wrote
_Refections on Violence_. As such, he discussed from afar
a movement which already existed. As the editor to a recent
edition of Sorel's book notes, "the immediate backdrop" of
_Reflections on Violence_ was "the rise of the French
syndicalist movement" which "Sorel had been following
. . . since the late 1890s." It was only "after 1902, when
the Confederation Generale du Travail (CGT) launched a
series of spectacular strikes, that syndicalism came to the
forefront of Sorel's attention." In summary, "Sorel did not
create or even inspire the syndicalist movement." [_Reflections 
on Violence_, pp. viii-ix] Rather, syndicalism came about when
anarchists (as Bakunin recommended thirty years previously)
entered the trade unions. Indeed, Sorel acknowledges this in 
his work, arguing that historians "will one day see in
this entry of the anarchists into the *syndicats* one of 
the greatest events that has been produced in our time."
[Op. Cit., p. 35]

Ultimately, claims like Pat Stack's simply shows how unfamiliar 
the author is with the ideas they are pathetically attempting to 
critique. Anarchists from Bakunin onwards shared most of the
same ideas as syndicalism (which is unsurprising as most of the
ideas of anarcho-syndicalism have direct roots in the ideas
of Bakunin). In other words, for Stack, the "huge advantage" 
anarcho-syndicalists have "over other anarchists" is that they,
in fact, share the same "understanding of the power of the 
working class, the centrality of the point of production (the 
workplace) and the need for collective action"! This, in itself,
shows the bankruptcy of Stack's claims and those like it.

H.2.9 Do anarchists have "liberal" politics?

Another assertion by Marxists is that anarchists have 
"liberal" politics or ideas. For example, one Marxist 
argues that the "programme with which Bakunin armed his 
super-revolutionary vanguard called for the 'political, 
economic and social equalisation of classes and individuals 
of both sexes, beginning with the abolition of the right of 
inheritance.' This is *liberal* politics, implying nothing 
about the abolition of capitalism." [Derek Howl, "The 
Legacy of Hal Draper," _International Socialism_, no. 52, 
p. 148] That Howl is totally distorting Bakunin's ideas 
can quickly be seen by looking at the whole of the
programme. Simply put, Howl is knowingly quoting Bakunin
out of context in order to discredit his ideas.

Howl is quoting from item 2 of the "Programme of the Alliance." 
Strangely he fails to quote the end of that item, namely when 
it states this "equalisation" was "in pursuance of the decision 
reached by the last working men's Congress in Brussels, the
land, the instruments of work and all other capital may
become the collective property of the whole of society and
be utilised only by the workers, in other words by the
agricultural and industrial associations." If this was
not enough to indicate the abolition of capitalism, item
4 states that the Alliance "repudiates all political action
whose target is anything except the triumph of the workers'
cause over Capital." [_Michael Bakunin: Selected Writings_, 
p. 174] Howl's dishonesty is clear. Bakunin *explicitly*
argued for the abolition of capitalism in the same item Howl 
(selectively) quotes from. If the socialisation of land and 
capital under the control of workers' associations is not 
the abolition of capitalism, we wonder what is!

Equally as dishonest as this quoting out of context is Howl's
non-mention of the history of the expression "political,
economic and social equalisation of classes and individuals
of both sexes." After Bakunin sent the Alliance programme to
the General Council of the _International Workingmen's 
Association_, he received a letter date March 9, 1869 from
Marx which argued that the term "the equalisation of classes"
"literally interpreted" would mean "harmony of capital and 
labour" as "persistently preached by the bourgeois socialists."
The letter argues that it was "not the logically impossible 
'equalisation of classes', but the historically necessary, 
superseding 'abolition of classes'" which was the "true 
secret of the proletarian movement" and which "forms the 
great aim of the International Working Men's Association."
Significantly, the letter adds the following:

"Considering, however, the context in which that phrase 
'equalisation of classes' occurs, it seems to be a mere 
slip of the pen, and the General Council feels confident 
that you will be anxious to remove from your program an 
expression which offers such a dangerous misunderstanding."
[Marx-Engels, _Collected Works_, vol 21, p. 46]

And, given the context, Marx was right. The phrase "equalisation
of classes" placed in the context of the political, economic
and social equalisation of individuals obviously implies the
abolition of classes. The logic is simple. If both worker and
capitalist shared the same economic and social position then 
wage labour would not exist (in fact, it would be impossible 
as it is based on social and economic *inequality*) and so 
class society would not exist. Similarly, if the tenant and the 
landlord were socially equal then the landlord would have no
power over the tenant, which would be impossible. Bakunin 
agreed with Marx on the ambiguity of the term and the Alliance 
changed its Programme to call for "the final and total abolition 
of classes and the political, economic and social equalisation 
of individuals of either sex." [Bakunin, Ibid.] This change 
ensured the admittance of the Alliance sections into the 
International Workingmen's Association (although this did 
not stop Marx, like his followers, bringing up the "equality 
of classes" years later). However, Howl repeating the changed 
phrase "equalisation of classes" out of context helps discredit
anarchism and so it is done.

Simply put, anarchists are *not* liberals as we are well aware of
the fact that without equality, liberty is impossible except for
the rich. As Nicolas Walter put it, "[l]ike liberals, anarchists
want freedom; like socialists, anarchists want equality. But we
are not satisfied by liberalism alone or by socialism alone.
Freedom without equality means that the poor and weak are less
free than the rich and strong, and equality without freedom means
that we are all slaves together. Freedom and equality are not
contradictory, but complementary; in place of the old polarisation
of freedom versus equality -- according to which we are told that
more freedom means equals less equality, and more equality equals
less freedom -- anarchists point out that in practice you cannot
have one without the other. Freedom is not genuine if some people
are too poor or too weak to enjoy it, and equality is not genuine
is some people are ruled by other." [_Reinventing Anarchy_, p. 43]
Clearly, anarchists do *not* have liberal politics. Quite the
reverse, as we subject it to extensive critique from a working
class perspective.

To the claim that anarchism "combines a socialist critique of 
capitalism with a liberal critique of socialism," anarchists say
that this is mistaken. [Paul Thomas, _Karl Marx and the Anarchists_,
p. 7] Rather, anarchism is simply a socialist critique of both
capitalism and the state. Freedom under capitalism is fatally
undermined by inequality -- it simply becomes the freedom to
pick a master. This violates liberty and equality. Equally, as
regards the state. "Any State at all," argued Bakunin, "no matter
what kind, is a domination and exploitation. It is a negation of
Socialism, which wants an equitable human society delivered from
all tutelage, from all authority and political domination as well
as economic exploitation." [quoted by Kenafick, Op. Cit., pp. 95-6]
As such, state structures violate not only liberty but also equality.
There is no real equality in power between, say, the head of the 
government and one of the millions who may, or may not, have voted 
for them. As the Russian Revolution proved, there can be no meaningful 
equality between a striking worker and the "socialist" political 
police sent to impose the will of the state.

This means that if anarchists are concerned about freedom (both 
individual *and* collective) it is not because we are influenced
by liberalism. Quite the reverse, as liberalism happily tolerates
hierarchy and the restrictions of liberty implied by private
property, wage labour and the state. As Bakunin argued, capitalism
turns "the worker into a subordinate, a passive and obedient
servant." [_The Political Philosophy of Bakunin_, p. 188] As such,
anarchism rejects liberalism, although (as Bakunin put it), "[i]f
socialism disputes radicalism, this is hardly to reverse it but
rather to advance it." [_The Basic Bakunin_, p. 87] Therefore,
anarchism rejects liberalism, not because it supports the idea
of freedom, but precisely because it does not go far enough
and fails to understand that without equality, freedom is little
more than freedom for the master. 

Lastly, a few words on the mentality that could suggest that anarchist
concern for liberty means that it is a form of liberalism. Rather
than suggest the bankruptcy of anarchism it, in fact, suggests the
bankruptcy of the politics of the person making the accusation.
After all, the clear implication is that a concern with individual,
collective and social freedom is alien to socialist ideas. It also
strikes at the heart of socialism -- its concern for equality --
as it clearly implies that some have more power (namely the right
to suppress the liberty of others) than the rest. As such, it
suggests a superficial understanding of *real* socialism. 

Ultimately, to argue that a concern for freedom means "liberalism" 
(or, equally, "individualism") indicates that the person is not a 
socialist. After all, a concern that every individual controls their 
daily lives (i.e. to be free) means a wholehearted support for 
collective self-management of group affairs. It means a vision 
of a revolution (and post-revolutionary society) based on direct 
working class participation and management of society from below 
upwards. To dismiss this vision by dismissing the principles which 
inspire it as "liberalism" means to support rule from above by the 
"enlightened" elite (i.e. the party) and the hierarchical state 
structures. It means arguing for *party* power, not *class* power, 
as liberty is seen as a *danger* to the revolution and so the 
people must be protected against the "petty-bourgeois"/"reactionary" 
narrowness of the people. Rather than seeing free debate of ideas 
and mass participation as a source of strength, it sees it as a 
source of "bad influences" which the masses must be protected from.

Moreover, it suggests a total lack of understanding of the difficulties 
that a social revolution will face. Unless it is based on the active
participation of the majority of a population, any revolution will
fail. The construction of socialism, of a new society, will face
thousands of unexpected problems and seek to meet the needs of
millions of individuals, thousands of communities and hundreds of
cultures. Without the individuals and groups within that society 
being in a position to freely contribute to that constructive task, 
it will simply wither under the bureaucratic and authoritarian
rule of a few party leaders. As such, individual liberties are an
essential aspect of *genuine* social reconstruction -- without
freedom of association, assembly, organisation, speech and so on,
the active participation of the masses will be replaced by an
isolated and atomised collective of individuals subjected to 
autocratic rule from above. 

Ultimately, as Rudolf Rocker suggested, the "urge for social justice
can only develop properly and be effective, when it grows out of
man's sense of personal freedom and it based on that. In other
words *Socialism will be free, or it will not be at all.* In its
recognition of this lies the genuine and profound justification
for the existence of Anarchism." [_Anarcho-Syndicalism_, p. 20]

H.2.10 Are anarchists against leadership?

It is a common assertion by Marxists that anarchists reject
the idea of "leadership" and so think in terms of a totally
spontaneous revolution. This is also generally understood to
imply that anarchists do not see the need for revolutionaries
to organise together to influence the class struggle in the
here and now. Hence the British SWP's Duncan Hallas:

"That an organisation of socialist militants is necessary
is common ground on the left, a few anarchist purists
apart. But what kind of organisation? One view, widespread
amongst newly radicalised students and young workers, is
that of the libertarians . . . [They have] hostility to
centralised, co-ordinated activity and profound suspicion
of anything smacking of 'leadership.' On this view nothing
more than a loose federation of working groups is necessary
or desirable. The underlying assumptions are that centralised
organisations inevitably undergo bureaucratic degeneration
and that the spontaneous activities of working people are
the sole and sufficient basis for the achievement of 
socialism . . . some libertarians draw the conclusion that
a revolutionary socialist party is a contradiction in terms.
This, of course, is the traditional anarcho-syndicalist
position." [_Towards a revolutionary socialist party_, p. 39]

Ignoring the usual patronising references to the age and
experience of non-Leninists, this argument can be faulted
on many levels. Firstly, while libertarians do reject 
centralised structures, it does *not* mean we reject 
co-ordinated activity. This may be a common Marxist 
argument, but it is a straw man one. Secondly, anarchists
do *not* reject the idea of "leadership." We simply reject
the idea of hierarchical leadership. Thirdly, while all
anarchists do think that a "revolutionary socialist party"
is a contradiction in terms, it does not mean that we
reject the need for revolutionary organisations (i.e.
organisations of anarchists). While opposing centralised
and hierarchical political parties, anarchists have long
saw the need for anarchist groups and federations to discuss
and spread our ideas and influence. We will discuss each issue
in turn.

The first argument is the least important. For Marxists, 
co-ordination equals centralism and to reject centralisation
means to reject co-ordination of joint activity. For anarchists,
co-ordination does not each centralism or centralisation. This
is why anarchism stresses federation and federalism as the means
of co-ordinating joint activity. Under a centralised system,
the affairs of all are handed over to a handful of people at
the centre. Their decisions are then binding on the mass of
the members of the organisation whose position is simply that 
of executing the orders of those whom the majority elect. This
means that power rests at the top and decisions flow from the
top downwards. As such, the "revolutionary" party simply mimics 
the very society it claims to oppose.

In a federal structure, in contrast, decisions flow from the
bottom up by means of councils of elected, mandated and 
recallable *delegates*. In fact, we discover anarchists 
like Bakunin and Proudhon arguing for elected, mandated and 
recallable delegates rather than for representatives in 
their ideas of how a free society worked years before the 
Paris Commune applied them in practice. The federal structure 
exists to ensure that any co-ordinated activity accurately 
reflects the decisions of the membership. As such, anarchists 
"do not deny the need for co-ordination between groups, for 
discipline, for meticulous planning, and for unity in action. 
But they believe that co-ordination, discipline, planning, 
and unity in action must be achieved *voluntarily,* by means 
of a self-discipline nourished by conviction and understanding, 
not by coercion and a mindless, unquestioning obedience to orders 
from above." [_Post-Scarcity Anarchism_, p. 215] In other words, 
co-ordination comes *from below* rather than being imposed from 
above by a few leaders. To use an analogy, federalist co-ordination 
is the co-ordination created in a strike by workers resisting their
bosses. It is created by debate amongst equals and flows from
below upwards. Centralised co-ordination is the co-ordination
imposed from the top-down by the boss. 

As such, anarchists reject the "centralised" model of the party
as it is a "revolutionary" grouping organised on the capitalist
model. As such, it is not revolutionary at all. It simply 
reproduces the very problems within the "revolutionary" 
movement that, ironically, inspired the initial revolt of its 
members towards socialism. The idea that the membership should 
run the organisation becomes simply that the majority designates 
its rulers and, like the bourgeois system of parliamentary
democracy it is copied from, quickly becomes drained of any
real meaning and becomes a veil thrown over the unlimited
power of the rulers. The membership does not run the party
simply because it elects delegates once a year who, in turn,
designate the central committee -- no more than the people
are sovereign in a parliamentary-style republic because they
vote for the deputies who designate the government. Moreover,
it trains the membership in accepting a division between
leaders and led which, if applied during a revolution, will
quickly mean that the party, *not* the masses, have real power.

Ultimately, centralised organisations become very undemocratic
and, equally as important, *ineffective.* Hierarchical 
organisations kill people's enthusiasm and creativity. Such
organisations are organisations where plans and ideas are not 
adopted because they are the best but simply because it is what
a handful of leaders *think* are best for everyone else. Really
effective organisations are those which make decisions based
frank and open co-operation and debate, where dissent is *not*
stifled and ideas are adopted because of their merit, and not
*who* suggests them (i.e. the leaders of the party). In their 
quest for power and command, authoritarians usually end up 
manipulating processes, railroad their agendas, and in the 
process alienate people -- exactly those people who are new to 
organising for social change. They cause experienced organisers 
to quit and put-off people who might otherwise join the movement.

This is why anarchists stress federalist organisations. It ensures
that co-ordination flows from below and there is no institutionalised
leadership. By organising in a way that reflects the kind of society
we want, we train ourselves in the skills and decision making processes
required to make a free and classless society work. In other words,
that means and ends are united and this ensures that the means used
will result in the desired ends. Simply put, libertarian means must
be used if you want libertarian ends.

Secondly, anarchists are not against all forms of "leadership."
We are against hierarchical and institutionalised forms of 
leadership. In other words, of giving *power* to leaders. This 
is the key difference, as Albert Meltzer explains. "Some
people in some circumstance," he argues, "do naturally 'give a
lead.' But this should not mean they are a class apart. Any
revolutionary in a factory where the majority have no 
revolutionary experience, will at times, 'give a lead.' But
no anarchist would form an *institutionalised leadership,*
nor wait for a lead, but give one." [_Anarchism: Arguments
for and against_, p. 36] 

This means, as we argue in section J.3.6, that anarchists seek
to influence the class struggle as *equals.* Rather than aim
for positions of power, anarchists want to influence people
by the power of their ideas as expressed in the debates that
occur in the organisations created in the social struggle 
itself. This is because anarchists recognise that there is
an unevenness in the level of ideas within the working class.
This fact is obvious. Some workers accept the logic of the
current system, others are critical of certain aspects,
others (usually a minority) are consciously seek a better
society (and are anarchists, ecologists, Marxists, etc.)
and so on. Only constant discussion, the clash of ideas, 
combined with collective struggle can develop and narrow 
the unevenness of ideas within the oppressed. As Malatesta 
argued, "[o]nly freedom or the struggle for freedom can be 
the school for freedom." [_Life and Ideas_, p. 59]

From this perspective, it follows that any attempt to create
an institutionalised leadership structure means the end of
the revolutionary process. Such "leadership" automatically
means a hierarchical structure, one in which the leaders 
have power and make the decisions for the rest. This just
reproduces the old class division of labour between those
who think and those who act (i.e. between order givers
and order takers). Rather than the revolutionary masses
taking power in such a system, it is the "leaders" (i.e.
a specific party hierarchy) who do so and the masses role
becomes, yet again, simply that of selecting which boss
tells them what to do.

As such, the anarchist federation does not reject the need
of "leadership" in the sense of giving a led, of arguing
its ideas and trying to win people to them. It does reject
the idea that "leadership" should become separated from the
mass of the people. Simply put, no party, no group of leaders
have all the answers and so the active participation of all
is required for a successful revolution. "To give full scope
to socialism," argued Kropotkin, "entails rebuilding from
top to bottom a society dominated by the narrow individualism
of the shopkeeper . . . it is a question of completely
reshaping all relationships . . . In every street, in every
hamlet, in every group of men gathered around a factory or
along a section of the railway line, the creative, 
constructive, and organisational spirit must be awakened in
order to rebuild life -- in the factory, in the village,
in the store, in production, and in distribution of
supplies." Hence the need to "*shatter the state*" and
"rebuild a new organisation, by beginning from the very
foundations of society -- the liberated village commune,
federalism, groupings from simple to compound, free
workingmen's [and women's] associations." Such a task
could *not* be "carried out within the framework of the
state and the pyramidal organisation which is the essence
of the state." [_Selected Writings on Anarchism and 
Revolution_, pp. 261-2]

As such, anarchists reject the idea of turning the organs
created in the class struggle and revolutionary process into
hierarchical structures. By turning them from organs of
self-management into organs for nominating "leaders," the
constructive tasks and political development of the 
revolution will be aborted before they really begin. The
active participation of all will become the picking of new
masters and the revolution will falter. For this reason,
anarchists "differ from the Bolshevik type of party in
their belief that genuine revolutionaries must function
*within the framework of the forms created by the
revolution,* not within forms created by the party. . . 
Anarcho-communists seek to persuade the factory committees,
assemblies or soviets to make themselves into *genuine
organs of popular self-management,* not to dominate them,
manipulate them, or hitch them to an all-knowing political
party. Anarcho-communists do not seek to rear a state
structure over these popular revolutionary organs." 
[Bookchin, Op. Cit., p. 217]

This means that "an organisation is needed to propagate
ideas systematically -- and not ideas alone, but *ideas
which promote the concept of self-management.*" In other
words, there "is a need for a revolutionary organisation
-- but its function must always be kept clearly in mind.
Its first task is propaganda . . . In a revolutionary 
situation, the revolutionary organisation presents the
most advanced demands: it is prepared at every turn of
events to formulate -- in the most concrete fashion --
the immediate task that should be performed to advance
the revolutionary process. It provides the boldest 
elements in action and in the decision-making organs
of the revolution." [Bookchin, Op. Cit., pp. 216-7]
But what it does not is supplant those organs or 
decision-making process by creating institutionalised,
hierarchical leadership structures. As such, it is
not a question of organisation versus non-organisation,
or "leadership" versus non-"leadership" but rather what
*kind* of organisation and the *kind* of leadership.

Clearly, then, anarchists do not reject or dismiss the
importance of politically aware minorities organising
and spreading their ideas within social struggles. As 
Caroline Cahm summarised in her excellent study of 
Kropotkin's thought between 1872 and 1886, "Kropotkin
stressed the role of heroic minorities in the preparation
for revolution." [_Kropotkin and the Rise of Revolutionary
Anarchism, 1872-86_, p. 276] However, as John Crump correctly
argues, the "key words here are *in the preparation for
revolution.* By their courage and daring in opposing 
capitalism and the state, anarchist minorities could
teach by example and thereby draw increasing numbers into
the struggle. But Kropotkin was not advocating substitutionism;
the idea that a minority might carry out the revolution in
place of the people was as alien to him as the notion that
a minority would exercise rule after the revolution. In
fact, Kropotkin recognised that the former would be a
prescription for the latter." [_Hatta Shuzo and Pure
Anarchism in Interwar Japan_, p. 9] In Kropotkin's own
words:

"The idea of anarchist communism, today represented by
feeble minorities, but increasingly finding popular
expression, will make its way among the mass of the
people. Spreading everywhere, the anarchist groups
. . . will take strength from the support they find
among the people, and will raise the red flag of the
revolution . . . On that day, what is now the minority
will become the People, the great mass, and that mass
rising against property and the State, will march
forward towards anarchist communism." [_Words of a
Rebel_, p. 75]

This influence would be gained simply by the correctness of
our ideas and the validity of our suggestions. This means
that anarchists seek influence "through advice and example,
leaving the people . . .  to adopt our methods and solutions
if these are, or seem to be, better than those suggested and
carried out by others." As such, any anarchist organisation 
would "strive acquire overwhelming influence in order to draw 
the [revolutionary] movement towards the realisation of our
ideas. But such influence must be won by doing more and
better than others, and will be useful if won in that way."
This means rejecting "taking over command, that is by becoming
a government and imposing one's own ideas and interests
through police methods." [Malatesta, _The Anarchist 
Revolution_, pp. 108-9]

Moreover, unlike leading Marxists like Lenin and Karl Kautsky, 
anarchists think that socialist ideas are developed *within* 
the class struggle rather than outside it by the radical 
intelligentsia. According to Lenin (who was only agreeing 
with Kautsky, the leading light of German and International 
Social Democracy at the start of the twentieth century) 
socialist (or "Social-Democratic") "consciousness could only
be brought to them [the workers] from without. The history
of all countries shows that the working class, exclusively
by its own effort, is able to develop only trade union
consciousness." Socialist ideas did not arise from the
labour movement but from the "educated representatives 
of the propertied classes, the intellectuals."  ["What 
is to Be Done?", _Essential Works of Lenin_, p. 74]

Anarchists reject this perspective. Kropotkin argued that 
"modern socialism has emerged out of the depths of the people's
consciousness. If a few thinkers emerging from the bourgeoisie
have given it the approval of science and the support of
philosophy, the basis of the idea which they have given
their own expression has nonetheless been the product of
the collective spirit of the working people. The rational
socialism of the International is still today our greatest
strength, and it was elaborated in working class organisation,
under the first influence of the masses. The few writers who
offered their help in the work of elaborating socialist
ideas have merely been giving form to the aspirations that
first saw their light among the workers." [_Words of a Rebel_,
p. 59] In other words, anarchists are a part of the working
class (either by birth or by rejecting their previous class
background and becoming part of it), the part which has 
generalised its own experiences, ideas and needs into a 
theory called "anarchism" and seeks to convince the rest 
of the validity of its ideas and tactics. This would 
be a dialogue, based on both learning *and* teaching.

As such, this means that the relationship between the 
specifically anarchist groups and oppressed peoples in
struggle is a two way one. As well as trying to influence the
social struggle, anarchists also try and learn from the class
struggle and try to generalise from the experiences of their 
own struggles and the struggles of other working class people. 
Rather than seeing the anarchist group as some sort of teacher, 
anarchists see it as simply part of the social struggle and
its ideas can and must develop from active participation 
within the class struggle. As anarchists agree with Bakunin
and reject the idea that their organisations should take
power on behalf of the masses, it is clear that such groups
are not imposing alien ideas upon people but rather try to
clarify the ideas generated by working class people in struggle.
It is an objective fact that there is a great difference in
the political awareness within the masses of oppressed people.
This uneven development means that they do not accept, all at 
once or in their totality, revolutionary ideas. There are layers. 
Groups of people, by ones and twos and then in larger numbers, 
become interested, read literature, talk with others, and create
new ideas. The first groups that explicitly call their ideas 
"anarchism" have the right and duty to try to persuade others 
to join them. This is not opposed to the self-organisation of 
the working class, rather it is how the working class 
self-organises.  

Thirdly, as we discuss in section J.3, anarchists recognise the
need to create specifically anarchist organisations to spread
anarchist ideas and influence the class struggle. As we discuss
the different kinds of anarchist organisations in that section,
we will not do so here. Suffice to say, the idea that anarchists
reject this need to organise politically in order to achieve
a revolution is not to be found in the theory and practice of
all the major anarchist thinkers. 

Ultimately, if spontaneity was enough to create (and ensure the 
success of) a social revolution then we would be living in a
libertarian socialist society. The fact that we are not suggests
that spontaneity, however important, is not enough in itself.
This simple fact of history is understood by anarchists and
all the major anarchist thinkers.

See section J.3 for more details on what organisations anarchists
create and their role in anarchist revolutionary theory. Section
J.3.6 has a fuller discussion of the role of anarchist groups in 
the class struggle. For a discussion of the role of anarchists in 
a revolution, see section J.7.5. For a fuller discussion why
anarchists reject the idea of a revolutionary socialist party
see section H.5.1 ("Why are vanguard parties anti-socialist?").

H.2.11 Are anarchists "anti-democratic"?

One of the common arguments against anarchism is that it is
"anti-democratic" (or "elitist"). For example, the British 
_Socialist Workers Party_ journal _International Socialism_ 
(number 52) denounces anarchism for being "necessarily deeply 
anti-democratic" due to its "thesis of the absolute sovereignty 
of the individual ego as against the imposition of *any*
'authority' over it," which, its is claimed, is the "distinctly
anarchist concept." Then Hal Draper is quoted arguing that 
"[o]f all ideologies, anarchism is the most fundamentally 
anti-democratic in principle, since it is not only unalterably
hostile to democracy in general but particularly to any 
socialist democracy of the most ideal kind that could be 
imagined." This is because "[b]y the 'principle of authority' 
the consistent anarchist means principled opposition to any 
exercise of authority, including opposition to authority 
derived from the most complete democracy and exercised in 
completely democratic fashion." The author of the review argues 
that this position is an "idealist conception" in which "*any* 
authority is seen as despotic; 'freedom' and 'authority' (and 
therefore 'freedom' and 'democracy' are opposites. This 
presumption of opposition to 'authority' was fostered by 
liberalism." Needless to say, he contrasts this with the 
"Marxist" "materialist understanding of society" in which it 
"was clear that 'authority' is necessary in *any* society where 
labour is collaborative." [Derek Howl, "The Legacy of Hal Draper," 
_International Socialism_, no. 52, p. 145]

Such as argument is, of course, just ridiculous. Indeed, it is
flawed on so many levels its hard to know where to start. The
obvious place to start is the claim that anarchism is the most
"fundamentally anti-democratic in principle." Now, given that
there are fascists, monarchists, supporters (like Trotsky) of 
"party dictatorship" and a host of others who advocate minority 
rule (even by one person) over everyone else, can it be argued with
a straight face that anarchism is the most "anti-democratic"
because it argues for the liberty of all? Is the idea and
practice of absolute monarchy *really* more democratic than
anarchism? Clearly not, although this does indicate the quality
of this kind of argument.

Another obvious point is that anarchists do not see *any* authority 
as "despotic." As we indicated in section H.4, this common Marxist 
assertion is simply not true. Anarchists have always been very clear 
on the fact they reject specific kinds of authority and not "authority" 
as such. In fact, by the term "principal of authority," Bakunin
meant *hierarchical* authority, and not "authority" as such. This 
explains why Kropotkin argued that "the origin of the anarchist 
inception of society . . . [lies in] the criticism . . .  of the 
hierarchical organisations and the authoritarian conceptions of 
society" and stressed that anarchism "refuses all hierarchical 
organisation." [_Kropotkin's Revolutionary Pamphlets_, p. 158 and 
p. 137]

This means, just to state the obvious, that making and sticking 
by collective decisions are *not* acts of authority. Rather 
they simply expressions of individual autonomy. Clearly in most 
activities there is a need to co-operate with other people. 
Indeed, *living* involves the "absolute sovereignty of the 
individual ego" (as if anarchists like Bakunin used such terms!)
being "restricted" by exercising that "sovereignty." Take, for
example, playing football. This involves finding others who seek
to play the game, organising into teams, agreeing on rules and so
on. All terrible violations of the "absolute sovereignty of the 
individual ego," yet it was precisely the "sovereignty" of the
"individual" which produced the desire to play the game in the
first place. What sort of "sovereignty" is it that negates itself
when it is exercised? Clearly, then, the Marxist "summary" of 
anarchist ideas on this matter, like of many others, is poverty 
stricken.

And, unsurprisingly enough, we find anarchist thinkers like Bakunin
and Kropotkin attacking this idea of "the absolute sovereignty 
of the individual ego" in the most severe terms. Indeed, they
thought was a bourgeois theory which simply existed to justify
the continued domination and exploitation of working class 
people by the ruling class. Kropotkin quite clearly recognised
its anti-individual and unfree nature by labelling it "the 
authoritarian individualism which stifles us" and stressing its
"narrow-minded, and therefore foolish" nature. [_Conquest of
Bread_, p. 130] Similarly, it would do the Marxist argument 
little good if they quoted Bakunin arguing that the "freedom 
of individuals is by no means an individual matter. It is a 
collective matter, a collective product. No individual can 
be free outside of human society or without its co-operation"
or that he considered "individualism" as a "bourgeois
principle." [_The Basic Bakunin_, p. 46 and p. 57] Perhaps, 
of course, these two famous anarchists were not, in fact, 
"consistent" anarchists, but that claim is doubtful. 

Anarchism does, of course, derive from the Greek for "without 
authority" or "without rulers" and this, unsurprisingly, informs 
anarchist theory and visions of a better world. This means that 
anarchism is against the "domination of man by man" (and woman 
by woman, woman by man, and so on). However, "[a]s knowledge 
has penetrated the governed masses . . . the people have 
revolted against the form of authority then felt most intolerable. 
This spirit of revolt in the individual and the masses, is the 
natural and necessary fruit of the spirit of domination; the 
vindication of human dignity, and the saviour of social life." 
Thus "freedom is the necessary preliminary to any true and 
equal human association." [Charlotte Wilson, _Anarchist Essays_, 
p. 54 and p. 40] In other words, anarchist comes from the 
struggle of the oppressed against their rulers and is an 
expression of individual and social freedom. Anarchism was 
born from the class struggle.

Taking individual liberty as a good thing, the next question is
how do free individuals co-operate together in such a way as
to ensure their continued liberty. This, of course, means that
any association must be one of equality between the associating
individuals. This can only be done when everyone involved takes
a meaningful role in the decision making process and because of
this anarchists stress the need for *self-government* (usually 
called *self-management*) of both individuals and groups. 
Self-management within free associations and decision making 
from the bottom-up is the only way domination can be eliminated. 
This is because, by making our own decisions ourselves, we 
automatically end the division of society into governors and 
governed (i.e. end hierarchy). As Anarchism clearly means 
support for freedom and equality, it automatically implies 
opposition to all forms of hierarchical organisation and 
authoritarian social relationship. This means that anarchist
support for individual liberty does not end, as many Marxists 
assert, in the denial of organisation or collective decision
making but rather in support for *self-managed* collectives. 
Only this form of organisation can end the division of society 
into rulers and ruled, oppressor and oppressed, exploiter and 
exploited and create an environment in which individuals can 
associate without denying their freedom and equality.

This is why anarchists stress such things as decision making by
mass assemblies and the co-ordination of decisions by the free
federation of mandated and recallable delegates. This would 
allow those affected by a decision to have a say in it, so 
allowing them to manage their own affairs directly and without 
hierarchy. 

Therefore, the *positive* side of anarchism (which naturally 
flows from its opposition to authority) results in a political 
theory which argues that people must control their own struggles,
organisations and affairs directly. This means we support mass 
assemblies and their federation via councils of mandated delegates 
subject to recall if they break their mandates (i.e. they act as 
they see fit, i.e. as politicians or bureaucrats, and not as the 
people who elected them desire). This way people directly govern 
themselves and control their own lives. Rather than imply an 
"individualism" which denies the importance of association and
the freedom it can generate, anarchism implies an opposition to
hierarchy in all its forms and the support free association of 
equals. In other words, anarchism can generally be taken to mean 
support for self-government or self-management, both by individuals
and by groups. 

In summary, anarchist support for individual liberty incurs a
similar support for self-managed groups. In such groups, individuals
co-operate as equals to maximise their liberty. This means, for 
anarchists, Marxists are just confusing co-operation with coercion, 
agreement with authority, association with subordination. Thus the
Marxist "materialist" concept of authority distorts the anarchist 
position and, secondly, is a supra-historical in the extreme. 
Different forms of decision making are lumped together, independent 
of the various forms it may assume. To equate hierarchical and 
self-managed decision making, antagonistic and harmonious forms
of organisation, alienated authority or authority retained in the
hands of those directly affected by it, can only be a source of
confusion. Rather than being a "materialistic" approach, the 
Marxist one is pure philosophical idealism -- the postulating of
a-historic concepts independently of the individuals and societies
that generate specific social relationships and ways of working
together.

Similarly, it would be churlish to note that Marxists themselves
have habitually rejected democratic authority when it suited them.
Even that "higher type of democracy" of the soviets was ignored
by the Bolshevik party once it was in power. In response to the 
"great Bolshevik losses in the soviet elections" during the 
spring and summer of 1918 which resulted in "big gains by the
SRs and particularly by the Mensheviks," "Bolshevik armed force 
usually overthrew the results of these provincial elections." 
In addition, "the government continually postponed the new general 
elections to the Petrograd Soviet, the term of which had ended in 
March 1918. Apparently, the government feared that the opposition 
parties would show gains." Moreover, the Bolsheviks "pack[ed]
local soviets once they could not longer count on an electoral 
majority" by giving representation to organisations they dominated. 
[Samuel Farber, _Before Stalinism_, pp. 23-4, p. 22 and p. 33] This, 
needless to say, made these elections meaningless and made the regime 
"soviet" in name only. The Bolsheviks simply undermined soviet 
democracy to ensure their hold in power.

In the workplace, the Bolsheviks replaced workers' economic 
democracy with "one-man management" appointed from above, by 
the state. Lenin was at the forefront of this process, arguing 
that workers' must "*unquestioningly obey the single will* of 
the leaders of labour" in April 1918 along with granting 
"individual executives dictatorial power (or 'unlimited' 
powers)." He argued that "the appointment of individuals, 
dictators with unlimited powers" was, in fact, "in general 
compatible with the fundamental principles of Soviet government" 
simply because "the history of revolutionary movements" had "shown" 
that "the dictatorship of individuals was very often the 
expression, the vehicle, the channel of the dictatorship of 
revolutionary classes." He notes that "[u]ndoubtably, the 
dictatorship of individuals was compatible with bourgeois 
democracy." [_The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government_, 
p. 34 and p. 32] This nonsense reached its heights (or, more 
correctly, depths) with Trotsky's ideas on the "militarisation 
of labour" he advanced in late 1919 and early 1920 as a
means of reconstructing Russia in a socialist (!) manner
after the (fast approaching) end of the Civil War. Need
we also mention that Trotsky also abolished democratic forms 
of organisation in the military *before* the start of the
Civil War -- as he put it, the "elective basis is politically 
pointless and technically inexpedient and has already been set 
aside by decree." [quoted by M. Brinton, _The Bolsheviks and 
Workers' Control_, pp. 37-8]

These are a few examples of Trotsky's argument that you
cannot place "the workers' right to elect representatives
above the party. As if the Party were not entitled to
assert its dictatorship even if that dictatorship clashed
with the passing moods of the workers' democracy!" He
continued by stating the "Party is obliged to maintain
its dictatorship . . . regardless of temporary vacillations
even in the working class . . . The dictatorship does not
base itself at every moment on the formal principle of
a workers' democracy." [quoted by Brinton, Op. Cit., p. 78]
He repeated this argument nearly two decades later, stating
that the "very same masses are at different times inspired 
by different moods and objectives. It is just for this 
reason that a centralised organisation of the vanguard 
is indispensable. Only a party, wielding the authority 
it has won, is capable of overcoming the vacillation 
of the masses themselves." [_The Moralists and Sycophants_,
p. 59] Ultimately, for Leninists, the revolution is seen
purely as a way for the "revolutionary" party to take power.
Trotsky, for example, argued that "the proletariat can take 
power only through its vanguard" and that a "revolutionary 
party, even having seized power . . . is still by no means 
the sovereign ruler of society." Note, the party is "the 
sovereign ruler of society," *not* the working class. He
stressed this by arguing that those "who propose the 
abstraction of Soviets to the party dictatorship should 
understand that only thanks to the party dictatorship were 
the Soviets able to lift themselves out of the mud of 
reformism and attain the state form of the proletariat." 
[_Stalinism and Bolshevism_]

So, remember when Lenin or Trotsky argue for "the dictatorship of
individuals," the over-riding of the democratic decisions of the 
masses by the party, the elimination of workers factory committees 
in favour of appointed managers armed with "dictatorial" power or 
when the Bolshevik disbanded soviets with non-Bolshevik majorities, 
it is *anarchism* which is fundamentally "anti-democratic"! All
in all, that anyone can claim that anarchism is more 
"anti-democratic" than Leninism is a joke. However, all these
anti-democratic acts do fit in nicely with Howl's "materialist" 
Marxist concept that "'authority' is necessary in *any* society 
where labour is collaborative." As such, since "authority" is
essential and all forms of collective decision making are 
necessarily "authoritarian" and involve "subordination," then
it clearly does not really matter how collectives are organised 
and how decisions are reached. Hence the lack of concern for 
the liberty of the working people subjected to the (peculiarly 
bourgeois-like) forms of authority preferred by Lenin and 
Trotsky. It was precisely for this reason, to differentiate 
between egalitarian (and so libertarian) forms of organisation 
and decision making and authoritarian ones, that anarchists 
called themselves "anti-authoritarians." 

Even if we ignore all the anti-democratic acts of Bolshevism (or
justify them in terms of the problems facing the Russian Revolution,
as most Leninists do), the anti-democratic nature of Marxist ideas
still come to the fore. The Leninist support for centralised state 
power brings their attack on anarchism as being "anti-democratic" 
into clear perspective. Ultimately, Marxism results in the affairs
of millions being decided upon by a handful of people in the 
Central Committee of the vanguard party. As an example, we will
discuss Trotsky's arguments against the Makhnovist movement in the
Ukraine. 

Trotsky argued that the Makhnovists were against "Soviet power." 
This, he argued, was simply "the authority of all the local soviets
in the Ukraine" because they all "recognise the central power
which they themselves have elected." Consequently, the Makhnovists
reject not only central authority about also the local soviets
as well. Trotsky also argued that there were no "appointed"
persons in Russia as "there is no authority in Russia but that 
which is elected by the whole working class and working peasantry. 
It follows [!] that commanders appointed by the central Soviet 
Government are installed in their positions by the will of the 
working millions." He stressed that one can speak of "appointed"
persons "only under the bourgeois order, when Tsarist officials 
or bourgeois ministers appointed at their own discretion commanders 
who kept the soldier masses subject to the bourgeois classes."
[_The Makhno Movement_] When the Makhnovists tried to call 
the fourth regional conference of peasants, workers and partisans
to discuss the progression of the Civil War in early 1919, Trotsky,
unsurprisingly enough, banned it. 

In other words, because the Bolshevik government had been elected 
one year previously under a regime which had manipulated and 
overturned soviet elections, he (as its representative) had the 
right to ban a conference which would have expressed the wishes 
of millions of workers, peasants and partisans fighting for the 
revolution! The fallacious nature of his arguments is easily
seen. Rather than executing the will of millions of toilers,
Trotsky was simply executing his own will. He did not consult
those millions nor the local soviets who had, in Bolshevik 
ideology, surrendered their power to the handful of people in
the central committee of the Bolshevik Party. By banning the
conference he was very effectively undermining the practical, 
functional democracy of millions and replacing it with a purely 
formal "democracy" based on empowering a few leaders at the
centre. Yes, indeed, truly democracy in action when one person 
can deny a revolutionary people its right to decide its own
fate!

Unsurprisingly, the anarchist Nestor Makhno replied by 
arguing that he considered it "an inviolable right of
the workers and peasants, a right won by the revolution,
to call congresses on their own account, to discuss their
affairs. That is why the prohibition by the central
authorities on the calling of such congresses . . .
represent a direct and insolent violation of the rights of
the workers." [quoted by Peter Arshinov, _The History of
the Makhnovist Movement_, p. 129] We will leave it to the
readers to decide which of the two, Trotsky or Makhno, 
showed the fundamentally "anti-democratic" perspective.

Lastly, there are a few theoretical issues that need to be
raised on this matter. Notice, for example, that no attempt 
is made to answer the simple question of why having 51% of 
a group automatically makes you right! It is taken for 
granted that the minority should subject themselves to the 
will of the majority before that will is even decided upon. 
Does that mean, for example, that Marxists refuse minorities 
the right of civil disobedience if the majority acts in a way 
which harms their liberties and equality? If, for example, the 
majority in community decides to implement race laws, does that 
mean that Marxists would *oppose* the discriminated minority 
taking direct action to change those laws? Or, to take an 
example closer to Marxism, in 1914 the leaders of the Social 
Democratic Party in the German Parliament voted for war credits. 
The anti-war minority of that group went along with the majority 
in the name of "democracy," "unity" and "discipline". Would Howl 
and Draper argue that they were right to do so? If they were not
right to betray the ideas of Marxism and the international working
class, then why not? They did, after all, subject themselves to
the "most perfect socialist democracy" and so, presumably, made
the correct decision. Simply put, the arguments that anarchists
are "anti-democratic" are question-begging in the extreme.

As a general rule-of-thumb, anarchists have little problem 
with the minority accepting the decisions of the majority
after a process of free debate and discussion. As we argue
in section A.2.11, such collective decision making is 
compatible with anarchist principles -- indeed, is based 
on them. By governing ourselves directly, we exclude others 
governing us. However, we do not make a fetish of this, 
recognising that, in certain circumstances, the minority 
must and should ignore majority decisions. For example, 
if the majority of an organisation decide on a policy 
which the minority thinks is disastrous then why should 
they follow the majority? Equally, if the majority make 
a decision which harms the liberty and equality of a
non-oppressive and non-exploitative minority, then that 
minority has the right to reject the "authority" of the
majority. Hence Carole Pateman:

"The essence of liberal social contract theory is that individuals
ought to promise to, or enter an agreement to, obey representatives,
to whom they have alienated their right to make political decisions
. . . Promising . . . is an expression of individual freedom and
equality, yet commits individuals for the future. Promising also
implies that individuals are capable of independent judgement and
rational deliberation, and of evaluating and changing their own
actions and relationships; promises may sometimes justifiably be
broken. However, to promise to obey is to deny or limit, to a
greater or lesser degree, individuals' freedom and equality and
their ability to exercise these capacities. To promise to obey
is to state that, in certain areas, the person making the promise
is no longer free to exercise her capacities and decide upon her
own actions, and is no longer equal, but subordinate." [_The
Problem of Political Obligation_, p. 19]

Thus, for anarchists, a democracy which does not involve individual
rights to dissent, to disagree and to practice civil disobedience
would violate freedom and equality, the very values Marxists usually 
claim to be at the heart of their politics. The claim that anarchism 
is "anti-democratic" basically hides the argument that the minority 
must become the slave of the majority -- with no right of dissent 
when the majority is wrong (in practice, of course, it is usually
meant the orders and laws of the minority who are elected to power). 
In effect, it wishes the minority to be subordinate, not equal, 
to the majority. Anarchists, in contrast, because we support 
self-management also recognise the importance of dissent and 
individuality -- in essence, because we are in favour of 
self-management ("democracy" does not do the concept justice) we 
also favour the individual freedom that is its rationale. We 
support the liberty of private individuals because we believe in 
self-management ("democracy") so passionately. 

Indeed, Howl and Draper fail to understand the rationale for 
democratic decision making -- it is not based on the idea that 
the majority is always right but that individual freedom requires 
democracy to express and defend itself. By placing the collective 
above the individual, they undermine democratic values and replace 
them with little more than tyranny by the majority (or, more likely, 
those who claim to represent the majority).

Progress is determined by those who dissent and rebel against the 
status quo and the decisions of the majority. That is why anarchists 
support the right of dissent in self-managed groups -- in fact,
as we argue in section A.2.11, dissent, refusal, revolt by 
individuals and minorities is a key aspect of self-management. 
Given that Leninists do not support self-management (rather they, 
at best, support the Lockean notion of electing a government as 
being "democracy") it is hardly surprising they, like Locke, views 
dissent as a danger and something to denounce. Anarchists, on
the other hand, recognising that self-management's (i.e. direct 
democracy's) rationale and base is in individual freedom, recognise 
and support the rights of individuals to rebel against what they 
consider as unjust impositions. As history shows, the anarchist 
position is the correct one -- without rebellion, numerous 
minorities would never have improved their position and society
would stagnant. Indeed, Howl's and Draper's comments are just a 
reflection of the standard capitalist diatribe against strikers 
and protestors -- they don't need to protest, for they live in 
a "democracy."

So, yes, anarchists do support individual freedom to resist even
democratically made decisions simply because democracy *has to be* 
based on individual liberty. Without the right of dissent, democracy
becomes a joke and little more than a numerical justification 
for tyranny. This does not mean we are "anti-democratic," indeed
the reverse as we hold true to the fundamental rationale for
democratic decision-making -- it allows individuals to combine
as equals and not as subordinates and masters. Moreover, diversity 
is essential for any viable eco-system and it is essential in any 
viable society (and, of course, any society worth living in). This
means that a healthy society is one which encourages diversity,
individuality, dissent and, equally, self-managed associations 
to ensure the freedom of all.

As Malatesta argued, "[t]here are matters over which it is worth 
accepting the will of the majority because the damage caused by 
a split would be greater than that caused by error; there are 
circumstances in which discipline becomes a duty because to 
fail in it would be to fail in the solidarity between the 
oppressed and would mean betrayal in face of the enemy . . . 
What is essential is that individuals should develop a sense 
of organisation and solidarity, and the conviction that fraternal 
co-operation is necessary to fight oppression and to achieve a 
society in which everyone will be able to enjoy his [or her] 
own life." [_Life and Ideas_, pp. 132-3] 

As such, anarchists are not against majority decision making as
such. We simply recognise it has limitations. In practice, the
need for majority and minority to come to an agreement is one
most anarchists would recognise: 

"But such an adaptation [of the minority to the decisions
of the majority] on the one hand by one group must be reciprocal,
voluntary and must stem from an awareness of need and of
goodwill to prevent the running of social affairs from being paralysed by obstinacy. It cannot be imposed as a principle
and statutory norm. . .

"So . . . anarchists deny the right of the majority to govern
in human society in general . . . how is it possible . . . to 
declare that anarchists should submit to the decisions of the 
majority before they have even heard what those might be?" 
[Malatesta, _The Anarchist Revolution_, pp. 100-1]

Therefore, while accepting majority decision making as a key
aspect of a revolutionary movement and a free society, anarchists
do not make a fetish of it. We recognise that we must use our
own judgement in evaluating each decision reached simply because
the majority is not always right. We must balance the need for
solidarity in the common struggle and needs of common life with
critical analysis and judgement. As Malatesta argues:

"In any case it is not a question of being right or wrong; it
is a question of freedom, freedom for all, freedom for each
individual so long as he [or she] does not violate the equal
freedom of others. No one can judge with certainty who is
right and who is wrong, who is closer to the truth and which
is the best road for the greatest good for each and everyone.
Experience through freedom is the only means to arrive at the
truth and the best solutions; and there is no freedom if there
is not the freedom to be wrong.

"In our opinion, therefore, it is necessary that majority and
minority should succeed in living together peacefully and
profitably by mutual agreement and compromise, by the
intelligent recognition of the practical necessities of
communal life and of the usefulness of concessions which
circumstances make necessary." [_Life and Ideas_, p. 72]

Needless to say, our arguments apply with even more force to
the decisions of the *representatives* of the majority, who are
in practice a very small minority. Leninists usually try and
confuse these two distinct forms of decision making. When 
Leninists discuss majority decision making they almost always 
mean the decisions of those elected by the majority -- the 
central committee or the government -- rather than the majority 
of the masses or an organisation. Ultimately, the Leninist
support for democracy (as the Russian Revolution showed) is
conditional on whether the majority supports them or not. 
Anarchists are not as hypocritical or as elitist as this,
arguing that everyone should have the same rights the
Leninists usurp for their leaders.

Therefore the Marxist attack on anarchism as "anti-democratic"
is not only false, it is ironic and hypocritical. Firstly,
anarchists do *not* argue for "the absolute sovereignty of 
the individual ego." Rather, we argue for individual freedom.
This, in turn, implies a commitment to self-managed forms of
social organisation. This means that anarchists do not confuse
agreement with (hierarchical) authority. Secondly, Marxists do
not explain why the majority is always right or why their
opinions are automatically the truth. Thirdly, the logical
conclusions of their arguments would result in the absolute
enserfment of the individual to the representatives of the
majority. Fourthly, rather than being supporters of democracy, 
Marxists like Lenin and Trotsky explicitly argued for minority 
rule and the ignoring of majority decisions when they clashed 
with the decisions of the ruling party. Fifthly, their support 
for "democratic" centralised power means, in practice, the 
elimination of democracy in the grassroots. As can be seen 
from Trotsky's arguments against the Makhnovists, the 
democratic organisation and decisions of millions can be 
banned by a single individual.

All in all, Marxists claims that anarchists are "anti-democratic"
just backfire on Marxism.

H.2.12 Does anarchism survive only in the absence of a strong
       workers' movement?

Derek Howl argues that anarchism "survives only in the absence
of a strong workers themselves." This was based, apparently,
anarchism is the politics of "non-proletarians." As he puts
it, there "is a class basis of this. Just as Proudhon's
'anarchism' reflected the petty bourgeoisie under pressure,
so too Bakuninism as a movement rested upon non-proletarians
. . . In Italy Bakuninism was based upon the large 'lumpen
bourgeoisie', doomed petty bourgeois layers. In Switzerland
the Jura Federation . . . was composed of a world of cottage
industry stranded between the old world and the new, as were
pockets of newly proletarianised peasants that characterised
anarchism in Spain." He quotes Hal Draper statement that 
anarchism "was an ideology alien to the life of modern 
working people." ["The Legacy of Hal Draper," _International 
Socialism_, no. 52, p. 148]

Ignoring the obvious contradiction of "newly proletarianised
peasants" being "non-proletarians," we have the standard
Marxist "class analysis" of anarchism. This is to assert that
anarchism is "non-proletarian" while Marxism is "proletarian."
On the face of it, such an assertion seems to fly in the face 
of historical facts. After all, when Marx and Engels were 
writing the _Communist Manifesto_, the proletariat was a tiny 
minority of the population of a mostly rural, barely 
industrialised Germany and France. Perhaps it was Engels 
experiences as a capitalist in England that allowed him an 
insight into "the life of modern working people?"

Beyond this there are a few problems with this type of argument.
Firstly, there is the factual problems. Simply put, anarchism
appealed to "modern" working people and Marxism has appealed
to the "non-proletarian" groups and individuals (and vice versa, 
of course). This can be seen from the examples Howl lists as well 
as the rise of syndicalist ideas after the reformism of the first 
Marxist movement (social democracy) became apparent. Simply put, 
the rise of Marxism within the labour movement is associated with
its descent into reformism, *not* revolution. Secondly, there is 
the slight ideological problem that Lenin himself argued that the 
working class, by its own efforts, did not produce socialist ideas 
which were generated far from "the life of modern working people" 
by the intelligentsia. Lastly, there is the assumption that two 
long dead Germans, living in an environment where "modern working 
people" (proletarians) were a small minority of the working 
population, could really determine for all history which is 
(and is not) "proletarian" politics.

Taking the countries Howl lists, we can see that any claim
that anarchism is "alien" to the working class is simply false.
Looking at each case, it is clearly the case that the *politics*
of the people involved signify their working class credentials
for Marxists, *not* their actual economic or social class. Thus 
we have the sociological absurdity that makes anarchist workers 
"petty bourgeois" while actual members of the bourgeoisie (like 
Engels) or professional revolutionaries (and the sons of middle 
class families like Marx, Lenin and Trotsky) are considered as 
representatives of "proletarian" politics. Indeed, when these
radical members of the middle-class repress working class people
(as did Lenin and Trotsky were in power) they *remain* figures
to be followed and their acts justified in terms of the "objective"
needs of the working people they are oppressing! Ultimately, for 
most Marxists, whether someone is "non-proletariat" depends on 
their ideological viewpoint and not, in fact, their actual class.

Hence we discover Marx and Engels (like their followers) blaming
Bakunin's success in the International, as one historian notes, 
"on the middle-class leadership of Italy's socialist movement 
and the backwardness of the country. But if middle-class leaders 
were the catalysts of proletarian revolutionary efforts in Italy, 
this was also true of every other country in Europe, not excluding 
the General Council in London." [T.R. Ravindranathan, _Bakunin and 
the Italians_, p. 168] And by interpreting the difficulties for
Marxism in this way, Marx and Engels (like their followers)
need not question their own ideas and assumptions. As Nunzio
Pernicone notes, "[f]rom the outset, Engels had consistently
underestimated Bakunin as a political adversary and refused
to believe that Italian workers might embrace anarchist 
doctrines." However, "even a casual perusal of the 
internationalist and dissident democratic press would have
revealed to Engels that Bakuninism was rapidly developing
a following among Italian artisans and workers. But this
reality flew in the face of his unshakeable belief that
Italian internationalists were all a 'gang of declasses,
the refuse of the bourgeoisie.'" Even after the rise of 
the Italian Marxism in the 1890s, "the anarchist movement 
was proportionately more working-class than the PSI" and
the "the number of bourgeois intellectuals and professionals
that supported the PSI [Italian Socialist Party] was
vastly greater" than those supporting anarchism. Indeed,
"the percentage of party membership derived from the 
bourgeoisie was significantly higher in the PSI than among
the anarchists." [_Italian Anarchism, 1864-1892_, p. 82 and 
p. 282] Ironically, given Engels diatribes against the Italian
anarchists stopping workers following "proletarian" (i.e.
Marxist) politics and standing for elections, "as the PSI 
grew more working-class, just before the outbreak of war [in 
1914], its Directorate [elected by the party congress] grew more 
anti-parliamentary." [Gwyn A. Williams, _Proletarian Order_, 
p. 29] 

As we noted in section A.5.5, the role of the anarchists and 
syndicalists compared to the Marxists during the 1920 near 
revolution suggested that the real "proletarian" revolutionaries 
were, in fact, the former and *not* the latter. All in all,
the history of the Italian labour movement clearly show that,
for most Marxists, whether a group represents the "proletariat"
is simply dependent on their ideological commitment, *not*
their actual class. 

As regards the Jura Federation, we discover that its support was
wider than suggested by Marxists. As Marxist Paul Thomas noted,
"Bakunin's initial support in Switzerland -- like Marx's in
England -- came from resident aliens, political refugees . . .
but he also gathered support among *Gastarbeitier* for whom
Geneva was already a centre, where builders, carpenters and
and workers in heavy industry tended to be French or Italian
. . . Bakunin . . .  also marshalled considerable support among
French speaking domestic workers and watchmakers in the Jura."
[_Karl Marx and the Anarchists_, p. 390] It would be interesting
to hear a Marxist claim that "heavy industry" represented the
past or "non-proletarian" elements! Similarly, E. H. Carr in his
(hostile) biography of Bakunin, noted that the "sections of the
International at Geneva fell into two groups." Skilled craftsmen
formed the "Right wing" while "the builders, carpenters, and
workers in the heavier trades, the majority of whim were
immigrants from France and Italy, represented the Left." 
Unsurprisingly, these different groups of workers had different
politics. The craftsmen "concentrated on . . . reform" while
the latter "nourished hopes of a complete social upheaval."
Bakunin, as would be expected, "fanned the spirit of revolt"
among these, the proletarian, workers and soon had a "commanding
position in the Geneva International." [_Michael Bakunin_, p. 361] 
It should be noted that Marx and the General Council of the
International consistently supported the reformist wing of the
International in Geneva which organised political alliances
with the middle-class liberals during elections. Given these 
facts, it is little wonder that Howl concentrates on the 
support Bakunin received from domestic workers producing 
watches. To mention the support for Bakunin by organised, 
obviously proletarian, workers would undermine his case and 
so it is ignored.

Lastly, there is Spain. It seems funny that a Marxist would use
Spain as an example *against* the class roots of anarchism. 
After all, that is one of the countries where anarchism dominated
the working class movement. As one historian points out, "it
was not until the 1860s -- when anarchism was introduced --
that a substantive working class movement began to emerge" and
"throughout the history of Spanish anarchism, its survival
depended in large measure on the anarchists' ability to
maintain direct links with the workers." [George R. Esenwein,
_Anarchist Ideology and the Working-Class Movement in Spain,
1868-1898_, p. 6 and p. 207] As well as organising "newly
proletarianised peasants," the "Bakuninists" also organised
industrial workers -- indeed, far more successfully than
the Socialists. Indeed, the UGT only started to approach 
the size of the CNT once it had started to organise "newly 
proletarianised peasants" in the 1930s (i.e. anarchist 
unions organised more of the industrial working class than
the Socialist ones). From such a fact, we wonder if Marxists 
would argue that socialism rested on "non-proletarian" 
elements?

Moreover, the logic of dismissing anarchism as "non-proletarian" 
because it organised "newly proletarianised peasants" is simply 
laughable. After all, capitalism needed landless labours in order 
to start. This meant that the first proletarians existing in rural 
areas and were made up of ex-peasants. When these ex-peasants arrived
in the towns and cities, they were still "newly proletarianised
peasants." To ignore these groups of workers would mean, of
course, that they would lack basic socialist ideas once they 
reached urban areas, so potentially harming the labour movement
there. And, of course, a large section of Bolshevik support in 
1917 was to be found in "newly proletarianised peasants" whether 
in the army or working in the factories. Ironically enough, the 
Mensheviks argued that the Bolsheviks gained their influence 
from worker-peasant industrial "raw recruits" and not from the 
genuine working class. [Orlando Figes, _A People's Tragedy_, 
p. 830] As such, to dismiss anarchism because it gained converts 
from similar social strata as the Bolsheviks seems, on the face 
of it, a joke. 

As can be seen Howl's attempts to subject anarchism to a "class
analysis" simply fails. He selects the evidence which fits his
theory and ignores that which does not. However, looking at the
very examples he bases his case on shows how nonsensical it is.
Simply put, anarchist ideas appealed to many types of workers,
including typically "proletarian" ones who worked in large-scale
industries. What they seem to have in common is a desire for
radical social change, organised by themselves in their own
combative class organs (such as unions). Moreover, like the 
early British workers movement, they considered that these
unions, as well as being organs of class struggle, could also
be the framework of a free socialist society. Such a perspective
is hardly backward (indeed, since 1917 most Marxists pay 
lip-service to this vision!).

Which brings us to the next major problem with Howl's argument,
namely the fate of Marxism and the "strong" labour movement
it allegedly is suited for. Looking at the only nation which 
did have a "modern" working class during the most of Marx's 
life, Britain, the "strong" labour movement it produced was 
(and has) not been anarchist, it is true, but neither was it 
(nor did it become) Marxist. Rather, it has been a mishmash of 
conflicting ideas, predominately reformist state socialist ones 
which owe little, if anything, to Marx. Indeed, the closest 
Britain came to developing a wide scale revolutionary working 
class movement was during the "syndicalist revolt" of the 1910s. 
Ironically, some Marxists joined this movement simply because 
the existing Marxist parties were so reformist or irrelevant 
to the "life of modern working people." 

Looking at the rise of capitalism in other countries, we find
the same process. The rise of social democracy (Marxism) in 
the international labour movement simply signified the rise 
of reformism. Instead of producing a *revolutionary* labour 
movement, Marxism helped produce the opposite (although,
initially, hiding reformist activity behind revolutionary
rhetoric). So when Howl asserts that anarchism "survives in 
the absence of a strong workers' movement," we have to wonder 
what planet he is on. 

Thus, to state matters more correctly, anarchism flourishes
during those periods when the labour movement and its members
are radical, taking direct action and creating new forms of
organisation which are still based on workers' self-management.
This is to be expected as anarchism is both based upon and
is the result of workers' self-liberation through struggle.
In less militant times, the effects of bourgeois society and 
the role of unions within the capitalist economy can de-radicalise 
the labour movement and lead to the rise of bureaucracy within it. 
It is then, during periods when the class struggle is low, that 
reformist ideas spread. Sadly, Marxism aided that spread by its 
tactics -- the role of electioneering focused struggle away from
direct action and into the ballot-box and so onto leaders rather
than working class self-activity.

Moreover, if we look at the current state of the labour movement, 
then we would have to conclude that Marxism is "an ideology alien 
to the life of modern working people." Where are the large Marxist 
working class unions and parties? There are a few large reformist 
socialist and Stalinist parties in continental Europe, but these 
are not Marxist in any meaningful sense of the word. Most of the 
socialist ones used to be Marxist, although they relatively quickly 
stopped being revolutionary in any meaningful sense of the word 
a very long time ago (some, like the German Social Democrats, 
organised counter-revolutionary forces to crush working class 
revolt after the First World War). As for the Stalinist parties, 
it would be better to consider it a sign of shame that they get 
any support in the working class at all. Simply put, in terms of 
revolutionary Marxists, there are various Trotskyist sects arguing 
amongst themselves on who is the *real* vanguard of the proletariat, 
but *no* Marxist labour movement.

Which, of course, brings us to the next point, namely the ideological
problems for Leninists themselves by such an assertion. After all,
Lenin himself argued that "the life of modern working people" could
only produce "trade-union consciousness." Indeed, according to him,
socialist ideas were developed independently of working people by
the socialist (middle-class) "intelligentsia." As he put it in
_What is to be done?_, "the working class, exclusively by their 
own effort, is able to develop only trade union consciousness 
. . . the theoretical doctrine of Social-Democracy arose quite 
independently of the spontaneous growth of the labour movement; 
it arose as a natural and inevitable outcome of ideas among the 
revolutionary socialist intelligentsia." This meant that "Social 
Democratic [i.e. socialist] consciousness . . . could only be brought 
to them [the workers] from without." [_Essential Works of Lenin_, 
pp. 74-5] Clearly, then, for Lenin, socialism was an ideology
which was alien to the life of modern working class people. 

Lastly, there is the question of whether Marx and Engels can
seriously be thought of as being able to decree once and for
all what is and is not "proletarian" politics. Given that
neither of these men were working class (one was a capitalist!)
it makes the claim that they would know "proletarian" politics
suspect. Moreover, they formulated their ideas of what constitute
"proletarian" politics before a modern working class actually
developed in any country bar Britain. This means, that from the
experience of one section of the proletarian in one country in
the 1840s, Marx and Engels have decreed for all time what is and
is not a "proletarian" set of politics! On the face of it, it is
hardly a convincing argument, particularly as we have over 150
years of experience of these tactics with which to evaluate them!

Based on this perspective, Marx and Engels opposed all other 
socialist groups as "sects" if they did not subscribe to their
ideas. Ironically, while arguing that all other socialists were
fostering their sectarian politics onto the workers movement, 
they themselves fostered their own perspective onto it.
Originally, because the various sections of the International
worked under different circumstances and had attained different 
degrees of development, the theoretical ideals which reflected 
the real movement would also diverge. The International, therefore, 
was open to all socialist and working class tendencies its general 
policies would be, by necessity, based on conference decisions 
that reflected this divergence. These decisions would be determined 
by free discussion within and between sections of all economic, 
social and political ideas. Marx, however, replaced this policy 
with a common program of "political action" (i.e. electioneering) 
by mass political parties via the fixed Hague conference of 1872. 
Rather than having this position agreed by the normal exchange 
of ideas and theoretical discussion in the sections guided by 
the needs of the practical struggle, Marx imposed what *he* 
considered as the future of the workers movement onto the 
International -- and denounced those who disagreed with him 
as sectarians. The notion that what Marx considered as necessary 
might be another sectarian position imposed on the workers' 
movement did not enter his head nor those of his followers. 

Thus the Marxist claim that true working class movements are based 
on mass political parties based on hierarchical, centralised, 
leadership and those who reject this model and political action 
(electioneering) are sects and sectarians is simply their option
and little more. Once we look at the workers' movement without 
the blinkers created by Marxism, we see that Anarchism was a 
movement of working class people using what they considered 
valid tactics to meet their own social, economic and political 
goals -- tactics and goals which evolved to meet changing 
circumstances. Seeing the rise of anarchism and syndicalism 
as the political expression of the class struggle, guided by 
the needs of the practical struggle they faced naturally 
follows when we recognise the Marxist model for what it 
is -- just one possible interpretation of the future of the 
workers' movement rather than *the* future of that movement
(and as the history of Social Democracy indicates, the 
predictions of Bakunin and the anarchists within the First 
International were proved correct). 

This tendency to squeeze the revolutionary workers' movement into
the forms decreed by two people in the mid-nineteenth century has
proved to be disastrous for it. Even after the total failure of
social democracy, the idea of "revolutionary" parliamentarianism
was fostered onto the Third International by the Bolsheviks in spite
of the fact that more and more revolutionary workers in advanced
capitalist nations were rejecting it in favour of direct action
and autonomous working class self-organisation. Anarchists and
libertarian Marxists based themselves on this actual movement of
working people, influenced by the failure of "political action,"
while the Bolsheviks based themselves on the works of Marx and
Engels and their experiences in a backward, semi-feudal society
whose workers had already created factory committees and soviets 
by direct action. It was for this reason that the anarcho-syndicalist
Augustin Souchy said he referred "to the tendencies that exist in
the modern workers' movement" when he argued at the Second Congress 
of the Communist International:

"It must be granted that among revolutionary workers the tendency
toward parliamentarism is disappearing more and more. On the
contrary, a strong anti-parliamentary tendency is becoming 
apparent in the ranks of the most advanced part of the proletariat.
Look at the Shop Stewards' movement [in Britain] or Spanish
syndicalism . . . The IWW is absolutely antiparliamentary . . .
I want to point out that the idea of antiparliamentarism is
asserting itself more strongly in Germany . . . as a result of
the revolution itself . . . We must view the question in this
light." [_Proceedings and Documents of the Second Congress 1920_,
vol 1, pp. 176-7]

Of course, this perspective of basing yourself on the ideas and
tactics generated by the action class struggle was rejected in
favour of a return to the principles of Marx and Engels and their
vision of what constituted a genuine "proletarian" movement. If 
these tactics were the correct ones, then why did they not lead 
to a less dismal set of results? After all, the degeneration of
social democracy into reformism would suggest their failure and
sticking "revolutionary" before their tactics (as in "revolutionary
parliamentarianism") changes little. Marxists, like anarchists, are
meant to be materialists, not idealists. What was the actual outcome 
of the Leninist strategies? Did they result in successful proletarian 
revolutions. No, they did not. The revolutionary wave peaked and
fell and the Leninist parties themselves very easily and quickly
became Stalinised. Significantly, those areas with a large anarchist,
syndicalist or quasi-syndicalist (e.g. the council communists) 
workers movements (Italy, Spain and certain parts of Germany) 
came closest to revolution and by the mid-1930s, only Spain with 
its strong anarchist movement had a revolutionary labour movement.
Therefore, rather than representing "non-proletarian" or "sectarian" 
politics forced upon the working class, anarchism reflected the 
politics required to built a *revolutionary* workers' movement 
rather than a reformist mass party.

As such, perhaps we can finally lay to rest the idea that Marx
predicted the whole future of the labour movement and the path 
it must take like some kind of socialist Nostradamus. Equally,
we can dismiss Marxist claims of the "non-proletarian" nature 
of anarchism as uninformed and little more than an attempt to 
squeeze history into an ideological prison. As noted above, 
in order to present such an analysis, the actual class 
compositions of significant events and social movements have 
to be manipulated. This is the case of the Paris Commune, 
for example, which was predominantly a product of artisans 
(i.e. the "petit bourgeoisie"), *not* the industrial working 
class and yet claimed by Marxists as an example of the 
"dictatorship of the proletariat." Ironically, many of the 
elements of the Commune praised by Marx can be found in the 
works of Proudhon and Bakunin which pre-date the uprising. 
Similarly, the idea that workers' fighting organisations 
("soviets") would be the means to abolish the state and the 
framework of a socialist society can be found in Bakunin's works,
decades before Lenin paid lip-service to this idea in 1917. For a 
theory allegedly resting on "non-proletarian" elements it has 
successfully predicted many of the ideas Marxists claim to have 
learnt from proletarian class struggle! 

So, in summary, the claims that anarchism is "alien" to working
class life, that it is "non-proletarian" or "survives in the
absence of a strong workers' movement" are simply false. Looking
objectively at the facts of the matter quickly shows that this 
is the case.

H.2.13 Do anarchists reject "political" struggles and action?

A common Marxist claim is that anarchists and syndicalists 
ignore or dismiss the importance of "political" struggles or
action. This is not true. Rather, as we discuss in section
J.2.10, we think that "political" struggles should be 
conducted by the same means as social and economic struggles, 
namely by direct action, solidarity and working class 
self-organisation.

As this is a common assertion, it is useful to provide a quick 
summary of why anarchists do not, in fact, reject "political" 
struggles and action as such. Rather, to quote Bakunin, 
anarchism "does not reject politics generally. It will 
certainly be forced to involve itself insofar as it will 
be forced to struggle against the bourgeois class. It 
only rejects bourgeois politics . . . [as it] establishes 
the predatory domination of the bourgeoisie." [_The Political 
Philosophy of Bakunin_, p. 313] For Kropotkin, it was a
truism that it was "absolutely impossible . . . to confine
the ideas of the working mass within the narrow circle of
reductions in working hours and wage increases . . . The
social question compels attention." This fact implied two
responses: "the workers' organisation propels itself either 
into the sterile path of parliamentary politics as in
Germany, or into the path of revolution." [quoted by 
Caroline Cahm, _Kropotkin and the rise of Revolutionary
Anarchism, 1872-1886_, p. 241] 

So while Marxists often argue that anarchists exclusively 
interested in economic struggle and reject "politics" or 
"political action," the truth of the matter is different.
We are well aware of the importance of political issues,
although anarchists reject using bourgeois methods in
favour of direct action. Moreover, we are aware that any
social or economic struggle has its political aspects and
that such struggles bring the role of the state as defender
of capitalism and the need to struggle against it into 
focus:

"There is no serious strike that occurs today without the
appearance of troops, the exchange of blows and some acts of
revolt. Here they fight with the troops; there they march on
the factories; . . . in Pittsburgh in the United States, the
strikers found themselves masters of a territory as large as
France, and the strike became the signal for a general revolt 
against the State; in Ireland the peasants on strike found
themselves in open revolt against the State. Thanks to 
government intervention the rebel against the factory becomes 
the rebel against the State." [quoted by Caroline Cahm, Op. Cit., 
p. 256]

As Malatesta argued, from "the economic struggle one must
pass to the political struggle, that is to struggle against
government; and instead of opposing the capitalist millions
with the workers' few pennies scraped together with difficulty,
one must oppose the rifles and guns which defend property
with the more effective means that the people will be able 
to defeat force by force." [_Life and Ideas_, pp. 193-4] So
anarchists are well aware of the need to fight for political
issues and reforms, and so are "not in any way opposed to
the political struggle, but in their opinion this struggle,
too, must take the form of direct action, in which the 
instruments of economic [and social] power which the 
working class has at its command are the most effective.
The most trivial wage-fight shows clearly that, whenever
the employers find themselves in difficulties, the state
stops in with the police, and even in some cases with the
militia, to protect the threatened interests of the possessing
classes. It would, therefore, be absurd for them to overlook
the importance of the political struggle." [Rudolf Rocker,
_Anarcho-Syndicalism_, p. 65]

This means that the question of whether to conduct political 
struggles is *not* the one which divides anarchists from
Marxists. Rather, it is a question of *how* this struggle
is fought. For anarchists, this struggle is best fought using
*direct action* (see section J.2) and fighting working class 
organisations based in our workplaces and communities. For
Marxists, the political struggle is seen as being based on
standing candidates in bourgeois elections. This can be seen 
from the resolution passed by the socialist ("Second") 
International in 1893. This resolution was designed to 
exclude anarchists and stated that only "those Socialist
Parties and Organisations which recognise the organisation
of workers and of political action." By "political action"
it mean "that the working-class organisations seek, in as
far as possible, to use or conquer political rights and the
machinery of legislation for the furthering of the interests
of the proletariat and the conquest of political power."
[quoted by Susan Milner, _The Dilemmas of Internationalism_,
p. 49] Significantly, while this International and its member 
parties (particular the German Social Democrats) were happy to 
expel anarchists, they never expelled the leading reformists 
from their ranks.

So, in general, anarchists use the word "political action" to 
refer exclusively to the taking part of revolutionaries in 
bourgeois elections (i.e. electioneering or parliamentarianism). 
It does not mean a rejection of fighting for political reforms 
or a lack of interest in political issues, quite the reverse in
fact. The reason *why* anarchists reject this tactic is discussed
in section J.2.6 ("What are the effects of radicals using 
electioneering?"), which means we will give a short summary
here.

Simply put, for anarchists, the net effect of socialists using
bourgeois elections would be to put them (and the movements 
they represent) into the quagmire of bourgeois politics and
influences. In other words, the parties involved will be shaped
by the environment they are working within and not vice versa.
As Bakunin argued, the "inevitable result" of electing workers
into bourgeois state would be to see them "become middle class
in their outlook" due to them being "transferred to a purely
bourgeois environment and into an atmosphere of purely
bourgeois political ideas." This meant that as "long as
universal suffrage is exercised in a society where the people,
the mass of workers, are *economically* dominated by a minority
holding exclusive possession the property and capital of the
country . . . elections . . . . can only be illusory,
anti-democratic in their results." [Op. Cit., p. 216 and
p. 213] This meant that "the election to the German
parliament of one or two workers . . . from the Social
Democratic Party" was "not dangerous" and, in fact, was
"highly useful to the German state as a lightning-rod, or
a safety-valve." Unlike the "political and social theory"
of the anarchists, which "leads them directly and inexorably
to a complete break with all governments and all forms of
bourgeois politics, leaving no alternative but social 
revolution," Marxism, he argued, "inexorably enmeshes and
entangles its adherents, under the pretext of political 
tactics, in endless accommodation with governments and the
various bourgeois political parties -- that is, it thrusts
them directly into reaction." [Bakunin, _Statism and Anarchy_, 
p. 193 and pp. 179-80] In the case of the German Social
Democrats, this became obvious in 1914, when they supported
their state in the First World war, and after 1918, when 
they crushed the German Revolution.

For Kropotkin, the idea that you could somehow "prepare" for a
revolution by electioneering was simply a joke. "As if the
bourgeoisie," he argued, "still holding on to its capital,
could allow them [the socialists] to experiment with socialism
even if they succeeded in gaining control of power! As if the
conquest of the municipalities were possible without the
conquest of the factories." He saw that "those who yesterday 
were considered socialists are today letting go of socialism, 
by renouncing its mother idea ["the need to replace the wage 
system and to abolish individual ownership of . . . social 
capital"] and passing over into the camp of the bourgeoisie, 
while retaining, so as to hide their turnabout, the label of 
socialism." [_Words of a Rebel_, p. 181 and p. 180]

Ultimately, the bourgeois tactics used ended up with bourgeois
results. As Emma Goldman argued, socialism "was led astray by
the evil spirit of politics" and "landed in the [political]
trap and has now but one desire -- to adjust itself to the
narrow confines of its cage, to become part of the authority,
part of the very power that has slain the beautiful child 
Socialism and left begin a hideous monster." [_Red Emma 
Speaks_, p. 80] The net effect of "political action" was the
corruption of the socialist movement into a reformist party
which betrayed the promise of socialism in favour of making
existing society better (so it can last longer). This process
confirmed Bakunin's predictions as well as Kropotkin's 
comments:

"The middle class will not give up its power without a struggle.
It will resist. And in proportion as Socialists will become
part of the Government and share power with the middle class,
their Socialism will grow paler and paler. This is, indeed,
what Socialism is rapidly doing. Were this no so, the middle
classes . . . would not share their power with the Socialists."
[_Evolution and Environment_, p. 102]

In addition, as we argue in sections H.1.5 and J.2.5, direct
action is either based on (or creates) forms of self-managed
working class organisations. The process of collective struggle,
in other words, necessitates collective forms of organisation
and decision making. These combative organisations, as well as
conducting the class struggle under capitalism, can also be the
framework of a free society (see section H.1.4). However, standing
in elections does *not* produce such alternative social structures
and, indeed, hinders them as the focus for social changes becomes
a few leaders working in existing (i.e. bourgeois) structures and
bodies. 

As can be seen, anarchists reject "political" struggle (i.e.
electioneering) for good (and historically vindicated) reasons.
This makes a mockery of Marxists assertions (beginning with
Marx) that anarchists like Bakunin "opposed all political action
by the working class since this would imply 'recognition'
of the existing state." [Derek Howl, "The Legacy of Hal 
Draper," _International Socialism_, no. 52, p. 147] This, 
in fact, is a common Marxist claim, namely that anarchists 
reject "political struggle" on principle (i.e. for idealistic
purposes). In the words of Engels, Bakunin was "opposed to all 
political action by the working class, since this would in fact 
involve recognition of the existing state." [Marx, Engels and 
Lenin, _Anarchism and Anarcho-Syndicalism_, p. 49] Sadly, like 
all Marxists, he failed to indicate where, in fact, Bakunin 
actually said that. As can be seen, this was *not* the case.
Bakunin, like all revolutionary anarchists, reject "political
action" (in the sense of electioneering) simply because they
feared that such tactics would be counterproductive and
undermine the revolutionary nature of the labour movement. As
the experience of Marxist Social Democracy showed, he was
proved correct.

In summary, while anarchists reject standing of socialists in
elections ("political action," narrowly defined), we do not
reject the need to fight for political reforms or specific
political issues. However, we see such action as being based
on collective working class *direct action* organised around
combative organs of working class self-management and power
rather than the individualistic act of placing a cross on a
piece of power once every few years and letting leaders fight
your struggles for you.

H.2.14 Are anarchist organisations either "ineffective," "elitist" 
       or the "downright bizarre"?

Marxists often accuse anarchist organisations of being "elitist"
or "secret." Pat Stack (of the British SWP) ponders the history 
of anarchist organisation (at least the SWP version of that 
history):

"how otherwise [than Leninist vanguard political parties] do 
revolutionaries organise? Apart from the serious efforts of 
anarcho-syndicalists to grapple with this problem, anarchists 
have failed to pose any serious alternative. In as much as they 
do, they have produced either the ineffective, the elitist or 
the downright bizarre. Bakunin's organisation, the 'Alliance of 
Social Democracy', managed all three: 'The organisation had two 
overlapping forms, one secret, involving only the "intimates", 
and one public, the Alliance of Social Democracy. Even in its 
open, public mode, the alliance was to be a highly centralised 
organisation, with all decisions on the national level approved 
by the Central Committee. Since it was the real controlling body, 
the secret organisation was even more tightly centralised . . . 
with first a Central Committee, then a "central Geneva section" 
acting as the "permanent delegation of the permanent Central 
Committee", and, finally, within the central Geneva section a 
"Central Bureau", which was to be both the "executive power . . . 
composed of three, or five, or even seven members" of the secret 
organisation and the executive directory of the public 
organisation.'

"That this was far more elitist and less democratic than Lenin's 
model is clear."

There are, as is obvious, numerous problems with Stack's assertions.
Firstly, he makes absolutely *no* attempt to discuss anarchist
ideas on the question of revolutionary organisation. In section
J.3, we discuss the various approaches anarchists have historically
suggested in this area and Stack fails to mention any of them.
Rather, he prefers to present a somewhat distorted account of the
ideas of Bakunin on the structural aspects of his organisation, 
ideas which died with him in 1876! Secondly, as Stack fails to
discuss how anarchists (including Bakunin) see their organisations
operating, its hard to determine whether they are "ineffective"
or "elitist." This is hardly surprising, as they are neither.
Thirdly, even as regards his own example (Bakunin's Alliance) his
claim that it was "ineffectual" seems inappropriate in the 
extreme. Whether it was "elitist" or "downright bizarre" is hard
to determine, as Stack quotes an unnamed author and their quotes
from its structure. Fourthly, and ironically for Stack, Lenin's
"model" shared many of the same features as those of Bakunin's!

As noted, Stack fails to discuss any of the standard anarchist
ideas on how revolutionaries should organise. As we discuss
in section J.3, there are three main types: the "synthesis"
federation, the "class struggle" federation and the "Platform."
In the twenty-first century, these are the main types of 
anarchist organisation. As such, it would be extremely hard 
to argue that these are "elitist," "ineffective" or "downright 
bizarre." What these organisational ideas have in common is
the vision of an anarchist organisation as a federation of 
autonomous self-managed groups which work with others as equals. 
How can directly democratic organisations, which influence others 
by the force of their ideas and by their example, be "elitist"
or "downright bizarre"? Little wonder, then, that Stack used 
an example from 1868 to attack anarchism in the twenty-first 
century! If he actually presented an honest account of anarchist 
ideas then his claims would quickly be seen to be nonsense. And 
as for the claim of being "ineffective," well, given that Stack's
article is an attempt to combat anarchist influence in the 
anti-globalisation movement it would suggest the opposite.

For a modern account of how anarchist groups operate, organise
and try to influence the class struggle directly, by the "natural 
influence" (to use Bakunin's expression) of its members in working 
class organisations see section J.3. 

Even looking at the example of Bakunin's Alliance, we can see
evidence that Stack's summary is simply wrong. Firstly, it seems 
strange for Stack to claim that the Alliance was "ineffective." 
After all, Marx spent many years combating it (and Bakunin's 
influence) in the First International. Indeed, so effective 
was it that anarchist ideas dominated most sections of that 
organisation, forcing Marx to move the General Council to 
America to ensure that it did not fall into the hands of the 
anarchists (i.e. of the majority). Moreover, it was hardly 
"ineffective" when it came to building the International. As 
Marxist Paul Thomas notes, "the International was to prove 
capable of expanding its membership only at the behest of the
Bakuninists [sic!]" and "[w]herever the International was 
spreading, it was doing so under the mantle of Bakuninism." 
[_Karl Marx and the Anarchists_, p. 315and p. 319] Yet Stack 
considers this as an example of an "ineffective" organisation!

As regards Stack's summary of Bakunin's organisation goes, we
must note that Stack is quoting an unnamed source on Bakunin's 
views on this subject. We, therefore, have no way of evaluating 
whether this is a valid summary of Bakunin's ideas on this matter. 
As we indicate elsewhere (see section J.3.7) Leninist summaries 
of Bakunin's ideas on secret organising usually leave a lot to be 
desired (by usually leaving a lot out or quoting out of context 
certain phrases). As such, and given the total lack of relevance
of this model for anarchists since the 1870s, we will not bother
to discuss this summary. Simply put, it is a waste of time to 
discuss an organisational model which no modern anarchist supports.

However, as we discuss in section J.3.7, there is a key way  in which Bakunin's ideas on this issue were far *less* 
"elitist" and *more* "democratic" than Lenin's model. Simply, 
Bakunin always stressed that his organisation "rules out any 
idea of dictatorship and custodial control." The revolution 
"everywhere must be created by the people, and supreme control
must always belong to the people organised into a free federation 
of agricultural and industrial associations . . . organised from 
the bottom upwards by means of revolutionary delegation." [_Michael 
Bakunin: Selected Writings_, p. 172] In other words, Bakunin
saw the social revolution in terms of popular participation and
control, *not* the seizing of power by a "revolutionary" party
or group. 

The "main purpose and task of the organisation," argued Bakunin,
would be to "help the people to achieve self-determination." It 
would "not threaten the liberty of the people because it is free 
from all official character" and "not placed above the people like 
state power." Its programme "consists of the fullest realisation of 
the liberty of the people" and its influence is "not contrary to 
the free development and self-determination of the people, or its 
organisation from below according to its own customs and instincts 
because it acts on the people only by the natural personal influence 
of its members who are not invested with any power." Thus the
revolutionary group would be the "helper" of the masses, with 
an "organisation within the people itself." [quoted by Michael 
Confino, _Daughter of a Revolutionary_, p. 259, p. 261, p. 256 
and p. 261] The revolution itself would see "an end to all 
masters and to domination of every kind, and the free 
construction of popular life in accordance with popular 
needs, not from above downward, as in the state, but from 
below upward, by the people themselves, dispensing with 
all governments and parliaments -- a voluntary alliance of 
agricultural and factory worker associations, communes, 
provinces, and nations; and, finally, . . . universal human 
brotherhood triumphing on the ruins of all the states."
[_Statism and Anarchy_, p. 33]

Unlike Lenin, Bakunin did not confuse party power with people power. 
His organisation, for all it faults (and they were many), did not 
aim to take power in the name of the working class and exercise
power through a centralised, top-down, state. Rather, its influence 
would be based on the "natural influence" of its members within
mass organisations. The influence of anarchists would, therefore,
be limited to the level by which their specific ideas were accepted
by other members of the same organisations after discussion and
debate. As regards the nature of the labour movement, we must point 
out that Bakunin provided the same "serious" answer as the 
anarcho-syndicalists -- namely, revolutionary labour unionism.
As we discuss in section H.2.8, Bakunin's ideas on this matter
are nearly identical to those of the syndicalists Stack praises.

As noted, however, no anarchist group has reproduced the internal
structure of the Alliance, which means that Stack's point is simply
historical in nature. Sadly this is not the case with his own politics
as the ideas he attacks actually parallel Lenin's model in many ways 
(although, as indicated above, how Bakunin's organisation would 
function in the class struggle was fundamentally different, as Lenin's 
party sought power for itself). Given that Stack is proposing Lenin's 
model as a viable means of organising revolutionaries, it is useful 
to summarise it. We shall take as an example two statements issued 
by the Second World Congress of the Communist International in 1920 
under the direction of Lenin. These are "Twenty-One Conditions of 
Communism" and "Theses on the Role of the Communist Party in the 
Proletarian Revolution." These two documents provide a vision of 
Leninist organisation which is fundamentally elitist.

Lenin's "model" is clear from these documents. The parties adhering 
to the Communist International had to have two overlapping forms, 
one legal (i.e. public) and another "illegal" (i.e. secret). It was
the "duty" of these parties "to create everywhere a parallel illegal 
organisational apparatus." [_Proceedings and Documents of the Second 
Congress 1920_, vol. 2, p. 767]

Needless to say, this illegal organisation would be the real 
controlling body, as it would have to be made up of trusted 
communists and could only be even more tightly centralised 
than the open party as its members could only be appointed
from above by the illegal organisation's central committee. 
To stress that the "illegal" (i.e. secret) organisation
controlled the party, the Communist International agreed
that while "the Communist Parties must learn to systematically
combine legal and illegal activity," the legal work "must
be under the actual control of the illegal party at all
times." [Op. Cit., vol. 1, p. 199]

Even in its open, public mode, the Communist Party was to 
be a highly centralised organisation, with all decisions on 
the national level made by the Central Committee. The parties
must be as centralised as possible, with a party centre which
has strength and authority and is equipped with the most
comprehensive powers. Also, the party press and other 
publications, and all party publishing houses, must be 
subordinated to the party presidium. This applied on 
an international level as well, with the decisions of its 
Communist International's Executive Committee were binding on 
all parties belonging to the Communist International. 
[Op. Cit., vol. 2, p. 769] 
Moreover, "Communist cells of all kinds must be subordinate
to each other in a strictly hierarchical order of rank as
precisely as possible." Democratic centralism itself was
fundamentally hierarchical, with its "basic principles" 
being that "the higher bodies shall be elected by the
lower, that all instructions of the higher bodies are
categorically and necessarily binding on the lower." 
Indeed, "there shall be a strong party centre whose 
authority is universally and unquestionably recognised
for all leading party comrades in the period between
congresses." Any "advocacy of broad 'autonomy' for the
local party organisations only weakens the ranks of the
Communist Party" and "favours petty-bourgeois, anarchist
and disruptive tendencies." [Op. Cit., vol. 1, p. 198]

It seems strange for Stack to argue that Bakunin's ideas
(assuming he presents an honest account of them, of course) 
were "far more elitist and less democratic than Lenin's model" 
as it obviously was not. Indeed, the similarities between Stack's 
summary of Bakunin's ideas and Leninist theory are striking. The 
Leninist party has the same division between open and secret (legal
and illegal) structures as in Bakunin's, the same centralism and 
top-down nature. Lenin argued that "[i]n all countries, even in
those that are freest, most 'legal,' and most 'peaceful' . . .
it is now absolutely indispensable for every Communist Party to
systematically combine legal and illegal work, legal and illegal
organisation." He stressed that "[o]nly the most reactionary
philistine, no matter what cloak of fine 'democratic' and
pacifist phrases he may don, will deny this fact or the 
conclusion that of necessity follows from it, viz., that all
legal Communist parties must immediately form illegal organisations
for the systematic conduct of illegal work." [_Collected Works_,
vol. 31, p. 195] 

This was due to the threat of state repression, which also faced
Bakunin's Alliance. As Murray Bookchin argues, "Bakunin's emphasis on
conspiracy and secrecy can be understood only against the social
background of Italy, Spain, and Russia the three countries in
Europe where conspiracy and secrecy were matters of sheer survival."
[_The Spanish Anarchists_, p. 24]

For anarchists, the similarity in structure between Bakunin and Lenin
is no source of embarrassment. Rather, we argue that it is due to
a similarity in political conditions in Russia and *not* similarities
in political ideas. If we look at Bakunin's ideas on social revolution
and the workers' movement we see a fully libertarian perspective
-- of a movement from the bottom-up, based on the principles of
direct action, self-management and federalism. Anarchists since 
his death have applied *these* ideas to the specific anarchist 
organisation as well, rejecting the non-libertarian elements of 
Bakunin's ideas which Stack correctly (if somewhat hypocritically 
and dishonestly) denounce. All in all, Stack has shown himself to 
be a hypocrite or, at best, a "most reactionary philistine" (to
use Lenin's choice expression).

In addition, it would be useful to evaluate the effectiveness 
of Stack's Leninist alternative. Looking at the outcome of the 
Russian Revolution, we can only surmise that it is not very
effective. This is because its goal is meant to be a socialist
society based on soviet democracy. Did the Russian Revolution 
actually result in such a society? Far from it. The Kronstadt 
revolt was repressed in 1921 because it demanded soviet power (see
section H.7). Nor was this an isolated example. The Bolsheviks 
had been disbanding soviets with elected non-Bolshevik majorities 
since early 1918 (i.e. *before* the start of the Civil War) and 
by 1920 leading Bolsheviks were arguing that dictatorship of the
proletariat could only be expressed by means of the dictatorship
of the party (see section H.6 for details). Clearly, the Bolshevik 
method is hardly "effective" in the sense of achieving its stated 
goals. Nor was it particularly effective before the revolution
either. During the 1905 revolution, the Bolsheviks opposed the
councils of workers' deputies (soviets) which had been formed
and gave them an ultimatum: either accept the programme of the 
Bolsheviks or else disband! The soviets ignored them. In February 
1917 the Bolshevik party opposed the actions that produced the 
revolution which overthrew the Tsar. Simply put, the one event
that validates the Bolshevik model is the October Revolution 
of 1917 and even that failed. 

The weakness of Stack's diatribe can be seen from his use of 
the Alliance example. Moreover, it backfires on his own politics. 
The similarities between Bakunin's ideas and Lenin's on this 
subject are clear. The very issues which Stack raises as being 
"elitist" in Bakunin (secret and open organisation, centralisation, 
top-down decision making) are shared by Lenin. Given that no other 
anarchist organisation has ever followed the Alliance structure 
(and, indeed, it is doubtful the Alliance followed it!), it makes 
a mockery of the scientific method to base a generalisation on 
an exception rather than the norm (indeed, the only exception). 
For Stack to use Bakunin's ideas on this issue as some kind of 
evidence against anarchism staggers belief. Given that anarchists 
reject Bakunin's ideas on this subject while Leninists continue to 
subscribe to Lenin's, it is very clear that Stack is being extremely 
hypocritical in this matter.

All in all, anarchists would argue that it is Leninist ideas on
the vanguard party which are "elitist," "ineffective" and "downright
bizarre." As we discuss in section H.5, the only thing the Leninist 
"revolutionary" party is effective for is replacing one set of 
bosses with a new set (the leaders of the party).

H.2.15 Do anarchists reject discipline?

The idea that anarchists reject the need for discipline, or
are against organisation, or base their ideas on the whim of
the individual, are common place in Marxism. Simply put, the 
idea that anarchists reject "discipline" is derived from the 
erroneous Marxist assertion that anarchism is basically a 
form of "individualism" and based on the "absolute sovereignty 
of the individual ego" (see section H.2.11). From this (incorrect)
position, it is logically deduced that anarchism must reject the 
need for "discipline" (i.e. the ability to make and stick to 
collective decisions). Needless to say, this is false. Anarchists
are well aware of the need to organise together and, therefore,
the need to stick by decisions reached. The importance of 
solidarity in anarchist theory is an expression of this 
awareness.

However, there is "discipline" and "discipline." There can be no
denying that in a capitalist workplace or army there is "discipline"
yet few, if any, sane persons would argue that this distinctly
top-down and hierarchical "discipline" is something to aspire to,
particularly if you seek a free society. This cannot be compared
to a making and sticking by a collective decision reached by free 
discussion and debate within a self-governing associations. As 
Bakunin argued:

"Discipline, mutual trust as well as unity are all excellent 
qualities when properly understood and practised, but disastrous
when abused . . . [one use of the word] discipline almost always 
signifies despotism on the one hand and blind automatic submission
to authority on the other . . . 

"Hostile as I am to [this,] the authoritarian conception of 
discipline, I nevertheless recognise that a certain kind of 
discipline, not automatic but voluntary and intelligently 
understood is, and will ever be, necessary whenever a greater 
number of individuals undertake any kind of collective work or 
action. Under these circumstances, discipline is simply the 
voluntary and considered co-ordination of all individual efforts 
for a common purpose. At the moment of revolution, in the
midst of the struggle, there is a natural division of functions
according to the aptitude of each, assessed and judged by the
collective whole: Some direct and others carry out orders.
But no function remains fixed and it will not remain permanently
and irrevocably attached to any one person. Hierarchical order
and promotion do not exist, so that the executive of yesterday
can become the subordinate of tomorrow. No one rises above the
others, and if he does rise, it is only to fall back again a
moment later, like the waves of the sea forever returning to
the salutary level of equality.

"In such a system, power, properly speaking, no longer exists.
Power is diffused to the collectivity and becomes the true
expression of the liberty of everyone, the faithful and
sincere realisation of the will of all . . . this is the
only true discipline, the discipline necessary for the
organisation of freedom. This is not the kind of discipline
preached by the State . . . which wants the old, routine-like,
automatic blind discipline. Passive discipline is the foundation
of every despotism." [_Bakunin on Anarchism_, pp. 414-5]

Clearly, anarchists see the need for *self*-discipline rather
than the hierarchical "discipline" associated with capitalism
and other class systems. It simply means that "anyone who 
associates and co-operates with others for a common purpose
must feel the need to co-ordinate his [or her] actions with
those of his [or her] fellow members and do nothing that harms
the work of others and, thus, the common cause; and respect
the agreements that have been made -- except when wishing 
sincerely to leave the association when emerging differences
of opinion or changed circumstances or conflict over preferred
methods make co-operation impossible or inappropriate." [Malatesta,
_The Anarchist Revolution_, pp. 107-8] As such, we reject
hierarchical "discipline," considering it as confusing agreement
with authority, co-operation with coercion and helping with
hierarchy.

Anarchists are not alone in this. A few Marxists have also seen
this difference. For example, Rosa Luxemburg repeated (probably
unknowingly) Bakunin's distinction between forms of "discipline" 
when she argued, against Lenin, that:

"Lenin . . . declares that 'it is no longer the proletarians but
certain intellectuals in our party who need to be educated in
the matters of organisation and discipline' . . . He glorifies
the educative influence of the factory, which, he says, accustoms
the proletariat to 'discipline and organisation' . . .

"Saying all this, Lenin seems to demonstrate . . . his conception
of socialist organisation is quite mechanistic. The discipline
Lenin has in mind being implanted in the working class not only
by the factory but also by the military and the existing state
bureaucracy -- by the entire mechanism of the centralised
bourgeois state.

"We misuse words and we practice self-deception when we apply
the same term -- discipline -- to such dissimilar notions as:
(1) the absence of thought and will in a body with a thousand
automatically moving hands and legs, and (2) the spontaneous
co-ordination of the conscious, political acts of a body of
men. What is there in common between the regulated docility
of an oppressed class and the self-discipline and organisation
of a class struggling for its emancipation?

"The self-discipline of the social democracy is not merely the
replacement of the authority of the bourgeois rulers with the
authority of a socialist central committee. The working class
will acquire the sense of the new discipline, the freely 
assumed self-discipline of the social democracy, not as a
result of the discipline imposed on it by the capitalist
state, but by extirpating, to the last root, its old habits
of obedience and servility." [_Rosa Luxemburg Speaks_, 
pp. 119-20]

Like Luxemburg, anarchists stress the difference in forms of
decision making and reject authoritarian organisations along
with hierarchical "discipline" (see section H.4). This
support for self-discipline within self-managed organisations
flows directly from the anarchist awareness of the *collective*
nature of social change: as "[t]oday, in revolutionary action 
as in labour itself, collectivism must replace individualism. 
Understand clearly that in organising yourselves you will be
stronger than all the political leaders in the world." [Bakunin, 
quoted by K.J. Kenafick, _Michael Bakunin and Karl Marx_, 
p. 244]

For anarchists, collective organisation and co-operation does 
not mean the end of individuality. As Bakunin argued: 

"You will think, you will exist, you will act collectively,
which nevertheless will not prevent in the least the full
development of the intellectual and moral faculties of
each individual. Each of you will bring to you his own
talents, and in all joining together you will multiply 
your value a hundred fold. Such is the law of collective
action . . . in giving your hands to each other for this
action in common, you will promise to each other a mutual
fraternity which will be . . . a sort of free contract . . .
Then proceed collectively to action you will necessarily
commence by practising this fraternity between yourselves
. . . by means of regional and local organisations . . .
you will find in yourselves strength that you had never
imagined, if each of you acted individually, according
to his own inclination and not as a consequence of a
unanimous resolution, discussed and accepted beforehand."
[quoted by Kenafick, Op. Cit., pp. 244-5]

Therefore, anarchists see the need for "discipline," assuming
that it is created in appropriately libertarian ways. We reject
it if it simply means blindly following the orders of those in 
power, which is usually does mean within modern society and,
sadly, large parts of the labour and socialist movements. However, 
this does not mean that the majority is always right. As 
Malatesta argued, "[t]here are matters over which it is worth 
accepting the will of the majority because the damage caused 
by a split would be greater than that caused by error; there 
are circumstances in which discipline becomes a duty because 
to fail in it would be to fail in the solidarity between the 
oppressed and would mean betrayal in face of the enemy. But 
when is convinced that the organisation is pursuing a course
which threatens the future and makes it difficult to remedy
the harm done, then it is a duty to rebel and to resist even
at the risk of providing a split." Therefore, "anarchists
should extend our activities into all organisations to
preach unity among all workers, decentralisation, freedom
of initiative, within the common framework of solidarity
 . . . What is essential is that individuals should develop 
a sense of organisation and solidarity, and the conviction 
that fraternal co-operation is necessary to fight oppression 
and to achieve a society in which everyone will be able to 
enjoy his [or her] own life." [_Life and Ideas_, pp. 132-3]

In other words, anarchists reject the idea that obeying orders
equals "discipline" and recognise that real discipline means
evaluating the needs of solidarity and equality with your
fellow workers and acting accordingly.

H.2.16 Does the Spanish Revolution show the failure of anarchism?

The actions of the anarchists of the CNT and FAI during the
Spanish Civil War is almost always mentioned by Marxists when
they attack anarchism. Take, for example, Pat Stack. He argues
as follows:

"This question of state power, and which class holds it, was to 
prove crucial for revolutionaries during the Spanish Civil War and 
in particular during the revolutionary upheavals in Catalonia. Here 
anarchism faced its greatest test and greatest opportunity, yet it 
failed the former and therefore missed the latter. 

"When the government in the region under the leadership of Companys 
admitted its impotence and offered to dissolve, effectively handing 
power to the revolutionary forces, the anarchists turned them down. 
CNT leader and FAI . . . militant Garcia Oliver explained, 'The 
CNT and the FAI decided on collaboration and democracy, renouncing 
revolutionary totalitarianism which would lead to the strangulation 
of the revolution by the anarchist and Confederal dictatorship. We 
had to choose, between Libertarian Communism, which meant anarchist 
dictatorship, and democracy, which meant collaboration.' The choice 
was between leaving the state intact and paving the way for Franco's 
victory or building a workers' government in Catalonia which could 
act as a focal point for the defeat of Franco and the creation of 
the structures of a new workers' state. In choosing the former the 
anarchists were refusing to distinguish between a capitalist 
state and a workers' state . . . The movement that started 
by refusing to build a workers' state ended up by recognising a 
capitalist one and betraying the revolution in the process."
["Anarchy in the UK?", _Socialist Review_, no. 246]

While we have addressed this issue in sections I.8.10 and I.8.11,
it is useful to summarise a few key points on this issue. First,
there is the actual objective situation in which the decision to
collaborate was made in. Strangely, for all his talk of anarchists
ignoring "material conditions," Stack fails to mention any when he
discusses the decisions of Spanish Anarchism. As such, he critique
is pure idealism, without any attempt to ground it in the objective
circumstances facing the CNT and FAI. Second, the quote provided as 
the only evidence for Stack's analysis dates from a year after the
decision was made. Rather than reflect the actual concerns of the
CNT and FAI when they made their decision, they reflect the attempts
of the leaders of an organisation which had significantly departed
from its libertarian principles to justify their actions. While this
obviously suits Stack's idealist analysis of events, its use can be
flawed for this reason. Thirdly, clearly the decision of the CNT and
FAI *ignored* anarchist theory. As such, it seems ironic to blame
anarchism when anarchists ignores its recommendations, yet this is
what Stack argues. Lastly, there is the counter-example of Aragon,
which clearly refutes Stack's analysis. 

To understand why the CNT and FAI made the decisions it did, it is
necessary to do what Stack fails to do, namely to provide some
context. The decision to ignore anarchist theory, ignore the state
rather than smashing it and work with other anti-fascist organisations
was made immediately after the army had been defeated on the streets
of Barcelona on the 20th of July, 1936. It is this fact, the success
of a popular insurrection in one region against a *nation wide* military
coup, which helps place the CNT's decisions into context. Catalonia is 
but one region in Spain. While the CNT had great strength in many 
regions of that country, it was not uniform. Some areas, such as 
around Madrid and in Asturias, the socialist UGT was stronger 
(although the CNT had been making inroads in both areas). This meant
any decision to introduce libertarian communism in Catalonia would 
have, in all likelihood, meant isolation within Republican Spain 
and the possibility that the CNT would have to fight both the 
Republican state *as well as* Franco. 

As such, the *real* choice facing the CNT was not "between leaving 
the state intact . . . or building a workers' government in Catalonia 
which could act as a focal point for the defeat of Franco" but rather 
something drastically different. Either work with other anti-fascists 
against Franco so ensuring unity against the common enemy and implement 
anarchism after victory *or* immediately implement libertarian 
communism and possibly face a conflict on two fronts, against Franco 
*and* the Republic (and, possibly, imperialist intervention against 
the social revolution). This situation made the CNT-FAI decided to
collaborate with other anti-fascist groups in the Catalan _Central 
Committee of Anti-Fascist Militias_. To downplay these objective 
factors and simply blame the decision on anarchist politics is a 
joke. As we argue in section I.8.10 in more detail, this dilemma 
was the one which was driving the decisions of the CNT leadership, 
*not* any failings in anarchist politics (see section I.8.11 for
a discussion of why applying anarchist ideas would have been the
correct decision, although hindsight is always twenty-twenty).

Similarly, the Garica Oliver quote provided by Stack dated from 
a year *after* the events of July 1936. As discussed in section 
I.8.11, these comments are justifications of CNT-FAI actions and 
were designed for political effect. As such, they simply cannot 
be taken at face value for two reasons. 

Firstly, the decision to collaborate was obviously driven by fear 
of Franco and the concern not to divide the forces fighting him. 
As the 1937 report to the AIT put it, the CNT had a "difficult 
alternative: to completely destroy the state, to declare war 
against the Rebels, the government, foreign capitalists . . . or 
collaborating." [quoted by Robert Alexander, _The Anarchists in 
the Spanish Civil War_, vol. 2, p. 1156] That was the reality 
facing the CNT -- not Stack's pondering of Garcia Oliver quotes 
ripped from their historical context. 

Secondly, Oliver's arguments are totally contradictory. After all, 
he is arguing that libertarian communism (a society based on 
directly democratic free associations organised and run from 
the bottom up) is an "anarchist dictatorship" and *less* 
democratic than the capitalist Republic Garica Oliver had 
been fighting against for most of his life! Moreover, 
libertarian communism *was* the revolution. As such, to choose 
it over capitalist democracy to stop "the strangulation of the 
revolution" makes no sense, as the revolution which was created 
by the rank-and-file of the anarchist movement after the defeat 
of Franco was based on libertarian communist ideas and ideals!

For these reasons, it is safe to take Garica Oliver's words with
a large pinch of salt. To rely upon them for an analysis of the
actions of the Spanish Anarchists or the failings of anarchism
suggests an extremely superficial perspective. This is particularly
the case when we look at both the history of the CNT and anarchist
theory. According to anarchist ideas, the social revolution, to 
quote Bakunin, must "totally destroy the State," expropriate 
capital and the land "on behalf of workers' associations" and
create "the federative Alliance of all working men's associations" 
which "will constitute the Commune." [_Michael Bakunin: Selected 
Writings_, p. 170] Therefore, it is "not true to say that we 
completely ignore politics. We do not ignore it, for we definitely 
want to destroy it." [Bakunin, _The Political Philosophy of Bakunin_, 
p. 331] As can be seen, the CNT ignored these recommendations. Given 
that the CNT did *not* destroy the state, nor create a federation of
workers' councils, then how can anarchist theory be blamed? It
seems strange to point to the failure of anarchists to apply their
politics as an example of the failure of those politics, yet this
is what Stack is doing.

As we discuss in section I.8.11, the CNT leadership, going against
anarchist theory, decided to postpone the revolution until *after* 
Franco was defeated. As the Catalan CNT leadership put it in August 
1936:

"Reports have also been received from other regions. There has been
some talk about the impatience of some comrades who wish to go
futher than crushing fascism, but for the moment the situation in
Spain as a whole is extremely delicate. In revolutionary terms,
Catalonia is an oasis within Spain.

"Obviously no one can foresee the changes which may follow the
civil war and the conquest of that part of Spain which is still
under the control of mutinous reactionaries." [quoted by Jose
Peirats, _The CNT in the Spanish Revolution_, vol. 1, pp. 151-2]

As can be seen, concern that Catalonia would be isolated from the
rest of the Republic is foremost in their minds. Equally, there is
the acknowledgement that many CNT members were applying anarchist
politics by fighting fascism via a revolutionary war. This can
be seen by the rank and file of the CNT and FAI ignoring the 
decision "postpone" the revolution in favour of an anti-fascist
war. All across Republican Spain, workers and peasants started to 
expropriate capital and the land, placing it under workers' 
self-management. They did so on their own initiative. They also 
applied anarchist ideas in full in Aragon, where the _Council of 
Aragon_ was created in October 1936 at a meeting of delegates 
from CNT unions, village collectives and militia columns. In 
other words, the creation of a federation of workers' 
associations as argued by Bakunin. Little wonder Stack fails 
to mention what happened in Aragon, it would undermine his
argument against anarchism to mention it.

To contrast Catalonia and Aragon shows the weakness of Stack's 
argument. The same organisation, with the same politics, yet 
different results. How can anarchist ideas be blamed for what
happened in Catalonia when they had been applied in Aragon? Such 
a position could not be logically argued and, unsurprisingly, 
Aragon usually fails to get mentioned by Marxists when discussing
Anarchism during the Spanish Civil War. The continuity of what 
happened in Aragon with the ideas of anarchism and the CNT's 1936 
Zaragoza Resolution on Libertarian Communism is clear.

In summary, how could anarchism have "failed" during the Spanish
Revolution when it was ignored in Catalonia (for fear of fascism) 
and applied in Aragon? How can it be argued that anarchist politics 
were to blame when those very same politics had formed the Council 
of Aragon? It cannot. Simply put, the Spanish Civil War showed
the failure of certain anarchists to apply their ideas in a
difficult situation rather than the failure of anarchism.

Needless to say, Stack also claims that the _Friends of Durruti_
group developed towards Marxism. As he puts it:

"Interestingly the one Spanish anarchist group that developed the 
most sophisticated critique of all this was the Friends of Durutti. 
As Felix Morrow points out, 'They represented a conscious break with 
the anti-statism of traditional anarchism. They explicitly declared 
the need for democratic organs of power, juntas or soviets, in the 
overthrow of capitalism, and the necessary state measures of 
repression against the counter-revolution.' The failure of the 
Spanish anarchists to understand exactly that these were the stark 
choices workers' power, or capitalist power followed by reaction."

The _Friends of Durruti_ (FoD) were an anarchist grouping within the 
CNT and FAI which, like a large minority of others, strongly and 
consistently opposed the policy of anti-fascist unity. However,
rather than signify a "conscious break" with anarchism, it signified
a conscious *return* to it. This can be clearly seen when we compare
their arguments to those of Bakunin. As noted by Stack, the FoD
argued for "juntas" in the overthrow of capitalism and to defend
against counter-revolution. This is *exactly* what revolutionary 
anarchists have argued for since Bakunin (see section H.2.1 for 
details)! The continuity of the ideas of FoD with the pre-Civil 
War politics of the CNT and the ideas of revolutionary anarchism 
are clear. As such, the FoD were simply arguing for a return to 
the traditional positions of anarchism and cannot be considered 
to have broken with it. If Stack or Morrow knew anything about 
anarchism, then they would have known this.

(See "Did the Friends of Durruti 'break with' anarchism?" in the 
"Marxists and Spanish Anarchism" appendix for a much fuller 
discussion of this topic.)

As such, the failure of the Spanish anarchists was not the "stark
choice" between "workers' power" and "capitalist power" but rather
the making of the wrong choice in the real dilemma of introducing 
anarchism (which would, by definition, be based on workers' power, 
organisation and self-management) or collaborating with other 
anti-fascist groups in the struggle against the greater enemy of 
Franco (i.e. fascist reaction). That Stack does not see this
suggests that he simply has no appreciation of the dynamics of
the Spanish Revolution and prefers abstract sloganeering to a
serious analysis of the problems facing it.

Stack ends by summarising:

"The most important lesson . . . is that whatever ideals and gut 
instincts individual anarchists may have, anarchism, both in 
word and deed, fails to provide a roadworthy vehicle for human 
liberation. Only Marxism, which sees the centrality of the working 
class under the leadership of a political party, is capable of 
leading the working class to victory."

As a useful antidote to these claims, we need simply quote Trotsky 
on what the Spanish anarchists should have done. In his words: 
"Because the leaders of the CNT renounced dictatorship *for 
themselves* they left the place open for the Stalinist dictatorship." 
[our emphasis, _Writings 1936-7_, p. 514] Hardly an example of
"workers' power"!

Or, as he put it in his essay "Stalinism and Bolshevism," a
"revolutionary party, even having seized power (of which the 
anarchist leaders were incapable in spite of the heroism of 
the anarchist workers), is still by no means the sovereign 
ruler of society." [_Stalinism and Bolshevism_] Rather than 
seeing "democratic organs of power, juntas or soviets, in the 
overthrow of capitalism" as being the key issue, Trotsky 
considered the party as being the decisive factor. Indeed, 
the idea that such organs ("juntas" or "soviets," to use 
Stack's words) could replace the party dictatorship is 
dismissed:

"Those who propose the abstraction of Soviets to the party 
dictatorship should understand that only thanks to the party 
dictatorship were the Soviets able to lift themselves out of 
the mud of reformism and attain the state form of the proletariat." 
[Op. Cit.]

Clearly, the leading Marxist at the time was not arguing for the
"centrality of the working class under the leadership of a political
party." He was arguing for the dictatorship of a "revolutionary"
party *over* the working class. Rather than the working class being 
"central" to the running of a revolutionary regime, Trotsky saw the 
party being in the central position. What sort of "victory" is 
possible when the party has dictatorial power over the working class 
and the "sovereign ruler" of society? Simply the kind of "victory"
that leads to Stalinism.

Anarchists reject this vision. They also reject the first step along 
this path, namely the identification of party power with workers' power. 
Simply put, if the "revolutionary" party is in power then the working 
class is not. Rather than seeing working class organisations as the 
means by which working people run society, Leninists see them purely 
in instrumental terms -- the means by which the party can seize power.
As the Russian Revolution proved beyond doubt, in a conflict between
workers' power and party power Leninists will suppress the former
to ensure the latter (see section H.6). As Trotsky argued in 1939
(18 years after he made similar arguments when he was in power)
the "very same masses are at different times inspired by different 
moods and objectives. It is just for this reason that a centralised 
organisation of the vanguard is indispensable. Only a party, wielding 
the authority it has won, is capable of overcoming the vacillation 
of the masses themselves." [_The Moralists and Sycophants_, p. 59]

To paraphrase Stack, the most important lesson from both the Russian
and Spanish revolutions is that whatever ideals and gut instincts 
individual Leninists may have, Leninism, both in word and deed, fails 
to provide a roadworthy vehicle for human liberation. Only Anarchism, 
which sees the centrality of the working class management of the class
struggle and revolution, is capable of ensuring the creation of a
real, free, socialist society. 

Therefore, rather than see the failure of anarchism, the Spanish 
Revolution showed the failure of anarchists to apply their politics 
due to exceptionally difficult objective circumstances, a mistake
which almost all anarchists acknowledge and have learned from. 
This does not justify the decision, rather it helps to explain 
it. Moreover, the Spanish Revolution also has a clear example of 
anarchism being applied in the Council of Aragon. As such, it is 
hard to blame anarchism for the failure of the CNT when the same 
organisation applied its ideas successfully there. Simply put, 
Marxist claims that the Spanish Revolution shows the failure of 
anarchist ideas are not only wrong, they are extremely superficial 
and not rooted in the objective circumstances of the time.

H.3 What are the myths of state socialism?

Ask most people what socialism means and they will point to 
the former Soviet Union, China, Cuba and a host of other 
authoritarian, centralised and oppressive party dictatorships. 
These regimes have in common two things. Firstly, the claim 
that their rulers are Marxists or socialists. Secondly, that
they have successfully alienated millions of working class 
people from the very idea of socialism. Indeed, the supporters 
of capitalism simply had to describe the "socialist paradises" 
as they really were in order to put people off socialism. 
Moreover, the Stalinist regimes (and their various apologists 
and even "opponents", like the Trotskyists, who defended them 
as "degenerated workers' states") let the bourgeoisie have an
easy time in dismissing all working-class demands and struggles 
as so many attempts to set up similar party dictatorships. 

The association of "socialism" or "communism" with these 
dictatorships has often made anarchists wary of calling 
themselves socialists or communists in case our ideas are 
associated with them. As Errico Malatesta argued in 1924:

"I foresee the possibility that the communist anarchists
will gradually abandon the term 'communist': it is growing
in ambivalence and falling into disrepute as a result of
Russian 'communist' despotism. If the term is eventually
abandoned this will be a repetition of what happened with 
the word 'socialist.' We who, in Italy at least, were the
first champions of socialism and maintained and still maintain
that we are the true socialists in the broad and human sense
of the word, ended by abandoning the term to avoid confusion
with the many and various authoritarian and bourgeois 
deviations of socialism. Thus too we may have to abandon 
the term 'communist' for fear that our ideal of free human
solidarity will be confused with the avaricious despotism 
which has for some time triumphed in Russia and which one
party, inspired by the Russian example, seeks to impose 
worldwide." [_The Anarchist Revolution_, p. 20]

That, to a large degree happened, with anarchists simply 
calling themselves by that name, without adjectives, to avoid 
confusion. This, sadly, resulted in two problems. Firstly, 
it gave Marxists even more potential to portray anarchism as 
being primarily against the state and not as equally opposed
to capitalism, hierarchy and inequality (as we argue in section 
H.2.4, anarchists have opposed the state as just one aspect 
of class society). Secondly, extreme right-wingers tried to 
appropriate the names "libertarian" and "anarchist" to describe 
their vision of extreme capitalism as "anarchism," they claimed, 
was simply "anti-government" (see section F for discussion on 
why "anarcho"-capitalism is not anarchist). To counter these 
distortions of anarchist ideas, many anarchists have recently 
re-appropriated the use of the words "socialist" and "communist," 
although always in combination with the words "anarchist" and 
"libertarian."

Such combination of words is essential as the problem Malatesta
predicted still remains. If one thing can be claimed for the 
20th century, it is that it has seen the word "socialism" become 
narrowed and restricted into what anarchists call "state 
socialism" -- socialism created and run from above, by the 
state (i.e. by the state bureaucracy). This restriction of 
"socialism" has been supported by both Stalinist and Capitalist 
ruling elites, for their own reasons (the former to secure 
their own power and gain support by associating themselves
with socialist ideals, the latter by discrediting those ideas
by associating them with the horror of Stalinism). 

This means that anarchists and other libertarian socialists 
have a major task on their hands -- to reclaim the promise of
socialism from the distortions inflicted upon it by both its
enemies (Stalinists and capitalists) and its erstwhile and
self-proclaimed supporters (Social Democracy and its various
offspring like the Bolsheviks and its progeny like the 
Trotskyists). A key aspect of this process is a critique of
both the practice and ideology of Marxism and its various 
offshoots. Only by doing this can anarchists prove, to quote
Rocker, that "*Socialism will be free, or it will not be at
all*." [_Anarcho-Syndicalism_, p. 20]

Such a critique raises the problem of which forms of "Marxism" 
to discuss. There is an extremely diverse range of Marxist  viewpoints and groups in existence. Indeed, the different
groups spend a lot of time indicating why all the others are 
not "real" Marxists (or Marxist-Leninists, or Trotskyists, 
and so on) and are just "sects" without "real" Marxist theory 
or ideas. This "diversity" is, of course, a major problem 
(and somewhat ironic, given that some Marxists like to insult 
anarchists by stating there are as many forms of anarchism as 
anarchists!). Equally, many Marxists go further than dismissing
specific groups. Some even totally reject other branches of 
their movement as being non-Marxist (for example, some Marxists 
dismiss Leninism as having little, or nothing, to do with what 
they consider the "real" Marxist tradition to be). This means 
that discussing Marxism can be difficult as Marxists can argue 
that our FAQ does not address the arguments of this or that 
Marxist thinker, group or tendency.

With this in mind, this section of the FAQ will concentrate on
the works of Marx and Engels (and so the movement they generated,
namely Social Democracy) as well as the Bolshevik tradition 
started by Lenin and continued (by and large) by Trotsky. These
are the core ideas (and the recognised authorities) of most 
Marxists and so latter derivations of these tendencies can be 
ignored (for example Maoism, Castroism and so on). It should 
also be noted that even this grouping will produce dissent 
as some Marxists argue that the Bolshevik tradition is
not part of Marxism. This perspective can be seen in the
"impossiblist" tradition of Marxism (e.g. the Socialist Party
of Great Britain and its sister parties) as well as in the
left/council communist tradition (e.g. in the work of such
Marxists as Anton Pannekoek and Paul Mattick). The arguments
for their positions are strong and well worth reading (indeed,
any honest analysis of Marxism and Leninism cannot help but
show important differences between the two). However, as 
the vast majority of Marxists today are also Leninists, we
have to reflect this in our FAQ (and, in general, we do so
by referring to "mainstream Marxists" as opposed to the
small minority of libertarian Marxists).

Another problem arises when we consider the differences not
only between Marxist tendencies, but also within a specific
tendency before and after its representatives seize power.
For example, "there are . . . very different strains of 
Leninism . . . there's the Lenin of 1917, the Lenin of the
'April Theses' and _State and Revolution_. That's one Lenin.
And then there's the Lenin who took power and acted in ways
that are unrecognisable . . . compared with, say, the doctrines
of 'State and Revolution.' . . . this [is] not very hard to
explain. There's a big difference between the libertarian
doctrines of a person who is trying to associate himself 
with a mass popular movement to acquire power and the 
authoritarian power of somebody who's taken power and is
trying to consolidate it. . . that is true of Marx also.
There are competing strains in Marx." [Noam Chomsky,
_Language and Politics_, p. 177]

As such, this section of our FAQ will try and draw out 
the contradictions within Marxism and indicate what 
aspects of the doctrine aided the development of the 
"second" Lenin. The seeds from which authoritarianism 
grew post-October 1917 existed from the start. Anarchists 
agree with Noam Chomsky when he stated that he considered
it "characteristic and unfortunate that the lesson that 
was drawn from Marx and Lenin for the later period was 
the authoritarian lesson. That is, it's the authoritarian 
power of the vanguard party and destruction of all popular 
forums in the interests of the masses. That's the Lenin who 
became know to later generations. Again, not very 
surprisingly, because that's what Leninism really was 
in practice." [Ibid.]


Ironically, given Marx's own comments on the subject, a key 
hindrance to such an evaluation is the whole idea and history 
of Marxism itself. While, as Murray Bookchin noted "to his 
lasting credit," Marx tried (to some degree) "to create a 
movement that looks to the future instead of to the past," 
his followers have not done so. "Once again," Bookchin 
argues, "the dead are walking in our midst -- ironically, 
draped in the name of Marx, the man who tried to bury the 
dead of the nineteenth century. So the revolution of our own 
day can do nothing better than parody, in turn, the October 
Revolution of 1918 and the civil war of 1918-1920 . . . The 
complete, all-sided revolution of our own day . . . follows 
the partial, the incomplete, the one-sided revolutions of 
the past, which merely changed the form of the 'social 
question,' replacing one system of domination and hierarchy 
by another." [_Post-Scarcity Anarchism_, p. 174 and p. 175] 
In Marx's words, the "tradition of all the dead generations 
weighs down like a nightmare on the brain of the living." 
Marx's own work, and the movements it inspired, now add to 
this dead-weight. In order to ensure, as Marx put it, the 
social revolution draws is poetry from the future rather 
than the past, Marxism itself must be transcended.

Which, of course, means evaluating both the theory *and* 
practice of Marxism. For anarchists, it seems strange that 
for a body of work whose followers stress is revolutionary
and liberating, its results have been so bad. If Marxism is 
so obviously revolutionary and democratic, then why have so 
few of the people who read it drawn those conclusions? How
could it be transmuted so easily into Stalinism? Why are 
there so few *libertarian* Marxists, if it was Lenin (or
Social Democracy) which "misinterpreted" Marx and Engels?
So when Marxists argue that the problem is in the 
interpretation of the message not in the message itself, 
anarchists reply that the reason these numerous, allegedly 
false, interpretations exist at all simply suggests that 
there are limitations within Marxism *as such* rather than 
the readings it has been subjected to. When something 
repeatedly fails (and produces such terrible results), 
then there has to be a fundamental flaw somewhere. 

Thus Cornelius Castoriadis:

"Marx was, in fact, the first to stress that the significance
of a theory cannot be grasped independently of the historical
and social practice it inspires and initiates, to which it
gives rise, in which it prolongs itself and under cover of
which a given practice seeks to justify itself.

"Who, today, would dare proclaim that the only significance
of Christianity for history is to be found in reading 
unaltered versions of the Gospels or that the historical
practice of various Churches over a period of some 2,000
years can teach us nothing fundamental about the significance
of this religious movement? A 'faithfulness to Marx' which
would see the historical fate of Marxism as something 
unimportant would be just as laughable. It would in fact
be quite ridiculous. Whereas for the Christian the revelations
of the Gospels have a transcendental kernel and an intemporal
validity, no theory could ever have such qualities in the
eyes of a Marxist. To seek to discover the meaning of 
Marxism only in what Marx wrote (while keeping quiet about
what the doctrine has become in history) is to pretend --
in flagrant contradiction with the central ideas of that
doctrine -- that real history doesn't count and that the 
truth of a theory is always and exclusively to be found 
'further on.' It finally comes to replacing revolution 
by revelation and the understanding of events by the
exegesis of texts." ["The Fate of Marxism," pp. 75-84
_The Anarchist Papers_, Dimitrios Roussopoulos (ed.), 
p. 77]

This does not mean forsaking the work of Marx and Engels. It
means rejecting once and for all the idea that two people,
writing over a period of decades over a hundred years ago 
have all the answers. As should be obvious! Ultimately, 
anarchists think we have to *build* upon the legacy of the
past, not squeeze current events into it. We should stand 
on the shoulders of giants, not at their feet.

Thus this section of our FAQ will attempt to explain the various
myths of Marxism and provide an anarchist critique of Marxism and
its offshoots. Of course, the ultimate myth of Marxism is what 
Alexander Berkman called "The Bolshevik Myth," namely the idea 
that the Russian Revolution was a success. However, as we discuss 
this revolution in section H.6 we will not do so here except
when it provides useful empirical evidence for our critique. Our
discussion here will concentrate for the most part on Marxist
theory, showing its inadequacies, its problems, where it 
appropriated anarchist ideas and how anarchism and Marxism 
differ. This is a big task and this section of the FAQ can 
only be a small contribution to it. 

As noted above, there are minority trends in Marxism which are 
libertarian in nature (i.e. close to anarchism). As such, it 
would be simplistic to say that anarchists are "anti-Marxist" 
and we generally do differentiate between the (minority) 
libertarian element and the authoritarian mainstream of Marxism 
(i.e. Social-Democracy and Leninism in its many forms). Without 
doubt, Marx contributed immensely to the enrichment of socialist 
ideas and analysis (as acknowledged by Bakunin, for example). 
His influence, as to be expected, was both positive and negative. 
For this reason he must be read and discussed critically. This 
FAQ is a contribution to this task of transcending the work of 
Marx. As with anarchist thinkers, we must take what is useful 
from Marx and reject the rubbish. But never forget that 
anarchists are anarchists precisely because we think that 
anarchist thinkers have got more right than wrong and we reject 
the idea of tying our politics to the name of a long dead thinker. 

H.3.1 Do Anarchists and Marxists want the same thing?

Ultimately, the greatest myth of Marxism is the idea that 
anarchists and most Marxists want the same thing. Indeed, 
it could be argued that it is anarchist criticism of Marxism 
which has made them stress the similarity of long term goals 
with anarchism.  "Our polemics against them [the Marxists],"
Bakunin argued, "have forced them to recognise that freedom, 
or anarchy -- that is, the voluntary organisation of the 
workers from below upward -- is the ultimate goal of social 
development." He continued by stressing that the means to 
this apparently similar end were different. The Marxists, he
argues, "say that [a] state yoke, [a] dictatorship, is a 
necessary transitional device for achieving the total 
liberation of the people: anarchy, or freedom, is the goal, 
and the state, or dictatorship, is the means . . . We reply 
that no  dictatorship can have any other objective than to 
perpetuate itself, and that it can engender and nurture 
only slavery in the people who endure it. Liberty can be 
created only by liberty, by an insurrection of all the 
people and the voluntary organisation of the workers from 
below upwards." [_Statism and Anarchy_, p. 179]

As such, it is commonly taken for granted that the ends of
both Marxists and Anarchists are the same, we just disagree
over the means. However, within this general agreement over 
the ultimate end (a classless and stateless society), the 
details of such a society are somewhat different. This, 
perhaps, is to be expected given the differences in means. 
As is obvious from Bakunin's argument, anarchists stress 
the unity of means and goals, that the means which are 
used affect the goal reached. This unity between means 
and ends is expressed well by Martin Buber's observation 
that "[o]ne cannot in the nature of things expect a little 
tree that has been turned into a club to put forth leaves." 
[_Paths in Utopia_, p. 127] In summary, we cannot expect 
to reach our end destination if we take a path going 
in the opposite direction. As such, the agreement on ends
may not be as close as often imagined.

So when it is stated that anarchists and state socialists 
want the same thing, the following should be borne in mind. 
Firstly, there are key differences on the question of current 
tactics. Secondly, there is the question of the immediate 
aims of a revolution. Thirdly, there is the long term goals 
of such a revolution. These three aspects form a coherent 
whole, with each one logically following on from the last. 
As we will show, the anarchist and Marxist vision of each 
aspect are distinctly different, so suggesting that the short, 
medium *and* long term goals of each theory are, in fact, 
different. We will discuss each aspect in turn.

Firstly, the question of the nature of the revolutionary 
movement. Here anarchists and most Marxists have distinctly 
opposing ideas. The former argue that both the revolutionary 
organisation (i.e. an anarchist federation) and the wider 
labour movement should be organised in line with the vision 
of society which inspires us. This means that it should be 
a federation of self-managed groups based on the direct 
participation of its membership in the decision making 
process. Power, therefore, is decentralised and there is 
no division between those who make the decisions and those 
who execute them. We reject the idea of others acting on 
our behalf or on behalf of the people and so urge the use 
of direct action and solidarity, based upon working class 
self-organisation, self-management and autonomy. Thus, 
anarchists apply their ideas in the struggle against the 
current system, arguing what is "efficient" from a 
hierarchical or class position is deeply inefficient from 
a revolutionary perspective.

Marxists disagree. Most Marxists are also Leninists. They 
argue that we must form "vanguard" parties based on the 
principles of "democratic centralism" complete with 
institutionalised leaderships. They argue that how we 
organise today is independent of the kind of society we 
seek and that the party should aim to become the 
recognised leadership of the working class. Every thing
they do is subordinated to this end, meaning that no  
struggle is seen as an end in itself but rather as a 
means to gaining membership and influence for the party
until such time as it gather enough support to seize power.
As this is a key point of contention between anarchists 
and Leninists, we discuss this in some detail in section 
H.8 and its related sections and so not do so here. 

Obviously, in the short term anarchists and Leninists 
cannot be said to want the same thing. While we seek 
a revolutionary movement based on libertarian (i.e. 
revolutionary) principles, the Leninists seek a party 
based on distinctly bourgeois principles of centralisation, 
delegation of power and representative over direct democracy. 
Both, of course, argue that only their system of organisation 
is effective and efficient (see section H.5.8 on a discussion 
why anarchists argue that the Leninist model is not effective 
from a revolutionary perspective). The anarchist perspective 
is to see the revolutionary organisation as part of the 
working class, encouraging and helping those in struggle to 
clarify the ideas they draw from their own experiences and 
its role is to provide a lead rather than a new set of leaders 
to be followed (see section J.3.6 for more on this). The 
Leninist perspective is to see the revolutionary party as 
the leadership of the working class, introducing socialist 
consciousness into a class which cannot generate itself 
(see section H.5.1).

Given the Leninist preference for centralisation and a leadership 
role by hierarchical organisation, it will come as no surprise 
that their ideas on the nature of post-revolutionary society are 
distinctly different from anarchists. While there is a tendency
for Leninists to deny that anarchists have a clear idea of what
will immediately be created by a revolution (see section H.1.4),
we do have concrete ideas on the kind of society a revolution 
will immediately create. This vision is in almost every way 
different from that proposed by most Marxists. 

Firstly, there is the question of the state. Anarchists, 
unsurprisingly enough, seek to destroy it. Simply put, while 
anarchists want a stateless and classless society and advocate 
the means appropriate to those ends, most Marxists argue that 
in order to reach a stateless society we need a new "workers'"
state, a state, moreover, in which their party will be in 
charge. Trotsky, writing in 1906, made this clear when he
argued that "[e]very political party deserving of the name 
aims at seizing governmental power and thus putting the state 
at the service of the class whose interests it represents." 
[quoted by Israel Getzler, "Marxist Revolutionaries and the 
Dilemma of Power", pp. 88-112, _Revolution and Politics in
Russia_, Alexander and Janet Rabinowitch and Ladis K.D. 
Kristof (eds,), p. 105] This fits in with Marx's 1852 
comments that "Universal Suffrage is the equivalent of 
political power for the working class of England, where 
the proletariat forms the large majority of the population 
. . . Its inevitable result, here, is *the political 
supremacy of the working class.*" [_Collected Works_, 
vol. 11, pp. 335-6] In other words, "political power" 
simply means the ability to nominate a government. Thus 
Engels:

"In every struggle of class against class, the next end
fought for is political power; the ruling class defends
its political supremacy, that is to say its safe majority
in the Legislature; the inferior class fights for, first
a share, then the whole of that power, in order to become
enabled to change existing laws in conformity with their
own interests and requirements. Thus the working class of
Great Britain for years fought ardently and even violently 
for the People's Charter [which demanded universal suffrage
and yearly general elections], which was to give it that 
political power." [_Collected Works_, vol. 24, p. 386]

While Marxists like to portray this new government as "the 
dictatorship of the proletariat," anarchist argue that, 
in fact, it will be the dictatorship *over* the proletariat. 
This is because if the working class *is* the ruling class 
(as Marxists claim) then, anarchists argue, how can they 
delegate their power to a government and remain so? Either 
the working class directly manages its own affairs (and so 
society) or the government does. We discuss this issue in 
section H.3.7 any state is simply rule by a few and so 
is incompatible with socialism. The obvious implication of 
this is that Marxism seeks party rule, not working class 
direct management of society (as we discuss in section
H.3.8, the Leninist tradition is extremely clear on this 
matter). 
Then there is the question of the building blocks of 
socialism. Yet again, there is a clear difference between 
anarchism and Marxism. Anarchists have always argued that 
the basis of socialism is working class organisations,
created in the struggle against capitalism and the state
(see section H.1.4 for details). This applies to both
the social and economic structure of a post-revolutionary
society. For most forms of Marxism, a radically different
picture has been the dominant one. As we discuss in section 
H.3.10, Marxists only reached a similar vision for the
political structure of socialism in 1917 when Lenin 
supported the soviets as he framework of his workers' state.
However, as we prove in section H.3.11, he did so for 
instrumental purposes only, namely as the best means of 
assuring Bolshevik power. If the soviets clashed with the
party, it was the latter which took precedence. Unsurprisingly,
the Bolshevik mainstream moved from "All Power to the Soviets"
to "dictatorship of the party" rather quickly. Thus, unlike
anarchism, most forms of Marxism aim for party power, a
"revolutionary" government above the organs of working class 
self-management.

Economically, there are also clear differences. Anarchists have 
consistently argued that the workers "ought to be the real 
managers of industries." [Peter Kropotkin, _Fields, Factories 
and Workshops Tomorrow_, p. 157] To achieve this, we have 
pointed to various organisations over time, such as factory
committees and labour unions as the "medium which Socialist
forms of life could find . . . realisation." Thus they would 
"not only [be] an instrument for the improvement of the 
conditions of labour, but also of [were capable of] becoming 
an organisation which might . . . take into its hands the 
management of production." [Kropotkin, _The Conquest of 
Bread_, pp. 22-3]

As we discuss in more detail in section H.3.12, Lenin, in 
contrast, saw socialism as being constructed on the basis 
of structures and techniques (including management ones) 
developed under capitalism. Rather than see socialism as 
being built around new, working class organisations, Lenin 
saw it being constructed on the basis of developments in 
capitalist organisation. "The Leninist road to socialism,"
notes one expert on Lenin, "emphatically ran through the 
terrain of monopoly capitalism. It would, according to Lenin, 
abolish neither its advanced technological base nor its 
institutionalised means for allocating resources or 
structuring industry. . . The institutionalised framework 
of advanced capitalism could, to put it shortly, be utilised
for realisation of specifically socialist goals. They were 
to become, indeed, the principal (almost exclusive) 
instruments of socialist transformation." [Neil Harding,
_Leninism_, p.145] As Lenin explained, socialism is 
"nothing but the next step forward from state capitalist 
monopoly. In other words, Socialism is nothing but state 
capitalist monopoly *made to benefit the whole people*; by 
this token it *ceases* to be capitalist monopoly." [_The 
Threatening Catastrophe and how to avoid it_, p. 37]

The role of workers' in this vision was basically unchanged. 
Rather than demand, like anarchists, workers' self-management 
of production in 1917, Lenin raised the demand for "universal, 
all-embracing workers' control over the capitalists." [_Will 
the Bolsheviks Maintain Power_, p. 52] Once the Bolsheviks
were in power, the workers' own organs (the factory committees) 
were integrated into a system of state control, losing whatever 
power they once held at the point of production. Lenin then 
modified this vision by raising "one-man management" over the 
workers (see section H.3.14). In other words, a form of *state* 
capitalism in which workers would still be wage slaves under 
bosses appointed by the state. Unsurprisingly, the "control" 
workers exercised over their bosses (i.e. those with *real* 
power in production) proved to be as elusive in production 
as it was in the state. In this, Lenin undoubtedly followed 
the lead of the _Communist Manifesto_ which stressed state 
ownership of the means of production without a word about 
workers' self-management of production. As we discuss in 
section H.3.13, state "socialism" cannot help being "state 
capitalism" by its very nature.

Needless to say, as far as means go, few anarchists and
syndicalists are complete pacifists. As syndicalist Emile 
Pouget argued, "[h]istory teaches that the privileged have 
never surrendered their privileges without having been compelled 
so to do and forced into it by their rebellious victims. It 
is unlikely that the bourgeoisie is blessed with an exceptional 
greatness of soul and will abdicate voluntarily." This meant
that "[r]ecourse to force . . . will be required." [_The Party 
Of Labour_] This does not mean that libertarians glorify
violence or argue that all forms of violence are acceptable
(quite the reverse!), it simply means that for self-defence
against violent opponents violence is, unfortunately, sometimes
required.

The way an anarchist revolution would defend itself also shows
a key difference between anarchism and Marxism. As we discussed
in section H.2.1, anarchists (regardless of Marxist claims) have
always argued that a revolution needs to defend itself. This
would be organised in a federal, bottom-up way as the social
structure of a free society. It would be based on voluntary 
working class militias. As Bakunin put it, "the peasants, like 
the industrial city workers, should unite by federating the 
fighting battalions, district by district, this assuring a 
common co-ordinated defence against internal and external 
enemies." [_Bakunin on Anarchism_, p. 190] This model of working 
class self-defence was applied successfully in both the Spanish 
and Ukrainian revolutions (by the CNT-FAI and the Makhnovists, 
respectively). In contrast, the Bolshevik method of defending a 
revolution was the top-down, hierarchical and centralised "Red 
Army" (see section H.6.14 for details). As the example of the 
Makhnovists (see section H.11) showed, the "Red Army" was not 
the only way the Russian Revolution could have been defended
although it was the only way Bolshevik power could be.

So while Anarchists have consistently argued that socialism 
must be based on working class self-management of production
and society based on working class organisations, the Leninist 
tradition has not supported this vision (although it has 
appropriated some of its imagery to gain popular support). 
Clearly, in terms of the immediate aftermath of a revolution, 
anarchists and Leninists do not seek the same thing. The former 
want a free society organised and run from below-upwards by the
working class based on workers self-management of production
while the latter seek party power in a new state structure 
which would preside over an essentially state capitalist 
economy.

Lastly, there is the question of the long term goal. Even 
in this vision of a classless and stateless society there 
is very little in common between anarchist communism and 
Marxist communism, beyond the similar terminology used to 
describe it. This is blurred by the differences in terminology 
used by both theories. Marx and Engels had raised in the 1840s 
the (long term) goal of "an association, in which the free 
development of each is the condition for the free development 
of all" replacing "the old bourgeois society, with its classes 
and class antagonisms," in the _Communist Manifesto_. Before 
this "vast association of the whole nation" was possible, the 
proletariat would be "raise[d] . . . to the position of ruling 
class" and "all capital" would be "centralise[d] . . . in the 
hands of the State, i.e. of the proletariat organised as the 
ruling class." As economic classes would no longer exist, 
"the public power would lose its political character" as 
political power "is merely the organised power of one class 
for oppressing another." [_Manifesto of the Communist Party_, 
p. 53] 

It was this, the means to the end, which was the focus of much 
debate (see section H.1.1 for details). However, it cannot be
assumed that the ends desired by Marxists and anarchists are 
identical. The argument that the "public power" could stop being
"political" (i.e. a state) is a tautology, and a particularly 
unconvincing one at that. After all, if "political power" is 
defined as being an instrument of class rule it automatically 
follows that a classless society would have a non-political 
"public power" and so be without a state! This does not imply 
that a "public power" would no longer exist as a structure 
within (or, more correctly, over) society, it just implies 
that its role would no longer be "political" (i.e. an 
instrument of class rule). Given that, according to the
Manifesto, the state would centralise the means of production,
credit and transportation and then organise it "in accordance
with a common plan" using "industrial armies, especially for
agriculture" this would suggest that the state structure 
would remain even after its "political" aspects had, to use
Engels term, "withered away." [Marx and Engels, Op. Cit., 
pp. 52-3]

From this perspective, the difference between anarchist
communism and Marxist-communism is clear. "While both,"
notes John Clark, "foresee the disappearance of the state, 
the achievement of social management of the economy, the 
end of class rule, and the attainment of human equality, 
to mention a few common goals, significant differences 
in ends still remain. Marxist thought has inherited a
vision which looks to high development of technology 
with a corresponding degree of centralisation of social
institutions which will continue even after the coming 
of the social revolution. . . . The anarchist vision sees
the human scale as essential, both in the techniques which
are used for production, and for the institutions which
arise from the new modes of association . . . In addition,
the anarchist ideal has a strong hedonistic element which
has seen Germanic socialism as ascetic and Puritanical."
[_The Anarchist Moment_, p. 68] 

Moreover, it is unlikely that such a centralised system
could become stateless and classless in actuality. As 
Bakunin argued, in the Marxist state "there will be no 
privileged class. Everybody will be equal, not only from 
the judicial and political but also from the economic 
standpoint. This is the promise at any rate . . . So there 
will be no more class, but a government, and, please note, 
an extremely complicated government which, not content 
with governing and administering the masses politically 
. . . will also administer them economically, by taking 
over the production and *fair* sharing of wealth, 
agriculture, the establishment and development of factories, 
the organisation and control of trade, and lastly the 
injection of capital into production by a single banker, 
the State." Such a system would be, in fact, "the reign 
of the *scientific mind,* the most aristocratic, despotic, 
arrogant and contemptuous of all regimes" base on "a new 
class, a new hierarchy of real or bogus learning, and
the world will be divided into a dominant, science-based
minority and a vast, ignorant majority." [_Michael Bakunin:
Selected Writings_, p. 266] 

George Barrett's words also seem appropriate:

"The modern Socialist . . . have steadily worked for 
centralisation, and complete and perfect organisation 
and control by those in authority above the people. The 
anarchist, on the other hand, believes in the abolition 
of that central power, and expects the free society to 
grow into existence from below, starting with those 
organisations and free agreements among the people
themselves. It is difficult to see how, by making a 
central power control everything, we can be making a 
step towards the abolition of that power." [_Objections 
to Anarchism_]

As Brain Morris notes, "Bakunin's fears that under Marx's 
kind of socialism the workers would continue to labour 
under a regimented, mechanised, hierarchical system of 
production, without direct control over their labour, has 
been more than confirmed by the realities of the Bolshevik 
system. Thus, Bakunin's critique of Marxism has taken on an 
increasing relevance in the age of bureaucratic State 
capitalism." [_Bakunin: The Philosophy of Freedom_, p. 132]

Therefore, anarchists are not convinced that a highly 
centralised structure (as a state is) managing the 
economic life of society can be part of a truly classless 
society. While economic class as defined in terms of 
property may not exist, social classes (defined in 
terms of inequality of power and wealth) will continue 
simply because the state is designed to create and 
protect minority rule (see section H.3.7). As Bolshevik 
and Stalinist Russia showed, nationalising the means of 
production does not end class society. As Malatesta argued:

"When F. Engels, perhaps to counter anarchist criticisms, 
said that once classes disappear the State as such has no 
*raison d'etre* and transforms itself from a government of 
men into an administration of thing, he was merely playing 
with words. Whoever has power over things has power over men; 
whoever governs production also governs the producers; who 
determines consumption is master over the consumer.

"This is the question; either things are administered on the 
basis of free agreement of the interested parties, and this 
is anarchy; or they are administered according to laws made 
by administrators and this is government, it is the State, 
and inevitably it turns out to be tyrannical.

"It is not a question of the good intentions or the good will 
of this or that man, but of the inevitability of the situation, 
and of the tendencies which man generally develops in given circumstances." [_Life and Ideas_, p. 145]

The anarchist vision of the future society, therefore, does not 
exactly match the state communist vision, as much as the latter 
would like to suggest it does. The difference between the two is 
authority, which cannot be anything but the largest difference
possible. Anarchist economic and organisational theories are 
built around an anti-authoritarian core and this informs both 
our means and aims. For anarchists, the Leninist vision of 
socialism is unattractive. Lenin continually stressed that his 
conception of socialism and "state capitalism" were basically 
identical. Even in _State and Revolution_, allegedly Lenin's 
most libertarian work, we discover this particularly unvisionary 
and uninspiring vision of "socialism":

"*All* citizens are transformed into the salaried employees of
the state . . . *All* citizens become employees and workers of
a *single* national state 'syndicate' . . .  The whole of 
society will have become a single office and a single factory 
with equality of work and equality of pay." [_Essential Works 
of Lenin_, p. 348]

To which, anarchists point to Engels and his comments on the
tyrannical and authoritarian character of the modern factory
(as we discuss in section H.4.4). Engels, let us not forget,
had argued against the anarchists that large-scale industry 
(or, indeed, any form of organisation) meant that "authority" 
was required (organisation meant that "the will of a single 
individual will always have to subordinate itself, which means 
that questions are settled in an authoritarian way."). He (like
the factory owner he was) stated that factories should have 
"Lasciate ogni autonomia, voi che entrate" ("Leave, ye that 
enter in, all autonomy behind") written above their doors. 
This obedience, Engels argued, was necessary even under 
socialism, as applying the "forces of nature" meant "a 
veritable despotism independent of all social organisation." 
This meant that "[w]anting to abolish authority in large-scale 
industry is tantamount to wanting to abolish industry itself." 
[_Marx-Engels Reader_, p. 731] Clearly, Lenin's idea of turning 
the world into one big factory takes on an extremely frightening
nature given Engels lovely vision of the lack of freedom in 
industry. 

For these reasons anarchists reject the simplistic Marxist
analysis of inequality being rooted simply in economic class. 
Such an analysis, as the comments of Lenin and Engels prove, 
show that social inequality can be smuggled in by the backdoor 
of a proposed classless and stateless society. Thus Bookchin:

"Basic to anti-authoritarian Socialism ---specifically, 
to Anarchist Communism -- is the notion that hierarchy and
domination cannot be subsumed by class rule and economic
exploitation, indeed, that they are more fundamental to
an understanding of the modern revolutionary project.
Before 'man' began to exploit 'man,' he began to dominate
woman . . . Power of human over human long antedates *the
very formation of classes and economic modes of social
oppression.* . . . This much is clear: it will no longer
do to insist that a classless society, freed from material
exploitation, will necessarily be a liberated society.
There is nothing in the social future to suggest that
bureaucracy is incompatible with a classless society,
the domination of women, the young, ethnic groups or
even professional strata." [_Toward an Ecological 
Society_, pp. 208-9]

Ultimately, anarchists see that "there is a realm of domination 
that is broader than the realm of material exploitation. The 
tragedy of the socialist movement is that, steeped in the past, 
it uses the methods of domination to try to 'liberate' us from 
material exploitation." Needless to say, this is doomed to 
failure. Socialism "will simply mire us in a world we are 
trying to overcome. A non-hierarchical society, self-managed 
and free of domination in all its forms, stands on the agenda 
today, not a hierarchical system draped in a red flag." [Murray
Bookchin, Op. Cit., p. 272 and pp. 273-4]

In summary, it cannot be said that anarchists and most Marxists 
want the same thing. While they often use the same terms, these 
terms often hide radically different concepts. Just because, say, 
anarchists and mainstream Marxists talk about "social revolution," 
"socialism," "all power to the soviets" and so on, it does not 
mean that we mean the same thing by them. For example, the phrase 
"all power to the soviets" for anarchists means exactly that (i.e. 
that the revolution must be directly managed by working class 
organs). Leninists mean "all power to a central government 
elected by a national soviet congress." Similarly with other 
similar phrases (which shows the importance of looking at the 
details of any political theory and its history). 

We have shown that discussion over ends is as important 
as discussion over means as they are related. As Kropotkin 
once pointed out, those who downplay the importance of 
discussing the "order of things which . . . should emerge 
from the coming revolution" in favour of concentrating on 
"practical things" are being less than honest as "far from 
making light of such theories, they propagate them, and all 
that they do now is a logical extension of their ideas. In 
the end those words 'Let us not discuss theoretical questions' 
really mean: 'Do not subject our theory to discussion, but 
help us to put it into execution.'" [_Words of a Rebel_, 
p. 200]

Hence the need to critically evaluate both ends and means.
This shows the weakness of the common argument that anarchists
and Leftists share some common visions and so we should work 
with them to achieve those common things. Who knows what 
happens after that? As can be seen, this is not the case. 
Many aspects of anarchism and Marxism are in opposition and 
cannot be considered similar (for example, what a Leninist 
considers as socialism is extremely different to what an 
anarchist thinks it is). If you consider "socialism" as
being a "workers' state" presided over by a "revolutionary"
government, then how can this be reconciled with the 
anarchist vision of a federation of self-managed communes
and workers' associations? As the Russian Revolution shows,
only by the armed might of the "revolutionary" government 
crushing the anarchist vision.

The only thing we truly share with these groups is a mutual 
opposition to existing capitalism. Having a common enemy does
not make someone friends. Hence anarchists, while willing 
to work on certain mutual struggles, are well aware there is 
substantial differences in both terms of means and goals. The
lessons of revolution in the 20th Century is that once in power,
Leninists will repress anarchists, their current allies against
the capitalist system. This is does not occur by accident, it 
flows from the differences in vision between the two movements,
both in terms of means and goals.

H.3.2 Is Marxism "socialism from below"?

Some Marxists, such as the _International Socialist Tendency_,
like to portray their tradition as being "socialism from 
below." Under "socialism from below," they place the ideas
of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Trotsky, arguing that they and
they alone have continued this, the true, ideal of socialism
(Hal Draper's essay "The Two Souls of Socialism" seems to have
been the first to argue along these lines). They contrast this 
idea of "democratic" socialism "from below" with "socialism 
from above," in which they place reformist socialism (social 
democracy, Labourism, etc.), elitist socialism (Lassalle and 
others who wanted educated and liberal members of the middle 
classes to liberate the working class) and Stalinism 
(bureaucratic dictatorship over the working class). 

For those who uphold this idea, "Socialism from below" is simply 
the self-emancipation of the working class by its own efforts. 
To anarchist ears, the claim that Marxism (and in particular
Leninism) is socialism "from below" sounds paradoxical, indeed
laughable. This is because anarchists from Proudhon onwards 
have used the imagery of socialism being created and run from 
below upwards. They have been doing so for far longer than 
Marxists have. As such, "socialism from below" simply sums 
up the *anarchist* ideal! 

Thus we find Proudhon in 1848 talking about being a 
"revolutionary *from below*" and that every "serious and 
lasting Revolution" was "made *from below,* by the people." 
A "Revolution *from above*" was "pure governmentalism," 
"the negation of collective activity, of popular 
spontaneity" and is "the oppression of the wills of 
those below." [quoted by George Woodcock, _Pierre-Joseph 
Proudhon_, p. 143] For Proudhon, the means of this revolution
"from below" would be working class associations for both 
credit (mutual banks) and production (workers' associations
or co-operatives). The workers, "organised among themselves,
without the assistance of the capitalist" would march by
"Work to the conquest of the world" by the "force of 
principle." Thus capitalism would be reformed away by 
the actions of the workers themselves. The "problem of
association," Proudhon argues, "consists in organising
 . . . the *producers,* and by this subjecting capital 
subordinating power. Such is the war of liberty against
authority, a war of the producer against the non-producer;
a war of equality against privilege . . . An agricultural
and industrial combination must be found by means of 
which power, today the ruler of society, shall become its
slave." [quoted by K. Steven Vincent, _Pierre-Joseph Proudhon
and the Rise of French Republican Socialism_, p. 148 and 
p. 157]

Similarly, Bakunin saw an anarchist revolution as coming 
"from below." As he put it, "liberty can be created only by 
liberty, by an insurrection of all the people and the voluntary 
organisation of the workers from below upward." [_Statism
and Anarchy_, p. 179] Elsewhere he writes that "popular
revolution" would "create its own organisation from the 
bottom upwards and from the circumference inwards, in 
accordance with the principle of liberty, and not from 
the top downwards and from the centre outwards, as in the
way of authority." [_Michael Bakunin: Selected Writings_,
p. 170] His vision of revolution and revolutionary 
self-organisation and construction from below was a 
core aspect of his anarchist ideas, arguing repeatedly
for "the free organisation of the people's lives in 
accordance with their needs -- not from the top down, 
as we have it in the State, but from the bottom up,
an organisation formed by the people themselves . . . a
free union of associations of agricultural and factory 
workers, of communes, regions, and nations." He stressed
that "the politics of the Social Revolution" was "the
abolition of the State" and "the economic, altogether free
organisation of the people, an organisation from below
upward, by means of federation." [_The Political Philosophy
of Bakunin_, pp. 297-8]

While Proudhon wanted to revolutionise society, he rejected 
revolutionary means to do so (i.e. collective struggle, 
strikes, insurrection, etc.). Bakunin, however, was a 
revolutionary in this, the popular, sense of the word. Yet 
he shared with Proudhon the idea of socialism being created 
by the working class itself. As he put it, in "a social 
revolution, which in everything is diametrically opposed 
to a political revolution, the actions of individuals 
hardly count at all, whereas the spontaneous action of 
the masses is everything. All that individuals can do is 
clarify, propagate and work out the ideas corresponding 
to the popular instinct, and, what is more, to contribute 
their incessant efforts to revolutionary organisation of 
the natural power of the masses -- but nothing else beyond 
that; the rest can and should be done by the people themselves 
. . . revolution can be waged and brought to its full 
development only through the spontaneous and continued 
mass action of groups and associations of the people." 
[Op. Cit., pp. 298-9]

Therefore, the idea of "socialism from below" is a distinctly
anarchist notion, one found in the works of Proudhon and
Bakunin and repeated by anarchists ever since. As such, to
hear Marxists appropriate this obviously anarchist terminology
and imagery appears to many anarchists as opportunistic and 
attempt to cover the authoritarian reality of mainstream Marxism 
with anarchist rhetoric. However, there are "libertarian" 
strains of Marxism which are close to anarchism. Does this mean 
that there are no elements of a "socialism from below" to be 
found in Marx and Engels? 

If we look at Marx, we get contradictory impressions. On the one 
hand, he argued that freedom "consists in converting the state 
from an organ superimposed upon society into one completely 
subordinate to it." Combine this with his comments on the Paris 
Commune (see his "The Civil War in France"), we can say that 
there are clearly elements of "socialism from below" in Marx's 
work. On the other hand, he often stresses the need for strict 
centralisation of power. In 1850, for example, he argued that 
the workers must "not only strive for a single and indivisible 
German republic, but also within this republic for the most 
determined centralisation of power in the hands of the state 
authority." This was because "the path of revolutionary 
activity" can "proceed only from the centre." This meant that 
the workers must be opposed to the "federative republic" 
planned by the democrats and "must not allow themselves to be 
misguided by the democratic talk of freedom for the 
communities, of self-government, etc." This centralisation 
of power was essential to overcome local autonomy, which 
would allow "every village, every town and every province" 
to put "a new obstacle in the path" the revolution due to 
"local and provincial obstinacy." Decades later, Marx 
dismisses Bakunin's vision of "the free organisation of the 
worker masses from bottom to top" as "nonsense." [_Marx-Engels 
Reader_, p. 537, p. 509 and p. 547]

Thus we have a contradiction. While arguing that the state 
must become subordinate to society, we have a central power
imposing its will on "local and provincial obstinacy." This 
implies a vision of revolution in which the centre (indeed, 
"the state authority") forces its will on the population, 
which (by necessity) means that the centre power is 
"superimposed upon society" rather than "subordinate" 
to it. Given his dismissal of the idea of organisation from
bottom to top, we cannot argue that by this he meant simply
the co-ordination of local initiatives. Rather, we are struck
by the "top-down" picture of revolution Marx presents. Indeed,
his argument from 1850 suggests that Marx favoured centralism
not only in order to prevent the masses from creating obstacles
to the revolutionary activity of the "centre," but also to
prevent them from interfering with their own liberation.

Looking at Engels, we discover him writing that "[a]s soon 
as our Party is in possession of political power it has 
simply to expropriate the big landed proprietors just like the 
manufacturers in industry . . . thus restored to the community 
[they] are to be turned over by us to the rural workers who
are already cultivating them and are to be organised into
co-operatives." He even states that this expropriation may
"be compensated," depending on "the circumstances which we
obtain power, and particularly by the attitude adopted by 
these gentry." [_Marx-Engels Selected Writings_, pp. 638-9] 
Thus we have the party taking power, then expropriating the 
means of life *for the workers* and, lastly, "turning over" 
these to them. While this fits into the general scheme of 
the _Communist Manifesto_, it cannot be said to be "socialism 
from below" which can only signify the direct expropriation 
of the means of production by the workers themselves, 
organising themselves into free producer associations 
to do so. 

This vision of revolution as the party coming to power can
be seen from Engels' warning that the "worse thing that can
befall the leader of an extreme party is to be compelled to
assume power at a time when the movement is not yet ripe 
for the domination of the class he represents and for the 
measures this domination implies." [_Collected Works_, 
vol. 10, p. 469] Needless to say, such a vision is hard to 
equate with "socialism from below" which implies the active 
participation of the working class in the direct management 
of society from the bottom-up. If the leaders "assume power"
then *they* have the real power, not the class they claim 
to "represent." Equally, it seems strange that socialism can
be equated with a vision which equates "domination" of a 
class being achieved by the fact a leader "represents" it.
Can the working class really be said to be the ruling class
if its role in society is to select those who exercise power
on its behalf (i.e. to select representatives)? Bakunin quite
rightly answered in the negative. While representative 
democracy may be acceptable to ensure bourgeois rule, it 
cannot be assumed that it be utilised to create a socialist 
society. It was designed to defend class society and its 
centralised and top-down nature reflects this role. 

Moreover, Marx and Engels had argued in _The Holy Family_ 
that the "question is not what this or that proletarian, 
or even the whole of the proletariat at the moment *considers*
as its aim. The question is *what the proletariat is*, and 
what, consequent on that *being*, it will be compelled to do." 
[quoted by Murray Bookchin, _The Spanish Anarchists_, p. 280] 
As Murray Bookchin argues:

"These lines and others like them in Marx's writings were
to provide the rationale for asserting the authority of
Marxist parties and their armed detachments over and
even against the proletariat. Claiming a deeper and
more informed comprehension of the situation then
'even the whole of the proletariat at the given moment,'
Marxist parties went on to dissolve such revolutionary
forms of proletarian organisation as factory committees
and ultimately to totally regiment the proletariat 
according to lines established by the party leadership."
[Op. Cit., p. 289]

Thus the ideological underpinning of a "socialism from
above" is expounded, one which dismisses what the members 
of the working class actually want or desire at a given
point (a position which Trotsky, for one, explicitly 
argued). A few years later, they argued in _The Communist 
Manifesto_ that "a portion of the bourgeois goes over to 
the proletariat, and in particular, a portion of the 
bourgeois ideologists, who have raised themselves to
the level of comprehending theoretically the historical
movement as a whole." They also noted that the Communists
are "the most advanced and resolute section of the 
working-class parties . . . [and] they have over the
great mass of the proletariat the advantage of clearly
understanding the line of march, the conditions, and the 
general results of the proletarian movement." [_Selected 
Works_, p. 44 and p. 46] This gives a privileged place to 
the party (particularly the "bourgeois ideologists" who
join it), a privileged place which their followers had no
problem abusing in favour of party power and hierarchical 
leadership from above. As we discuss in section H.5, 
Lenin was just expressing orthodox Social-Democratic (i.e. 
Marxist) policy when he argued that socialist consciousness 
was created by bourgeois intellectuals and introduced into 
the working class from outside. Against this, we have to 
note that the Manifesto states that the proletarian movement 
was "the self-conscious, independent movement of the immense 
majority, in the interests of the immense majority" 
(although, as discussed in section H.1.1, when they wrote
this the proletariat was a *minority* in all countries bar
Britain). [Op. Cit., p. 45] 

Looking at the tactics advocated by Marx and Engels, we 
see a strong support for "political action" in the sense
of participating in elections. This support undoubtedly 
flows from Engel's comments that universal suffrage "in
an England two-thirds of whose inhabitants are industrial
proletarians means the exclusive political rule of the
working class with all the revolutionary changes in social
conditions which are inseparable from it." [_Collected 
Works_, vol. 10, p. 298 Marx argued along identical lines. 
[Op. Cit., vol. 11, pp. 335-6] However, how could an entire 
class, the proletariat organised as a "movement" exercise 
its power under such a system? While the atomised voting 
to nominate representatives (who, in reality, held the 
real power in society) may be more than adequate to 
ensure bourgeois, i.e. minority, power, could it be used 
for proletarian, i.e. majority, power?

This is because such institutions are designed to place 
policy-making in the  hands of representatives and do not 
(indeed, cannot) constitute a "proletariat organised as a 
ruling class." If public policy, as distinguished from 
administrative activities, is not made by the people 
themselves, in federations of self-managed assemblies, 
then a movement of the vast majority in the precise sense 
of the term cannot exist. For people to acquire real power 
over their lives and society, they must establish 
institutions organised and run, as Bakunin constantly 
stressed, from below. This would necessitate that they 
themselves directly manage their own affairs, communities 
and workplaces and, for co-ordination, mandate federal 
assemblies of revocable and strictly controllable delegates, 
who will execute their decisions. Only in this sense can a 
majority class, especially one committed to the abolition 
of all classes, organise as a class to manage society.

As such, Marx and Engels tactics are at odds with any idea of
"socialism from below." While, correctly, supporting strikes
and other forms of working class direct action (although,
significantly, Engels dismissed the general strike) they 
placed that support within a general political strategy which 
emphasised electioneering and representative forms. This,
however, is a form of struggle which can only really be
carried out by means of leaders. The role of the masses 
is minor, that of voters. The focus of the struggle is at
the top, in parliament, where the duly elected leaders are.
As Luigi Galleani argued, this form of action involved the
"ceding of power by all to someone, the delegate, the 
representative, individual or group." This meant that 
rather than the anarchist tactic of "direct pressure 
put against the ruling classes by the masses," the Socialist
Party "substituted representation and the rigid discipline 
of the parliamentary socialists," the inevitably resulted
in it "adopt[ing] class collaboration in the legislative
arena, without which all reforms would remain a vain hope."
It also resulted in the socialists needing "authoritarian
organisations", i.e. ones which are centralised and disciplined 
from above down. [_The End of Anarchism?_, p. 14, p. 12 and
p. 14] The end result was the encouragement of a viewpoint
that reforms (indeed, the revolution) would be the work of
leaders acting on behalf of the masses whose role would be
that of voters and followers, not active participants in the
struggle (see section J.2 for a discussion on direct action
and why anarchists reject electioneering). 

By the 1890s, the top-down and essentially reformist nature
of these tactics had made their mark in both Engels politics
and the practical activities of the Social-Democratic parties.
Engels "introduction" to Marx's _The Class Struggles in France_
indicated how far Marxism had progressed. Engels, undoubtedly
influenced by the rise of Social-Democracy as an electoral
power, stressed the use of the ballot box as the ideal way, 
if not the only way, for the party to take power. He notes
that "[w]e, the 'revolutionists', the 'overthrowers'" were
"thriving far better on legal methods than on illegal methods
and overthrow" and the bourgeoisie "cry despairingly . . .
legality is the death of us" and were "much more afraid of
the legal than of the illegal action of the workers' party,
of the results of elections than of those of rebellion." He 
argued that it was essential "not to fitter away this daily 
increasing shock force [of party voters] in vanguard skirmishes, 
but to keep it intact until the decisive day." [_Selected 
Writings_, p. 656, p. 650 and p. 655] 

The net effect of this would simply be keeping the class 
struggle within the bounds decided upon by the party leaders, 
so placing the emphasis on the activities and decisions of 
those at the top rather than the struggle and decisions of 
the mass of working class people themselves. As we noted in 
section H.1.1, when the party was racked by the "revisionism" 
controversy after Engels death, it was fundamentally a 
conflict between those who wanted the party's rhetoric to 
reflect its reformist tactics and those who sought the 
illusion of radical words to cover the reformist practice. 
The decision of the Party to support their state in the
First World War simply proved that radical words cannot 
defeat reformist tactics. 

Needless to say, from this contradictory inheritance, Marxists
had two ways of proceeding. Either they become explicitly 
anti-state (and so approach anarchism) or become explicitly
in favour of party and state power and so, by necessity, 
"revolution from above." The council communists and other 
libertarian Marxists followed the first path, the Bolsheviks 
and their followers the second. As we discuss in the next
section, Lenin explicitly dismissed the idea that Marxism 
proceeded "only from below," stating that this was an 
anarchist principle. Nor was he shy in equating party power
with working class power. Indeed, this vision of socialism 
as involving party power was not alien to the mainstream 
social-democracy Leninism split from. The leading left-wing 
Menshevik Martov argued as follows:

"In a class struggle which has entered the phase of civil war,
there are bound to be times when the advance guard of the
revolutionary class, representing the interests of the broad
masses but ahead of them in political consciousness, is 
obliged to exercise state power by means of a dictatorship
of the revolutionary minority. Only a short-sighted and
doctrinaire viewpoint would reject this prospect as such. 
The real question at stake is whether this dictatorship, which
is unavoidable at a certain stage of any revolution, is 
exercised in such a way as to consolidate itself and create
a system of institutions enabling it to become a permanent
feature, or whether, on the contrary, it is replaced as soon
as possible by the organised initiative and autonomy of the
revolutionary class or classes as a whole. The second of 
these methods is that of the revolutionary Marxists who,
for this reason, style themselves Social Democrats; the
first is that of the Communists." [_The Mensheviks in the
Russian Revolution_, Abraham Ascher (Ed.), p. 119]

All this is to be expected, given the weakness of the Marxist
theory of the state. As we discuss in section H.3.7, Marxists
have always had an a-historic perspective on the state, 
considering it as purely an instrument of class rule rather
than what it is, an instrument of *minority* class rule. For 
anarchists, the "State is the minority government, from the 
top downward, of a vast quantity of men."  This automatically 
means that a socialism, like Marx's, which aims for a socialist 
government and a workers' state automatically becomes, against 
the wishes of its best activists, "socialism from above."
As Bakunin argued, Marxists are "worshippers of State power, 
and necessarily also prophets of political and social discipline 
and champions of order established from the top downwards, 
always in the name of universal suffrage and the sovereignty 
of the masses, for whom they save the honour and privilege of 
obeying leaders, elected masters." [_Michael Bakunin: Selected 
Writings_, p. 265 and pp. 237-8]

For this reason anarchists from Bakunin onwards have argued for 
a bottom-up federation of workers' councils as the basis of 
revolution and the means of managing society after capitalism 
and the state have been abolished. If these organs of workers' 
self-management are co-opted into a state structure (as happened 
in Russia) then their power will be handed over to the real power 
in any state -- the government and its bureaucracy. The state 
is the delegation of power -- as such, it means that the idea 
of a "workers' state" expressing "workers' power" is a logical 
impossibility. If workers are running society then power rests 
in their hands. If a state exists then power rests in the hands 
of the handful of people at the top, not in the hands of all. 
The state was designed for minority rule. No state can be an 
organ of working class (i.e. majority) self-management due to 
its basic nature, structure and design.

So, while there are elements of "socialism from below" in the 
works of Marx and Engels they are placed within a distinctly 
centralised and authoritarian context which undermines them. 
As John Clark summarises, "in the context of Marx's consistent 
advocacy of centralist programmes, and the part these programmes 
play in his theory of social development, the attempt to construct 
a *libertarian* Marxism by citing Marx's own proposals for social 
change would seem to present insuperable difficulties." [Op. Cit.,
p. 93]

H.3.3 Is Leninism "socialism from below"?

As discussed in the last section, Marx and Engels left their
followers with an ambiguous legacy. On the one hand, there *are* elements of "socialism from below" in their politics
(most explicitly in Marx's comments on the libertarian 
influenced Paris Commune). On the other, there are distinctly
centralist and statist themes in their work. 

From this legacy, Leninism took the statist themes. Which 
explains why anarchists think the idea of Leninism being 
"socialism from below" is incredible. Simply put, the actual 
comments and actions of Lenin and his followers show that 
they had no commitment to a "socialism from below." As we 
will indicate, Lenin disassociated himself repeatedly from 
the idea of politics "from below," considering it (quite 
rightly) an anarchist idea. In contrast, he stressed the 
importance of a politics which somehow combined action 
"from above" and "from below." For those Leninists who 
maintain that their tradition is "socialism from below" 
(indeed, the only "real" socialism "from below"), this is 
a major problem and, unsurprisingly, they generally fail 
to mention it. 

So what was Lenin's position on "from below"? In 1904, during 
the debate over the party split into Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, 
Lenin stated that the argument "[b]ureaucracy *versus* democracy 
is in fact centralism *versus* autonomism; it is the organisational 
principle of revolutionary Social-Democracy as opposed to the 
organisational principle of opportunist Social-Democracy. The 
latter strives to proceed from the bottom upward, and, therefore, 
wherever possible . . . upholds autonomism and 'democracy,' 
carried (by the overzealous) to the point of anarchism. The 
former strives to proceed from the top downward. . ." [_Collected 
Works_, vol. 7, pp. 396-7] Thus it is the non-Bolshevik 
("opportunist") wing of Marxism which bases itself on the 
"organisational principle" of "from the bottom upward," not 
the Bolshevik tradition (as we note in section H.5.5, Lenin 
also rejected the "primitive democracy" of mass assemblies as 
the basis of the labour and revolutionary movements). Moreover, 
this vision of a party run from the top down was enshrined in 
the Bolshevik ideal of "democratic centralism" (see section H.5). 
How you can have "socialism from below" when your "organisational 
principle" is "from the top downward" is not explained by Leninist 
exponents of "socialism from below."

Lenin repeated this argument in his discussion on the right 
tactics to apply during the near revolution of 1905. He 
mocked the Mensheviks for only wanting "pressure from below" 
which was "pressure by the citizens on the revolutionary 
government." Instead, he argued for "pressure . . . from above 
as well as from below," where "pressure from above" was 
"pressure by the revolutionary government on the citizens." 
He notes that Engels "appreciated the importance of action 
from above" and that he saw the need for "the utilisation of 
the revolutionary governmental power." Lenin summarised his 
position (which he considered as being in line with that of 
orthodox Marxism) by stating that "[l]imitation, in principle, 
of revolutionary action to pressure from below and renunciation
of pressure also from above is *anarchism.*" [Marx, Engels and 
Lenin, _Anarchism and Anarcho-Syndicalism_, pp. 189-90, p. 193,
p. 195 and p. 196] This seems to have been a common Bolshevik 
position at the time, with Stalin stressing in the same year 
that "action only from 'below'" was "an anarchist principle, 
which does, indeed, fundamentally contradict Social-Democratic 
tactics." [_Collected Works_, vol. 1, p. 149]

It is in this context of "above and below" in which we must
place Lenin's comments in 1917 that socialism was "democracy
from below, without a police, without a standing army,
voluntary social duty by a *militia* formed from a universally
armed people." [_Collected Works_, vol. 24, p. 170] Given 
that Lenin had rejected the idea of "only from below" as
an anarchist principle (which it is), we need to bear in
mind that this "democracy from below" was *always* placed 
in the context of a Bolshevik government. Lenin always 
stressed that the *Bolsheviks* would "take over full state 
power," that they "can and must take state power into their 
own hands." His "democracy from below" always meant representative
government, *not* popular power or self-management. The role of 
the working class was that of voters and so the Bolsheviks' first 
task was "to convince the majority of the people that its programme 
and tactics are correct." The second task "that confronted our 
Party was to capture political power." The third task was for 
"the Bolshevik Party" to "*administer* Russia." [_Selected Works_, 
vol. 2, p. 352, p. 328 and p. 589] Thus Bolshevik power was
equated with working class power.

Towards the end of 1917, he stressed this vision of a Bolshevik
run "democracy from below" by arguing that "[a]fter the 1905 
revolution Russia was ruled by 130,000 landowners . . . yet 
they tell us that Russia will not be able to be governed by 
the 240,000 members of the Bolshevik party." He even equated 
rule by the party with rule by the class -- "the power of the 
Bolsheviks -- that is, the power of the proletariat," while 
admitting that the proletariat could not actually govern itself. 
As he put it, "[w]e know that just any labourer or any cook 
would be incapable of taking over immediately the administration 
of the State . . . We demand that the teaching of the business 
of government be conducted by the class-conscious workers and 
soldiers." The "conscious workers must be in control, but they
can attract to the actual work of management the real labouring 
and oppressed masses." Ironically, he calls this system "real 
popular self-administration" and "teaching the people to manage 
their own affairs."  He also indicated that once in power, the 
Bolsheviks "shall be fully and unreservedly for a strong 
government and centralism." [_Will the Bolsheviks Maintain 
Power_, pp. 61-2, p. 66, p. 69 and p. 75] 

Clearly, Lenin's position had not changed. The goal of the 
revolution was simply a Bolshevik government, which, if it 
was to be effective, had to have the real power in society.
Thus, socialism would be implemented from above, by the 
"strong" government of the "conscious workers" who
would be "in control." While, eventually, the "labouring" 
masses would take part in the administration of state 
decisions, the initial role of the workers could be the
same as under capitalism. And, we must note, there is a
difference between making policy and taking part in 
administration (i.e. between the "work of management" 
and management itself), a difference Lenin obscures. 

All of which, perhaps, explains the famous leaflet 
addressed to the workers of Petrograd immediately after 
the October Revolution, informing that "the revolution 
has won." The workers were called upon to "show . . . 
*the greatest firmness and endurance,* in order to 
facilitate the execution of all the aims of the new 
People's Government." They were asked to "cease 
immediately all economic and political strikes, to 
take up your work, and do it in perfect order . . . All 
to your places." It stated that the "best way to support 
the new Government of Soviets in these days" was "by 
doing your job." [cited by John Read, _Ten Days that 
Shook the World_, pp. 341-2] Which smacks far more of
"socialism from above" than "socialism from below"!

The implications of Lenin's position became clearer after the 
Bolsheviks had taken power in 1917. In that situation, it
was not a case of "dealing with the general question of 
principle, whether in the epoch of the democratic revolution
it is *admissible* to pass from pressure from below to
pressure from above." [Lenin, _Collected Works_, vol. 24, 
p. 190] Rather, it was the concrete situation of a 
"revolutionary" government exercising power "from above" 
onto the very class it claimed to represent. Thus we have a 
power over the working class which was quite happy to exercise 
coercion to ensure its position. As Lenin explained to his 
political police, the Cheka, in 1920:

"Without revolutionary coercion directed against the avowed 
enemies of the workers and peasants, it is impossible to
break down the resistance of these exploiters. On the other
hand, revolutionary coercion is bound to be employed towards
the wavering and unstable elements among the masses 
themselves." [_Collected Works_, vol. 42, p. 170]

It could be argued that this position was forced on Lenin
by the problems facing the Bolsheviks in the Civil War, but
such an argument is flawed. This is for two reasons. Firstly,
according to Lenin himself civil war was inevitable and so,
unsurprisingly, Lenin considered his comments as universally
applicable. Secondly, this position fits in well with the idea 
of pressure "from above" exercised by the "revolutionary" 
government against the masses (and nothing to do with any 
sort of "socialism from below"). Indeed, "wavering" and 
"unstable" elements is just another way of saying "pressure
from below," the attempts by those subject to the "revolutionary" 
government to influence its policies. As we noted in section
H.1.2, it was in this period (1919 and 1920) that the Bolsheviks
openly argued that the "dictatorship of the proletariat" was, in
fact, the "dictatorship of the party" (see section H.3.8 on how
the Bolsheviks modified the Marxist theory of the state in line
with this). Rather than the result of the problems facing Russia 
at the time, Lenin's comments simply reflect the unfolding of 
certain aspects of his ideology when his party held power (as
we make clear in section H.9, the ideology of the ruling party 
and the ideas held by the masses are also factors in history).

To show that Lenin's comments were not caused by circumstantial 
factors, we can turn to his infamous work _Left-Wing Communism_. 
In this 1920 tract, written for the Second Congress of the 
Communist International, Lenin lambasted those Marxists who 
argued for direct working class power against the idea of 
party rule (i.e. the various council communists around 
Europe). We have already noted in section H.1.2 that Lenin 
had argued in that work that it was "ridiculously absurd and 
stupid" to "a contrast in general between the dictatorship of 
the masses and the dictatorship of the leaders." [p. 25] 
Here we provide his description of the "top-down" nature of 
Bolshevik rule:

"The interrelations between leaders-Party-class-masses . . .
now present themselves concretely in Russia in the following
form. The dictatorship is exercised by the proletariat 
which is organised in the Soviets and is led by the 
Communist Party . . . The Party, which holds annual 
congresses . . . is directed by a Central Committee of 
nineteen elected at the congress, while the current work
in Moscow [the capital] had to be carried on by [two] still
smaller bodies . . . which are elected at the plenary sessions
of the Central Committee, five members of the Central 
Committee in each bureau. This, then, looks like a real
'oligarchy.' Not a single important political or organisational
question is decided by any State institution in our republic
[sic!] without the guiding instructions of the Central 
Committee of the Party.

"In its work the Party relies directly on the *trade unions* 
. . . In reality, all the controlling bodies of the overwhelming
majority of the unions . . . consists of Communists, who 
secure the carrying out of all the instructions of the Party.
Thus . . . we have a . . . very powerful proletarian apparatus, 
by means of which the Party is closely linked up with the 
*class* and with *the masses,* and by means of which, under 
the leadership of the Party, the *class dictatorship* of the
class is realised." [_Left-Wing Communism_, pp. 31-2]

Combined with "non-Party workers' and peasants' conferences"
and Soviet Congresses, this was "the general mechanism of
the proletarian state power viewed 'from above,' from the
standpoint of the practical realisation of the dictatorship"
and so "all talk about 'from above' or 'from below,' about
'the dictatorship of leaders' *or* 'the dictatorship of the
masses,' cannot but appear to be ridiculous, childish 
nonsense." [Op. Cit., p. 33] Perhaps this explains why he
did not bother to view "proletarian" state power "from below,"
from the viewpoint of the proletariat? If he did, perhaps
he would have recounted the numerous strikes and protests
broken by the Cheka under martial law, the gerrymandering and
disbanding of soviets, the imposition of "one-man management"
onto the workers in production, the turning of the unions 
into agents of the state/party and the elimination of working 
class freedom by party power? After all, *if* the congresses 
of soviets were "more democratic" than anything in the "best 
democratic republics of the bourgeois world," the Bolsheviks 
would have no need for non-Party conferences "to be able to 
watch the mood of the masses, to come closer to them, to 
respond to their demands." [Op. Cit., p. 33 and p. 32] How
the Bolsheviks "responded" to these conferences and their 
demands is extremely significant. They disbanded them. This
was because "[d]uring the disturbances" of late 1920, "they
provided an effective platform for criticism of Bolshevik
policies." Their frequency was decreased and they "were 
discontinued soon afterward." [Richard Sakwa, _Soviet 
Communists in Power_, p. 203]

At the Comintern congress itself, Zinoviev announced that 
"the dictatorship of the proletariat is at the same time 
the dictatorship of the Communist Party." [_Proceedings and 
Documents of the Second Congress 1920_, vol. 1, p. 152]
Trotsky, for his part, also universalised Lenin's argument
when he pondered the important decisions of the revolution
and who would make them in his reply to the anarchist delegate
from the Spanish anarcho-syndicalist union the CNT:

"Who decides this question [and others like it]?  We have
the Council of People's Commissars but it has to be subject 
to some supervision. Whose supervision? That of the working
class as an amorphous, chaotic mass? No. The Central 
Committee of the party is convened to discuss . . . and to 
decide . . . Who will solve these questions in Spain? The
Communist Party of Spain." [Op. Cit., p. 174]

As is obvious, Trotsky was drawing general lessons for the
international revolutionary movement. Needless to say, he 
still argued that the "working class, represented and led 
by the Communist Party, [was] in power here" in spite of it 
being "an amorphous, chaotic mass" which did not make any 
decisions on important questions affecting the revolution!

Incidentally, his and Lenin's comments of 1920 disprove 
Trotsky's later assertion that it was "[o]nly after the 
conquest of power, the end of the civil war, and the 
establishment of a stable regime" when "the Central 
Committee little by little begin to concentrate the 
leadership of Soviet activity in its hands. Then would 
come Stalin's turn." [_Stalin_, vol. 1, p. 328] While it 
was definitely the "conquest of power" by the Bolsheviks 
which lead to the marginalisation of the soviets, this 
event cannot be shunted to after the civil war as Trotsky 
would like (particularly as Trotsky admitted that "[a]fter 
eight months of inertia and of democratic chaos, came the 
dictatorship of the Bolsheviks." [Op. Cit., vol. 2, p. 242]). 
We must note (see sections H.1.2 or H.3.8) Trotsky argued 
for the "objective necessity" of the "revolutionary 
dictatorship of a proletarian party" until his death.

Clearly, the claim that Leninism (and its various off-shoots
like Trotskyism) is "socialism from below" is hard to take
seriously. As proven above, the Leninist tradition is explicitly
against the idea of "only from below," with Lenin explicitly
stating that it was an "anarchist stand" to be for "'action 
only from below', not 'from below and from above'" which was 
the position of Marxism. [_Collected Works_, vol. 9, p. 77] 
Once in power, Lenin and the Bolsheviks implemented this vision
of "from below and from above," with the highly unsurprising
result that "from above" quickly repressed "from below" (which
was dismissed as "wavering" by the masses). This was to be 
expected, for a government to enforce its laws, it has to have
power over its citizens and so socialism "from above" is a 
necessary side-effect of Leninist theory. 

Ironically, Lenin's argument in _State and Revolution_ comes
back to haunt him. In that work he had argued that the 
"dictatorship of the proletariat" meant "democracy for the 
people" which "imposes a series of restrictions on the 
freedom of the oppressors, the exploiters, the capitalists." 
These must be crushed "in order to free humanity from 
wage-slavery; their resistance must be broken by force; 
it is clear that where there is suppression there is also 
violence, there is no freedom, no democracy." [_Essential 
Works of Lenin_, pp. 337-8] If the working class itself 
is being subject to "suppression" then, clearly, there 
is "no freedom, no democracy" for that class -- and the 
people "will feel no better if the stick with which they 
are being beaten is labelled 'the people's stick'." 
[Bakunin, _Bakunin on Anarchism_, p. 338]

Thus, when Leninists argue that they stand for the "principles 
of socialism from below" and state that this means the direct 
and democratic control of society by the working class then, 
clearly, they are being less than honest. Looking at the 
tradition they place themselves, the obvious conclusion which 
must be reached is that Leninism is *not* based on "socialism 
from below" in the sense of working class self-management of 
society (i.e. the only condition when the majority can "rule" 
and decisions truly flow from below upwards). At best, they 
subscribe to the distinctly bourgeois vision of "democracy" 
as being simply the majority designating (and trying to 
control) its rulers. At worse, they defend politics which 
have eliminated even this form of democracy in favour of 
party dictatorship and "one-man management" armed with 
"dictatorial" powers in industry (most members of such parties 
do not know how the Bolsheviks gerrymandered and disbanded 
soviets to maintain power, raised the dictatorship of the 
party to an ideological truism and wholeheartedly advocated 
"one-man management" rather than workers' self-management of 
production). As we discuss in section H.5, this latter 
position flows easily from the underlying assumptions of 
vanguardism which Leninism is based on.

So, Lenin, Trotsky and so on simply cannot be considered as
exponents of "socialism from below." Any one who makes such a
claim is either ignorant of the actual ideas and practice of 
Bolshevism or they seek to deceive. For anarchists, "socialism 
from below" can only be another name, like libertarian socialism, 
for anarchism (as Lenin, ironically enough, acknowledged). This 
does not mean that "socialism from below," like "libertarian 
socialism," is identical to anarchism, it simply means that 
libertarian Marxists and other socialists are far closer to 
anarchism than mainstream Marxism.

H.3.4 Don't anarchists just quote Marxists selectively?

No, far from it. While it is impossible to quote everything
a person or an ideology says, it is possible to summarise
those aspects of a theory which influenced the way it 
developed in practice. As such, *any* account is "selective" 
in some sense, the question is whether this results in a 
critiqued rooted in the ideology and its practice or whether 
it presents a picture at odds with both. As Maurice Brinton 
puts it in the introduction to his classic account of workers' 
control in the Russian Revolution:

"Other charges will also be made. The quotations from Lenin
and Trotsky will not be denied but it will be stated that
they are 'selective' and that 'other things, too' were said.
Again, we plead guilty. But we would stress that there are 
hagiographers enough in the trade whose 'objectivity' . . . 
is but a cloak for sophisticated apologetics . . . It 
therefore seems more relevant to quote those statements of 
the Bolsheviks leaders of 1917 which helped determine Russia's 
evolution [towards Stalinism] rather those other statements 
which, like the May Day speeches of Labour leaders, were for 
ever to remain of rhetoric." [_The Bolsheviks and Workers' 
Control_, p. xv]

Hence the need to discuss all aspects of Marxism rather than
take what its adherents like to claim for it as granted. In 
this, we agree with Marx himself who argued that we cannot 
judge people by what they say about themselves but rather what 
they do. Unfortunately while many self-proclaimed Marxists 
(like Trotsky) may quote these comments, fewer apply them 
to their own ideology or actions (again, like Trotsky).

This can be seen from the almost ritualistic way many Marxists
response to anarchist (or other) criticisms of their ideas. 
When they complain that anarchists "selectively" quote from 
the leading proponents of Marxism, they are usually at pains 
to point people to some document which they have selected 
as being more "representative" of their tradition. Leninists 
usually point to Lenin's _State and Revolution_, for example,
for a vision of what Lenin "really" wanted. To this anarchists
reply by, as we discussed in section H.1.7 (Haven't you read 
Lenin's "State and Revolution"?), pointing out that much of 
that passes for 'Marxism' in _State and Revolution_ is anarchist 
and, equally important, it was not applied in practice. This
explains an apparent contradiction. Leninists point to the 
Russian Revolution as evidence for the democratic nature of 
their politics. Anarchists point to it as evidence of Leninism's 
authoritarian nature. Both can do this because there is a 
substantial difference between Bolshevism before it took power 
and afterwards. While the Leninists ask you to judge them by 
their manifesto, anarchists say judge them by their record! 

Simply put, Marxists quote selectively from their own 
tradition, ignoring those aspects of it which would be
unappealing to potential recruits. While the leaders may 
know their tradition has skeletons in its closet, they 
try their best to ensure no one else gets to know. Which, 
of course, explains their hostility to anarchists doing so! 
That there is a deep divide between aspects of Marxist 
rhetoric and its practice and that even its rhetoric is
not consistent we will now prove. By so doing, we can show
that anarchists do not, in fact, quote Marxist's "selectively."

As an example, we can point to the leading Bolshevik Grigorii
Zinoviev. In 1920, as head of the Communist International he
wrote a letter to the Industrial Workers of the World, a
revolutionary labour union, which stated that the "Russian 
Soviet Republic. . . is the most highly centralised government 
that exists. It is also the most democratic government in 
history. For all the organs of government are in constant 
touch with the working masses, and constantly sensitive to 
their will." [_Proceedings and Documents of the Second Congress 
1920_, vol. 2, p. 928] The same year, he explained in a
Communist journal that "soviet rule in Russia could not 
have been maintained for three years -- not even three weeks 
-- without the iron dictatorship of the Communist Party. Any 
class conscious worker must understand that the dictatorship 
of the working class can by achieved only by the dictatorship 
of its vanguard, i.e., by the Communist Party . . . All 
questions . . ., on which the fate of the proletarian 
revolution depends absolutely, are decided . . . in the 
framework of the party organisations." [quoted by Oskar 
Anweiler, _The Soviets_, pp. 239-40] It seems redundant to
note that the second quote is the accurate one, the one
which matches the reality of Bolshevik Russia. Therefore
it is hardly "selective" to quote the latter and not the
former, rather it expresses what was actually happening.

This duality and the divergence between practice and rhetoric
comes to the fore when Trotskyists discuss Stalinism and try
to counter pose the Leninist tradition to it. For example, 
we find the British SWP's Chris Harman arguing that the "whole 
experience of the workers' movement internationally teaches 
that only by regular elections, combined with the right of 
recall by shop-floor meetings can rank-and-file delegates be 
made really responsible to those who elect them." [_Bureaucracy 
and Revolution in Eastern Europe_, pp. 238-9] Significantly,
Harman does not mention that both Lenin and Trotsky rejected
this experience (see section H.3.8 for a full discussion on
how Leninism argues for state power explicitly to eliminate
such control from below). How can Trotsky's comment that the
"revolutionary dictatorship of a proletarian party is . . . 
an objective necessity" be reconciled with it? And what of 
the claim that the "revolutionary party (vanguard) which 
renounces its own dictatorship surrenders the masses to the 
counter-revolution"? [_Writings 1936-37_, pp. 513-4] Or his 
similar argument sixteen years earlier that the Party was 
"entitled to assert its dictatorship even if that dictatorship 
clashed with the passing moods of the workers' democracy"? 
[quoted by Maurice Brinton, Op. Cit., p. 78]

The ironies do not stop there, of course. Harman correctly notes 
that under Stalinism, the "bureaucracy is characterised, like the 
private capitalist class in the West, by its control over the 
means of production." [Op. Cit., p. 147] However, he fails to
note that it was *Lenin,* in early 1918, who had raised and then
implemented such "control" in the form of "one-man management."
As he put it: "Obedience, and unquestioning obedience at that, 
during work to the one-man decisions of Soviet directors, of 
the dictators elected or appointed by Soviet institutions, 
vested with dictatorial powers." [_Six Theses on the Immediate 
Tasks of the Soviet Government_, p. 44] To *fail* to note this
link between Lenin and the Stalinist bureaucracy on this issue
is quoting "selectively." 

The contradictions pile up. He argues that "people who seriously 
believe that workers at the height of revolution need a police 
guard to stop them handing their factories over to capitalists 
certainly have no real faith in the possibilities of a socialist 
future." [Op. Cit., p. 144] Yet this does not stop him praising 
the regime of Lenin and Trotsky and contrasting it with Stalinism, 
in spite of the fact that this was precisely what the Bolsheviks 
*did* from 1918 onwards! Indeed this tyrannical practice played a 
role in provoking the strikes in Petrograd which preceded the 
Kronstadt revolt in 1921, when "the workers wanted the special 
squads of armed Bolsheviks, who carried out a purely police 
function, withdrawn from the factories." Paul Avrich, _Kronstadt 
1921_, p. 42] It seems equally strange that Harman denounces
the Stalinist suppression of the Hungarian revolution for
workers' democracy and socialism while he defends the Bolshevik 
suppression of the Kronstadt revolt for the same goals (and 
as we discuss in section H.7, the rationales both regimes used 
to justify their actions were akin).

Similarly, when Harman argues that if by "political party" it
is "meant a party of the usual sort, in which a few leaders 
give orders and the masses merely obey . . . then certainly
such organisations added nothing to the Hungarian revolution."
However, as we discuss in section H.5, such a party was 
*precisely* what Leninism argued for and applied in practice. 
Simply put, the Bolsheviks were never a party "that stood for 
the councils taking power." [Op. Cit., p. 186 and p. 187] As 
Lenin repeatedly stressed, its aim was for the Bolshevik party 
to take power *through* the councils (see section H.3.11). 

This confusion between what was promised and what was done 
is a common feature of Leninism. Felix Morrow, for example,
wrote what is usually considered the definitive Trotskyist
work on the Spanish Revolution (in spite of it being, as we 
discuss in the appendix "Marxists and Spanish Anarchism," 
deeply flawed). In that work he states that the "essential 
points of a revolutionary program [are] all power to the 
working class, and democratic organs of the workers, 
peasants and combatants, as the expression of the workers' 
power." [_Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Spain_, p. 133] 
How this can be reconciled with Trotsky's comment, written 
in the same year, that "a revolutionary party, even after 
seizing power . . . is still by no means the sovereign ruler 
of society."? Or the opinion that it was "only thanks to 
the party dictatorship [that] were the Soviets able to lift 
themselves out of the mud of reformism and attain the state 
form of the proletariat"? [_Stalinism and Bolshevism_] Or 
Lenin's opinion that "an organisation taking in the whole 
proletariat cannot directly exercise proletarian dictatorship" 
and that it "can be exercised only by a vanguard"? [_Collected 
Works_, vol. 32, p. 21] How can the working class "have all 
power" if power is held by a vanguard party? Particularly 
when this party has power specifically to enable it "overcom[e] 
the vacillation of the masses themselves." [Trotsky, _The 
Moralists and Sycophants_, p. 59]

Given all this, who is quoting who "selectively"? The Marxists
who ignore what the Bolsheviks did when in power and repeatedly
point to Lenin's _State and Revolution_ or the anarchists who 
link what they did with what they said outside of that holy text?
Considering this absolutely contradictory inheritance, anarchists
feel entitled to ask the question "Will the real Leninist please 
stand up?" What is it to be, popular democracy or party rule? If
we look at Bolshevik practice, the answer is the latter. As we
discuss in section H.3.8, the likes of Lenin and Trotsky concur,
incorporating the necessity of party power into their ideology
as a lesson of the revolution. As such, anarchists do not feel
they are quoting Leninism "selectively" when they argue that it 
is based on party power, not working class self-management. That
Leninists often publicly deny this aspect of their own ideology
or, at best, try to rationalise and justify it, suggests that 
when push comes to shove (as it does in every revolution) they
will make the same decisions and act in the same way!

In addition there is the question of what could be called the
"social context." Marxists often accuse anarchists of failing 
to place the quotations and actions of, say, the Bolsheviks 
into the circumstances which generated them. By this they mean
that Bolshevik authoritarianism can be explained purely in 
terms of the massive problems facing them (i.e. the rigours 
of the Civil War, the economic collapse and chaos in Russia
and so on). As we discuss this question in section H.8, we 
will simply summarise the anarchist reply by noting that this
argument has three major problems with it. Firstly, there is 
the problem that Bolshevik authoritarianism started *before* 
the start of the Civil War (as we discuss in section H.6) and,
moreover, continued *after* its ends. As such, the Civil War
cannot be blamed. The second problem is simply that Lenin 
continually stressed that civil war and economic chaos was 
inevitable during a revolution. If Leninist politics cannot 
handle the inevitable then they are to be avoided. Equally,
if Leninists blame what they should *know* is inevitable for
the degeneration of the Bolshevik revolution it would suggest
their understanding of what revolution entails is deeply 
flawed. The last problem is simply that the Bolsheviks did
not care. As Samuel Farber notes, "there is no evidence 
indicating that Lenin or any of the mainstream Bolshevik 
leaders lamented the loss of workers' control or of 
democracy in the soviets, or at least referred to these
losses as a retreat, as Lenin declared with the replacement
of War Communism by NEP in 1921." [_Before Stalinism_, p. 44]
Hence the continuation (indeed, intensification) of Bolshevik
authoritarianism after their victory in the civil war. Given 
this, it is significant that many of the quotes from Trotsky 
given above date from the late 1930s. To argue, therefore, 
that "social context" explains the politics and actions of 
the Bolsheviks seems incredulous. 

Lastly, it seems ironic that Marxists accuse anarchists of
quoting "selectively." After all, as proven in section H.2,
this is *exactly* what Marxists do to anarchism! Indeed, 
anarchists often make good propaganda out of such activity
by showing how selective their accounts are and how at odds
they are with want anarchism actually stands for and what
anarchists actually do (see the appendix of our FAQ on
"Anarchism and Marxism").

In summary, rather than quote "selectively" from the works 
and practice of Marxism, anarchists summarise those tendencies 
of both which, we argue, contribute to its continual failure in 
practice as a revolutionary theory. Moreover, Marxists themselves
are equally as "selective" as anarchists in this respect. Firstly,
as regards anarchist theory and practice and, secondly, as regards
their own. 

H.3.5 Has Marxist appropriation of anarchist ideas changed it?

As is obvious in any account of the history of socialism, 
Marxists (of various schools) have appropriated key anarchist 
ideas and (often) present them as if Marxists thought of them 
first. 

For example, as we discuss in section H.3.10, it was anarchists 
who first raised the idea of smashing the bourgeois state and 
replacing it with the fighting organisations of the working 
class (such as unions, workers' councils, etc.). It was only 
in 1917, decades after anarchists had first raised the idea, 
that Marxists started to argue these ideas but, of course, 
with a twist. While anarchists meant that working class 
organisations would be the basis of a free society, Lenin 
saw these organs as the best means of achieving Bolshevik 
party power. 

Similarly with the libertarian idea of the "militant 
minority." By this, anarchists and syndicalists meant 
groups of workers who gave an example by their direct 
action which their fellow workers could imitate (for 
example by leading wildcat strikes which would use 
flying pickets to get other workers to join in). This 
"militant minority" would be at the forefront of social 
struggle and would show, by example, practice and 
discussion, that their ideas and tactics were the 
correct ones. After the Russian Revolution of 1917, 
Bolsheviks argued that this idea was similar to their 
idea of a vanguard party. This ignored two key differences.
Firstly that the libertarian "militant minority" did not 
aim to take power on behalf of the working class but 
rather to encourage it, by example, to manage its own 
struggles and affairs (and, ultimately, society). 
Secondly, that "vanguard parties" are organised in 
hierarchical ways alien to the spirit of anarchism. While
both the "militant minority" and "vanguard party" approaches
are based on an appreciation of the uneven development of 
ideas within the working class, vanguardism transforms this 
into a justification for party rule *over* the working class 
by a so-called "advanced" minority (see section H.5 for a
full discussion). Other concepts, such as "workers' control," 
direct action, and so on have suffered a similar fate.

As such, while Marxists have appropriated certain anarchist
concepts, it does not mean that they mean exactly the same
thing by them. Rather, as history shows, radically different
concepts can be hidden behind similar sounding rhetoric. As
Murray Bookchin argued, many Marxist tendencies "attach 
basically alien ideas to the withering conceptual framework 
of Marxism -- not to say anything new but to preserve 
something old with ideological formaldehyde -- to the 
detriment of any intellectual growth that the distinctions
are designed to foster. This is mystification at its worst,
for it not only corrupts ideas but the very capacity of the
mind to deal with them. If Marx's work can be rescued for
our time, it will be by dealing with it as an invaluable
part of the development of ideas, not as pastiche that is
legitimated as a 'method' or continually 'updated' by 
concepts that come from an alien zone of ideas." [_Toward
an Ecological Society_, p. 242f]

This is not some academic point. The ramifications of Marxists
appropriating such "alien ideas" (or, more correctly, the 
rhetoric associated with those ideas) has had negative impacts
on actual revolutionary movements. For example, Lenin's 
definition of "workers' control" was radically different than
that current in the factory committee movement during the
Russian Revolution (which had more in common with anarchist
and syndicalist use of the term). The similarities in rhetoric,
allowed the factory committee movement to put its weight behind 
the Bolsheviks. Once in power, Lenin's position was implemented
while that of the factory committees was ignored. Ultimately,
Lenin's position was a key factor in creating state capitalism
rather than socialism in Russia (see section H.3.14 for more
details). 

This, of course, does not stop modern day Leninists appropriating 
the term workers' control "without bating an eyelid. Seeking to 
capitalise on the confusion of now rampant in the movement, these 
people talk of 'workers' control' as if a) they meant by those 
words what the politically unsophisticated mean (i.e. that working 
people should themselves decide about the fundamental matters 
relating to production) and b) as if they -- and the Leninist 
doctrine to which they claim to adhere -- had always supported 
demands of this kind, or as if Leninism had always seen in workers'
control the universally valid foundation of a new social order,
rather than just a *slogan* to be used for manipulatory purposes 
in specific and very limited historical contexts." [Maurice 
Brinton, _The Bolsheviks and Workers' Control_, p. iv] Section 
H.3.14 discusses this further.

Thus the fact that Leninists have appropriated libertarian (and 
working class) ideas and demands does not, in fact, mean that we 
aim for the same thing (as we discuss in section H.3.1, this is 
far from the case). The use of anarchist/popular rhetoric and 
slogans means little and we need to look at the content of the 
ideas proposed. Given the legacy of the appropriation of 
libertarian terminology to popularise authoritarian parties and 
its subsequent jettison in favour of authoritarian policies once 
the party is in power, anarchists have strong grounds to take
Leninist claims with a large pinch of salt!

Equally with examples of actual revolutions. As Martin Buber
notes, while "Lenin praises Marx for having 'not yet, in
1852, put the concrete question as to what should be set up
in place of the State machinery after it had been abolished,'"
Lenin argued that "it was only the Paris Commune that taught
Marx this." However, as Buber correctly points out, the Paris
Commune "was the realisation of the thoughts of people who had
put this question very concretely indeed . . . the historical
experience of the Commune became possible only because in the
hearts of passionate revolutionaries there lived the picture of
a decentralised, very much 'de-Stated'  society, which picture
they undertook to translate into reality. The spiritual fathers
of the Commune had such that ideal aiming at decentralisation
which Marx and Engels did not have, and the leaders of the
Revolution of 1871 tried, albeit with inadequate powers, to
begin the realisation of that idea in the midst of revolution."
[_Paths in Utopia_, pp. 103-4] Thus, while the Paris Commune
and other working class revolts are praised, their obvious 
anarchistic elements (as predicted by anarchist thinkers)
are not mentioned. This results in some strange dichotomies.
For example, Bakunin's vision of revolution is based on
a federation of workers' councils, predating Marxist support
for such bodies by decades, yet Marxists argue that Bakunin's 
ideas have nothing to teach us. Or, the Paris Commune being 
praised by Marxists as the first "dictatorship of the 
proletariat" when it implements federalism, delegates being 
subjected to mandates and recall and raises the vision of a 
socialism of associations while anarchism is labelled 
"petit-bourgeois" in spite of the fact that these ideas can 
be found in works of Proudhon and Bakunin which predate the 
1871 revolt!

From this, we can draw two facts. Firstly, anarchism has 
successfully predicted certain aspects of working class
revolution. Anarchist K.J. Kenafick stated the obvious when
he argues that any "comparison will show that the programme 
set out [by the Paris Commune] is . . . the system of Federalism, 
which Bakunin had been advocating for years, and which had first 
been enunciated by Proudhon. The Proudhonists . . . exercised 
considerable influence in the Commune. This 'political form' 
was therefore not 'at last' discovered; it had been discovered 
years ago; and now it was proven to be correct by the very fact 
that in the crisis the Paris workers adopted it almost 
automatically, under the pressure of circumstance, rather 
than as the result of theory, as being the form most suitable 
to express working class aspirations." [_Michael Bakunin and 
Karl Marx_, pp. 212-3] Thus, rather than being somehow alien
to the working class and its struggle for freedom, anarchism
in fact bases itself on the class struggle. This means that
it should come as no surprise when the ideas of anarchism are 
developed and applied by those in struggle, for those ideas 
are just generalisations derived from past working class 
struggles! If anarchism ideas are applied spontaneously by
those in struggle, it is because those involved are themselves 
drawing similar conclusions from their own experiences. 

The other fact is that while mainstream Marxism often appropriated 
certain aspects of libertarian theory and practice, it does 
so selectively and places them into an authoritarian context 
which undermines their libertarian nature. Hence anarchist 
support for workers councils becomes transformed into a means 
to ensure party power (i.e. state authority) rather than working 
class power or self-management (i.e. no authority). Similarly, 
anarchist support for leading by example becomes transformed 
into support for party rule (and often dictatorship). Ultimately, 
the practice of mainstream Marxism shows that libertarian ideas 
cannot be transplanted selectively into an authoritarian ideology 
and be expected to blossom. Significantly, those Marxists who *do* 
apply anarchist ideas honestly are usually labelled by their
orthodox comrades as "anarchists." 

As an example of Marxists appropriating libertarian ideas 
honestly, we can point to the council communist and currents
within autonomist Marxism. The council communists broke with
the Bolsheviks over the question of whether the party would
exercise power or whether the workers' councils would. Needless
to say, Lenin labelled them an "anarchist deviation." Currents 
within Autonomist Marxism have built upon the council communist 
tradition, stressing the importance of focusing analysis on 
working class struggle as the key dynamic in capitalist society. 

In this they go against the mainstream Marxist orthodoxy and 
embrace a libertarian perspective. As libertarian socialist 
Cornelius Castoriadis argued, "the economic theory expounded 
[by Marx] in _Capital_ is based on the postulate that capitalism 
has managed completely and effectively to transform the worker -- 
who only appears there only as labour power -- into a commodity; 
therefore the use value of labour power -- the use the capitalist 
makes of it -- is, as for any commodity, completely determined 
by the use, since its exchange value -- wages -- is determined 
solely by the laws of the market . . . This postulate is 
necessary for there to be a 'science of economics' along the 
physico-mathematical model Marx followed . . . But he contradicts 
the most essential fact of capitalism, namely, that the use value 
and exchange value of labour power are objectively indeterminate; 
they are determined rather by the struggle between labour and 
capital both in production and in society. Here is the ultimate 
root of the 'objective' contradictions of capitalism . . . The 
paradox is that Marx, the 'inventor' of class struggle, wrote a 
monumental work on phenomena determined by this struggle in which 
the struggle itself was entirely absent." [_Political and Social 
Writings_, vol. 2, p. 203] Castoriadis explained the limitations 
of Marx's vision most famously in his "Modern Capitalism and 
Revolution." [Op. Cit., pp. 226-343]

By rejecting this heritage which mainstream Marxism bases itself
on and stressing the role of class struggle, Autonomist Marxism
breaks decisively with the Marxist mainstream and embraces a 
position previously associated with anarchists and other libertarian
socialists. The key role of class struggle in invalidating all 
deterministic economic "laws" was expressed by French syndicalists 
at the start of the twentieth century. This insight predated the 
work of Castoriadis and the development of Autonomist Marxism by 
over 50 years and is worth quoting at length:

"the keystone of socialism [. . .] proclaimed that 'as a 
general rule, the average wage would be no more than what 
the worker strictly required for survival'. And it was said: 
'That figure is governed by capitalist pressure alone and this 
can even push it below the minimum necessary for the working 
man's subsistence . . . The only rule with regard to wage 
levels is the plentiful or scarce supply of man-power . . .'

"By way of evidence of the relentless operation of this law 
of wages, comparisons were made between the worker and a 
commodity: if there is a glut of potatoes on the market, 
they are cheap; if they are scarce, the price rises . . . It 
is the same with the working man, it was said: his wages 
fluctuate in accordance with the plentiful supply or dearth 
of labour! 

"No voice was raised against the relentless arguments of this 
absurd reasoning: so the law of wages may be taken as right 
. . . for as long as the working man [or woman] is content to 
be a commodity! For as long as, like a sack of potatoes, she 
remains passive and inert and endures the fluctuations of the 
market . . . For as long as he bends his back and puts up with 
all of the bosses' snubs, . . . the law of wages obtains. 

"But things take a different turn the moment that a glimmer of 
consciousness stirs this worker-potato into life. When, instead 
off dooming himself to inertia, spinelessness, resignation and 
passivity, the worker wakes up to his worth as a human being 
and the spirit of revolt washes over him: when he bestirs himself, 
energetic, wilful and active . . . [and] once the labour bloc 
comes to life and bestirs itself . . . then, the laughable 
equilibrium of the law of wages is undone." [Emile Pouget, 
_Direct Action_]

And Marx, indeed, had compared the worker to a commodity,
stating that labour power "is a commodity, neither more
nor less than sugar. The former is measured by the clock,
the latter by the scale." [_Marx-Engels Selected Works_,
p. 72] However, as Castoridas argued, unlike sugar the
extraction of the use value of labour power "is not a
technical operation; it is a process of bitter struggle
in which half the time, so to speak, the capitalists 
turn out to be losers." [Op. Cit., p. 248] A fact which
Pouget stressed in his critique of the mainstream 
socialist position:
 
"A novel factor has appeared on the labour market: the will 
of the worker! And this factor, not pertinent when it comes 
to setting the price of a bushel of potatoes, has a bearing 
upon the setting of wages; its impact may be large or small, 
according to the degree of tension of the labour force which 
is a product of the accord of individual wills beating in 
unison -- but, whether it be strong or weak, there is no 
denying it. 

"Thus, worker cohesion conjures up against capitalist might a 
might capable of standing up to it. The inequality between the 
two adversaries -- which cannot be denied when the exploiter is 
confronted only by the working man on his own -- is redressed in
proportion with the degree of cohesion achieved by the labour 
bloc. From then on, proletarian resistance, be it latent or 
acute, is an everyday phenomenon: disputes between labour and 
capital quicken and become more acute. Labour does not always 
emerge victorious from these partial struggles: however, even 
when defeated, the struggle workers still reap some benefit: 
resistance from them has obstructed pressure from the employers 
and often forced the employer to grant some of the demands put."
[Op. Cit.]

The best currents of autonomist Marxism share this anarchist
stress on the power of working people to transform society 
and to impact on how capitalism operates. Unsurprisingly,
most autonomist Marxists reject the idea of the vanguard 
party and instead, like the council communists, stress the
need for *autonomist* working class self-organisation and
self-activity (hence the name!). They agree with Pouget
when he argued that "Direct action spells liberation for the 
masses of humanity . . . [It] puts paid to the age of miracles 
-- miracles from Heaven, miracles from the State -- and, in 
contraposition to hopes vested in 'providence' (no matter 
what they may be) it announces that it will act upon the 
maxim: salvation lies within ourselves!" [Op. Cit.] As such,
they draw upon anarchistic ideas and rhetoric (for many, 
undoubtedly unknowingly) and draw anarchistic conclusions.
This can be seen from the works of the leading US Autonomist 
Marxist Harry Cleaver. His excellent essay "Kropotkin,
Self-Valorisation and the Crisis of Marxism" is by far the
best Marxist account of Kropotkin's ideas and shows the 
similarities between communist-anarchism and autonomist
Marxism. [_Anarchist Studies_, vol.2 , no. 2, pp. 119-36]
Both, he points out, share a "common perception and sympathy 
for the power of workers to act autonomously" regardless of 
the "substantial differences" on other issues. [_Reading 
Capital Politically_, p. 15]

As such, the links between the best Marxists and anarchism 
can be substantial. This means that some Marxists have taken
on board many anarchist ideas and have forged a version of
Marxism which is basically libertarian in nature. Unfortunately,
such forms of Marxism have always been a minority current 
within it. Most cases have seen the appropriation of anarchist
ideas by Marxists simply as part of an attempt to make mainstream, 
authoritarian Marxism more appealing and such borrowings have
been quickly forgotten once power has been seized.

Therefore appropriation of rhetoric and labels should not be
confused with similarity of goals and ideas. The list of groupings
which have used inappropriate labels to associate their ideas
with other, more appealing, ones is lengthy. Content is what
counts. If libertarian sounding ideas *are* being raised, the
question becomes one of whether they are being used simply 
to gain influence or whether they signify a change of heart.
As Bookchin argues:

"Ultimately, a line will have to be drawn that, by definition,
excludes any project that can tip decentralisation to the 
side of centralisation, direct democracy to the side of
delegated power, libertarian institutions to the side of
bureaucracy, and spontaneity to the side of authority. Such
a line, like a physical barrier, must irrevocably separate
a libertarian zone of theory and practice from the 
hybridised socialisms that tend to denature it. This zone
must build its anti-authoritarian, utopian, and revolutionary
commitments into the very recognition it has of itself, in
short, into the very way it defines itself. . . . to admit 
of domination is to cross the line that separates the 
libertarian zone from the [state] socialist." [Op. Cit., 
pp. 223-4] 
Unless we know exactly what we aim for, how to get there and 
who our *real* allies are we will get a nasty surprise once 
our self-proclaimed "allies" take power. As such, any attempt 
to appropriate anarchist rhetoric into an authoritarian ideology 
will simply fail and become little more than a mask obscuring 
the real aims of the party in question. As history shows.

H.3.6 Is Marxism the only revolutionary politics which 
      have worked?

Some Marxists will dismiss our arguments, and anarchism, out 
of hand. This is because anarchism has not lead a "successful"
revolution while Marxism has. The fact, they assert, that 
there has never been a serious anarchist revolutionary 
movement, let alone an anarchist revolution, in the whole 
of history proves that Marxism works. For some Marxists, 
practice determines validity. Whether something is true 
or not is not decided intellectually in wordy publications 
and debates, but in reality. 

For Anarchists, such arguments simply show the ideological
nature of most forms of Marxism. The fact is, of course,
that there has been many anarchistic revolutions which,
while ultimately defeated, show the validity of anarchist 
theory (the ones in Spain and in the Ukraine being the
most significant). Moreover, there have been serious 
revolutionary anarchist movements across the world, the
majority of them crushed by state repression (usually
fascist or communist based). However, this is not the most 
important issue, which is the fate of these "successful" 
Marxist movements and revolution. The fact that there has 
never been a "Marxist" revolution which has not become a 
party dictatorship proves the need to critique Marxism.

So, given that Marxists argue that Marxism is *the* 
revolutionary working class political theory, its actual 
track record has been appalling. After all, while many 
Marxist parties have taken part in revolutions and even 
seized power, the net effect of their "success" have been 
societies bearing little or no relationship to socialism. 
Rather, the net effect of these revolutions has been to 
discredit socialism by associating it with one-party 
states presiding over state capitalist economies. 

Equally, the role of Marxism in the labour movement has 
also been less than successful. Looking at the first 
Marxist movement, social democracy, it ended by becoming 
reformist, betraying socialist ideas by (almost always) 
supporting their own state during the First World War 
and going so far as crushing the German revolution and 
betraying the Italian factory occupations in 1920. Indeed, 
Trotsky stated that the Bolshevik party was "the only 
revolutionary" section of the Second International, 
which is a damning indictment of Marxism. [_Stalin_, 
vol. 1, p. 248] Just as damning is the fact that neither 
Lenin or Trotsky noticed it! Indeed, Lenin praised the 
"fundamentals of parliamentary tactics" of German and 
International Social Democracy, expressing the opinion 
that they were "at the same time implacable on questions 
of principle and always directed to the accomplishment of 
the final aim" in his obituary of August Bebel in 1913! 
[Marx, Engels and Lenin, _Anarchism and Anarcho-Syndicalism_, 
p. 248] For those that way inclined, some amusement can be 
gathered comparing Engels glowing predictions for these 
parties and their actual performance (in the case of Spain 
and Italy, his comments seem particularly ironic).

As regards Bolshevism itself, the one "revolutionary" party 
in the world, it avoided the fate of its sister parties 
simply because there no question of applying social
democratic tactics within bourgeois institutions as 
these did not exist. Moreover, the net result of its 
seizure of power was, first, a party dictatorship and 
state capitalism under Lenin, then the creation of 
Stalinism and a host of Trotskyist sects who spend a 
considerable amount of time justifying and rationalising 
the ideology and actions of the Bolsheviks which helped 
create the Stalinism (see section H.6 for a discussion 
of the Russian revolution). 

Clearly, a key myth of Marxism is the idea that it has been 
a successful movement. In reality, its failures have been 
consistent and devastating so suggesting its time to 
re-evaluate the whole ideology and embrace a revolutionary 
theory like anarchism. Indeed, it would be no exaggeration 
to argue that every "success" of Marxism has, in fact, proved 
that the anarchist critique of Marxism was correct. Thus, as 
Bakunin predicted, the Social-Democratic parties became 
reformist and the "dictatorship of the proletariat" became 
the "dictatorship *over* the proletariat." With "victories" 
like these, Marxism does not need failures! Thus Murray 
Bookchin:

"A theory which is so readily 'vulgarised,' 'betrayed,' or, 
more sinisterly, institutionalised into bureaucratic power 
by nearly all its adherents may well be one that lends 
itself to such 'vulgarisations,' 'betrayals,' and bureaucratic
forms *as a normal condition of its existence.* What may
seem to be 'vulgarisations, 'betrayals,' and bureaucratic
manifestations of its tenets in the heated light of doctrinal
disputes may prove to be the fulfilment of its tenets in the
cold light of historical development." [_Toward an Ecological
Society_, p. 196]

Hence the overwhelming need to critically evaluate Marxist 
ideas and history (such as the Russian Revolution -- see 
sections H.6, H.7 and H.11). Unless we honestly discuss and 
evaluate all aspects of revolutionary ideas, we will never 
be able to build a positive and constructive revolutionary 
movement. By seeking the roots of Marxism's problems, we
can enrich anarchism by avoiding possible pitfalls and 
recognising and building upon its strengths (i.e. where 
anarchists have identified, however incompletely, problems 
in Marxism which bear on revolutionary ideas, practice and 
transformation).

If this is done, anarchists are sure that Marxist claims 
that Marxism is *the* revolutionary theory will be exposed 
for the baseless rhetoric they are. 

H.3.7 What is wrong with the Marxist theory of the state?

For anarchists, the idea that a state (any state) can be 
used for socialist ends is simply ridiculous. This is 
because of the nature of the state as an instrument of 
minority class rule. As such, it precludes the mass 
participation required for socialism and would create 
a new form of class society.

As we discussed in section B.2, the state is defined 
by certain characteristics (most importantly, the 
centralisation of power into the hands of a few). 
Thus, for anarchists, "the word 'State' . . . 
should be reserved for those societies with the 
hierarchical system and centralisation." [Peter 
Kropotkin, _Ethics_, p. 317f] This defining feature 
of the state has not come about by chance. As Kropotkin 
argued in his classic history of the state, "a social 
institution cannot lend itself to *all* the desired 
goals, since, as with every organ, [the state] developed 
according to the function it performed, in a definite 
direction and not in all possible directions." This 
means, by "seeing the State as it has been in history, 
and as it is in essence today" the conclusion anarchists 
"arrive at is for the abolition of the State." Thus the 
state has "developed in the history of human societies 
to prevent the direct association among men [and women] 
to shackle the development of local and individual
initiative, to crush existing liberties, to prevent their
new blossoming -- all this in order to subject the masses
to the will of minorities." [_The State: Its Historic Role_, 
p. 56] 

So if the state, as Kropotkin stresses, is defined by "the 
existence of a power situated above society, but also of a 
*territorial concentration* as well as the concentration 
*in the hands of a few of many functions in the life of 
societies*" then such a structure has not evolved by chance. 
Therefore "the pyramidal organisation which is the essence 
of the State" simply "cannot lend itself to a function 
opposed to the one for which it was developed in the 
course of history," such as the popular participation from
below required by social revolution and socialism. [Op. Cit., 
p. 10, p. 59 and p. 56] Based on this evolutionary analysis
of the state, Kropotkin, like all anarchists, drew the
conclusion "that the State organisation, having been the
force to which the minorities resorted for establishing 
and organising their power over the masses, cannot be the
force which will serve to destroy these privileges." 
[_Evolution and Environment_, p. 82] 

This does *not* mean that anarchists dismiss differences 
between types of state, think the state has not changed 
over time or refuse to see that different states exist 
to defend different ruling minorities. Far from it. 
Anarchists argue that "[e]very economic phase has a 
political phase corresponding to it, and it would be 
impossible to touch private property unless a new mode 
of political life be found at the same time." "A society 
founded on serfdom," Kropotkin explained, "is in keeping 
with absolute monarchy; a society based on the wage system, 
and the exploitation of the masses by the capitalists 
finds it political expression in parliamentarianism."
As such, the state form changes and evolves, but its 
basic function (defender of minority rule) and structure 
(delegated power into the hands of a few) remains.
Which means that "a free society regaining possession 
of the common inheritance must seek, in free groups 
and free federations of groups, a new organisation, in 
harmony with the new economic phase of history." 
[_The Conquest of Bread_, p. 54]

So, as with any social structure, the state has evolved to 
ensure that it carries out its function. In other words, the 
state is centralised because it is an instrument of minority 
domination and oppression. Insofar as a social system is
based on decentralisation of power, popular self-management
and participation and free federation from below upwards,
it is not a state. If a social system is, however, marked
by delegated power and centralisation it is a state and
cannot be, therefore, a instrument of social liberation.
Rather it will become, slowly but surely, "whatever title
it adopts and whatever its origin and organisation may
be" what the state has always been, a instrument for 
"oppressing and exploiting the masses, of defending the
oppressors and the exploiters." [_Anarchy_, p. 20] Which, 
for obvious reasons, is why anarchists argue for the
destruction of the state by a free federation of 
self-managed communes and workers' councils (see 
sections I.5 and H.1.4 for further discussion).

This explains why anarchists reject the Marxist definition 
and theory of the state. For Marxists, "the state is nothing 
but a machine for the oppression of one class by another." 
While it has been true that, historically, it is "the state 
of the most powerful, economically dominant class, which, 
through the medium of the state, becomes also the politically 
dominant class, and this acquires the means of holding down 
and exploiting the oppressed class," this need not always be 
the case. The state is "at best an evil inherited by the 
proletariat after its victorious struggle for class supremacy," 
although it "cannot avoid having to lop off at once as much 
as possible" of it "until such time as a generation reared 
in new, free social conditions is able to throw the entire 
lumber of the state on the scrap heap." This new state, 
often called the "dictatorship of the proletariat," would 
slowly "wither away" (or "dies out") as classes disappear 
and the state "at last . . . becomes the real representative 
of the whole of society" and so "renders itself unnecessary." 
Engels is at pains to differentiate this position from that 
of the anarchists, who demand "the abolition of the state 
out of hand." [Engels, _Marx-Engels Selected Works_, p. 258, 
pp. 577-8, p. 528 and p. 424]

For anarchists, this argument has deep flaws. Simply put, 
unlike the anarchist one, this is not an empirically based 
theory of the state. Rather, we find such a theory mixed up 
with a metaphysical, non-empirical, a-historic definition 
which is based not on what the state *is* but rather what is 
*could* be. Thus the argument that the state "is nothing but 
a machine for the oppression of one class by another" is 
trying to draw out an abstract "essence" of the state rather
than ground what the state is on empirical evidence and 
analysis. This perspective, anarchists argue, simply confuses 
two very different things, namely the state and popular social
organisation, with potentially disastrous results. By calling
the popular self-organisation required by a social revolution
the same name as a hierarchical and centralised body constructed
for, and evolved to ensure, minority rule, the door is wide 
open to confuse popular power with party power, to confuse
rule by the representatives of the working class with 
working class self-management of the revolution and society.

As we discussed in section H.2.1, anarchist opposition to
the idea of a "dictatorship of the proletariat" should not
be confused with idea that anarchists do not think that a
social revolution needs to be defended. Rather, our opposition
to the concept rests on the confusion which inevitably occurs
when you mix up scientific analysis with metaphysical concepts.
By drawing out an a-historic definition of the state, Engels
helped ensure that the "dictatorship of the proletariat"
became the "dictatorship over the proletariat" by implying
that centralisation and delegated power into the hands of
the few can be considered as an expression of popular power.
 
To explain why, we need only to study the works of Engels
himself. Engels, in his famous account of the _Origin 
of the Family, Private Property and the State_, defined 
the state as follows:

"The state is . . . by no means a power forced on society from
without . . . Rather, it is a product of society at a certain
stage of development; it is an admission . . . that it has
split into irreconcilable antagonisms . . . in order that 
these antagonisms and classes with conflicting economic 
interests might not consume themselves and society in
fruitless struggle, it became necessary to have power 
seemingly standing above society that would alleviate the
conflict . . . this power, arisen out of society but placing
itself above it, and alienating itself more and more from it,
is the state." [_Marx-Engels: Selected Writings_, p. 576]

The state has two distinguishing features, firstly (and least
importantly) it "divides its subjects *according to territory.*"
The second "is the establishment of a *public power* which
no longer directly coincides with the population organising
itself as an armed force. This special public power is necessary
because a self-acting armed organisation of the population 
has become impossible since the split into classes . . . This
public power exists in every state; it consists not merely of
armed men but also of material adjuncts, prisons and institutions
of coercion of all kinds." Thus "an essential feature of the 
state is a public power distinct from the mass of the people." 
[Op. Cit., pp. 576-7 and pp. 535-6]

In this, as can be seen, the Marxist position concurs with the
anarchist. He discusses the development of numerous ancient 
societies to prove his point. Talking of Greek society, he
argues that it was based on a popular assembly which was 
"sovereign" plus a council. This social system was not a 
state because "when every adult male member of the tribe 
was a warrior, there was as yet no public authority separated 
from the people that could have been set up against it. 
Primitive democracy was still in full bloom, and this must 
remain the point of departure in judging power and the status 
of the council." [Op. Cit., pp. 525-6] 

Discussing the descent of this society into classes, he argues
that this required "an institution that would perpetuate, not 
only the newly-rising class division of society, but the right 
of the possessing class to exploit the non-possessing class and 
the rule of the former over the latter." Unsurprisingly, "this 
institution arrived. The *state* was invented." The original 
communal organs of society were "superseded by real governmental 
authorities" and the defence of society ("the actual 'people in 
arms'") was "taken by an armed 'public power' at the service of 
these authorities and, therefore, also available against the 
people." With the rise of the state, the communal council was 
"transformed into a senate." [Op. Cit., p. 528 and p. 525] Thus
the state arises specifically to exclude popular self-government,
replacing it with minority rule conducted via a centralised,
hierarchical top-down structure ("government . . . is the 
natural protector of capitalism and other exploiters of popular 
labour." [Bakunin, _Michael Bakunin: Selected Writings_, p. 239]).

This account of the rise of the state is at direct odds with
Engels argument that the state is simply an instrument of 
class rule. For the "dictatorship of the proletariat" to 
be a state, it would have to constitute a power above society, 
be different from the people armed, and so be "a public power 
distinct from the mass of the people." However, Marx and 
Engels are at pains to stress that the "dictatorship of 
the proletariat" will not be such a regime. However, how 
can you have something (namely "a public power distinct 
from the mass of the people") you consider as "an essential 
feature" of a state missing in an institution you call the 
same name? It is a bit like calling a mammal a "new kind 
of reptile" in spite of the former not being cold-blooded, 
something you consider as "an essential feature" of the 
latter! 

This contradiction helps explains Engels comments that 
"[w]e would therefore propose to replace *state* everywhere
by *Gemeinwesen,* a good old German word which can very 
well convey the meaning of the French word '*commune'*"
He even states that the Paris Commune "was no longer a 
state in the proper sense of the word." However, this 
comment does not mean that Engels sought to remove any 
possible confusion on the matter, for he still talked 
of "the state" as "only a transitional institution 
which is used in the struggle, in the revolution, to 
hold down's one's adversaries by force . . . so long 
as the proletariat still *uses* the state, it does 
not use it the interests of freedom but in order to 
hold down its adversaries, and as soon as it becomes
possible to speak of freedom the state as such ceases 
to exist." [Op. Cit., p. 335] Thus the state would 
still exist and, furthermore, is *not* identified with 
the working class as a whole ("a self-acting armed 
organisation of the population"), rather it is an 
institution standing apart from the "people armed"
which is used, by the proletariat, to crush its enemies. 

(As an aside, we must stress that to state that it only 
becomes possible to "speak of freedom" after the state 
and classes cease to exist is a serious theoretical
error. Firstly, it means to talk about "freedom" in the 
abstract, ignoring the reality of class and hierarchical
society. To state the obvious, in class society working 
class people have their freedom restricted by the state,
wage labour and other forms of social hierarchy. The
aim of social revolution is the conquest of liberty by the
working class by overthrowing hierarchical rule. Freedom
for the working class, by definition, means stopping 
any attempts to restrict that freedom by its adversaries.
To state the obvious, it is not a "restriction" of the 
freedom of would-be bosses to resist their attempts to
impose their rule! As such, Engels, yet again, fails to
consider revolution from a working class perspective --
see section H.4.7 for another example of this flaw.
Moreover his comments have been used to justify 
restrictions on working class freedom, power and 
political rights by Marxist parties once they have 
seized power. "Whatever power the State gains," correctly
argues Bookchin, "it always does so at the expense of
popular power. Conversely, whatever power the people 
gain, they always acquire at the expense of the State.
To legitimate State power, in effect, is to delegitimate
popular power." [_Remaking Society_, p. 160])

Elsewhere, we have Engels arguing that "the characteristic
attribute of the former state" is that while society
"had created its own organs to look after its own
special interests" in the course of time "these organs, 
at whose head was the state power, transformed themselves 
from the servants of society into the masters of society." 
[Op. Cit., p. 257] Ignoring the obvious contradiction with 
his earlier claims that the state and communal organs were
different, with the former destroying the latter, we are 
struck yet again by the idea of the state as being defined 
as an institution above society. Thus, if the post 
revolutionary society is marked by "the state" being 
dissolved into society, placed under its control, then it 
is not a state. To call it a "new and truly democratic" 
form of "state power" makes as little sense as calling a 
motorcar a "new" form of bicycle. As such, when Engels 
argues that the Paris Commune "was no longer a state in 
the proper sense of the word" or that when the proletariat 
seizes political power it "abolishes the state as state" we 
may be entitled to ask what it is, a state or not a state. 
[Op. Cit., p. 335 and p. 424] It cannot be both, it cannot 
be a "public power distinct from the mass of the people" 
*and* "a self-acting armed organisation of the population." 
If it is the latter, then it does not have what Engels 
considered as "an essential feature of the state" and 
cannot be considered one. If it is the former, then any 
claim that such a regime is the rule of the working class 
is automatically invalidated. That Engels mocked the
anarchists for seeking a revolution "without a provisional 
government and in the total absence of any state or 
state-like institution, which are to be destroyed" we can 
safely say that it is the former. [Marx, Engels and Lenin, 
_Anarchism and Anarcho-Syndicalism_, p. 156] Given that 
"primitive democracy," as Engels noted, defended itself 
against its adversaries without such an institution shows 
that to equate the defence of working class freedom with 
the state is not only unnecessary, it simply leads to 
confusion. For this reason anarchists do not confuse the 
necessary task of defending and organising a social 
revolution with creating a state. 

Thus, the problem for Marxism is that the empirical definition 
of the state collides with the metaphysical, the actual state 
with its Marxist essence. As Italian Anarchist Camillo Berneri 
argued, "'The Proletariat' which seizes the state, bestowing 
on it the complete ownership of the means of production and 
destroying itself as proletariat and the state 'as the state' 
is a metaphysical fantasy, a political hypotasis of social 
abstractions." ["The Abolition and Extinction of the State," 
_Cienfuegos Press Anarchist Review_, no. 4, p. 50] 

This is no academic point, as we explain in the next section 
this confusion has been exploited to justify party power 
*over* the proletariat. Thus, as Berneri argues, Marxists
"do not propose the armed conquest of the commune by the
whole proletariat, but they propose the conquest of the
State by the party which imagines it represents the 
proletariat. The Anarchists allow the use of direct power 
by the proletariat, but they understand by the organ of 
this power to be formed by the entire corpus of systems 
of communist administration -- corporate organisations
[i.e. industrial unions], communal institutions, both 
regional and national -- freely constituted outside and 
in opposition to all political monopoly by parties and 
endeavouring to a minimum administrational centralisation." 
Thus "the Anarchists desire the destruction of the classes 
by means of a social revolution which eliminates, with the 
classes, the State." ["Dictatorship of the Proletariat and 
State Socialism", Op. Cit., p. 52] Anarchists are opposed 
to the state because it is not neutral, it cannot be made 
to serve our interests. The structures of the state are 
only necessary when a minority seeks to rule over the 
majority. We argue that the working class can create our 
own structures, organised and run from below upwards, to 
ensure the efficient running of everyday life.

By confusing two radically different things, Marxism 
ensures that popular power is consumed and destroyed by 
the state, by a new ruling elite. In the words Murray 
Bookchin:

"Marx, in his analysis of the Paris Commune of 1871, has 
done radical social theory a considerable disservice. The 
Commune's combination of delegated policy-making with the 
execution of policy by its own administrators, a feature 
of the Commune which Marx celebrated, is a major failing 
of that body. Rousseau quite rightly emphasised that popular 
power cannot be delegated without being destroyed. One either 
has a fully empowered popular assembly or power belongs to 
the State." ["Theses on Libertarian Municipalism", pp. 9-22, 
_The Anarchist Papers_, Dimitrios Roussopoulos (ed.), p. 14]

If power belongs to the state, then the state is a 
public body distinct from the population and, therefore,
not an instrument of working class power. Rather, as an 
institution designed to ensure minority rule, it would
ensure its position within society and become either the 
ruling class itself or create a new class which instrument
it would be. As we discuss in section H.3.9 ("Is the state 
simply an agent of economic power?") the state cannot be 
considered as a neutral instrument of class rule, it has
specific interests in itself which can and does mean it 
can play an oppressive and exploitative role in society
independently of a ruling class.

Which brings us to the crux of the issue whether this
"new" state will, in fact, be unlike any other state 
that has ever existed. Insofar as this "new" state is 
based on popular self-management and self-organisation,
anarchists argue that such an organisation cannot be
called a state as it is *not* based on delegated power.
"As long as," as Bookchin stresses, "the institutions of 
power consisted of armed workers and peasants as 
distinguished from a professional bureaucracy, police 
force, army, and cabal of politicians and judges, they 
were no[t] a State . . . These institutions, in fact 
comprised a revolutionary people in arms . . . not a 
professional apparatus that could be regarded as a State 
in any meaningful sense of the term." ["Looking Back at 
Spain," pp. 53-96, _The Radical Papers_, p. 86]

This was why Bakunin was at pains to emphasis that a
"federal organisation, from below upward, of workers'
associations, groups, communes, districts, and 
ultimately, regions and nations" could not be considered
as the same as "centralised states" and "contrary to 
their essence." [_Statism and Anarchy_, p. 13] So 
when Lenin argues in _State and Revolution_ that 
in the "dictatorship of the proletariat" the "organ
of suppression is now the majority of the population,
and not the minority" and that "since the majority of
the people *itself* suppresses its oppressors, a 
'special force' for the suppression [of the bourgeoisie]
is *no longer necessary*" he is confusing two 
fundamentally different things. As Engels made clear, 
such a social system of "primitive democracy" is not a 
state. However, when Lenin argues that "the more the 
functions of state power devolve upon the people 
generally, the less need is there for the existence 
of this power," he is implicitly arguing that there 
would be, in fact, a "public power distinct from mass 
of the people" and so a state in the normal sense of 
the word based on delegated power, "special forces"
separate from the armed people and so on. [_Essential 
Works of Lenin_, p. 301] 

That such a regime would not "wither away" has been proven
by history. The state machine does not (indeed, *cannot*) 
represent the interests of the working classes due to its 
centralised, hierarchical and elitist nature -- all it can 
do is represent the interests of the party in power, its 
own bureaucratic needs and privileges and slowly, but 
surely, remove itself from popular control. This, as 
anarchists have constantly stressed, is why the state 
is based on the delegation of power, on hierarchy and 
centralisation. The state is organised in this way to 
facilitate minority rule by excluding the mass of people 
from taking part in the decision making processes within 
society. If the masses actually did manage society directly, 
it would be impossible for a minority class to dominate it. 
Hence the need for a state. Which shows the central fallacy 
of the Marxist theory of the state, namely it argues that 
the rule of the proletariat will be conducted by a structure, 
the state, which is designed to exclude the popular 
participation such a concept demands!

Considered another way, "political power" (the state) is 
simply the power of minorities to enforce their wills. This 
means that a social revolution which aims to create socialism 
cannot use it to further its aims. After all, if the state 
(i.e. "political power") has been created to further minority 
class rule (as Marxists and anarchists agree) then, surely,
this function has determined how the organ which exercises
it has developed. Therefore, we would expect organ and
function to be related and impossible to separate. 

So when Marx argued that the "conquest of political power
becomes the great duty of the proletariat" because "the lords 
of the land and of capital always make use of their political 
privileges to defend and perpetuate their economic monopolies
and enslave labour," he drew the wrong conclusion. [Marx, 
Engels and Lenin, _Anarchism and Anarcho-Syndicalism_, p. 85] 
Building on a historically based (and so evolutionary) 
understanding of the state, anarchists concluded that it 
was necessary not to seize political power (which could 
only be exercised by a minority within any state) but 
rather to destroy it, to dissipate power into the hands of 
the working class, the majority. By ending the regime of 
the powerful by destroying their instrument of rule, the 
power which was concentrated into their hands automatically 
falls back into the hands of society. Thus, working class 
power can only be concrete once "political power" is 
shattered and replaced by the social power of the working 
class based on its own class organisations (such as factory 
committees, workers' councils, unions, neighbourhood 
assemblies and so on). As Murray Bookchin put it:

"the slogan 'Power to the people' can only be put into 
practice when the power exercised by social elites is 
dissolved into the people. Each individual can then take 
control of his [or her] daily life. If 'Power to the people' 
means nothing more than power to the 'leaders' of the people, 
then the people remain an undifferentiated, manipulated mass, 
as powerless after the revolution as they were before." 
[_Post-Scarcity Anarchism_, p. 20f]

In practice, this means that any valid social revolution needs
to break the new state and *not* replace it with another one.
This is because, in order to be a state, any state structure 
must be based on delegated power, hierarchy and centralisation
("every State, even the most Republican and the most democratic
. . . . are in essence only machine governing the masses from
above" and "[i]f there is a State, there must necessarily be
domination, and therefore slavery; a State without slavery,
overt or concealed, is unthinkable -- and that is why we are
enemies of the State." [Bakunin, _The Political Philosophy of 
Bakunin_, p. 211 and p. 287]). This means that if power is 
devolved to the working class then the state no longer exists 
as its "essential feature" (of delegated power) is absent. 
What you have is a new form of the "primitive democracy" 
which existed before the rise of the state. While this new,
modern, form of self-management will have to defend itself
against those seeking to recreate minority power, this does
not mean that it becomes a state. After all, "primitive 
democracy" had to defend itself against its adversaries and
so that, in itself, does not (as Engels acknowledges) means 
it is a state. Thus defence of a revolution, as anarchists 
have constantly stressed, does not equate to a state as it 
fails to address the key issue, namely who has *power* in 
the system -- the masses or their leaders. 

This issue is fudged by Marx. In his comments on Bakunin's 
question in "Statism and Anarchy" about "Will the entire 
proletariat head the government?", Marx argues in response:

"Does in a trade union, for instance, the whole union 
constitute the executive committee? Will all division of 
labour in a factory disappear and also the various functions 
arising from it? And will everybody be at the top in Bakunin's 
construction built from the bottom upwards? There will in 
fact be no below then. Will all members of the commune also 
administer the common affairs of the region? In that case 
there will be no difference between commune and region. 
'The Germans [says Bakunin] number nearly 40 million. Will, 
for example, all 40 million be members of the government?' 
Certainly, for the thing begins with the self-government 
of the commune." [Marx, Engels and Lenin, _Anarchism and 
Anarcho-Syndicalism_, pp. 150-1]

As Alan Carter argues, "this might have seemed to Marx 
[over] a century ago to be satisfactory rejoinder, but 
it can hardly do today. In the infancy of the trade unions, 
which is all Marx knew, the possibility of the executives 
of a trade union becoming divorced from the ordinary members 
may not have seemed to him to be a likely outcome, We, 
however, have behind us a long history of union leaders
'selling out' and being out of touch with their members. 
Time has ably demonstrated that to reject Bakunin's fears 
on the basis of the practice of trade union officials 
constitutes a woeful complacency with regard to power 
and privilege -- a complacency that was born ample fruit 
in the form of present Marxist parties and 'communist' 
societies . . . [His] dispute with Bakunin shows quite 
clearly that Marx did not stress the continued control 
of the revolution by the mass of the people as a 
prerequisite for the transcendence of all significant 
social antagonisms." [_Marx: A Radical Critique_, 
pp. 217-8]

As we discussed in section H.3.1, Marx's "Address 
to the Communist League," with its stress on "the most
determined centralisation of power in the hands of 
the state authority" and that "the path of revolutionary
activity . . . can only proceed with full force from
the centre," suggests that Bakunin's fears were valid
and Marx's answer simply inadequate. [_Marx-Engels 
Reader_, p. 509] Simply put, if, as Engels argues, 
the "an essential feature of the state is a public 
power distinct from the mass of the people," then, 
clearly Marx's argument of 1850 (and others like it) 
signifies a state in the usual sense of the word, 
one which has to be "distinct" from the mass of the 
population in order to ensure that the masses are 
prevented from interfering with their own revolution. 

Ultimately, the question, of course, is one of power. Does 
the "executive committee" have the fundamental decision 
making power in society, or does that power lie in 
the mass assemblies upon which a federal socialist 
society is built? If the former, we have rule by a 
few party leaders and the inevitable bureaucratisation 
of the society and a state in the accepted sense of the
word. If the latter, we have a basic structure of a free 
and equal society and a new organisation of popular 
self-management which eliminates, by self-management,
the existence of a public power above society. This is 
not playing with words. It signifies the key issue of 
social transformation, an issue which Marxism tends to
ignore or confuse matters about when discussing. Bookchin 
clarifies what is at stake:

"To some neo-Marxists who see centralisation and 
decentralisation merely as difference of degree, the
word 'centralisation' may merely be an awkward way of
denoting means for *co-ordinating* the decisions made
by decentralised bodies. Marx, it is worth noting, 
greatly confused this distinction when he praised the
Paris Commune as a 'working, not a parliamentary body,
executive and legislative at the same time.' In point 
of fact, the consolidation of 'executive and legislative' 
functions in a single body was regressive. It simply 
identified the process of policy-making, a function that 
rightly should belong to the people in assembly, with the 
technical execution of these policies, a function that 
should be left to strictly administrative bodies subject 
to rotation, recall, limitations of tenure . . . 
Accordingly, the melding of policy formation with 
administration placed the institutional emphasis of 
classical [Marxist] socialism on centralised bodies, 
indeed, by an ironical twist of historical events, 
bestowing the privilege of formulating policy on the 
'higher bodies' of socialist hierarchies and their 
execution precisely on the more popular 'revolutionary 
committees' below." [_Toward an Ecological Society_, 
pp. 215-6]

By confusing co-ordination with the state (i.e. with
delegation of power), Marxism opens the door wide open
to the "dictatorship of the proletariat" being a state
"in the proper sense." Not only does Marxism open that
door, it even invites the state "in the proper sense" of 
the word in! This can be seen from Engels comment that 
just as "each political party sets out to establish its 
rule in the state, so the German Social-Democratic 
Workers' Party is striving to establish *its* rule, 
the rule of the working class." [Marx, Engels and Lenin, 
_Anarchism and Anarcho-syndicalism_, p. 94] By confusing 
rule by the party "in the state" with "rule of the working 
class," Engels is confusing party power and popular power. 
For the party to "establish *its* rule," the state in 
the normal sense (i.e. a structure based on the delegation 
of power) has to be maintained. As such, the "dictatorship 
of the proletariat" signifies the delegation of power by 
the proletariat into the hands of the party and that 
implies a "public power distinct from the mass of the
people" and so minority rule. This aspect of Marxism, 
as we argue in the next section, was developed under the 
Bolsheviks and became "the dictatorship of the party" (i.e. 
the dictatorship *over* the proletariat).

It is for this reason why anarchists are extremely critical
of Marxist ideas of social revolution. As Alan Carter argues:

"It is to argue not against revolution, but against 
'revolutionary' praxis employing central authority. 
It is to argue that any revolution must remain in the 
hands of the mass of people and that they must be aware 
of the dangers of allowing power to fall into the hands 
of a minority in the course of the revolution. Latent 
within Marxist theory . . . is the tacit condoning of
political inequality in the course and aftermath of 
revolutionary praxis. Only when such inequality is openly 
and widely rejected can there be any hope of a libertarian 
communist revolution. The lesson to learn is that we must 
oppose not revolutionary practice, but *authoritarian* 
'revolutionary' practice. Such authoritarian practice
will continue to prevail in revolutionary circles as 
long as the Marxist theory of the state and the 
corresponding theory of power remain above criticism 
within them." [_Marx: A Radical Critique_, p. 231]

In summary, the Marxist theory of the state is simply 
a-historic and postulates some kind of state "essence" 
which exists independently of actual states and their
role in society. To confuse the organ required by a 
minority class to execute and maintain its rule and that
required by a majority class to manage society is to
make a theoretical error of great magnitude. It opens
the door to the idea of party power and even party 
dictatorship. As such, the Marxism of Marx and Engels 
is confused on the issue of the state. Their comments 
fluctuate between the anarchist definition of the state 
(based, as it is, on generalisations from historical 
examples) and the a-historic definition (based not on 
historical example but rather derived from a 
supra-historical analysis). Trying to combine the 
metaphysical with the scientific, the authoritarian 
with the libertarian, can only leave their followers 
with a confused legacy and that is what we find.

Since the death of the founding fathers of Marxism, their
followers have diverged into two camps. The majority have 
embraced the metaphysical and authoritarian concept of the
state and proclaimed their support for a "workers' state."
This is represented by social-democracy and it radical 
offshoot, Leninism. As we discuss in the next section, this
school has used the Marxist conception of the state to allow 
for rule over the working class by the "revolutionary" party.
The minority has become increasingly and explicitly anti-state,
recognising that the Marxist legacy is contradictory and that
for the proletarian to directly manage society then there can
be no power above them. To this camp belongs the libertarian
Marxists of the council communist, Situationist and other 
schools of thought which are close to anarchism.

H.3.8 What is wrong with the Leninist theory of the state?
 As discussed in the last section, there is a contradiction at
the heart of the Marxist theory of the state. On the one hand,
it acknowledges that the state, historically, has always been
an instrument of minority rule and is structured to ensure 
this. On the other, it argues that you can have a state (the 
"dictatorship of the proletariat") which transcends this 
historical reality to express an abstract essence of the 
state as an "instrument of class rule." This means that Marxism
usually confuses two very different concepts, namely the state
(a structure based on centralisation and delegated power) and 
the popular self-management and self-organisation required
to create and defend a socialist society.

This confusion between two fundamentally different concepts 
proved to be disastrous when the Russian Revolution broke out.
Confusing party power with working class power, the Bolsheviks
aimed to create a "workers' state" in which their party would
be in power (see section H.6.5). As the state was an instrument
of class rule, it did not matter if the new "workers' state"
was centralised, hierarchical and top-down like the old state
as the structure of the state was considered irrelevant in 
evaluating its role in society. Thus, while Lenin seemed to
promise a radical democracy in which the working class would
directly manage its own affairs in his _State and Revolution_,
in practice implemented a "dictatorship of the proletariat"
which was, in fact, "the organisation of the vanguard of the
oppressed as the ruling class." [_Essential Works of Lenin_,
p. 337] In other words, the vanguard party in the position 
of head of the state, governing on behalf of the working 
class which, as we argued in the last section, meant that
the new "workers' state" was fundamentally a state in the
usual sense of the word. This quickly lead to a dictatorship
*over,* not of, the proletariat (as Bakunin had predicted).

This development did not come as a surprise to anarchists,
who long argued that a state is an instrument of minority 
rule and cannot change its nature. To use the state to affect
socialist change is impossible, simply because it is not
designed for such a task. As we argued in section B.2,
the state is based on centralisation of power explicitly to
ensure minority rule and for this reason has to be abolished
during a social revolution.

Ironically, the theoretical lessons Leninists gained from 
the experience of the Russian Revolution confirm the 
anarchist analysis that the state structure exists to 
facilitate minority rule and marginalise and disempower 
the majority to achieve that rule. This can be seen from 
the significant revision of the Marxist position which 
occurred once the Bolshevik party become the ruling party.
Simply put, after 1917 leading representatives of Leninism
stressed that the idea that state power was *not* required 
to repress resistance by the ex-ruling class as such, but,
in fact, was necessitated by the divisions within the 
working class. In other words, state power was required
because the working class was not able to govern itself
and so required a grouping (the party) above it to ensure
the success of the revolution and overcome any "wavering"
within the masses themselves.

While we have discussed this position in section H.1.2 and
so will be repeating ourselves to some degree, it is worth
summarising again the arguments put forward to justify this
revision. This is because they confirm what anarchists have
always argued, namely that the state is an instrument of
minority rule and *not* one by which working class people 
can manage their own affairs directly. As the quotations
from leading Leninists make clear, it is *precisely* this
feature of the state which recommends it for party (i.e.
minority) power. In other words, the contradiction at the 
heart of the Marxist theory of the state we pointed out in 
the last section has been resolved in Leninism. It supports
the state precisely because it is "a public power distinct 
from the mass of the people," rather than an instrument of
working class self-management of society. 

Needless to say, latter day followers of Leninism point to 
Lenin's apparently democratic, even libertarian sounding, 
1917 work, _The State and Revolution_ when asked about the
Leninist theory of the state. As our discussion of the Russian
revolution in section H.6 proves, the ideas expounded in his 
pamphlet were rarely, if at all, applied in practice by the
Bolsheviks. Moreover, it was written before the seizure of
power. In order to see the validity of his argument we must
compare it to his and his fellow Bolshevik leaders opinions
once the revolution had "succeeded." What lessons did they
generalise from their experiences and how did these lessons
relate to _State and Revolution_?

This change can be seen from Trotsky, who argued quite
explicitly that "the proletariat can take power only through 
its vanguard" and that "the necessity for state power arises 
from an insufficient cultural level of the masses and their 
heterogeneity." Only with "support of the vanguard by the 
class" can there be the "conquest of power" and it was in
"this sense the proletarian revolution and dictatorship are 
the work of the whole class, but only under the leadership of 
the vanguard." Thus, rather than the working class as a whole 
seizing power, it is the "vanguard" which takes power -- "a 
revolutionary party, even after seizing power . . . is still 
by no means the sovereign ruler of society." [_Stalinism and 
Bolshevism_] 

Thus state power is required to *govern the masses,* who 
cannot exercise power themselves. As Trotsky put it, 
"[t]hose who propose the abstraction of Soviets to the 
party dictatorship should understand that only thanks to 
the party dictatorship were the Soviets able to lift 
themselves out of the mud of reformism and attain the 
state form of the proletariat." [Op. Cit.] Clearly, 
the state is envisioned as an instrument existing 
*above* society, above the working class, and its 
"necessity" is not driven by the need to defend the 
revolution, but rather in the "insufficient cultural 
level of the masses." Indeed, "party dictatorship" is 
required to create "the state form of the proletariat." 

This idea that state power was required due to the limitations
within the working class is reiterated a few years later in
1939:

"The very same masses are at different times inspired by 
different moods and objectives. It is just for this reason 
that a centralised organisation of the vanguard is 
indispensable. Only a party, wielding the authority it has 
won, is capable of overcoming the vacillation of the masses 
themselves . . . if the dictatorship of the proletariat
means anything at all, then it means that the vanguard of
the proletariat is armed with the resources of the state
in order to repel dangers, including those emanating from
the backward layers of the proletariat itself." [_The 
Moralists and Sycophants_, p. 59]

Needless to say, *by definition* everyone is "backward"
when compared to the "vanguard of the proletariat." Moreover,
as it is this "vanguard" which is "armed with the resources
of the state" and *not* the proletariat as a whole we are
left with one obvious conclusion, namely party dictatorship
rather than working class democracy. How Trotsky's position 
is compatible with the idea of the working class as the 
"ruling class" is not explained. However, it fits in well 
with the anarchist analysis of the state as an instrument 
designed to ensure minority rule. Other, equally elitist 
arguments were expressed by Trotsky twenty years earlier 
when he held the reins of power.

In 1920, he argued that while the Bolsheviks have "more than 
once been accused of having substituted for the dictatorship
of the Soviets the dictatorship of the party," in fact "it 
can be said with complete justice that the dictatorship of 
the Soviets became possible only by means of the dictatorship 
of the party." This, just to state the obvious, was his 
argument seventeen years later. "In this 'substitution' of 
the power of the party for the power of the working class,"
Trotsky added, "there is nothing accidental, and in reality 
there is no substitution at all. The Communists express the 
fundamental interests of the working class." [_Terrorism and 
Communism_, p. 109] In early 1921, he argued again for Party 
dictatorship at the Tenth Party Congress. His comments made 
there against the _Workers' Opposition_ within the Communist 
Party make his position clear: 

"The Workers' Opposition has come out with dangerous slogans, 
making a fetish of democratic principles! They place the 
workers' right to elect representatives above the Party, as 
if the party were not entitled to assert its dictatorship 
even if that dictatorship temporarily clashed with the passing 
moods of the workers' democracy. It is necessary to create 
amongst us the awareness of the revolutionary birthright of 
the party, which is obliged to maintain its dictatorship, 
regardless of temporary wavering even in the working classes. 
This awareness is for us the indispensable element. The 
dictatorship does not base itself at every given moment on the 
formal principle of a workers' democracy." [quoted by Samuel 
Farber, _Before Stalinism_, p. 209] 

The similarities with his arguments of 1939 are obvious.
Unsurprisingly, he maintained this position in the intervening 
years. He stated in 1922 that "we maintain the dictatorship of our 
party!" [_The First Five Years of the Communist International_,
vol. 2, p. 255] The next year saw him arguing that "[i]f 
there is one question which basically not only does not 
require revision but does not so much as admit the 
thought of revision, it is the question of the dictatorship 
of the Party." He stressed that "[o]ur party is the ruling 
party" and that "[t]o allow any changes whatever in this 
field" meant "bring[ing] into question all the achievements 
of the revolution and its future." He indicated the fate of 
those who *did* question the party's "leading role": "Whoever 
makes an attempt on the party's leading role will, I hope, 
be unanimously dumped by all of us on the other side of
the barricade." [_Leon Trotsky Speaks_, p. 158 and p. 160]

By 1927, when Trotsky was in the process of being "dumped"
on the "other side of the barricade" by the ruling bureaucracy,
he *still* argued for Party dictatorship. The _Platform
of the Opposition_ includes "the Leninist principle, inviolable 
for every Bolshevik, that the dictatorship of the proletariat 
is and can be realised only through the dictatorship of the 
party." The document stresses the "dictatorship of the 
proletariat [sic!] demands as its very core a single 
proletarian party," that "the dictatorship of the proletariat 
demands a single and united proletarian party as the leader 
of the working masses and the poor peasantry." 

Ten years later, he explicitly argued that the "revolutionary 
dictatorship of a proletarian party" was "an objective 
necessity imposed upon us by the social realities -- the 
class struggle, the heterogeneity of the revolutionary
class, the necessity for a selected vanguard in order to 
assure the victory." This "dictatorship of a party" was
essential and "we can not jump over this chapter" of human
history. He stressed that the "revolutionary party (vanguard)
which renounces its own dictatorship surrenders the masses
to the counter-revolution" and argued that "the party 
dictatorship" could *not* be replaced by "the 'dictatorship' 
of the whole toiling people without any party." This was
because the "level of political development among the 
masses" was not "high" enough as "capitalism does not permit 
the material and the moral development of the masses." 
[Trotsky, _Writings 1936-37_, pp. 513-4]

Thus, for Trotsky over a twenty year period, the "dictatorship 
of the proletariat" was fundamentally a "dictatorship of the 
party." While the working class may be allowed some level of 
democracy, the rule of the party was repeatedly given precedence. 
While the party may be placed into power by a mass revolution, 
once there the party would maintain its position of power and
dismiss attempts by the working class to replace it as "wavering"
or "vacillation" due to the "insufficient cultural level of the 
masses and their heterogeneity." In other words, the party 
dictatorship was required to protect working class people
from themselves, their tendency to change their minds based
on debates between difference political ideas and positions, 
make their own decisions, reject what is in their best interests
(as determined by the party), and so on. Thus the underlying 
rationale for democracy (namely that it reflects the changing
will of the voters, their "passing moods" so to speak) is 
used to justify party dictatorship!

As noted in section H.1.2, Trotsky on this matter was simply
following Lenin's led, who had admitted at the end of 1920
that while "the dictatorship of the proletariat" was 
"inevitable" in the "transition of socialism," it is "not 
exercised by an organisation which takes in all industrial
workers." The reason, he states, "is given in the theses of
the Second Congress of the Communist International on the
role of political parties" (more on which later). This means
that "the Party, shall we say, absorbs the vanguard of the
proletariat, and this vanguard exercises the dictatorship
of the proletariat." This was required because "in all 
capitalist countries . . . the proletariat is still so divided, 
so degraded, and so corrupted in parts." Therefore, it "can be 
exercised only by a vanguard." [_Collected Works_, vol. 32, 
p. 20 and p. 21] As we pointed out in section H.3.3, Lenin
argued that "revolutionary coercion is bound to be employed 
towards the wavering and unstable elements among the masses 
themselves." [Op. Cit., vol. 42, p. 170] Needless to say, 
Lenin failed to mention this aspect of his system in _The 
State and Revolution_ (a failure usually repeated by his 
followers). It is, however, a striking confirmation of 
Bakunin's comments "the State cannot be sure of its own
self-preservation without an armed force to defend it 
against its own *internal enemies,* against the discontent
of its own people." [_Michael Bakunin: Selected Writings_,
p. 265]

Looking at the lessons leading leaders of Leninism gained from
the experience of the Russian Revolution, we have to admit that
the Leninist "workers' state" will not be, in fact, a "new" kind
of state, a "semi-state," or, to quote Lenin, a "new state" which
"is *no longer* a state in the proper sense of the word." If, as 
Lenin argued in early 1917, the state "in the proper sense of 
the term is domination over the people by contingents of armed
men divorced from the people," then Bolshevism in power quickly
saw the need for a state "in the proper sense." [_Selected Works_, 
vol. 2, p. 60] While this state "in the proper sense" had existed
from the start of Bolshevik rule (see section H.6), it was only
from 1919 onwards (at the latest) that the leaders of Bolshevism 
had openly brought what they said into line with what they did. 
It was only by being a "state in the proper sense" could the 
Bolshevik party rule and exercise "the dictatorship of the party" 
over the "wavering" working class.

So when Lenin states that "Marxism differs from anarchism in 
that it recognises *the need for a state* for the purpose of 
the transition to socialism," anarchists agree. Insofar as 
"Marxism" aims for, to quote Lenin, the party to "take state
power into [its] own hands," to become "the governing party"
and considers one of its key tasks for "our Party to capture 
political power" and to "administer" a country, then we can 
safely say that the state needed is a state "in the proper 
sense," based on the centralisation and delegation of power 
into the hands of a few. [Op. Cit., p. 60, p. 589, p. 328 
and p. 589]

This recreation of the state "in the proper sense" did not 
come about by chance or simply because of the "will to power" 
of the leaders of Bolshevism. Rather, there are strong 
institutional pressures at work within any state structure 
(even a "semi-state") to turn it back into a "proper" state. 
We discuss this in more detail in section H.3.9. However,
we should not ignore that many of the roots of Bolshevik 
tyranny can be found in the contradictions of the Marxist 
theory of the state. As noted in the last section, for 
Engels, the seizure of power by the party meant that the 
working class was in power. The Leninist tradition builds 
on this confusion between party and class power. It is clear 
that the "dictatorship of the proletariat" is, in fact, rule 
by the party. In Lenin's words:

"Engels speaks of *a government that is required for the 
domination of a class* . . . Applied to the proletariat, 
it consequently means a government *that is required for 
the domination of the proletariat,* i.e. the dictatorship 
of the proletariat for the effectuation of the socialist 
revolution." [_Collected Works_, vol. 8, p. 279]

The role of the working class in this state was also indicated,
as "only a revolutionary dictatorship supported by the vast
majority of the people can be at all durable." [Op. Cit., 
p. 291] In other words the "revolutionary government" has the
power, not the working class in whose name it governs. In
1921 he made this explicit: "To govern you need an army of 
steeled revolutionary Communists. We have it, and it is 
called the Party." The "Party is the leader, the vanguard 
of the proletariat, which rules directly." For Lenin, as 
"long as we, the Party's Central Committee and the whole 
Party, continue to run things, that is govern we shall 
never -- we cannot -- dispense with . . . removals, transfers, 
appointments, dismissals, etc." [Op. Cit., vol. 32, p. 62, 
p. 98 and p. 99] So much for "workers' power," "socialism
from below" and other such rhetoric. 

This vision of "socialism" being rooted in party power over
the working class was the basis of the Communist International's
resolution of the role of the party. This resolution is, therefore, 
important and worth discussing. 

It argues that the Communist Party "is *part* of the working 
class," namely its "most advanced, most class-conscious, and 
therefore most revolutionary part." It is "distinguished from 
the working class as a whole in that it grasps the whole 
historic path of the working class in its entirety and at 
every bend in that road endeavours to defend not the interests 
of individual groups or occupations but the interests of the 
working class as a whole." [_Proceedings and Documents of the 
Second Congress 1920_, vol. 1, p. 191] However, in response it 
can be argued that this simply means the "interests of the 
party" as only it can understand what "the interests of the 
working class as a whole" actually are. Thus we have the 
possibility of the party substituting its will for that of 
the working class simply because of what Leninists term the 
"uneven development" of the working class. As Alan Carter 
argues, these "conceptions of revolutionary organisation 
maintain political and ideological domination by retaining 
supervisory roles and notions of privileged access to 
knowledge . . . the term 'class consciousness' is 
employed to facilitate such domination over the workers. 
It is not what the workers think, but what the party 
leaders think they ought to think that constitutes the 
revolutionary consciousness imputed to the workers." 
The ideological basis for a new class structure is 
created as the "Leninist revolutionary praxis . . . is 
carried forward to post-revolutionary institutions," 
[_Marx: A Radical Critique_, p. 175]

The resolution stresses that before the revolution, the 
party "will encompass . . . only a minority of the workers." 
Even after the "seizure of power," it will still "not be 
able to unite them all into its ranks organisationally." 
It is only after the "final defeat of the bourgeois order" 
will "all or almost all workers begin to join" it. Thus
the party is a *minority* of the working class. The 
resolution then goes on to state that "[e]very class 
struggle is a political struggle. This struggle, which 
inevitably becomes transformed into civil war, has as
its goal the conquest of political power. Political power
cannot be seized, organised, and directed other than by
some kind of political party." [Op. Cit., p. 192, p. 193]
And as the party is a "part" of the working class which 
cannot "unite" all workers "into its ranks," this means 
that political power can only be "seized, organised, and 
directed" by a *minority.* 

Thus we have minority rule, with the party (or more 
correctly its leaders) exercising political power. The 
idea that the party "must *dissolve* into the councils,
that the councils can *replace* the Communist Party" is 
"fundamentally wrong and reactionary." This is because, 
to "enable the soviets to fulfil their historic tasks, 
there must . . . be a strong Communist Party, one that
does not simply 'adapt' to the soviets but is able to 
make them renounce 'adaptation' to the bourgeoisie." 
[Op. Cit., p. 196] Thus rather than the workers' councils 
exercising power, their role is simply that of allowing
the Communist Party to seize political party. 

The underlying assumptions behind this resolution and its
implications were clear by Zinoviev during his introductory
speech to the congress meeting on the role of the party
which finally agreed the resolution: 

"Today, people like Kautsky come along and say that in Russia
you do not have the dictatorship of the working class but the
dictatorship of the party. They think this is a reproach against
us. Not in the least! We have a dictatorship of the working
class and that is precisely why we also have a dictatorship of
the Communist Party. The dictatorship of the Communist Party
is only a function, an attribute, an expression of the
dictatorship of the working class . . . [T]he dictatorship
of the proletariat is at the same time the dictatorship of
the Communist Party." [Op. Cit., pp. 151-2]

Little wonder that Bertrand Russell, on his return from 
Lenin's Russia in 1920, wrote that "[f]riends of Russia 
here [in Britain] think of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat as merely a new form of representative 
government, in which only working men and women have 
votes, and the constituencies are partly occupational,
not geographical. They think that 'proletariat' means
'proletariat,' but 'dictatorship' does not quote mean
'dictatorship.' This is the opposite of the truth. When
a Russian Communist speak of a dictatorship, he means
the word literally, but when he speaks of the proletariat,
he means the word in a Pickwickian sense. He means the
'class-conscious' part of the proletariat, i.e. the 
Communist Party. He includes people by no means 
proletarian (such as Lenin and Tchicherin) who have 
the right opinions, and he excludes such wage-earners 
as have not the right opinions, whim he classifies as 
lackeys of the *bourgeoisie.*" Significantly, Russell 
pointed, like Lenin, to the Comintern resolution on the 
role of the Communist Party. In addition, Russell notes
the reason why this party dictatorship was required:
"No conceivable system of free elections would give
majorities to the Communists, either in the town or
country." [_The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism_, 
pp. 26-27 and pp. 40-1]

Nor are followers of Bolshevism shy in repeating its elitist 
conclusions. Tony Cliff, for example, showed his lack of 
commitment to working class democracy when he opined that 
the "actual level of democracy, as well as centralism, 
[during a revolution] depends on three basic factors: 
1. the strength of the proletariat; 2. the material and 
cultural legacy left to it by the old regime; and 3. the 
strength of capitalist resistance. The level of democracy 
feasible must be indirect proportion to the first two 
factors, and in inverse proportion to the third. The 
captain of an ocean liner can allow football to be played 
on his vessel; on a tiny raft in a stormy sea the level of 
tolerance is far lower." [_Lenin_, vol. 3, p. 179] That 
Cliff compares working class democracy to "football" says 
it all. Rather than seeing it as the core gain of a 
revolution, he relegates it to the level of a *game,* 
which may or may not be "tolerated"! 

And need we speculate who the paternalistic "captain" in charge 
of the ship of the state would be would be? Replacing Cliff's 
revealing analogies we get the following: "The party in charge 
of a workers' state can allow democracy when the capitalist class 
is not resisting; when it is resisting strongly, the level 
of tolerance is far lower." So, democracy will be "tolerated"
in the extremely unlikely situation that the capitalist class 
will not resist a revolution! That the party has no right to
"tolerate" democracy or not is not even entertained by Cliff,
its right to negate the basic rights of the working class 
is taken as a given. Clearly the key factor is that the party 
is in power. It *may* "tolerate" democracy, but ultimately 
his analogy shows that Bolshevism considers it as an added 
extra whose (lack of) existence in no way determines the 
nature of the "workers' state." Perhaps, therefore, we may 
add another "basic factor" to Cliff's three; namely "4. the 
strength of working class support for the party." The level 
of democracy feasible must be in direct proportion to this 
factor, as the Bolsheviks made clear. As long as the workers 
vote the party, then democracy is wonderful. If they do not, 
then their "wavering" and "passing moods" cannot be 
"tolerated" and democracy is replaced by the dictatorship 
of the party. Which is no democracy at all.

Obviously, then, if, as Engels argued, "an essential feature 
of the state is a public power distinct from the mass of 
the people" then the regime advocated by Bolshevism is 
not a "semi-state" but, in fact, a normal state. Trotsky 
and Lenin are equally clear that said state exists to ensure 
that the "mass of the people" do not participate in public 
power, which is exercised by a minority, the party (or, 
more correctly, the rulers of the party). One of the key aims
of this new state is to repress the "backward" or "wavering"
sections of the working class (although, by definition, 
all sections of the working class are "backward" in relation
to the "vanguard"). Hence the need for a "public power
distinct from the people" (as the suppression of the strike
wave and Kronstadt in 1921 shows, elite troops are always
needed to stop the army siding with their fellow workers).
And as proven by Trotsky's comments after he was squeezed
out of power, this perspective was *not* considered as a
product of "exceptional circumstances." Rather it was 
considered a basic lesson of the revolution, a position 
which was applicable to all future revolutions. In this,
Lenin and other leading Bolsheviks concurred.

The irony (and tragedy) of all this should not be lost. In
his 1905 diatribe against anarchism, Stalin had denied that
Marxists aimed for party dictatorship. He stressed that there
was "a dictatorship of the minority, the dictatorship of a
small group . . . which is directed against the people . . .
Marxists are the enemies of such a dictatorship, and they
fight such a dictatorship far more stubbornly and 
self-sacrificingly than do our noisy Anarchists." The 
practice of Bolshevism and the ideological revisions it
generated easily refutes Stalin's claims. The practice of
Bolshevism shows that his claims that "[a]t the head" of
the "dictatorship of the proletarian majority . . . stand
the masses" stand in sharp contradiction with Bolshevik
support for "revolutionary" governments. Either you have
(to use Stalin's expression) "the dictatorship of the 
streets, of the masses, a dictatorship directed against 
all oppressors" or you have party power *in the name of 
the street, of the masses.* The fundamental flaw in Leninism 
is that it confuses the two and so lays the group for the
very result anarchists predicted and Stalin denied. 
[_Collected Works_, vol. 1, p. 371-2]

While anarchists are well aware of the need to defend a 
revolution (see section H.2.1), we do not make the mistake 
of equating this with a state. Ultimately, the state 
cannot be used as an instrument of liberation -- it is
not designed for it. Which, incidentally, is why we have
not discussed the impact of the Russian Civil War on the
development of Bolshevik ideology. Simply put, the "workers'
state" is proposed, by Leninists, as the means to defend 
a revolution. As such, you cannot blame what it is meant to
be designed to withstand (counter-revolution and civil war) 
for its "degeneration." If the "workers' state" cannot handle
what its advocates claim it exists for, then its time to
look for an alternative and dump the concept in the dustbin
of history. We discuss this further in sections H.6 and 
H.8.

In summary, Bolshevism is based on a substantial revision of 
the Marxist theory of the state. While Marx and Engels were 
at pains to stress the accountability of their new state to 
the population under it, Leninism has made a virtue of the 
fact that the state has evolved to exclude that mass 
participation in order to ensure minority rule. Leninism has 
done so explicitly to allow the party to overcome the 
"wavering" of the working class, the very class it claims 
is the "ruling class" under socialism! In doing this, the 
Leninist tradition exploited the confused nature of the 
state theory of traditional Marxism (see last section). 
The Leninist theory of the state is flawed simply because 
it is based on creating a "state in the proper sense
of the word," with a public power distinct from the mass of
the people. This was the major lesson gained by the leading
Bolsheviks (including Lenin and Trotsky) and has its roots in
the common Marxist error of confusing party power with working 
class power. So when Leninists point to Lenin's _State and
Revolution_ as the definitive Leninist theory of the state,
anarchists simply point to the lessons Lenin himself gained
from actually conducting a revolution. Once we do, the 
slippery slope to the Leninist solution to the contradictions
inherit in the Marxist theory of the state can be seen, 
understood and combated.

H.3.9 Is the state simply an agent of economic power?

As we discussed in section H.3.7, the Marxist theory of
the state confuses an empirical analysis of the state with
a metaphysical one. While Engels is aware that the state
developed to ensure minority class rule and, as befits its
task, evolved specific characteristics to execute that 
role, he also raised the idea that the state ("as a rule") 
is "the state of the most powerful, economically dominant 
class" and "through the medium of the state, becomes also 
the politically dominant class." Thus the state can be 
considered, in essence, as "nothing but a machine for the 
oppression of one class by another." [_Marx-Engels Selected 
Works_, pp. 577-8 and p. 258] 

The clear implication is that the state is simply an
instrument, without special interests of its own. If this
is the case, the use of a state by the proletariat is,
therefore, unproblematic (and so the confusion between
working class self-organisation and the state we have
discussed in various sections above is irrelevant). This 
argument can lead to simplistic conclusions, such as
once a "revolutionary" government is in power in a "workers
state" we need not worry about abuses of power or even 
civil liberties (this position was commonplace in Bolshevik
ranks during the Russian Civil War, for example). It also
is at the heart of Trotsky's contortions with regards to
Stalinism, refusing to see the state bureaucracy as a new
ruling class simply because the state, by definition, could 
not play such a role.

For anarchists, this position is a fundamental weakness 
of Marxism, a sign that the mainstream Marxist position 
significantly misunderstands the nature of society and 
the needs of social revolution. However, we must stress
that anarchists would agree that state generally does
serve the interests of the economically dominant classes.
Bakunin, for example, argued that the State "is authority, 
domination, and forced, organised by the property-owning
and so-called enlightened classes against the masses." He 
saw the social revolution as destroying capitalism and the 
state at the same time, that is "to overturn the State's 
domination, and that of the privileged classes whom it 
solely represents." [_The Basic Bakunin_, p. 140] 

However, anarchists do not reduce our analysis and 
understanding of the state to this simplistic Marxist
level. While being well aware that the state is the 
means of ensuring the domination of an economic elite, 
anarchists recognise that the state machine also has 
interests of its own. The state, for anarchists, is the 
delegation of power into the hands of a few. This creates, 
by its very nature, a privileged position for those at 
the top of the hierarchy:

"A government [or state], that is a group of people entrusted 
with making the laws and empowered to use the collective 
force to oblige each individual to obey them, is already 
a privileged class and cut off from the people. As any 
constituted body would do, it will instinctively seek to 
extend its powers, to be beyond public control, to impose 
its own policies and to give priority to its special 
interests. Having been put in a privileged position,
the government is already at odds with the people whose 
strength it disposes of." [Malatesta, _Anarchy_, p. 34]

Thus, while Malatesta was under no doubts that under capitalism
the state was essentially "the bourgeoisie's servant and 
*gendarme,*" it did not mean that it did not have interests
of its own. As he put it, "the government, though springing
from the bourgeoisie and its servant and protector, tends,
as with every servant and protector, to achieve its own 
emancipation and to dominate whoever it protects." [Op. Cit.,
p. 20 and p. 22] 

Why this would happen is not hard to discover. Given that 
the state is a highly centralised, top-down structure it is 
unsurprising that it develops around itself a privileged 
class, a bureaucracy, around it. The inequality in power 
implied by the state is a source of privilege and 
oppression independent of property and economic class. 
Those in charge of the state's institutions would aim 
to protect (and expand) their area of operation, ensuring
that they select individuals who share their perspectives 
and who they can pass on their positions. By controlling the
flow of information, of personnel and resources, the members
of the state's higher circles can ensure its, and their own,
survival and prosperity. As such, politicians who are elected 
are at a disadvantage. The state is the permanent collection 
of institutions that have entrenched power structures and 
interests. The politicians come and go while the power in 
the state lies in its institutions due to their permanence. 
It is to be expected that such institutions would have their
own interests and would pursue them whenever they can. 

This would not fundamentally change in a new "workers' 
state" if it is, like all states, based on the delegation 
and centralisation of power into a few hands. Any 
"workers' government" would need a new apparatus to 
enforce its laws and decrees. It would need effective 
means of gathering and collating information. It would 
thus create "an entirely new ladder of administration 
to extend it rule and make itself obeyed." While a
social revolution needs mass participation, the state
limits initiative to the few who are in power and 
"it will be impossible for one or even a number of
individuals to elaborate the social forms" required,
which "can only be the collective work of the masses
. . . Any kind of external authority will merely be
an obstacle, a hindrance to the organic work that
has to be accomplished; it will be no better than a
source of discord and of hatreds." [Kropotkin, _Words 
of a Rebel_, p. 169 and pp. 176-7] 

Rather than "withering away," any "workers' state" would 
tend to grow in terms of administration and so the 
government creates around itself a class of bureaucrats 
whose position is different from the rest of society. 
This would apply to production as well. Being unable to 
manage everything, the state would have to re-introduce 
hierarchical management in order to ensure its orders are 
met and that a suitable surplus is extracted from the 
workers to feed the needs of the state machine. By 
creating an economically powerful class which it can rely 
on to discipline the workforce, it would simply recreate 
capitalism anew in the form of "state capitalism" (this is 
precisely what happened during the Russian Revolution). To 
enforce its will onto the people it claims to represent, 
specialised bodies of armed people (police, army) would be 
required and soon created. All of which is to be expected, 
as state socialism "entrusts to a few the management of 
social life and [so] leads to the exploitation and oppression 
of the masses by the few." [Malatesta, Op. Cit., p. 46]

This process does not happen instantly, it takes time.
However, the tendency for government to escape from popular 
control and to generate privileged and powerful institutions 
around it can be seen in all revolutions, including the Paris 
Commune and the Russian Revolution. In the former, the 
Communal Council was "largely ignored . . . after it was 
installed. The insurrection, the actual management of the 
city's affairs and finally the fighting against the 
Versaillese, were undertaken mainly by popular clubs, the 
neighbourhood vigilance committees, and the battalions of 
the National Guard. Had the Paris Commune (the Municipal 
Council) survived, it is extremely doubtful that it could 
have avoided conflict with these loosely formed street and 
militia formations. Indeed, by the end of April, some 
six weeks after the insurrection, the Commune constituted 
an 'all-powerful' Committee of Public Safety, a body 
redolent with memories of the Jacobin dictatorship 
and the Terror , which suppressed not only the right 
in the Great [French] Revolution of a century earlier, 
but also the left." [Murray Bookchin, _Post-Scarcity
Anarchism_, pp. 148-9] A minority of council members
(essentially those active in the International) stated 
that "the Paris Commune has surrendered its authority
to a dictatorship" and it was "hiding behind a dictatorship
that the electorate have not authorised us to accept
or to recognise." [_The Paris Commune of 1871: The View 
from the Left_, Eugene Schulkind (ed.), p. 187] The 
Commune was crushed before this process could fully 
unfold, but the omens were there (although it would 
have undoubtedly been hindered by small-scale of the 
institutions involved). As we discuss in section H.6, a 
similar process of a "revolutionary" government escaping 
from popular control occurred right from the start of the 
Russian Revolution. The fact the Bolshevik regime lasted 
longer and was more centralised (and covered a larger area) 
ensured that this process developed fully, with the 
"revolutionary" government creating around itself the 
institutions (the bureaucracy) which finally subjected the 
politicians and party leaders to its influence and then 
domination.

Simply put, the vision of the state as merely an instrument 
of class rule blinds its supporters to the dangers of 
*political* inequality in terms of power, the dangers 
inherent in giving a small group of people power over 
everyone else. The state has certain properties *because 
it is a state* and one of these is that it creates a 
bureaucratic class around it due to its centralised, 
hierarchical nature. Within capitalism, the state bureaucracy 
is (generally) under the control of the capitalist class. 
However, to generalise from this specific case is wrong 
as the state bureaucracy is a class in itself -- and so 
trying to abolish classes without abolishing the state is 
doomed to failure:

"The State has always been the patrimony of some privileged 
class: the sacerdotal class, the nobility, the bourgeoisie
-- and finally, when all the other classes have exhausted 
themselves, the class of the bureaucracy enters upon the 
stage and then the State falls, or rises, if you please to
the position of a machine." [Bakunin, _The Political
Philosophy of Bakunin_, p. 208]

Thus the state cannot simply be considered as an instrument 
of rule by economic classes. It can be quite an effective
parasitical force in its own right, as both anthropological 
and historical evidence suggest. The former raises the 
possibility that the state arose before the classes and 
that its roots are in inequalities in power (i.e. hierarchy) 
within society, not inequalities of wealth. The latter 
points to examples of societies in which the state was 
not, in fact, an instrument of (economic) class rule but 
rather pursued an interest of its own.

As regards anthropology, Michael Taylor summarises that the 
"evidence does not give [the Marxist] proposition [that the 
rise in classes caused the creation of the state] a great 
deal of support. Much of the evidence which has been offered 
in support of it shows only that the primary states, not long 
after their emergence, were economically stratified. But this 
is of course consistent also with the simultaneous rise . . . 
of political and economic stratification, or with the *prior* 
development of the state -- i.e. of *political* stratification 
-- and the creation of economic stratification by the ruling 
class." [_Community, Anarchy and Liberty_, p. 132] He quotes
Elman Service on this:

"In all of the archaic civilisations and historically known
chiefdoms and primitive states the 'stratification' was . . .
mainly of two classes, the governors and the governed -- 
political strata, not strata of ownership groups." [quoted
by Taylor, Op. Cit., p. 133]

Talyor argues that it the "weakening of community and the 
development of gross inequalities are the *concomitants*
and *consequences* of state formation." He points to the
"germ of state formation" being in the informal social
hierarchies which exist in tribal societies. [Op. Cit., 
p. 133 and p. 134] Thus the state is not, initially, a 
product of economic classes but rather an independent 
development based on inequalities of social power. Harold 
Barclay, an anarchist who has studied anthropological
evidence on this matter, concurs:

"In Marxist theory power derives primarily, if not exclusively,
from control of the means of production and distribution of
wealth, that is, from economic factors. Yet, it is evident that
power derived from knowledge -- and usually 'religious' style
knowledge -- is often highly significant, at least in the social
dynamics of small societies. . . Economic factors are hardly the
only source of power. Indeed, we see this in modern society as
well, where the capitalist owner does not wield total power.
Rather technicians and other specialists command it as well, 
not because of their economic wealth, but because of their
knowledge." [quoted by Alan Carter, _Marx: A Radical Critique_, 
p. 191]

If, as Bookchin summarises, "hierarchies precede classes" then
trying to use a hierarchical structure like the state to abolish
them is simply wishful thinking. 

As regards more recent human history, there have been numerous 
examples of the state existing without being an instrument of 
class rule. Rather, the state *was* the "ruling class." While 
the most obvious example is the Stalinist regimes where the 
state bureaucracy ruled over a state capitalist regime, there
have been plenty of others, as Murray Bookchin points out:

"Each State is not necessarily an institutionalised system
of violence in the interests of a specific ruling class, 
as Marxism would have us believe. There are many examples
of States that *were* the 'ruling class' and whose own
interests existed quite apart from -- even in antagonism
to -- privileged, presumably 'ruling' classes in a given
society. The ancient world bears witness to distinctly 
capitalistic classes, often highly privileged and 
exploitative, that were bilked by the State, circumscribed
by it, and ultimately devoured by it -- which is in part
why a capitalist society never emerged out of the ancient 
world. Nor did the State 'represent' other class interests,
such as landed nobles, merchants, craftsmen, and the like.
The Ptolemaic State in Hellenistic Egypt was an interest
in its own right and 'represented' no other interest than
its own. The same is true of the Aztec and the Inca States
until they were replaced by Spanish invaders. Under the
Emperor Domitian, the Roman State became the principal 
'interest' in the empire, superseding the interests of
even the landed aristocracy which held such primacy in
Mediterranean society. . . 

"Near-Eastern State, like the Egyptian, Babylonian, and 
Persian, were virtually extended households of individual
monarchs . . . Pharaohs, kings, and emperors nominally
held the land (often co-jointly with the priesthood)
in the trust of the deities, who were either embodied in 
the monarch or were represented by him. The empires of
Asian and North African kings were 'households' and the
population was seen as 'servants of the palace' . . .

"These 'states,' in effect, were not simply engines of 
exploitation or control in the interests of a privileged
'class.' . . . The Egyptian State was very real but it
'represented' nothing other than itself." [_Remaking 
Society_, pp. 67-8]

Bakunin pointed to Turkish Serbia, where economically
dominant classes "do not even exist -- there is only a
bureaucratic class. Thus, the Serbian state will crush
the Serbian people for the sole purpose of enabling 
Serbian bureaucrats to live a fatter life." [_Statism
and Anarchy_, p. 54] Leninist Tony Cliff, in his attempt
to prove that Stalinist Russia was state capitalist and
its bureaucracy a ruling class, pointed to various 
societies in which "had deep class differentiation, 
based not on private property but on state property.
Such systems existed in Pharaonic Egypt, Moslem Egypt,
Iraq, Persia and India." He discusses the example of Arab 
feudalism in more detail, where "the feudal lord had no 
permanent domain of his own, but a member of a class 
which collectively controlled the land and had the right
to appropriate rent." This was "ownership of the land by
the state" rather than by individuals. [_State Capitalism
in Russia_, pp. 316-8] As such, the idea that the state 
is simply an instrument of class rule seems unsupportable. 
As Gaston Leval argued, "the State, by its nature, tends 
to have a life of its own." [quoted by Sam Dolgoff, _A 
Critique of Marxism_, p. 10]

Alan Carter summarises the obvious conclusion:

"By focusing too much attention on the economic structure of
society and insufficient attention on the problems of political
power, Marx has left a legacy we would done better not to 
inherit. The perceived need for authoritarian and centralised
revolutionary organisation is sanctioned by Marx's theory 
because his theoretical subordination of political power to
economic classes apparently renders post-revolutionary 
political power unproblematic." [_Marx: A Radical Critique_, 
p. 231]

Given this blindness of orthodox Marxism to this issue, it
seems ironic that one of the people responsible for it also 
provides anarchists with evidence to back up our argument
that the state is not simply an instrument of class role but
rather has interests of its own. Thus we find Engels arguing
that proletariat, "in order not to lose again its only just
conquered supremacy," would have "to safeguard itself against 
its own deputies and officials, by declaring them all, without 
exception, subject to recall at any moment." [_Marx-Engels
Selected Works_, p. 257] Yet, if the state was simply an 
instrument of class rule such precautions would not be 
necessary. As such, this shows an awareness that the state 
can have interests of its own, that it is not simply an 
machine of class rule. 

Aware of the obvious contradiction, he argues that the state 
"is, as a rule, the state of the most powerful, economically 
dominant class which, through the medium of the state, becomes 
the politically dominant class . . . By way of exception, 
however, periods occur in which the warring classes balance 
each other, so nearly that the state power, as ostensible 
mediator, acquires, for the moment, a certain degree of 
independence of both." And points to "the Bonapartism of 
the First, and still more of the Second French Empire." 
[Op. Cit., pp. 577-8] But if the state can become 
"independent" of economic classes, then that implies 
that it is no mere machine, no mere "instrument" of 
class rule. It implies the anarchist argument that the 
state has interests of its own, generated by its essential 
features and so, therefore, cannot be used by a majority 
class as part of its struggle for liberation is correct. 
Simply put, Anarchists have long "realised -- feared -- that 
any State structure, whether or not socialist or based on 
universal suffrage, has a certain independence from 
society, and so may serve the interests of those within 
State institutions rather than the people as a whole or 
the proletariat." [Brian Morris, _Bakunin: The Philosophy 
of Freedom_, p. 134]

Ironically, arguments and warnings about the "independence" 
of the state by Marxists imply that the state has interests 
of its own and cannot be considered simply as an instrument 
of class rule. Rather, it suggests that the anarchist 
analysis of the state is correct, namely that any structure
based on delegated power, centralisation and hierarchy must,
inevitably, have a privileged class in charge of it, a class 
whose position enables it to not only exploit and oppress
the rest of society but also to effectively escape from 
popular control and accountability. This is no accident.
The state is structured to enforce minority rule and 
exclude the majority.

H.3.10 Has Marxism always supported the idea of workers' councils?

One of the most widespread myths associated with Marxism is the
idea that Marxism has consistently aimed to smash the current
(bourgeois) state and replace it by a "workers' state" based
on working class organisations created during a revolution. 

This myth is sometimes expressed by those who should know 
better (i.e. Marxists). According to John Rees (of the 
British Socialist Workers Party) it has been a "cornerstone 
of revolutionary theory" that "the soviet is a superior form 
of democracy because it unifies political and economic power." 
This "cornerstone" has, apparently, existed "since Marx's 
writings on the Paris Commune." ["In Defence of October," 
_International Socialism_, no. 52, p. 25] In fact, nothing 
could be further from the truth, as Marx's writings on the 
Paris Commune prove beyond doubt. 

The Paris Commune, as Marx himself noted, was "formed 
of the municipal councillors, chosen by universal suffrage 
in the various wards of the town." ["The Civil War in 
France", _Selected Works_, p. 287] As Marx made clear, 
it was definitely *not* based on delegates from workplaces 
and so could *not* unify political and economic power. 
Indeed, to state that the Paris Commune was a soviet is 
simply a joke, as is the claim that Marxists supported 
soviets as revolutionary organs to smash and replace 
the state from 1871. In fact Marxists did not subscribe 
to this "cornerstone of revolutionary theory" until 1917 
when Lenin argued that the Soviets would be the best means 
of ensuring a Bolshevik government. Which explains why 
Lenin's use of the slogan "All Power to the Soviets" and
call for the destruction of the bourgeois state came as 
such a shock to his fellow Marxists. Unsurprisingly, given 
the long legacy of anarchist calls to smash the state and
their vision of a socialist society built from below by 
workers councils, many Marxists called Lenin an anarchist!
Therefore, the idea that Marxists have always supported 
workers councils' is untrue and any attempt to push this
support back to 1871 simply a farcical.

Before 1917, when Lenin claimed to have discovered what 
had eluded all the previous followers of Marx and Engels 
(including himself!), it was only anarchists (or those 
close to them such as the Russian SR-Maximalists) who 
argued that the future socialist society would be 
structurally based around the organs working class 
people themselves created in the process of the class
struggle and revolution (see sections H.1.4 and I.2.3). 
To re-quote Bakunin:

"The future social organisation must be made solely from 
the bottom up, by the free association or federation of 
workers, firstly in their unions, then in the communes, 
regions, nations and finally in a great federation, 
international and universal." [_Michael Bakunin: Selected 
Writings_, pp. 170-2]

So, ironically, the idea of the superiority of workers' councils
has existed from around the time of the Paris Commune, but in
only in Bakunin's writings and others in the libertarian wing of the First International!

Not all Marxists are as ignorant of their political tradition
as Rees. As his fellow party member Chris Harman recognised, 
"[e]ven the 1905 [Russian] revolution gave only the most 
embryonic expression of how a workers' state would in fact 
be organised. The fundamental forms of workers' power -- the 
soviets (workers' councils) -- were not recognised." It was 
"[n]ot until the February revolution [of 1917 that] soviets 
became central in Lenin's writings and thought." [_Party and 
Class_, p. 18 and p. 19] 

Before continuing it should be noted that Harman's summary
is correct only if we are talking about the Marxist movement.
Looking at the wider revolutionary movement, two groups 
definitely "recognised" the importance of the soviets as 
a form of working class power. These were the anarchists 
and the Social-Revolutionary Maximalists, both of whom 
"espoused views that corresponded almost word for word
with Lenin's April 1917 program of 'All power to the 
soviets.'" The "aims of the revolutionary far left in 
1905 . . . Lenin combined in his call for soviet power
[in 1917], when he apparently assimilated the anarchist
program to secure the support of the masses for the 
Bolsheviks." [Oskar Anweiler, _The Soviets_, p. 94 and 
p. 96] Unsurprisingly, both the anarchists and Maximalists
were extremely influential in that paradigm of soviet 
power and democracy, the Kronstadt commune (see section 
H.5 for more details).

Thus, in anarchist circles, the soviets were must definitely  
"recognised" as the practical confirmation of anarchist 
ideas of working class self-organisation as being the 
framework of a socialist society. For example, the
syndicalists "regarded the soviets . . . as admirable 
versions of the *bourses du travail*, but with a revolutionary
function added to suit Russian conditions. Open to all
leftist workers regardless of specific political affiliation,
the soviets were to act as nonpartisan labour councils 
improvised 'from below' . . . with the aim of bringing 
down the old regime." The anarchists of _Khleb i Volia_
"also likened the 1905 Petersburg Soviet -- as a nonparty
mass organisation -- to the central committee of the 
Paris Commune of 1871." [Paul Avrich, _The Russian 
Anarchists_, pp. 80-1] Kropotkin argued that anarchists
should take part in the soviets as long as they "are
organs of the struggle against the bourgeoisie and the
state, and not organs of authority." [quoted by Graham
Purchase, _Evolution and Revolution_, p. 30]

So, if Marxists did not support workers' councils until
1917, what *did* Marxists argue should be the framework 
of a socialist society before this date? To discover this, 
we must look to Marx and Engels. Once we do, we discover 
that their works suggest that their vision of socialist 
transformation was fundamentally based on the bourgeois 
state, suitably modified and democratised to achieve this 
task. As such, rather than present the true account of the 
Marxist theory of the state Lenin interpreted various 
inexact and ambiguous statements by Marx and Engels 
(particularly from Marx's defence of the Paris Commune) to 
justify his own actions in 1917. Whether his 1917 revision 
of Marxism in favour of workers' councils as the framework 
of socialism is in keeping with the *spirit* of Marx is 
another matter of course. Given that libertarian Marxists 
(like the council communists) embraced the idea of workers' 
councils and broke with the Bolsheviks over the issue of 
whether the councils or the party had power, we can say that 
perhaps it is not. In this, they express the best in Marx. 
When faced with the Paris Commune and its libertarian 
influences he embraced it, distancing himself (for a while 
at least) with many of his previous ideas.

So what was the original (orthodox) Marxist position?
It can be seen from Lenin who, as late December 1916 
argued that "Socialists are in favour of utilising the 
present state and its institutions in the struggle for 
the emancipation of the working class, maintaining also
that the state should be used for a specific form of
transition from capitalism to socialism." Lenin attacked
Bukharin for "erroneously ascribing this [the anarchist]
view to the socialist" when he had stated socialists
wanted to "abolish" the state or "blow it up." He called
this "transitional form" the dictatorship of the 
proletariat, "which is *also* a state." [_Collected
Works_, vol. 23, p. 165] In other words, the socialist
party would aim to seize power within the existing state
and, after making suitable modifications to it, use it
to create socialism. This conquest of state power would
be achieved either by insurrection or by the ballot box,
the latter being used for political education and struggle 
under capitalism.

That this position was the orthodox one is hardly surprising,
given the actual comments of both Marx and Engels. For example,
Engels argued in 1886 while he and Marx saw "the gradual 
dissolution and ultimate disappearance of that political
organisation called *the State*" as "*one* of the final
results of the future revolution," they "at the same time
. . . have always held that . . . the proletarian class will
first have to possess itself of the organised political 
force of the State and with its aid stamp out the resistance
of the Capitalist class and re-organise society." The idea
that the proletariat needs to "possess" the existing state
is made clear when he argues while the anarchists "reverse
the matter" by arguing that the revolution "has to *begin* 
by abolishing the political organisation of the State,"
for Marxists "the only organisation the victorious working
class finds ready-made for use, is that of the State. It
may require adaptation to the new functions. But to destroy
that at such a moment, would be to destroy the only organism
by means of which the working class can exert its newly 
conquered power." [_Collected Works_, vol. 47, p. 10] 

Obviously the only institution which the working class "finds 
ready-made for use" is the bourgeois state, although, as Engels 
stresses, it "may require adaptation." This schema is repeated
five years later, in Engels introduction to Marx's "The 
Civil War in France." Arguing that the state "is nothing but
a machine for the oppression of one class by another" he
notes that it is "at best an evil inherited by the proletariat
after its victorious struggle for class supremacy, whose 
worst sides the victorious proletariat, just like the Commune,
cannot avoid having to lop off at once as much as possible."
[_Marx-Engels Selected Works_, p. 258] Simply put, if the 
proletariat creates a *new* state system to replace the 
bourgeois one, then how can it be "an evil inherited" by it?
If, as Lenin argued, Marx and Engels thought that the
working class had to smash the bourgeois state and replace
it with a new one, why would it have "to lop off at once as 
much as possible" from the state it had just "inherited"?

In the same year, Engels repeats this argument in his critique 
of the draft of the Erfurt program of the German Social Democrats:

"If one thing is certain it is that our Party and the working 
class can only come to power under the form of a democratic 
republic. This is even the specific form for the dictatorship 
of the proletariat, as the Great French Revolution has already 
shown." [quoted by David W. Lovell, _From Marx to Lenin_, p. 81]

Clearly Engels does not speak of a "commune-republic" or anything 
close to a soviet republic, as expressed in Bakunin's work or the 
libertarian wing of the First International with their ideas of a 
"trade-union republic" or a free federation of workers' 
associations. Clearly and explicitly he speaks of the democratic 
republic, the current state ("an evil inherited by the proletariat") 
which is to be seized and transformed as in the Paris Commune. 
Unsurprisingly, when Lenin comes to quote this passage in _State 
and Revolution_ he immediately tries to obscure its meaning. 
"Engels," he says, "repeats here in a particularly striking manner 
the fundamental idea which runs like a red thread through all of 
Marx's work, namely, that the democratic republic is the nearest 
approach to the dictatorship of the proletariat." [_Essential 
Works of Lenin_, p. 324] However, clearly Engels does not speak 
of the political form which "is the nearest approach" to the 
dictatorship, rather he speaks only of "the specific form" of 
the dictatorship, the "only" form in which "our Party" can come 
to power.

This explains Engels 1887 comments that in the USA the workers 
"next step towards their deliverance" was "the formation of a 
political workingmen's party, with a platform of its own, and 
the conquest of the Capitol and the White House for its goal." 
This new party "like all political parties everywhere . . . aspires 
to the conquest of political power." Engels then discusses the 
"electoral battle" going on in America. [Marx & Engels, _Basic 
Writings on Politics and Philosophy_, pp. 527-8 and p. 529] Six
years previously he had argued along the same lines as regards
England, "where the industrial and agricultural working class forms
the immense majority of the people, democracy means the dominion
of the working class, neither more nor less. Let, then, that
working class prepare itself for the task in store for it -- 
the ruling of this great Empire . . . And the best way to do
this is to use the power already in their hands, the actual 
majority they possess . . . to send to Parliament men of their
own order." In case this was not clear enough, he lamented that
"[e]verywhere the labourer struggles for political power, for
direct representation of his class in the legislature -- 
everywhere but in Great Britain." [_Collected Works_, vol. 24,
p. 405]

All of which, of course, fits into Marx's account of the Paris 
Commune. In that work he stresses that the Commune was formed by 
elections, by universal suffrage in a democratic republic. Once 
voted into office, the Commune then smashes the state machine 
inherited by it from the old state, recognising that "the working 
class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery, and
wield it for its own purposes." The "first decree of the Commune 
. . . was the suppression of the standing army, and the substitution 
for it of the armed people." Thus the Commune lops off one of the 
"ubiquitous organs" associated with the "centralised State power" 
once it had inherited the state via elections. [_Marx-Engels 
Selected Works_, p. 285, p. 287 and p. 285] 

It is, of course true, that Marx expresses in his defence of 
the Commune the opinion that new "Communal Constitution" was 
to become a "reality by the destruction of the State power" 
yet he immediately argues that "the merely repressive organs 
of the old government power were to be amputated" and "its 
legitimate functions were to be wrestles from" it and "restored 
to the responsible agents of society." [Op. Cit., pp. 288-9] This 
corresponds to Engels arguments about removing aspects from the 
state inherited by the proletariat and signifies the "destruction" 
of the state machinery (its bureaucratic-military aspects) rather 
than the state itself.

The source of Lenin's restatement of the Marxist theory of the 
state which came as such a shock to so many Marxists can be 
found in the nature of the Paris Commune. After all, the major 
influence in terms of "political vision" of the Commune was 
anarchism. The "rough sketch of national organisation which 
the Commune had no time to develop" which Marx praises but 
does not quote was written by a follower of Proudhon. [Marx, 
Op. Cit., p. 288] It expounded a clearly *federalist* and 
"bottom-up" organisational structure. It clearly implied "the 
destruction of the State power" rather than seeking to "inherit" 
it. Based on this libertarian revolt, it is unsurprising that 
Marx's defence of it took on a libertarian twist. As noted by 
Bakunin, who argues that its "general effect was so striking 
that the Marxists themselves, who saw their ideas upset by the 
uprising, found themselves compelled to take their hats off to 
it. They went further, and proclaimed that its programme and 
purpose where their own, in face of the simplest logic . . . 
This was a truly farcical change of costume, but they were 
bound to make it, for fear of being overtaken and left behind 
in the wave of feeling which the rising produced throughout 
the world." [_Michael Bakunin: Selected Writings_, p. 261]

This opinion was shared by almost all Marxists before 1917
(including Lenin). As Franz Mehring (considered by many as 
the best student and commentator of Marx in pre-world war 
social democracy and a extreme left-winger) argued, the 
"opinions of _The Communist Manifesto_ could not be 
reconciled with the praise lavished . . . on the Paris 
Commune for the vigorous fashion in which it had begun to 
exterminate the parasitic State." He notes that "both Marx 
and Engels were well aware of the contradiction" and in 
the June 1872 preface to their work "they revised their 
opinions . . . declaring that the workers could not
simply lay hold of the ready-made State machinery and 
wield it for their own purposes. At a later date, and 
after the death of Marx, Engels was compelled to engage
in a struggle against the anarchist tendencies in the 
working-class movement, and he let this proviso drop 
and once again took his stand on the basis of the 
Manifesto." [_Karl Marx_, p. 453] 

The fact that Marx did not mention anything about abolishing 
the existing state and replacing it with a new one in his 
contribution to the "Program of the French Workers Party" in 
1880 is significant. It said that the that "collective 
appropriation" of the means of production "can only proceed 
from a revolutionary action of the class of producers -- the 
proletariat -- organised in an independent political party."
This would be "pursued by all the means the proletariat has 
at its disposal including universal suffrage which will thus 
be transformed from the instrument of deception that it 
has been until now into an instrument of emancipation." 
[_Collected Works_, vol. 24, p. 340] There is nothing about 
overthrowing the existing state and replacing it with a 
new state, rather the obvious conclusion which is to be 
drawn is that universal suffrage was the tool by which the 
workers would achieve socialism. It does fit in, however,
with Marx's comments in 1852 that "Universal Suffrage is the 
equivalent of political power for the working class of England, 
where the proletariat forms the large majority of the population 
. . . Its inevitable result, here, is *the political supremacy 
of the working class.*" [Op. Cit., vol. 11, pp. 335-6] Or,
indeed, Engels similar comments from 1881 quoted above.

It is for this reason that orthodox Marxism up until 1917
held the position that the socialist revolution would be
commenced by seizing the existing state (usually by the
ballot box, or by insurrection if that was impossible).
Martov, the leading left-Menshevik, in his discussion of
Lenin's "discovery" of the "real" Marxist theory on the 
state (in _State and Revolution_) stresses that the idea
that the state should be smashed by the workers who would
then "transplant into the structure of society the forms
of *their own* combat organisations" was a libertarian idea,
alien to Marx and Engels. While acknowledging that "in our
time, working people take to 'the idea of the soviets' after 
knowing them as combat organisations formed in the process 
of the class struggle at a sharp revolutionary stage," he 
distances Marx and Engels quite successfully from such a 
position. As such, he makes a valid contribution to
Marxism and presents a necessary counter-argument to Lenin's
claims in _State and Revolution_ (at which point, we are 
sure, nine out of ten Leninists will dismiss our argument!). 
[_The State and Socialist Revolution_, p. 42]

All this may seem a bit academic to many. Does it matter? 
After all, most Marxists today subscribe to some variation 
of Lenin's position and so, in some aspects, what Marx and
Engels really thought is irrelevant. Indeed, it is likely 
that Marx, faced with workers' councils as he was with the
Commune, would have embraced them (perhaps not, as he was
dismissive of similar ideas expressed in the libertarian 
wing of the First International). What is important is that
the idea that Marxists have always subscribed to the idea
that a social revolution would be based on the workers' own
combat organisations (be they unions, soviets or whatever)
is a relatively new one to the ideology. While Bakunin and
other anarchists argued for such a revolution, Marx and 
Engels did not. Given this, the shock which met Lenin's
arguments in 1917 can be easily understood.

Rather than being rooted in the Marxist vision of revolution,
as it has been in anarchism since the 1860s, workers councils
have played, rhetoric aside, the role of fig-leaf for party 
power (libertarian Marxism being a notable exception). They
have been embraced by its Leninist wing purely as a means of
ensuring party power. Rather than being seen as the most 
important gain of a revolution as they allow mass participation,
workers' councils have been seen, and used, simply as a means
by which the party can seize power. Once this is achieved, 
the soviets can be marginalised and ignored without affecting
the "proletarian" nature of the revolution in the eyes of the
party:

"while it is true that Lenin recognised the different functions 
and democratic raison d'etre for both the soviets and his party, 
in the last analysis it was the party that was more important 
than the soviets. In other words, the party was the final 
repository of working-class sovereignty. Thus, Lenin did not 
seem to have been reflected on or have been particularly 
perturbed by the decline of the soviets after 1918." [Samuel 
Farber, _Before Stalinism_, p. 212]

This perspective can be traced back to the lack of interest
Marx and Engels expressed in the forms which a proletarian 
revolution would take, as exemplified by Engels comments on
having to "lop off" aspects of the state "inherited" by the
working class. The idea that the organisations people create 
in their struggle for freedom may help determine the outcome
of the revolution is missing. Rather, the idea that any 
structure can be appropriated and (after suitable modification) 
used to rebuild society is clear. This perspective cannot help 
take emphasis away from the mass working class organisations 
required to rebuild society in a socialist manner and place it 
on the group who will "inherit" the state and "lop off" its 
negative aspects, namely the party and the leaders in charge 
of both it and the new "workers' state." 

This focus towards the party became, under Lenin (and the 
Bolsheviks in general) a purely instrumental perspective 
on workers' councils and other organisations. They were of 
use purely in so far as they allowed the Bolshevik party to 
take power (indeed Lenin constantly identified workers' power 
and soviet power with Bolshevik power and as Martin Buber 
noted, for Lenin "All power to the Soviets!" meant, at bottom, 
"All power to the Party through the Soviets!"). It can, therefore,
be argued that his book _State and Revolution_ was a means 
to use Marx and Engels to support his new found idea of the 
soviets as being the basis of creating a Bolshevik government
rather than a principled defence of workers' councils as the
framework of a socialist revolution. We discuss this issue in 
the next section.

H.3.11 Does Marxism aim to place power into the hands of workers 
       organisations? 

The short answer depends on which branch of Marxism you mean.

If you are talking about libertarian Marxists such as council
communists, Situationists and so on, then the answer is a 
resounding "yes." Like anarchists, these Marxists see a social
revolution as being based on working class self-management 
and, indeed, criticised (and broke with) Bolshevism precisely
on this question (as can be seen from Lenin's comments in 
_Left-wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder_ on the question
of class or party dictatorship). However, if we look at the 
mainstream Marxist tradition (namely Bolshevism), the answer 
has to be an empathic "no." 

As we noted in section H.1.4, anarchists have long argued that
the organisations created by the working class in struggle 
would be the initial framework of a free society. These organs,
created to resist capitalism and the state, would be the means 
to overthrow both as well as extending and defending the 
revolution (such bodies have included the "soviets" and "factory
committees" of the Russian Revolution, the collectives in the
Spanish revolution, popular assemblies as in the current 
Argentine revolt and the French Revolution, revolutionary 
unions and so on). Thus working class self-management is at the 
core of the anarchist vision and so we stress the importance 
(and autonomy) of working class organisations in the revolutionary
movement and the revolution itself. Anarchists work within such
bodies at the base, in the mass assemblies, and do not seek to
replace their power with that of their own organisation (see
section J.3.6).

Leninists, in contrast, have a different perspective on such 
bodies. Rather than placing them at the heart of the revolution,
Leninism views them purely in instrumental terms -- namely, as
a means of achieving party power. Writing in 1907, Lenin argued
that "Social-Democratic Party organisations may, in case of
necessity, participate in inter-party Soviets of Workers'
Delegates . . . and in congresses . . . of these organisations,
and may organise such institutions, provided this is done on
strict Party lines for the purpose of developing and strengthening
the Social-Democratic Labour Party." The party would "utilise"
such organs "for the purpose of developing the Social-Democratic
movement." Significantly, given the fate of the soviets 
post-1917, Lenin notes that the party "must bear in mind that if
Social-Democratic activities among the proletarian masses are
properly, effectively and widely organised, such institutions
may actually become superfluous." [Marx, Engels and Lenin, 
_Anarchism and Anarcho-Syndicalism_, p. 210] Thus the means
by which working class can manage their own affairs would become
"superfluous" once the party was in power. How the working 
class could be considered the "ruling class" in such a society 
is hard to understand.

As Oscar Anweiler summarises in his account of the soviets
during the two Russian Revolutions:

"The drawback of the new 'soviet democracy' hailed by 
Lenin in 1906 is that he could envisage the soviets only
as *controlled* organisations; for him they were instruments
by which the party controlled the working masses, rather
than true forms of a workers democracy. The basic 
contradiction of the Bolshevik soviet system -- which
purports to be a democracy of all working people but in
reality recognises only the rule of one party -- is already
contained in Lenin's interpretation of the soviets during
the first Russian revolution." [_The Soviets_, p. 85]

Thirteen years later, Lenin repeated this same vision of party 
power as the goal of revolution. In his infamous diatribe
against "Left-wing" Communism (i.e. those Marxists close 
to anarchism), Lenin argued that "the correct understanding 
of a Communist of his tasks" lies in "correctly gauging 
the conditions and the moment when the vanguard of the 
proletariat can successfully seize power, when it will be 
able during and after this seizure of power to obtain support 
from sufficiently broad strata of the working class and of 
the non-proletarian toiling masses, and when, thereafter, it 
will be able to maintain, consolidate, and extend its rule, 
educating, training and attracting ever broader masses of 
the toilers." He stressed that "to go so far . . . as to 
draw a contrast in general between the dictatorship of the 
masses and the dictatorship of the leaders, is ridiculously 
absurd and stupid." [_Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile 
Disorder_, p. 35 and p. 27] As we noted in section H.1.2,
the Bolsheviks had this stage explicitly argued for party 
dictatorship and considered it a truism that (to re-quote 
Lenin) "an organisation taking in the whole proletariat 
cannot directly exercise proletarian dictatorship. It can be 
exercised only by a vanguard . . . the dictatorship of the 
proletariat cannot be exercised by a mass proletarian 
organisation." [_Collected Works_, vol. 32, p. 21]

Therefore, rather than seeing revolution being based upon 
the empowerment of working class organisation and the 
socialist society being based on this, Leninists see workers 
oorganisations in purely instrumental terms as the means of 
achieving a Leninist government:

"With all the idealised glorification of the soviets as
a new, higher, and more democratic type of state, Lenin's
principal aim was revolutionary-strategic rather than
social-structural . . . The slogan of the soviets was
primarily tactical in nature; the soviets were in theory
organs of mass democracy, but in practice tools for the
Bolshevik Party. In 1917 Lenin outlined his transitional
utopia without naming the definitive factor: the party.
To understand the soviets' true place in Bolshevism, it
is not enough, therefore, to accept the idealised picture
in Lenin's state theory. Only an examination of the actual
give-and-take between Bolsheviks and soviets during the
revolution allows a correct understanding of their 
relationship." [Oscar Anweiler, Op. Cit., pp. 160-1]

Simply out, Leninism confuses the party power and workers' 
power. An example of this "confusion" can be found in most 
Leninist works. For example, John Rees argues that "the 
essence of the Bolsheviks' strategy . . . was to take power 
from the Provisional government and put it in the hands of 
popular organs of working class power -- a point later made 
explicit by Trotsky in his _Lessons of October_." ["In 
Defence of October," _International Socialism_, no. 52, 
p. 73] However, in reality, as noted in section H.3.3, 
Lenin had always been clear that the essence of the 
Bolsheviks' strategy was the taking of power by the 
Bolshevik party *itself.* He explicitly argued for 
Bolshevik power during 1917, considering the soviets 
as the best means of achieving this. He constantly 
equated Bolshevik rule with working class rule. Once in 
power, this identification did not change. As such, rather 
than argue for power to be placed into "the hands of popular 
organs of working class power" Lenin argued this only 
insofar as he was sure that these organs would then 
*immediately* pass that power into the hands of a Bolshevik 
government. 

This explains his turn against the soviets after July 1917 
when he considered it impossible for the Bolsheviks to gain 
a majority in them. It can be seen when the Bolshevik party's 
Central Committee opposed the idea of a coalition government 
immediately after the overthrow of the Provisional Government 
in October 1917. As it explained, "a purely Bolshevik 
government" was "impossible to refuse" since "a majority at 
the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets . . . handed power 
over to this government." [quoted by Robert V. Daniels, _A
Documentary History of Communism_, pp. 127-8] A mere ten days 
after the October Revolution the Left Social Revolutionaries 
charged that the Bolshevik government was ignoring the Central 
Executive Committee of the Soviets, established by the second 
Congress of Soviets as the supreme organ in society. Lenin 
dismissed their charges, stating that "the new power could 
not take into account, in its activity, all the rigmarole 
which would set it on the road of the meticulous observation
of all the formalities." [quoted by Frederick I. Kaplan, 
_Bolshevik Ideology and the Ethics of Soviet Labour_, p. 124]
Clearly, the soviets did not have "All Power," they promptly 
handed it over to a Bolshevik government (and Lenin implies 
that he was not bound in any way to the supreme organ of the 
soviets in whose name he ruled). All of which places Rees' 
assertions into the proper context and shows that the slogan 
"All Power to the Soviets" is used by Leninists in a radically 
different way than most people would understand by it! It also  explains why soviets were disbanded if the opposition won 
majorities in them in early 1918:

"Menshevik newspapers and activists in the trade unions, the 
Soviets, and the factories had made a considerable impact on 
a working class which was becoming increasingly disillusioned 
with the Bolshevik regime, so much so that in many places the 
Bolsheviks felt constrained to dissolve Soviets or prevent 
re-elections where Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries 
had gained majorities." [Israel Getzler, _Martov_, p. 179]

Thus the Bolsheviks expelled the Mensheviks in the context of 
political loses *before* the Civil War. The Civil War gave the
Bolsheviks an excuse and they "drove them underground, just on 
the eve of the elections to the Fifth Congress of Soviets in 
which the Mensheviks were expected to make significant gains" 
and while the Bolsheviks "offered some formidable fictions to 
justify the expulsions" there was "of course no substance 
in the charge that the Mensheviks had been mixed in 
counter-revolutionary activities on the Don, in the Urals, 
in Siberia, with the Czechoslovaks, or that they had joined 
the worst Black Hundreds." [Getzler, Op. Cit., p. 181]

While we will discuss this in more detail in section H.6, 
we can state here that the facts are that the Bolsheviks only 
supported "Soviet power" when the soviets were Bolshevik. As 
recognised by Martov, who argued that the Bolsheviks loved 
Soviets only when they were "in the hands of the Bolshevik 
party." [quoted by Getzler, Op. Cit., p. 174] Which, perhaps,
explains Lenin's comment that "[o]nly the development of this 
[the First World] war can bring *us* to power but we must 
*speak* of this as little as possible in our agitation 
(remembering very well that even tomorrow events may put us 
in power and then we will not let it go)." [quoted by Neil 
Harding, _Leninism_, p. 253]

All this can be confirmed, unsurprisingly enough, by looking at
the essay Rees references. When studying Trotsky's _Lessons of 
October_ we find the same instrumentalist approach to the 
question of the "popular organs of working class power." This 
is stated quite clearly by Trotsky in his essay when he argued 
that the "essential aspect" of Bolshevism was the "training, 
tempering, and organisation of the proletarian vanguard as 
enables the latter to seize power, arms in hand." As such,
the vanguard seizes power, *not* "popular organs of working 
class power." Indeed, the idea that the working class can
seize power itself is raised and dismissed:

"But the events have proved that without a party capable of 
directing the proletarian revolution, the revolution itself 
is rendered impossible. The proletariat cannot seize power by 
a spontaneous uprising . . . there is nothing else that can
serve the proletariat as a substitute for its own party."

Hence "popular organs of working class power" are not considered 
as the "essence" of Bolshevism, rather the "fundamental instrument 
of proletarian revolution is the party." Popular organs are 
seen purely in instrumental terms, always discussing such organs
of "workers' power" in terms of the strategy and program of the 
party, not in terms of the value that such organs have as forms
of working class self-management of society. 
 
This can be clearly seen from Trotsky's discussion of the
"October Revolution" of 1917 in _Lessons of October_. 
Commenting on the Bolshevik Party conference of April 1917, 
he states that the "whole of . . . [the] Conference was devoted 
to the following fundamental question: Are we heading toward 
the conquest of power in the name of the socialist revolution 
or are we helping (anybody and everybody) to complete the 
democratic revolution? . . . Lenin's position was this: . . . 
the capture of the soviet majority; the overthrow of the 
Provisional Government; the seizure of power through the 
soviets." Note, *through* the soviets not *by* the soviets, 
thus indicating the fact the Party would hold the real power, 
not the soviets of workers' delegates. This is confirmed when 
Trotsky states that "to prepare the insurrection and to carry 
it out under cover of preparing for the Second Soviet Congress 
and under the slogan of defending it, was of inestimable 
advantage to us" and that it was "one thing to prepare an 
armed insurrection under the naked slogan of the seizure of 
power by the party, and quite another thing to prepare and 
then carry out an insurrection under the slogan of defending 
the rights of the Congress of Soviets." The Soviet Congress 
just provided "the legal cover" for the Bolshevik plans 
rather than a desire to see the Soviets actually start 
managing society. [_The Lessons of October_]

Thus we have the "seizure of power through the soviets"
with "an armed insurrection under the naked slogan of
the seizure of power by the party" being hidden by 
"the slogan" ("the legal cover") of defending the Soviets!
Hardly a case of placing power in the hands of working 
class organisations. Trotsky *does* note that in 1917 
the "soviets had to either disappear entirely or take 
real power into their hands." However, he immediately 
adds that "they could take power . . . only as the 
dictatorship of the proletariat directed by a single party." 
Clearly, the "single party" has the real power, *not* 
the soviets. Unsurprisingly, in practice, the rule of
"a single party" also amounted to the soviets effectively
disappearing as they quickly became mere ciphers for party 
rule. Soon the "direction" by "a single party" became
the dictatorship of that party *over* the soviets, which
(it should be noted) Trotsky defended wholeheartedly until
his death (see section H.3.8).

This cannot be considered as a one-off. Trotsky repeated this 
analysis in his _History of the Russian Revolution_, when he 
stated that the "question, what mass organisations were to 
serve the party for leadership in the insurrection, did not 
permit an *a priori,* much less a categorical, answer." Thus 
the "mass organisations" serve the party, not vice versa. This 
instrumentalist perspective can be seen when Trotsky notes that 
when "the Bolsheviks got a majority in the Petrograd Soviet, 
and afterward a number of others," the "phrase 'Power to the 
Soviets' was not, therefore, again removed from the order of 
the day, but received a new meaning: All power to the *Bolshevik* 
soviets." This meant that the "party was launched on the road 
of armed insurrection through the soviets and in the name of 
the soviets." As he put it in his discussion of the July days 
in 1917, the army "was far from ready to raise an insurrection 
in order to give power to the Bolshevik Party." Ultimately, 
"the state of popular consciousness . . . made impossible the 
seizure of power by the Bolsheviks in July." [vol. 2, p. 303, 
p. 307, p. 78 and p. 81] So much for "all power to the Soviets"! 
He even quotes Lenin: "The Bolsheviks have no right to await 
the Congress of Soviets. They ought to seize the power right 
*now.*" Ultimately, the "Central Committee adopted the motion
of Lenin as the only thinkable one: to form a government of
the Bolsheviks only." [vol. 3, pp. 131-2 and p. 299] 

In case anyone is in doubt what Trotsky meant, he clarified 
it in the book he was writing when he was assassinated: "After 
eight months of inertia and of democratic chaos, came the 
dictatorship of the Bolsheviks." [_Stalin_, vol. 2, p. 242]
This is confirmed by other sources:
 "Within six weeks of the October revolution, Gorky's newspaper
_Novaya Zhizn_ lamented the rapidity with which life had run
out of the Soviet movement: 'The slogan "All power to the
Soviets,"' it concluded, 'had actually been transformed into
the slogan "All power to the few Bolsheviks" . . . The Soviets
decay, become enervated, and from day to day lose more of
their prestige in the ranks of democracy.' The initial heroic
stage -- the stage of mass involvement and unsullied dreams
-- was already over." [Neil Harding, _Leninism_, p. 253]

So where does this leave Rees' assertion that the Bolsheviks
aimed to put power into the hands of working class organisations?
Clearly, Rees' summary of both Trotsky's essay and the "essence" 
of Bolshevism leave a lot to be desired. As can be seen, the 
"essence" of Trotsky's essay and of Bolshevism is the importance 
of party power, not workers' power (as recognised by other 
members of the SWP: "The masses needed to be profoundly 
convinced that there was no alternative to Bolshevik power."
[Tony Cliff, _Lenin_, vol. 2, p. 265]). Trotsky even provides 
us with an analogy which effectively and simply refutes Rees'
claims. "Just as the blacksmith cannot seize the red hot
iron in his naked hand," Trotsky asserts, "so the proletariat
cannot directly seize power; it has to have an organisation
accommodated to this task." While paying lip service to 
the soviets as the organisation "by means of which the 
proletariat can both overthrow the old power and replace
it," he adds that "the soviets by themselves do not settle
the question" as they may "serve different goals according
to the programme and leadership. The soviets receive their
programme from the party . . . the revolutionary party 
represents the brain of the class. The problem of 
conquering the power can be solved only by a definite
combination of party with soviets." [_The History of the 
Russian Revolution_, vol. 3, pp. 160-1 and p. 163] 

Thus the key organisation was the party, *not* the mass 
organisations of the working class. Indeed, as we discussed 
in section H.3.8, Trotsky was quite explicit that such 
organisations could only become the state form of the 
proletariat under the party dictatorship. Significantly, 
Trotsky fails to indicate what would happen when these two 
powers clash. Certainly Trotsky's role in the Russian 
revolution tells us that the power of the party was more 
important to him than democratic control by workers through 
mass bodies (see section H.6 and section H.7 on the Kronstadt
revolt). Indeed, as we have shown in section H.3.8, Trotsky 
explicitly argued that a state was required to overcome the 
"wavering" in the working class which could be expressed by 
democratic decision making.

Given this legacy of viewing workers' organisations in 
purely instrumental terms, the opinion of Martov (the
leading left-Menshevik during the Russian Revolution)
seems appropriate. He argued that "[a]t the moment when 
the revolutionary masses expressed their emancipation from 
the centuries old yoke of the old State by forming 
'autonomous republics of Kronstadt' and trying Anarchist 
experiments such as 'workers' control,' etc. -- at that 
moment, the 'dictatorship of the proletariat and the poorest 
peasantry' (said to be incarnated in the real dictatorship of 
the opposed 'true' interpreters of the proletariat and the 
poorest peasantry: the chosen of Bolshevist Communism) could 
only consolidate itself by first dressing itself in such 
Anarchist and anti-State ideology." [_The State and Socialist 
Revolution_, p. 47] As can be seen, Martov has a point. As the 
text used as evidence that the Bolsheviks aimed to give power 
to workers organisations shows, this was *not* an aim of the 
Bolshevik party. Rather, such workers organs were seen purely 
as a means to the end of party power. 

It is for this reason that anarchists argue for direct
working class self-management of society. When we argue
that working class organisations must be the framework of
a free society they mean it. We do not equate party 
power with working class power or think that "All power
to the Soviets" is possible if they immediately delegate
that power to the leaders of the party. This is for
obvious reasons:

"If the revolutionary means are out of their hands,
if they are in the hands of a techno-bureaucratic elite,
then such an elite will be in a position to direct to
their own benefit not only the course of the revolution,
but the future society as well. If the proletariat are
to *ensure* that an elite will not control the future
society, they must prevent them from controlling the
course of the revolution." [Alan Carter, _Marx: A
Radical Critique_, p. 165]

Thus the slogan "All power to the Soviets" for anarchists
means exactly that -- organs for the working class to run 
society directly, based on mandated, recallable delegates. 
As such, this slogan fitted perfectly with our ideas, as 
anarchists had been arguing since the 1860's that such 
workers' councils were both a weapon of class struggle 
against capitalism and the framework of the future 
libertarian society. For the Bolshevik tradition, that 
slogan simply means that a Bolshevik government will be 
formed over and above the soviets. The difference is important, 
"for the Anarchists declared, if 'power' really should belong 
to the soviets, it could not belong to the Bolshevik party, 
and if it should belong to that Party, as the Bolsheviks 
envisaged, it could not belong to the soviets." [Voline,
_The Unknown Revolution_, p. 213] Reducing the soviets to 
simply executing the decrees of the central (Bolshevik) 
government and having their All-Russian Congress be able 
to recall the government (i.e. those with *real* power) 
does not equal "all power," quite the reverse -- the 
soviets will simply be a fig-leaf for party power.

In summary, rather than aim to place power into the hands of 
workers' organisations, most Marxists do not. Their aim is to
place power into the hands of the party. Workers' organisations
are simply means to this end and, as the Bolshevik regime showed,
if they clash with that goal, they will be simply be disbanded.
However, we must stress that not all Marxist tendencies subscribe 
to this. The council communists, for example, broke with the
Bolsheviks precisely over this issue, the difference between
party and class power.

H.3.12 Is big business the precondition for socialism?

A key idea in most forms of Marxism is that the evolution
of capitalism itself will create the preconditions for
socialism. This is because capitalism tends to result in
big business and, correspondingly, increased numbers of
workers subject to the "socialised" production process
within the workplace. The conflict between the socialised
means of production and their private ownership is at the
heart of the Marxist case for socialism. Engels writes:

"Then came the concentration of the means of production
and of the producers in large workshops and manufacturies,
their transformation into actual socialised means of
production and socialised producers. But the socialised
producers and means of production and their products 
were still treated, after this change, just as they
had been before . . . the owner of the instruments of
labour . . . appropriated to himself . . . exclusively
the product of the *labour of others.* Thus, the product
now produced socially were not appropriated by those who
actually set in motion the means of production and 
actually produced the commodities, but by the 
*capitalists.* . . . The mode of production is subjected
to this [individual or private] form of appropriation,
although it abolishes the conditions upon which the 
latter rests.

"This contradiction, which gives to the new mode of 
production its capitalistic character, *contains the
germ of the whole of the social antagonisms of today.*"
[_Marx-Engels Reader_, p. 704]

It is the economic crises of capitalism which show this
contradiction between socialised production and capitalist
appropriation the best. Indeed, the "fact that the 
socialised organisation of production within the factory
has developed so far that it has become incompatible
with the anarchy of production in society, which exists
side by side with and dominates it, is brought home to
the capitalists themselves by the violent concentration
of capital that occurs during crises." The pressures of
socialised production results in capitalists merging 
their properties "in a particular branch of industry
in a particular country" into "a trust, a union for 
the purpose of regulating production." In this way,
"the production of capitalistic society capitulates 
to the production upon a definite plan of the invading
socialistic society." This "transformation" can take 
the form of "joint-stock companies and trusts, or
into state ownership." Even state ownership does not
change the "capitalist relation" although this does
have "concealed within it" the "technical conditions 
that form the elements of that solution." This "shows
itself the way to accomplishing this revolution. *The
proletariat seizes political power and turns the means
of production into state property.*" [Op. Cit., p. 709, 
p. 710, p. 711, p. 712 and p. 713]

Thus the centralisation and concentration of production 
into bigger and bigger units, into big business, is seen 
as the evidence of the need for socialism. It provides
the objective grounding for socialism, and, in fact, this 
analysis is what makes Marxism "scientific socialism."
This process explains how human society develops through
time:

"In the social production of their life, men enter into
definite relations that are indispensable and independent
of their will, relations of production which correspond
to a definite stage of development of their material 
productive forces. The sum total of these relations of
production constitutes the economic structure of society,
the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political
superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of
social consciousness. . . At a certain stage of their
development, the material productive forces come in 
conflict with the existing relations of production or
-- what is but a legal expression for the same thing
-- with the property relations within which they have
been at work hitherto. From forms of development of the
productive forces these relations turn into their 
fetters. Then begins an epoch of social revolution.
With the change of the economic foundation the entire 
immense superstructure is more or less rapidly 
transformed." [Marx, Op. Cit., pp. 4-5]

The obvious conclusion to be drawn from this is that 
socialism will come about due to tendencies inherent 
within the development of capitalism. The "socialisation"
of labour implied by collective labour within a firm
grows steadily as capitalist companies grow larger and
larger. The objective need for socialism is therefore 
created and so, for most Marxists, "big is beautiful."
Indeed, some Leninists have invented terminology to 
describe these aspects of the "invading socialistic 
society" associated with the rise of big business. They
contrast the "law of planning" associated with the
conscious planning of economic activity on a wider and
wider scale by large companies to the "law of value" 
which operates in the market. In other words, that the 
increased size of capital means that more and more of 
the economy is subject to the despotism of the owners 
and managers of capital and so the "anarchy" of the 
market is slowly replaced with the conscious planning 
of resources. Marxists sometimes call this the "objective 
socialisation of labour" (to use Mandel's term).

Therefore, there is a tendency for Marxists to see the 
increased size and power of big business as providing 
objective evidence for socialism, which will bring these
socialistic tendencies within capitalism to full light
and full development. Needless to say, most will argue 
that socialism, while developing planning fully, will 
replace the autocratic and hierarchical planning of big 
business with democratic, society-wide planning. 

This position, for anarchists, has certain problems 
associated with it. One key drawback, as we discuss in 
the next section, is it focuses attention away from the 
internal organisation within the workplace and industry 
onto ownership and links between economic units. It ends 
up confusing capitalism with the market relations between 
firms rather than identifying it with its essence, the 
labour market and the wage slavery this generates. This
meant that many Marxists considered that the basis of a
socialist economy was guaranteed once property was 
nationalised. The anarchist critique that this simply
replaced a multitude of bosses with one, the state,
was (and is) ignored.

The other key problem is that such a perspective tends to 
dismiss as irrelevant the way production is managed. Rather
than seeing socialism as being dependent on workers'
management of production, this position ends up seeing
socialism as being dependent on organisational links 
between workplaces, as exemplified by big business under
capitalism. Thus the "relations of production" which 
matter are *not* those associated with wage labour but
rather those associated with the market. This can be seen
from the famous comment in _The Manifesto of the Communist
Party_. The bourgeoisie, it argues "cannot exist without 
constantly revolutionising the instruments of production, 
and thereby the relations of production, and with them 
the whole relations of society." [_Marx-Engels Reader_,
p. 476] But the one relation of production it *cannot*
revolutionise is the one generated by the wage labour 
at the heart of capitalism, the hierarchical relations
at the point of production. As such, it is clear that
by "relations of production" Marx and Engels meant 
something else than wage slavery, the internal 
organisation of what they term "socialised production."

Capitalism is, in general, as dynamic as Marx and Engels 
stressed. It transforms the means of production, the 
structure of industry and the links between workplaces 
constantly. Yet it only modifies the form of the 
organisation of labour, not its content. No matter how 
it transforms machinery and the internal structure of 
companies, the workers are still wage slaves. At best, 
it simply transforms much of the hierarchy which governs 
the workforce into hired managers. This does not transform 
the fundamental social relationship of capitalism, however. 
Thus the "relations of production" which prefigure socialism 
is, precisely, those associated with the "socialisation of 
the labour process" which occurs *within* capitalism and 
are no way antagonistic to it. 

This is confirmed when Marx, in his polemic against 
Proudhon, argues that social relations "are closely 
bound up with productive forces. In acquiring new 
productive forces men change their mode of production; 
and in changing their mode of production, in changing 
the way of earning their living, they change their 
social relations. The hand-mill gives you society
with the feudal lord; the steam-mill, society with the
industrial capitalist." [_Collected Works_, vol. 6, 
p. 166] On the face of it, this had better *not* be 
true. After all, the aim of socialism is to expropriate 
the property of the industrial capitalist. If the social 
relationships *are* dependent on the productive forces 
then, clearly, socialism is impossible as it will have 
to be based, initially, on the legacy of capitalism. 
Fortunately, the way a workplace is managed is not 
predetermined by the technological base of society. As 
is obvious, a steam-mill can be operated by a co-operative, 
so making the industrial capitalist redundant. The claim 
that a given technological-level implies a specific social 
structure is, therefore, wrong. However, it does suggest
that our comments that, for Marx and Engels, the new "social 
relationships" which develop under capitalism which imply 
socialism are relations between workplaces, *not* those 
between individuals and classes are correct. The 
implications of this position because clear during the 
Russian revolution.

Later Marxists built upon this "scientific" groundwork. Lenin,
for example, argued that "the difference between a socialist 
revolution and a bourgeois revolution is that in the latter 
case there are ready made forms of capitalist relationships; 
Soviet power [in Russia] does not inherit such ready made 
relationships, if we leave out of account the most developed 
forms of capitalism, which, strictly speaking, extended to a 
small top layer of industry and hardly touched agriculture."
[_Collected Works_, vol. 27, p. 90] Thus, for Lenin, "socialist" 
relationships are generated within big business, relationships 
"socialism" would "inherit" and universalise. As such, his
comments fit in with the analysis of Marx and Engels we have
presented above. However, his comments also reveal that Lenin 
had no idea that socialism meant the transformation of the 
relations of production, i.e. workers managing their own 
activity. This, undoubtedly, explains the systematic 
undermining of the factory committee movement by the
Bolsheviks in favour of state control we discuss in 
section H.6.10.

The idea that socialism involved simply taking over the state 
and nationalising the "objectively socialised" means of
production can be seen in both mainstream social-democracy
and its Leninist child. Hilferding, for example, wrote 
_Finance Capital_ which argued that capitalism was evolving 
into a highly centralised economy, run by big banks and big 
firms. All what was required to turn this into socialism 
would be its nationalisation:

"Once finance capital has brought the most important branches of
production under its control, it is enough for society, through 
its conscious executive organ -- the state conquered by the working 
class -- to seize finance capital in order to gain immediate control 
of these branches of production. . . taking possession of six large 
Berlin banks would . . . greatly facilitate the initial phases of 
socialist policy during the transition period, when capitalist 
accounting might still prove useful." [pp. 367-8] 

Lenin basically disagreed with this only in-so-far as the party 
of the proletariat would take power via revolution rather than 
by election ("the state conquered by the working class" equals 
the election of a socialist party). Lenin took it for granted 
that the difference between Marxists and anarchists is that 
"the former stand for centralised, large-scale communist 
production, while the latter stand for disconnected small 
production." The obvious implication of this is that anarchist 
views "express, not the future of bourgeois society, which is 
striving with irresistible force towards the socialisation of 
labour, but the present and even the past of that society, the 
domination of blind chance over the scattered and isolated 
small producer." [Marx, Engels and Lenin, _Anarchism and 
Anarcho-Syndicalism_, p. 261 and p. 205]

As we discuss in more detail in section H.6, Lenin applied
this perspective during the Russian Revolution. For example,
he argued in 1917 that his immediate aim was for a "state 
capitalist" economy, this being a necessary stage to 
socialism. As he put it, "socialism is merely the next step 
forward from state-capitalist monopoly . . . socialism is 
merely state-capitalist monopoly *which is made to serve the 
interests of the whole people* and has to that extent 
*ceased* to be capitalist monopoly." [_Selected Works_, 
vol. 2, p. 211]

The Bolshevik road to "socialism" ran through the terrain 
of state capitalism and, in fact, simply built upon its 
institutionalised means of allocating recourses and 
structuring industry. As Lenin put it, "the modern state 
possesses an apparatus which has extremely close connections 
with the banks and syndicates, an apparatus which performs an 
enormous amount of accounting and registration work . . . This 
apparatus must not, and should not, be smashed. It must be 
wrestled from the control of the capitalists," it "must be 
subordinated to the proletarian Soviets" and "it must be 
expanded, made more comprehensive, and nation-wide." This 
meant that the Bolsheviks would "not invent the organisational 
form of work, but take it ready-made from capitalism" and 
"borrow the best models furnished by the advanced countries." 
[Op. Cit., p. 365 and p. 369]

The institutional framework of capitalism would be utilised 
as the principal (almost exclusive) instruments of "socialist" 
transformation. "*Without big banks Socialism would be 
impossible,*" argued Lenin, as they "are the 'state apparatus' 
which we need to bring about socialism, and which we *take 
ready-made* from capitalism; our task here is merely to 
*lop off* what capitalistically mutilates this excellent 
apparatus, to make it *even bigger,* even more democratic, 
even more comprehensive. A single State Bank, the biggest 
of the big . . . will constitute as much as nine-tenths of 
the *socialist* apparatus. This will be country-wide 
book-keeping, country-wide accounting of the production 
and distribution of goods." While this is "not fully a 
state apparatus under capitalism," it "will be so with us, 
under socialism." For Lenin, building socialism was easy. 
This "nine-tenths of the socialist apparatus" would be 
created "at one stroke, by a single decree." [Op. Cit., 
p. 365] 

Once in power, the Bolsheviks implemented this vision of 
socialism being built upon the institutions created by 
monopoly capitalism. Moreover, Lenin quickly started to 
advocate and implement the most sophisticated capitalist 
methods of organising labour, including "one-man management" 
of production, piece-rates and Taylorism ("scientific 
management"). This was not done accidentally or because 
no alternative existed (as we discuss in section H.6). 
As Gustav Landuer commented, when mainstream Marxists 
"call the capitalist factory system a social production 
. . . we know the real implications of their socialist 
forms of labour." [_For Socialism_, p. 70] As can be 
seen, this glorification of large-scale, state-capitalist 
structures can be traced back to Marx and Engels, while 
Lenin's support for capitalist production techniques can
be explained by mainstream Marxism's lack of focus on the 
social relationships at the point of production. 

For anarchists, the idea that socialism can be built on the
framework provided to us by capitalism is simply ridiculous.
Capitalism has developed industry and technology to further the
ends of those with power, namely capitalists and managers. Why
should they use that power to develop technology and industrial
structures which leads to workers' self-management and power 
rather than technologies and structures which enhance their own 
position vis--vis their workers and society as a whole? As 
such, technological and industrial development is not "neutral" 
or just the "application of science." They are shaped by class
struggle and class interest and cannot be used for different
ends. Simply put, socialism will need to develop *new* forms
of economic organisation based on socialist principles. As
such, the concept that monopoly capitalism paves the way 
for socialist society is rooted in the false assumption that
the forms of social organisation accompanying capital 
concentration are identical with the socialisation of 
production, that the structures associated with collective 
labour under capitalism are the same as those required under
socialism is achieve *genuine* socialisation. This false 
assumption, as can be seen, goes back to Engels and was
shared by both Social-Democracy and Leninism despite their
other differences.

While anarchists are inspired by a vision of a non-capitalist, 
decentralised, diverse society based on appropriate technology 
and appropriate scale, mainstream Marxism is not. Rather, it 
sees the problem with capitalism is that its institutions are 
not centralised and big enough. As Alexander Berkman correctly 
argues: 

"The role of industrial decentralisation in the revolution 
is unfortunately too little appreciated. . . Most people 
are still in the thraldom of the Marxian dogma that 
centralisation is 'more efficient and economical.' They 
close their eyes to the fact that the alleged 'economy' is 
achieved at the cost of the workers' limb and life, that 
the 'efficiency' degrades him to a mere industrial cog, 
deadens his soul, kills his body. Furthermore, in a system 
of centralisation the administration of industry becomes 
constantly merged in fewer hands, producing a powerful 
bureaucracy of industrial overlords. It would indeed be 
the sheerest irony if the revolution were to aim at such 
a result. It would mean the creation of a new master class." 
[_The ABC of Anarchism_, pp. 80-1]

That mainstream Marxism is soaked in capitalist ideology 
can be seen from Lenin's comments that when "the separate 
establishments are amalgamated into a single syndicate, 
this economy [of production] can attain tremendous 
proportions, as economic science teaches us." [Op. Cit., 
p. 200] Yes, *capitalist* economic science, based on 
*capitalist* definitions of efficiency and economy and
on *capitalist* criteria! That Bolshevism bases itself 
on centralised, large scale industry because it is more 
"efficient" and "economic" suggests nothing less than 
that its "socialism" will be based on the same priorities 
of capitalism. This can be seen from Lenin's idea that 
Russia had to learn from the advanced capitalist countries, 
that there was only one way to develop production and that 
was by adopting capitalist methods of "rationalisation" 
and management. In the words of Luigi Fabbri:

"Marxist communists, especially Russian ones, are beguiled by
the distant mirage of big industry in the West or America and
mistake for a system of production what is only a typically
capitalist means of speculation, a means of exercising 
oppression all the more securely; and they do not appreciate
that that sort of centralisation, far from fulfilling the 
real needs of production, is, on the contrary, precisely
what restricts it, obstructs it and applies a brake to it
in the interests of capital.

"Whenever [they] talk about 'necessity of production' they
make no distinction between those necessities upon which 
hinge the procurement of a greater quantity and higher 
quality of products -- this being all that matters from 
the social and communist point of view -- and the necessities
inherent in the bourgeois regime, the capitalists' necessity
to make more profit even should it mean producing less to
do so. If capitalism tends to centralise its operations, 
it does so not for the sake of production, but only for
the sake of making and accumulating more money." ["Anarchy 
and 'Scientific' Communism", in _The Poverty of Statism_, 
pp. 13-49, Albert Meltzer (ed.), pp. 21-22]

Efficiency, in other words, does not exist independently of 
a given society or economy. What is considered "efficient" 
under capitalism may be the worse form of inefficiency in a
free society. The idea that socialism may have *different* 
priorities, need *different* methods of organising production, 
have *different* visions of how an economy was structured than 
capitalism, is absent in mainstream Marxism. Lenin thought that 
the institutions of bourgeois economic power, industrial 
structure and capitalist technology and techniques could be 
"captured" and used for other ends. Ultimately, though, 
capitalist means and organisations can only generate capitalist 
ends. It is significant that the "one-man management," 
piece-work, Taylorism, etc. advocated and implemented under 
Lenin are usually listed by his followers as evils of Stalinism 
and as proof of its anti-socialist nature. 

Equally, it can be argued that part of the reason why large 
capitalist firms can "plan" production on a large scale is 
because they reduce the decision making criteria to a few 
variables, the most significant being profit and loss. That
such simplification of input data may result in decisions 
which harm people and the environment goes without a saying. 
"The lack of context and particularity," James C. Scott
correctly notes, "is not an oversight; it is the necessary 
first premise of any large-scale planning exercise. To the
degree that the subjects can be treated as standardised 
units, the power of resolution in the planning exercise is
enhanced. Questions posed within these strict confines can
have definitive, quantitative answers. The same logic applies
to the transformation of the natural world. Questions about 
the volume of commercial wood or the yield of wheat in 
bushels permit more precise calculations than questions 
about, say, the quality of the soil, the versatility and
taste of the grain, or the well-being of the community. The 
discipline of economics achieves its formidable resolving
power by transforming what might otherwise be considered
qualitative matters into quantitative issues with a single
metric and, as it were, a bottom line: profit or loss."
[_Seeing like a State_, p. 346] Whether a socialist society 
could factor in all the important inputs which capitalism
ignores within an even more centralised planning structure 
is an important question. This does not mean that anarchists 
argue for "small-scale" production as many Marxists, like
Lenin, assert (as we prove in section I.3.8, anarchists 
have always argued for *appropriate* levels of production 
and scale). It is simply to raise the possibility of what
works under capitalism make be undesirable from a perspective
which values people and planet instead of power and profit. 

As should be obvious, anarchism is based on critical evaluation 
of technology and industrial structure, rejecting the whole 
capitalist notion of "progress" which has always been part of 
justifying the inhumanities of the status quo. Just because 
something is rewarded by capitalism it does not mean that it makes 
sense from a human or ecological perspective. This informs our 
vision of a free society and the current struggle. We have long 
argued that that capitalist methods cannot be used for socialist 
ends. In our battle to democratise and socialise the workplace, 
in our awareness of the importance of collective initiatives by 
the direct producers in transforming their work situation, we 
show that factories are not merely sites of production, but 
also of reproduction -- the reproduction of a certain structure 
of social relations based on the division between those who give 
orders and those who take them, between those who direct and 
those who execute.

It goes without saying that anarchists recognise that a social 
revolution will have to start with the industry and technology 
which is left to it by capitalism and that this will have to be 
expropriated by the working class (this expropriation will, of
course, involve transforming it and, in all likelihood, rejecting
of numerous technologies, techniques and practices considered
as "efficient" under capitalism). This is *not* the issue. The 
issue is who expropriates it and what happens to it next. For 
anarchists, the means of life are expropriated directly by
society, for most Marxists they are expropriated by the state. 
For anarchists, such expropriation is based workers' 
self-management and so the fundamental capitalist "relation 
of production" (wage labour) is abolished. For most Marxists, 
state ownership of production is considered sufficient to ensure 
the end of capitalism (with, if we are lucky, some form of 
"workers' control" over those state officials who do management 
production -- see section H.3.14).

In contrast to the mainstream Marxist vision of socialism 
being based around the institutions inherited from capitalism, 
anarchists have raised the idea that the "free commune" would 
be the "medium in which the ideas of modern Socialism may 
come to realisation." These "communes would federate" into 
wider groupings. Labour unions (or other working class organs
created in the class struggle such as factory committees)
were "not only an instrument for the improvement of the 
conditions of labour, but also of becoming an organisation 
which might . . . take into its hands the management of 
production." Large labour associations would "come into 
existence for the inter-communal service[s]." Such communes 
and workers' organisations as the basis of "Socialist forms 
of life could find a much easier realisation" than the 
"seizure of all industrial property by the State, and 
the State organisation of agriculture and industry." Thus 
railway network "could be much better handled by a Federated 
Union of railway employees, than by a State organisation." 
Combined with co-operation "both for production and for 
distribution, both in industry and agriculture," workers' 
self-management of production would create "samples of 
the bricks" of the future society ("even samples of some 
of its rooms"). [Kropotkin, _The Conquest of Bread_, 
pp. 21-23]

This means that anarchists also root our arguments for
socialism in a scientific analysis of tendencies within
capitalism. However, in opposition to the analysis of
mainstream Marxism which focuses on the objective tendencies
within capitalist development, anarchists emphasis the 
*oppositional* nature of socialism to capitalism. Both 
the "law of value" and the "law of planning" are tendencies
*within* capitalism, that is aspects of capitalism. Anarchists 
encourage class struggle, the direct conflict of working class 
people against the workings of all capitalism's "laws". This 
struggle produces *mutual aid* and the awareness that we can 
care best for our own welfare if we *unite* with others -- what
we can loosely term the "law of co-operation". This law, in 
contrast to the Marxian "law of planning" is based on working 
class subjectively and develops within society only in 
*opposition* to capitalism. As such, it provides the necessary 
understanding of where socialism will come from, from *below*, 
in the spontaneous self-activity of the oppressed fighting 
for their freedom.

This means that the basic structures of socialism will be 
the organs created by working class people in their struggles 
against exploitation and oppress (see sections H.1.4 and I.2.3
for more details). Gustav Landauer's basic insight is correct 
(if his means were not totally so) when he wrote that "Socialism 
will not grow out of capitalism but away from it" [Op. Cit., 
p. 140] In other words, tendencies *opposed* to capitalism 
rather than ones which are part and parcel of it.

Anarchism's recognition of the importance of these tendencies 
towards mutual aid within capitalism is a key to understanding 
what anarchists do in the here and now, as will be discussed
in section J. In addition, it also laid the foundation of 
understanding the nature of an anarchist society and what 
creates the framework of such a society in the here and now. 
Anarchists do not abstractly place a better society (anarchy) 
against the current, oppressive one. Instead, we analysis what 
tendencies exist within current society and encourage those 
which empower and liberate people. Based on these tendencies, 
anarchists propose a society which develops them to their 
logical conclusion. Therefore an anarchist society is created
not through the developments within capitalism, but in social 
activity against it. Section I indicates what such a society 
would be like and where its framework comes from.
 
H.3.13 Why is state socialism just state capitalism?

For anarchists, the idea that socialism can be achieved
via state ownership is simply ridiculous. For reasons
which will become abundantly clear, anarchists argue 
that any such "socialist" system would simply be a
form of "state capitalism." Such a regime would not 
fundamentally change the position of the working class,
whose members would simply be wage slaves to the state
bureaucracy rather than to the capitalist class. 

However, before beginning our discussion of why anarchists 
think this we need to clarify our terminology. This is 
because the expression "state capitalism" has three distinct, 
if related, meanings in socialist (particularly Marxist) 
thought. Firstly, "state capitalism" was/is used to describe 
the current system of big business subject to extensive state 
control (particularly if, as in war, the capitalist state 
accrues *extensive* powers over industry). Secondly, it was 
used by Lenin to describe his immediate aims after the October 
Revolution, namely a regime in which the capitalists would
remain but would be subject to a system of state control
inherited by the new "proletarian" state from the old 
capitalist one (see section H.6 for details). The third 
use of the term is to signify a regime in which the state 
*replaces* the capitalist class *totally* via nationalisation 
of the means of production. In such a regime, the state would 
own, manage and accumulate capital rather than individual 
capitalists.

Anarchists are opposed to all three systems described by
the term "state capitalism." Here we concentrate on the 
third definition, arguing that state socialism would be
better described as "state capitalism" as state ownership
of the means of life does not get to the heart of capitalism,
namely wage labour. Rather it simply replaces private bosses
with the state and changes the form of property (from private
to state property) rather than getting rid of it.

The idea that socialism simply equals state ownership 
(nationalisation) is easy to find in the works 
of Marxism. The _Communist Manifesto_, for example,
states that the "proletariat will use its political
supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the
bourgeoisie, to centralise all instruments of production
into the hands of the State." This meant the 
"[c]entralisation of credit in the hands of the State,
by means of a national bank with State capital and an
exclusive monopoly," plus the "[c]entralisation of the
means of communication and transport in the hands of
the State," "[e]xtension of factories and instruments
of production owned by the State" and the "[e]stablishment
of industrial armies, especially for agriculture." 
[_Marx-Engels Selected Works_, pp. 52-3]

Engels repeats this formula thirty-two years later in 
_Socialism: Utopian and Scientific_ by asserting that 
capitalism itself "forces on more and more the 
transformation of the vast means of production, already 
socialised, into state property. *The proletariat seizes 
political power and turns the means of production into 
state property.*" Socialism is *not* equated with state 
ownership of productive forces by a capitalist state, 
"but concealed within it are the technical conditions 
that form the elements of that solution" to the social 
problem. It simply "shows itself the way to accomplishing 
this revolution. *The proletariat seizes political power 
and turns the means of production into state property.*" 
Thus state ownership *after* the proletariat seizes power 
is the basis of socialism, when by this "first act" of 
the revolution the state "really constitutes itself as the 
representative of the whole of society." [_Marx-Engels 
Reader_, p. 713, p. 712 and p. 713]

What is significant from these programmatic statements on 
the first steps of socialism is the total non-discussion 
of what is happening at the point of production, the 
non-discussion of the social relations in the workplace. 
Rather we are subjected to discussion of "the contradiction 
between socialised production and capitalist appropriation" 
and claims that while there is "socialised organisation 
of production within the factory," this has become 
"incompatible with the anarchy of production in society."
The obvious conclusion to be drawn is that "socialism" 
will inherit, without change, the "socialised" workplace
of capitalism and that the fundamental change is that 
of ownership: "The proletariat seized the public power, 
and by means of this transforms the socialised means of
production . . . into public property. By this act, the
proletariat frees the means of production from the
character of capital they have thus far borne." 
[Op. Cit., p. 709 and p. 717]

That the Marxist movement came to see state ownership 
rather than workers' management of production as the 
key issue is hardly surprising. Thus we find leading
Social-Democrats arguing that socialism basically meant
the state, under Social-Democratic control of course, 
acquiring the means of production and nationalising them.
Hilferding presented what was Marxist orthodoxy at the
time when he argued that in "a communist society" 
production "is consciously determined by the social 
central organ," which would decide "what is to be 
produced and how much, where and by whom." While this
information is determined by the market forces under
capitalism, in socialism it "is given to the members 
of the socialist society by their authorities . . . we 
must derive the undisturbed progress of the socialist 
economy from the laws, ordinances and regulations of 
socialist authorities." [quoted by Nikolai Bukharin, 
_Economy Theory of the Leisure Class_, p. 157] As we 
discuss in section H.6, the Bolsheviks inherited
this concept of "socialism" and implemented it.

This vision of society in which the lives of the 
population are controlled by "authorities" in a
"social central organ" which tell the workers what 
to do, while in line with the _Communist Manifesto_, 
seems less that appealing. It also shows why state
socialism is not socialism at all. Thus George Barrett:

"If instead of the present capitalist class there were 
a set of officials appointed by the Government and set
in a position to control our factories, it would bring
about no revolutionary change. The officials would have
to be paid, and we may depend that, in their privileged
positions, they would expect good remuneration. The 
politicians would have to be paid, and we already know
their tastes. You would, in fact, have a non-productive
class dictating to the producers the conditions upon 
which they were allowed to use the means of production.
As this is exactly what is wrong with the present system
of society, we can see that State control would be no
remedy, while it would bring with it a host of new
troubles . . . under a governmental system of society, 
whether it is the capitalism of today or a more a
perfected Government control of the Socialist State,
the essential relationship between the governed and
the governing, the worker and the controller, will be
the same; and this relationship so long as it lasts can
be maintained only by the bloody brutality of the 
policeman's bludgeon and the soldier's rifle." [_The 
Anarchist Revolution_, pp. 8-9]

The key to seeing why state socialism is simply state
capitalism can be found in the lack of change in the
social relationships at the point of production. The
workers are still wage slaves, employed by the state 
and subject to its orders. As Lenin stressed in _State
and Revolution_, under Marxist Socialism "[a]ll citizens 
are transformed into hired employees of the state . . . 
All citizens become employees and workers of a single 
country-wide state 'syndicate' . . . The whole of society 
will have become a single office and a single factory, 
with equality of labour and pay." [Lenin, _Selected Works_, 
vol. 2, p. 312] Given that Engels had argued, against 
anarchism, that a factory required subordination, authority, 
lack of freedom and "a veritable despotism independent of 
all social organisation," Lenin's idea of turning the world 
into one big factory takes on an extremely frightening 
nature. [_Marx-Engels Reader_, p. 731] A reality which one 
anarchist described in 1923 as being the case in Lenin's 
Russia:

"The nationalisation of industry, removing the workers 
from the hands of individual capitalists, delivered them 
to the yet more rapacious hands of a single, ever-present 
capitalist boss, the State. The relations between the 
workers and this new boss are the same as earlier 
relations between labour and capital, with the sole 
difference that the Communist boss, the State, not only 
exploits the workers, but also punishes them himself . . . 
Wage labour has remained what it was before, except that 
it has taken on the character of an obligation to the 
State . . . It is clear that in all this we are dealing 
with a simple substitution of State capitalism for private 
capitalism." [Peter Arshinov, _History of the Makhnovist 
Movement_, p. 71]

All of which makes Bakunin's comments seem justified (as
well as stunningly accurate):

"*Labour financed by the State* -- such is the fundamental
principle of *authoritarian Communism,* of State Socialism.
The State, *having become the sole proprietor* . . . will
have become sole capitalist, banker, money-lender, organiser,
director of all national work, and the distributor of its
profits." [_The Political Philosophy of Bakunin_, p. 293]

Such a system, based on those countries "where modern 
capitalist development has reached its highest point of
development" would see "the gradual or violent expropriation
of the present landlords and capitalists, or of the
appropriation of all land and capital by the State. In
order to be able to carry out its great economic and 
social mission, this State will have to be very far-reaching,
very powerful and highly centralised. It will administer
and supervise agriculture by means of its appointed 
mangers, who will command armies of rural workers 
organised and disciplined for that purpose. At the 
same time, it will set up a single bank on the ruins
of all existing banks." Such a system, Bakunin correctly
predicted, would be "a barracks regime for the proletariat,
in which a standardised mass of men and women workers would
wake, sleep, work and live by rote; a regime of privilege
for the able and the clever." [_Michael Bakunin: Selected
Writings_, p. 258 and p. 259] 

Proudhon, likewise was well aware that state ownership did 
not mean the end of private property, rather it meant a
change in who ordered the working class about. "We do
not want," he stated, "to see the State confiscate the
mines, canals and railways; that would be to add to 
monarchy, and more wage slavery. We want the mines, 
canals, railways handed over to democratically organised
workers' associations" which would be the start of a
"vast federation of companies and societies woven into
the common cloth of the democratic social Republic."
He contrasted workers' associations run by and for 
their members to those "subsidised, commanded and 
directed by the State," which would crush "all liberty
and all wealth, precisely as the great limited companies
are doing." [_No Gods, No Masters_, vol. 1, p. 62 and 
p. 105]

Simply put, if workers did not directly manage their own
work then it matters little who formally owns the workplaces
in which they toil. As Maurice Brinton argues, libertarian
socialists "hold that the 'relations of production' -- the 
relations which individuals or groups enter into with one 
another in the process of producing wealth -- are the 
essential foundations of any society. A certain pattern 
of relations of production is the common denominator of 
all class societies. This pattern is one in which the 
producer does not dominate the means of production but 
on the contrary both is 'separated from them' and from 
the products of his [or her] own labour. In all class 
societies the producer is in a position of subordination 
to those who manage the productive process. Workers' 
management of production -- implying as it does the total 
domination of the producer over the productive process - 
is not for us a marginal matter. It is the core of our 
politics. It is the only means whereby authoritarian 
(order-giving, order-taking) relations in production can 
be transcended and a free, communist or anarchist, society 
introduced." He goes on to note that "the means of 
production may change hands (passing for instance from 
private hands into those of a bureaucracy, collectively 
owning them) with out this revolutionising the relations 
of production. Under such circumstances -- and whatever 
the formal status of property -- the society is still a 
class society for production is still managed by an agency 
other than the producers themselves. Property relations, 
in other words, do not necessarily reflect the relations 
of production. They may serve to mask them -- and in fact 
they often have." [_The Bolsheviks and Workers' Control_,
pp. vii-vii]

As such, for anarchists (and libertarian Marxists) the 
idea that state ownership of the means of life (the land, 
workplaces, factories, etc.) is the basis of socialism is 
simply wrong. Therefore, "Anarchism cannot look upon the 
coming revolution as a mere substitution . . . of the 
State as the universal capitalist for the present 
capitalists." [Kropotkin, _Evolution and Environment_, 
p. 106] Given that the "State organisation having always 
been . . . the instrument for establishing monopolies 
in favour of the ruling minorities, [it] cannot be made 
to work for the destruction of these monopolies. The 
anarchists consider, therefore, that to hand over to 
the State all the main sources of economic life -- the 
land, the mines, the railways, banking, insurance, and 
so on -- as also the management of all the main branches 
of industry . . . would mean to create a new instrument 
of tyranny. State capitalism would only increase the 
powers of bureaucracy and capitalism." [_Kropotkin's
Revolutionary Pamphlets_, p. 286] Needless to say, a
society which was not democratic in the workplace would
not remain democratic politically either. Either 
democracy would become as formal as it is within any 
capitalist republic or it would be replaced by dictatorship. 
So, without a firm base in the direct management of 
production, any "socialist" society would see working 
class social power ("political power") and liberty wither 
and die, just like a flower ripped out of the soil.

Unsurprisingly, given all this, we discover throughout 
history the co-existence of private and state property. 
Indeed, the nationalisation of key services and 
industries has been implemented under all kinds of 
capitalist governments and within all kinds of 
capitalist states (which proves the non-socialist 
nature of state ownership). Moreover, anarchists can 
point to specific events where the capitalist class 
has used nationalisation to undermine revolutionary 
gains by the working class. The best example by far 
is in the Spanish Revolution, when the Catalan 
government used nationalisation against the wave of 
spontaneous, anarchist inspired, collectivisation which 
had placed most of industry into the hand direct hands 
of the workers (see section I.8). The government, under 
the guise of legalising the gains of the workers, placed 
them under state ownership to stop their development, 
ensure hierarchical control and so class society. 

A similar process occurred during the Russian Revolution 
under the Bolsheviks. Significantly, "many managers, at 
least those who remained, appear to have preferred 
nationalisation (state control) to workers' control and 
co-operated with Bolshevik commissars to introduce it. 
Their motives are not too difficult to understand . . . 
The issue of who runs the plants -- who makes decisions -- 
is, and probably always will be, the crucial question for 
managers in any industrial relations system." [Jay B. 
Sorenson, _The Life and Death of Soviet Trade Unionism_, 
pp. 67-8] As we discuss in the next section, the managers 
and capitalists were not the only ones who disliked "workers' 
control," the Bolsheviks did so as well, who ensured that it 
was marginalised within a centralised system of state control 
based on nationalisation.

As such, anarchists think that a utterly false dichotomy has 
been built up in discussions of socialism, one which has served 
the interests of both capitalists and state bureaucrats. This 
dichotomy is simply that the economic choices available to 
humanity are "private" ownership of productive means 
(capitalism), or state ownership of productive means (usually 
defined as "socialism"). In this manner, capitalist nations 
used the Soviet Union, and continue to use autocracies like 
North Korea, China, and Cuba as examples of the evils of 
"public" ownership of productive assets.

Anarchists see little distinction between "private" ownership of 
the means of life and "state" ownership. This is because the 
state is a highly centralised structure specifically designed to
exclude mass participation and so, therefore, necessarily composed 
of a ruling administrative body. As such, the "public" cannot 
actually "own" the property the state claims to hold in its name. 
The ownership and thus control of the productive means is then 
in the hands of a ruling elite, the state administration (i.e. 
bureaucracy). Thus, the means of production and land of a state 
"socialist" regime are *not* publicly owned -- rather, they are 
owned by a bureaucratic elite, *in the name of the people*, a 
subtle but important distinction. 

In this fashion, decisions about the allocation and use of the 
productive assets is not made by the people themselves, but by 
the administration, by economic planners. Similarly, in "private" 
capitalist economies, economic decisions are made by a coterie 
of managers. In both cases the managers make decisions which
reflect their own interests and the interests of the owners 
(be it shareholders or the state bureaucracy) and *not* the 
workers involved or society as a whole. In both cases, economic 
decision-making is top-down in nature, made by an elite of 
administrators -- bureaucrats in the state socialist economy, 
capitalists or managers in the "private" capitalist economy. 
The much-lauded distinction of capitalism is that unlike the 
monolithic, centralised state socialist bureaucracy it has 
a *choice* of bosses (and choosing a master is not freedom).
And given the similarities in the relations of production 
between capitalism and state "socialism," the obvious 
inequalities in wealth in so-called "socialist" states 
are easily explained. The relations of production and the
relations of distribution are inter-linked and so inequality
in terms of power in production means inequality in control
of the social product, which will be reflected in inequality
in terms of wealth.

In other words, private property exists if some individuals 
(or groups) control/own things which are used by other people.
This means, unsurprising, that state ownership is just a form 
of property rather than the negation of it. If you have a 
highly centralised structure (as the state is) which plans 
and decides about all things within production, then this 
central administrative would be the real owner because it 
has the exclusive right to decide how things are used, *not* 
those using them. The existence of this central administrative 
strata excludes the abolition of property, replacing socialism
or communism with state owned "property," i.e. *state* 
capitalism. As such, state ownership does *not* end wage 
labour and, therefore, social inequalities in terms of wealth
and access to resources. Workers are still order-takers under 
state ownership (whose bureaucrats control the product of 
their labour and determine who gets what). The only difference 
between workers under private property and state property is 
the person telling them what to do. Simply put, the capitalist 
or company appointed manager is replaced by a state appointed 
one. 

As anarcho-syndicalist Tom Brown stresses, when "the many 
control the means whereby they live, they will do so by 
abolishing private ownership and establishing common 
ownership of the means of production, with workers' control 
of industry." However, this is "not to be confused with 
nationalisation and state control" as "ownership is, in 
theory, said to be vested in the people" but, in fact 
"control is in the hands of a small class of bureaucrats." 
Then "common ownership does not exist, but the labour market 
and wage labour go on, the worker remaining a wage slave to 
State capitalism." Simply put, common ownership "demands 
common control. This is possible only in a condition of 
industrial democracy by workers' control." [_Syndicalism_, 
p. 94] In summary:

"Nationalisation is not Socialisation, but State Capitalism 
. . . Socialisation . . . is not State ownership, but the 
common, social ownership of the means of production, and
social ownership implies control by the producers, not by
new bosses. It implies Workers' Control of Industry --
and that is Syndicalism." [Op. Cit., p. 111]

However, many Marxists (in particular Leninists) state they 
are in favour of both state ownership *and* "workers' control." 
As we discuss in more depth in next section, while they mean 
the same thing as anarchists do by the first term, they have 
a radically different meaning for the second (it is for this 
reason modern-day anarchists generally use the term "workers' 
self-management"). To anarchist ears, the combination of
nationalisation (state ownership) and "workers' control" 
(and even more so, self-management) simply expresses 
political confusion, a mishmash of contradictory ideas which
simply hides the reality that state ownership, by its very 
nature, precludes workers' control. As such, anarchists reject
such contradictory rhetoric in favour of "socialisation" and
"workers' self-management of production." History shows that
nationalisation will always undermine workers' control at the
point of production and such rhetoric always paves the way for 
state capitalism.

Therefore, anarchists are against both nationalisation
*and* privatisation, recognising both as forms of 
capitalism, of wage slavery. We believe in genuine public 
ownership of productive assets, rather than corporate/private 
or state/bureaucratic control. Only in this manner can the 
public address their own economic needs. Thus, we see a 
third way that is distinct from the popular "either/or" 
options forwarded by capitalists and state socialists, a 
way that is entirely more democratic. This is workers' 
self-management of production, based on social ownership 
of the means of life by federations of self-managed 
syndicates and communes. 

For further discussion, see Kropotkin's discussion of
"The collectivist Wages System" in _The Conquest of
Bread_ and selections from the British Anarchist Journal 
_Freedom_ about the wide-scale nationalisation which 
took place after the end of the Second World War entitled 
_Neither Nationalisation Nor Privatisation: An Anarchist 
Approach_.

H.3.14 Don't Marxists believe in workers' control?

As we discussed in the last section, anarchists consider
the usual association of state ownership with socialism to
be false. We argue that it is just another form of the wages
system, of capitalism, albeit with the state replacing the
capitalist. As such, state ownership, for anarchists, is
simply state capitalism. Instead we urge socialisation 
based on workers' self-management of production. Libertarian
Marxists concur.

Some mainstream Marxists, however, say they seek to combine 
state ownership with "workers' control." This can be seen 
from Trotsky, for example, who argued in 1938 for "workers' 
control . . . the penetration of the workers' eye into all 
open and concealed springs of capitalist economy . . . 
workers' control becomes a school for planned economy. On 
the basis of the experience of control, the proletariat will 
prepare itself for direct management of nationalised industry 
when the hour for that eventuality strikes." Modern day 
Leninists are often heard voicing support for what anarchists 
consider an oxymoron, namely "nationalisation under worker' 
control." This, it will be argued, proves that nationalisation 
(state control) is not "state capitalism" as we argued in the 
last section, rather "control is the first step along the road 
to the socialist guidance of economy." [_The Death Agony 
of Capitalism and the Tasks of the Fourth International_, 
p. 73 and p. 74]

Anarchists are not convinced. This is because of two reasons.
Firstly, because by "workers' control" anarchists and Leninists
mean two radically different things. Secondly, when in *power* 
Trotsky advocated radically different ideas. Based on these 
reasons, anarchists view Leninist calls for "workers' control" 
simply as a means of gaining popular support, calls which will 
be ignored once the real aim, party power, has been achieved: 
it is an example of Trotsky's comment that "[s]logans as well 
as organisational forms should be subordinated to the indices 
of the movement." [Op. Cit., p. 72] In other words, rather than 
express a commitment to the ideas of worker's control of 
production, mainstream Marxist use of the term "workers' control" 
is simply an opportunistic technique aiming at securing support 
for the party's seizure of power and once this is achieved it 
will be cast aside in favour of the first part of the demands, 
namely state ownership and so control. In making this claim 
anarchists feel they have more than enough evidence, evidence 
which many members of Leninist parties simply know nothing about.

We will look first at the question of terminology. Anarchists 
traditionally used the term "workers' control" to mean workers' 
full and direct control over their workplaces, and their work. 
However, after the Russian Revolution a certain ambiguity arose 
in using that term. This is because specific demands which were 
raised during that revolution were translated into English as 
"workers' control" when, in fact, the Russian meaning of the 
word (*kontrolia*) was far closer to "supervision" or "steering." 
Thus the term "workers' control" is used to describe two 
radically different concepts.

This can be seen from Trotsky when he argued that the workers 
should "demand resumption, as public utilities, of work in 
private businesses closed as a result of the crisis. Workers' 
control in such case would be replaced by direct workers' 
management." [Op. Cit., p. 73] Why workers' employed in 
open capitalist firms were not considered suitable for 
"direct workers' management" is not explained, but the fact
remains Trotsky clearly differentiated between management and
control. For him, "workers' control" meant "workers supervision"
over the capitalist who retained power. In other words, a 
system of "dual power" at the point of production (and, like
all forms of dual power, essentially and inevitably unstable).

This vision of "workers' control" as simply supervision of
the capitalist managers can be found in Lenin. Rather than 
seeing "workers' control" as workers managing production 
directly, he always saw it in terms of workers' "controlling" 
those who did. It simply meant "the country-wide, all-embracing, 
omnipresent, most precise and most conscientious *accounting* 
of the production and distribution of goods." He clarified
what he meant, arguing for "country-wide, all-embracing 
workers' control over the capitalists" who would still 
manage production. Significantly, he considered that "as
much as nine-tenths of the *socialist* apparatus" required
for this "country-wide *book-keeping,* country-wide *accounting*
of the production and distribution of goods" would be achieved
by nationalising the "big banks," which "*are* the 'state 
apparatus' which we *need* to bring about socialism" (indeed,
this was considered "something in the nature of the *skeleton*
of socialist society"). Over time, this system would move
towards full socialism. [_Selected Works_, vol. 2, pp. 364-5, 
p. 366 and p. 365]

Thus, what Leninists mean by "workers' control" is radically
different than what anarchists traditionally meant by that term
(indeed, it was radically different from the workers' definition,
as can be seen from a resolution of the Bolshevik dominated
First Trade Union Congress which complained that "the workers 
misunderstand and falsely interpret workers' control." [quoted 
by M. Brinton, _The Bolsheviks and Workers' Control_, p. 32]).
It is for this reason that from the 1960s English speaking  anarchists and other libertarian socialists have been explicit 
and have used the term "workers' self-management" rather than 
"workers' control" to describe their aims. Mainstream Marxists,
however have continued to use the latter slogan, undoubtedly,
as we note in section H.3.5, to gain members from the confusion 
in meanings.

Secondly, there is the example of the Russian Revolution itself. 
Indeed, Trotsky is simply repeating the slogans used by the 
Bolsheviks in 1917. As historian S.A. Smith correctly summarises, 
the "factory committees launched the slogan of workers' control 
of production quite independently of the Bolshevik party. It 
was not until May that the party began to take it up." However, 
Lenin used "the term ['workers' control'] in a very different 
sense from that of the factory committees." In fact Lenin's 
"proposals . . . [were] thoroughly statist and centralist in 
character, whereas the practice of the factory committees was 
essentially local and autonomous." [_Red Petrograd_, p. 154] 

This is not all, this "workers' control" was always placed in 
a statist context and it would be exercised not by workers' 
organisations but rather by state capitalist institutions. In 
May 1917, Lenin was arguing for the "establishment of state 
control over all banks, and their amalgamation into a single 
central bank; also control over the insurance agencies and big 
capitalist syndicates." He reiterated this framework later that 
year, arguing that "the new means of control have been created 
not by us, but by capitalism in its military-imperialist stage" 
and so "the proletariat takes its weapons from capitalism and 
does not 'invent' or 'create them out of nothing.'" [Op. Cit.,
p. 112, p. 367 and p. 599] The factory committees were added
to this "state capitalist" system but they played only a very 
minor role in it. Indeed, this system of state control was 
designed to limit the power of the factory committees:

"One of the first decrees issues by the Bolshevik Government
was the Decree on Workers' Control of 27 November 1917. By
this decree workers' control was institutionalised . . . 
Workers' control implied the persistence of private ownership
of the means of production, though with a 'diminished' right
of disposal. The organs of workers' control, the factory 
committees, were not supposed to evolve into workers'
management organs after the nationalisation of the factories.
The hierarchical structure of factory work was not questioned
by Lenin . . . To the Bolshevik leadership the transfer of
power to the working class meant power to its leadership, 
i.e. to the party. Central control was the main goal of the
Bolshevik leadership. The hasty creation of the VSNKh (the
Supreme Council of the National Economy) on 1 December 1917,
with precise tasks in the economic field, was a significant 
indication of fact that decentralised management was not among
the projects of the party, and that the Bolsheviks intended to
counterpose central direction of the economy to the possible
evolution of workers' control toward self-management." 
[Silvana Malle, _The Economic Organisation of War Communism,
1918-1921_, p. 47]

Once in power, the Bolsheviks soon turned away from even 
this limited vision of workers' control and in favour of 
"one-man management." Lenin raised this idea in late April
1918 and it involved granting state appointed "individual 
executives dictatorial powers (or 'unlimited' powers)." 
Large-scale industry required "thousands subordinating 
their will to the will of one," and so the revolution 
"demands" that "the people unquestioningly obey the single 
will of the leaders of labour." Lenin's "superior forms of 
labour discipline" were simply hyper-developed capitalist 
forms. The role of workers in production was the same, but 
with a novel twist, namely "unquestioning obedience to the 
orders of individual representatives of the Soviet government 
during the work." This support for wage slavery was combined 
with support for capitalist management techniques. "We must 
raise the question of piece-work and apply and test it in 
practice," argued Lenin, "we must raise the question of 
applying much of what is scientific and progressive in the 
Taylor system; we must make wages correspond to the total 
amount of goods turned out." [Lenin, Op. Cit., p. 610, 
p. 611, p. 612 and pp. 602-3]

This vision had already been applied in practice, with the 
"first decree on the management of nationalised enterprises in
March 1918" which had "established two directors at the head of 
each enterprise . . . Both directors were appointed by the 
central administrators." An "economic and administrative 
council" was also created in the workplace, but this "did not
reflect a syndicalist concept of management." Rather it 
included represents of the employees, employers, engineers,
trade unions, the local soviets, co-operatives, the local
economic councils and peasants. This composition "weakened
the impact of the factory workers on decision-making . . . 
The workers' control organs [the factory committees] remained
in a subordinate position with respect to the council." Once
the Civil War broke out in May 1918, this process was 
accelerated. By 1920, most workplaces were under one-man 
management and the Communist Party at its Ninth Congress had 
"promoted  one-man management as the most suitable form of 
management." [Silvana Malle, Op. Cit., p. 111, p. 112, 
p. 141 and p. 128] In other words, the manner in which 
Lenin organised industry had handed it over entirely into
the hands of the bureaucracy.

Trotsky, as to be expected, did not disagree with all this.
In fact, quite the reverse. He wholeheartedly defended the
imposing of "one-man management" in his justly infamous book 
_Terrorism and Communism_. As he put it, "our Party Congress
. . . expressed itself in favour of the principle of one-man 
management in the administration of industry . . . It would 
be the greatest possible mistake, however, to consider this 
decision as a blow to the independence of the working class. 
The independence of the workers is determined and measured 
not by whether three workers or one are placed at the head 
of a factory." As such, it "would consequently be a most 
crying error to confuse the question as to the supremacy of 
the proletariat with the question of boards of workers at the 
head of factories. The dictatorship of the proletariat is 
expressed in the abolition of private property in the means 
of production, in the supremacy over the whole Soviet mechanism 
of the collective will of the workers, and not at all in the 
form in which individual economic enterprises are administered."
[_Terrorism and Communism_, p. 162] The term "collective will 
of the workers" is simply a euphemism for the Party which
Trotsky had admitted had "substituted" its dictatorship for
that of the Soviets (indeed, "there is nothing accidental" 
in this "'substitution' of the power of the party for the 
power of the working class" and "in reality there is no 
substitution at all." The "dictatorship of the Soviets became 
possible only by means of the dictatorship of the party." 
[Op. Cit., p. 109]). The unions "should discipline the 
workers and teach them to place the interests of production
above their own needs and demands." He even argued that "the 
only solution to economic difficulties from the point of 
view of both principle and of practice is to treat the 
population of the whole country as the reservoir of the 
necessary labour power . . . and to introduce strict order 
into the work of its registration, mobilisation and 
utilisation." [Op. Cit., p. 143 and p. 135]

Trotsky did not consider this a result of the Civil War. 
Again, the opposite was the case: "I consider if the civil 
war had not plundered our economic organs of all that was 
strongest, most independent, most endowed with initiative, 
we should undoubtedly have entered the path of one-man 
management in the sphere of economic administration much 
sooner and much less painfully." [Op. Cit., pp. 162-3]

Significantly, discussing developments in Russia since 
the N.E.P, Trotsky argued that it was "necessary for each
state-owned factory, with its technical director and
with its commercial director, to be subjected not only
to control from the top -- by the state organs -- but 
also from below, by the market which will remain the 
regulator of the state economy for a long time to come." 
Workers' control, as can be seen, was not even mentioned, 
nor considered as an essential aspect of control "from 
below." As Trotsky also stated that "[u]nder socialism 
economic life will be directed in a centralised manner," 
our discussion of the state capitalist nature of mainstream 
Marxism we presented in the last section is confirmed. 
[_The First Five Years of the Communist International_,
vol. 2, p. 237 and p. 229]

The contrast between what Trotsky did when he was in 
power and what he argued for after he had been expelled 
is obvious. Indeed, the arguments of 1938 and 1920 are 
in direct contradiction to each other. Needless to say, 
Leninists and Trotskyists today are fonder of quoting 
Trotsky and Lenin when they did not have state power 
rather than when they did. Rather than compare what they
said to what they did, they simply repeat ambiguous slogans
which meant radically different things to Lenin and Trotsky
than to the workers' who thrust them into power. For obvious
reasons, we feel. Given the opportunity for latter day 
Leninists to exercise power, we wonder if a similar process 
would occur again? Who would be willing to take that chance?

As such, the claim that Marxists stand for "workers' control"
can be refuted on two counts. Firstly, by that term they simply
mean workers' supervision of those who do have real power in
production (either the capitalists or state appointed managers).
It does *not* mean workers' self-management of production.
Secondly, when they had the chance they did not implement it.
In fact, they imposed capitalist style hierarchical management
and did not consider this as anything to be worried about. And
as this policy was advocated *before* the start of the Civil
War, it cannot be said to have been forced upon them by necessity.
As such, any claim that mainstream Marxism considers "workers' 
control" as an essential feature of its politics is simply 
nonsense. 

For a comprehensive discussion of "workers' control" during the
Russian Revolution Maurice Brinton's _The Bolsheviks and Workers'
Control_ cannot be bettered.

The roots of this confusion can be found in Marx and Engels.
In the struggle between authentic socialism (i.e. workers'
self-management) and state capitalism (i.e. state ownership)
there *are* elements of the correct solution to be found in 
their ideas. This is their support for co-operatives. For 
example, Marx praised the efforts made within the Paris 
Commune to create co-operatives, so "transforming the means 
of production, land and capital . . . into mere instruments 
of free and associated labour." He argued that "[i]f 
co-operative production is not to remain a shame and a snare; 
if it is to supersede the Capitalist system; if united 
co-operative societies are to regulate national production 
upon a common plan, thus taking it under their own control,
and putting an end to the constant anarchy and periodical
convulsions which are the fatality of Capitalist production
-- what else . . . would it be but Communism, 'possible'
Communism?" [Op. Cit., pp. 290-1] Engels, continuing this 
theme, argued for "the transfer -- initially on lease -- 
of large estates to autonomous co-operatives under state 
management and effected in such a way that the State retains 
ownership of the land." He stated that neither he nor Marx 
"ever doubted that, in the course of transition to a wholly 
communist economy, widespread use would have to be made of 
co-operative management as an intermediate stage. Only it 
will mean so organising things that society, i.e. initially 
the State, retains ownership of the means of production and 
thus prevents the particular interests of the co-operatives 
from taking precedence over those of society as a whole." 
[_Marx-Engels Collected Works_, vol. 47, p. 389] 

However, Engels comments simply bring home the impossibilities 
of trying to reconcile state ownership and workers' 
self-management. While the advocacy of co-operatives is a 
positive step forward from the statist arguments of the 
_Communist Manifesto_, Engels squeezes these libertarian forms 
of organising production into typically statist structures. 
How "autonomous co-operatives" can co-exist with (and under!) 
"state management" and "ownership" is not explained, plus 
the fatal confusion of socialisation with nationalisation.

In addition, the differences between the comments of Marx and 
Engels are obvious. While Marx talks of "united co-operative
societies," Engels talks of "the State." The former implies
a free federation of co-operatives, the latter a centralised
structure which the co-operatives are squeezed into and 
under. The former is socialism, the latter is state capitalist.
From Engels argument, it is obvious that the stress is on 
state ownership and management rather than self-management.
This confusion became a source of tragedy during the 
Russian Revolution when the workers, like their comrades
during the Commune, started to form a federation of
factory committees while the Bolsheviks squeezed these
bodies into a system of state control which was designed
to marginalise them (see section H.6.10 for full details).

Moreover, the aims of the Paris workers were at odds with
the vision of the _Communist Manifesto_ and in line with 
anarchism. Proudhon, for example, had argued in 1848
against state ownership and for "democratically organised
workers' associations" which would be "models for agriculture,
industry and trade, the pioneering core of that vast
federation of companies and societies" which would make
up "the democratic social Republic." [_No Gods, No Masters_,
vol. 1, p. 62] In his _Principle of Federation_ he called
this idea an "agro-industrial federation." Thus the idea
of co-operative production is a clear expression of what
Proudhon explicitly called "industrial democracy," a
"reorganisation of industry, under the jurisdiction of
all those who compose it." [quoted by K. Steven Vincent,
_Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and the Rise of French Republican
Socialism_, p. 225] Bakunin and later anarchists simply 
developed these ideas to their logical conclusion (see 
section I.3 for example).

Marx, to his credit, supported these libertarian visions 
when applied in practice by the Paris workers during the
Commune and promptly revised his ideas. This fact has been 
obscured somewhat by Engels historical revisionism in this 
matter. He argued, for example, that the "economic measures" 
of the Commune were driven not by "principles" but by "simple,
practical needs." This meant that "the confiscation of 
shut-down factories and workshops and handing them over
to workers' associations" were "not at all in accordance
with the spirit of Proudhonism but certainly in accordance
with the spirit of German scientific socialism." [Marx,
Engels, Lenin, _Anarchism and Anarcho-Syndicalism_, p. 92]
This distortion of Proudhon's ideas is also present in
Engels' 1891 introduction to Marx's "The Civil War in
France." He painted a picture of Proudhon being opposed
to association (except for large-scale industry). He
stresses that "to combine all these associations in one
great union" was "the direct opposite of the Proudhon
doctrine" and so "the Commune was the grave of the 
Proudhon doctrine." [_Marx-Engels Selected Works_, p. 256]

However, as noted, this is nonsense. The forming of workers'
associations was a key aspect of Proudhon's ideas and so
the Communards were obviously acting in his spirit. Given
that the _Communist Manifesto_ stressed state ownership
and failed to mention co-operatives at all, the claim that
the Commune acted in its spirit seems a tad optimistic.
Particularly since Marx had commented in 1866 that in France 
the workers ("particularly those of Paris"!) "are strongly
attached, without knowing it [!], to the old rubbish" and
that the "Parisian gentlemen had their heads full of the 
emptiest Proudhonist phrases." [Marx, Engels and Lenin, 
Op. Cit., p. 46 and p. 45] 

What did this "old rubbish" consist of? Well, in 1869 the 
delegate of the Parisian Construction Workers' Trade Union 
argued that "[a]ssociation of the different corporations 
[labour unions/associations] on the basis of town or country 
. . . leads to the commune of the future . . . Government is 
replaced by the assembled councils of the trade bodies, and 
by a committee of their respective delegates." In addition, 
"a local grouping which allows the workers in the same area 
to liase on a day to day basis" and "a linking up of the 
various localities, fields, regions, etc." (i.e. international 
trade or industrial union federations) would ensure that 
"labour organises for present and future by doing away with 
wage slavery." This "mode of organisation leads to the labour 
representation of the future." [_No Gods, No Masters_, vol. 1, 
p. 184]

To state the obvious, this had clear links with both Proudhon's
ideas *and* what the Commune did in practice. Rather than being
the "grave" of Proudhon's ideas on workers' associations, the
Commune saw their birth, i.e. their application. Rather than 
the Parisian workers becoming Marxists "without knowing it," 
Marx had become a follower of Proudhon! Thus the idea of 
socialism being based on a federation of workers' associations 
was not buried with the Paris Commune. It was integrated into 
all forms of social anarchism (including communist-anarchism 
and anarcho-syndicalism) and recreated every time there is a 
social revolution.

In ending when must note that anarchists are well aware that
individual workplaces could pursue aims at odds with the 
rest of society (to use Engels expression, their "particular 
interests"). This is often termed "localism." Anarchists, 
however, argue that the mainstream Marxist solution is worse 
than the problem. By placing self-managed workplaces under 
state control (or ownership) they become subject to even 
worse "particular interests," namely those of the state 
bureaucracy who will use their power to further their own 
interests. In contrast, anarchists advocate federations of 
self-managed workplaces to solve this problem (see section 
I.3 for more).

In summary, the problem of "localism" and any other problems 
faced by a social revolution will be solved in the interests 
of the working class only if working class people solve them 
themselves. For this to happen it requires working class 
people to manage their own affairs directly and that implies 
self-managed organising from the bottom up (i.e. anarchism) 
rather than delegating power to a minority at the top, to a 
"revolutionary" party or state. This applies economically, 
socially and politically. As Bakunin argued, the "revolution 
should not only be made for the people's sake; it should also 
be made by the people." [_No Gods, No Masters_, vol. 1, p. 141]

H.4 Didn't Engels refute anarchism in his essay 
    "On Authority"?

No, far from it. Engels (in)famous essay "On Authority" is 
often pointed to by Marxists of various schools as refuting 
anarchism. Indeed, it is often considered the essential 
Marxist work for this and is often trotted out (pun intended)
when anarchist influence is on the rise. However this is not 
the case. In fact, his essay is both politically flawed and 
misrepresentative of his foes opinions. As such, anarchists 
do not think that Engels refuted anarchism in his essay. 
Indeed, rather than refute anarchism, Engels' essay just 
shows his ignorance of the ideas he was critiquing. This 
ignorance essentially rests on the fact that the whole 
concept of authority was defined and understood differently 
by Bakunin and Engels meant that the latter's critique was
flawed. While Engels may have thought that they both were 
speaking of the same thing, in fact they were not. 

For Engels, all forms of group activity meant the subjection 
of the individuals that make it up. As he puts it, "whoever 
mentions combined action speaks of organisation" and so it 
is not possible "to have organisation without authority," 
as authority means "the imposition of the will of another 
upon ours . . . authority presupposes subordination." 
[_Marx-Engels Reader_, p. 731 and p. 730] As such, he 
considers the ideas of Bakunin to fly in the face of 
common sense and so show that he does not know what he 
is talking about. However, it is Engels who shows that 
he does not know what he is talking about.

The first fallacy in Engels account is that anarchists 
do not oppose all forms of authority. Bakunin was extremely
clear on this issue and differentiated between *types* of
authority, of which only certain kinds did he oppose. For
example, he asked the question "[d]oes it follow that I
reject all authority?" and answered quite clearly: "No,
far be it from me to entertain such a thought." He 
acknowledged the difference between being *an* authority 
-- an expert -- and being *in* authority, for example.
This meant that "[i]f I bow before the authority of the
specialists and declare myself ready to follow, to a
certain extent and so long as it may seem to me to be
necessary, their general indications and even their
directions, it is because their authority is imposed
upon me by no one . . . I bow before the authority of
specialists because it is imposed upon me by my own
reason." [_The Political Philosophy of Bakunin_, p. 253]

Similarly, he argued that anarchists "recognise all natural
authority, and all influence of fact upon us, but none of
right; for all authority and all influence of right,
officially imposed upon us, immediately becomes a falsehood 
and an oppression." He stressed that the "only great and 
omnipotent authority, at once natural and rational, the 
only one we respect, will be that of the collective and 
public spirit of a society founded on equality and 
solidarity and the mutual respect of all its members." 
[Op. Cit., p. 241 and p. 255]

So while Bakunin and other anarchists, on occasion, *did*
argue that anarchists reject "all authority" they, as Carole
Pateman correctly notes, "tended to treat 'authority' as a
synonym for 'authoritarian,' and so have identified 'authority'
with hierarchical power structures, especially those of the
state. Nevertheless, their practical proposals and some of
their theoretical discussions present a different picture."
[_The Problem of Political Obligation_, p. 141] This can
be seen when Bakunin noted that "the principle of *authority*"
was the "eminently theological, metaphysical and political
idea that the masses, *always* incapable of governing
themselves, must submit at all times to the benevolent
yoke of a wisdom and a justice, which in one way or another,
is imposed from above." [_Marxism, Freedom and the State_,
p. 33] Clearly, by the term "principle of authority" Bakunin
meant *hierarchy* rather than organisation and the need
to make agreements (what is now called self-management). 

Therefore Bakunin did not oppose *all* authority but rather
a specific kind of authority, namely *hierarchical* authority.
This kind of authority placed power into the hands of a few.
For example, wage labour produced this kind of authority,
with a "meeting . . . between master and slave . . . the
worker sells his person and his liberty for a given time."
[_The Political Philosophy of Bakunin_, p. 187] The state 
is also based hierarchical authority, with "those who 
govern" (i.e. "those who frame the laws of the country as 
well as those who exercise the executive power") are in an 
"exceptional position diametrically opposed to . . . popular 
aspirations" towards liberty. They end up "viewing society 
from the high position in which they find themselves" and 
so "[w]hoever says political power says domination" over 
"a more or less considerable section of the population." 
[Op. Cit., p. 218]

Thus hierarchical authority is top-down, centralised and 
imposed. It is *this* kind of authority Bakunin had in mind
when he argued that anarchists "are in fact enemies of all
authority" and it will "corrupt those who exercise [it]
as much as those who are compelled to submit to [it]." 
[Op. Cit., p. 249] In other words, "authority" was used 
as shorthand for "hierarchy" (or "hierarchical authority"), 
the imposition of decisions rather than agreement to abide 
by the collective decisions you make with others when you
freely associate with them. In place of this kind of authority, 
Bakunin proposed a "natural authority" based on the masses 
"governing themselves." He did not object to the need for 
individuals associating themselves into groups and 
managing their own affairs, rather he opposed the idea
that co-operation necessitated hierarchy:

"Hence there results, for science as well as for industry,
the necessity of division and association of labour. I
take and I give -- such is human life. Each is an 
authoritative leader and in turn is led by others.
Accordingly there is no fixed and constant authority, but
continual exchange of mutual, temporary, and, above all,
voluntary authority and subordination." [Op. Cit., pp. 353-4]

This kind of free association would be the expression of 
liberty rather than (as in hierarchical structures) its 
denial. Anarchists reject the idea of giving a minority 
(a government) the power to make our decisions for us. 
Rather, power should rest in the hands of all, not 
concentrated in the hands of a few. Anarchism is based
on rejecting what Bakunin called "the authoritarian 
conception of discipline" which "always signifies 
despotism on the one hand and blind automatic 
submission to authority on the other." In an anarchist 
organisation "hierarchic order and advancement do not 
exist" and there would be "voluntary and thoughtful 
discipline" for "collective work or action." This
would be a new kind of discipline, one which is 
"voluntary and intelligently understood" and 
"necessary whenever a greater number of individuals 
undertake any kind of collective work or action." 
This is "simply the voluntary and considered 
co-ordination of all individual efforts for a 
common purpose . . In such a system, power, properly 
speaking, no longer exists. Power is diffused to the 
collectivity and becomes the true expression of the 
liberty of everyone, the faithful and sincere 
realisation of the will of all . . . this is the 
only true discipline, the discipline necessary for 
the organisation of freedom." [Op. Cit., pp. 259-60]

Clearly Engels misunderstands the anarchist conception 
of liberty. Rather than seeing it as essentially negative, 
anarchists argue that liberty is expressed in two different,
but integrated, ways. Firstly, there is rebellion, the 
expression of autonomy in the face of authority. This is
the negative aspect of it. Secondly, there is association, 
the expression of autonomy by working with equals. This is
the positive aspect of it. As such, Engels concentrates on
the negative aspect of anarchist ideas, ignoring the positive,
and so paints a false picture of anarchism. Freedom, as
Bakunin argued, is a product of connection, not of isolation. 
How a group organises itself determines whether it is 
authoritarian or libertarian. If the individuals who take 
part in a group manage the affairs of that group (including
what kinds of decisions can be delegated) then that group is 
based on liberty. If that power is left to a few individuals 
(whether elected or not) then that group is structured in an 
authoritarian manner. This can be seen from Bakunin's 
argument that power must be "diffused" into the collective 
in an anarchist society. Clearly, anarchists do not 
reject the need for organisation nor the need to make 
and abide by collective decisions. Rather, the question 
is how these decisions are to be made -- are they to be 
made from below, by those affected by them, or from above, 
imposed by a few people in authority.

Only a sophist would confuse hierarchical power with the 
power of people managing their own affairs. It is an 
improper use of words to denote equally as "authority" 
two such opposed concepts as individuals subjected to 
the autocratic power of a boss and the voluntary 
co-operation of conscious individuals working together 
as equals. The lifeless obedience of a governed mass 
cannot be compared to the organised co-operation of 
free individuals, yet this is what Engels does. The 
former is marked by hierarchical power and the turning 
of the subjected into automations performing mechanical
movements without will and thought. The latter is 
marked by participation, discussion and agreement. 
Both are, of course, based on co-operation but to 
argue that latter restricts liberty as much as the 
former simply confuses co-operation with coercion. 
It also indicates a distinctly liberal conception 
of liberty, seeing it restricted by association with 
others rather than seeing association as an expression 
of liberty. As Malatesta argued:

"The basic error . . . is in believing that organisation 
is not possible without authority.

"Now, it seems to us that organisation, that is to say,
association for a specific purpose and with the structure
and means required to attain it, is a necessary aspect of
social life. A man in isolation cannot even live the life
of a beast . . . Having therefore to join with other
humans . . . he must submit to the will of others (be
enslaved) or subject others to his will (be in authority)
or live with others in fraternal agreement in the interests
of the greatest good of all (be an associate). Nobody can
escape from this necessity." [_Life and Ideas_, pp. 84-5]

Therefore, organisation is "only the practice of co-operation
and solidarity" and is a "natural and necessary condition
of social life." [Malatesta, Op. Cit., p. 83] Clearly, the 
question is not whether we organise, but how do we do so. 
This means that, for anarchists, Engels confused vastly
different concepts: "Co-ordination is dutifully confused
with command, organisation with hierarchy, agreement with
domination -- indeed, 'imperious' domination." [Murray
Bookchin, _Towards an Ecological Society_, pp. 126-7]

Socialism will only exist when the discipline currently 
enforced by the stick in the hand of the boss is replaced 
by the conscious self-discipline of free individuals. It 
is not by changing who holds the stick (from a capitalist 
to a "socialist" boss) that socialism will be created. 
It is only by the breaking up and uprooting of this slavish 
spirit of discipline, and its replacement by self-management, 
that working people will create a new discipline what will 
be the basis of socialism (the voluntary self-discipline 
Bakunin talked about).

Clearly, then, Engels did not refute anarchism by his essay.
Rather, he refuted a straw man of his own creation. The 
question was *never* one of whether certain tasks need
co-operation, co-ordination, joint activity and agreement. 
It was, in fact, a question of *how* that is achieved. As 
such, Engels diatribe misses the point. Instead of addressing 
the actual politics of anarchism or their actual use of the
word "authority," he rather addresses a series of logical
deductions he draws from a false assumption regarding those 
politics. Engels essay shows the bedlam that can be created 
when a remorseless logician deduces away from an incorrect 
starting assumption.

For collective activity anarchists recognise the need to make 
and stick by agreements. Collective activity of course needs 
collective decision making and organisation. In so far as 
Engels had a point to his diatribe (namely that group efforts 
meant co-operating with others), Bakunin (like any anarchist)
would have agreed. The question was how are these decisions
to be made, not whether they should be or not. Ultimately,
Engels confused agreement with hierarchy. Anarchists do not. 

H.4.1 Does organisation imply the end of liberty?

Engels argument in "On Authority" can be summed up as any form 
of collective activity means co-operating with others and that
this means the individual subordinates themselves to others,
specifically the group. As such, authority cannot be abolished 
as organisation means that "the will of a single individual 
will always have to subordinate itself, which means that 
questions are settled in an authoritarian way." [Op. Cit., 
p. 731]

As such, Engels argument proves too much. As every form of
joint activity involves agreement and "subordination," then
life itself becomes "authoritarian." The only free person,
according to Engels' logic, would be the hermit. As George
Barrett argues:

"To get the full meaning out of life we must co-operate, and 
to co-operate we must make agreements with our fellow-men. But 
to suppose that such agreements mean a limitation of freedom 
is surely an absurdity; on the contrary, they are the exercise 
of our freedom.

"If we are going to invent a dogma that to make agreements is 
to damage freedom, then at once freedom becomes tyrannical, for 
it forbids men [and women] to take the most ordinary everyday 
pleasures. For example, I cannot go for a walk with my friend 
because it is against the principle of Liberty that I should 
agree to be at a certain place at a certain time to meet him. 
I cannot in the least extend my own power beyond myself, 
because to do so I must co-operate with someone else, and 
co-operation implies an agreement, and that is against 
Liberty. It will be seen at once that this argument is
absurd. I do not limit my liberty, but simply exercise it, 
when I agree with my friend to go for a walk.

"If, on the other hand, I decide from my superior knowledge 
that it is good for my friend to take exercise, and therefore 
I attempt to compel him to go for a walk, then I begin to limit 
freedom. This is the difference between free agreement and 
government." [_Objections to Anarchism_]

So, if we took Engels' argument seriously, then we would have
to conclude that living makes freedom impossible! After all 
by doing any joint activity you "subordinate" yourself to
others and, ironically, exercising your liberty by making
decisions and associating with others would become a denial 
of liberty. Clearly Engels argument is lacking something!

Perhaps this paradox can be explained once we recognise 
that Engels is using a distinctly liberal view of freedom 
-- i.e. freedom from. Anarchists reject this. We see 
freedom as holistic -- freedom from and freedom to. This 
means that that freedom is maintained by the kind of 
relationships we form with others, *not* by isolation. 
Liberty is denied when we form hierarchical relationships 
with others not necessarily when we associate with others. 
To combine with other individuals is an expression of 
individual liberty, *not* its denial! We are aware that 
freedom is impossible outside of association. Within an 
association absolute "autonomy" cannot exist, but such 
a concept of "autonomy" would restrict freedom to such a 
degree that it would be so self-defeating as to make a 
mockery of the concept of autonomy and no sane person 
would seek it.

Clearly, Engels "critique" hides more than it explains. Yes, 
co-operation and coercion both involve people working jointly 
together, but they are *not* to be equated. While Bakunin 
recognised this fundamental difference and tried, perhaps 
incompletely, to differentiate them (by arguing against 
"the principle of authority") and to base his politics on 
the difference, Engels obscures the differences and muddies 
the water by confusing the two radically different concepts 
within the word "authority." 

Any organisation or group is based on co-operation and 
co-ordination (Engels' "principle of authority"). How 
that co-operation is achieved is dependent on the 
*type* of organisation in question and that, in turn, 
specifies the *social* relationships within it. It is 
these social relationships which determine whether
an organisation is authoritarian or libertarian, not the
universal need to make and stick by agreements. Engels is 
simply confusing obedience with agreement, coercion with 
co-operation, organisation with authority, objective
reality with despotism.

As such, rather than seeing organisation as restricting
freedom, anarchists argue that the *kind* of organisation
we create is what matters. We can form relationships with 
others which are based on equality, not subordination. As 
an example, we point to the differences between marriage
and free love (see next section). Once it is recognised
that decisions can be made on the basis of agreements
between equals, Engels essay can be seen for what it is -- 
a deeply flawed piece of cheap and inaccurate diatribe.

H.4.2 How does free love versus marriage indicate the weakness
	of Engels' argument?
 
Engels, let us not forget, argues, in effect, any activities which 
"replace isolated action by combined action of individuals" means
"the imposition of the will of another upon ours" and so "the will 
of the single individual will have to subordinate itself, which 
means that questions are settled in an authoritarian manner." 
This, for Engels, means that "authority" has not "disappeared" 
under anarchism but rather it has only "changed its form." 
[Op. Cit., pp. 730-1]

However, to say that authority just changes its form misses 
the qualitative differences between authoritarian and 
libertarian organisation. Precisely the differences which
Bakunin and other anarchists tried to stress by calling
themselves anti-authoritarians and being against the 
"principle of authority." By arguing that all forms of
association are necessarily "authoritarian," Engels is
impoverishing the liberatory potential of socialism. He
ensures that the key question of liberty within our
associations is hidden behind a mass of sophistry.

As an example, look at the difference between marriage 
and free love. Both forms necessitate two individuals 
living together, sharing the same home, organising their 
lives together. The same situation and the same commitments. 
But do both imply the same social relationships? Are they
both "authoritarian"?

Traditionally, the marriage vow is based on the wife promising 
to obey the husband. Her role is simply that of obedience (in 
theory, at least). As Carole Pateman argues, "[u]ntil late
into the nineteenth century the legal and civil position of
a wife resembled that of a slave" and, in theory, "became the
property of her husband and stood to him as a slave/servant
to a master." [_The Sexual Contract_, p. 119 and pp. 130-1]
As such, an obvious social relationship exists -- an
authoritarian one in which the man has power over the woman.
We have a relationship based on domination and subordination. 

In free love, the couple are equals. They decide their own affairs, 
together. The decisions they reach are agreed between them and no 
domination takes place (unless you think making an agreement
equals domination or subordination). They both agree to the 
decisions they reach, based on mutual respect and give and take. 
Subordination to individuals does not meaningfully exist (at
best, it could be argued that both parties are "dominated" by
their decisions, hardly a meaningful use of the word). Instead 
of subordination, there is free agreement. 

Both types of organisation apply to the same activities -- a 
couple living together. Has "authority" just changed its form 
as Engels argued? Of course not. There is a substantial 
difference between the two. The former is authoritarian. One 
part of the organisation dictates to the other. The latter is 
libertarian as neither dominates (or they, as a couple, 
"dominate" each other as individuals -- surely an abuse 
of the language, we hope you agree!). Each part of the 
organisation agrees to the decision. Do all these differences 
just mean that we have changed name of "authority" or has
authority been abolished and liberty created? This was
the aim of Bakunin's terminology, namely to draw attention 
to the qualitative change that has occurred in the social 
relationships generated by the association of individuals
when organised in an anarchist way.

As such, Engels is confusing two radically different means 
of decision making by arguing both involve subordination and 
authority. The difference is clear: the former involves the
domination of an individual over another while the second 
involves the "subordination" of individuals to the decisions 
and agreements they make. The first is authority, the second
is liberty. 

Therefore, the example of free love indicates that, for
anarchists, Engels arguments are simply pedantic sophistry.
It goes without saying that organisation involves co-operation
and that, by necessity, means that individuals come to agreements
between themselves to work together. The question is *how* do
they do that, not whether they do so or not. As such, Engels'
arguments confuse agreement with hierarchy, co-operation with
coercion. Simply put, the *way* people conduct joint activity 
determines whether an organisation is libertarian or authoritarian. 
That was why anarchists called themselves anti-authoritarians,
to draw attention to the different ways of organising collective
work.

H.4.3 How do anarchists propose to run a factory?

In his campaign against anti-authoritarian ideas within the 
First International, Engels asks in a letter written in 
January 1872 "how do these people [the anarchists] propose 
to run a factory, operate a railway or steer a ship without 
having in the last resort one deciding will, without a 
single management." [_The Marx-Engels Reader_, p. 729] 

This, of course, can only be asked if Engels was totally 
ignorant of Bakunin's ideas and his many comments supporting 
co-operatives and workers' associations as the means by 
which workers would "organise and themselves conduct the 
economy without guardian angels, the state or their former 
employers." Indeed, Bakunin was "convinced that the co-operative 
movement will flourish and reach its full potential only in 
a society where the land, the instruments of production, 

and hereditary property will be owned and operated by the 
workers themselves: by their freely organised federations 
of industrial and agricultural workers." [_Bakunin on 
Anarchism_, p. 399 and p. 400] Which means that Bakunin,
like all anarchists, was well aware of how a factory or 
other workplace would be organised: 

"Only associated labour, that is, labour organised upon the 
principles of reciprocity and co-operation, is adequate to 
the task of maintaining . . . civilised society." [_The 
Political Philosophy of Bakunin_, p. 341]

By October of that year, Engels had finally "submitted arguments 
like these to the most rabid anti-authoritarians" who replied to 
run a factory, railway or ship did require organisation "but here 
it was not a case of authority which we confer on our delegates, 
*but of a commission entrusted!*" Engels commented that the 
anarchists "think that when they have changed the names of 
things they have changed the things themselves." He, therefore, 
thinks that authority "will . . . only have changed its form" 
rather than being abolished under anarchism as "whoever mentions 
combined action speaks of organisation" and it is not possible 
"to have organisation without authority." [Op. Cit., p. 732 and 
p. 731]

However, Engels is simply confusing two different things, 
authority and agreement. To make an agreement with another 
person is an exercise of your freedom, not its restriction. 
As Malatesta argued, "the advantages which association and 
the consequent division of labour offer" meant that humanity 
"developed towards solidarity." However, under class society
"the advantages of association, the good that Man could
drive from the support of his fellows" was distorted and
a few gained "the advantages of co-operation by subjecting
other men to [their] will instead of joining with them."
This oppression "was still association and co-operation,
outside of which there is no possible human life; but it
was a way of co-operation, imposed and controlled by a few
for their personal interest." [_Anarchy_, p. 28] Anarchists
seek to organise association to eliminate domination. This
would be done by workers organising themselves collectively
to make their own decisions about their work (workers'
self-management, to use modern terminology).

As such, workers would organise their tasks but this did not
necessitate the same authoritarian social relationships as
exist under capitalism:

"Of course in every large collective undertaking, a division
of labour, technical management, administration, etc., is
necessary. But authoritarians clumsily play on words to
produce a *raison d'etre* for government out of the very
real need for the organisation of work. Government . . . 
is the concourse of individuals who have had, or have
seized, the right and the means to make laws and to oblige
people to obey; the administrator, the engineer, etc.,
instead are people who are appointed or assume the
responsibility to carry out a particular job and do
so. Government means the delegation of power, that is
the abdication of initiative and sovereignty of all into
the hands of a few; administration means the delegation of
work, that is tasks given and received, free exchange of
services based on free agreement. . . Let one not confuse
the function of government with that of administration,
for they are essentially different, and if today the two
are often confused, it is only because of economic and
political privilege." [_Anarchy_, pp. 39-40]

For a given task, co-operation and joint activity may be
required by its very nature. Take, for example, a train
network. The joint activity of numerous workers are 
required to ensure that it operates successfully. The
driver depends on the work of signal operators, for 
example, and guards to inform them of necessary information
essential for the smooth running of the network. The
passengers are dependent on the driver and the other
workers to ensure their journey is safe and quick. As
such, there is an objective need to co-operate but this
need is understood and agreed to by the people involved.

If a specific activity needs the co-operation of a number of 
people and can only be achieved if these people work together 
as a team and, therefore, need to make and stick by agreements, 
then this is undoubtedly a natural fact which the individual 
can only rebel against by leaving the association. Similarly, 
if an association considers it wise to elect a delegate whose 
tasks have been allocated by that group then, again, this 
is a natural fact which the individuals in question have 
agreed to and so have not been imposed upon the individual
by any external will -- the individual has been convinced
of the need to co-operate and does so.

Engels, therefore, confuses the authority of the current system,
organised and imposed from the top-down, with the self-management
required by a free society. He attempted to apply the same word
"authority" to two fundamentally different concepts. However,
we abuse words and practice deception when we apply the same
term to totally different concepts. As if the hierarchical,
authoritarian organisation of work under capitalism, imposed
by the few on the many and based by the absence of thought
and will of the subordinated, could be compared with the
co-ordination of joint activities by free individuals! What 
is there in common with the authoritarian structure of the
capitalist workplace or army and the libertarian organisation
required by workers to manage their struggle for freedom and,
ultimately, to manage their own working activity? Engels 
does damage to the language by using the same word 
("authority") to describe two so radically different things 
as the hierarchical organisation of wage labour and the free 
association and co-operation of equals of self-management. If 
an activity requires the co-operation of numerous individuals 
then, clearly, that is a natural fact and there is not much 
the individuals involved can do about it. Anarchists are not 
in the habit of denying common sense. The question is simply 
*how* do these individuals co-ordinate their activities. Is 
it by means of self-management or by hierarchy (authority)?

As such, anarchists have always been clear on how industry 
would be run -- by the workers' themselves in their own free
associations. In this way the domination of the boss would be
replaced by agreements between equals (see also sections 
I.3.1 and I.3.2 on how anarchists think workplaces will be
run in a free society).

H.4.4 How does the class struggle refute Engels' arguments 
      that industry required leaving "all autonomy behind"?

Engels argued that large-scale industry (or, indeed, any
form of organisation) meant that "authority" was required.
He stated that factories should have "Lasciate ogni autonomia,
voi che entrate" ("Leave, ye that enter in, all autonomy
behind") written above their doors. Indeed, that is the
basis of capitalism, with the wage worker being paid to
obey. This obedience, Engels argued, was necessary even
under socialism, as applying the "forces of nature" meant
"a veritable despotism independent of all social organisation."
This meant that "[w]anting to abolish authority in large-scale 
industry is tantamount to wanting to abolish industry itself." 
[Op. Cit., p. 731]

The best answer to Engels claims can be found in the class
struggle. Given that Engels was a capitalist (i.e. an owner
of a factory), he may have not been aware of the effectiveness
of "working to rule" when practised by workers. This basically
involves doing *exactly* what the boss tells you to do, regardless
of the consequences as regards efficiency, production and so on.
Quite simply, workers' refusing to practice autonomy can be an 
extremely effective and powerful weapon in the class struggle. 

This weapon has long been used by workers and advocated by
anarchists, syndicalists and wobblies. For example, the IWW
booklet _How to fire your boss_ argues that "[w]orkers often 
violate orders, resort to their own techniques of doing things, 
and disregard lines of authority simply to meet the goals of 
the company. There is often a tacit understanding, even by 
the managers whose job it is to enforce the rules, that these 
shortcuts must be taken in order to meet production quotas 
on time." They argue, correctly, that "if each of these rules 
and regulations were followed to the letter" then "[c]onfusion 
would result -- production and morale would plummet. And best 
of all, the workers can't get in trouble with the tactic 
because they are, after all, 'just following the rules.'"

The British anarcho-syndicalists of the _Direct Action Movement_
agree and even quote an industrial expert on the situation:

"If managers' orders were completely obeyed, confusion would 
result and production and morale would be lowered. In order to 
achieve the goals of the organisation workers must often violate 
orders, resort to their own techniques of doing things, and 
disregard lines of authority. Without this kind of systematic 
sabotage much work could not be done. This unsolicited sabotage 
in the form of disobedience and subterfuge is especially necessary 
to enable large bureaucracies to function effectively." [_Social 
Psychology of Industry_ by J.A.C. Brown, quoted in _Direct Action 
in Industry_]

Another weapon of workers' resistance is what has been called
"Working without enthusiasm" and is related to the "work to
rule." This tactic aims at "slowing production" in order to
win gains from management:

"Even the simplest repetitive job demands a certain minimum of
initiative and in this case it is failing to show any non-obligatory
initiative . . . [This] leads to a fall in production -- above all
in quality. The worker carries out every operation minimally;
the moment there is a hitch of any kind he [or she] abandons
all responsibility and hands over to the next man [or woman]
above him [or her] in the hierarchy; he works mechanically,
not checking the finished object, not troubling to regulate
his machine. In short he gets away with as much as he can,
but never actually does anything positively illegal." [Pierre
Dubois, _Sabotage in Industry_, p. 51]

The practice of "working to rule" and "working without enthusiasm"
shows how out of touch Engels (like any capitalist) is with 
the realities of shop floor life. These forms of direct action 
is extremely effective *because* the workers refuse to act 
autonomously in industry, to work out the problems they face 
during the working day themselves, and instead place all the 
decisions on the authority required, according to Engels, to 
run the factory. The factory itself quickly grinds to a halt. 
What keeps it going is not the "imperious" will of authority, 
but rather the autonomous activity of workers thinking and 
acting for themselves to solve the numerous problems they face 
during the working day.

As Cornelius Castoriadis argues:

"Resistance to exploitation expresses itself in a drop in
*productivity as well as exertion on the workers' part* . . .
At the same time it is expressed in the disappearance of
the *minimum* collective and spontaneous *management and
organisation* of work that the workers normally and of
necessity puts out. No modern factory could function for
twenty-four hours without this spontaneous organisation of
work that groups of workers, independent of the official
business management, carry out by filling in the gaps of
official production directives, by preparing for the
unforeseen and for regular breakdowns of equipment, by
compensating for management's mistakes, etc.

"Under 'normal' conditions of exploitation, workers are
torn between the need to organise themselves in this way
in order to carry out their work -- otherwise there are
repercussions for them -- and their natural desire to 
do their work, on the one hand, and, on the other, the
awareness that by doing so they only are serving the 
boss's interests. Added to those conflicting concerns
are the continual efforts of factory's management 
apparatus to 'direct' all aspects of the workers'
activity, which often results only in preventing them
from organising themselves." [_Political and Social
Writings_, vol. 2, p. 68]

Needless to say, co-operation and co-ordination is required in
any collective activity. Anarchists do not deny this fact of
nature, but the example Engels considered as irrefutable simply 
shows the fallacy of his argument. If large-scale industry 
was run along the lines argued by Engels, it would quickly
grind to halt. 

Ironically, the example of Russia under Lenin and Trotsky 
reinforces this fact. "Administrative centralisation" was 
enforced on the railway workers which, in turn, "led 
more to ignorance of distance and the inability to 
respond properly to local circumstances . . . 'I have no 
instructions' became all the more effective as a defensive 
and self-protective rationalisation as party officials vested 
with unilateral power insisted all their orders be strictly 
obeyed. Cheka ruthlessness instilled fear, but repression . . . 
only impaired the exercise of initiative that daily operations
required." [William G. Rosenberg, "The Social Background to
Tsektran," _Party, State, and Society in the Russian Civil War_,
Diane P. Koenker, William G. Rosenberg and Ronald Grigor
Suny (eds.), p. 369] Without the autonomy required to manage
local problems, the operation of the railways was seriously
harmed and, unsurprisingly, a few months after Trotsky
subjected to railway workers to the "militarisation of 
labour" in September 1920, there was a "disastrous collapse 
of the railway network in the winter of 1920-1." [Jonathan 
Aves, _Workers against Lenin_, p. 102]

As the experience of workers' in struggle shows, it is the 
*abolition* of autonomy which means the abolition of 
large-scale industry, not its exercise. This can be seen
from various forms of direct action such as "working to rule"
as well as Trotsky's attempts to impose the "militarisation
of labour" on the Russian workers. The conscious decision by 
workers to *not* exercise their autonomy brings industry 
grinding to a halt and are effective tools in the class 
struggle. As any worker know, it is only their ability to 
make decisions autonomously that keeps industry going.

Rather than abolishing authority making large-scale industry 
impossible, it is the abolishing of autonomy which quickly 
achieves this. The issue is how do we organise industry so 
that this essential autonomy is respected and co-operation
between workers achieved based on it. For anarchists, this 
is done by self-managed workers associations in which 
hierarchical authority is replaced by collective self-discipline 
(as discussed in section H.6.12).

H.4.5 Is the way industry operates "independent of all
      social organisation"?

As noted in the last section, Engels argued that applying the 
"forces of nature" meant "a veritable despotism independent 
of all social organisation." This meant that "[w]anting to 
abolish authority in large-scale industry is tantamount to 
wanting to abolish industry itself." [Op. Cit., p. 731]

For anarchists, Engels' comments ignore the reality of class 
society in an important way. Modern ("large-scale") industry 
has not developed neutrally or naturally, independently of all 
social organisation as Engels claimed. Rather it has been 
shaped by the class struggle. As we argued in section D.10, 
technology is a weapon in the class struggle. As Castoriadis 
argues:

"Management organises production with a view of achieving
'maximum efficiency.' But the first result of this sort of
organisation is to stir up the workers' revolt against
production itself . . . To combat the resistance of the
workers, the management institutes an ever more minute 
division of labour and tasks . . . Machines are invented,
or selected, according to one fundamental criterion: Do
they assist in the struggle of management against workers,
do they reduce yet further the worker's margin of autonomy,
do they assist in eventually replacing him [or her]
altogether? In this sense, the organisation of production
today . . . is *class organisation.* Technology is
predominantly *class technology.* No . . . manager would
ever introduce into his plant a machine which would 
increase the freedom of a particular worker or of a
group of workers to run the job themselves, even if
such a machine increased production.

"The workers are by no means helpless in this struggle.
They constantly invent methods of self-defence. They
break the rules, while 'officially' keeping them. They
organise informally, maintain a collective solidarity
and discipline." [_The Meaning of Socialism_, pp. 9-10]

As such, one of the key aspects of the class struggle
is the conflict of workers against attempts by management
to eliminate their autonomy within the production process.
This struggle generates the machines which Engels claims
produce a "veritable despotism independent of all social
organisation." Regardless of what Engels implies, the way
industry has developed is not independent of class society
and its "despotism" has been engineered that way. For
example, it may be a fact of nature that ten people may be
required to operate a machine, but that machine is not
such a fact, it is a human invention and so can be changed.
Nor is it a fact of nature that work organisation should be
based on a manager dictating to the workers what to do --
rather it could be organised by the workers themselves,
using collective self-discipline to co-ordinate their
joint effort.

As one shop steward put it, workers are "not automatons.
We have eyes to see with, ears to hear with, and mouths
to talk." As David Noble comments, "[f]or management 
. . . that was precisely the problem. Workers controlled
the machines, and through their unions had real authority
over the division of labour and job content." [_Forces
of Production_, p. 37] This autonomy was what managers
constantly struggled against and introduced technology
to combat. As such, Engels' notion that machinery was
"despotic" hide the nature of class society and the fact
that authority is a social relationship, a relationship
between people and not people and things. And, equally,
that different kinds of authority meant different kinds
of organisation and different social relationships to do
the collective tasks. It was precisely to draw attention
to this that anarchists called themselves anti-authoritarians.

Clearly, Engels is simply ignoring the actual relations
of authority within capitalist industry and, like the
capitalism he claims to oppose, is raising the needs of
the bosses to the plane of "natural fact." Indeed, is 
this not the refrain of every boss or supporter of 
capitalism? Right-libertarian guru Ludwig von Mises 
spouted this kind of refrain when he argued that 
"[t]he root of the syndicalist idea is to be seen 
in the belief that entrepreneurs and capitalists are 
irresponsible autocrats who are free to conduct their 
affairs arbitrarily. Such a dictatorship must not be 
tolerated . . . The fundamental error of this argument 
is obvious [sic!]. The entrepreneurs and capitalists are 
not irresponsible autocrats. They are unconditionally 
subject to the sovereignty of the consumers. The market 
is a consumers' democracy." [_Human Action_, p. 814] In
other words, it is not the bosses fault work is so hard 
or that they dictate to the worker. No, of course not, 
it is the despotism of the machine, of nature, of the 
market, of the customer, anyone and anything *but* 
the person *with* authority who is actually giving 
the orders and punishing those who do not obey! 

Needless to say, like Engels essay, von Mises' argument 
is fundamentally flawed simply because the boss is not 
just repeating the instructions of the market (assuming 
that it is a "consumers' democracy," which it is not). 
Rather, they give their own instructions based on
their own sovereignty over the workers. The workers could,
of course, manage their own affairs and meet the demands
of consumers directly. The "sovereignty" of the market
(just like the "despotism" of machines and joint action)
is independent of the social relationships which exist
within the workplace, but the social relationships themselves
are not predetermined by them. Thus the same workshop can
be organised in different ways. As such, the way industry
operates *is* dependent on social organisation. The workers
can manage their own affairs or be subjected to the rule
of a boss. To say that "authority" still exists simply
means to confuse agreement with obedience.

The importance of differentiating between types of
organisation and ways of making decisions can be seen from 
the experience of the class struggle. During the Spanish 
Revolution anarchists organised militias to fight the fascists. 
One was lead by anarchist militant Durruti. His military adviser, 
Prez Farras, a professional soldier, was concerned about the 
application of libertarian principles to military organisation. 
Durruti replied:

"I have already said and I repeat; during all my life, I have 
acted as an anarchist. The fact of having been given political 
responsibility for a human collective cannot change my convictions. 
It is under these conditions that I agreed to play the role
given to me by the Central Committee of the Militias.

"I thought -- and what has happened confirms my belief -- that a 
workingmen's militia cannot be led according to the same rules as
an army. I think that discipline, co-ordination and the fulfilment 
of a plan are indispensable. But this idea can no longer be
understood in the terms of the world we have just destroyed. 
We have new ideas. We think that solidarity among men must
awaken personal responsibility, which knows how to accept 
discipline as an autonomous act.

"Necessity imposes a war on us, a struggle that differs from 
many of those that we have carried on before. But the goal of our
struggle is always the triumph of the revolution. This means not 
only victory over the enemy, but also a radical change in man.
For this change to occur, man must learn to live in freedom and 
develop in himself his potentialities as a responsible individual.
The worker in the factory, using his tools and directing production, 
is bringing about a change in himself. The fighter, like the
worker, uses his gun as a tool and his acts must lead to the 
same goals as those of the worker. 

"In the struggle he cannot act like a soldier under orders but 
like a man who is conscious of what he is doing. I know it is not 
easy to get such a result, but what one cannot get by reason, one 
can never get through force. If our revolutionary army must be
maintained through fear, we will have changed nothing but the 
colour of fear. It is only by freeing itself from fear that a 
free society can be built." [quoted by Abel Paz, _Durruti: The 
People Armed_, p. 225]

Is it really convincing to argue that the individuals who made
up the militia are subject to the same social relationships as
those in a capitalist or Leninist army? The same, surely, goes
for workers associations and wage labour. Ultimately, the
flaw in Engels' argument can be best seen simply because he 
thinks that the "automatic machinery of a big factory is much 
more despotic than the small capitalist who employ workers ever 
have been." [Op. Cit., p. 731] Authority and liberty become 
detached from human beings, as if authoritarian social 
relationships can exist independently of individuals! It 
is a *social* relationship anarchists oppose, not an 
abstraction.

As such, Engels' argument is applicable to *any* society
and to *any* task which requires joint effort. If, for
example, a table needs four people to move it then those
four people are subject to the "despotism" of gravity!
Under such "despotism" can we say its irrelevant whether
these four people are slaves to a master who wants the
table moved or whether they agree between themselves to
move the table and on the best way to do it? In both
cases the table movers are subject to the same "despotism" 
of gravity, yet in the latter example they are *not* 
subject to the despotism of other human beings they
are subject to in the former. Clearly, Engels is playing
with words!
 
The fallacy of Engels' basic argument can be seen from 
this simple example. He essentially uses a *liberal*
concept of freedom (i.e. freedom exists prior to society 
and is reduced within it) when attacking anarchism. Rather 
than see freedom as a product of interaction, as Bakunin 
did, Engels sees it as a product of isolation. Collective 
activity is seen as a realm of necessity (to use Marx's 
phrase) and not one of freedom. Indeed, machines and the
forces of nature are considered by Engels' as "despots"!
As if despotism was not a specific set of relationships
between *humans.* As Bookchin argues:

"To Engels, the factory is a natural fact of technics, not
a specifically bourgeois mode of rationalising labour;
hence it will exist under communism as well as capitalism.
It will persist 'independently of all social organisation.' 
To co-ordinate a factory's operations requires 'imperious 
obedience,' in which factory hands lack all 'autonomy.' 
Class society or classless, the realm of necessity
is also a realm of command and obedience, of ruler and
ruled. In a fashion totally congruent with all class
ideologists from the inception of class society, Engels
weds Socialism to command and rule as a natural fact.
Domination is reworked from a social attribute into a
precondition for self-preservation in a technically
advanced society." [_Towards an Ecological Society_,
p. 206]

Given this, it can be argued that Engels' "On Authority" 
had a significant impact in the degeneration of the 
Russian Revolution into state capitalism. By deliberately 
obscuring the differences between self-managed and authoritarian 
organisation, he helped provide Bolshevism with ideological 
justification for eliminating workers self-management in 
production. After all, if self-management and hierarchical 
management both involve the same "principle of authority," 
then it does not really matter how production is organised 
and whether industry is managed by the workers or by 
appointed managers (as Engels stressed, authority in industry 
was independent of the social system and all forms of 
organisation meant subordination). Murray Bookchin draws 
the obvious conclusion from Engels' (and Marx's) position:
"Obviously, the factory conceived of as a 'realm of necessity' 
[as opposed to a 'realm of freedom'] requires no need 
for self-management." [Op. Cit., p. 126] 

Hence the Bolsheviks need not to consider whether replacing 
factory committees with appointed managers armed with 
"dictatorial powers" would have any effect on the position 
of workers in socialism (after all, the were subject to 
subordination either way). Engels had used the modern 
factory system of mass production as a direct analogy 
to argue against the anarchist call for workers' councils, 
for autonomy, for participation, for self-management. 
Authority, hierarchy, and the need for submission and 
domination is inevitable given the current mode of 
production, both Engels and Lenin argued. Little wonder, 
then, the worker become the serf of the state (see
section H.6.11 for more details). In his own way, Engels 
contributed to the degeneration of the Russian Revolution 
by providing the rationale for the Bolsheviks disregard for 
workers' self-management of production. 

Simply put, Engels was wrong. The need to co-operate and
co-ordinate activity may be independent of social development,
but the nature of a society does impact on how this
co-operation is achieved. If it is achieved by hierarchical
means, then it is a class society. If it is achieved by
agreements between equals, then it is a socialist one. As
such, how industry operates *is* dependent on society it 
is part of. An anarchist society would run industry based 
on the free agreement of workers united in free associations 
(see section H.4.3). This would necessitate making and 
sticking to joint decisions but this co-ordination would be 
between equals, not master and servant. By not recognising
this fact, Engels fatally undermined the cause of socialism.

H.4.6 Why does Engel's "On Authority" harm Marxism?

Ironically, Engels' essay "On Authority" also strikes at the
heart of Marxism and its critique of anarchism. Forgetting
what he had written in 1873, Engels argued in 1894 that
for him and Marx the "ultimate political aim is to overcome
the whole state and therefore democracy as well." [quoted
by Lenin, "State and Revolution", _Essential Works of
Lenin_, p. 331] Lenin argued that "the abolition of the
state means also the abolition of democracy." [Op. Cit., 
p. 332]

However, Lenin quoted Engels' "On Authority" which stated
that any form of collective activity meant "authority" and
so the subjection of the minority to the majority ("if
possible") and "the imposition of the will of another
upon ours." [Engels, _Marx-Engels Reader_, p. 731 and 
p. 730]

Aware of the contradiction, Lenin stresses that 
"someone may even begin to fear we are expecting 
the advent of an order of society in which the 
subordination of the minority to the majority will 
not be respected." That was not the case, however. 
He simply rejected the idea that democracy was "the 
recognition of this principle" arguing that "democracy 
is a *state* which recognises the subordination of 
the minority to the majority, i.e. an organisation 
for the systematic use of *violence* by one class 
against the other, by one section of the population 
against another." He argued that "the need for violence 
against people in general, the need for the *subjection* 
of one man to another, will vanish, since people will 
*become accustomed* to observing the elementary 
conditions of social life *without force* and *without
subordination.*" [Lenin, Op. Cit., pp. 332-3]

Talk about playing with words! Earlier in his work Lenin
summarised Engels "On Authority" by stating that "is it
not clear that . . . complex technical units, based on
the employment of machinery and the ordered co-operation
of many people, could function without a certain amount
of subordination, without some authority or power." [Op.
Cit., p. 316] Now, however, he argues that communism
would involve no "subordination" while, at the same time,
be based on the "the principle of the subordination of
the minority to the majority"! A contradiction? Perhaps
no, as he argues that the minority would "become
accustomed" to the conditions of "social life" -- in
other words the recognition that sticking to your
agreements you make with others does not involve
"subordination." This, ironically, would confirm 
anarchist ideas as we argue that making agreements
with others, as equals, does not involve domination
or subordination but rather is an expression of
autonomy, of liberty.

Similarly, we find Engels arguing in _Anti-Duhring_ that
socialism would "puts an end to the former subjection of
men to their own means of production" and that "productive
labour, instead of being a means of subjugating men, will
become a means of their emancipation." [_Marx-Engels
Reader_, p. 720 and p. 721] This work was written in
1878, six years after "On Authority" when he stressed
that "the automatic machinery of a big factory is much
more despotic than the small capitalists who employ
workers ever have been" and "subdu[ing] the forces of
nature . . . avenge themselves" upon "man" by "subjecting
him . . . to a veritable despotism independent of all
social organisation." [Op. Cit., p. 731] Engels is 
clearly contradicting himself. When attacking the anarchists, 
he argues that the "subjection" of people to the means of 
production was inevitable and utterly "independent of all 
social organisation." Six years later he argues that 
socialism will abolish this inescapable subjection to 
the "veritable despotism" of modern industry!

As can be seen from both Engels and Lenin, we have a 
contradiction within Marxism. On the one hand, they argue 
that authority ("subjection") will always be with us, no 
matter what, as "subordination" and "authority" is 
independent of the specific social society we live in. On
the other, they argue that Marxist socialism will be 
without a state, "without subordination," "without force" 
and will end the "subjection of men to their own means of 
production." The two positions cannot be reconciled. 

Simply put, if Engels "On Authority" is correct then,
logically, it means that not only is anarchism impossible
but also Marxist socialism. Lenin and Engels are trying to 
have it both ways. On the one hand, arguing that anarchism 
is impossible as any collective activity means subjection 
and subordination, on the other, that socialism will end 
that inevitable subjection. And, of course, arguing that 
democracy will be "overcome" while, at the same time, 
arguing that it can never be. Ultimately, it shows that
Engels essay is little more than a cheap polemic without
much merit.

Even worse for Marxism is Engels' comment that authority and
autonomy "are relative things whose spheres vary with the
various phases of society" and that "the material conditions
of production and circulation inevitably develop with
large-scale industry and large-scale agriculture, and
increasingly tend to enlarge the scope of this authority."
[Op. Cit., p. 732] Given that this is "a veritable
despotism" and Marxism aims at "one single vast plan"
in modern industry, then the scope for autonomy, for
freedom, is continually reduced during the working day.
[Op. Cit., p. 723 and p. 731] The only possible solution
is reducing the working day to a minimum and so the time
spent as a slave to the machine is reduced. The idea that
work should be transformed into creative, empowering and
liberating experience is automatically destroyed by Engels
argument. Like capitalism, Marxist-Socialism is based on
"work is hell" and the domination of the producer. Hardly
an inspiring vision of the future.

H.4.7 Why does Engels' argument that revolution is "the most
      authoritarian thing there is" totally miss the point?

As well as the argument that "authority" is essential for
every collective activity, Engels raises another argument
against anarchism. This second argument is that revolutions 
are by nature authoritarian. In his words, a "revolution is 
certainly the most authoritarian thing there is; it is the 
act whereby one part of the population imposes its will upon 
the other part by means of rifles, bayonets and cannon -- 
authoritarian means, if such there be at all; and if the 
victorious party does not want to have fought in vain, it 
must maintain this rule by means of the terror its arms 
inspire in the reactionaries." [_Marx-Engels Reader_, p. 733]

However, such an analysis is without class analysis and so 
will, by necessity, mislead the writer and the reader. Engels 
argues that revolution is the imposition by "one part of the 
population" on another. Very true -- but Engels fails to 
indicate the nature of class society and, therefore, of a 
social revolution. In a class society "one part of the 
population" constantly "imposes its will upon the other 
part" -- those with power imposes its decisions to those 
beneath them in the social hierarchy. In other words, the 
ruling class imposes its will on the working class everyday 
in work by the hierarchical structure of the workplace and 
in society by the state. Discussing the "population" as 
if it was not divided by classes and so subject to specific 
forms of authoritarian social relationships is liberal 
nonsense. 

Once we recognise that the "population" in question is divided 
into classes we can easily see the fallacy of Engels argument. 
In a social revolution, the act of revolution is the overthrow 
of the power and authority of an oppressing and exploiting 
class by those subject to that oppression and exploitation. 
In other words, it is an act of *liberation* in which the 
hierarchical power of the few over the many is eliminated 
and replaced by the freedom of the many to control their 
own lives. It is hardly authoritarian to destroy authority! 
Thus a social revolution is, fundamentally, an act of 
liberation for the oppressed who act in their own interests
to end the system in which "one part of population imposes its
will upon the other" everyday. 

Malatesta states the obvious:

"To fight our enemies effectively, we do not need to deny
the principle of freedom, not even for one moment: it is
sufficient for us to want real freedom and to want it for
all, for ourselves as well as for others.

"We want to expropriate the property-owning class, and with
violence, since it is with violence that they hold on to
social wealth and use it to exploit the working class. Not
because freedom is a good thing for the future, but because
it is a good thing, today as well as tomorrow, and the
property owners, be denying us the means of exercising
our freedom, in effect, take it away from us.

"We want to overthrow the government, all governments --
and overthrow them with violence since it is by the use
of violence that they force us into obeying -- and once
again, not because we sneer at freedom when it does not
serve our interests but because governments are the
negation of freedom and it is not possible to be free
without getting rid of them . . . 

"The freedom to oppress, to exploit, to oblige people
to take up arms [i.e. conscription], to pay taxes,
etc., is the denial of freedom: and the fact that
our enemies make irrelevant and hypocritical use of
the word freedom is not enough to make us deny the
principle of freedom which is the outstanding 
characteristic of our movement and a permanent,
constant and necessary factor in the life and progress
of humanity." [_Life and Ideas_, p. 51]

It seems strange that Engels, in effect, is arguing that the 
abolition of tyranny is tyranny against the tyrants! As
Malatesta so clearly argued, anarchists "recognise violence
only as a means of legitimate self-defence; and if today
they are in favour of violence it is because they maintain
that slaves are always in a state of legitimate defence."
[Op. Cit., p. 59] As such, Engels fails to understand the 
revolution from a *working class* perspective (perhaps 
unsurprisingly, as he was a capitalist). The "authority" 
of the "armed workers" over the bourgeois is, simply,
the defence of the workers' freedom against those who
seek to end it by exercising/recreating the very 
authoritarian social relationships the revolution sought 
to end in the first place. Ultimately, Engels is like the 
liberal who equates the violence of the oppressed to
end oppression with that the oppressors!

Needless to say, this applies to the class struggle as well.
Is, for example, a picket line really authoritarian because 
it tries to impose its will on the boss, police or scabs? 
Rather, is it not defending the workers' freedom against 
the authoritarian power of the boss and their lackeys (the 
police and scabs)? Is it "authoritarian" to resist authority 
and create a structure -- a strike assembly and picket line -- 
which allows the formally subordinated workers to manage their 
own affairs directly and without bosses? Is it "authoritarian" 
to combat the authority of the boss, to proclaim your freedom 
and exercise it? Of course not. Little wonder Bakunin talked
about "the development and organisation" of the "social (and, 
by consequence, anti-political) power of the working masses" 
and "the revolutionary organisation of the natural power of 
the masses"! 

Structurally, a strikers' assembly and picket line -- which 
are forms of self-managed association -- cannot be compared 
to an "authority" (such as a state). To try and do so fails 
to recognise the fundamental difference. In the strikers' 
assembly and picket line the strikers themselves decide 
policy and do not delegate power away into the hands of an 
authority (any strike committees execute the strikers 
decisions or is replaced). In a state, *power* is delegated 
into the hands of a few who then use that power as they see 
fit. This by necessity disempowers those at the base, who 
are turned into mere electors and order takers (i.e. an 
authoritarian relationship is created). Such a situation 
can only spell death of a social revolution, which requires 
the active participation of all if it is to succeed. It also,
incidentally, exposes a central fallacy of Marxism, namely that 
it claims to desire a society based on the participation of 
everyone yet favours a form of organisation -- centralisation 
-- that excludes that participation. 

Georges Fontenis summarises anarchist ideas on this subject
when he writes:

"And so against the idea of State, where power is exercised by 
a specialised group isolated from the masses, we put the idea 
of direct workers power, where accountable and controlled 
elected delegates (who can be recalled at any time and are 
remunerated at the same rate as other workers) replace 
hierarchical, specialised and privileged bureaucracy; 
where militias, controlled by administrative bodies such 
as soviets, unions and communes, with no special privileges 
for military technicians, realising the idea of the armed 
people, replace an army cut off from the body of Society 
and subordinated to the arbitrary power of a State or 
government." [_Manifesto of Libertarian Communism_, p. 24]

Anarchists, therefore, are no more impressed with this aspect
of Engels critique than his "organisation equals authority" 
argument. In summary, his argument is simply a liberal analysis 
of revolution, totally without a class basis or analysis and so 
fails to understand the anarchist case nor answer it. To argue 
that a revolution is made up of two groups of people, one of
which "imposes its will upon the other" fails to indicate 
the social relations that exist between these groups (classes)
and the relations of authority between them which the revolution 
is seeking to overthrow. As such, Engels critique totally misses 
the point.

H.8 What is vanguardism and why do anarchists reject it?

Many socialists follow the ideas of Lenin and, in particular,
his ideas on vanguard parties. These ideas were expounded by 
Lenin in his (in)famous work, _What is to be Done?_, which 
is considered as one of the important books in the development 
of Bolshevism. 

The core of these ideas is the concept of "vanguardism," or
the "vanguard party." According to this perspective, socialists
need to organise together in a party, based on the principles 
of "democratic centralism," which aims to gain a decisive 
influence in the class struggle. The ultimate aim of such a
party is revolution and its seizure of power. Its short term 
aim is to gather into it all "class conscious" workers into
a "efficient" and "effective" party, alongside members of 
other classes who consider themselves as revolutionary Marxists.
The party would be strictly centralised, with all members 
expected to submit to party decisions, speak in one voice and
act in one way. Without this "vanguard," injecting its politics
into the working class (who, it is argued, can only reach 
trade union consciousness by its own efforts), a revolution
is impossible.

Lenin laid the foundation of this kind of party in his book
_What is to be Done?_ and the vision of the "vanguard" party 
was explicitly formalised in the Communist International. As
Lenin put it, "Bolshevism *has created* the ideological and
tactical foundations of a Third International . . . Bolshevism
*can serve as a model of tactics for all.*" [_Collected Works_,
vol. 28, p. 292-3] Using the Russian Communist Party as its 
model, Bolshevik ideas on party organisation were raised as 
a model for revolutionaries across the world. Since then, the 
various followers of Leninism and its offshoots like Trotskyism
have organised themselves in this manner (with varying success).

The wisdom of applying an organisational model that had been 
developed in the semi-feudal conditions of Tsarist Russia to 
*every* country, regardless of its level of development, has 
been questioned by anarchists from the start. After all, could
it not be wiser to build upon the revolutionary tendencies 
which had developed in specific countries rather than import 
a new model which had been created for, and shaped by, radically
different social, political and economic conditions? The wisdom 
of applying the vanguard model is not questioned on these 
(essentially materialist) points by those who subscribe to 
it. While revolutionary workers in the advanced capitalist 
nations subscribed to anarchist and syndicalist ideas, this 
tradition is rejected in favour of one developed by, in the 
main, bourgeois intellectuals in a nation which was still
primarily feudal and absolutist. The lessons learned from years
of struggle in actual capitalist societies were simply rejected
in favour of those from a party operating under Tsarism. While 
most supporters of vanguardism will admit that conditions 
now are different than in Tsarist Russia, they still subscribe 
to organisational method developed in that context and justify
it, ironically enough, because of its "success" in the totally
different conditions that prevailed in Russia in the early 
20th Century! And Leninists claim to be materialists! Perhaps
the reason why Bolshevism rejected the materialist approach was 
because most of the revolutionary movements in advanced capitalist 
countries were explicitly anti-parliamentarian, direct actionist,
decentralist, federalist and influenced by libertarian ideas?
This materialist analysis was a key aspect of the council-communist 
critique of Lenin's _Left-Wing Communism_, for example (see Herman 
Gorter's _Open Letter to Comrade Lenin_ for one excellent reply
to Bolshevik arguments, tactics and assumptions).

However, this attempt to squeeze every working class movement 
into *one* "officially approved" model dates back to Marx and Engels. 
Faced with any working class movement which did *not* subscribe
to their vision of what they should be doing (namely organised
in political parties to take part in "political action," i.e.
standing in bourgeois elections) they simply labelled it as
the product of non-proletarian "sects." They went so far as
to gerrymander the 1872 conference of the First International 
to make acceptance of "political action" mandatory on all 
sections in an attempt to destroy anarchist influence in it.

So this section of our FAQ will explain why anarchists reject 
this model. In our view, the whole concept of a "vanguard
party" is fundamentally anti-socialist. Rather than present an
effective and efficient means of achieving revolution, the 
Leninist model is elitist, hierarchical and highly inefficient
in achieving a socialist society. At best, these parties play
a harmful effect in the class struggle by alienating activists
and militants with their organisational principles and manipulative
tactics within popular structures and groups. At worse, these
parties can seize power and create a new form of class society
(a state capitalist one) in which the working class is oppressed
by new bosses (namely, the party hierarchy and its appointees).
As we discuss in section H.5.9, their "efficiency" is a false 
economy.

However, before discussing why anarchists reject "vanguardism"
we need to stress a few points. Firstly, anarchists recognise 
the obvious fact that the working class is divided in terms 
of political consciousness. Secondly, from this fact most 
anarchists recognise the need to organise together to 
spread our ideas as well as taking part in, influencing 
and learning from the class struggle. As such, anarchists 
have long been aware of the need for revolutionaries
to organise *as revolutionaries.* Thirdly, anarchists are
well aware of the importance of revolutionary minorities 
playing an inspiring and "leading" role in the class struggle.
We do not reject the need for revolutionaries to "give a 
lead" in struggles, we reject the idea of institutionalised 
leadership and the creation of a leader/led hierarchy 
implicit (and sometimes no so implicit) in vanguardism.

As such, we do not oppose "vanguardism" for these reasons. 
So when Leninists like Tony Cliff argue that it is 
"unevenness in the class [which] makes the party necessary," 
anarchists reply that "unevenness in the class" makes it 
essential that revolutionaries organise together to influence 
the class but that organisation does not and need not take 
the form of a vanguard party. [Tony Cliff, _Lenin_, vol. 2, 
p. 149] This is because we reject the concept and practice 
for three reasons. 

Firstly, and most importantly, anarchists reject the underlying
assumption of vanguardism. As we discuss in the next section,
vanguardism is based on the argument that "socialist 
consciousness" has to be introduced into the working class 
from outside. We argue that not only is this position is 
empirically false, it is fundamentally anti-socialist in 
nature. This is because it logically denies that the 
emancipation of the working class is the task of the working
class itself. Moreover, it serves to justify elite rule. Some 
Leninists, embarrassed by the obvious anti-socialist nature 
of this concept, try and argue that Lenin (and so Leninism) 
does not hold this position. As we prove in section H.5.4, 
such claims are false.

Secondly, there is the question of organisational structure. 
Vanguard parties are based on the principle of "democratic
centralism" (see section H.5.5). Anarchists argue that such 
parties, while centralised, are not, in fact, democratic nor 
can they be. As such, the "revolutionary" or "socialist" party 
is no such thing as it reflects the structure of the capitalist 
system it claims to oppose. We discuss this in sections H.5.6
and H.5.10.

Lastly, anarchists argue that such parties are, despite the 
claims of their supporters, not actually very efficient or
effective in the revolutionary sense of the word. At best, 
they hinder the class struggle by being slow to respond to
rapidly changing situations. At worse, they are "efficient" in 
shaping both the revolution and the post-revolutionary society 
in a hierarchical fashion, so re-creating class rule. We discuss 
this aspect of vanguardism in section H.5.9.

So these are key aspects of the anarchist critique of vanguardism,
which we discuss in more depth in the following sections. It is a 
bit artificial to divide these issues into different sections
because they are all related. The role of the party implies a
specific form of organisation (as Lenin himself stressed), the
form of the party influences its effectiveness. However, it is
for ease of presentation we divide up our discussion so. 

H.5.1 Why are vanguard parties anti-socialist?

The reason why vanguard parties are anti-socialist is simply
because of the role assigned to them by Lenin, which he thought
was vital. Simply put, without the party, no revolution would 
be possible. As Lenin put it in 1900, "[i]solated from 
Social-Democracy, the working class movement becomes petty 
and inevitably becomes bourgeois." [_Collected Works_, vol. 
4, p. 368] 

In _What is to be Done?_, he expands on this position:

"Class political consciousness can be brought to the workers
*only from without,* that is, only outside of the economic
sruggle, outside the sphere of relations between workers and
employers. The sphere from which alone it is possible to obtain
this knowledge is the sphere of relationships between *all* the
various classes and strata and the state and the government --
the sphere of the interrelations between *all* the various 
classes." [_Essential Works of Lenin_, p. 112]

Thus the role of the party is to inject socialist politics into
a class incapable of developing them itself. 

Lenin is at pains to stress the Marxist orthodoxy of his claims
and quotes the "profoundly true and important" comments of Karl
Kautsky on the subject. [Op. Cit., p. 81] Kautsky, considered
the "pope" of Social-Democracy, stated that it was "absolutely
untrue" that "socialist consciousness" was a "necessary and 
direct result of the proletarian class struggle." Rather, 
"socialism and the class struggle arise side by side and not 
one out of the other . . . Modern socialist consciousness can 
arise only on the basis of profound scientific knowledge . . . 
The vehicles of science are not the proletariat, but the 
*bourgeois intellegentsia*: it was on the minds of some members 
of this stratum that modern socialism originated, and it was 
they who communicated it to the more intellectually developed 
proletarians who, in their turn, introduced it into the 
proletarian class struggle." Kautsky stressed that "socialist 
consciousness is something introduced into the proletarian 
class struggle from without." [quoted by Lenin, Op. Cit., 
pp. 81-2]

Lenin, as is obvious, wholeheartedly agreed with this position
(any attempt to claim that he did not or later rejected it 
is nonsense, as we prove in section H.5.4). Lenin, with his 
usual modesty, claimed to speak on behalf of the workers when
he wrote that "intellectuals must talk to us, and tell us more 
about what we do not know and what we can never learn from our 
factory and 'economic' experience, that is, you must give us 
political knowledge." [Op. Cit., p. 108] Thus we have Lenin 
painting a picture of a working class incapable of developing
"political knowledge" or "socialist consciousness" by its 
own efforts and so is reliant on members of the party, 
themselves either radical elements of the bourgeoisie and 
petty-bourgeoisie or educated by them, to provide it with such 
knowledge. 

The obvious implication of this argument is that the working 
class cannot liberate itself by its own efforts. After all, 
if the working class cannot develop its own political theory 
by its own efforts then it cannot conceive of transforming 
society and, at best, can see only the need to work within 
capitalism for reforms to improve its position in society. 
Without the radical bourgeois to provide the working class 
with "socialist" ideas, a socialist movement, let alone 
society, is impossible. A class whose members cannot develop 
political knowledge by its own actions cannot emancipate 
itself. It is, by necessity, dependent on others to shape 
and form its movements. To quote Trotsky's telling analogy 
on the respective roles of party and class, leaders and led: 

"Without a guiding organisation, the energy of the masses 
would dissipate like steam not enclosed in a piston. But 
nevertheless, what moves things is not the piston or the 
box, but the steam." [_History of the Russian Revolution_, 
vol. 1, p. 17] 

While Trotsky's mechanistic analogy may be considered as 
somewhat crude, it does expose the underlying assumptions 
of Bolshevism. After all, did not Lenin argue that the 
working class could not develop "socialist consciousness"
by themselves and that it had to be introduced from without?
How can you expect steam to create a piston? You cannot.
Thus we have a blind, elemental force incapable of conscious 
thought being guided by a creation of science, the piston 
(which, of course, is a product of the work of the "vehicles 
of science," namely the *bourgeois intellegentsia*). In the 
Leninist perspective, if revolutions are the locomotives 
of history (to use Marx's words) then the masses are the 
steam, the party the locomotive and the leaders the train 
driver. The idea of a future society being constructed 
democratically from below by the workers themselves rather 
than through occasionally elected leaders seems to have
passed Bolshevism past. This is unsurprising, given that 
the Bolsheviks saw the workers in terms of blindly moving 
steam in a box, something incapable of being creative unless 
an outside force gave them direction (instructions). 

Cornelius Castoriadis provides a good critique of the 
implications of the Leninist position:

"No positive content, nothing new capable of providing 
the foundation for the reconstruction of society could
arise out of a mere awareness of poverty. From the 
experience of life under capitalism the proletariat 
could derive no new principles either for organising 
this new society or for orientating it in another 
direction. Under such conditions, the proletarian 
revolution becomes . . . a simple reflex revolt against
hunger. It is impossible to see how socialist society 
could ever be the result of such a reflex . . . Their
situation forces them to suffer the consequences of
capitalism's contradictions, but in no way does it 
lead them to discover its causes. An acquaintance with
these causes comes not from experiencing the production
process but from theoretical knowledge . . . This
knowledge may be accessible to individual workers, but
not to the proletariat *qua* proletariat. Driven by
its revolt against poverty, but incapable of self-direction
since its experiences does not give it a privileged 
viewpoint on reality, the proletariat according to this
outlook, can only be an infantry in the service of a 
general staff of specialists. These specialists *know*
(from considerations that the proletariat as such does
not have access to) what is going wrong with present-day
society and how it must be modified. The traditional view
of the economy and its revolutionary perspective can only
found, and actually throughout history has only founded,
a *bureaucratic politics* . . . [W]hat we have outlined
are the consequences that follow objectively from this
theory. And they have been affirmed in an ever clearer
fashion within the actual historical movement of Marxism,
culminating in Stalinism." [_Social and Political Writings_,
vol. 2, pp. 257-8]

Thus we have a privileged position for the party and a
perspective which can (and did) justify party dictatorship 
*over* the proletariat. Given the perspective that the 
working class cannot formulate its own "ideology" by its 
own efforts, of its incapacity to move beyond "trade union
consciousness" independently of the party, the clear 
implication is that the party could in no way be bound 
by the predominant views of the working class. As the
party embodies "socialist consciousness" (and this arises
outside the working class and its struggles) then 
opposition of the working class to the party signifies
a failure of the class to resist alien influences. As
Lenin put it:

"Since there can be no talk of an independent ideology being
developed by the masses of the workers in the process of
their movement, *the only choice is*: either bourgeois or
socialist ideology. There is no middle course . . . Hence,
to belittle socialist ideology *in any way,* to *deviate
from it in the slightest degree* means strengthening 
bourgeois ideology. There is a lot of talk about spontaneity,
but the *spontaneous* development of the labour movement 
leads to its becoming subordinated to bourgeois ideology
. . . Hence our task, the task of Social-Democracy, is to
*combat spontaneity,* to *divert* the labour movement from
its spontaneous, trade unionist striving to go under the
wing of the bourgeoisie, and to bring it under the wing of
revolutionary Social-Democracy." [Lenin, Op. Cit., pp. 82-3]

The implications of this argument became clear once the 
Bolsheviks seized power. As a justification for party 
dictatorship, you would be hard pressed to find any 
better. If the working class revolts against the 
ruling party, then we have a "spontaneous" development 
which, inevitably, is an expression of bourgeois ideology. 
As the party represents socialist consciousness, any 
deviation in working class support for it simply meant 
that the working class was being "subordinated" to the 
bourgeoisie. This meant, obviously, that to "belittle"
the "role" of the party by questioning its rule meant 
to "strengthen bourgeois ideology" and when workers 
spontaneously went on strike or protested against the 
party's rule, the party had to "combat" these strivings 
in order to maintain working class rule! As the "masses 
of the workers" cannot develop an "independent ideology," 
the workers are rejecting socialist ideology in favour of 
bourgeois ideology. The party, in order to defend the 
"the revolution" (even the "rule of the workers") has 
to impose its will onto the class, to "combat spontaneity." 

As we saw in section H.1.2, none of the leading Bolsheviks 
were shy about drawing these conclusions once in power and 
faced with working class revolt against their rule. Indeed, 
they raised the idea that the "dictatorship of the 
proletariat" was also, in fact, the "dictatorship of 
the party" and, as we discuss in section H.3.8 integrated
this into their theory of the state. Thus, Leninist ideology 
implies that "workers' power" exists independently of the 
workers. This means that the sight of the "dictatorship of 
the proletariat" (i.e. the Bolshevik government) repressing 
the proletariat, who cannot develop socialist conscious by 
themselves, is to be expected.

This elitist perspective of the party, the idea that it 
and it alone possesses knowledge can be seen from the 
resolution of the Communist International on the role 
of the party. It stated that "the working class without 
an independent political party is a body without a head." 
[_Proceedings and Documents of the Second Congress 1920_, 
vol. 1, p. 194] This use of biological analogies says 
more about Bolshevism that its authors intended. After 
all, it suggests a division of labour which is unchangeable. 
Can the hands evolve to do their own thinking? Of course 
not. Thus, yet again, we have an image of the class as 
unthinking brute force. 

The implications of this model can be draw from Victor 
Serge's comments from 1919. As he put it, the party "is 
in a sense the nervous system of the class. Simultaneously 
the consciousness and the active, physical organisation of 
the dispersed forces of the proletariat, which are often 
ignorant of themselves and often remain latent or express 
themselves contradictorily." And the masses, what is their 
role? Well, the party is "supported by the entire working
population," although, strangely enough, "it maintains its 
unique situation in dictatorial fashion." He admits "the
energies which have just triumphed . . . exist outside"
the party and that "they constitute its strength only 
because it represents them knowingly." Thus the workers
are "[b]ehind" the communists, "sympathising instinctively
with the party and carrying out the menial tasks required
by the revolution." [_Revolution in Danger_, p. 67, p. 66 
and p. 6] Can we be surprised that the workers have the
"menial tasks" to perform when the party is the conscious
element? Equally, can we be surprised that this situation 
is maintained "in dictatorial fashion"? It was precisely 
this kind of social division of labour between manual and
mental labour which helped cause the Russian revolution 
in the first place!

As the Cohen-Bendit brothers argue, the "Leninist belief
that the workers cannot spontaneously go beyond the level
of trade union consciousness is tantamount to beheading 
the proletariat, and then insinuating the Party as the
head . . . Lenin was wrong, and in fact, in Russia the
Party was forced to decapitate the workers' movement 
with the help of the political police and the Red Army
under the brilliant leadership of Trotsky and Lenin."
[_Obsolute Communism_, pp. 194-5]

As well as explaining the subsequent embrace of party 
dictatorship *over* the working class, vanguardism also
explains the notorious inefficiency of Leninist parties
faced with revolutionary situations we discuss in 
section H.5.8. After all, basing themselves on the 
perspective that all spontaneous movements are inherently
bourgeois they could not help but be opposed to autonomous
class struggle and the organisations and tactics it 
generates. James C. Scott, in his excellent discussion 
of the roots and flaws in Lenin's ideas on the party, 
makes the obvious point that since, for Lenin, "authentic,
revolutionary class consciousness could never develop
autonomously within the working class, it followed that
that the actual political outlook of workers was always
a threat to the vanguard party." [_Seeing like a State_,
p. 155] As Maurice Brinton argues, the "Bolshevik cadres 
saw their role as the leadership of the revolution. 
Any movement not initiated by them or independent of 
their control could only evoke their suspicion." These 
developments, of course, did not occur by chance or 
accidentally. As Brinton notes, "a given ideological 
premise (the preordained hegemony of the Party) led 
necessarily to certain conclusions in practice." 
[_The Bolsheviks and Workers' Control_, p. xi and 
p. xii] 

Bakunin expressed the implications of the vanguardist 
perspective extremely well. It is worthwhile quoting 
him at length:

"Idealists of all sorts, metaphysicians, positivists, 
those who uphold the priority of science over life, the 
doctrinaire revolutionists -- all of them champion with 
equal zeal although differing in their argumentation, 
the idea of the State and State power, seeing in them, 
quite logically from their point of view, the only 
salvation of society. *Quite logically,* I say, having
take as their basis the tenet -- a fallacious tenet in 
our opinion -- that thought is prior to life, and 
abstract theory is prior to social practice, and that 
therefore sociological science must become the starting 
point for social upheavals and social reconstruction -- 
they necessarily arrived at the conclusion that since 
thought, theory, and science are, for the present at 
least, the property of only a very few people, those 
few should direct social life; and that on the morrow
of the Revolution the new social organisation should 
be set up not by the free integration of workers' 
associations, villages, communes, and regions from 
below upward, conforming to the needs and instincts 
of the people, but solely by the dictatorial power of 
this learned minority, allegedly expressing the general 
will of the people." [_The Political Philosophy of 
Bakunin_, pp. 283-4]

The idea that "socialist consciousness" can exist independently
of the working class and its struggle suggests exactly the
perspective Bakunin was critiquing. For vanguardism, the abstract 
theory of socialism exists prior to the class struggle and 
exists waiting to be brought to the masses by the educated few. 
The net effect is, as we have argued, to lay the ground for party 
dictatorship. The basic idea of vanguardism, namely that the 
working class is incapable of developing "socialist consciousness" 
by its own efforts, contradictions the socialist maxim that "the 
emancipation of the working class is the task of the working 
class itself." Thus the concept is fundamentally anti-socialist, 
a justification for elite rule and the continuation of class 
society in new, party approved, ways.

H.5.2 Have vanguardist assumptions been validated?

As discussed in the last section, Lenin claimed that workers 
can only reach a "trade union consciousness" by their own 
efforts. Anarchists argued that such an assertion is 
empirically false. The history of the labour movement is 
maarked by revolts and struggles which went far further than 
just seeking reforms and revolutionary theories derived
from such experiences. 

As such, the category of the "economic struggle" corresponds 
to no known social reality. Very "economic" struggle is 
"political" in some sense and those involved can, and do, 
learn political lessons from them. As Kropotkin noted in 
the 1880s, there "is almost no serious strike which occurs 
together wwith the appearance of troops, the exchange of 
blows and some acts of revolt. Here they fight with the 
troops; there they march on the factories . . . Thanks to 
government intervention the rebel against the factory 
becomes the rebel against the State." [quoted by Caroline 
Cahm, _Kropotkin and the Rise of Revolutionary Anarchism_, 
p. 256] If history shows anything, it shows that workers 
are more than capable of going beyond "trade union 
consciousness." The Paris Commune, the 1848 revolts and, 
ironically enough, the 1905 and 1917 Russian Revolutions 
show that the masses are capable of revolutionary struggles 
in which the self-proclaimed "vanguard" of socialists 
spend most of their time trying to catch up with them! 

These last two examples, the Russian Revolutions, also 
help to discredit Lenin's argument that the workers cannot 
develop socialist consciousness alone due to the power of 
bourgeois ideology. This, according to Lenin, required the 
bourgeois intelligentsia to import "socialist" ideology from 
outside the movement. Lenin's argument is flawed. Simply put, 
if the working class is subjected to bourgeois influences, 
then so are the "professional" revolutionaries within the 
party. Indeed, the strength of such influences on the 
"professionals" of revolution *must* be higher as they are 
not part of proletarian life. After all, if social being 
determines consciousness than if a revolutionary is no 
longer part of the working class, then they no longer are 
rooted in the social conditions which generate socialist 
theory and action. Rootless and no longer connected with 
collective labour and working class life, the "professional" 
revolutionary is more likely to be influenced by the social 
milieu he or she now is part of (i.e. a bourgeois, or at 
best petit-bourgeois, environment). This may explain the 
terrible performance of such "vanguards" in revolutionary 
situations (see section H.5.8).

This tendency for the "professional" revolutionary and 
intellectuals to be subject to the bourgeois influences 
which Lenin subscribes solely to the working class can 
continually be seen from the history of the Bolshevik 
party. For example, as Trotsky himself notes: 

"It should not be forgotten that the political machine of
the Bolshevik Party was predominantly made up of the 
intelligentsia, which was petty bourgeois in its origin
and conditions of life and Marxist in its ideas and in
its relations with the proletariat. Workers who turned 
professional revolutionists joined this set with great
eagerness and lost their identity in it. The peculiar 
social structure of the Party machine and its authority
over the proletariat (neither of which is accidental
but dictated by strict historical necessity) were more
than once the cause of the Party's vacillation and 
finally became the source of its degeneration . . . In 
most cases they lacked independent daily contact with 
the labouring masses as well as a comprehensive 
understanding of the historical process. They thus left
themselves exposed to the influence of alien classes." 
[_Stalin_, vol. 1, pp. 297-8]

He pointed to the example of the First World War, when,
"even the Bolshevik party did not at once find its way
in the labyrinth of war. As a general rule, the confusion
was most pervasive and lasted longest amongst the Party's
higher-ups, who came in direct contact with bourgeois
public opinion." Thus the professional revolutionaries 
"were largely affected by compromisist tendencies, which 
emanated from bourgeois circles, while the rank and file 
Bolshevik workingmen displayed far greater stability 
resisting the patriotic hysteria that had swept the 
country." [Op. Cit., p. 248 and p. 298] It should be 
noted that he is repeating earlier comments from his 
_History of the Russian Revolution_ when he argued that 
the "immense intellectual backsliding of the upper stratum 
of the Bolsheviks during the war" was caused by "isolation 
from the masses and isolation from those abroad -- that is 
primarily from Lenin." [vol. 3, p. 134] As we discuss in 
section H.6, even Trotsky had to admit that during 1917 
the working class was far more revolutionary than the party 
and the party more revolutionary than the "party machine" 
of "professional revolutionaries."

Ironically enough, Lenin himself recognised this aspect of
the intellectuals after he had praised their role in bringing
"revolutionary" consciousness to the working class in his
1904 work _One Step Forward, Two Steps Back_. He argued 
that it was now the "presence of large numbers of radical 
intellectuals in the ranks . . . [which] has made . . . 
the existence of opportunism, produced by their mentality, 
inevitable." [contained in Robert V. Daniels, _A Documentary 
History of Communism_, vol. 1, p. 25] According to Lenin's 
new philosophy, the working class simply needs to have been 
through the "schooling of the factory" in order to give the 
intelligentsia lessons in political discipline, the very
same intelligentsia which up until then had played the leading 
role in the Party and had given political consciousness to
the working class. In his words:

"The factory, which seems only a bogey to some, represents
that highest form of capitalist co-operation which has
united and disciplined the proletariat, taught it to
organise . . . And it is precisely Marxism, the ideology
of the proletariat trained by capitalism, that has
taught . . . unstable intellectuals to distinguish 
between the factory as a means of exploitation (discipline
based on fear of starvation) and the factory as a means
of organisation (discipline based on collective work . . ).
The discipline and organisation which come so hard to 
the bourgeois intellectual are especially easily acquired
by the proletariat just because of this factory 'schooling.'"
[Op. Cit., p. 24]

Lenin's analogy is, of course, flawed. The factory is a "means
of exploitation" because its "means of organisation" is top-down
and hierarchical. The "collective work" which the workers are
subjected to is organised by the boss and the "discipline" is
that of the barracks, not that of free individuals. In fact, 
the "schooling" for revolutionaries is *not* the factory, but 
the class struggle. As such, healthy and positive discipline 
is generated by the struggle against the way the workplace is
organised under capitalism. Factory discipline, in other words, 
is completely different from the discipline required for social
struggle or revolution. Thus the workers become revolutionary 
in so far as they reject the hierarchical discipline of the 
workplace and develop the self-discipline required to fight 
that discipline.

A key task of anarchism is encourage working class revolt 
against this type of discipline, particularly in the 
capitalist workplace. The "discipline" Lenin praises 
simply replaces human thought and association with the 
following of orders and hierarchy. Thus anarchism aims to 
undermine capitalist (imposed and brutalising) discipline 
in favour of solidarity, the "discipline" of free association 
and agreement based on the community of struggle and the 
political consciousness and revolutionary enthusiasm that 
struggle creates. To the factory discipline Lenin argues for, 
anarchists argue for the discipline produced in workplace 
struggles and conflicts against that hierarchical discipline. 
Thus, for anarchists, the model of the factory can never be 
the model for a revolutionary organisation any more than 
Lenin's vision of society as "one big workplace" could be 
our vision of socialism (see section H.3.1). Ultimately, the 
factory exists to reproduce hierarchical social relationships 
and class society just as much as it exists to produce goods.

It should be noted that Lenin's argument does not contradict
his earlier arguments. The proletarian and intellectual have 
complementary jobs in the party. The proletariat is to give 
lessons in political discipline to the intellectuals as they 
have been through the process of factory (i.e. hierarchical) 
discipline. The role of the intellectuals as providers of 
"political consciousness" is the same and so they give 
political lessons to the workers.

Moreover, his vision of the vanguard party is basically the 
same as in _What is to Be Done?_. This can be seen from 
his comments that his opponent (the leading Menshevik 
Martov) "wants to *lump together* organised and 
unorganised elements in the Party, those who submit to 
direction and those who do not, the advanced and the 
incorrigibly backward." He stressed that the "division of 
labour under the direction of a centre evokes from him [the 
intellectual] a tragicomical outcry against people being 
transformed into 'wheels and cogs'" [Op. Cit., p. 21 and
p. 24] Thus there is the same division of labour as in the
capitalist factory, with the boss ("the centre") having the
power to direct the workers (who "submit to direction"). Thus
we have a "revolutionary" party organised in a *capitalist* 
manner, with the same "division of labour" between order 
givers and order takers.

H.5.3 Why does vanguardism imply party power?

As we discussed in section H.5.1, anarchists argue that the
assumptions of vanguardism leads to party rule over the
working class. Needless to say, followers of Lenin disagree 
that the idea that vanguardism results in such an outcome. 
For example, Chris Harman of the British Socialist Workers 
Party argues the opposite case in his essay "Party and Class." 
However, his own argument suggests the elitist conclusions 
we have draw from Lenin's.

Harman argues that there are two ways to look at the
revolutionary party, the Leninist way and the traditional 
social-democratic way (as represented by the likes of 
Trotsky and Rosa Luxemburg in 1903-5). "The latter,"
he argues, "was thought of as a party of the whole [working]
class . . . All the tendencies within the class had to be
represented within it. Any split within it was to be
conceived of as a split within the class. Centralisation,
although recognised as necessary, was feared as a centralisation
over and against the spontaneous activity of the class. Yet
it was precisely in this kind of party that the 'autocratic' 
tendencies warned against by Luxemburg were to develop most.
For within it the confusion of member and sympathiser, the
massive apparatus needed to hold together a mass of only
half-politicised members in a series of social activities,
led to a toning down of political debate, a lack of political
seriousness, which in turn reduced the ability of the members
to make independent political evaluations and increased the
need for apparatus-induced involvement." [_Party and Class_, 
p. 32]

Thus, the lumping together into one organisation all those
who consider themselves as "socialist" and agree with the 
party's aims creates in a mass which results in "autocratic" 
tendencies within the party organisation. As such, it is 
important to remember that "the Party, as the vanguard 
of the working class, must not be confused with the entire 
class." [Op. Cit., p. 22] For this reason, the party must be
organised in a specific manner which reflect his Leninist 
assumptions:

"The alternative [to the vanguard party] is the 'marsh' -- 
where elements motivated by scientific precision are so mixed 
up with those who are irremediably confused as to prevent any 
decisive action, effectively allowing the most backward to 
lead." [Op. Cit., p. 30]

The problem for Harman is now how to explain how the proletariat
can become the ruling class if this is true. He argues that 
"the party is not the embryo of the workers' state -- the
workers' council is. The working class as a whole will be
involved in the organisations that constitute the state,
the most backward as well as the most progressive elements."
As such, the "function of the party is not to be the state." 
[Op. Cit., p. 33] Thus, the implication is that the working 
class will take an active part in the decision making process
during the revolution (although the level of this "involvement"
is unspecified, probably for good reasons as we explain).
If this *is* the case, then the problem of the mass party
reappears, but in a new form (we must also note that this 
problem must have also appearing in 1917, when the Bolshevik
party opened its doors to become a mass party).

As the "organisations that constitute the state" are made
up of the working class "as a whole," then, obviously, 
they cannot be expected to wield power (i.e. directly 
manage the revolution from below). If they did, then the 
party would be "mixed up" with the "irremediably confused" 
and so could not lead (as we discuss in section H.5.5,
Lenin links "opportunism" to "primitive" democracy, i.e.
self-management, within the party). Hence the need for 
party power. Which, of course, explains Lenin's 1920 
comments that an organisation embracing the whole working
class cannot exercise the "dictatorship of the proletariat"
and that a "vanguard" is required to do so (see section
H.1.2 for details). Of course, Harman does not explain how 
the "irremediably confused" are able to judge that the party 
is the best representative of its interests. Surely if 
someone is competent enough to pick their ruler, they must 
also be competent enough to manage their own affairs 
directly? Equally, if the "irremediably confused" vote 
against the party once it is in power, what happens? Will 
the party submit to the "leadership" of what it considers 
"the most backward"? If the Bolsheviks are anything to go 
by, the answer has to be no.

Ironically, he argues that it "is worth noting that in Russia
a real victory of the apparatus over the party required
precisely the bringing into the party hundreds of thousands
of 'sympathisers,' a dilution of the 'party' by the 'class.'
. . . The Leninist party does not suffer from this tendency
to bureaucratic control precisely because it restricts its
membership to those willing to be serious and disciplined 
enough to take *political* and *theoretical* issues as their
starting point, and to subordinate all their activities to
those." [Op. Cit., p. 33] Yet, in order to have a socialist
revolution, the working class as a whole must participate in
the process and that implies self-management. Thus the decision
making organisations will be based on the party being "mixed 
up" with the "irremediably confused" as if they were part of 
a non-Leninist party.

From Harman's own assumptions, this by necessity results in an
"autocratic" regime within the new "workers' state." This was
implicitly recognised by the Bolsheviks when they stressed that
the function of the party was to become the government, the head 
of the state. Lenin and Trotsky continually stressed this fact, 
urging that the party "assume power," that the Bolsheviks "can 
and *must* take state power into their own hands." Indeed, "take 
over full state power alone." [Lenin, _Selected Works_, vol. 2,
p. 329, p. 328 and p. 352] Thus, while the working class "as a 
whole" will be "involved in the organisations that constitute the 
state," the party (in practice, its leadership) will hold power
(see section H.3.8 for a further discussion of this Bolshevik 
position). And for Trotsky, this substitution of the party for 
the class was inevitable:

"We have more than once been accused of having substituted for 
the dictatorship of the Soviets the dictatorship of our party. 
Yet it can be said with complete justice that the dictatorship 
of the Soviets became possible only by means of the dictatorship 
of the party. It is thanks to the clarity of its theoretical 
vision and its strong revolutionary organisation that the party 
has afforded to the Soviets the possibility of becoming transformed 
from shapeless parliaments of labour into the apparatus of the 
supremacy of labour. In this 'substitution' of the power of the 
party for the power of the working class there is nothing 
accidental, and in reality there is no substitution at all. 
The Communists express the fundamental interests of the working 
class. It is quite natural that, in the period in which history 
brings up those interests . . . the Communists have become the 
recognised representatives of the working class as a whole." 
[_Terrorism and Communism_, p. 109]

He notes that within the state, "the last word belongs to the 
Central Committee of the party." [Op. Cit., p. 107] In 1937,
he repeats this argument, explicitly linking the "objective 
necessity" of the "revolutionary dictatorship of a proletarian 
party" to the "heterogeneity of the revolutionary class, the 
necessity for a selected vanguard in order to assure the 
victory." Stressed the "dictatorship of a party," he argued
that "[a]bstractly speaking, it would be very well if the 
party dictatorship could be replaced by the 'dictatorship' 
of the whole toiling people without any party, but this 
presupposes such a high level of political development 
among the masses that it can never be achieved under 
capitalist conditions." [_Writings 1936-37_, pp. 513-4]

This means that given Harman's own assumptions, autocratic rule
by the party is inevitable. Ironically, he argues that "to be a 
'vanguard' is not the same as to substitute one's own desires, 
or policies or interests, for those of the class." He stresses 
that an "organisation that is concerned with participating in 
the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism by the working class
cannot conceive of substituting itself for the organs of the 
direct rule of that class." [Op. Cit., p. 33 and p. 34] However, 
the logic of his argument suggests otherwise. Simply put, his
arguments against a broad party organisation are also applicable
to self-management during the class struggle and revolution. 
The rank and file party members are "mixed up" in the class.
This leads to party members becoming subject to bourgeois 
influences. This necessitates the power of the higher bodies 
over the lower (see section H.5.5). The highest party organ, 
the central committee, must rule over the party machine, which 
in turn rules over the party members, who, in turn, rule over 
the workers. This logical chain was, ironically enough, 
recognised by Trotsky in 1904 in his polemic against Lenin. 
He argued:

"The organisation of the party substitutes itself for the
party as a whole; then the central committee substitutes 
itself for the organisation; and finally the 'dictator' 
substitutes himself for the central committee." [quoted 
by Harman, Op. Cit., p. 22]

Obviously once in power in 1920 this substitution was less of 
a concern for him than in 1904! Which, however, does not deny 
the insight Trotsky showed in 1904 about the dangers inherent 
in the Bolshevik assumptions on working class spontaneity and 
how revolutionary ideas develop. Dangers which he, ironically,
helped provide empirical evidence for.

This false picture of the party (and its role) explains the
progression of the Bolshevik party after 1917. As the soviets
organised all workers, we have the problem that the party 
(with its "scientific" knowledge) is swamped by the class. 
The task of the party is to "persuade, not coerce these
[workers] into accepting its lead" and, as Lenin made clear, 
for it to take political power. [Harman, Op. Cit., p. 34] 
Once in power, the decisions of the party are in constant 
danger of being overthrown by the working class, which 
necessitates a state run with "iron discipline" (and the 
necessary means of coercion) by the party. With the 
disempowering of the mass organisations by the party, 
the party itself becomes a substitute for popular 
democracy as being a party member is the only way to 
influence policy. As the party grows, the influx of new 
members "dilutes" the organisation, necessitating a similar 
growth of centralised power at the top of the organisation. 
This eliminates the substitute for proletarian democracy 
which had developed within the party (which explains the 
banning of factions within the Bolshevik party in 1921). 
Slowly but surely, power concentrates into fewer and fewer 
hands, which, ironically enough, necessitates a bureaucracy 
to feed the party leaders information and execute its will. 
Isolated from all, the party inevitably degenerates and 
Stalinism results. 

We are sure that many Trotskyists will object to our
analysis, arguing that we ignore the problems facing the
Russian Revolution in our discussion. Harman argues that 
it was "not the form of the party that produces party as 
opposed to soviet rule, but the decimation of the working 
class" that occurred during the Russian Revolution. [Op. Cit., 
p. 37] This is false. As noted, Lenin was always explicit that 
about the fact that the Bolshevik's sought party rule ("full
state power") and that their rule *was* working class rule. 
As such, we have the first, most basic, substitution of party
power for workers power. Secondly, as we discuss in section 
H.4, the Bolshevik party had been gerrymandering and disbanding 
soviets before the start of the Civil War, so proving that it 
cannot be held accountable for this process of substitution.
Thirdly, Leninists are meant to know that civil war is
inevitable during a revolution. To blame the inevitable for
the degeneration of the revolution is hardly convincing 
(particularly as the degeneration started before the civil
war broke out).

Unsurprisingly, anarchists reject the underlying basis of
this progression, the idea that the working class, by its
own efforts, is incapable of developing beyond a "trade 
union consciousness." The actions of the working class 
itself condemned these attitudes as outdated and simply 
wrong long before Lenin's infamous comments were put on 
paper. In every struggle, the working class has created 
its own organisations to co-ordinate its struggle (to use 
Trotsky's analogy, the steam creates its own piston and 
constantly has). In the process of struggle, the working 
class changes its perspectives. This process is uneven 
in both quantity and quality, but it does happen. As such,
anarchists do not think that *all* working class people 
will, at the same time, spontaneously become anarchists. 
If they did, we would be in an anarchist society today! 

As we argued in sections J.3 and H.2.10, anarchists acknowledge 
that political development within the working class is uneven. 
The difference between anarchism and Leninism is how we see 
socialist ideas developing. In every class struggle there 
is a radical minority which takes the lead and many of this 
miinority develop revolutionary conclusions from their 
experiences. As such, members of the working class develop 
their own revolutionary theory and it does not need bourgeois 
intellectuals to inject it into them. 

Anarchists go on to argue that this minority (along with 
any members of other classes who have broken with their 
background and become libertarians) should organise and 
work together. The role of this revolutionary organisation 
is to co-ordinate revolutionary activity, discuss and 
revise ideas and help others draw the same conclusions 
as they have from their own, and others, experiences. The 
aim of such a group is, by word and deed, to assist the 
working class in its struggles and to draw out and clarify 
the libertarian aspects of this struggle. It seeks to 
abolish the rigid division between leaders and led which 
is the hallmark of class society by drawing the vast
majority of the working class into social struggle and 
revolutionary politics by encouraging their direct 
management of the class struggle. Only this participation 
and the political discussion it generates will allow 
revolutionary ideas to become widespread. 

In other words, anarchists argue that precisely *because* 
of political differences ("unevenness") we need the 
fullest possible democracy and freedom to discuss 
issues and reach agreements. Only by discussion and 
self-activity can the political perspectives of those 
in struggle  develop and change. In other words, the fact 
Bolshevism uses to justify its support for party power is 
the strongest argument against it.

Our differences with vanguardism could not be more clear.

H.5.4 Did Lenin abandon vanguardism?

As discussed in section H.5.1, vanguardism rests on the premise 
that the working class cannot emancipate itself. As such, the 
ideas of Lenin as expounded in _What is to be Done?_ contradicts 
the key idea of Marx that the emancipation of the working class 
is the task of the working class itself. Thus the paradox of 
Leninism. On the one hand, it subscribes to an ideology 
allegedly based on working class self-liberation. On the 
other, the founder of that school wrote an obviously 
influential work whose premise not only logically implies 
that they cannot, it also provides the perfect rationale for 
party dictatorship over the working class (and as the history 
of Leninism in power showed, this underlying premise was much 
stronger than any democratic-sounding rhetoric -- see section H.6).

It is for this reason that many Leninists are somewhat embarrassed
by Lenin's argument in _What is to be Done?_. Hence we see 
Chris Harman writing that "the real theoretical basis for his 
[Lenin's] argument on the party is not that the working class 
is incapable on its own of coming to theoretical socialist 
consciousness . . . The real basis for his argument is that the 
level of consciousness in the working class is never uniform."
[_Party and Class_, pp. 25-6] In other words, Harman changes
the focus of the question away from the point explicitly and 
repeatedly stated by Lenin that the working class was incapable 
on its own of coming to theoretical socialist consciousness and 
that he was simply repeating Marxist orthodoxy when he did. 

Harman bases his revision on Lenin's later comments regarding
his book, namely that he sought to "straighten matters out" 
by "pull[ing] in the other direction" to the "extreme" which
the "economists" had went to. He repeated this in 1907 (see
below). While Lenin may have been right to attack the 
"economists," his argument that socialist consciousness 
comes to the working class only "from without" is not a 
case of going too far in the other direction; it is wrong. 
Simply put, you do not attack ideas you disagree with arguing
an equally false set of ideas. This suggests that Harman's 
attempt to downplay Lenin's elitist position is flawed. Simply
put, the "real theoretical basis" of the argument was precisely
the issue Lenin himself raised, namely the incapacity of the
working class to achieve socialist consciousness by itself.
It is probably the elitist conclusions of this argument which
drives Harman to try and change the focus to another issue,
namely the political unevenness within the working class.

Some go to even more extreme lengths, denying that Lenin 
even held such a position. For example, Hal Draper argues at 
length that Lenin did not, in fact, hold the opinions he 
actually expressed in his book! While Draper covers many 
aspects of what he calls the "Myth of Lenin's 'Concept of 
The Party,'" in his essay of the same name, we will 
concentrate on the key idea, namely that socialist ideas 
are developed outside the class struggle by the radical 
intelligentsia and introduced into the working class from 
without. Here, as argued in section H.5.1, is the root of 
the anti-socialist basis of Leninism.

So what does Draper say? On the one hand, he denies that Lenin
held this theory (he states that it is a "virtually non-existent 
theory" and "non-existent after WITBD"). He argues that those who
hold the position that Lenin actually meant what he said in his
book "never quote anything other than WITBD," and states that 
this is a "curious fact" (a fact we will disprove shortly). Draper
argues as follows: "Did Lenin put this theory forward even in 
WITBD? Not exactly." He then notes that Lenin "had just read 
this theory in the most prestigious theoretical organ of Marxism 
of the whole international socialist movement" and it had been
"put forward in an important article by the leading Marxist 
authority," Karl Kautsky. Draper notes that "Lenin first 
paraphrased Kautsky" and then "quoted a long passage from 
Kautsky's article."

This much, of course, is well known by anyone who has read Lenin's
book. By paraphrasing and quoting Kautsky as he does, Lenin is
showing his agreement with Kautsky's argument. Indeed, Lenin
states before quoting Kautsky that his comments are "profoundly
true and important" [_Essential Works of Lenin_, p. 79] As such, 
by explicitly and obviously agreeing with Kautsky, it can be 
said that it also becomes Lenin's theory as well! Over time, 
particularly after Kautsky had been labelled a "renegade" 
by Lenin, Kautsky's star waned and Lenin's rose. Little 
wonder the argument became associated with Lenin rather 
than the discredited Kautsky. Draper then speculates that 
"it is curious . . . that no one has sought to prove that 
by launching this theory . . . Kautsky was laying the basis 
for the demon of totalitarianism." A simply reason exists
for this, namely the fact that Kautsky, unlike Lenin, was never
the head of a one-party dictatorship and justified this system
politically. Indeed, Kautsky attacked the Bolsheviks for this,
which caused Lenin to label him a "renegade." Kautsky, in this 
sense, can be considered as being inconsistent with his political 
assumptions, unlike Lenin who took his assumptions to their 
logical conclusions.

How, after showing the obvious fact that "the crucial 'Leninist' 
theory was really Kautsky's," he then wonders "[d]id Lenin, in 
WITBD, adopt Kautsky's theory?" He answers his own question 
with an astounding "Again, not exactly"! Clearly, quoting 
approvingly of a theory and stating it is "profoundly true" 
does not, in fact, make you a supporter of it! What evidence 
does Draper present for his amazing answer? Well, Draper argued 
that Lenin "tried to get maximum mileage out of it against the 
right wing; this was the point of his quoting it. If it did 
something for Kautsky's polemic, he no doubt figured that it 
would do something for his." Or, to present a more simple and 
obvious explanation, Lenin *agreed* with Kautsky's "profoundly 
true" argument!

Aware of this possibility, Draper tries to combat it. "Certainly,"
he argues, "this young man Lenin was not (yet) so brash as to 
attack his 'pope' or correct him overtly. But there was obviously 
a feeling of discomfort. While showing some modesty and attempting 
to avoid the appearance of a head-on criticism, the fact is that 
Lenin inserted two longish footnotes rejecting (or if you wish, 
amending) precisely what was worst about the Kautsky theory on 
the role of the proletariat." So, here we have Lenin quoting 
Kautsky to prove his own argument (and noting that Kautsky's 
words were "profoundly true and important"!) but "feeling 
discomfort" over what he has just approvingly quoted! Incredible!

So how does Lenin "amend" Kautsky's "profoundly true and 
important" argument? In two ways, according to Draper. 
Firstly, in a footnote which "was appended right after 
the Kautsky passage" Lenin quoted. Draper argued that 
it "was specifically formulated to undermine and weaken 
the theoretical content of Kautsky's position. It began: 
'This does not mean, of course, that the workers have no 
part in creating such an ideology.' But this was exactly 
what Kautsky did mean and say. In the guise of offering 
a caution, Lenin was proposing a modified view. 'They 
[the workers] take part, however,' Lenin's footnote 
continued, 'not as workers, but as socialist theoreticians, 
as Proudhons and Weitlings; in other words, they take part 
only when they are able . . .' In short, Lenin was 
reminding the reader that Kautsky's sweeping statements 
were not even 100% true historically; he pointed to 
exceptions." Yes, Lenin *did* point to exceptions *in 
order to refute objections to Kautsky's argument before 
they were raised*! It is clear that Lenin is *not* refuting 
Kautsky. He is agreeing with him and raising possible 
counter-examples in order to refute potential objections
based on them. Thus Proudhon adds to socialist ideology 
in so far as he is a "socialist theoretician" and not a 
worker! How clear can you be? As Lenin continues, people 
like Proudhon "take part only to the extent that they are 
able, more or less, to acquire the knowledge of their age 
and advance that knowledge." In other words, insofar as 
they learn from the "vehicles of science." Neither Kautsky
or Lenin denied that it was possible for workers to acquire
such knowledge and pass it on. However this does *not* mean
that they thought workers, as part of their daily life and
struggle *as workers,* could develop "socialist theory."
Thus Lenin's footnote reiterates Kautsky's argument rather
than, as Draper hopes, refutes it.

Draper turns to another footnote, which he notes "was not directly 
tied to the Kautsky article, but discussed the 'spontaneity of the 
socialist idea. 'It is often said,' Lenin began, 'that the working 
class spontaneously gravitates towards socialism. This is perfectly 
true in the sense that socialist theory reveals the causes of the 
misery of the working class ... and for that reason the workers 
are able to assimilate it so easily,' but he reminded that this 
process itself was not subordinated to mere spontaneity. 'The 
working class spontaneously gravitates towards socialism; 
nevertheless, ... bourgeois ideology spontaneously imposes 
itself upon the working class to a still greater degree.'" 
Draper argues that this "was obviously written to modify and 
recast the Kautsky theory, without coming out and saying that 
the Master was wrong." So, here we have Lenin approvingly quoting 
Kautsky in the main text while, at the same time, providing a 
footnote to show that, in fact, he did not agree with what he
has just quoted! Truly amazing -- and easily refuted. After all,
the footnote stresses that workers appreciate socialist theory 
"*provided,* however, that this theory does not step aside for
spontaneity and *provided* it subordinates spontaneity to itself."
In other words, workers "assimilate" socialist theory only when
socialist theory does not adjust itself to the "spontaneous" 
forces at work in the class struggle. Thus, rather than refuting
Kautsky by the backdoor, Lenin in this footnote still agrees with 
him. Socialism does not develop, as Kautsky stressed, from the
class struggle but rather has to be injected into it. This means,
by necessity, the theory "subordinates spontaneity to itself."

Draper argues that this "modification" simply meant that there 
"are several things that happen 'spontaneously,' and what will 
win out is not decided only by spontaneity" but as can be seen,
this is not the case. Only when "spontaneity" is subordinated to
the theory (i.e. the party) can socialism be won, a totally 
different position. As such, when Draper asserts that "[a]ll 
that was clear at this point was that Lenin was justifiably 
dissatisfied with the formulation of Kautsky's theory," he is 
simply expressing wishful thinking. This footnote, like the 
first one, continues the argument developed by Lenin in the 
main text and in no way is in contradiction to it. As is obvious.

Draper argues that the key problem is that critics of Lenin 
"run two different questions together: (a) What was, historically, 
the *initial* role of intellectuals in the beginnings of the 
socialist movement, and (b) what *is* - and above all, what 
should be - the role of bourgeois intellectuals in a working-class 
party today." He argues that Kautsky did not believe that "*if* it 
can be shown that intellectuals historically played a certain 
initiatory role, they *must* and *should* continue to play the 
same role now and forever. It does not follow; as the working 
class matured, it tended to throw off leading strings." However,
this is unconvincing. After all, if socialist consciousness cannot
be generated by the working class by its own struggles then this
is applicable now and in the future. Thus workers who join the
socialist movement will be repeating the party ideology, as 
developed by intellectuals in the past. If they *do* develop
new theory, it would be, as Lenin stressed, "not as workers,
but as socialist theoreticians" and so socialist consciousness
still does not derive from their own class experiences. This
places the party in a privileged position vis--vis the working
class and so the elitism remains.

Ironically, Draper agrees with Kautsky and Lenin as regards the
claim that socialism does not develop out of the class struggle.
As he put it, "[a]s a matter of fact, in the International of 1902 
no one really had any doubts about the historical facts concerning 
the beginnings of the movement." The question is, "[b]ut what 
followed from those facts?" To which he argues that Marx and Engels
"concluded, from the same facts and subsequent experiences, that 
the movement had to be sternly warned against the influence of 
bourgeois intellectuals inside the party." (We wonder if Marx and 
Engels included themselves in the list of "bourgeois intellectuals" 
the workers had to be "sternly warned" about?) Thus, amusingly 
enough, Draper argues that Marx, Engels, Kautsky and Lenin all 
held to the "same facts" that socialist consciousness developed 
outside the experiences of the working classes! 

Draper, after rewriting history somewhat in his laborious and
hardly convincing arguments, states that it "is a curious fact 
that no one has ever found this alleged theory anywhere else 
in Lenin's voluminous writings, not before and not after 
[_What is to be Done?_]. It never appeared in Lenin again. 
No Leninologist has ever quoted such a theory from any other 
place in Lenin." However, as this theory was the orthodox 
Marxist position, Lenin had no real need to reiterate this
argument continuously. After all, he had quoted the acknowledged
leader of Marxism on the subject explicitly to show the 
orthodoxy of his argument and the "non-Marxist" base of those
he argued against. Once the debate had been won and orthodox
Marxism triumphant, why repeat the argument again? As we 
will see below, this was exactly the position Lenin *did*
take in 1907 when he wrote an introduction to a book which
contained _What is to Be Done?_.

In contradiction to Draper's claim, Lenin *did* return to this 
matter. In October 1905 he wrote an a short article in praise 
of an article by Stalin on this very subject. Stalin had sought 
to explain Lenin's ideas to the Georgian Social-Democracy and, 
like Lenin, had sought to root the argument in Marxist 
orthodoxy (partly to justify the argument, partly to expose 
the Menshevik opposition as being "non-Marxists"). Stalin 
argues along similar lines to Lenin:

"the question now is: who works out, who is able to work out
this socialist consciousness (i.e. scientific socialism)? 
Kautsky says, and I repeat his idea, that the masses of 
proletarians, as long as they remain proletarians, have
neither the time nor the opportunity to work out socialist
consciousness . . . The vehicles of science are the 
intellectuals . . . who have both the time and opportunity
to put themselves in the van of science and workout socialist
consciousness. Clearly, socialist consciousness is worked
out by a few Social-Democratic intellectuals who posses the
time and opportunity to do so." [_Collected Works_, vol. 1,
p. 164]

Stalin stresses the Marxist orthodoxy by stating Social-Democracy
"comes in and introduces socialist consciousness into the working 
class movement. This is what Kautsky has in mind when he says 
'socialist consciousness is something introduced into the 
proletarian class struggle from without.'" [Op. Cit., pp. 164-5]
That Stalin is simply repeating Lenin's and Kautsky's arguments
is clear, as is the fact it was considered the orthodox position
within social-democracy.

If Draper is right, then Lenin would have taken the opportunity
to attack Stalin's article and express the alternative viewpoint
Draper is convinced he held. However, Lenin put pen to paper to
*praise* Stalin's work, noting "the splendid way in which the
problem of the celebrated 'introduction of a consciousness from 
without' had been posed." Lenin explicitly agrees with Stalin's
summary of his argument. He argues that "social being determines 
consciousness . . . Socialist consciousness corresponds to the
position of the proletariat" and then quotes Stalin: "'Who can
and does evolve this consciousness (scientific socialism)?'"
and answers (again approvingly quoting Stalin) that "its 
'evolution' is a matter for a few Social-Democratic intellectuals 
who posses the necessary means and time.'" Lenin does argue
that Social-Democracy meets "an instinctive *urge* towards
socialism" when it "comes to the proletariat with the message
of socialism," but this does not counter the main argument that
the working class cannot develop socialist consciousness by it
own efforts and the, by necessity, elitist and hierarchical
politics that flow from this position. [Lenin, _Collected
Works_, vol. 9, p. 388] 

That Lenin did not reject his early formulations can also be 
seen from in his introduction to the pamphlet "Twelve Years" 
which contained _What is to be Done?_. Rather than explaining 
the false nature of that work's more infamous arguments, Lenin 
in fact defended them. For example, as regards the question 
of professional revolutionaries, he argued that the statements 
of his opponents now "look ridiculous" as "*today* the idea
of an organisation of professional revolutionaries has
*already* scored a complete victory," a victory which "would
have been impossible if this idea had not been pushed to the
*forefront* at the time." He noted that his work had 
"vanquished Economism . . . and finally *created* this
organisation." On the question of socialist consciousness, 
he simply reiterates the Marxist orthodoxy of his position, 
noting that its "formulation of the relationship between 
spontaneity and political consciousness was agreed upon by 
all the *Iskar* editors . . . Consequently, there could be 
no question of any difference in principle between the draft 
Party programme and _What is to be Done?_ on this issue." So
while Lenin argues that he had "straighten out what had
been twisted by the Economists," he did not correct his early
arguments. [_Collected Works_, vol. 13, p. 101, p. 102 and 
p. 107]

Looking at Lenin's arguments at the Communist International on
the question of the party we see an obvious return to the ideas
of _What is to be Done?_. Here was have a similar legal/illegal 
duality, strict centralism, strong hierarchy and the vision of 
the party as the "head" of the working class (i.e. its 
consciousness). In _Left-Wing Communism_, Lenin mocks those who 
reject the idea that dictatorship by the party is the same as 
that of the class. 

Ultimately, the whole rationale for the kind of wishful thinking
that Draper inflicts on us is flawed. As noted above, you do not 
combat what you think is an incorrect position with one which
you consider as also being wrong or do not agree with! You 
counter what you consider as an incorrect position with one
you consider correct and agree with. As Lenin, in WITBD, 
explicitly did. This means that later attempts by his followers 
to downplay the ideas raised in Lenin's book are unconvincing. 
Moreover, as he was simply repeating Social-Democratic orthodoxy 
it seems doubly unconvincing. 

Clearly, Draper is wrong. Lenin did, as indicated above, 
actually mean what he said in _What is to be Done?_. The 
fact that Lenin quoted Kautsky simply shows that this 
position was the orthodox Social-Democratic one, held by 
the mainstream of the party. Given that Leninism was (and 
still is) a "radical" offshoot of this movement, this should 
come as no surprise. However, Draper's comments remind us how
religious many forms of Marxism are. After all, why do we
need facts when we have the true faith?

H.5.5 What is "democratic centralism"?

As noted above, anarchists oppose vanguardism for three reasons, 
one of which is the way it recommends how revolutionaries should 
organise to influence the class struggle.

So how is a "vanguard" party organised? To quote the Communist
International's 1920 resolution on the role of the Communist 
Party in the revolution, the party must have a "centralised 
political apparatus" and "must be organised on the basis of 
iron proletarian centralism." This, of course, suggests a 
top-down structure internally, which the resolution explicitly
calls for. In its words, "Communist cells of every kind must be 
subordinate to one another as precisely as possible in a strict 
hierarchy." [_Proceedings and Documents of the Second Congress 
1920_, vol. 1, p. 193, p. 198 and p. 199] Therefore, the vanguard 
party is organised in a centralised, top-down way. However, this 
is not all, as well as being "centralised," the party is also meant
to be democratic, hence the expression "democratic centralism."
On this the resolution states:

"The Communist Party must be organised on the basis of democratic 
centralism. The most important principle of democratic centralism 
is election of the higher party organs by the lowest, the fact 
that all instructions by a superior body are unconditionally and 
necessarily binding on lower ones, and existence of a strong 
central party leadership whose authority over all leading party
comrades in the period between one party congress and the next 
is universally accepted." [Op. Cit., p. 198]

For Lenin, speaking in the same year, democratic centralism meant
"only that representatives from the localities meet and elect a
responsible body which must then govern . . . Democratic centralism
consists in the Congress checking on the Central Committee, 
removing it and electing a new one." [quoted by Robert Service,
_The Bolshevik Party in Revolution_, p. 131] Thus, "democratic 
centralism" is inherently top-down, although the "higher" party 
organs are, in principle, elected by the "lower." Without this, 
of course, there would be no "democratic" aspect to the party. 
The real question is whether such democracy is effective, a 
topic we will return to. However, the key point is that the 
central committee is the active element, the one whose 
decisions are implemented and so the focus of the structure 
is in the "centralism" rather than the "democratic" part of 
the formula.

As we noted in section H.2.14, the Communist Party was expected 
to have a dual structure, one legal and the other illegal. The 
resolution states that "[i]n countries where the bourgeoisie . . . 
is still in power, the Communist parties must learn to combine 
legal and illegal activity in a planned way. However, the legal 
work must be placed under the actual control of the illegal party 
at all times." [_Proceedings and Documents of the Second Congress 
1920_, vol. 1, p. 198-9] It goes without saying that the illegal 
structure is the real power in the party and that it cannot be 
expected to be as democratic as the legal party, which in turn 
would be less that democratic as the illegal would have the real
power within the organisation.

All this has clear parallels with Lenin's infamous work, 
_What is to be done?_. In that work Lenin argues for "a 
powerful and strictly secret organisation, which 
concentrates in its hands all the threads of secret 
activities, an organisation which of necessity must be 
a centralised organisation." This call for centralisation 
is not totally dependent on secrecy, though. As he notes, 
"specialisation necessarily presupposes centralisation, 
and in its turn imperatively calls for it." Such a 
centralised organisation would need leaders and Lenin 
argues that "no movement can be durable without a stable 
organisation of leaders to maintain continuity." As such, 
"the organisation must consist chiefly of persons engaged 
in revolutionary activities as a profession." Thus, we 
have a centralised organisation which is managed by 
specialists, by "professional revolutionaries." 
[_Essential Works of Lenin_, p. 158, p. 153, p. 147 
and p. 148] 

This does not mean that these "professional revolutionaries" 
all come from the bourgeoisie or petit bourgeoisie. According 
to Lenin:

"A workingman agitator who is at all talented and 'promising'
*must not be left* to work eleven hours a day in a factory.
We must arrange that he be maintained by the Party, that he
may in due time go underground." [Op. Cit., p. 155]

Thus the full time professional revolutionaries are drawn from 
all classes into the party apparatus. However, in practice
the majority of such full-timers were/are middle class. Trotsky 
notes that "just as in the Bolshevik committees, so at the 
[1905] Congress itself, there were almost no workingmen. The
intellectuals predominated." [_Stalin_, vol. 1, p. 101] This
did not change, even after the influx of working class members
in 1917 the "incidence of middle-class activists increases at 
the highest echelons of the hierarchy of executive committees." 
[Robert Service, _The Bolshevik Party in Revolution_, p. 47] 
An ex-worker was a rare sight in the Bolshevik Central Committee, 
an actual worker non-existent. However, regardless of their 
original class background what unites the full-timers is not 
their origin but rather their current relationship with the 
working class, one of separation and hierarchy. 

The organisational structure of this system was made clear 
at around the same time as _What is to be Done?_, with 
Lenin arguing that the factory group (or cell) of the 
party "must consist of a small number of *revolutionaries,* 
receiving *direct from the [central] committee* orders and 
power to conduct the whole social-democratic work in the 
factory. All members of the factory committee must regard 
themselves as agents of the [central] committee, bound to 
submit to all its directions, bound to observe all 'laws 
and customs' of this 'army in the field' in which they
have entered and which they cannot leave without permission
of the commander." [quoted by E.H. Carr, _The Bolshevik 
Revolution_, vol. 1, p. 33] The similarities to the structure
proposed by Lenin and agreed to by the Comintern in 1920 is
obvious. Thus we have a highly centralised party, one run by 
"professional revolutionaries" from the top down (as we noted 
in section H.3.3 Lenin stressed that the organisational principle 
of Marxism was from top down). 

It will be objected that Lenin was discussing the means of 
party building under Tsarism and advocated wider democracy
under legality. However, given that in 1920 he universalised
the Bolshevik experience and urged the creation of a dual
party structure (based on legal and illegal structures), his 
comments on centralisation are applicable to vanguardism in 
general. Moreover, in 1902 he based his argument on experiences
drawn from democratic capitalist regimes. As he argued, "no 
revolutionary organisation has ever practised *broad* 
democracy, nor could it, however much it desired to do so." 
This was not considered as just applicable in Russia under the 
Tsar as Lenin then goes on to quote the Webb's "book on trade 
unionism" in order to clarify what he calls "the confusion of
ideas concerning the meaning of democracy." He notes that 
"in the first period of existence in their unions, the 
British workers thought it was an indispensable sign of 
democracy for all members to do all the work of managing the
unions." This involved "all questions [being] decided by the
votes of all the members" and all "official duties" being
"fulfilled by all the members in turn." He dismisses "such
a conception of democracy" as "absurd" and "historical 
experience" made them "understand the necessity for 
representative institutions" and "full-time professional 
officials." [_Essential Works of Lenin_, p. 161 and pp. 162-3]

Needless to say, Lenin links this to Kautsky, who "shows the 
need for *professional* journalists, parliamentarians, etc., 
for the Social-Democratic leadership of the proletarian class 
struggle" and who "attacks the 'socialism of anarchists and 
*litterateurs*' who . . . proclaim the principle that laws 
should be passed directly by the whole people, completely 
failing to understand that in modern society this principle 
can have only a relative application." [Op. Cit., p. 163] 
The universal nature of his dismissal of self-management 
within the revolutionary organisation in favour of 
representative forms is thus stressed.

Significantly, Lenin states that this "'primitive' conception 
of democracy" exists in two groups, the "masses of the students 
and workers" and the "Economists of the Bernstein persuasion" 
(i.e. reformists). Thus the idea of directly democratic working
class organisations is associated with opportunism. He was 
generous, noting that he "would not, of course, . . . condemn 
practical workers who have had too few opportunities for 
studying the theory and practice of real [sic!] democratic 
[sic!] organisation" but individuals "play[ing] a leading role" 
in the movement should be so condemned! [Op. Cit., p. 163] 
These people should know better! Thus "real" democratic 
organisation implies the restriction of democracy to that 
of electing leaders and any attempt to widen the input of
ordinary members is simply an expression of workers who 
need educating from their "primitive" failings! 

In summary, we have a model of a "revolutionary" party which is
based on full-time "professional revolutionaries" in which the
concept of direct democracy is replaced by a system of, at
best, representative democracy. It is highly centralised, as
befitting a specialised organisation. As noted in section H.3.3,
the "organisational principle of revolutionary Social-Democracy" 
was "to proceed from the top downward" rather than "from the 
bottom upward." [Lenin, _Collected Works_, vol. 7, pp. 396-7]
Rather than being only applicable in Tsarist Russia, Lenin 
drew on examples from advanced, democratic capitalist countries
to justify his model in 1902 and in 1920 he advocated a similar
hierarchical and top-down organisation with a dual secret and 
public organisation in the _Communist International_. The
continuity of ideas is clear.

H.5.6 Why do anarchists oppose "democratic centralism"?

What to make of Lenin's suggested model of "democratic 
centralism" discussed in the last section? It is, to use 
Cornelius Castoriadis's term, a "revolutionary party 
organised on a capitalist manner." He argues that in 
practice the "democratic centralist" party, while 
being centralised, will not be very democratic. In 
fact, the level of democracy would reflect that in a 
capitalist republic rather than a socialist society. In 
his words:

"The dividing up of tasks, which is indispensable wherever there
is a need for co-operation, becomes a real division of labour, 
the labour of giving orders being separate from that of carrying
them out . . . this division between directors and executants 
tends to broaden and deepen by itself. The leaders specialise 
in their role and become indispensable while those who carry 
out orders become absorbed in their concrete tasks. Deprived 
of information, of the general view of the situation, and of 
the problems of organisation, arrested in their development by
their lack of participation in the overall life of the Party, 
the organisation's rank-and-file militants less and less have 
the means or the possibility of having any control over those at
the top.

"This division of labour is supposed to be limited by 'democracy.'
But democracy, which should mean that *the majority rules,* is 
reduced to meaning that the majority *designates its rulers;*
copied in this way from the model of bourgeois parliamentary
democracy, drained of any real meaning, it quickly becomes a 
veil thrown over the unlimited power of the rulers. The base
does not run the organisation just because once a year it elects
delegates who designate the central committee, no more than the
people are sovereign in a parliamentary-type republic because
they periodically elect deputies who designate the government.

"Let us consider, for example, 'democratic centralism' as it 
is supposed to function in an ideal Leninist party. That the 
central committee is designated by a 'democratically elected' 
congress makes no difference since, once it is elected, it 
has complete (statutory) control over the body of the Party
(and can dissolve the base organisations, kick out militants,
etc.) or that, under such conditions, it can determine the
composition of the next congress. The central committee 
could use its powers in an honourable way, these powers
could be reduced; the members of the Party might enjoy 
'political rights' such as being able to form factions, 
etc. Fundamentally this would not change the situation, 
for the central committee would still remain the organ 
that defines the political line of the organisation and
controls its application from top to bottom, that, in a
word, has permanent monopoly on the job of leadership. The
expression of opinions only has a limited value once the 
way the group functions prevents this opinion from forming 
on solid bases, i.e. permanent *participation* in the 
organisation's activities and in the solution of problems
that arise. If the way the organisation is run makes the 
solution of general problems he specific task and permanent 
work of a separate category of militants, only their opinion
will, or will appear, to count to the others." [_Social and
Political Writings_, vol. 2, pp. 204-5]

Castoridis' insight is important and strikes at the heart of
the problem with vanguard parties. They simply reflect the 
capitalist society they claim to represent. As such, Lenin's
argument against "primitive" democracy in the revolutionary 
and labour movements is significant. When he asserts that 
those who argue for direct democracy "completely" fail to 
"understand that in modern society this principle can have 
only a relative application," he is letting the cat out of 
the bag. [Lenin, Op. Cit., p. 163] After all, "modern society" 
is capitalism, a class society. In such a society, it is 
understandable that self-management should not be applied 
as it strikes at the heart of class society and how it 
operates. That Lenin can appeal to "modern society" without
recognising its class basis says a lot. The question becomes, 
if such a "principle" is valid for a class system, is it 
applicable in a socialist society one and in the movement 
aiming to create such a society? Can we postpone the 
application of our ideas until "after the revolution" or 
can the revolution only occur when we apply our socialist 
principles in resisting class society?

In a nutshell, can the same set of organisational structures 
be used for the different ends? Can bourgeois structures be
considered neutral or have they, in fact, evolved to ensure and 
protect minority rule? Ultimately, form and content are not 
independent of each other. Form and content adapt to fit each 
other and they cannot be divorced in reality. Thus, if the 
bourgeoisie embrace centralisation and representation they have
done so because it fits perfectly with their specific form of
class society. Neither centralisation and representation can 
undermine minority rule and, if they did, they would quickly be
eliminated. This can be seen from the fate of radicals utilising
representative democracy. If they are in a position to threaten 
bourgeois society, representative government is eliminated in 
favour of even stronger forms of centralisation (e.g. fascism
or some other form of dictatorship). 

Ironically enough, both Bukharin and Trotsky acknowledged that 
fascism had appropriated Bolshevik ideas. The former demonstrated 
at the 12th Congress of the Communist Party in 1923 how Italian 
fascism had "adopted and applied in practice the experiences of 
the Russian revolution" in terms of their "methods of combat." In 
fact, "[i]f one regards them from the *formal* point of view, that 
is, from the point of view of the technique of their political
methods, then one discovers in them a complete application of 
Bolshevik tactics. . . in the sense of the rapid concentration of 
forced [and] energetic action of a tightly structured military 
organisation." [quoted by R. Pipes, _Russia Under the Bolshevik 
Regime, 1919-1924_, p. 253] The latter, in his uncompleted 
biography on Stalin noted that "Mussolini stole from the 
Bolsheviks . . . Hitler imitated the Bolsheviks and Mussolini." 
[_Stalin_, vol. 2, p. 243] The question arises as to whether the 
same tactics and structures serve both the needs of fascist 
reaction *and* socialist revolution? Now, if Bolshevism can 
serve as a model for fascism, it must contain structural and 
functional elements which are also common to fascism. After 
all, no one has detected a tendency of Hitler or Mussolini, in 
their crusade against democracy, the organised labour movement 
and the left, to imitate the organisational principles of 
anarchism or even of Menshevism.

Simply put, we can expect decisive structural differences 
to exist between capitalism and socialism if these societies 
are to have different aims. Where one is centralised to 
facilitate minority rule, the other must be decentralised and 
federal to facilitate mass participation. Where one is top-down, 
the other must be from the bottom-up. If a "socialism" exists 
which uses bourgeois organisational elements then we should not 
be surprised if it turns out it is socialist in name only. The 
same applies to revolutionary organisations.As  the anarchists 
of _Trotwatch_ explain:

"In reality, a Leninist Party simply reproduces and 
institutionalises existing capitalist power relations
inside a supposedly 'revolutionary' organisation: 
between leaders and led; order givers and order takers;
between specialists and the acquiescent and largely
powerless party workers. And that elitist power relation 
is extended to include the relationship between the party 
and class." [_Carry on Recruiting!_, p. 41]

If you have an organisation which celebrates centralisation,
having an institutionalised "leadership" separate from the
mass of members becomes inevitable. Thus the division of 
labour which exists in the capitalist workplace or state is
created. Forms cannot and do not exist independently of 
people and so imply specific forms of social relationships 
within them. These social relationships shape those subject 
to them. Can we expect the same forms of authority to have 
different impacts simply because the organisation has 
"socialist" or "revolutionary" in its name? Of course not.
It is for this reason that anarchists argue that only in
a "libertarian socialist movement the workers learn about
non-dominating forms of association through creating and
experimenting with forms such as libertarian labour 
organisations, which put into practice, through struggle
against exploitation, principles of equality and free
association." [John Clark, _The Anarchist Moment_, p. 79]

As noted above, a "democratic centralist" party requires that
the "lower" party bodies (cells, branches, etc.) should be
subordinate to the higher ones (e.g. the central committee).
The higher bodies are elected at the (usually) annual 
conference. As it is impossible to mandate for future 
developments, the higher bodies therefore are given 
carte blanche to determine policy which is binding on the
whole party (hence the "from top-down" principle). In between
conferences, the job of full time (ideally elected, but not
always) officers is to lead the party and carry out the 
policy decided by the central committee. At the next 
conference, the party membership can show its approval of
the leadership by electing another. The problems with this
scheme are numerous:

"The first problem is the issue of hierarchy. Why should 
'higher' party organs interpret party policy any more 
accurately than 'lower' ones? The pat answer is that the
'higher' bodies compromise the most capable and experienced
members and are (from their lofty heights) in a better 
position to take an overall view on a given issue. In fact
what may well happen is that, for example, central committee
members may be more isolated from the outside world than 
mere branch members. This might ordinarily be the case 
because given the fact than many central committee members
are full timers and therefore detached from more real issues
such as making a living . . ." [ACF, _Marxism and its 
Failures_, p. 8]

Equally, in order that the "higher" bodies can evaluate the 
situation they need effective information from the "lower"
bodies. If the "lower" bodies are deemed incapable of formulating
their own policies, how can they be wise enough, firstly, to
select the right leaders and, secondly, determine the appropriate
information to communicate to the "higher" bodies? As such, 
given the assumptions for centralised power in the party, can
we not see that "democratic centralised" parties will be 
extremely inefficient in practice as information and knowledge
is lost in the party machine and whatever decisions which are
reached at the top are made in ignorance of the real situation
on the ground? As we discuss in section H.3.8, this is usually
the fate of such parties.

Within the party, as noted, the role of "professional revolutionaries"
(or "full timers") is stressed. As Lenin argued, any worker which
showed any talent must be removed from the workplace and become a
party functionary. Is it surprising that the few Bolshevik cadres 
(i.e. professional revolutionaries) of working class origin soon 
lost real contact with the working class? Equally, what will their
role *within* the party be? As we discuss in section H.6.3, 
their role in the Bolshevik party was essentially conservative in
nature and aimed to maintain their own position. As Bakunin argued
(in a somewhat different context) Marxism always "comes down to 
the same dismal result: government of the vast majority of the 
people by a privileged minority. But this minority, the Marxists 
say, will consist of workers. Yes, perhaps of *former* workers, 
who, as soon as they become rulers or representatives of the 
people will cease to be workers and will begin to look upon 
the whole workers' world from the heights of the state. They 
will no longer represent the people but themselves and their 
own pretensions to govern the people." [_Statism and Anarchy_, 
p. 178] Replacing "state" with "party machine" and "the people" 
by "the party" we get a good summation of the way the Bolshevik 
cadres *did* look upon the party members (see section H.5.9). It 
also indicates the importance of organising today in a socialist 
manner rather than in a bourgeois one.

That the anarchist critique of "democratic centralism" is valid,
we need only point to the comments and analysis of numerous 
members (and often soon to be ex-members) of such parties. Thus
we get a continual stream of articles discussing why specific
parties are, in fact, "bureaucratic centralist" rather than 
"democratic centralist" and what is required to reform them. 
That almost every "democratic centralist" party in existence is
not that democratic does not hinder their attempts to create one
which is. In a way, the truly "democratic centralist" party is
the Holy Grail of modern Leninism. As we discuss in section 
H.8.10, their goal may be as mythical as that of the Arthurian 
legends.

H.5.7 Is the way revolutionaries organise important?

As we discussed in the last section, anarchists argue that
the way revolutionaries organise today is important. However, 
according to some of Lenin's followers, the fact that the 
"revolutionary" party is organised in a non-revolutionary 
manner does not matter. In the words of Chris Harman, leading 
member of the British Socialist Workers' Party, "[e]xisting 
under capitalism, the revolutionary organisation [i.e. the 
vanguard party] will of necessity have a quite different 
structure to that of the workers' state that will arise in 
the process of overthrowing capitalism." [_Party and Class_, 
p. 34]

However, in practice this distinction is impossible to make. 
If the party is organised in specific ways then it is so 
because this is conceived to be "efficient," "practical" 
and so on. Hence we find Lenin arguing against "backwardness 
in organisation" and that the "point at issue is whether our 
ideological struggle is to have *forms of a higher type* to 
clothe it, forms of Party organisation binding on all." 
[contained in Robert V. Daniels, _A Documentary History of 
Communism_, vol. 1, p. 23] Why would the "workers' state" 
be based on "backward" or "lower" kinds of organisational
forms? If, as Lenin remarked, "the organisational principle 
of revolutionary Social-Democracy" was "to proceed from
the top downward," why would the party, once in power, 
reject its "organisational principle" in favour of one 
it thinks is "opportunist," "primitive" and so on?

Therefore, as the *vanguard* the party represents the level 
to which the working class is supposed to reach then its
organisational principles must, similarly, be those which
the class must reach. As such, Harman's comments are 
incredulous. How we organise today is hardly irrelevant, 
particularly if the revolutionary organisation in question 
seeks (to use Lenin's words) to "take over full state power 
alone." [_Selected Works_, vol. 2, p. 352] These prejudices 
(and the political and organisational habits they generate) 
will influence the shaping of the "workers' state" by the 
party once it has taken power. This decisive influence of 
the party and its ideological as well as organisational 
assumptions can be seen when Trotsky argued in 1923 that 
"the party created the state apparatus and can rebuild it 
anew . . . from the party you get the state, but not the 
party from the state." [_Leon Trotsky Speaks_, p. 161] This 
is to be expected, after all the aim of the party is to take, 
hold and execute power. Given that the vanguard party is 
organised as it is to ensure effectiveness and efficiency, 
why should we assume that the ruling party will not seek to 
recreate these organisational principles once in power? As
the Russian Revolution proves, this is the case:

"On 30 October, Sovnarkom [The Council of People's Commissars]
unilaterally arrogated to itself legislative power simply 
by promulgating a decree to this effect. This was, effectively,
a Bolshevik *coup d'etat* that made clear the government's
(and party's) pre-eminence over the soviets and their 
executive organ. Increasingly, the Bolsheviks relied upon the 
appointment from above of commissars with plenipotentiary 
powers, and they split up and reconstituted fractious Soviets 
and intimidated political opponents." [Neil Harding, _Leninism_,
p. 253]

As such, to claim how we organise under capitalism is not 
important to a revolutionary movement is simply not true. 
The way revolutionaries organise have an impact both on 
themselves and how they will view the revolution developing.
An ideological prejudice for centralisation and "top-down"
organisation will not disappear once the revolution starts.
Rather, it will influence the way the party acts within it
and, if it aims to seize power, how it will exercise that 
power once it has.

For these reasons anarchists stress the importance of building
the new world in the shell of the old. All organisations exert
pressures on their membership and create social relationships 
which shape them. As the members of these parties will be part
of the revolutionary process, they will influence how that 
revolution will develop and any "transitional" institutions 
which are created. As the aim of such organisations is to 
facilitate the creation of socialism, the obvious implication 
is that the revolutionary organisation must, itself, reflect 
the society it is trying to create. Clearly, then, the idea that 
how we organise as revolutionaries today can be considered somehow 
independent of the revolutionary process and the nature of 
post-capitalist society and its institutions cannot be maintained 
(particularly is the aim of the "revolutionary" organisation is 
to seize power on behalf of the working class).

As we argue elsewhere (see section H.2.10 and J.3) anarchists argue
for revolutionary groups based on self-management, federalism and
decision making from below. In other words, we apply within our
organisations the same principles as those which the working 
class has evolved in the course of its own struggles. Autonomy 
is combined with federalism, so ensuring co-ordination of decisions 
and activities is achieved from below upwards by means of mandated
and recallable delegates. Effective co-operation is achieved as 
it is informed by and reflects the needs on the ground. Simply 
put, working class organisation and discipline -- as exemplified
by the workers' council or strike committee -- represents a 
completely different thing from *capitalist* organisation and
discipline, of which Leninists are constantly asking for more
(albeit draped with the Red Flag and labelled "revolutionary").
And as we discuss in the next section, the Leninist model of 
top-down centralised parties is marked more by its failures 
than its successes, suggesting that not only is the vanguard 
model undesirable, it is also unnecessary.

H.5.8 Are vanguard parties effective?

In a word, no. Vanguard parties have rarely been proven to be
effective organs for fermenting revolutionary change which is,
let us not forget, their stated purpose. Indeed, rather than
being in the vanguard of social struggle, the Leninist parties
are often the last to recognise, let alone understand, the 
initial stirrings of important social movements and events.
It is only once these movements have exploded in the streets
that the self-proclaimed "vanguards" notice it and decide it
requires their leadership. 

Part of this process are constant attempts to install their 
political program onto movements that they do not understand, 
movements that have proven to be successful using different 
tactics and methods of organisation. Rather than learn from 
the experiences of others, social movements are seen as raw
material, as a source of new party members, to be used in order
to advance the party rather than the autonomy and combativeness
of the working class. The latest example of this process is the
current "anti-globalisation" or "anti-capitalist" movement which
started without the help of these self-appointed vanguards, who
have since spent a lot of time trying to catch up with the 
movement while criticising its proven organisational principles
and tactics.

The reasons for such behaviour are not too difficult to find. They
lie in organisational structure favoured by these parties and the
mentality lying behind them. As anarchists have long argued, a 
centralised, top-down structure will simply be unresponsive to 
the needs of those in struggle. The inertia associated with the
party hierarchy will ensure that it responds slowly to new 
developments and its centralised structure means that the 
leadership is isolated from what is happening on the ground 
and cannot respond appropriately. The underlying assumption of
the vanguard party, namely that the party represents the interests
of the working class, makes it unresponsive to new developments 
within the class struggle. As Lenin argued that spontaneous 
working class struggle tends to reformism, the leaders of a 
vanguard party automatically are suspicious of new developments
which, by their very nature, rarely fit into previously agreed
models of "proletarian" struggle. The example of Bolshevik 
hostility to the soviets spontaneously formed by workers during 
the 1905 Russian revolution is one of the best known examples of
this tendency.

Murray Bookchin is worth quoting at length on this subject:

"The 'glorious party,' when there is one, almost invariably lags 
behind the events . . . In the beginning . . . it tends to have an 
inhibitory function, not a 'vanguard' role. Where it exercises 
influence, it tends to slow down the flow of events, not 'co-
ordinate' the revolutionary forced. This is not accidental. The 
party is structured along hierarchical lines *that reflect the very 
society it professes to oppose.* Despite its theoretical pretensions,
it is a bourgeois organism, a miniature state, with an apparatus
and a cadre whose function it is to *seize* power, not *dissolve*
power. Rooted in the pre-revolutionary period, it assimilates all
the forms, techniques and mentality of bureaucracy. Its membership 
is schooled in obedience and in the preconceptions of a rigid dogma
and is taught to revere the leadership. The party's leadership, 
in turn, is schooled in habits born of command, authority, 
manipulation and egomania. This situation is worsened when the
party participates in parliamentary elections. In election 
campaigns, the vanguard party models itself completely on 
existing bourgeois forms and even acquires the paraphernalia 
of the electoral party. . . 

"As the party expands, the distance between the leadership and
the ranks inevitably increases. Its leaders not only become
'personages,' they lose contact with the living situation below. 
The local groups, which know their own immediate situation better 
than any remote leaders, are obliged to subordinate their insights 
to directives from above. The leadership, lacking any direct 
knowledge of local problems, responds sluggishly and prudently. 
Although it stakes out a claim to the 'larger view,' to greater
'theoretical competence,' the competence of the leadership tends
to diminish as one ascends the hierarchy of command. The more
one approaches the level where the real decisions are made, the
more conservative is the nature of the decision-making process,
the more bureaucratic and extraneous are the factors which come
into play, the more considerations of prestige and retrenchment
supplant creativity, imagination, and a disinterested dedication
to revolutionary goals.

"The party becomes less efficient from a revolutionary point of 
view the more it seeks efficiency by means of hierarchy, cadres 
and centralisation. Although everyone marches in step, the orders 
are usually wrong, especially when events begin to move rapidly 
and take unexpected turns -- as they do in all revolutions. . . 

"On the other hand, this kind of party is extremely vulnerable
in periods of repression. The bourgeoisie has only to grab its
leadership to destroy virtually the entire movement. With its
leaders in prison or in hiding, the party becomes paralysed; 
the obedient membership had no one to obey and tends to flounder.
Demoralisation sets in rapidly. The party decomposes not only
because of the repressive atmosphere but also because of its
poverty of inner resources.

"The foregoing account is not a series of hypothetical inferences,
it is a composite sketch of all the mass Marxian parties of the
past century -- the Social Democrats, the Communists and the 
Trotskyist party of Ceylon (the only mass party of its kind. To 
claim that these parties failed to take their Marxian principles
seriously merely conceals another question: why did this failure
happen in the first place? The fact is, these parties were
co-opted into bourgeois society because they were structured 
along bourgeois lines. The germ of treachery existed in them
from birth." [_Post-Scarcity Anarchism_, pp. 194-8]

Thus, the evidence Bookchin summarises suggests that vanguard
parties are less than efficient promoting revolutionary change.
Sluggish, unresponsive, undemocratic, they simply cannot 
adjust to the dynamic nature of social struggle, never mind
revolution. This is to be expected:

"For the state centralisation is the appropriate form of 
organisation, since it aims at the greatest possible uniformity 
in social life for the maintenance of political and social 
equilibrium. But for a movement whose very existence depends 
on prompt action at any favourable moment and on the independent 
thought and action of its supporters, centralism could but be a
curse by weakening its power of decision and systematically 
repressing all immediate action. If, for example, as was the 
case in Germany, every local strike had first to be approved 
by the Central, which was often hundreds of miles away and was 
not usually in a position to pass a correct judgement on the 
local conditions, one cannot wonder that the inertia of the 
apparatus of organisation renders a quick attack quite impossible, 
and there thus arises a state of affairs where the energetic and 
intellectually alert groups no longer serve as patterns for the 
less active, but are condemned by these to inactivity, inevitably 
bringing the whole movement to stagnation. Organisation is, after 
all, only a means to an end. When it becomes an end in itself, it 
kills the spirit and the vital initiative of its members and
sets up that domination by mediocrity which is the characteristic 
of all bureaucracies." [Rudolf Rocker, _Anarcho-Syndicalism_, 
p. 54]

As we discuss in section H.6.3, the example of the Bolshevik
party during the Russian Revolution amply proves Rocker's point.
Rather than being a highly centralised, disciplined vanguard
party, the Bolshevik party was marked by extensive autonomy
throughout its ranks. Party discipline was regularly ignored,
including by Lenin in his attempts to get the central party 
bureaucracy to catch up with the spontaneous revolutionary 
actions and ideas of the Russian working class. As Bookchin 
summarises, the "Bolshevik leadership was ordinarily extremely 
conservative, a trait that Lenin had to fight throughout 1917 
-- first in his efforts to reorient the Central Committee 
against the provisional government (the famous conflict 
over the 'April Theses'), later in driving the Central 
Committee toward insurrection in October. In both cases he 
threatened to resign from the Central Committee and bring 
his views to 'the lower ranks of the party.'" Once in power,
however, "the Bolsheviks tended to centralise their party to 
the degree that they became isolated from the working class." 
[Op. Cit., pp. 198-9 and p. 199]

The "vanguard" model of organising is not only inefficient 
and ineffective from a revolutionary perspective, it 
generates bureaucratic and elitist tendencies which undermine
any revolution unfortunate enough to be dominated by such a
party. For these extremely practical and sensible reasons 
anarchists reject it wholeheartedly.

In summary, vanguard parties have been proven to be less than
effective in a revolutionary sense. Their top-down centralised
structure is simply not responsive enough to the needs of social
struggle and so usually remain out of touch with such movements,
spending most of their time trying to catch up with them. As we 
discuss in the next section, the only thing vanguard parties 
*are* effective at is to supplant the diversity produced and 
required by revolutionary movements with the drab conformity 
produced by centralisation and to replace popular power and
freedom with party power and tyranny.

H.5.9 What are vanguard parties effective at?

As we discussed the last section, vanguard parties are not 
efficient as agents of revolutionary change. So, it may be 
asked, what *are* vanguard parties effective at? If they 
are harmful to revolutionary struggle, what are they good 
at? The answer to this is simple. No anarchist would deny 
that vanguard parties are extremely efficient and effective 
at certain things, most notably reproducing hierarchy and 
bourgeois values into so-called "revolutionary" organisations 
and movements. As Murray Bookchin argues, the party "is 
efficient in only one respect -- in moulding society in its 
own hierarchical image if the revolution is successful. It 
recreates bureaucracy, centralisation and the state. It 
fosters the very social conditions which justify this 
kind of society. Hence, instead of 'withering away,' the 
state controlled by the 'glorious party' preserves the very 
conditions which 'necessitate' the existence of a state -- 
and a party to 'guard' it." [_Post-Scarcity Anarchism_, 
pp. 197-8]

Thus, by being structured along hierarchical lines that reflect
the very system that it professes to oppose, the vanguard 
party very "effectively" reproduces that system within both
the current radical social movements *and* any revolutionary
society that may be created. This means that once in power, 
it shapes society in its own image. Ironically, this tendency 
towards conservatism and bureaucracy was noted by Trotsky: 

"As often happens, a sharp cleavage developed between the
classes in motion and the interests of the party machines.
Even the Bolshevik Party cadres, who enjoyed the benefit 
of exceptional revolutionary training, were definitely 
inclined to disregard the masses and to identify their own
special interests and the interests of the machine on the
very day after the monarchy was overthrown. What, then, 
could be expected of these cadres when they became an 
all-powerful state bureaucracy?" [_Stalin_, vol. 1, p. 298]

In such circumstances, it is unsurprising that urging party
power and identifying it with working class power would have
less than revolutionary results. Discussing the Bolsheviks
in 1905 Trotsky points out this tendency existed from the
start:

"The habits peculiar to a political machine were already
forming in the underground. The young revolutionary 
bureaucrat was already emerging as a type. The conditions
of conspiracy, true enough, offered rather merge scope
for such formalities of democracy as electiveness, 
accountability and control. Yet, undoubtedly the
committeemen narrowed these limitations considerably
more than necessity demanded and were far more intransigent
and severe with the revolutionary workingmen than with
themselves, preferring to domineer even on occasions
that called for lending an attentive eat to the voice
of the masses." [Op. Cit., p. 101]

He quotes Krupskaya on these party bureaucrats, the 
"committeemen." Krupskaya argues that "as a rule" they 
"did not recognise any party democracy" and "did not want 
any innovations. The 'committeeman' did not desire, and 
did not know how to, adapt himself to rapidly changing 
conditions." [quoted by Trotsky, Op. Cit., p. 101] This
conservatism played havoc in the party during 1917, 
incidentally. It would be no exaggeration to argue that 
the Russian revolution occurred in spite of, rather than 
because of, Bolshevik organisational principles (see next 
section). These principles, however, came into their own
once the party had seized power, ensuring the consolidation
of bureaucratic rule by an elite.

That a vanguard party helps to produces a bureaucratic regime 
once in power should not come as a surprise. If the party,
to use Trotsky's expression, exhibits a "caste tendency of 
the committeemen" can we be surprised if once in power it 
reproduces such a tendency in the state it is now the master
of? [Op. Cit., p. 102] And this "tendency" can be seen today
in the multitude of Trotskyist sects that exist.

H.5.10 Why does "democratic centralism" produce "bureaucratic
       centralism"?

In spite of the almost ritualistic assertions that vanguard
parties are "the most democratic the world has seen," an 
army of ex-members, expelled dissidents and disgruntled 
members testify that they do not live up to the hype. They
argue that most, if not all, "vanguard" parties are not
"democratic centralist" but are, in fact, " bureaucratic
centralist." Within the party, in other words, a bureaucratic
clique controls it from the top-down with little democratic
control, never mind participation.

For anarchists, this is hardly surprising. The reasons why 
this continually happens are rooted in the nature of 
"democratic centralism" itself.

Firstly, the assumption of "democratic centralism" is that 
the membership elect a leadership and give them the power to 
decide policy between conferences and congresses. This has
a subtle impact on the membership, as it is assumed that the 
leadership has a special insight into social problems above 
and beyond that of anyone else, otherwise they would not
have been elected to such an important position. Thus many
in the membership come to believe that disagreements with 
the leadership's analysis, even before they had been clearly 
articulated, are liable to be wrong. Doubt dares not speak 
its name. Unquestioning belief in the party leadership has 
been an all to common recurring theme in many accounts of 
vanguard parties.

Conformity within such parties is also reinforced by the 
intense activism expected by members, particularly leading
activists and full-time members. Paradoxically, the more 
deeply people participate in activism, the harder it becomes 
to reflect on what they are doing. The unrelenting pace 
often induces exhaustion and depression, while making it 
harder to "think your way out"-- too many commitments have 
been made and too little time is left over from party activity 
for reflection. Moreover, high levels of activism prevent 
many, particularly the most committed, from having a personal 
life outside their role as party members. This high-speed 
political existence assure that rival social networks 
atrophy through neglect, so ensuring that the party line
is the only one which members get exposed to. Members tend 
to leave, typically, because of exhaustion, crisis, even 
despair rather than as the result of rational reflection 
and conscious decision.

Secondly, given that vanguard parties are based on the belief 
that they are the guardians of "scientific socialism," this 
means that there is a tendency to squeeze all of social life 
into the confines of the party's ideology. Moreover, as the 
party's ideology is a "science" it is expected to explain 
everything (hence the tendency of Leninists to expound on 
every subject imaginable, regardless of whether the author 
knows enough about the subject to discuss it in an informed 
way). The view that the party's ideology explains everything 
eliminates the need for fresh or independent thought, precludes 
the possibility of critically appraising past practice or 
acknowledging mistakes, and removes the need to seek meaningful 
intellectual input outside the party's own ideological fortress. 
As Victor Serge, anarchist turned Bolshevik, admitted in his
memoirs, "Bolshevik thinking is grounded in the possession of 
the truth. The Party is the repository of truth, and any
form of thinking which differs from it is a dangerous or
reactionary error. Here lies its spiritual source of it 
intolerance. The absolute conviction of its lofty mission
assures it of a moral energy quite astonishing in its
intensity -- and, at the same time, a clerical mentality 
which is quick to becoming Inquisitorial." [_Memoirs of 
a Revolutionary_, p. 134]

In fact, the intense levels of activism means that members are 
bombarded with party propaganda, are in endless party meetings, 
or spend time reading party literature and so, by virtue of the 
fact that there is not enough time to read anything, members 
end up reading nothing but party publications. Most points of 
contact with the external world are eliminated or drastically 
curtailed. Indeed, such alternative sources of information 
and such thinking is regularly dismissed as being contaminated 
by bourgeois influences. This often goes so far as to label
those who question any aspect of the party's analysis 
revisionists or deviationists, bending to the "pressures 
of capitalism," and are usually driven from the ranks as 
heretics. All this is almost always combined with contempt 
for all other organisations on the Left (indeed, the closer 
they are to the party's own ideological position the more 
likely they are to be the targets of abuse).

Thirdly, the practice of "democratic centralism" also aids this 
process towards conformity. Based on the idea that the party must 
be a highly disciplined fighting force, the party is endowed with 
a powerful central committee and a rule that all members must
publicly defend the agreed-upon positions of the party and the
decisions of the central committee, whatever opinions they might 
hold to the contrary in private. Between conferences, the party's 
leading bodies usually have extensive authority to govern the 
party's affairs, including updating party doctrine and deciding
the party's response to current political events.

As unity is the key, there is a tendency to view any opposition 
as a potential threat. It is not at all clear when "full freedom 
to criticise" policy internally can be said to disturb the unity 
of a defined action. The norms of democratic centralism confer 
all power between conferences onto a central committee, allowing 
it to become the arbiter of when a dissident viewpoint is in 
danger of weakening unity. The evidence from numerous vanguard
parties suggest that their leaderships usually view *any* 
dissent as precisely such a disruption and demand that dissidents 
cease their action or face expulsion from the party. 

It should also be borne in mind that Leninist parties also view 
themselves as vitally important to the success of any future 
revolution. This cannot help but reinforce the tendency to view 
dissent as something which automatically imperils the future of 
the planet and so something which must be combated at all costs.
As Lenin stressed an a polemic directed to the international 
communist movement in 1920, "[w]hoever brings about even the 
slightest weakening of the iron discipline of the party of the 
proletariat (especially during its dictatorship) is actually 
aiding the bourgeoisie against the proletariat." [_Collected 
Works_, vol. 31, p. 45] As can be seen, Lenin stresses the 
importance of "iron discipline" at all times, not only during
the revolution when "the party" is applying "its dictatorship"
(see section H.3.8 for more on this aspect of Leninism). This 
provides a justification of whatever measures are required to 
restore the illusion of unanimity, including the trampling 
underfoot of whatever rights the membership may have on paper
and the imposition of any decisions the leadership considers
as essential between conferences. 

Fourthly, and more subtly, it is well known that when people take 
a public position in defence of a proposition, there is then a 
strong tendency for their private attitudes to shift so that 
they harmonise with their public behaviour. It is difficult to 
say one thing in public and hold to a set of private beliefs at 
variance with what is publicly expressed. In short, if people 
tell others that they support X (for whatever reason), they will
slowly begin to change their own opinions and, indeed, internally
come to support X. The more public such declarations have been, 
the more likely it is that such a shift will take place. This has 
been confirmed by empirical research (see R. Cialdini, _Influence: 
Science and Practice_). 

This suggests that if, in the name of democratic centralism, 
party members publicly uphold the party line, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to hold a private belief at variance 
with publicly expressed opinions. The evidence suggests that 
it is not possible to have a group of people presenting a 
conformist image to society at large while maintaining an 
inner party regime characterised by frank and full discussion. 
Conformity in public tends to equal conformity in private. So
given what is now known of social influence, "democratic 
centralism" is almost certainly destined to prevent genuine 
internal discussion. This is sadly all too often confirmed 
in the internal regimes of vanguard parties, where debate is
often narrowly focused on a few minor issues of emphasis 
rather than fundamental issues of policy and theory. 

It has already been noted (in section H.5.5) that the 
organisational norms of democratic centralism imply a 
concentration of power at the top. There is abundant 
evidence that such a concentration has been a vital feature 
of every vanguard party and that such a concentration limits 
party democracy. An authoritarian inner party regime is 
maintained, which ensures that decision making is 
concentrated in elite hands. This regime gradually dismantles 
or ignores all formal controls on its activities. Members are 
excluded from participation in determining policy, calling 
leaders to account, or expressing dissent. This is usually 
combined with persistent assurances about the essentially 
democratic nature of the organisation, and the existence of 
exemplary democratic controls -- on paper. Correlated with this
inner authoritarianism is a growing tendency toward the abuse 
of power by the leaders, who act in arbitrary ways, accrue 
personal power and so on (as noted by Trotsky with regards 
to the Bolshevik party machine, as mentioned above). Indeed, 
it is often the case that activities that would provoke 
outrage if engaged in by rank-and-file members are tolerated 
when they apply to leaders. As one group of Scottish 
libertarians notes: 

"Further, in so far as our Bolshevik friends reject and defy 
capitalist and orthodox labourist conceptions, they also 
are as much 'individualistic' as the anarchist. Is it not 
boasted, for example, that on many occasions Marx, Lenin 
and Trotsky were prepared to be in a minority of one -- if 
they thought they were more correct than all others on the 
question at issue? In this, like Galileo, they were quite 
in order. Where they and their followers, obsessed by the 
importance of their own judgement go wrong, is in their 
tendency to refuse this inalienable right to other 
protagonists and fighters for the working class." [APCF, 
"Our Reply," _Class War on the Home Front_, p. 70]

As in any hierarchical structure, the tendency is for those in 
power is to encourage and promote those who agree with them. 
This means that members usually find their influence and position
in the party dependent on their willingness to conform to the
hierarchy and its leadership. Dissenters will rarely find their
contribution valued and advancement is limited, which produces
a strong tendency not to make waves. As Miasnikov, a working 
class Bolshevik dissident, argued in 1921, "the regime within 
the party" meant that "if someone dares to have the courage of 
his convictions," they are called either a self-seeker or, worse, 
a counter-revolutionary, a Menshevik or an SR. Moreover, within 
the party, favouritism and corruption were rife. In Miasnikov's 
eyes a new type of Communist was emerging, the toadying careerist 
who "knows how to please his superiors." At the last party congress
Lenin attended, Miasnikov was expelled. Only one delegate, V. V. 
Kosior, "argued that Lenin had taken the wrong approach to the 
question of dissent. If someone, said Kosior, had the courage 
to point out deficiencies in party work, he was marked down 
as an oppositionist, relieved of authority, placed under 
surveillance, and -- a reference to Miasnikov -- even expelled 
from the party." [Paul Avrich, _Bolshevik Opposition to Lenin_]
Serge notes about the same period that Lenin "proclaimed a
purge of the Party, aimed at those revolutionaries who had
come in from other parties -- i.e. those who were not 
saturated with the Bolshevik mentality. This meant the 
establishment within the Party of a dictatorship of the old
Bolsheviks, and the direction of disciplinary measures,
not against the unprincipled careerists and conformist
late-comers, but against those sections with a critical 
outlook." [Op. Cit., p. 135]

This, of course, also applies to the party congress, on paper 
the sovereign body of the organisation. All too often, 
resolutions at party conferences will either come from the 
leadership or be completely supportive of its position. If 
branches or members submit resolutions which are critical of
the leadership, enormous pressure is exerted to ensure that 
they are withdrawn. Moreover, often delegates to the congress
are not mandated by their branches, so ensuring that rank and
file opinions are not raised, never mind discussed. Other,
more drastic measures have been known to occur. Victor Serge
saw what he termed the "Party steamroller" at work in early
1921 and saw "the voting rigged for Lenin's and Zinoviev's
'majority'" in one of the districts of Petrograd. [Op. Cit.,
p.123]

All to often, such parties have "elected" bodies which have,
in practice, usurped the normal democratic rights of members 
and become increasingly removed from formal controls. All 
practical accountability of the leaders to the membership 
for their actions is eliminated. Usually this authoritarian
structure is combined with militaristic sounding rhetoric and
the argument that the "revolutionary" movement needs to be 
organised in a more centralised way than the current class
system, with references to the state's forces of repression
(notably the army). As Murray Bookchin argued, the Leninist 
"has always had a grudging admiration and respect for that 
most inhuman of all hierarchical institutions, the military." 
[_Toward an Ecological Society_, p. 254f] 

The modern day effectiveness of the vanguard party can be 
seen by the strange fact that many Leninists fail to join 
any of the existing parties due to their bureaucratic 
internal organisation and that many members are expelled 
(or leave in disgust) due to their attempts to make them 
more democratic. If vanguard parties are such positive 
organisations to be a member of, why do they have such big 
problems with member retention? Why are there so many vocal 
ex-members? Why are so many Leninists ex-members of vanguard
parties, desperately trying to find an actual party which 
matches their own vision of democratic centralism rather 
than the bureaucratic centralism which seems the norm?

Our account of the workings of vanguard parties explains, in
part, why many anarchists and other libertarians voice concern 
about them and their underlying ideology. We do so because 
their practices are disruptive and alienate new activists, 
hindering the very goal (socialism/revolution) they claim 
to be aiming for. As anyone familiar with the numerous groupings
and parties in the Leninist left will attest, the anarchist
critique of vanguardism seems to be confirmed in reality while
the Leninist defence seems sadly lacking (unless, of course,
the person is a member of such a party and then their 
organisation is the exception to the rule!).

H.5.11 Can you provide an example of the negative nature of
       vanguard parties?

Yes. Our theoretical critique of vanguardism we have presented
in the last few sections is more than proved by the empirical 
evidence of such parties in operation today. Rarely do 
"vanguard" parties reach in practice the high hopes their 
supporters like to claim for them. Such parties are usually 
small, prone to splitting as well as leadership cults, and 
usually play a negative role in social struggle. A long line 
of ex-members complain that such parties are elitist,
hierarchical and bureaucratic. 

Obviously we cannot hope to discuss all such parties. As such,
we will take just one example, namely the arguments of one 
group of dissidents of the biggest British Leninist party, 
the Socialist Workers Party. It is worth quoting their 
account of the internal workings of the SWP at length:

"The SWP is not democratic centralist but bureaucratic 
centralist. The leadership's control of the party is 
unchecked by the members. New perspectives are initiated 
exclusively by the central committee (CC), who then 
implement their perspective against all party opposition, 
implicit or explicit, legitimate or otherwise.

"Once a new perspective is declared, a new cadre is selected 
from the top down. The CC select the organisers, who select the
district and branch committees - any elections that take place
are carried out on the basis of 'slates' so that it is virtually
impossible for members to vote against the slate proposed by the
leadership. Any members who have doubts or disagreements are
written off as 'burnt out' and, depending on their reaction to
this, may be marginalised within the party and even expelled.

"These methods have been disastrous for the SWP in a number of 
ways: Each new perspective requires a new cadre (below the 
level of the CC), so the existing cadre are actively 
marginalised in the party. In this way, the SWP has failed 
to build a stable and experienced cadre capable of acting 
independently of the leadership. Successive layers of cadres 
have been driven into passivity, and even out of the 
revolutionary movement altogether. The result is the loss 
of hundreds of potential cadres. Instead of appraising the 
real, uneven development of individual cadres, the history 
of the party is written in terms of a star system (comrades 
currently favoured by the party) and a demonology (the 
'renegades' who are brushed aside with each turn of the 
party). As a result of this systematic dissolution of the 
cadre, the CC grows ever more remote from the membership 
and increasingly bureaucratic in its methods. In recent 
years the national committee has been abolished (it obediently 
voted for its own dissolution, on the recommendation of the 
CC), to be replaced by party councils made up of those 
comrades active at any one time (i.e. those who already 
agree with current perspectives); district committees are 
appointed rather than elected; the CC monopolise all 
information concerning the party, so that it is impossible 
for members to know much about what happens in the party 
outside their own branch; the CC give a distorted account 
of events rather than admit their mistakes . . . history 
is rewritten to reinforce the prestige of the CC . . . The 
outcome is a party whose conferences have no democratic 
function, but serve only to orientate party activists to carry 
out perspectives drawn up before the delegates even set out 
from their branches. At every level of the party, strategy and
tactics are presented from the top down, as pre-digested
instructions for action. At every level, the comrades 'below'
are seen only as a passive mass to be shifted into action,
rather than as a source of new initiatives." 

"The only exception is when a branch thinks up a new tactic 
to carry out the CC's perspective. In this case, the CC may 
take up this tactic and apply it across the party. In no way 
do rank and file members play an active role in determining 
the strategy and theory of the party -- except in the negative 
sense that if they refuse to implement a perspective eventually 
even the CC notice, and will modify the line to suit. A political 
culture has been created in which the leadership outside of the 
CC consists almost solely of comrades loyal to the CC, willing 
to follow every turn of the perspective without criticism . . .
Increasingly, the bureaucratic methods used by the CC to enforce 
their control over the political direction of the party have 
been extended to other areas of party life. In debates over 
questions of philosophy, culture and even anthropology an 
informal party 'line' emerged (i.e. concerning matters in 
which there can be no question of the party taking a 'line'). 
Often behind these positions lay nothing more substantial 
than the opinions of this or that CC member, but adherence 
to the line quickly became a badge of party loyalty, 
disagreement became a stigma, and the effect was to close 
down the democracy of the party yet further by placing 
even questions of theory beyond debate. Many militants, 
especially working class militants with some experience 
of trade union democracy, etc., are often repelled by the 
undemocratic norms in the party and refuse to join, or 
keep their distance despite accepting our formal politics."
[ISG, _Discussion Document of Ex-SWP Comrades_]

They argue that a "democratic" party would involve the "[r]egular 
election of all party full-timers, branch and district leadership, 
conference delegates, etc. with the right of recall," which means 
that in the SWP appointment of full-timers, leaders and so on is 
the norm. They argue for the "right of branches to propose motions 
to the party conference" and for the "right for members to 
communicate horizontally in the party, to produce and distribute 
their own documents." They stress the need for "an independent 
Control Commission to review all disciplinary cases (independent 
of the leadership bodies that exercise discipline), and the right 
of any disciplined comrades to appeal directly to party conference." 
They argue that in a democratic party "no section of the party would 
have a monopoly of information" which indicates that the SWP's 
leadership is essentially secretive, withholding information from 
the party membership. [Ibid.]

Even more significantly, given our discussion on the influence
of the party structure on post-revolutionary society in section 
H.5.7, they argue that "[w]orst of all, the SWP are training a 
layer of revolutionaries to believe that the organisational norms 
of the SWP are a shining example of proletarian democracy, applicable 
to a future socialist society. Not surprisingly, many people are 
instinctively repelled by this idea." [Ibid.]

Some of these critics of Leninism do not give up hope and 
still look for a truly democratic centralist party rather 
than the bureaucratic centralist ones which seem so common. 
For example, our group of ex-SWP dissidents argue that 
"[a]nybody who has spent time involved in 'Leninist' 
organisations will have come across workers who agree 
with Marxist politics but refuse to join the party because 
they believe it to be undemocratic and authoritarian. Many 
draw the conclusion that Leninism itself is at fault, as 
every organisation that proclaims itself Leninist appears 
to follow the same pattern." [_Lenin vs. the SWP: 
Bureaucratic Centralism Or Democratic Centralism?_] This 
is a common refrain with Leninists -- when reality says 
one thing and the theory another, it must be reality that 
is at fault. Yes, every Leninist organisation may be 
bureaucratic and authoritarian but it is not the theory's 
fault that those who apply it are not capable of actually 
doing so successfully. Such an application of scientific 
principles by the followers of "scientific socialism" is 
worthy of note -- obviously the usual scientific method 
of generalising from facts to produce a theory is 
inapplicable when evaluating "scientific socialism" itself.
However, Rather than ponder the possibility that "democratic 
centralism" does not actually work and automatically generates
the "bureaucratic centralism," they point to the example of the
Russian revolution and the original Bolshevik party as proof
of the validity of their hopes.

Indeed, it would be no exaggeration to argue that the only reason 
people take the vanguard party organisational structure seriously
is the apparent success of the Bolsheviks in the Russian revolution.
However, as noted above, even the Bolshevik party was subject
to bureaucratic tendencies and as we discuss in the next section, 
the experience of the 1917 Russian Revolutions disprove the 
effectiveness of "vanguard" style parties. The Bolshevik party 
of 1917 was a totally different form of organisation than the 
ideal "democratic centralist" type argued for by Lenin in 1902 
and 1920. As a model of revolutionary organisation, the 
"vanguardist" one has been proven false rather than confirmed 
by the experience of the Russian revolution. Insofar as the 
Bolshevik party was effective, it operated in a non-vanguardist 
way and insofar as it did operate in such a manner, it held back 
the struggle.

H.6 What really happened in Russia?

	H.6.1 Can you give a short summary of what happened in 1917?
	H.6.2 How did the Bolsheviks gain mass support?
	H.6.3 Surely the Russian Revolution proves that vanguard 
            parties work?
	H.6.4 Was Lenin's "State and Revolution" applied
	      after October?
	H.6.5 Did the Bolsheviks really aim for Soviet power?
	H.6.6 What happened to the soviets after October?
	H.6.7 How did the factory committee movement develop?
	H.6.8 What was the Bolshevik position on "workers' control" 
	      in 1917?
	H.6.9 What happened to the factory committees after October?
	H.6.10 What were the Bolshevik economic policies in 1918?
	H.6.11 Did Bolshevik economic policies work?
	H.6.12 Was there an alternative to Lenin's "state capitalism" 
	       and "war communism"?
	H.6.13 Did the Bolsheviks allow independent trade unions?
	H.6.14 Was the Red Army really a revolutionary army?
	H.6.15 Was the Red Army "filled with socialist consciousness"?
	H.6.16 How did the civil war start and develop?
	H.6.17 Was the civil war between just Reds and Whites?
	H.6.18 How extensive was imperialist intervention?
	H.6.19 Did the end of the civil war change Bolshevik policies?
	H.6.20 Can the Red Terror and the Cheka be justified?
	H.6.21 Did Bolshevik peasant policies work?
	H.6.22 Was there an alternative to grain requisition?
	H.6.23 Was the repression of the socialist opposition justified?
	H.6.24 What did the anarchists do during the revolution?
	H.6.25 Did the Russian revolution refute anarchism?

H.6 What really happened in Russia?

This section of the FAQ is not a full history of the Russian 
Revolution. The scope of such a work would simply be too large. 
Instead, this section will concentrate on certain key issues 
which matter in evaluating whether the Bolshevik revolution 
and regime were genuinely socialist or not. This is not all. 
Some Leninists acknowledge that that Bolshevik policies had 
little to do with socialism as such were the best that were 
available at the time. As such, this section will look at 
possible alternatives to Bolshevik policies and see whether 
they were, in fact, inevitable.

So for those seeking a comprehensive history of the revolution
will have to look elsewhere. Here, we concentrate on those
issues which matter when evaluating the socialist content of
the revolution and of Bolshevism. In other words, the development
of working class self-activity and self-organisation, workers'
resistance to their bosses (whether capitalist or "red"), the
activity of opposition groups and parties and the fate of
working class organisations like trade unions, factory committees
and soviets. Moreover, the role of the ruling party and its
ideals also need to be indicated and evaluated somewhat (see
section H.9 for a fuller discussion of the role of Bolshevik
ideology in the defeat of the revolution).

This means that this section is about two things, what Alexander
Berkman termed "the Bolshevik Myth" and what Voline called "the
Unknown Revolution" (these being the titles of their respective
books on the revolution). After his experiences in Bolshevik
Russia, Berkman came to the conclusion that it was "[h]igh 
time the truth about the Bolsheviki were told. The whited
sepulchre must unmasked, the clay feet of the fetish beguiling
the international proletariat to fatal will o' wisps exposed.
The Bolshevik myth must be destroyed." By so doing, he aimed
to help the global revolutionary movement learn from the
experience of the Russian revolution. Given that "[t]o millions
of the disinherited and enslaved it became a new religion, the
beacon of social salvation" it was an "imperative to unmask the
great delusion, which otherwise might lead the Western workers
to the same abyss as their brothers in Russia." Bolshevism had
"failed, utterly and absolutely" and so it was "incumbent upon
those who have seen though the myth to expose its true nature
. . . Bolshevism is of the past. The future belongs to man 
and his liberty." [_The Bolshevik Myth_, p. 318 and p. 342]

Subsequent events proved Berkman correct. Socialism became 
linked to Soviet Russia and as it fell into Stalinism, the
effect was to discredit socialism, even radical change as 
such, in the eyes of millions. And quite rightly too, given
the horrors of Stalinism. If more radicals had had the 
foresight of Berkman and the other anarchists, this 
association of socialism and revolution with tyranny would
have been combated and an alternative, libertarian, form 
of socialism would have risen to take the challenge of
combating capitalism in the name of a *genuine* socialism,
rooted in the ideals of liberty, equality and solidarity.

However, in spite of the horrors of Stalinism many people
seeking a radical change in society are drawn to Leninism.
This is partly to do with the fact that in many countries
Leninist parties have a organised presence and many 
radicalised people come across them first. It is also
partly to do with the fact that many forms of Leninism 
denounce Stalinism for what it was and raise the possibility
of the "genuine" Leninism of the Bolshevik party under
Lenin and Trotsky. This current of Leninism is usually
called "Trotskyism" and has many offshoots. For some of
these parties, the differences between Trotskyism and
Stalinism is pretty narrow. The closer to orthodox 
Trotskyism you get, the more Stalinist it appears. As
Victor Serge noted of Trotsky's "Fourth International" in 
the 1930s, "in the hearts of the persecuted I encountered
the same attitudes as in their persecutors [the Stalinists]
. . . Trotskyism was displaying symptoms of an outlook
in harmony with the very Stalinism against which it had
taken its stand . . . any person in the circles of the
'Fourth International' who went so far as to object to
[Trotsky's] propositions was promptly expelled and
denounced in the same language that the bureaucracy had]
employed against us in the Soviet Union." [_Memoirs of
a Revolutionary_, p. 349] As we discuss in section H.10.3,
perhaps this is unsurprising given how much politically
Trotsky's "Left Opposition" had shared with Stalinism.

Other Trotskyist parties have avoided the worse excesses 
of orthodox Trotskyism. Parties associated with the 
_International Socialists_, for example portray 
themselves as defending what they like to term "socialism
from below" and the democratic promise of Bolshevik as
expressed during 1917 and in the early months of Bolshevik
rule. While anarchists are somewhat sceptical that Leninism
can be called "socialism from below" (see section H.3.3),
we need to address the claim that the period between 
February 1917 to the start of the Russian civil war at the
end of May 1918 shows the real nature of Bolshevism. In
order to do that we need to discuss what the Russian
anarchist Voline called "The Unknown Revolution."

So what is the "Unknown Revolution"? Voline, an active
participant in 1917 Russian Revolution, used that 
expression as the title of his classic account of the 
Russian revolution. He used it to refer to the rarely
acknowledged independent, creative actions of the 
revolutionary people themselves. As Voline argued, 
"it is not known how to study a revolution" and most
historians "mistrust and ignore those developments
which occur silently in the depths of the revolution
. . . at best, they accord them a few words in passing
. . . [Yet] it is precisely these hidden facts which
are important, and which throw a true light on the 
events under consideration and on the period." This
section of the FAQ will try and present this "unknown
revolution," those movements "which fought the 
Bolshevik power in the name of true liberty and of
the principles of the Social Revolution which that
power had scoffed at and trampled underfoot." [_The
Unknown Revolution_, p. 19 and p. 437] Voline gives
the Kronstadt rebellion (see section H.7) and the
Makhnovist movement (see section H.11) pride of place
in his account. Here we discuss other movements and
the Bolshevik response to them.
 
Leninist accounts of the Russian Revolution, to a
surprising extent, fall into the official form of
history -- a concern more with political leaders
than with the actions of the masses. Indeed, the 
popular aspects of the revolution are often distorted 
to accord with a predetermined social framework of
Leninism. Thus the role of the masses is stressed
during the period before the Bolshevik seizure of
power. Here the typical Leninist would agree, to 
a large extend, with summarised history of 1917
we present in section H.6.1. They would undoubtedly
disagree with the downplaying of the role of the 
Bolshevik party (although as we discuss in section
H.6.2, that party was far from the ideal model of
the vanguard party of Leninist theory and modern 
Leninist practice). However, the role of the masses
in the revolution would be praised, as would the
Bolsheviks for supporting it.

The real difference arises once the Bolsheviks seize
power in November 1917 (October, according to the Old
Style calendar then used). After that, the masses simply 
disappear and into the void steps the leadership of the 
Bolshevik party. For Leninism, the "unknown revolution"
simply stops. The sad fact is that very little is known 
about the dynamics of the revolution at the grassroots, 
particularly after October. Incredible as it may sound, 
very few Leninists are that interested in the realities 
of "workers' power" under the Bolsheviks or the actual 
performance and fate of such working class institutions 
as soviets, factory committees and co-operatives. What 
is written is often little more than vague generalities 
that aim to justify authoritarian Bolshevik policies 
which either explicitly aimed to undermine such bodies 
or, at best, resulted in their marginalisation when 
implemented. 

This section of the FAQ aims to make known the "unknown
revolution" that continued under the Bolsheviks and,
equally important, the Bolshevik response to it. As
part of this process we need to address some of the 
key events of that period, such as the role of foreign
intervention and the impact of the civil war. However,
we do not go into these issues in depth here and instead
cover them in depth in section H.8. This is because most 
Leninists excuse Bolshevik authoritarianism on the impact 
of the civil war, regardless of the facts of the matter.
As we discuss in section H.9, the ideology of Bolshevism
played its role as well -- something that modern day
Leninists strenuously deny (again, regardless of the
obvious). As we indicate in this section, the idea that
Bolshevism came into conflict with the "unknown revolution"
is simply not viable. Bolshevik ideology and practice made
it inevitable that this conflict erupted, as it did *before*
the start of the civil war (also see section H.8.3).

Ultimately, the reason why Leninist ideas still have 
influence on the socialist movement is due to the apparent 
success of the Russian Revolution. Many Leninist groups, 
mainly Trotskyists and derivatives of Trotskyism, point to 
"Red October" and the creation of the first ever workers 
state as concrete examples of the validity of their ideas. 
They point to Lenin's _State and Revolution_ as proving the
"democratic" (even "libertarian") nature of Leninism while, 
at the same time, supporting the party dictatorship he 
created and, moreover, rationalising the utter lack of
working class freedom and power under it. We will try to 
indicate the falseness of such claims. As will become clear 
from this section, the following summation of an anonymous 
revolutionary is totally correct: 

"Every notion about revolution inherited from Bolshevism 
is false."

In this, they were simply repeating the conclusions of 
anarchists. As Kropotkin stressed in 1920:

"It seems to me that this attempt to build a communist 
republic on the basis of a strongly centralised state, 
under the iron law of the dictatorship of one party, has 
ended in a terrible fiasco. Russia teaches us how not to 
impose communism." [Peter Kropotkin, quoted by Guerin, 
_Anarchism_, p. 106]

Ultimately, the experience of Bolshevism was a disaster.
And as the Makhnovists in the Ukraine proved, Bolshevik 
ideology and practice was *not* the only option available
(see section H.11). There *were* alternatives, but 
Bolshevik ideology simply excluded using them (we will 
discuss some possibilities in this various sub-sections 
below). In other words, Bolshevik ideology is simply not 
suitable for a real revolutionary movement and the problems 
it will face. In fact, its ideology and practice ensures 
that any such problems will be magnified and made worse, 
as the Russian revolution proves. 

Sadly many socialists cannot bring themselves to acknowledge
this. While recognising the evils of the Stalinist bureaucracy, 
these socialists deny that this degeneration of Bolshevism 
was inevitable and was caused by outside factors (namely 
the Russian Civil War or isolation). While not denying 
that these factors did have an effect in the outcome of 
the Russian Revolution, the seeds for bureaucracy existed 
from the first moment of the Bolshevik insurrection. These 
seeds where from three sources: Bolshevik politics, the 
nature of the state and the post-October economic 
arrangements favoured and implemented by the ruling party. 

As we will indicate, these three factors caused the new 
"workers' state" to degenerate long before the out break 
of the Civil war in May of 1918. This means that the 
revolution was *not* defeated primarily because of 
isolation or the effects of the civil war. The Bolsheviks
had already seriously undermined it from within *long
before* the effects of isolation or civil war had a chance 
to take hold. The civil war which started in the summer
of 1918 did take its toll in what revolutionary gains
survived, not least because it allowed the Bolsheviks 
to portray themselves and their policies as the lessor
of two evils. However, Lenin's regime was already 
defending (state) capitalism against genuine socialist 
tendencies before the outbreak of civil war (see section
H.9). The suppression of Kronstadt in March 1921 was simply
the logical end result of a process that had started in
the spring of 1918, at the latest. As such, isolation
and civil war are hardly good excuses -- particularly as
anarchists had predicted they would affect every revolution
decades previously (see section H.8.1) and Leninists
are meant to realise that civil war and revolution are
inevitable (see section H.8.2). Also, it must be stressed
that Bolshevik rule was opposed by the working class, who
took collective action to resist it (see section H.8.5)
and the Bolsheviks justified their policies in ideological
terms and *not* in terms of measures required by difficult 
circumstances (see section H.8.6).

One last thing. We are sure, in chronicling the "excesses"
of the Bolshevik regime, that some Leninists will say "they 
sound exactly like the right-wing." Presumably, if we said 
that the sun rises in the East and sets in the West we would 
also "sound like the right-wing." That the right-wing also 
points to certain *facts* of the revolution does not in any 
way discredit these facts. How these facts are used is what
counts. The right uses the facts to discredit socialism and
the revolution. Anarchists use them to argue for libertarian
socialism and support the revolution while opposing the
Bolshevik ideology and practice which distorted it. Similarly,
unlike the right we take into account the factors which 
Leninists urge us to use to excuse Bolshevik authoritarianism
(such as civil war, economic collapse and so on). We are
simply not convinced by Leninist arguments (see section H.8
for further discussion).

Needless to say, few Leninists apply their logic to 
Stalinism. To attack Stalinism by describing the 
facts of the regime would make one sound like the 
"right-wing." Does that mean socialists should 
defend one of the most horrific dictatorships that ever 
existed? If so, how does that sound to non-socialists? 
Surely they would conclude that socialism *is* about 
Stalinism, dictatorship, terror and so on? If not, why 
not? If "sounding like the right" makes criticism of 
Lenin's regime anti-revolutionary, then why does this not 
apply to Stalinism? Simply because Lenin and Trotsky were 
not at the head of the dictatorship as they were in the 
early 1920s? Does the individuals who are in charge 
override the social relations of a society? Does
dictatorship and one-man management become less so 
when Lenin rules? The apologists for Lenin and Trotsky 
point to the necessity created by the civil war and
isolation within international capitalism for their 
authoritarian policies (while ignoring the fact they 
started *before* the civil war, continued after it 
*and were justified at the time* in terms of Bolshevik 
ideology). Stalin could make the same claim. 

Other objections may be raised. It may be claimed that we
quote "bourgeois" (or even worse, *Menshevik*) sources and
so our account is flawed. In reply, we have to state that
you cannot judge a regime based purely on what it says about
itself. As such, critical accounts are required to paint a
full picture of events. Moreover, it is a sad fact that few,
if any, Leninist accounts of the Russian Revolution actually
discuss the class and social dynamics (and struggles) of the
period under Lenin and Trotsky. This means we have to utilise
the sources which *do,* namely those historians who do not
identify with the Bolshevik regime. And, of course, any 
analysis (or defence) of the Bolshevik regime will have to
account for critical accounts, either by refuting them or
by showing their limitations. As will become obvious in our
discussion, the reason why latter day Bolsheviks talk about
the class dynamics post-October in the most superficial way
is that it would be hard, even impossible, to maintain that
Lenin's regime was remotely socialist or based on working 
class power. Simply put, from early 1918 (at the latest) 
conflict between the Bolsheviks and the Russian working 
masses was a constant feature of the regime. It is only
when that conflict reached massive proportions that 
Leninists do not (i.e. cannot) ignore it. In such cases,
as the Kronstadt rebellion proves, history is distorted in 
order to defend the Bolshevik state (see section H.7 for 
details).

The fact that Leninists try to discredit anarchists by 
saying that we sound like the right is sad. In effect, 
it *blocks* any real discussion of the Russian Revolution 
and Bolshevism (as intended, probably). This ensures that 
Leninism remains above critique and so no lessons can be 
learnt from the Russian experience. After all, if the
Bolsheviks had no choice then what lessons *are* there to
learn? None. And if we are to learn no lessons (bar,
obviously, mimic the Bolsheviks) we are doomed to repeat 
the same mistakes -- mistakes that are partly explained 
by the objective circumstances at the time and partly by 
Bolshevik politics. But given that most of the circumstances 
the Bolsheviks faced, such as civil war and isolation, are 
likely to reappear in any future revolution, modern-day 
Leninists are simply ensuring that Karl Marx was right -- 
history repeats itself, first time as tragedy, second time 
as farce.



Such a position is, of course, wonderful for the 
pro-Leninist. It allows them to quote Lenin and 
Trotsky and use the Bolsheviks as the paradigm of 
revolution while washing their hands of the results 
of that revolution. By arguing that the Bolsheviks
were "making a virtue of necessity," (to use the 
expression of Leninist Donny Gluckstein [_The Tragedy 
of Bukharin_, p. 41]), they are automatically absolved 
of proving their arguments about the "democratic" 
essence of Bolshevism in power. Which is useful as, 
logically, no such evidence could exist and, in fact, 
there is a whole host of evidence pointing the other 
way which can, by happy co-incidence, be ignored. 
Indeed, from this perspective there is no point even 
discussing the revolution at all, beyond praising the 
activities and ideology of the Bolsheviks while sadly 
noting that "fate" (to quote Leninist Tony Cliff)
ensured that they could not fulfil their promises. 
Which, of course, almost Leninist accounts *do* boil 
down to. Thus, for the modern Leninist, the Bolsheviks 
cannot be judged on what they did nor what they said 
while doing it (or even after). They can only be praised 
for what they said and did *before* they seized power.

However, anarchists have a problem with this position. It 
smacks more of religion than theory. Karl Marx was right to
argue that you cannot judge people by what they say, only
by what they do. It is in this revolutionary spirit that 
this section of the FAQ analyses the Russian revolution and
the Bolshevik role within it. We need to analyse what they
did when they held power as well as the election manifesto.
As we will indicate in this section, neither was particularly 
appealing.

Finally, we should note that Leninists today have various 
arguments to justify what the Bolsheviks did once in power.
We discuss these in section H.8. We also discuss in section
H.9 the ideological roots of the counter-revolutionary 
role of the Bolsheviks during the revolution. That the 
politics of the Bolsheviks played its role in the failure
of the revolution can be seen from the example of the 
anarchist influenced Makhnovist movement which applied 
basic libertarian principles in the same difficult 
circumstances of the Russian Civil War (see section H.11
on this important movement).

H.6.3 Surely the Russian Revolution proves that vanguard 
      parties work?

No, far from it. Looking at the history of vanguardism we 
are struck by its failures, not its successes. Indeed, the 
proponents of "democratic centralism" can point to only one 
apparent success of their model, namely the Russian Revolution.
However, we are warned by Leninists that failure to use the 
vanguard party will inevitably condemn future revolutions to 
failure: 

"The proletariat can take power only through its vanguard. . .  
Without the confidence of the class in the vanguard, without 
support of the vanguard by the class, there can be no talk 
of the conquest of power . . . The Soviets are the only 
organised form of the tie between the vanguard and the 
class. A revolutionary content can be given this form 
only by the party. This is proved by the positive 
experience of the October Revolution and by the negative 
experience of other countries (Germany, Austria, finally, 
Spain). No one has either shown in practice or tried to 
explain articulately on paper how the proletariat can 
seize power without the political leadership of a party 
that knows what it wants." [_Stalinism and Bolshevism_]

To anarchist ears, such claims seem out of place. After all, 
did the Russian Revolution actually result in socialism or 
even a viable form of soviet democracy? Far from it. Unless 
you picture revolution as simply the changing of the party 
in power, you have to acknowledge that while the Bolshevik 
party *did* take power in Russian in November 1917, the net 
effect of this was *not* the stated goals that justified 
that action. Thus, if we take the term "effective" to mean 
"an efficient means to achieve the desired goals" then 
vanguardism has not been proven to be effective, quite 
the reverse (assuming that your desired goal is a socialist 
society, rather than party power). Needless to say, Trotsky 
blames the failure of the Russian Revolution on "objective" 
factors rather than Bolshevik policies and practice, an 
argument we address in detail in section H.8 and will not 
do so here.

So while Leninists make great claims for the effectiveness of 
their chosen kind of party, the hard facts of history are 
against their positive evaluation of vanguard parties. 
Ironically, even the Russian Revolution disproves the claims
of Leninists. The fact is that the Bolshevik party in 1917 
was very far from the "democratic centralist" organisation 
which supporters of "vanguardism" like to claim it is. As 
such, its success in 1917 lies more in its divergence from 
the principles of "democratic centralism" than in their 
application. The subsequent degeneration of the revolution 
and the party is marked by the increasing *application* 
of those principles in the life of the party.

Thus, to refute the claims of the "effectiveness" and "efficiency"
of vanguardism, we need to look at its one and only success, namely 
the Russian Revolution. As the Cohen-Bendit brothers argue, "far 
from leading the Russian Revolution forwards, the Bolsheviks were 
responsible for holding back the struggle of the masses between 
February and October 1917, and later for turning the revolution 
into a bureaucratic counter-revolution -- in both cases because 
of the party's very nature, structure and ideology." Indeed,
"[f]rom April to October, Lenin had to fight a constant battle
to keep the Party leadership in tune with the masses." [_Obsolete 
Communism_, p. 183 and p. 187] It was only by continually violating 
its own "nature, structure and ideology" that the Bolshevik party 
played an important role in the revolution. Whenever the principles 
of "democratic centralism" were applied, the Bolshevik party played
the role the Cohen-Bendit brothers subscribed to it (and once in 
power, the party's negative features came to the fore).

Even Leninists acknowledge that, to quote Tony Cliff, throughout 
the history of Bolshevism, "a certain conservatism arose." Indeed,
"[a]t practically all sharp turning points, Lenin had to rely on
the lower strata of the party machine against the higher, or on
the rank and file against the machine as a whole." [_Lenin_, 
vol. 2, p. 135] This fact, incidentally, refutes the basic 
assumptions of Lenin's party schema, namely that the broad party
membership, like the working class, was subject to bourgeois 
influences so necessitating central leadership and control from
above.

Looking at both the 1905 and 1917 revolutions, we are struck 
by how often this "conservatism" arose and how often the higher
bodies were behind the spontaneous actions of the masses and 
the party membership. Looking at the 1905 revolution, we discover
a classic example of the inefficiency of "democratic centralism."
Facing in 1905 the rise of the soviets, councils of workers' 
delegates elected to co-ordinate strikes and other forms of 
struggle, the Bolsheviks did not know what to do. "The 
Petersburg Committee of the Bolsheviks," noted Trotsky, "was 
frightened at first by such an innovation as a non-partisan 
representation of the embattled masses, and could find nothing 
better to do than to present the Soviet with an ultimatum: 
immediately adopt a Social-Democratic program or disband. The 
Petersburg Soviet as a whole, including the contingent of 
Bolshevik workingmen as well ignored this ultimatum without 
batting an eyelash." [_Stalin_, vol. 1, p. 106] More than 
that, "[t]he party's Central Committee published the resolution 
on October 27, thereby making it the binding directive for all 
other Bolshevik organisations." [Oskar Anweiler, _The Soviets_, 
p. 77] It was only the return of Lenin which stopped the 
Bolshevik's open attacks against the Soviet (also see 
section H.9.8).

The rationale for these attacks is significant. The St. 
Petersburg Bolsheviks were convinced that "only a strong 
party along class lines can guide the proletarian political 
movement and preserve the integrity of its program, rather 
than a political mixture of this kind, an indeterminate and 
vacillating political organisation such as the workers council 
represents and cannot help but represent." [quoted by Anweiler,
Op. Cit., p. 77] In other words, the soviets could not reflect 
workers' interests because they were elected by the workers!
The implications of this perspective came clear in 1918, when
the Bolsheviks gerrymandered and disbanded soviets to remain
in power (see section H.6.6). That the Bolshevik's position 
flowed naturally from Lenin's arguments in _What is to be
Done?_ is clear. Thus the underlying logic of Lenin's 
vanguardism ensured that the Bolsheviks played a negative 
role with regards the soviets which, combined with "democratic 
centralism" ensured that it was spread far and wide. Only by 
ignoring their own party's principles and staying in the 
Soviet did rank and file Bolsheviks play a positive role in 
the revolution. This divergence of top and bottom would be 
repeated in 1917.

Given this, perhaps it is unsurprising that Leninists started
to rewrite the history of the 1905 revolution. Victor Serge,
a "Left Oppositionist" and anti-Stalinist asserted in the
late 1920s that in 1905 the Petrograd Soviet was "led by 
Trotsky and inspired by the Bolsheviks." [_Year One of the 
Russian Revolution_, p. 36]. While the former claim is correct, 
the latter is not. As noted, the Bolsheviks were initially 
opposed the soviets and systematically worked to undermine 
them. Unsurprisingly, Trotsky at that time was a Menshevik, 
not a Bolshevik. After all, how could the most revolutionary
party that ever existed have messed up so badly? How could
democratic centralism faired so badly in practice? Best,
then, to suggest that it did not and give the Bolsheviks
a role better suited to the rhetoric of Bolshevism than
its reality. 

Trotsky was no different. He, needless to say, denied 
the obvious implications of these events in 1905. While 
admitting that the Bolsheviks "adjusted themselves more 
slowly to the sweep of the movement" and that the Mensheviks 
"were preponderant in the Soviet," he tries to save vanguardism 
by asserting that "the general direction of the Soviet's
policy proceeded in the main along Bolshevik lines." So, in
spite of the lack of Bolshevik influence, in spite of the 
slowness in adjusting to the revolution, Bolshevism was, in
fact, the leading set of ideas in the revolution! Ironically, 
a few pages later, he mocks the claims of Stalinists that Stalin
had "isolated the Mensheviks from the masses" by noting that
the "figures hardly bear [the claims] out." [Op. Cit., p. 112 
and p. 117] Shame he did not apply this criteria to his own 
claims. 

Of course, every party makes mistakes. The question is, 
how did the "most revolutionary party of all time" fare 
in 1917. Surely that revolution proves the validity of 
vanguardism and "democratic centralism"? After all, there 
was a successful revolution, the Bolshevik party did seize 
power. However, the apparent success of 1917 was not due 
to the application of "democratic centralism," quite the 
reverse. While the myth of 1917 is that a highly efficient, 
democratic centralist vanguard party ensured the overthrow 
of the Provisional Government in November 1917 in favour 
of the Soviets (or so it seemed at the time) the facts are 
somewhat different. Rather, the Bolshevik party throughout 
1917 was a fairly loose collection of local organisations 
(each more than willing to ignore central commands and 
express their autonomy), with much internal dissent and 
infighting and no discipline beyond what was created by 
common loyalty. The "democratic centralist" party, as 
desired by Lenin, was only created in the course of the 
Civil War and the tightening of the party dictatorship. 
In other words, the party became more like a "democratic 
centralist" one as the revolution degenerated. As such, 
the various followers of Lenin (Stalinists, Trotskyists 
and their multitude of offshoots) subscribe to a myth, 
which probably explains their lack of success in 
reproducing a similar organisation since. So assuming 
that the Bolsheviks did play an important role in the 
Russian revolution, it was because it was *not* the 
centralised, disciplined Bolshevik party of Leninist 
myth. Indeed, when the party *did* operate in a vanguardist
manner, failure was soon to follow.

This claim can be proven by looking at the history of the
1917 revolution. The February revolution started with a
spontaneous protests and strikes. As Murray Bookchin
notes, "the Petrograd organisation of the Bolsheviks 
opposed the calling of strikes precisely on the eve of
the revolution which was destined to overthrow the 
Tsar. Fortunately, the workers ignored the Bolshevik 
'directives' and went on strike anyway. In the events 
which followed, no one was more surprised by the revolution
than the 'revolutionary' parties, including the Bolsheviks."
[_Post-Scarcity Anarchism_, p. 194] Trotsky quotes one
of the Bolshevik leaders at the time:

"Absolutely no guiding initiative from the party centres
was felt . . . the Petrograd Committee had been arrested 
and the representative of the Central Committee . . . was
unable to give any directives for the coming day." [quoted
by Trotsky, _History of the Russian Revolution_, vol. 1, 
p. 147]

Not the best of starts. Of course rank and file Bolsheviks
took part in the demonstrations, street fights and strikes
and so violated the principles their party was meant
to be based on. As the revolution progressed, so did the 
dual nature of the Bolshevik party (i.e. its practical 
divergence from "democratic centralism" in order to be 
effective and attempts to force it back into that schema
which handicapped the revolution). However, during 1917, 
"democratic centralism" was ignored in order to ensure the
the Bolsheviks played any role at all in the revolution.
As one historian of the party makes clear, in 1917 and
until the outbreak of the Civil War, the party operated
in ways that few modern "vanguard" parties would tolerate:

"The committees were a law unto themselves when it came to 
accepting orders from above. Democratic centralism, as
vague a principle of internal administration as there ever
has been, was commonly held at least to enjoin lower 
executive bodies that they should obey the behests of all
higher bodies in the organisational hierarchy. But town
committees in practice had the devil's own job in imposing
firm leadership . . . Insubordination was the rule of the 
day whenever lower party bodies thought questions of 
importance were at stake.

"Suburb committees too faced difficulties in imposing 
discipline. Many a party cell saw fit to thumb its nose
at higher authority and to pursue policies which it 
felt to be more suited to local circumstances or more
desirable in general. No great secret was made of this.
In fact, it was openly admitted that hardly a party 
committee existed which did not encounter problems 
in enforcing its will even upon individual activists." 
[Robert Service, _The Bolshevik Party in Revolution
1917-1923_, pp. 51-2]

So while Lenin's ideal model of a disciplined, centralised
and top-down party had been expounded since 1902, the 
operation of the party never matched his desire. As Service
notes, "a disciplined hierarchy of command stretching down 
from the regional committees to party cells" had "never 
existed in Bolshevik history." In the heady days of the
revolution, when the party was flooded by new members,
the party ignored what was meant to be its guiding principles.
As Service constantly stresses, Bolshevik party life in 
1917 was the exact opposite of that usually considered
(by both opponents and supporters of Bolshevism) as it
normal mode of operation. "Anarchist attitudes to higher 
authority," he argues, "were the rule of the day" and
"no Bolshevik leader in his right mind could have
contemplated a regular insistence upon rigid standards of
hierarchical control and discipline unless he had abandoned
all hope of establishing a mass socialist party." This 
meant that "in the Russia of 1917 it was the easiest thing 
in the world for lower party bodies to rebut the demands and 
pleas by higher authority." He stresses that "[s]uburb and 
town committees . . . often refused to go along with official 
policies . . . they also . . . sometimes took it into their 
heads to engage in active obstruction." [Op. Cit., p. 80, 
p. 62 p. 56 and p. 60]

This worked both ways, of course. Town committees did "snub 
their nose at lower-echelon viewpoints in the time before the 
next election. Try as hard as they might, suburb committees 
and ordinary cells could meanwhile do little to rectify 
matters beyond telling their own representative on their
town committee to speak on their behalf. Or, if this too
failed, they could resort to disruptive tactics by 
criticising it in public and refusing it all collaboration."
[Op. Cit., pp. 52-3] Even by early 1918, the Bolshevik 
party bore little resemblance to the "democratic centralist"
model desired by Lenin:

"The image of a disciplined hierarchy of party committees was
therefore but a thin, artificial veneer which was used by 
Bolshevik leaders to cover up the cracked surface of the 
real picture underneath. Cells and suburb committees saw
no reason to kow-tow to town committees; nor did town 
committees feel under compulsion to show any greater respect 
to their provincial and regional committees then before." 
[Op. Cit., p. 74]

It is this insubordination, this local autonomy and action
in spite of central orders which explains the success of
the Bolsheviks in 1917. Rather than a highly centralised
and disciplined body of "professional" revolutionaries, 
the party in 1917 saw a "significant change . . . within
the membership of the party at local level . . . From the
time of the February revolution requirements for party
membership had been all but suspended, and now Bolshevik
ranks swelled with impetuous recruits who knew next to
nothing about Marxism and who were united by little more
than overwhelming impatience for revolutionary action."
[Alexander Rabinowitch, _Prelude to Revolution_, p. 41]

This mass of new members (many of whom were peasants who 
had just recently joined the industrial workforce) had a
radicalising effect on the party's policies and structures.
As even Leninist commentators argue, it was this influx of
members who allowed Lenin to gain support for his radical 
revision of party aims in April. However, in spite of this 
radicalisation of the party base, the party machine still 
was at odds with the desires of the party. As Trotsky 
acknowledged, the situation "called for resolute 
confrontation of the sluggish Party machine with 
masses and ideas in motion." He stressed that "the 
masses were incomparably more revolutionary than the 
Party, which in turn was more revolutionary than its 
committeemen." Ironically, given the role Trotsky usually 
gave the party, he admits that "[w]ithout Lenin, no one 
had known what to make of the unprecedented situation." 
[_Stalin_, vol. 1, p. 301, p. 305 and p. 297]

Which is significant in itself. The Bolshevik party is
usually claimed as being the "most revolutionary" that 
ever existed, yet here is Trotsky admitting that its 
leading members did not have a clue what to do. He even
argued that "[e]very time the Bolshevik leaders had to 
act without Lenin they fell into error, usually inclining 
to the Right." [Op. Cit., p. 299] This negative opinion 
of the Bolsheviks applied even to the "left Bolsheviks,
especially the workers" whom we are informed "tried with
all their force to break through this quarantine" created
by the Bolshevik leaders policy "of waiting, of accommodation,
and of actual retreat before the Compromisers" after the
February revolution and before the arrival of Lenin. 
Trotsky argues that "they did not know how to refute the
premise about the bourgeois character of the revolution
and the danger of an isolation of the proletariat. They
submitted, gritting their teeth, to the directions of
their leaders." [_History of the Russian Revolution_,
vol. 1, p. 273] It seems strange, to say the least, that
without one person the whole of the party was reduced to
such a level given that the aim of the "revolutionary" 
party was to develop the political awareness of its 
members.

Lenin's arrival, according to Trotsky, allowed the influence 
of the more radical rank and file to defeat the conservatism
of the party machine. By the end of April, Lenin had 
managed to win over the majority of the party leadership
to his position. However, as Trotsky argues, this "April 
conflict between Lenin and the general staff of the party 
was not the only one of its kind. Throughout the whole 
history of Bolshevism . . . all the leaders of the party 
at all the most important moments stood to the *right* of 
Lenin." [Op. Cit., p. 305] As such, if "democratic centralism"
had worked as intended, the whole party would have been 
arguing for incorrect positions the bulk of its existence
(assuming, of course, that Lenin was correct most of the
time). 

For Trotsky, "Lenin exerted influence not so much as an 
individual but because he embodied the influence of the 
class on the Party and of the Party on its machine." 
[_Stalin_, vol. 1, p. 299] Yet, this was the machine
which Lenin had forged, which embodied his vision of how
a "revolutionary" party should operate and was headed by
him. In other words, to argue that the party machine was
behind the party membership and the membership behind the
class shows the bankruptcy of Lenin's organisational scheme.
This "backwardness," moreover, indicates an independence of
the party bureaucracy from the membership and the membership
from the masses. As Lenin's constantly repeated aim was for 
the party to seize power (based on the dubious assumption 
that class power would only be expressed, indeed was identical
to, party power) this independence held serious dangers, 
dangers which became apparent once this goal was achieved.

Trotsky asks the question "by what miracle did Lenin manage 
in a few short weeks to turn the Party's course into a new 
channel?" Significantly, he answers as follows: "Lenin's
personal attributes and the objective situation." [Ibid.]
No mention is made of the democratic features of the party
organisation, which suggests that without Lenin the rank
and file party members would not have been able to shift
the weight of the party machine in their favour. Trotsky
seems close to admitting this:

"As often happens, a sharp cleavage developed between the
classes in motion and the interests of the party machines.
Even the Bolshevik Party cadres, who enjoyed the benefit 
of exceptional revolutionary training, were definitely 
inclined to disregard the masses and to identify their own
special interests and the interests of the machine on the
very day after the monarchy was overthrown." [_Stalin_, 
vol. 1, p. 298]

Thus the party machine, which embodied the principles of
"democratic centralism" proved less than able to the task
assigned it in practice. Without Lenin, it is doubtful
that the party membership would have over come the 
party machine:

"Lenin was strong not only because he understood the laws
of the class struggle but also because his ear was 
faultlessly attuned to the stirrings of the masses in
motion. He represented not so much the Party machine as
the vanguard of the proletariat. He was definitely 
convinced that thousands from among those workers who
had borne the brunt of supporting the underground Party
would now support him. The masses at the moment were
more revolutionary than the Party, and the Party more
revolutionary than its machine. As early as March the
actual attitude of the workers and soldiers had in many
cases become stormily apparent, and it was widely at
variance with the instructions issued by all the parties,
including the Bolsheviks." [Op. Cit., p. 299]

Little wonder the local party groupings ignored the 
party machine, practising autonomy and initiative in
the face of a party machine inclined to conservatism,
inertia, bureaucracy and remoteness. This conflict 
between the party machine and the principles it was 
based on and the needs of the revolution and party
membership was expressed continually throughout 1917:

"In short, the success of the revolution called for action
against the 'highest circles of the party,' who, from 
February to October, utterly failed to play the 
revolutionary role they ought to have taken in theory.
The masses themselves made the revolution, with or even
against the party -- this much at least was clear to
Trotsky the historian. But far from drawing the correct
conclusion, Trotsky the theorist continued to argue 
that the masses are incapable of making a revolution 
without a leader." [Daniel & Gabriel Cohn-Bendit, 
Op. Cit., p. 188]

Looking at the development of the revolution from April
onwards, we are struck by the sluggishness of the party
hierarchy. At every revolutionary upsurge, the party 
simply was not to the task of responding to the needs of
masses and the local party groupings closest to them.
The can be seen in June, July and October itself. At 
each turn, the rank and file groupings or Lenin had to
constantly violate the principles of their own party
in order to be effective. The remoteness and conservatism
of the party even under Lenin can be constantly seen.

For example, when discussing the cancellation by the central 
committee of a demonstration planned for June 10th by 
the Petrograd Bolsheviks, the unresponsiveness of the 
party hierarchy can be seen. The "speeches by Lenin and 
Zinoviev [justifying their actions] by no means satisfied
the Petersburg Committee. If anything, it appears that 
their explanations served to strengthen the feeling that
at best the party leadership had acted irresponsibly and
incompetently and was seriously out of touch with reality."
Indeed, many "blamed the Central Committee for taking so 
long to respond to Military Organisation appeals for a 
demonstration." [Rabinowitch, Op. Cit., p. 88 and p. 92]

During the discussions in late June, 1917, on whether to 
take direct action against the Provisional Government there
was a "wide gulf" between lower organs evaluations of the
current situation and that of the Central Committee. 
[Rabinowitch, Op. Cit., p. 129] Indeed, among the delegates
from the Bolshevik military groups, only Lashevich (an
old Bolshevik) spoke in favour of the Central Committee
position and he noted that "[f]requently it is impossible
to make out where the Bolshevik ends and the Anarchist
begins." [quoted by Rabinowitch, Op. Cit., p. 129]

In the July days, the breach between the local party groups
and the central committee increased. As we noted in the
section H.6.1, this spontaneous uprising was opposed by 
the Bolshevik leadership, in spite of the leading role 
of their own militants (along with anarchists) in 
fermenting it. While calling on their own militants to
restrain the masses, the party leadership was ignored by 
the rank and file membership who played an active role in
the event. Sickened by being asked to play the role of
"fireman," the party militants rejected party discipline in
order to maintain their credibility with the working class.
Rank and file activists, pointing to the snowballing of 
the movement, showed clear dissatisfaction with the Central 
Committee. One argued that it "was not aware of the latest 
developments when it made its decision to oppose the movement 
into the streets." Ultimately, the Central Committee appeal
"for restraining the masses . . . was removed from . . .
*Pravda* . . . and so the party's indecision was reflected
by a large blank space on page one." [Rabinowitch, Op. Cit., 
p. 150, p. 159 and P. 175] Ultimately, the indecisive nature
of the leadership can be explained by the fact it did not
think it could seize state power for itself. As Trotsky
noted, "the state of popular consciousness . . . made 
impossible the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks in July." 
[_History of the Russian Revolution_, vol. 2, p. 81]

The indecision of the party hierarchy did have an effect,
of course. While the anarchists at Kronstadt looked at the
demonstration as the start of an uprising, the Bolsheviks
there were "wavering indecisively in the middle" between 
them and the Left-Social Revolutionaries who saw it as a 
means of applying pressure on the government. This was because
they were "hamstrung by the indecision of the party Central
Committee." [Rabinowitch, Op. Cit., p. 187] Little wonder
so many Bolshevik party organisations developed and protected
their own autonomy and ability to act! 

Significantly, one of the main Bolshevik groupings 
which helped organise and support the July uprising, 
the Military Organisation, started their own paper 
after the Central Committee had decreed after the 
failed revolt that neither it, nor the Petersburg 
Committee, should be allowed to have one. It "angrily 
insisted on what it considered its just prerogatives" 
and in "no uncertain terms it affirmed its right to 
publish an independent newspaper and formally protested 
what is referred to as 'a system of persecution and repression
of an extremely peculiar character which had begun with 
the election of the new Central Committee.'" [Rabinowitch,
Op. Cit., p. 227] The Central Committee backed down, 
undoubtedly due to the fact it could not enforce its
decision.

As the Cohn-Bendit brothers argue, "five months after the
Revolution and three months before the October uprising, the
masses were still governing themselves, and the Bolshevik
vanguard simply had to toe the line." [Op. Cit., p. 186]
Within that vanguard, the central committee proved to be
out of touch with the rank and file, who ignored it rather
than break with their fellow workers. 

Even by October, the party machine still lagged behind the
needs of the revolution. In fact, Lenin could only impose
his view by going over the head of the Central Committee.
According to Trotsky's account, "this time he [wa]s not
satisfied with furious criticism" of the "ruinous Fabianism
of the Petrograd leadership" and "by way of protest he
resign[ed] from the Central Committee." [_History of the
Russian Revolution_, vol. 3, p. 131] Trotsky quotes
Lenin as follows:

"I am compelled to request permission to withdraw from
the Central Committee, which I hereby do, and leave 
myself freedom of agitation in the lower ranks of the
party and at the party congress." [quoted by Trotsky,
Op. Cit., p. 131]

Thus the October revolution was precipitated by a blatant 
violation of the principles Lenin spent his life advocating.
Indeed, if someone else other than Lenin had done this we
are sure that Lenin, and his numerous followers, would have
dismissed it as the action of a "petty-bourgeois intellectual"
who cannot handle party "discipline." This is itself is
significant, as is the fact that he decided to appeal to
the "lower ranks" of the party. Simply put, rather than
being "democratic" the party machine effectively blocked
communication and control from the bottom-up. Looking at
the more radical party membership, he "could only impose
his view by going over the head of his Central Committee."
[Daniel and Gabriel Cohn-Bendit, Op. Cit., p. 187] He
made sure to send his letter of protest to "the Petrograd
and Moscow committees" and also made sure that "copies fell
into the hands of the more reliable party workers of the
district locals." By early October (and "over the heads of
the Central Committee") he wrote "directly to the Petrograd
and Moscow committees" calling for insurrection. He also
"appealed to a Petrograd party conference to speak a firm
word in favour of insurrection." [Trotsky, Op. Cit., p. 131 
and p. 132]

In October, Lenin had to fight what he called "a wavering"
in the "upper circles of the party" which lead to a "sort
of dread of the struggle for power, an inclination to 
replace this struggle with resolutions protests, and 
conferences." [quoted by Trotsky, Op. Cit., p. 132] For
Trotsky, this represented "almost a direct pitting of the
party against the Central Committee," required because
"it was a question of the fate of the revolution" and
so "all other considerations fell away." [Trotsky, 
Op. Cit., pp. 132-3] On October 8th, when Lenin addressed 
the Bolshevik delegates of the forthcoming Northern
Congress of Soviets on this subject, he did so "personally"
as there "was no party decision" and the "higher institutions
of the party had not yet expressed themselves." [Trotsky,
Op. Cit., p. 133] Ultimately, the Central Committee came
round to Lenin's position but they did so under pressure
of means at odds with the principles of the party.

This divergence between the imagine and reality of the 
Bolsheviks explains their success. If the party had 
applied or had remained true to the principles of 
"democratic centralism" it is doubtful that it would 
have played an important role in the movement. As
Alexander Rabinowitch argues, Bolshevik organisational 
unity and discipline is "vastly exaggerated" and, in 
fact, Bolshevik success in 1917 was down to "the party's 
internally relatively democratic, tolerant, and 
decentralised structure and method of operation, as 
well as its essentially open and mass character -- 
in striking contrast to the traditional Leninist model."
In 1917, he goes on, "subordinate party bodies with the 
Petersburg Committee and the Military Organisation were
permitted considerable independence and initiative . . .
Most importantly, these lower bodies were able to tailor 
their tactics and appeals to suit their own particular 
constituencies amid rapidly changing conditions. Vast 
numbers of new members were recruited into the party . . .
The newcomers included tens of thousands of workers and 
soldiers . . . who knew little, if anything, about Marxism
and cared nothing about party discipline." For example,
while the slogan "All Power to the Soviets" was "officially
withdrawn by the Sixth [Party] Congress in late July, this
change did not take hold at the local level." [_The Bolsheviks
Come to Power_, p. 311, p. 312 and p. 313]

It is no exaggeration to argue that if any member of a current 
vanguard party acted as the Bolshevik rank and file did in 1917, 
they would quickly be expelled (this probably explains why no
such party has been remotely successful since). However, this 
ferment from below was quickly undermined within the party 
with the start of the Civil War. It is from this period when 
"democratic centralism" was actually applied within the party
and clarified as an organisational principle:

"It was quite a turnabout since the anarchic days before the
Civil War. The Central Committee had always advocated the
virtues of obedience and co-operation; but the rank-and-filers
of 1917 had cared little about such entreaties as they did
about appeals made by other higher authorities. The wartime
emergency now supplied an opportunity to expatiate on this
theme at will." [Service, Op. Cit., p. 91]

Service stresses that "it appears quite remarkable how 
quickly the Bolsheviks, who for years had talked idly 
about a strict hierarchy of command inside the party, at 
last began to put ideas into practice." [Op. Cit., p. 96]

In other words, the conversion of the Bolshevik party into
a fully fledged "democratic centralist" party occurred 
during the degeneration of the Revolution. This was both 
a consequence of the rising authoritarianism within the
party and society as well as one of its causes. As such, 
it is quite ironic that the model used by modern day 
followers of Lenin is that of the party during the decline
of the revolution, not its peak. This is not surprising. 
Once in power, the Bolshevik party imposed an authoritarian 
state capitalist regime onto the Russian people. Can it be 
surprising that the party structure which it developed to 
aid this process was also based on bourgeois attitudes and 
organisation? Simply put, the party model advocated by 
Lenin may not have been very effective during a revolution 
but it was exceedingly effective at prompting hierarchy and 
authority in the post-revolutionary regime. It simply
replaced the old ruling elite with another, made up of
members of the radical intelligentsia and odd ex-worker
or ex-peasant.

This was due to the hierarchical and top-down nature of 
the party Lenin had created. While the party base was 
largely working class, the leadership was not. Full-time 
revolutionaries, they were either middle-class intellectuals 
or (occasionally) ex-workers and (even rarer) ex-peasants 
who had left their class to become part of the party machine. 
Even the delegates at the party congresses did not truly 
reflect class basis of the party membership. For example, 
the number of delegates was still dominated by white-collar 
or others (59.1% to 40.9%) at the sixth party congress at 
the end of July 1917. [Cliff, _Lenin_, vol. 2, p. 160] So 
while the party gathered more working class members in 
1917, it cannot be said that this was reflected in the 
party leadership which remained dominated by non-working 
class elements. Rather than being a genuine working class 
organisation, the Bolshevik party was a hierarchical group 
headed by non-working class elements whose working class 
base could not effectively control them even during the 
revolution in 1917. It was only effective because these 
newly joined and radicalised working class members 
ignored their own party structure and its defining 
ideology.

After the revolution, the Bolsheviks saw their membership 
start to decrease. Significantly, "the decline in numbers 
which occurred from early 1918 onwards" started happening 
"contrary to what is usually assumed, some months before 
the Central Committee's decree in midsummer that the party 
should be purged of its 'undesirable' elements." These lost 
members reflected two things. Firstly, the general decline 
in the size of the industrial working class. This meant 
that the radicalised new elements from the countryside 
which had flocked to the Bolsheviks in 1917 returned home.
Secondly, the lost of popular support the Bolsheviks were 
facing due to the realities of their regime. This can be 
seen from the fact that while the Bolsheviks were losing 
members, the Left SRS almost doubled in size to 100,000 
(the Mensheviks claimed to have a similar number). Rather 
than non-proletarians leaving, "[i]t is more probable by 
far that it was industrial workers who were leaving in 
droves. After all, it would have been strange if the 
growing unpopularity of Sovnarkom in factory milieu 
had been confined exclusively to non-Bolsheviks." 
Unsurprisingly, given its position in power, "[a]s the 
proportion of working-class members declined, so that
of entrants from the middle-class rose; the steady drift
towards a party in which industrial workers no longer
numerically predominated was under way." By late 1918 
membership started to increase again but "[m]ost newcomers 
were not of working-class origin . . . the proportion of 
Bolsheviks of working-class origin fell from 57 per cent 
at the year's beginning to 48 per cent at the end." It 
should be noted that it was not specified how many were 
classed as having working-class origin were still employed 
in working-class jobs. [Robert Service, Op. Cit., p. 70, 
pp. 70-1 and p. 90] A new ruling elite was thus born,
thanks to the way vanguard parties are structured and the
application of vanguardist principles which had previously
been ignored.

In summary, the experience of the Russian Revolution does
not, in fact, show the validity of the "vanguard" model.
The Bolshevik party in 1917 played a leading role in the
revolution only insofar as its members violated its own
organisational principles (Lenin included). Faced with a
real revolution and an influx of more radical new members,
the party had to practice anarchist ideas of autonomy,
local initiative and the ignoring of central orders which
had no bearing to reality on the ground. When the party 
did try to apply the top-down and hierarchical principles
of "democratic centralism" it failed to adjust to the 
needs of the moment. Moreover, when these principles were
finally applied they helped ensure the degeneration of
the revolution. As we discussed in section H.5, this 
was to be expected.

H.6.4 Was Lenin's "State and Revolution" applied
      after October?

In a nutshell, no. In fact the opposite was the case.
Post-October, the Bolsheviks not only failed to introduce
the ideas of Lenin's _State and Revolution_, they in fact
introduced the exact opposite. As one historian puts it:

"To consider 'State and Revolution' as the basic statement of
Lenin's political philosophy -- which non-Communists as well
as Communists usually do -- is a serious error. Its argument
for a utopian anarchism never actually became official policy.
The Leninism of 1917 . . . came to grief in a few short years;
it was the revived Leninism of 1902 which prevailed as the 
basis for the political development of the USSR." [Robert V. 
Daniels, _The Conscience of the Revolution_, pp. 51-2]

Daniels is being far too lenient with the Bolsheviks. It 
was not, in fact, "a few short years" before the promises
of 1917 were forgotten. In some cases, it was a few short
hours. In others, a few short months. However, in a sense
Daniels is right. It did take until 1921 before all hope
for saving the Russian Revolution finally ended. With the
crushing of the Kronstadt rebellion, the true nature of
the regime became obvious to all with eyes to see. Moreover,
the banning of factions within the party at the same time
did mark a return to the pattern of "What is to be Done?"
rather than the more fluid practice Bolshevism exhibited
in, say, 1917 (see section H.6.3). However, as we discuss
in section H.10, the various Bolshevik oppositions were,
in their own way, just as authoritarian as the mainstream
of the party.

In order to show that this is the case, we need to summarise 
the main ideas contained in Lenin's work. Moreover, we need
to indicate what the Bolsheviks did, in fact, do. Finally,
we need to see if the various rationales justifying these
actions hold water.

So what did Lenin argue for in _State and Revolution_? 
Writing in the mid-1930s, anarchist Camillo Berneri 
summarised the main ideas of that work as follows:

"The Leninist programme of 1917 included these points:
the discontinuance of the police and standing army,
abolition of the professional bureaucracy, elections
for all public positions and offices, revocability of
all officials, equality of bureaucratic wages with 
workers' wages, the maximum of democracy, peaceful
competition among the parties within the soviets,
abolition of the death penalty." ["The Abolition and 
Extinction of the State," _Cienfuegos Press Anarchist 
Review_, no. 4, p. 50] 

As he noted, "[n]ot a single one of the points of this
programme has been achieved." This was, of course, 
under Stalinism and most Leninists will concur with
Berneri. However what Leninists tend not to mention is
that in the 7 month period from November 1917 to May 1918
none of these points was achieved. So, as an example
of what Bolshevism "really" stands for it seems strange
to harp on about a work which was never implemented when
the its author was in a position to do so (i.e. before
the onslaught of a civil war Lenin thought was inevitable
anyway!).

To see that Berneri's summary is correct, we need to quote
Lenin directly. Obviously the work is a wide ranging defence
of Lenin's interpretation of Marxist theory on the state. 
As it is an attempt to overturn decades of Marxist orthodoxy,
much of the work is quotes from Marx and Engels and Lenin's
attempts to enlist them for his case (we discuss this issue
in section H.3.10). Equally, we need to discount the numerous
straw men arguments about anarchism Lenin inflicts on his
reader (see sections H.1.3, H.1.4 and H.1.5 for the truth
about his claims). Here we simply list the key points as 
regards Lenin's arguments about his "workers' state" and
how the workers would maintain control of it:

1) Using the Paris Commune as a prototype, Lenin argued 
for the abolition of "parliamentarianism" by turning  
"representative institutions from mere 'talking shops' 
into working bodies." This would be done by removing 
"the division of labour between the legislative and the 
executive." [_Essential Works of Lenin_, p. 304 and p. 306]

2) "All officials, without exception, to be elected and 
subject to recall *at any time*" and so "directly 
responsible to their constituents." "Democracy means 
equality." [Op. Cit., p. 302, p. 306 and p. 346]

3) The "immediate introduction of control and
superintendence by *all,* so that *all* shall become 
'bureaucrats' for a time and so that, therefore, *no one*
can become a 'bureaucrat'." Proletarian democracy would
"take immediate steps to cut bureaucracy down to the roots
. . . to the complete abolition of bureaucracy" as the
"*essence* of bureaucracy" is officials becoming transformed
"into privileged persons divorced from the masses and 
*superior to* the masses." [Op. Cit., p. 355 and p. 360]

4) There should be no "special bodies of armed men" standing 
apart from the people "since the majority of the people 
itself suppresses its oppressors, a 'special force' is no 
longer necessary." Using the example of the Paris Commune, 
Lenin suggested this meant "abolition of the standing army."
Instead there would be the "armed masses." [Op. Cit., p. 275, 
p. 301 and p. 339]

5) The new (workers) state would be "the organisation of 
violence for the suppression of . . . the exploiting class, 
i.e. the bourgeoisie. The toilers need a state only to 
overcome the resistance of the exploiters" who are "an 
insignificant minority," that is "the landlords and 
the capitalists." This would see "an immense expansion
of democracy . . . for the poor, democracy for the people"
while, simultaneously, imposing "a series of restrictions
on the freedom of the oppressors, the exploiters, the
capitalists. . . their resistance must be broken by force:
it is clear that where is suppression there is also violence,
there is no freedom, no democracy." [Op. Cit., p. 287 and
pp. 337-8]

This would be implemented after the current, bourgeois, state had
been smashed. This would be the "dictatorship of the proletariat"
and be "the introduction of complete democracy for the people."
[Op. Cit., p. 355] However, the key practical ideas on what the
new "semi-state" would be are contained in these five points. 
He generalised these points, considering them valid not only 
for Russia in 1917 but in all countries. In this his followers
agree. Lenin's work is considered valid for today, in advanced
countries as it was in revolutionary Russia.

Three things strike anarchist readers of Lenin's work. Firstly,
as we noted in section H.1.7, much of it is pure anarchism. 
Bakunin had raised the vision of a system of workers' councils
as the framework of a free socialist society in the 1860s and
1870s. Moreover, he had also argued for the election of mandated
and recallable delegates as well as for using a popular militia 
to defend the revolution (see section H.2.1). What is not
anarchist is the call for centralisation, equating the council
system with a state and the toleration of a "new" officialdom.
Secondly, the almost utter non-mention of the role of the party
in the book is deeply significant. Given the emphasis that Lenin 
had always placed on the party, it's absence is worrying. 
Particularly (as we indicate in section H.6.5) he had been
calling for the party to seize power all through 1917. As
we discuss in section H.9.2, when he does mention the party
he does so in an ambiguous way which suggests that it, not
the class, would be in power. As subsequent events show, this
was indeed what happened in practice. And, finally, the 
anarchist reader is struck by the fact that every one of these
key ideas were not implemented under Lenin. In fact, the 
opposite was done. This can be seen from looking at each point
in turn.

The first point as the creation of "working bodies", the 
combining of legislative and executive bodies. The first
body to be created by the Bolshevik revolution was the
"Council of People's Commissars" (CPC) This was a government
separate from and above the Central Executive Committee (CEC)
of the soviets congress. It was an executive body elected
by the soviet congress, but the soviets themselves were
not turned into "working bodies." Thus the promises of
Lenin's _State and Revolution_ did not last the night.

As indicated in section H.6.5, the Bolsheviks clearly knew
that the Soviets had alienated their power to this body.
However, it could be argued that Lenin's promises were 
kept as this body simply gave itself legislative powers 
four days later. Sadly, this is not the case. In the 
Paris Commune the delegates of the people took executive 
power into their own hands. Lenin reversed this. His 
executive took legislative power from the hands of 
the people's delegates. In the former case, power was
decentralised into the hands of the population. In the 
latter case, it was centralised into the hands of a few.
This concentration of power into executive committees
occurred at all levels of the soviet hierarchy (see
section H.6.6 for full details). Simply put, legislative
and executive power was taken *from* the soviets assemblies
and handed to Bolshevik dominated executive committees.

What of the next principle, namely the election and recall
of all officials? This lasted slightly longer, namely 
around 5 months. By March of 1918, the Bolsheviks started 
a systematic campaign against the elective principle in
the workplace, in the military and even in the soviets.
In the workplace, Lenin was arguing for appointed 
one-man managers "vested with dictatorial powers" by
April 1918 (see section H.6.10). In the military, Trotsky
simply decreed the end of elected officers in favour of
appointed officers (see section H.6.14). And as far as
the soviets go, the Bolsheviks were refusing to hold
elections because they "feared that the opposition parties
would show gains." When elections were held, "Bolshevik
armed force usually overthrew the results" in provincial
towns. Moreover, the Bolsheviks "pack[ed] local soviets"
with representatives of organisations they controlled
"once they could not longer count on an electoral 
majority." [Samuel Farber, _Before Stalinism_, p. 22, 
p. 24 and p. 33] This gerrymandering was even practised
at the all-Russian soviet congress (see section H.6.6
for full details of this Bolshevik onslaught against
the soviets). So much for competition among the parties 
within the soviets! And as far as the right of recall 
went, the Bolsheviks only supported this when the 
workers were recalling the opponents of the Bolsheviks, 
not when the workers were recalling them.

In summary, in under six months the Bolsheviks had replaced 
election of "all officials" by appointment from above in many 
areas of life. Democracy had simply being substituted by 
appointed from above (see section H.9.4 for the deeply
undemocratic reasoning used to justify this top-down and
autocratic system of so-called democracy). The idea that
different parties could compete for votes in the soviets
(or elsewhere) was similarly curtailed and finally abolished.

Then there was the elimination of bureaucracy. As we show
in section H.9.7, a new bureaucratic and centralised system 
quickly emerged. Rather than immediately cutting the size
and power of the bureaucracy, it steadily grew. It soon
became the real power in the state (and, ultimately, in 
the 1920s became the social base for the rise of Stalin).
Moreover, with the concentration of power in the hands of
the Bolshevik government, the "essence" of bureaucracy
remained as the party leaders became "privileged persons 
divorced from the masses and *superior to* the masses." 
They were, for example, more than happy to justify their
suppression of military democracy in terms of them knowing
better than the general population what was best for them
(see section H.9.4 for details).

Then there is the fourth point, namely the elimination of 
the standing army, the suppression of "special bodies of 
armed men" by the "armed masses." This promise did not 
last two months. On the 20th of December, 1917, the 
Council of People's Commissars decreed the formation 
of a political (secret) police force, the "Extraordinary 
Commission to Fight Counter-Revolution." This was more 
commonly known by the Russian initials of the first two
terms of its official name: The Cheka. Significantly, 
its founding decree stated it was to "watch the press, 
saboteurs, strikers, and the Socialist-Revolutionaries 
of the Right." [contained in Robert V. Daniels, _A 
Documentary History of Communism_, vol. 1, p. 133]

While it was initially a small organisation, as 1918 
progressed it grew in size and activity. By April 1918, 
it was being used to break the anarchist movement across 
Russia (see section H.6.23 for details). The Cheka soon 
became a key instrument of Bolshevik rule, with the full
support of the likes of Lenin and Trotsky. The Cheka
was most definitely a "special body of armed men" and
not the same as the "armed workers." In other words,
Lenin's claims in _State and Revolution_ did not last 
two months and in under six months the Bolshevik state
had a mighty group of "armed men" to impose its will.

This is not all. The Bolsheviks also conducted a sweeping 
transformation of the military within the first six months
of taking power. During 1917, the soldiers and sailors 
(encouraged by the Bolsheviks and other revolutionaries) 
had formed their own committees and elected officers. In
March 1918, Trotsky simply abolished all this by decree
and replaced it with appointed officers (usually ex-Tsarist
ones). In this way, the Red Army was turned from a workers'
militia (i.e. an armed people) into a "special body" 
separate from the general population (see section H.6.15
for further discussion on this subject).

So instead of eliminating a "special force" above the people, 
the Bolsheviks did the opposite by creating a political police 
force (the Cheka) and a standing army (in which elections were
a set aside by decree). These were special, professional, armed 
forces standing apart from the people and unaccountable to 
them. Indeed, they were used to repress strikes and working 
class unrest, a topic we now turn to.

Then there is the idea of that Lenin's "workers' state"
would simple be an instrument of violence directed at
the exploiters. This was not how it turned out in practice.
As the Bolsheviks lost popular support, they turned the
violence of the "worker's state" against the workers (and,
of course, the peasants). As noted above, when the Bolsheviks
lost soviet elections they used force to disband them (see
section H.6.6 for further details). Faced with strikes and
working class protest during this period, the Bolsheviks 
responded with state violence (see section H.8.5 for 
details). We will discuss the implications of this for 
Lenin's theory below. So, as regards the claim that the 
new ("workers") state would repress only the exploiters, 
the truth was that it was used to repress whoever opposed 
Bolshevik power, including workers and peasants.

As can be seen, after the first six months of Bolshevik 
rule not a single measure advocated by Lenin in _State 
and Revolution_ existed in "revolutionary" Russia. Some
of the promises were broken in quiet quickly (overnight,
in one case). Most took longer. For example, the 
democratisation of the armed forces had been decreed in
late December 1917. However, this was simply acknowledging 
the existing revolutionary gains of the military personnel.
Similarly, the Bolsheviks passed a decree on workers' control
which, again, simply acknowledged the actual gains by the
grassroots (and, in fact, limited them for further 
development -- see section H.6.9). This cannot be taken
as evidence of the democratic nature of Bolshevism as 
most governments faced with a revolutionary movement will
acknowledge and "legalise" the facts on the ground (until
such time as they can neutralise or destroy them). For 
example, the Provisional Government created after the 
February Revolution also legalised the revolutionary 
gains of the workers (for example, legalising the soviets, 
factory committees, unions, strikes and so forth). The
real question is whether Bolshevism continued to encourage
these revolutionary gains once it had consolidated its 
power. Which they did not. Indeed, it can be argued that
the Bolsheviks simply managed to do what the Provisional 
Government it replaced had failed to do, namely destroy
the various organs of popular self-management created 
by the revolutionary masses. So the significant fact is 
not that the Bolsheviks recognised the gains of the masses
but that their toleration of the application of what their
followers say were their real principles did not last long 
and was quickly ended. Moreover, when the leading Bolsheviks 
looked back at this abolition they did not consider it in 
any way in contradiction to the principles of "communism" 
(see section H.6.14). 

We have stressed this period for a reason. This was the 
period *before* the out-break of major Civil War and thus
the policies applied show the actual nature of Bolshevism,
it's essence if you like. This is a significant date 
as most Leninists blame the failure of Lenin to live 
up to his promises on this even. In reality, the civil 
war was *not* the reason for these betrayals -- simply 
because it had not started yet (see section H.6.16
on when the civil war started and its impact). Each of the
promises were broken in turn months before the civil war
happened. "All Power to the Soviets" became, very quickly, 

"All Power to the Bolsheviks." In the words of historian 
Marc Ferro:

"In a way, _The State and Revolution_ even laid the
foundations and sketched out the essential features 
of an alternative to Bolshevik power, and only the 
pro-Leninist tradition has used it, almost to quieten
its conscience, because Lenin, once in power, ignored
its conclusions. The Bolsheviks, far from causing the
state to wither away, found endless reasons for
justifying its enforcement." [_October 1917_, 
pp. 213-4]

Where does that leave Lenin's _State and Revolution_? Well,
modern-day Leninists still urge us to read it, considering
it his greatest work and the best introduction to what 
Leninism really stands for. For example, we find Leninist 
Tony Cliff calling that book "Lenin's real testament" while, 
at the same time, acknowledging that its "message . . . which 
was the guide for the first victorious proletarian revolution, 
was violated again and again during the civil war." Not a 
very good "guide" or that convincing a "message" if it was 
not applicable in the very circumstances it was designed to 
be applied in (a bit like saying you have an excellent
umbrella but it only works when it is not raining). Moreover,
Cliff is factually incorrect. The Bolsheviks "violated" that 
"guide" before the civil war started (i.e. when "the 
victories of the Czechoslovak troops over the Red Army in 
June 1918, that threatened the greatest danger to the Soviet 
republic," to quote Cliff). Similarly, much of the economic
policies implemented by the Bolsheviks had their roots in 
that book and the other writings by Lenin from 1917 (see 
section H.9.5). [_Lenin_, vol. 3, p. 161 and p. 18]

Given this, what use is Lenin's _State and Revolution_? If
this really was the "guide" it is claimed to be, the fact
that it proved totally impractical suggests it should simply
be ignored. Simply put, if the side effects of a revolution
(such as civil war) require it to be ripped up then modern
Leninists should come clean and admit that revolution and
workers' democracy simply do not go together. This was, 
after all, the conclusion of Lenin and Trotsky (see section
H.3.8). As such, they should not recommend Lenin's work as
an example of what Bolshevism aims for. If, however, the
basic idea of workers' democracy and freedom are valid 
and considered the only way of achieving socialism then
we need to wonder *why* the Bolsheviks did not apply them
when they had the chance, particularly when the Makhnovists
in the Ukraine did (see section H.11 on the Makhnovist 
movement). Such an investigation would only end up by
concluding the validity of anarchism, *not* Leninism. 

This can be seen from the trajectory of Bolshevik ideology
post-October. Simply put, it was not bothered by the breaking
of the promises of _State and Revolution_ and 1917 in general.
As such, Cliff is just wrong to assert that while the message
of _State and Revolution_ was "violated again and again" it
"was also invoked again and again against bureaucratic 
degeneration." [Cliff, Op. Cit., p. 161] Far from it. 

Lenin's _State and Revolution_ was rarely invoked against 
degeneration by the mainstream Bolshevik leadership. Indeed, 
they happily supported party dictatorship and one-man management. 
Ironically for Cliff, it *was* famously invoked against the 
state capitalist policies being implemented in early 1918. 
This was done by the "Left Communists" around Bukharin in 
their defence of workers' self-management against Lenin's 
policy! Lenin told them to reread it (along with his other 
1917 works) to see that "state capitalism" was his aim all 
along! Not only that, he quoted from _State and Revolution_.
He argued that "accounting and control" was required "for
the proper functioning of the first stage of communist
society." "And this control," he continued, "must be
established not only over 'the insignificant capitalist
minority, over the gentry . . . ', but also over the 
workers who 'have been thoroughly corrupted by capitalism
. . . '" He ended by saying it was "significant that 
Bukharin did *not* emphasise *this*." [_Collected Works_,
vol. 27, pp. 353-4] Needless to say, the Leninists who
urge us to read Lenin's work do not emphasis that either.

As the Bolsheviks lost more and more support, the number
of workers "thoroughly corrupted by capitalism" increased.
How to identify them was easy: they did not support the
party. As historian Richard summarises, a "lack of 
identification with the Bolshevik party was treated
as the absence of political consciousness altogether." 
[_Soviet Communists in Power_, p. 94] This is the
logical conclusion of vanguardism, of course (see
section H.5.3). However, to acknowledge that state
violence was also required to "control" the working 
class totally undermines the argument of _State and
Revolution_. 

This is easy to see and to prove theoretically. For 
example, by 1920, Lenin was more than happy to admit 
that the "workers' state" used violence against the 
masses. At a conference of his political police, the 
Cheka, Lenin argued as follows:

"Without revolutionary coercion directed against the
avowed enemies of the workers and peasants, it is
impossible to break down the resistance of these
exploiters. On the other hand, revolutionary coercion
is bound to be employed towards the wavering and unstable
elements among the masses themselves." [_Collected Works_,
vol. 42, p. 170]

This was simply summarising Bolshevik practice from the
start. However, in _State and Revolution_ Lenin had 
argued for imposing "a series of restrictions on the 
freedom of the oppressors, the exploiters, the capitalists."
In 1917 he was "clear that where is suppression there 
is also violence, there is no freedom, no democracy." 
[Op. Cit., pp. 337-8] So if violence is directed against
the working class then, obviously, there can be "no freedom,
no democracy" for that class. And who identifies who the 
"wavering and unstable" elements are? Only the party. Thus
any expression of workers' democracy which conflicts with
the party is a candidate for "revolutionary coercion."
So it probably just as well that the Bolsheviks had 
eliminated military democracy in March, 1918.

Trotsky expands on the obvious autocratic implications of 
this in 1921 when he attacked the Workers' Opposition's 
ideas on economic democracy:

"The Party . . . is . . . duty bound to retain its 
dictatorship, regardless of the temporary vacillations
of the amorphous masses, regardless of the temporary
vacillations even of the working class. This awareness
is essential for cohesion; without it the Party is in
danger of perishing . . . At any given moment, the
dictatorship does not rest on the formal principle of
workers' democracy . . . if we look upon workers'
democracy as something unconditional . . . then . . .
every plant should elect its own administrative organs
and so on . . .  From a formal point of view this is 
the clearest link with workers' democracy. But we are
against it. Why?  . . . Because, in the first place,
we want to retain the dictatorship of the Party, and,
in the second place, because we think that the 
[democratic] way of managing important and essential
plants is bound to be incompetent and prove a failure
from an economic point of view . . ." [quoted by
Jay B. Sorenson, _The Life and Death of Soviet Trade
Unionism_, p. 165]

Thus the Russian Revolution and the Bolshevik regime
confirmed anarchist theory and predictions about state
socialism. In the words of Luigi Fabbri:

"It is fairly certain that between the capitalist regime 
and the socialist there will be an intervening period of
struggle, during which proletariat revolutionary workers 
will have to work to uproot the remnants of bourgeois
society . . . But if the object of this struggle and this 
organisation is to free the proletariat from exploitation 
and state rule, then the role of guide, tutor or director 
cannot be entrusted to a new state, which would have an 
interest in pointing the revolution in a completely 
opposite direction. . . 

"The outcome would be that a new government - battening on 
the revolution and acting throughout the more or less 
extended period of its 'provisional' powers - would lay down 
the bureaucratic, military and economic foundations of a new 
and lasting state organisation, around which a compact network 
of interests and privileges would, naturally, be woven. Thus 
in a short space of time what one would have would not be the 
state abolished, but a state stronger and more energetic than
its predecessor and which would come to exercise those functions 
proper to it - the ones Marx recognised as being such - 
'keeping the great majority of producers under the yoke of
a numerically small exploiting minority.'

"This is the lesson that the history of all revolutions teaches 
us, from the most ancient down to the most recent; and it is 
confirmed . . . by the day-to-day developments of the Russian 
revolution . . .

"Certainly, [state violence] starts out being used against the
old power . . . But as the new power goes on consolidating its
position . . . ever more frequently and ever more severely,
the mailed fist of dictatorship is turned against the proletariat
itself in whose name that dictatorship was set up and is 
operated! . . . the actions of the present Russian government
[of Lenin and Trotsky] have shown that in real terms (and it
could not be otherwise) the 'dictatorship of the proletariat'
means police, military, political and economic dictatorship
exercised over the broad mass of the proletariat in city and
country by the few leaders of the political party.

"The violence of the state always ends up being used AGAINST
ITS SUBJECTS, of whom the vast majority are always proletarians
. . . The new government will be able to expropriate the old 
ruling class in whole or in part, but only so as to establish 
a new ruling class that will hold the greater part of the 
proletariat in subjection.

"That will come to pass if those who make up the government and 
the bureaucratic, military and police minority that upholds it 
end up becoming the real owners of wealth when the property of 
everyone is made over exclusively to the state. In the first 
place, the failure of the revolution will be self evident. In 
the second, in spite of the illusions that many people create, 
the conditions of the proletariat will always be those of a 
subject class." ["Anarchy and 'Scientific' Communism", in 
_The Poverty of Statism_, pp. 13-49, Albert Meltzer (ed.),
pp. 26-31]

The standard response by most modern Leninists to arguments 
like this about Bolshevism is simply to downplay the 
authoritarianism of the Bolsheviks by stressing the 
effects of the civil war on shaping their ideology and 
actions. However, this fails to address the key issue 
of why the reality of Bolshevism (even before the civil 
war) was so different to the rhetoric. Anarchists, as we 
discuss in section H.9, can point to certain aspects of 
Bolshevik ideology and the social structures its favoured 
which can explain it. The problems facing the revolution 
simply brought to the fore the limitations and dangers 
inherent in Leninism and, moreover, shaping them in 
distinctive ways. We draw the conclusion that a future 
revolution, as it will face similar problems, would be 
wise to avoid applying Leninist ideology and the 
authoritarian practices it allows and, indeed, promotes 
by its support of centralisation, confusion of party power
with class power, vanguardism and equation of state
capitalism with socialism. Leninists, in contrast, can 
only stress the fact that the revolution was occurring 
in difficult circumstances and hope that "fate" is 
more kind to them next time -- as if a revolution, as 
Lenin himself noted in 1917, would not occur during 
nor create "difficult" circumstances! Equally, they
can draw no lessons (bar repeat what the Bolsheviks
did in 1917 and hope for better objective circumstances!) 
from the Russian experience simply because they are blind 
to the limitations of their politics. They are thus doomed 
to repeat history rather than make it.

So where does this analysis of Lenin's _State and 
Revolution_ and the realities of Bolshevik power 
get us? The conclusions of dissent Marxist Samuel 
Farber seem appropriate here. As he puts it, "the 
very fact that a Sovnarkom had been created as a 
separate body from the CEC [Central Executive 
Committee] of the soviets clearly indicates that, 
Lenin's _State and Revolution_ notwithstanding, the 
separation of at least the top bodies of the executive 
and the legislative wings of the government remained 
in effect in the new Soviet system." This suggests 
"that _State and Revolution_ did not play a decisive 
role as a source of policy guidelines for 'Leninism 
in power.'" After all, "immediately after the 
Revolution the Bolsheviks established an executive 
power . . . as a clearly separate body from the 
leading body of the legislature. . . Therefore, some 
sections of the contemporary Left appear to have  
greatly overestimated the importance that _State and 
Revolution_ had for Lenin's government. I would suggest
that this document . . . can be better understood as a
distant, although doubtless sincere [!], socio-political
vision . . . as opposed to its having been a programmatic
political statement, let alone a guide to action, for
the period immediately after the successful seizure of
power." [Farber, Op. Cit., pp. 20-1 and p. 38]

That is *one* way of looking at it. Another would be to draw
the conclusion that a "distant . . . socio-political vision"
drawn up to sound like a "guide to action" which was then
immediately ignored is, at worse, little more than a deception, 
or, at best, a theoretical justification for seizing power
in the face of orthodox Marxist dogma. Whatever the rationale
for Lenin writing his book, one thing is true -- it was never
implemented. Strange, then, that Leninists today urge use to
read it to see what "Lenin really wanted." Particularly given
that so few of its promises were actually implemented (those
that were just recognised the facts on the ground) and *all*
of were no longer applied in less than six months after the
seize of power.

The best that can be said is that Lenin did want this vision
to be applied but the realities of revolutionary Russia, the
objective problems facing the revolution, made its application
impossible. This is the standard Leninist account of the
revolution. They seem unconcerned that they have just admitted
that Lenin's ideas were utterly impractical for the real
problems that any revolution is most likely to face. This 
was the conclusion Lenin himself drew, as did the rest of
the Bolshevik leadership. This can be seen from the actual
practice of "Leninism in power" and the arguments it used.
And yet, for some reason, Lenin's book is still recommended 
by modern Leninists!

H.6.5 Did the Bolsheviks really aim for Soviet power?

It seems a truism for modern day Leninists that the
Bolsheviks stood for "soviet power." For example, they
like to note that the Bolsheviks used the slogan "All 
Power to the Soviets" in 1917 as evidence. However,
for the Bolsheviks this slogan had a radically different
meaning to what many people would consider it to mean.

As we discuss in section H.6.25, it was the anarchists
(and those close to them, like the SR-Maximalists) who
first raised the idea of soviets as the means by which
the masses could run society. This was during the 1905
revolution. At that time, neither the Mensheviks nor
the Bolsheviks viewed the soviets as the possible
framework of a socialist society. This was still the
case in 1917, until Lenin returned to Russia and 
convinced the Bolshevik Party that the time was right
to raise the slogan "All Power to the Soviets." 

However, as well as this, Lenin also advocated a somewhat
different vision of what a Bolshevik revolution would
result in. Thus we find Lenin in 1917 continually 
repeating the basic idea: "The Bolsheviks must assume 
power." The Bolsheviks "can and *must* take state power 
into their own hands." He raised the question of "will 
the Bolsheviks dare take over full state power alone?"
and answered it: "I have already had occasion . . . to 
answer this question in the affirmative." Moreover, "a 
political party . . . would have no right to exist, would 
be unworthy of the name of party . . . if it refused to 
take power when opportunity offers." [_Selected Works_, 
vol. 2, p 328, p. 329 and p. 352]

He equated party power with popular power: "the power of
the Bolsheviks -- that is, the power of the proletariat."
Moreover, he argued that Russia "was ruled by 130,000 
landowners . . . and they tell us that Russia will not
be able to be governed by the 240,000 members of the 
Bolshevik Party -- governing in the interest of the poor
and against the rich." He stresses that the Bolsheviks 
"are not Utopians. We know that just any labourer or 
any cook would be incapable of taking over immediately 
the administration of the State." Therefore they 
"demand that the teaching should be conducted by the 
class-consciousness workers and soldiers, that this 
should be started immediately." Until then, the 
"conscious workers must be in control." [_Will the 
Bolsheviks Maintain Power?_ p. 102, pp. 61-62, p. 66 
and p. 68] 

As such, given this clear and unambiguous position throughout 
1917 by Lenin, it seems incredulous, to say the least, for 
Leninist Tony Cliff to assert that "[t]o start with Lenin 
spoke of the *proletariat,* the *class* -- not the Bolshevik 
Party -- assuming state power." [_Lenin_, vol. 3,  p. 161] 
Surely the title of one of Lenin's most famous pre-October 
essays, usually translated as "Can the Bolsheviks Retain 
State Power?", should have given the game away? As would, 
surely, quoting numerous calls by Lenin for the Bolsheviks 
to seize power? Apparently not.

This means, of course, Lenin is admitting that the working 
class in Russia would *not* have power under the Bolsheviks. 
Rather than "the poor" governing society directly, we would 
have *the Bolsheviks* governing in their interests. Thus, 
rather than soviet power as such, the Bolsheviks aimed for 
"party power through the soviets" -- a radically different 
position. And as we discuss in the next section, when soviet 
power clashed with party power the former was always 
sacrificed to ensure the latter. As we indicate in 
section H.1.2, this support for party power before the 
revolution was soon transformed into a defence for party 
dictatorship after the Bolsheviks had seized power. However,
we should not forget, to quote one historian, that the 
Bolshevik leaders "anticipated a 'dictatorship of the
proletariat,' and that concept was a good deal closer to
a party dictatorship in Lenin's 1917 usage than revisionist
scholars sometimes suggest." [Sheila Fitzpatrick, "The Legacy
of the Civil War," pp. 385-398, _Party, State, and Society 
in the Russian Civil War_, Diane P. Koenker, William G. 
Rosenberg and Ronald Grigor Suny (eds.), p. 388]

While modern-day Leninists tend to stress the assumption of
power by the soviets as the goal of the Bolshevik revolution,
the Bolsheviks themselves were more honest about it. For
example, Trotsky quotes Lenin at the first soviet congress
stating that it was "not true to say that no party exists
which is ready to assume power; such a party exists: this
is our party." Moreover, "[o]ur party is ready to assume
power." As the Second Congress approached, Lenin "rebuked
those who connected the uprising with the Second Congress
of the Soviets." He protested against Trotsky's argument
that they needed a Bolshevik majority at the Second 
Congress, arguing (according to Trotsky) that "[w]e have
to win power and not tie ourselves to the Congress. It
was ridiculous and absurd to warn the enemy about the
date of the rising . . . First the party must seize power,
arms in hand, and then we could talk about the Congress."
[_On Lenin_, p. 71, p. 85]

Trotsky argued that "the party could not seize power by
itself, independently of the Soviets and behind its back.
This would have been a mistake . . . [as the] soldiers 
knew their delegates in the Soviet; it was through the
Soviet that they knew the party. If the uprising had
taken place behind the back of the Soviet, independently
of it, without its authority . . . there might have been
a dangerous confusion among the troops." Significantly,
Trotsky made no mention of the proletariat. Finally,
Lenin came over to Trotsky's position, saying "Oh, all
right, one can proceed in this fashion as well, provided
we seize power." [Op. Cit., p. 86 and p. 89]

Trotsky made similar arguments in his _History of the 
Russian Revolution_ and his article _Lessons of October_.
Discussing the July Days of 1917, for example, Trotsky 
discusses whether (to quote the title of the relevant 
chapter) "Could the Bolsheviks have seized the Power in 
July?" and noted, in passing, the army "was far from 
ready to raise an insurrection in order to give the 
power to the Bolshevik Party." As far as the workers 
were concerned, although "inclining toward the Bolsheviks 
in its overwhelming majority, had still not broken the 
umbilical cord attaching it to the Compromisers" and 
so the Bolsheviks could not have "seized the helm in 
July." He then lists other parts of the country where
the soviets were ready to take power. He states that
in "a majority of provinces and county seats, the
situation was incomparably less favourable" simply
because the Bolsheviks were not as well supported.
Later he notes that "[m]any of the provincial soviets
had already, before the July days, become organs of
power." Thus Trotsky was only interested in whether 
the workers could have put the Bolsheviks in power or 
not rather than were the soviets able to take power
themselves. Party power was the decisive criteria. 
[_History of the Russian Revolution_, vol. 2, p. 78, 
p. 77, p. 78, p. 81 and p. 281] 

This can be seen from the October insurrection. Trotsky
again admits that the "Bolsheviks could have seized power
in Petrograd at the beginning of July" but "they could
not have held it." However, by September the Bolsheviks
had gained majorities in the Petrograd and Moscow soviets.
The second Congress of Soviets was approaching. The time
was considered appropriate to think of insurrection. By
in whose name and for what end? Trotsky makes it clear.
"A revolutionary party is interested in legal coverings,"
he argued and so the party could use the defending the 
second Congress of Soviets as the means to justify its
seizure of power. He raises the question: "Would it not 
have been simpler . . . to summon the insurrection directly 
in the name of the party?" and answers it in the negative.
"It would be an obvious mistake," he argued, "to identify 
the strength of the Bolshevik party with the strength of 
the soviets led by it. The latter was much greater than 
the former. However, without the former it would have 
been mere impotence." He then quotes numerous Bolshevik 
delegates arguing that the masses would follow the soviet, 
not the party. Hence the importance of seizing power in
the name of the soviets, regardless of the fact it was
the Bolshevik party who would in practice hold "all power." 
Trotsky quotes Lenin are asking "Who is to seize power?" 
"That is now of no importance," argued Lenin. "Let the 
Military Revolutionary Committee take it, or 'some other 
institution,' which will declare that it will surrender 
the power only to the genuine representatives of the 
interests of the people." Trotsky notes that "some other 
institution" was a "conspirative designation for the Central 
Committee of the Bolsheviks." And who turned out to be
the "genuine representatives of the interests of the people"?
By amazing co-incidence the Bolsheviks, the members of
whose Central Committee formed the first "soviet" 
government. [Op. Cit., vol. 3, p. 265, p. 259, p. 262, 
p. 263 and p. 267]

As we discuss in section H.3.11, Trotsky was simply 
repeating the same instrumentalist arguments he had
made earlier. Clearly,  the support for the soviets 
was purely instrumental, simply a means of securing 
party power. For Bolshevism, the party was the key
institution of proletarian revolution: 

"The party set the soviets in motion, the soviets set 
in motion the workers, soldiers, and to some extent 
the peasantry . . . If you represent this conducting 
apparatus as a system of cog-wheels -- a comparison 
which Lenin had recourse at another period on another 
theme -- you may say that the impatient attempt to 
connect the party wheel directly with the gigantic 
wheel of the masses -- omitting the medium-sized 
wheel of the soviets -- would have given rise to the 
danger of breaking the teeth of the party wheel." 
[Trotsky, Op. Cit., p. 264]

Thus the soviets existed to allow the party to influence
the workers. What of the workers running society directly? 
What if the workers reject the decisions of the party?
After all, *before* the revolution Lenin "more than once
repeated that the masses are far to the left of the party,
just as the party is to the left of the Central Committee."
[Trotsky, Op. Cit., p. 258] What happens when the workers
refuse to be set in motion by the party but instead set
themselves in motion and reject the Bolsheviks? What then
for the soviets? Looking at the logic of Trotsky's 
instrumentalist perspective, in such a case we would 
predict that the soviets would have to be tamed (by 
whatever means possible) in favour of party power (the
real goal). And this is what did happen. The fate of the 
soviets after October prove that the Bolsheviks did not,
in fact, seek soviet power without doubt (see next section). 
And as we discuss in section H.9.4, the peculiar Bolshevik 
definition of "soviet power" allowed them to justify the 
elimination of from the bottom-up grassroots democracy in 
the military and in the workplace with top-down appointments.

Thus we have a distinctly strange meaning by the expression
"All Power to the Soviets." In practice, it meant that the
soviets alienate its power to a Bolshevik government. This
is what the Bolsheviks considered as "soviet power," namely
party power, pure and simple. As the Central Committee argued 
in November 1917, "it is impossible to refuse a purely Bolshevik 
government without treason to the slogan of the power of the 
Soviets, since a majority at the Second All-Russian Congress 
of Soviets . . . handed power over to this government." 
[contained in Robert v. Daniels (ed.), _A Documentary 
History of Communism_, vol. 1, pp. 128-9] Lenin was clear, 
arguing mere days after the October Revolution that "our 
present slogan is: No Compromise, i.e. for a homogeneous 
Bolshevik government." [quoted by Daniels, _Conscience of
the Revolution_, p. 65] 

In other words, "soviet power" exists when the soviets hand 
power over the someone else (namely the Bolshevik leaders)!
The difference is important, "for the Anarchists declared, 
if 'power' really should belong to the soviets, it could not 
belong to the Bolshevik party, and if it should belong to 
that Party, as the Bolsheviks envisaged, it could not belong 
to the soviets." [Voline, _The Unknown Revolution_, p. 213]

Which means that while anarchists and Leninists both use
the expression "All Power to the Soviets" it does not mean
they mean exactly the same thing by it. In practice the 
Bolshevik vision simply replaced the power of the soviets 
with a "soviet power" above them:

"The success of the Bolsheviks in the October Revolution 
-- that is to say, the fact that they found themselves 
in power and from there subordinated the whole Revolution 
to their Party is explained by their ability to substitute 
the idea of a Soviet power for the social revolution and 
the social emancipation of the masses. A priori, these 
two ideas appear as non-contradictory for it was possible 
to understand Soviet power as the power of the soviets, 
and this facilitated the substitution of the idea of 
Soviet power for that of the Revolution. Nevertheless, 
in their realisation and consequences these ideas were 
in violent contraction to each other. The conception of 
Soviet Power incarnated in the Bolshevik state, was 
transformed into an entirely traditional bourgeois power 
concentrated in a handful of individuals who subjected to 
their authority all that was fundamental and most powerful 
in the life of the people -- in this particular case, the 
social revolution. Therefore, with the help of the 'power 
of the soviets' -- in which the Bolsheviks monopolised 
most of the posts - they effectively attained a total 
power and could proclaim their dictatorship throughout 
the revolutionary territory . . .  All was reduced to 
a single centre, from where all instructions emanated 
concerning the way of life, of thought, of action of 
the working masses." [Peter Arshinov, _The Two Octobers_]

Isolated from the masses, holding power on their behalf,
the Bolshevik party could not help being influenced by
the realities of their position in society and the social
relationships produced by statist forms. Far from being 
the servants of the people, they become upon the seizing
of power their masters. As we argue in section H.9.7,
the experience of Bolshevism in power confirmed anarchist
fears that the so-called "workers' state" would quickly
become a danger to the revolution, corrupting those who
held power and generating a bureaucracy around the new
state bodies which came into conflict with both the ruling
party and the masses. Placed above the people, isolated
from them by centralisation of power, the Bolsheviks
pre-revolutionary aim for party power unsurprising became 
in practice party dictatorship. 

In less than a year, by July 1918, the soviet regime was 
a *de facto* party dictatorship. The theoretical revisions 
soon followed. Lenin, for example, was proclaiming in
early December 1918 that while legalising the Mensheviks 
the Bolsheviks would "reserve state power for ourselves, 
*and for ourselves alone.*" [_Collected Works_, vol. 28, 
p. 213] Victor Serge records how when he arrived in Russia
in the following month he discovered "a colourless article" 
signed by Zinoviev on "The Monopoly of Power" which said 
"Our Party rules alone . . . it will not allow anyone 
. . . The false democratic liberties demanded by the 
counter-revolution." [_Memoirs of a Revolutionary_, 
p. 69] Serge, like most Bolsheviks, embraced this 
perspective wholeheartedly. For example, when the 
Bolsheviks published Bakunin's "confession" to the 
Tsar in 1921 (in an attempt to discredit anarchism) 
"Serge seized on Bakunin's passage concerning the need 
for dictatorial rule in Russia, suggesting that
'already in 1848 Bakunin had presaged Bolshevism.'" 
[Lawrence D. Orton, "introduction," _The Confession 
of Mikhail Bakunin_, p. 21] At the time Bakunin wrote
his "confession" he was not an anarchist. At the time
Serge wrote his comments, he was a leading Bolshevik
and reflecting mainstream Bolshevik ideology.

Indeed, so important was it considered by them, the 
Bolsheviks revised their theory of the state to include 
this particular lesson of their revolution (see section
H.3.8 for details). As noted in section H.1.2, all the
leading Bolsheviks were talking about the "dictatorship
of the party" and continued to do so until their deaths.
Such a position, incidentally, is hard to square with 
support for soviet power in any meaningful term (although
it is easy to square with an instrumentalist position 
on workers' councils as a means to party power). It was 
only in the mid-30s that Serge started to revise his
position for this position (Trotsky still subscribed to 
it). By the early 1940s, he wrote that "[a]gainst the Party 
the anarchists were right when they inscribed on their 
black banners, 'There is no worse poison than power' -- 
meaning absolute power. From now on the psychosis of 
power was to captive the great majority of the leadership, 
especially at the lower levels." [Serge, Op. Cit., p. 100]

Nor can the effects of the civil war explain this shift.
As we discuss in the next section, the Bolshevik assault
on the soviets and their power started in the spring of
1918, months before the start of large scale civil war. 
And it should be stressed that the Bolsheviks were not
at all bothered by the creation of party dictatorship 
over the soviets. Indeed, in spite of ruling over a one 
party state Lenin was arguing in November 1918 that 
"Soviet power is a million times more democratic than 
the most democratic bourgeois republic." How can that 
be when the workers do not run society nor have a say 
in who rules them? When Karl Kautsky raised this issue,
Lenin replied by saying he "fails to see the *class*
nature of the state apparatus, of the machinery of
state . . . The Soviet government is the *first* in 
the world . . . to *enlist* the people, specifically
the *exploited* people in the work of administration."
[_Collected Works_, vol. 28, p. 247 and p. 248]

However, the key issue is not whether workers take part
in the state machinery but whether they determine the
policies that are being implemented, i.e. whether the
masses are running their own lives. After all, as
Ante Ciliga pointed out, the Stalinist GPU (secret
police) "liked to boast of the working class origin of
its henchmen." One of his fellow prisoners retorted to
such claims by pointing out they were "wrong to believe
that in the days the Tsar the gaolers were recruited
from among the dukes and the executioners from among
the princes!" [_The Russian Engima_, pp. 255-6] Simply
put, just because the state administration is made
up of bureaucrats who were originally working class
does not mean that the working class, as a class,
manages society. 

In December of that year Lenin went one further and 
noted that at the Sixth Soviet Congress "the Bolsheviks 
had 97 per cent" of delegates, i.e. "practically all 
representatives of the workers and peasants of the 
whole of Russia." This was proof of "how stupid and 
ridiculous is the bourgeois fairy-tale about the 
Bolsheviks only having minority support." [Op. Cit., 
pp. 355-6] Given that the workers and peasants had no 
real choice in who to vote for, can this result be 
surprising? Of course not. While the Bolsheviks *had* 
mass support a year previously, pointing to election 
results under a dictatorship where all other parties
and groups are subject to state repression is hardly 
convincing evidence for current support. Needless 
to say, Stalin (like a host of other dictators) 
made similar claims on similarly dubious election 
results. If the Bolsheviks were sincere in their 
support for soviet power then they would have
tried to organise genuine soviet elections. This
was possible even during the civil war as the 
example of the Makhnovists showed (see section 
H.11.7 for details).

So, in a nutshell, the Bolsheviks did not fundamentally
support the goal of soviet power. Rather, they aimed to
create a "soviet power," a Bolshevik power above the 
soviets which derived its legitimacy from them. However,
if the soviets conflicted with that power, it were the
soviets which were repudiated *not* party power. Thus the 
result of Bolshevik ideology was the marginalisation of 
the soviets and their replacement by Bolshevik dictatorship. 
This process started before the civil war and can be traced
to the nature of the state as well as the underlying 
assumptions of Bolshevik ideology (see section H.9).

H.6.6 What happened to the soviets after October?

As indicated in the last question, the last thing which
the Bolsheviks wanted was "all power to the soviets."
Rather they wanted the soviets to hand over that power
to a Bolshevik government. As the people in liberal 
capitalist politics, the soviets were "sovereign" in
name only. They were expected to delegate power to a
government. Like the "sovereign people" of bourgeois
republics, the soviets were much praised but in practice
ignored by those with real power.

In such a situation, we would expect the soviets to
play no meaningful role in the new "workers' state."
Under such a centralised system, we would expect the
soviets to become little more than a fig-leaf for party 
power. Unsurprisingly, this is *exactly* what they did 
become. As we discuss in section H.9.7, anarchists are
not surprised by this as the centralisation so beloved
by Marxists is designed to empower the few at the centre
and marginalise the many at the circumference.

The very first act of the Bolshevik revolution was for 
the Second Congress of Soviets to alienate its power and 
hand it over to the "Council of People's Commissars." This
was the new government and was totally Bolshevik in make-up
(the Left SRs later joined it, although the Bolsheviks 
always maintained control). Thus the first act of the 
revolution was the creation of a power *above* the soviets.
Although derived from the soviet congress, it was not
identical to it. Thus the Bolshevik "workers' state" or
"semi-state" started to have the same characteristics as 
the normal state (see sections H.3.7 for a discussion of
what marks a state). 

The subsequent marginalisation of the soviets in the "soviet"
state occurred from top to bottom should not, therefore be 
considered an accident or a surprise. The Bolshevik desire 
for party power within a highly centralised state could have 
no other effect. At the top, the Central Executive Committee 
(CEC or VTsIK) was quickly marginalised from power. This
body was meant to be the highest organ of soviet power but,
in practice, it was sidelined by the Bolshevik government.
This can be seen when, just four days after seizing power, 
the Bolshevik Council of People's Commissars (CPC or Sovnarkom) 
"unilaterally arrogated to itself legislative power simply by 
promulgating a decree to this effect. This was, effectively, 
a Bolshevik *coup d'etat* that made clear the government's 
(and party's) pre-eminence over the soviets and their 
executive organ. Increasingly, the Bolsheviks relied upon 
the appointment from above of commissars with plenipotentiary 
powers, and they split up and reconstituted fractious Soviets 
and intimidated political opponents." [Neil Harding, _Leninism_, 
p. 253] Strange actions for a party proclaiming it was acting
to ensure "All power to the soviets" (as we discussed in the
last section, this was always considered by Lenin as little 
more than a slogan to hide the fact that the party would be 
in power). 

It is doubtful that when readers of Lenin's _State and 
Revolution_ read his argument for combining legislative
and executive powers into one body, they had this in mind!
But then, as we discussed in section H.6.4, that work was
never applied in practice so we should not be too surprised
by this turn of events. One thing is sure, four days after
the "soviet" revolution the soviets had been replaced as
the effective power in society by a handful of Bolshevik
leaders. So the Bolsheviks immediately created a power 
*above* the soviets in the form of the CPC. Lenin's argument 
in _The State and Revolution_ that, like the Paris Commune, 
the workers' state would be based on a fusion of executive 
and administrative functions in the hands of the workers' 
delegates did not last one night. In reality, the Bolshevik
party was the *real* power in "soviet" Russia. 

Given that the All-Russian central Executive Committee
of Soviets (VTsIK) was dominated by Bolsheviks, it comes 
as no surprise to discover it was used to augment this
centralisation of power into the hands of the party.
The VTsIK ("charged by the October revolution with 
controlling the government," the Sovnarkom) was "used 
not to control but rather extend the authority and 
centralising fiat of the government. That was the work 
of Iakov Sverdlov, the VTsIK chairman, who -- in close 
collaboration with Lenin as chairman of the Sovnarkom 
-- ensured that the government decrees and ordinances 
were by the VTsIK and that they were thus endowed with 
Soviet legitimacy when they were sent to provincial 
soviet executive committees for transmission to all 
local soviets . . . To achieve that, Sverdlov had to 
reduce the 'Soviet Parliament' to nothing more than 
an 'administrative branch' (as Sukhanov put it) of the 
Sovnarkom. Using his position as the VTsIK chairman and 
his tight control over its praesidium and the large, 
disciplined and compliant Bolshevik majority in the 
plenary assembly, Sverdlov isolated the opposition and 
rendered it impotent. So successful was he that, by 
early December 1917, Sukhanov had already written off 
the VTsIK as 'a sorry parody of a revolutionary 
parliament,' while for the Bolshevik, Martin 
Latsis-Zurabs, the VTsIL was not even a good 
rubberstamp. Latsis campaigned vigorously in March 
and April 1918 for the VTsIK's abolition: with its 
'idle, long-winded talk and its incapacity for 
productive work' the VTsIK merely held up the work 
of government, he claimed. And he may have had a 
point: during the period of 1917 to 1918, the 
Sovnarkom issued 474 decrees, the VTsIK a mere 
62." [Israel Getzler, _Soviets as Agents of 
Democratisation_, p. 27] 

This process was not an accident. Far from it. In
fact, the Bolshevik chairman Sverdlov knew exactly
what he was doing. This included modifying the way
the CEC worked:

"The structure of VTsIK itself began to change under
Sverdlov. He began to use the presidium to circumvent
the general meeting, which contained eloquent minority
spokesmen . . . Sverdlov's used of the presidium marked
a decisive change in the status of that body within the
soviet hierarchy. In mid-1917 . . . [the] plenum had
directed all activities and ratified bureau decisions 
which had a 'particularly important social-political
character.' The bureau . . . served as the executive
organ of the VTsIK plenum . . . Only in extraordinary
cases when the bureau could no be convened for technical
reason could the presidium make decisions. Even then
such actions remained subject to review by the plenum."
[Charles Duval, "Yakov M. Sverdlov and the All-Russian 
Central Executive Committee of Soviets (VTsIK)", pp. 3-22, 
_Soviet Studies_, vol. XXXI, no. 1, January 1979, pp. 6-7]

Under the Bolsheviks, the presidium was converted "into
the *de facto* centre of power within VTsIK." It "began
to award representations to groups and factions which
supported the government. With the VTsIK becoming ever
more unwieldy in size by the day, the presidium began
to expand its activities." The presidium was used "to
circumvent general meetings." Thus the Bolsheviks were
able "to increase the power of the presidium, postpone
regular sessions, and present VTsIK with policies which
had already been implemented by the Sovnarkon. Even
in the presidium itself very few people determined
policy." [Charles Duval, Op. Cit., p.7, p. 8 and p. 18]

So, from the very outset, the VTsIK was overshadowed by 
the "Council of People's Commissars" (CPC). In the first 
year, only 68 of 480 decrees issued by the CPC were
actually submitted to the Soviet Central Executive Committee,
and even fewer were actually drafted by it. The VTsIK functions
"were never clearly delineated, even in the constitution,
despite vigorous attempts by the Left SRs . . . that Lenin 
never saw this highest soviet organ as the genuine equal 
of his cabin and that the Bolsheviks deliberated obstructed
efforts at clarification is [a] convincing" conclusion to
draw. It should be stressed that this process started before
the outbreak of civil war in late May, 1918. After that
the All-Russian Congress of soviets, which convened every 
three months or so during the first year of the revolution, 
met annually thereafter. Its elected VTsIK "also began to 
meet less frequently, and at the height of the civil war 
in late 1918 and throughout 1919, it never once met in full 
session. [Carmen Sirianni, _Workers' Control and Socialist 
Democracy_, pp. 203-4] 

The marginalisation of the soviets can be seen from the 
decision on whether to continue the war against Germany.
As Cornelius Castoriadis notes, under Lenin "[c]ollectively, 
the only real instance of power is the Party, and very soon, 
only the summits of the Party. Immediately after the seizure 
of power the soviets as institutions are reduced to the status 
of pure window-dressing (we need only look at the fact that, 
already at the beginning of 1918 in the discussions leading 
up to the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty, their role was absolutely 
nil)." [_The role of Bolshevik Ideology in the birth of the 
Bureaucracy_, p. 97] In fact, on the 26th of February, 1918,
the Soviet Executive "began a survey of 200 local soviets;
by 10 March 1918 a majority (105-95) had come out in favour
of a revolutionary war, although the soviets in the two 
capitals voted . . . to accept a separate peace." [Geoffrey
Swain, _The Origins of the Russian Civil War_, p. 128] This
survey was ignored by the Bolshevik Central Committee which 
voted 4 against, 4 abstain and 5 for it. This took Russia 
out of the Great War but handed over massive areas to 
imperialist Germany. The controversial treaty was ratified 
at the Fourth Soviet Congress, unsurprisingly as the Bolshevik 
majority simply followed the orders of their Central Committee. 
It would be pointless to go over the arguments of the rights 
and wrongs of the decision here, the point is that the 13 
members of the Bolshevik Central Committee decided the
future faith of Russia in this vote. The soviets were simply
ignored in spite of the fact it was possible to consult them
fully. Clearly, "soviet power" meant little more than 
window-dressing for Bolshevik power.

Thus, at the top summits of the state, the soviets had
been marginalised by the Bolsheviks from day one. Far 

from having "all power" their CEC had given that to a
Bolshevik government. Rather than exercise real power, 
it's basic aim was to control those who did exercise it.
And the Bolsheviks successfully acted to undermine even
this function.

If this was happening at the top, what was the situation
at the grassroots? Here, too, oligarchic tendencies in the 
soviets increased post-October, with "[e]ffective power
in the local soviets relentlessly gravitated to the executive
committees, and especially their presidia. Plenary sessions
became increasingly symbolic and ineffectual." The party was
"successful in gaining control of soviet executives in the
cities and at *uezd* and *guberniya* levels. These executive
bodies were usually able to control soviet congresses, though
the party often disbanded congresses that opposed major
aspects of current policies." Local soviets "had little input
into the formation of national policy" and "[e]ven at higher
levels, institutional power shifted away from the soviets."
[C. Sirianni, Op. Cit., p. 204 and p. 203] The soviets quickly 
had become rubber-stamps for the Communist government, with
the Soviet Constitution of 1918 codifying the centralisation 
of power and top-down decision making. Local soviets were
expected to "carry out all orders of the respective higher 
organs of the soviet power" (i.e. to carry out the commands 
of the central government). 

This was not all. While having popular support in October
1917, the realities of "Leninism in power" soon saw a
backlash develop. The Bolsheviks started to loose popular
support to opposition groups like the Mensheviks and SRs
(left and right). This growing opposition was reflected in 
two ways. Firstly, a rise in working class protests in the 
form of strikes and independent organisations (see section 
H.8.5, for example). Secondly, there was a rise in votes for 
the opposition parties in soviet elections. Faced with this,
the Bolsheviks responded in three ways, delaying elections.
gerrymandering or force. We will discuss each in turn.

Lenin argued in mid-April 1918 that the "socialist character 
of Soviet, i.e. *proletarian*, democracy" lies, in part, in 
because "the people themselves determine the order and time 
of elections." [_The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government_, 
pp. 36-7] However, the reality in the grassroots was somewhat
different. There "the government [was] continually postponed 
the new general elections to the Petrograd Soviet, the term of 
which had ended in March 1918" because it "feared that the 
opposition parties would show gains. This fear was well 
founded since in the period immediately preceding 25 January,
in those Petrograd factories where the workers had decided
to hold new elections, the Mensheviks, SRs, and non-affiliated
candidates had won about half the seats." [Samuel Farber, 
_Before Stalinism_, p. 22] In Yaroslavl, the "more the 
Bolsheviks tried to postpone the elections, the more the
idea of holding new elections became an issue itself." When
the Bolsheviks gave in and held elections in early April, 
the Mensheviks won 47 of the 98 seats, the Bolsheviks 38 
and the SRs 13. ["The Mensheviks' Political Comeback: 
The Elections to the Provincial City Soviets in Spring
1918", _The Russian Review_, vol. 42, pp. 1-50, p. 18] 
The fate of the Yaroslavl soviet will be discussed shorted. 
As Geoffrey Swain summaries, Menshevik and SR "successes 
in recalling Bolshevik delegates from the soviets had 
forced the Bolsheviks increasingly to delay by-elections." 
[_The Origins of the Russian Civil War_, p. 91]

As well as postponing elections and recall, the Bolsheviks 
also quickly turned to gerrymandering the soviets to ensure 
the stability of their majority in the soviets. In this 
they made use of certain institutional problems the 
soviets had had from the start. On the day which the 
Petrograd soviet was formed in 1917, the Bolshevik 
Shlyapnikov "proposed that each socialist party should 
have the right to two seats in the provisional executive 
committee of the soviet." This was "designed, initially, 
to give the Bolsheviks a decent showing, for they were 
only a small minority of the initiating group." It was 
agreed. However, the "result was that members of a dozen 
different parties and organisations (trades unions, 
co-operative movements, etc.) entered the executive 
committee. They called themselves 'representatives'
(of their organisations) and, by virtue of this, they 
speedily eliminated from their discussions the committee
members chosen by the general assembly although they were
the true founders of the Soviet." This meant, for example,
Bolshevik co-founders of the soviet made way for such 
people as Kamenev and Stalin. Thus the make-up of the 
soviet executive committee was decided upon by "the
leadership of each organisation, its executive officers,
and not with the [soviet] assembly. The assembly had lost 
its right to control." Thus, for example, the Bolshevik
central committee member Yoffe became the presidium of
the soviet of district committees without being elected
by anyone represented at those soviets. "After October,
the Bolsheviks were more systematic in their use of these
methods, but there was a difference: there were now no
truly free elections that might have put a brake to a
procedure that could only benefit the Bolshevik party."
[Marc Ferro, _October 1917_, p. 191 and p. 195]

The effects of this can be seen in Petrograd soviet 
elections of June 1918. In these the Bolsheviks "lost 
the absolute majority in the soviet they had previously 
enjoyed" but remained its largest party. However, the 
results of these elections were irrelevant. This was 
because "under regulations prepared by the Bolsheviks 
and adopted by the 'old' Petrograd soviet, more than
half of the projected 700-plus deputies in the 'new' 
soviet were to be elected by the Bolshevik-dominated 
district soviets, trade unions, factory committees, 
Red Army and naval units, and district worker 
conferences: thus, the Bolsheviks were assured of 
a solid majority even before factory voting began." 
[Alexander Rabinowitch, _Early Disenchantment with 
Bolshevik Rule_, p. 45] To be specific, the number 
of delegates elected directly from the workplace made 
up a mere third of the new soviet (i.e. only 260 of the 
700 plus deputies in the new soviet were elected directly 
from the factories): "It was this arbitrary 'stacking' of 
the new soviet, much more than election of 'dead souls' 
from shut-down factories, unfair campaign practices, 
falsification of the vote, or direct repression, that 
gave the Bolsheviks an unfair advantage in the contest." 
[Alexander Rabinowitch, _The Petrograd First City 
District Soviet during the Civil War_, p. 140]

In other words, the Bolsheviks gerrymandered and packed 
the soviet to remain in power, so distorting the soviet 
structure to ensure Bolshevik dominance. This practice
seems to have been commonplace. In Saratov, as in Petrograd, 
"the Bolsheviks, fearing that they would lose elections,
changed the electoral rules . . . in addition to the 
delegates elected directly at the factories, the trade
unions -- but only those in favour of soviet power, in
other words supporters of the Bolsheviks and Left SRs --
were given representation. Similarly, the political
parties supporting Soviet power automatically received
twenty-five seats in the soviets. Needless to say, these
rules heavily favoured the ruling parties" as the 
Mensheviks and SRs "were regarded by the Bolsheviks as
being against Soviet power." [Brovkin, Op. Cit., p. 30] 

A similar situation existed in Moscow. For example, the 
largest single union in the soviet in 1920 was that of 
soviet employees with 140 deputies (9% of the total), 
followed by the metal workers with 121 (8%). In total, 
the bureaucracies of the four biggest trade unions had 
29.5% of delegates in the Moscow soviet. This packing 
of the soviet by the trade union bureaucracy existed 
in 1918 as well, ensuring the Bolsheviks were 
insulated from popular opposition and the recall of 
workplace delegates by their electors. Another form of 
gerrymandering was uniting areas of Bolshevik strength 
"for electoral purposes with places where they were weak, 
such as the creation of a single constituency out of the 
Moscow food administration (MPO) and the Cheka in February 
1920." [Richard Sakwa, _Soviet Communists in Power_, 
p. 179 and p. 178]

However, this activity was mild compared to the Bolshevik
response to soviet elections which did not go their way. 
According to one historian, by the spring of 1918 "Menshevik 
newspapers and activists in the trade unions, the Soviets, 
and the factories had made a considerable impact on a working 
class which was becoming increasingly disillusioned with the 
Bolshevik regime, so much so that in many places the Bolsheviks 
felt constrained to dissolve Soviets or prevent re-elections 
where Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries had gained 
majorities." [Israel Getzler, _Martov_, p. 179] This is 
confirmed by other sources. "By the middle of 1918," notes 
Leonard Schapiro, "the Mensheviks could claim with some 
justification that large numbers of the industrial working 
class were now behind them, and that for the systematic
dispersal and packing of the soviets, and the mass arrests 
at workers' meetings and congresses, their party could 
eventually have won power by its policy of constitutional 
opposition. In the elections to the soviets which were 
taking place in the spring of 1918 throughout Russia, 
arrests, military dispersal, even shootings followed 
whenever Mensheviks succeeded in winning majorities or 
a substantial representation." [_The Origin of the
Communist Autocracy_, p. 191]

For example, the Mensheviks "made something of a comeback 
about Saratov workers in the spring of 1918, for which the 
Bolsheviks expelled them from the soviet." [Donald J.
Raleigh, _Experiencing Russia's Civil War_, p. 187] Izhevsk, 
a town of 100,000 with an armaments industry which was 
the main suppliers of rifles to the Tzar's Army, experienced 
a swing to the left by the time of the October revolution.
The Bolsheviks and SR-Maximalists became the majority and
with a vote 92 to 58 for the soviet to assume power. After 
a revolt by SR-Maximalist Red Guards against the Bolshevik
plans for a centralised Red Army in April, 1918, the 
Bolsheviks became the sole power. However, in the May
elections the Mensheviks and [right] SRs "experienced a 
dramatic revival" and for "the first time since September 
1917, these two parties constituted a majority in the
Soviet by winning seventy of 135 seats." The Bolsheviks
"simply refused to acquiesce to the popular mandate of
the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries." In June,
the Bolshevik leadership "appealed to the Karzan' Soviet
. . . for assistance." The troops sent along with the
Bolshevik dominated Red Guards "abrogated the results
of the May and June elections" and imprisoned the SR
and Menshevik soviet delegates. The summer of 1918 also
saw victories for the SRs and Mensheviks in the soviet 
elections in Votkinsk, a steel town near Izhevsk. "As 
in Izhevsk the Bolsheviks voided the elections." [Stephan 
M. Merk, "The 'Class-Tragedy' of Izhevsk: Working Class 
Opposition to Bolshevism in 1918", pp. 176-90, _Russian
History_, vol. 2, no. 2, p. 181 and p. 186]

However, the most in depth account of this destruction 
of soviet is found in the research of Vladimir Brovkin. 
According to him, there "are three factors" which emerge 
from the soviet election results in the spring of 1918. 
These are, firstly, "the impressive success of the 
Menshevik-SR opposition" in those elections in all 
regions in European Russia. The second "is the 
Bolshevik practice of outright disbandment of the 
Menshevik-SR-controlled soviets. The third is the 
subsequent wave of anti-Bolshevik uprisings." In 
fact, "in all provincial capitals of European Russia
where elections were held on which there are data, the
Mensheviks and the SRs won majorities on the city
soviets in the spring of 1918." Brovkin stresses that
the "process of the Menshevik-SR electoral victories
threatened Bolshevik power. That is why in the course
of the spring and summer of 1918, the soviet assemblies
were disbanded in most cities and villages. To stay in
power, the Bolsheviks had to destroy the soviets. . .
These steps generated a far-reaching transformation in
the soviet system, which remained 'soviet' in name
only." Brovkin presents accounts from numerous towns 
and cities. As an example, he discusses Tver' where 
the "escalation of political tensions followed the 
already familiar pattern" as the "victory of the 
opposition at the polls" in April 1918 "brought about 
an intensification of the Bolshevik repression. Strikes, 
protests, and marches in Tver' lead to the imposition 
of martial law." [Brovkin, Op. Cit., p. 46, p. 47, p. 48 
and p. 11] Thus Bolshevik armed force not only overthrew 
the election results, it also suppressed working class 
protest against such actions. (Brovkin's book _The 
Mensheviks after October_ contains the same information 
as his article).

This Bolshevik attack on the soviets usually started with 
attempts to stop new elections. For example, after a 
demonstration in Petrograd in favour of the Constituent 
Assembly was repressed by the Bolsheviks in mid-January 
1918, calls for new elections to the soviet occurred in 
many factories. "Despite the efforts of the Bolsheviks 
and the Factory Committees they controlled, the movement 
for new elections to the soviet spread to more than twenty 
factories by early February and resulted in the election 
of fifty delegates: thirty-six SRs, seven Mensheviks and 
seven non-party." However, the Bolsheviks "unwillingness 
to recognise the elections and to seat new delegates 
pushed a group of Socialists to . . . lay plans for an 
alternative workers' forum . . . what was later to become 
the Assembly of Workers' Plenipotentiaries." [Scott Smith, 
"The Social-Revolutionaries and the Dilemma of Civil War", 
_The Bolsheviks in Russian Society_, pp. 83-104, Vladimir 
N. Brovkin (Ed.), pp. 85-86] As we discuss in section H.8.5 
this forum, like all forms of working class protest, was 
crushed by the Bolshevik state. By the time the elections
were held, in June 1918, the civil war had started 
(undoubtedly favouring the Bolsheviks) and the Bolsheviks 
had secured their majority by packing the soviet with 
non-workplace "representatives."

In Tula, again in the spring of 1918, local Bolsheviks 
reported to the Bolshevik Central Committee that the 
"Bolshevik deputies began to be recalled one after 
another . . . our situation became shakier with passing 
day. We were forced to block new elections to the soviet 
and even not to recognise them where they had taken place 
not in our favour." In the end, the local party leader 
was forced to abolish the city soviet and to vest power 
in the Provincial Executive Committee. This refused to 
convene a plenum of the city soviet for more than two 
months, knowing that newly elected delegates were 
non-Bolshevik. [Smith, Op. Cit., p. 87]

In Yaroslavl', the newly elected soviet convened on April 
9th, 1918, and when it elected a Menshevik chairman, "the 
Bolshevik delegation walked out and declared the soviet 
dissolved. In response, workers in the city went out on 
strike, which the Bolsheviks answered by arresting the 
strike committee and threatening to dismiss the strikers 
and replace them with unemployed workers." This failed and
the Bolsheviks were forced to hold new elections, which 
they lost. Then "the Bolsheviks dissolved this soviet as 
well and places the city under martial law." A similar 
event occurred in Riazan' (again in April) and, again, 
the Bolsheviks "promptly dissolved the soviet and declared 
a dictatorship under a Military-Revolutionary Committee." 
[Op. Cit., pp. 88-9]

The opposition parties raised such issues at the All-Russian 
Central Executive Committee of Soviets (VTsIK), to little avail. 
On the 11th of April, one "protested that non-Bolshevik controlled
soviets were being dispersed by armed force, and wanted to
discuss the issue." The chairman "refus[ed] to include it in
the agenda because of lack of supporting material" and such
information be submitted to the presidium of the soviet. The
majority (i.e. the Bolsheviks) "supported their chairman"
and the facts were "submitted . . . to the presidium, where
they apparently remained." It should be noted that the "same
fate befell attempts to challenge the arrests of Moscow 
anarchists by the government on 12 April." The chairman's
"handling of the anarchist matter ended its serious discussion
in the VTsIK." [Charles Duval, Op. Cit., pp. 13-14] Given that 
the VTsIK was *meant* to be the highest soviet body between 
congresses, the lack of concern for Bolshevik repression 
against soviets and opposition groups clearly shows the 
Bolshevik contempt for soviet democracy.

Needless to say, this destruction of soviet democracy
continued during the civil war. For example, the 
Bolsheviks simply rejected the voice of people and 
would refuse to accept an election result. Emma
Goldman attended an election meeting of bakers in Moscow 
in March, 1920. "It was," she said, "the most exciting 
gathering I had witnessed in Russia." However the "chosen 
representative, an Anarchist, had been refused his mandate
by the Soviet authorities. It was the third time the
workers gathered to re-elect their delegate . . . and
every time they elected the same man. The Communist
candidate opposing him was Semashko, the Commissar of
the Department of Health . . . [who] raved against the
workers for choosing a non-Communist, called anathema
upon their heads, and threatened them with the Tcheka
and the curtailment of their rations. But he had no
effect on the audience except to emphasise their 
opposition to him, and to arouse antagonism against the
party he represented. The workers' choice was repudiated
by the authorities by the authorities and later even
arrested and imprisoned." After a hunger strike, they
were released. In spite of chekists with loaded guns
attending union meetings, the bakers "would not be
intimidated" and threatened a strike "unless they
were permitted to elect their own candidate. This ensured
the bakers' demands were met. [_My Disillusionment in
Russia_, pp. 88-9]

Unsurprisingly, "there is a mass of evidence to support 
the Menshevik accusations of electoral malpractice" during
elections in May 1920. And in spite of Menshevik "declaration
of support for the Soviet regime against the Poles" the
party was "still subject to harassment." [Skawa, Op. Cit.,
p. 178]

This gerrymandering was not limited to just local soviets.
The Bolsheviks used it at the fifth soviet congress as 

well. 

First, it should be noted that in the run up to the congress,
"on 14 June 1918, they expelled Martov and his five Mensheviks

together with the Socialist Revolutionaries from the Central
Executive Committee, closed down their newspapers . . and
drove them underground, just on the eve of the elections to
the Fifth Congress of Soviets in which the Mensheviks were
expected to make significant gains." [Israel Getzler, 
_Martov_, p. 181] The rationale for this action was the
claim that the Mensheviks had taken part in anti-soviet
rebellions (as we discuss in section H.6.23, this was not
true). The action was opposed by the Left SRs, who correctly
questioned the legality of the Bolshevik expulsion of
opposition groupings. They "branded the proposed expulsion 
bill illegal, since the Mensheviks and SRs had been sent 
to the CEC by the Congress of Soviets, and only the next 
congress had the right to withdraw their representation. 
Furthermore, the Bolsheviks had no right to pose as 
defenders of the soviets against the alleged SR 
counter-revolution when they themselves has been disbanding 
the peasants' soviets and creating the committees of the 
poor to replace them." [Brovkin, _The Mensheviks After
October_, p. 231] When the vote was taken, only the 
Bolsheviks supported it. Their votes were sufficient 
to pass it.

Given that the Mensheviks had been winning soviet elections
across Russia, it is clear that this action was driven far
more by political needs than the truth. This resulted in 
the Left Social Revolutionaries (LSRs) as the only 
significant party left in the run up to the fifth Congress. 
The LSR author (and ex-commissar for justice in the only 
coalition soviet government) of the only biography of LSR 
leader (and long standing revolutionary who suffered 
torture and imprisonment in her fight against Tsarism) 
Maria Spiridonova states that "[b]etween 900 and 100 
delegates were present. Officially the LSR numbered 40 
percent of the delegates. They own opinion was that 
their number were even higher. The Bolsheviks strove to 
keep their majority by all the means in their power." He 
quotes Spiridonova's address to the Congress: "You may 
have a majority in this congress, but you do have not 
a majority in the country." [I. Steinberg, _Spiridonova_, 
p. 209] 

Historian Geoffrey Swain indicates that the LSRs had a 
point:

"Up to the very last minute the Left SRs had been 
confident that, as the voice of Russia's peasant masses,
they would receive a majority when the Fifth Congress of
Soviets assembled . . . which would enable them to deprive
Lenin of power and launch a revolutionary war against Germany.
Between April and the end of June 1918 membership of their
party had almost doubled, from 60,000 to 100,000, and to
prevent them securing a majority at the congress Lenin was
forced to rely on dubious procedures: he allowed so-called
committees of poor peasants to be represented at the congress.
Thus as late as 3 July 1918 returns suggested a majority 
for the Left SRs, but a Congress of Committees of Poor
Peasants held in Petrograd the same day 'redressed the 
balance in favour of the Bolsheviks,' to quote the 
_Guardian_'s Philips-Price, by deciding it had the right
to represent the all those districts where local soviets
had not been 'cleansed of kulak elements and had not 
delivered the amount of food laid down in the requisitioning
lists of the Committees of Poor Peasants.' This blatant
gerrymandering ensured a Bolshevik majority at the
Fifth Congress of Soviets." [_The Origins of the Russian
Civil War_, p. 176]

Historian Alexander Rabinowitch confirms this gerrymandering. 
As he put it, by the summer of 1918 "popular disenchantment 
with Bolshevik rule was already well advanced, not only in
rural but also in urban Russia" and the "primary beneficiaries
of this nationwide grass-roots shift in public opinion 
were the Left SRs. During the second half of June 1918, 
it was an open question which of the two parties would
have a majority at the Fifth All-Russian Congress of 
Soviets . . . On the evening of 4 July, virtually from 
the moment the Fifth Congress of Soviets opened in Moscow's 
Bolshoi Theatre, it was clear to the Left SRs that the 
Bolsheviks had effectively 'fabricated' a sizeable majority 
in the congress and consequently, that there was no hope 
whatever of utilising it to force a fundamental change in 
the government's pro-German, anti-peasant policies." While 
he acknowledges that an "exact breakdown of properly 
elected delegates may be impossible to ascertain" it 
was possible ("based on substantial but incomplete archival 
evidence") to conclude that "it is quite clear that the 
Bolshevik majority was artificially inflated and highly
suspect." He quotes the report of one leading LSR, based on
data from LSR members of the congress's Credentials Committee,
saying that the Bolsheviks "conjured up" 299 voting delegates.
"The Bible tells us," noted the report's author, "that God
created the heavens and the earth from nothing . . . In the
twentieth century the Bolsheviks are capable of no lesser
miracles: out of nothing, they create legitimate credentials."
["Maria Spiridonova's 'Last Testament'", _The Russian Review_,
pp. 424-46, vol. 54, July 1995, p. 426]

This gerrymandering played a key role in the subsequent
events. "Deprived of their democratic majority," Swain
notes, "the Left SRs resorted to terror and assassinated
the German ambassador Mirbach." [Swain, Op. Cit., p. 176] 
The LSR assassination of Mirbach and the events which 
followed were soon labelled by the Bolsheviks an "uprising" 
against "soviet power" (see section H.6.23 for more details).
Lenin "decided that the killing of Mirbach provided
a fortuitous opportunity to put an end to the growing 
Left SR threat." [Rabinowitch, Op. Cit., p. 427] After 
this, the LSRs followed the Mensheviks and Right SRs and 
were expelled from the soviets. This in spite of the 
fact that the rank and file knew nothing of the plans of 
the central committees and that their soviet delegates 
had been elected by the masses. The Bolsheviks had finally
eliminated the last of their more left-wing opponents 
(the anarchists had been dealt with the in April, see 
section H.6.24 for details).

As discussed in section H.6.21, the Committees of 
Poor Peasants were only supported by the Bolsheviks. 
Indeed, the Left SRs opposed then as being utterly 
counter-productive and an example of Bolshevik ignorance
of village life. Consequently, we can say that the
"delegates" from the committees were Bolsheviks or
at least Bolshevik supporters. Significantly, by 
early 1919 Lenin admitted the Committees were failures
and ordered them disbanded. The new policy reflected
Left SR arguments against the Committees. It is hard 
not to concur with Vladimir Brovkin that by 
"establishing the committees of the poor to replace
the [rural] soviets . . . the Bolsheviks were trying to
create some institutional leverage of their own in
the countryside for use against the SRs. In this light,
the Bolshevik measures against the Menshevik-led city
soviets . . . and against SR-led village soviets may
be seen as a two-pronged attempt to stem the tide
that threatened to leave them in the minority at the
Fifth Congress of Soviets." [_The Mensheviks after
October_, p. 226]

Thus, by July 1918, the Bolsheviks had effectively
secured a monopoly of political power in Russia. When 
the Bolsheviks (rightly, if hypocritically) disbanded 
the Constituent Assembly in January 1918, they had 
claimed that the soviets (rightly) represented a 
superior form of democracy. Once they started losing 
soviet elections, they could find no better way to 
"secure" workers' democracy than to destroy it by 
gerrymandering soviets, disbanding them and expelling
opposition parties from them. All peaceful attempts 
to replace them had been destroyed. The soviet CEC 
was marginalised and without any real power. 
Opposition parties had been repressed, usually on 
little or no evidence. The power of the soviets 
had been replaced by a soviet power in less than 
a year. However, this was simply the culmination
of a process which had started when the Bolsheviks
seized power in November 1917. Simply put, the Bolsheviks
had always aimed for "all power to the party via the
soviets" and once this had been achieved, the soviets
could be dispensed with. Maurice Brinton simply stated
the obvious when he wrote that "when institutions such
as the soviets could no longer be influenced by 
ordinary workers, the regime could no longer be 
called a soviet regime." [_The Bolsheviks and Workers'
Control_, p. xiii] By this obvious criteria, the
Bolshevik regime was no longer soviet by the spring 
of 1918, i.e. before the outbreak of civil war. While
opposition groups were not finally driven out of the
soviets until 1923 (i.e. three years *after* the end
of the civil war) their presence "does not indicate
the existence of a multi-party system since they in 
no way threatened the dominating role of the Bolsheviks,
and they had not done so from mid-1918." [Richard 
Sakwa, Op. Cit., p. 168]

Tony Cliff, leader of the British Leninist party the SWP, 

justified the repression of the Mensheviks and SRs on the 
grounds that they were not prepared to accept the Soviet 
system and rejected the role of "constitutional opposition." 
He tries to move forward the repression until after the 
outbreak of full civil war by stating that "[d]espite their 
strong opposition to the government, for some time, i.e. 
until after the armed uprising of the Czechoslovakian Legion 
[in late May, 1918] -- the Mensheviks were not much hampered 
in their propaganda work." If having papers banned every 
now and then, members arrested and soviets being disbanded 
as soon as they get a Menshevik majority is "not much 
hampered" then Cliff does seem to be giving that phrase 
a new meaning. Similarly, Cliff's claim that the "civil 
war undermined the operation of the local soviets" also 
seems lacking based on this new research. [_Lenin: 
Revolution Besieged_, vol. 3, p. 163, p. 167 and p. 150]

However, the Bolshevik assault on the soviets started during 
the 
spring of 1918 (i.e. in March, April and May). That 
is *before* the Czech rising and the onset of full scale 
civil war which occurred in late May (see section H.8.3
on Bolshevik repression before the Czech revolt). Nor is 
it true that the Mensheviks rejected constitutional 
methods. Though they wished to see a re-convocation of the 
Constituent Assembly they believed that the only way to 
do this was by winning a majority of the soviets (see
section H.6.23). Clearly, attempts to blame the Civil 
War for the elimination of soviet power and democracy 
seems woefully weak given the actions of the Bolsheviks 
in the spring of 1918. And, equally clearly, the 
reduction of local soviet influence cannot be fully 
understood without factoring in the Bolshevik prejudice 
in favour of centralisation (as codified in the Soviet 
Constitution of 1918) along with this direct repression 
(see section H.9.7 for further discussion).

The simple fact is that the soviets were marginalised
and undermined after the October Revolution simply 
because they *did* reflect the wishes of the working
class, in spite of their defects (defects the Bolsheviks
exploited to consolidate their power). The problem was
that the workers no longer supported Lenin. Few Leninists
would support such an obvious conclusion. For example,
John Rees states that "[i]n the cities the Reds enjoyed 
the fierce 
and virtually undivided loyalty of the masses 
throughout the civil war period." ["In Defence of October", 
pp. 3-82, _International Socialism_, no. 52, p. 47] Which, 
of course, explains the vast number of strikes and protests 
directed against the Bolshevik regime and the workers' 
resolutions calling its end! It also explains why the
Bolsheviks, in the face of such "undivided loyalty",
had to suppress opposition parties and impose a party
dictatorship!

Simply put, *if* the Bolsheviks did have the support
Rees states they did then they had no need to repress
soviet democracy and opposition parties. Such "fierce"
loyalty would not have been amenable to opposition 
arguments. Strange, then, that the Bolsheviks continually 
explained working class unrest in terms of the influence
of Mensheviks, Left SRs and so on during the civil war.
Moreover, Rees contradicts himself by arguing that if 
the Kronstadt revolt had succeeded, then it would have 
resulted in "the fall of the Bolsheviks." [Op. Cit., 
p. 63] Now, given that the Kronstadt revolt called for 
free soviet elections (and *not* "soviets without parties" 
as Rees asserts), why did the Bolsheviks not agree to them 
(at least in the cities)? If, as Rees argues, the Reds had 
the fierce loyalty of the city workers, then why did the 
Bolsheviks not introduce soviet democracy in the cities
after the end of the Civil War? Simply because they knew
that such "loyalty" did not, in fact, exist. Zinoviev,
for example, declared that the Bolsheviks' support had
been reduced to 1 per cent in early 1920. [Farber,
_Before Stalinism_, p. 188] 

So much for working class "loyalty" to the Bolsheviks.
And, needless to say, Rees' comments totally ignore
the election results *before* the start of the civil war
which prompted the Bolsheviks to pack or disband soviets.
As Bertrand Russell summarised from his experiences in 
Lenin's Russia during the civil war (in 1920): "No 
conceivable system of free elections would give majorities 
to the Communists, either in the town or country." [_The 
Practice and Theory of Bolshevism_, pp. 40-1] Thus we 
have a major contradiction in the pro-Leninist argument.
On the one hand, they stress that the workers supported the 
Bolsheviks wholeheartedly during the civil war. On the other,
they argue that party dictatorship had to be imposed. If
the Bolsheviks had the support they claimed they had, then 
they would have won soviet elections easily. They did not
and so free soviet elections were not held.

This fact also explains the fate of the so-called "non
party" conferences favoured by the Bolsheviks in late 
1920. In spite of praising the soviets as "more democratic" 
than anything in the "best democratic republics of the 
bourgeois world," Lenin also argued that non-Party 
conferences were also required "to be able to watch the 
mood of the masses, to come closer to them, to respond 
to their demands." [_Left-Wing Communism_, p. 33 and p. 32]
If the soviets were as democratic as Lenin claimed, then 
the Bolsheviks would have no need of "non-party" conferences.
Significantly, the Bolsheviks "responded" to these conferences 
and "their demands" by disbanding them. This was because 
"[d]uring the disturbances" of late 1920, "they provided an
effective platform for criticism of Bolshevik policies." 
Their frequency was decreased and they "were discontinued 
soon afterward." [Richard Sakwa, _Soviet Communists in Power_, 
p. 203] In other words, they meet the same fate as the 
soviets in the spring and summer of 1918.

Perhaps we should not be too surprised by these developments.
After all, as we discuss in section H.9.8, the Bolsheviks had
long had a distinctly undemocratic political ideology. Their
support for democratic norms were less than consistent. The
one thing they *were* consistent was their hypocrisy. Thus
democratic decisions were to be binding on their opponents
(even if that majority had to be manipulated into being) but
not upon them. Before the revolution Lenin had openly espoused 
a double standard of discipline. "We will not permit," he
argued, "the idea of unity to tie a noose around our necks, 
and we shall under no circumstances permit the Mensheviks to 
lead us by the rope." [quoted by Robert V. Daniels, _The 
Conscience of the Revolution_, p. 17] Once in power, their
political perspectives had little trouble ignoring the will
of the working class when it classed with what they, as that
class's self-proclaimed vanguard, had decided what was in
its best interests. As we discussed in section H.5, such a
autocratic perspective is at the heart of vanguardism. If
you aim for party power, it comes as no surprise that the
organs used to achieve it will wither under it. Just as
muscles only remain strong if you use them, so soviets
can only work if it is used to run society, not nominate
the handful of party leaders who do. As Kropotkin argued 
in 1920:

"The idea of soviets . . . of councils of workers and peasants 
. . . controlling the economic and political life of the country 
is a great idea. All the more so, since it necessarily follows 
that these councils should be composed of all who take part in 
the production of natural wealth by their own efforts.

"But as long as the country is governed by a party dictatorship,
the workers' and peasants' councils evidently lose their
entire significance. They are reduced to . . . [a] passive
role . . . A council of workers ceases to be free and of any
use when liberty of the press no longer exists . . . [and
they] lose their significance when the elections are not
preceded by a free electoral campaign, and when the elections
are conducted under pressure of a party dictatorship . . . It
means the death-knell of the new system." [_Kropotkin's
Revolutionary Pamphlets_, pp. 254-5] 

Clearly, the fate of the soviets after October shows the
dangers of Bolshevism to popular self-management and 
autonomy. We should be try and learn the lessons from the
experience rather than, as pro-Bolsheviks do, rationalise
and justify the usurpation of power by the party. The most
obvious lesson to learn is to oppose the creation of any
power *above* the soviets. This was not lost on Russian 
anarchists active in the revolution. For this reason, 
anarcho-syndicalists resolved, in August 1918, that they 
"were for the soviets but categorically against the Soviet 
of People's Commissars as an organ which does not stem 
from the soviet structure but only interferes with its 
work." Thus they were "for the establishment of *free 
soviets* of workers' and peasants' representatives, and 
the abolition of the Soviet of People's Commissars as an 
organisation inimical to the interests of the working 
class." [contained in Paul Avrich, _The Anarchists in 
the Russian Revolution_, p. 118 and p. 117] This resolution 
was driven by the experience of the  Bolshevik dominated 
"soviet" regime.

It is also worth quoting Rudolf Rocker at length on this
issue:

"Let no one object that the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' 
cannot be compared to run of the mill dictatorship because 
it is the dictatorship of a class. Dictatorship of a class
cannot exist as such, for it ends up, in the last analysis, 
as being the dictatorship of a given party which arrogates 
to itself the right to speak for that class. Thus, the liberal
bourgeoisie, in their fight against despotism, used to speak 
in the name of the 'people'. . . 

"We already know that a revolution cannot be made with rosewater. 
And we know, too, that the owning classes will never yield up 
their privileges spontaneously. On the day of victorious 
revolution the workers will have to impose their will on the 
present owners of the soil, of the subsoil and of the means 
of production, which cannot be done -- let us be clear on 
this -- without the workers taking the capital of society 
into their own hands, and, above all, without their having 
demolished the authoritarian structure which is, and will 
continue to be, the fortress keeping the masses of the people 
under dominion. Such an action is, without doubt, an act of 
liberation; a proclamation of social justice; the very essence 
of social revolution, which has nothing in common with the 
utterly bourgeois principle of dictatorship.

"The fact that a large number of socialist parties have 
rallied to the idea of councils, which is the proper mark 
of libertarian socialist and revolutionary syndicalists, 
is a confession, recognition that the tack they have taken 
up until now has been the product of a falsification, a 
distortion, and that with the councils the labour movement 
must create for itself a single organ capable of carrying 
into effect the unmitigated socialism that the conscious 
proletariat longs for. On the other hand, it ought not to 
be forgotten that this abrupt conversion runs the risk of 
introducing many alien features into the councils concept, 
features, that is, with no relation to the original tasks 
of socialism, and which have to be eliminated because they 
pose a threat to the further development of the councils. 
These alien elements are able only to conceive things from 
the dictatorial viewpoint. It must be our task to face up 
to this risk and warn our class comrades against experiments 
which cannot bring the dawn of social emancipation any 
nearer -- which indeed, to the contrary, positively postpone 
it.

"Consequently, our advice is as follows: Everything for the 
councils or soviets! No power above them! A slogan which at 
the same time will be that of the social revolutionary." 
[_Anarchism and Sovietism_]

The validity of this argument can be seen, for example, from 
the expulsion of opposition parties from the soviets in June
and July 1918. This act exposes the hollowness of Bolshevik 
claims of their soviet system presented a form of "higher" 
democracy. If the Bolshevik soviet system was, as they 
claimed, based on instant recall then why did they, for 
example, have to expel the Mensheviks and Right SRs from 
the soviet CEC in the first place? Why did the electors not
simply recall them? It was two weeks after the Czech revolt
before the Bolsheviks acted, surely enough time for voters
to act? Perhaps this did not happen because the CEC was not, 
in fact, subject to instant recall at all? Being nominated
at the quarterly soviet congress, they were effectively 
isolated from popular control. It also means that the 
Bolshevik government was even more insulated from popular 
control and accountability. To "recall" it, electors would 
have to either wait for the next national soviet congress 
or somehow convince the CEC to call an emergency one. As 
an example of workers' running society, the Bolshevik  
system leaves much to be desired.

Another obvious lesson to learn was the use of appointments
to the soviets and their executives from other organisations.
As seen above, the Bolsheviks used the "representation" of
other bodies they control (such as trade unions) to pack 
soviet assemblies in their favour. Similarly, allowing 
political parties to nominate representatives in soviet
executives also marginalised the soviet assemblies and those
delegates actually elected in the workplaces. 

This was obvious to the Russian anarchists, who argued "for 
effective soviets organised on collective lines with the 
direct delegation of workers and peasants from every factory, 
workshop, village, etc., and not political chatterboxes 
gaining entry through party lists and turning the soviets 
into talking shops." [contained in Paul Avrich, _The 
Anarchists in the Russian Revolution_, p. 118] The 
Makhnovists, likewise, argued that "[o]nly labourers who 
are contributing work necessary to the social economy should 
participate in the soviets. Representatives of political 
organisations have no place in worker-peasant soviets, 
since their participation in a workers' soviet will 
transform the latter into deputies of the party and 
can lead to the downfall of the soviet system." 
[contained in Peter Arshinov's _History of the Makhnovist 
Movement_, p. 266] As we discuss in H.11.15, Leninists
sometimes distort this into a claim that the Makhnovists
opposed members of political standing for election.

This use of party lists meant that soviet delegates could 
be anyone. For example, the leading left-wing Menshevik 
Martov recounts that in early 1920 Bolsheviks in a chemical 
factory "put up Lenin against me as a candidate [to the 
Moscow soviet]. I received seventy-six votes he-eight (in 
an open vote)." [quoted by Israel Getzler, _Martov_, p. 202] 
How would either of these two intellectuals actually know 
and reflect the concerns and interests of the workers they 
would be "delegates" of? If the soviets were meant to be 
the delegates of working people, then why should non-working 
class members of political parties be elected to a soviet?

However, in spite of these problems, the Russian soviets
were a key means of ensuring working class participation 
in the revolution. As recognised by all the socialist
oppositions to the Bolsheviks, from the anarchists to the
Mensheviks. As one historian put it:

"Small wonder that the principal political demand of
Mensheviks, Left SRs, SR Maximalists, Kronstadt sailors
and of many oppositionists . . . has been for freely
elected soviets which would this be restored to their
original role as agents of democratisation." [Israel 
Getzler, _Soviets as Agents of Democratisation_, p. 30]

The sad fate of the soviets after the Bolshevik seizure 
of power simply confirms the opinion of the left
Menshevik Martov who had "rubbed it in to the Bolsheviks . . . 
at the first All-Russian Congress of Trade Unions [in January
1918], that they who were now extolling the Soviets as the 
'highest forms of the socialist development of the proletariat,' 
had shown little love of them in 1905 or in 1917 after the 
July days; they loved Soviets only when they were 'in the
hands of the Bolshevik party.'" [Getlzer, _Martov_, p. 174]
As the next few months showed, once the soviets left those 
hands, then the soviets themselves were destroyed. The civil 
war did not start this process, it just gave the latter-day 
supporters of Bolshevism something to use to justify these 
actions.

H.7 What was the Kronstadt Rebellion?
	H.7.1 Why is the Kronstadt rebellion important?
	H.7.2 What was the context of the Kronstadt revolt?
	H.7.3 What was the Kronstadt Programme?
	H.7.4 Did the Kronstadt rebellion reflect "the exasperation 
		of the peasantry"?
	H.7.5 What lies did the Bolsheviks spread about Kronstadt?
	H.7.6 Was the Kronstadt revolt a White plot?
	H.7.7 What was the *real* relationship of Kronstadt to 
		the Whites?
	H.7.8 Did the rebellion involve new sailors?
	H.7.9 Was Kronstadt different politically?
	H.7.10 Why did the Petrograd workers not support Kronstadt?
	H.7.11 Were the Whites a threat during the Kronstadt revolt?
	H.7.12 Was the country too exhausted to allow soviet democracy?
	H.7.13 Was there a real alternative to Kronstadt's "third 
		 revolution"?
	H.7.14 How do modern day Trotskyists misrepresent Kronstadt?
	H.7.15 What does Kronstadt tell us about Bolshevism?

H.8 What caused the degeneration of the Russian Revolution?
      H.8.1 Do anarchists ignore the objective factors facing the 
            Russian revolution?
      H.8.2 Can "objective factors" really explain the failure 
            of Bolshevism?
      H.8.3 Can the civil war explain the failure of Bolshevism?
      H.8.4 Did economic collapse and isolation destroy the 
            revolution?
      H.8.5 Was the Russian working class atomised or "declassed"?
      H.8.6 Did the Bolsheviks blame "objective factors" for their 
            actions?

H.9 How did Bolshevik ideology contribute to the failure 
    of the Revolution?
	H.9.1 How did the Marxist historical materialism affect 
		Bolshevism?
	H.9.2 Why did the Marxist theory of the state undermine 
            working class power?
	H.9.3 How did Engels' essay "On Authority" affect the 
            revolution?
	H.9.4 What was the Bolshevik vision of democracy?
	H.9.5 What was the effect of the Bolshevik vision of 
            "socialism"?
	H.9.6 How did Bolshevik preference for nationalisation
		affect the revolution?
      H.9.7 How did Bolshevik preference for centralism affect 
            the revolution?
      H.9.8 How did the aim for party power undermine the 
            revolution?

H.10 Were any of the Bolshevik oppositions a real
     alternative?
	H.10.1 Were the "Left Communists" of 1918 an alternative?
	H.10.2 What were the limitations of the "Workers' Opposition" 
	       of 1920?
	H.10.3 What about Trotsky's "Left Opposition" in the 1920s?
	H.10.4 What do these oppositions tell us about the essence of 
	       Leninism?

H.11 Why does the Makhnovist movement show there is an 
     alternative to Bolshevism?
      H.11.1 Who was Nestor Makhno?
      H.11.2 Why was the movement named after Makhno?
      H.11.3 Why was Makhno called "Batko"?
      H.11.4 Can you give a short overview of the Makhnovist movement?
      H.11.5 How were the Makhnovists organised?
      H.11.6 Did the Makhnovists have a constructive social programme?
      H.11.7 Did they apply their ideas in practice?
      H.11.8 Weren't the Makhnovists just Kulaks?
      H.11.9 Were the Makhnovists anti-Semitic and pogromists?
      H.11.10 Did the Makhnovists hate the city and city workers?
      H.11.11 Were the Makhnovists nationalists?
      H.11.12 Did the Makhnovists support the Whites?
      H.11.13 What was the relationship of the Bolsheviks to 
              the movement? 
	H.11.14 How did the Makhnovists and Bolsheviks differ?
      H.11.15 How do the modern followers of Bolshevism slander the 
              Makhnovists?
      H.11.16 What lessons can be learned from the Makhnovists?

H.7 What was the Kronstadt Rebellion?

The Kronstadt rebellion took place in the first weeks of March,
1921. Kronstadt was (and is) a naval fortress on an island in 
the Gulf of Finland. Traditionally, it has served as the base 
of the Russian Baltic Fleet and to guard the approaches to the 
city of St. Petersburg (which during the first world war was 
re-named Petrograd, then later Leningrad, and is now 
St. Petersburg again) thirty-five miles away. 

The Kronstadt sailors had been in the vanguard of the revolutionary 
events of 1905 and 1917. In 1917, Trotsky called them the "pride 
and glory of the Russian Revolution." The inhabitants of Kronstadt 
had been early supporters and practitioners of soviet power,
forming a free commune in 1917 which was relatively independent 
of the authorities. In the words of Israel Getzler, an expert
on Kronstadt, "it was in its commune-like self-government that
Red Kronstadt really came into its own, realising the radical,
democratic and egalitarian aspirations of its garrison and 
working people, their insatiable appetite for social recognition,
political activity and public debate, their pent up yearning for
education, integration and community. Almost overnight, the ship's
crews, the naval and military units and the workers created
and practised a direct democracy of base assemblies and 
committees." [_Kronstadt 1917-1921_, p. 248] In the centre of 
the fortress an enormous public square served as a popular forum 
holding as many as 30,000 persons. The Kronstadters "proved
convincingly the capacity of ordinary people to use their
'heads, too' in governing themselves, and managing Russia's
largest navel base and fortress." [Getzler, Op. Cit., p. 250]

The Russian Civil War had ended in Western Russia in November
1920 with the defeat of General Wrangel in the Crimea. All
across Russia popular protests were erupting in the countryside 
and in the towns and cities. Peasant uprisings were occurring 
against the Communist Party policy of grain requisitioning (a 
policy the Bolsheviks and their argued had been thrust upon them 
by the circumstances but which involved extensive, barbaric 
and counter-productive repression). In urban areas, a wave of 
spontaneous strikes occurred and in late February a near 
general strike broke out in Petrograd.

On February 26th, in response to these events in Petrograd,
the crews of the battleships *Petropavlovsk* and *Sevastopol*
held an emergency meeting and agreed to send a delegation to
the city to investigate and report back on the ongoing strike
movement. On their turn two days later, the delegates informed 
their fellow sailors of the strikes (with which they had full 
sympathy with) and the government repression directed against 
them. Those present at this meeting on the *Petropavlovsk* then 
approved a resolution which raised 15 demands which included free
elections to the soviets, freedom of speech, press, assembly
and organisation to workers, peasants, anarchists and
left-socialists (see section H.7.3 for full details). Of
the 15 demands, only two were related to what Marxists
like to term the "petty-bourgeoisie" (the peasantry and
artisans) and these demanded "full freedom of action" for all 
peasants and artisans who did not hire labour. Like the
Petrograd workers, the Kronstadt sailors demanded the
equalisation of wages and the end of roadblock detachments 
restricting travel and the ability of workers to bring food 
into the city.

A mass meeting of fifteen to sixteen thousand people was held
in Anchor Square on March 1st and what has became known as
the *Petropavlovsk* resolution was passed after the 
"fact-finding" delegation had made its report. Only two
Bolshevik officials voted against the resolution. At this
meeting it was decided to send another delegation to 
Petrograd to explain to the strikers and the city garrison 
of the demands of Kronstadt and to request that non-partisan
delegates be sent by the Petrograd workers to Kronstadt
to learn first-hand what was happening there. This
delegation of thirty members was arrested by the Bolshevik
government.

As the term of office of the Kronstadt soviet was about
to expire, the mass meeting also decided to call a
"Conference of Delegates" for March 2nd. This was to discuss
the manner in which the new soviet elections would be held. 
This conference consisted of two delegates from the ship's
crews, army units, the docks, workshops, trade unions and
Soviet institutions. This meeting of 303 delegates endorsed
the *Petropavlovsk* resolution and elected a five-person
"Provisional Revolutionary Committee" (this was enlarged
to 15 members two days later by another conference of
delegates). This committee was charged with organising
the defence of Kronstadt, a move decided upon in part by
the threats of the Bolshevik officials there and the
groundless rumour that the Bolsheviks had dispatched 
forces to attack the meeting. Red Kronstadt had turned
against the Communist government and raised the slogan of
the 1917 revolution "All Power to the Soviets", to
which was added "and not to parties." They termed
this revolt the "Third Revolution" and would complete
the work of the first two Russian Revolutions in 1917
by instituting a true toilers republic based on freely
elected, self-managed, soviets.

The Communist Government responded with an ultimatum
on March 2nd. This asserted that the revolt had "undoubtedly
been prepared by French counterintelligence" and that the
*Petropavlovsk* resolution was a "SR-Black Hundred"
resolution (SR stood for "Social Revolutionaries", a
party with a traditional peasant base and whose right-wing
had sided with White forces; the "Black Hundreds" were
a reactionary, indeed proto-fascist, force dating back 
to before the revolution which attacked Jews, labour
militants, radicals and so on). They argued that the
revolt had been organised by an ex-Tsarist officers led 
by ex-General Kozlovsky (who had, ironically, been placed 
in the fortress as a military specialist by Trotsky). This
was the official line through-out the revolt. 

During the revolt, Kronstadt started to re-organise itself
from the bottom up. The trade union committees were 
re-elected and a Council of Trade Unions formed. The
Conference of Delegates met regularly to discuss issues
relating to the interests of Kronstadt and the struggle
against the Bolshevik government (specifically on March
2nd, 4th and 11th). Rank and file Communists left the party 
in droves, expressing support for the revolt and its aim of 
"all power to the soviets and not to parties." About 300 
Communists were arrested and treated humanly in prison 
(in comparison, at least 780 Communists left the party 
in protest of the actions it was taking against Kronstadt 
and its general role in the revolution). Significantly, up 
to one-third of the delegates elected to Kronstadt's rebel 
conference of March 2nd were Communists. [Avrich, Op. Cit., 
pp. 184-7 and p. 81]

The Kronstadt revolt was a non-violent one, but from the start 
the attitude of the authorities was not one of serious negotiation 
but rather one of delivering an ultimatum: either come to your 
senses or suffer the consequences. Indeed, the Bolsheviks
issued the threat that they would shoot the rebels "like
partridges" and took the families of the sailors hostage in
Petrograd. Towards the end of the revolt Trotsky sanctioned 
the use of chemical warfare against the rebels and if they had 
not been crushed, a gas attack would have carried out. [Paul 
Avrich, _Kronstadt 1921_, p. 146 and pp. 211-2] No real attempt 
was made to settle the revolt peacefully. While there was at least 
three to four weeks before the ice was due to melt after the 
March 2nd "Conference of Delegates" meeting which marked the 
real start of the revolt, the Bolsheviks started military 
operations at 6.45pm on March 7th.

There were possible means for a peaceful resolution of the
conflict. On March 5th, two days before the bombardment of 
Kronstadt had begun, anarchists led by Emma Goldman and 
Alexander Berkman offered themselves as intermediates to 
facilitate negotiations between the rebels and the government 
(anarchist influence had been strong in Kronstadt in 1917). 
[Emma Goldman, _Living My Life_, vol. 2, pp. 882-3] This 
was ignored by the Bolsheviks. Years later, the Bolshevik 
Victor Serge (and eye-witness to the events) acknowledged 
that "[e]ven when the fighting had started, it would have 
been easy to avoid the worst: it was only necessary to 
accept the mediation offered by the anarchists (notably 
Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman) who had contact with 
the insurgents. For reasons of prestige and through an 
excess of authoritarianism, the Central Committee refused 
this course." [_The Serge-Trotsky Papers_, p. 164]

Another possible solution, namely the Petrograd Soviet 
suggestion of March 6th that a delegation of party and 
non-party members of the Soviet visit Kronstadt was not 
pursued by the government. The rebels, unsurprisingly enough, 
had reservations about the *real* status of the non-party 
delegates and asked that the elections to the delegation 
take place within the factories, with observers from Kronstadt 
present (in itself a very reasonable request). Nothing came 
of this (unsurprisingly, as such a delegation would have 
reported the truth that Kronstadt was a popular revolt of 
working people so exposing Bolshevik lies and making the 
planned armed attack more difficult). A delegation "sent
by Kronstadt to explain the issues to the Petrograd Soviet
and people was in the prisons of the Cheka." [Victor Serge,
_Memoirs of a Revolutionary_, p. 127]

According to Serge, "right from the first moment, at a time 
when it was easy to mitigate the conflict, the Bolshevik 
leaders had no intention of using anything but forcible
methods." [Ibid.] This is confirmed by latter research.
The refusal to pursue these possible means of resolving the 
crisis peacefully is explained by the fact that the decision
to attack Kronstadt had already been made. Basing himself on 
documents from the Soviet Archives, historian Israel Getzler
states that "[b]y 5 March, if not earlier, the Soviet leaders
had decided to crush Kronstadt. Thus, in a cable to . . . [a]
member of the Council of Labour and Defence, on that day, 
Trotsky insisted that 'only the seizure of Kronstadt will 
put an end to the political crisis in Petrograd.' On the same
day, acting as chairman of the RVSR [the Revolutionary Military
Council of the Army and Navy of the Republic], he ordered the
reformation and mobilisation of the Seventh Army 'to suppress
the uprising in Kronstadt,' and appointed General Mikhail
Tukhachevskii as its commander changed with suppressing the
uprising in Kronstadt 'in the shortest possible time.'" ["The 
Communist Leaders' Role in the Kronstadt Tragedy of 1921 in 
the Light of Recently Published Archival Documents", 
_Revolutionary Russia_, pp. 24-44, Vol. 15, No. 1, June 2002, 
p. 32] 

As Alexander Berkman noted, the Communist government would "make 
no concessions to the proletariat, while at the same time they 
were offering to compromise with the capitalists of Europe and 
America." [Berkman, _The Russian Tragedy_, p. 62] While happy to 
negotiate and compromise with foreign governments, they treated 
the workers and peasants of Kronstadt (like that of the rest of 
Russia) as the class enemy (indeed, at the time, Lenin was 
publicly worrying whether the revolt was a White plot to sink 
these negotiations!). 

The revolt was isolated and received no external support.
The Petrograd workers were under martial law and could
little or no action to support Kronstadt (assuming they
refused to believe the Bolshevik lies about the uprising).
The Communist government started to attack Kronstadt on 
March 7th. The first assault was a failure. "After the
Gulf had swallowed its first victims," Paul Avrich records,
"some of the Red soldiers, including a body of Peterhof 
*kursanty*, began to defect to the insurgents. Others 
refused to advance, in spite of threats from the machine
gunners at the rear who had orders to shoot any wavers.
The commissar of the northern group reported that his
troops wanted to send a delegation to Kronstadt to find
out the insurgents' demands." [Avrich, Op. Cit., pp. 153-4]
After 10 days of constant attacks the Kronstadt revolt 
was crushed by the Red Army. On March 17th, the final
assault occurred. Again, the Bolsheviks had to force their
troops to fight. On the night of 16-17 March, for example,
"the extraordinary *troika* of Aleksei Nikolaev had arrested
over 100 so-called instigators, 74 of whom he had publicly
shot." [Geltzer, Op. Cit., p. 35] Once the Bolshevik forces 
finally entered the city of Kronstadt "the attacking troops
took revenge for their fallen comrades in an orgy of 
bloodletting." [Avrich, Op. Cit., p. 211] The next day, 
as an irony of history, the Bolsheviks celebrated the 
fiftieth anniversary of the Paris Commune. 

The repression did not end there. According to Serge, the 
"defeated sailors belonged body and sole to the Revolution;
they had voiced the suffering and the will of the Russian 
people" yet "[h]undreds of prisoners were taken away to
Petrograd; months later they were still being shot in small
batches, a senseless and criminal agony" (particularly as
they were "prisoners of war . . . and the Government had
for a long time promised an amnesty to its opponents on
condition that they offered their support"). "This 
protracted massacre was either supervised or permitted
by Dzerzhinsky" (the head of the Cheka). The "responsibilities
of the Bolshevik Central Committee had been simply enormous"
and "the subsequent repression . . . needlessly barbarous."
[_Memoirs of a Revolutionary_, p. 131 and p. 348]

The Soviet forces suffered over 10,000 casualties storming 
Kronstadt. There are no reliable figures for the rebels 
loses or how many were later shot by the Cheka or sent 
to prison camps. The figures that exist are fragmentary. 
Immediately after the defeat of the revolt, 4,836 Kronstadt 
sailors were arrested and deported to the Crimea and the 
Caucasus. When Lenin heard of this on the 19th of April, he 
expressed great misgivings about it and they were finally sent 
to forced labour camps in the Archangelsk, Vologda and Murmansk 
regions. Eight thousand sailors, soldiers and civilians escaped
over the ice to Finland. The crews of the *Petropavlovsk* and 
*Sevastopol* fought to the bitter end, as did the cadets of the
mechanics school, the torpedo detachment and the communications 
unit. A statistical communiqu of the Special Section of the
Extraordinary *Troikas* of 1st May stated that 6,528 rebels had
been arrested, of whom 2,168 had been shot (33%), 1,955 had been
sentenced to forced labour (of whom 1,486 received a five year
sentence), and 1,272 were released. A statistical review of the
revolt made in 1935-6 listed the number arrested as 10,026 and
stated that it had "not been possible to establish accurately
the number of the repressed." The families of the rebels were
deported, with Siberia considered as "undoubtedly the only
suitable region" for them. Significantly, one of the members
of the *troika* judging the rebels complained that they had to
rely exclusively on information provided by the Special Section 
of the *Vecheka* as "neither commissars nor local Communists 
provided any material." [Israel Getzler, "The Communist 
Leaders' Role in the Kronstadt Tragedy of 1921 in the Light 
of Recently Published Archival Documents", _Revolutionary 
Russia_, pp. 24-44, Vol. 15, No. 1, June 2002, pp. 35-7] 

After the revolt had been put down, the Bolshevik government
reorganised the fortress. While it had attacked the revolt
in the name of defending "Soviet Power" Kronstadt's newly 
appointed military commander "abolish[ed] the [Kronstadt]
soviet altogether" and ran the fortress "with the assistance
of a revolutionary troika" (i.e. an appointed three man 
committee). [Getzler, Op. Cit., p. 244] Kronstadt's newspaper 
was renamed *Krasnyi Kronshtadt* (from *Izvestiia*) and stated 
in an editorial that the "fundamental features" of Kronstadt's
restored "dictatorship of the proletariat" during its
"initial phases" were "[r]estrictions on political liberty,
terror, military centralism and discipline and the
direction of all means and resources towards the creation
of an offensive and defensive state apparatus." [quoted by
Getzler, Op. Cit., p. 245] The victors quickly started to eliminate
all traces of the revolt. Anchor Square became "Revolutionary
Square" and the rebel battleships *Petropavlovsk* and *Sevastopol*
were renamed the *Marat* and the *Paris Commune*, respectively.

That, in a nutshell, was the Kronstadt revolt. Obviously we 
cannot cover all the details and we recommend readers to 
consult the books and articles we list at the end of this 
section for fuller accounts of the events. However, that 
presents the key points in the rebellion. Now we must analyse 
the revolt and indicate why it is so important in evaluating 
Bolshevism in both practice and as a revolutionary theory.

In the sections which follow, we indicate why the revolt is
so important (section H.7.1) and place it in historical context
(section H.7.2). We then present and discuss the Kronstadt demands, 
indicating their sources in working class rebellion and radicalism 
(see sections H.7.3 and H.7.4). We indicate the lies the Bolsheviks 
said about the rebellion at the time (section H.7.5), whether it
was, in fact, a White plot (section H.7.6) and indicate the revolts 
real relationship to the Whites (section H.7.7). We also disprove 
Trotskyist assertions that the sailors in 1921 were different from 
those in 1917 (section H.7.8) or that their political perspectives 
had fundamentally changed (section H.7.9). We indicate that state
coercion and repression was the significant in why the Kronstadt 
revolt did not spread to the Petrograd workers (section H.7.10). 
Then we discuss the possibility of White intervention during and 
after the revolt (section H.7.11). We follow this with a discussion 
of arguments that the country was too exhausted to allow soviet 
democracy (section H.7.12) or that soviet democracy would have 
resulted in the defeat of the revolution (section H.7.13). In 
the process, we will also show the depths to which supporters 
of Leninism will sink to defend their heroes (in particular, see 
section H.7.14). Lastly, we discuss what the Kronstadt revolt 
tells us about Leninism (section H.7.15)

As we will hope to prove, Kronstadt was a popular uprising
from below by the same sailors, soldiers and workers that
made the 1917 October revolution. The Bolshevik repression
of the revolt *can* be justified in terms of defending the
state power of the Bolsheviks but it cannot be defended 
in terms of socialist theory. Indeed, it indicates that
Bolshevism is a flawed political theory which cannot 
create a socialist society but only a state capitalist
regime based on party dictatorship. This is what Kronstadt
shows above all else: given a choice between workers' power
and party power, Bolshevism will destroy the former to
ensure the latter (see section H.7.15 in particular). In 
this, Kronstadt is no isolated event (as we indicate in 
section H.7.2).

There are many essential resources on the revolt available.
The best in depth studies of the revolt are Paul Avrich's 
_Kronstadt 1921_ and Israel Getzler's _Kronstadt 1917-1921_. 
Anarchist works include Ida Mett's _The Kronstadt Uprising_ 
(by far the best), Alexander Berkman's _The Kronstadt 
Rebellion_ (which is a good introduction and included 
in his _The Russian Tragedy_), Voline's _The Unknown 
Revolution_ has a good chapter on Kronstadt (and 
quotes extensively from the Kronstadters' paper 
*Izvestiia*) and volume two of Daniel Guerin's _No 
Gods, No Masters_ has an excellent section on the 
rebellion which includes a lengthy extract from Emma 
Goldman's autobiography _Living my Life_ on the events 
as well as extracts from the Kronstadters' paper. Anton 
Ciliga's (a libertarian socialist/Marxist) _Kronstadt 
Revolt_ is also a good introduction to the issues 
relating to the uprising. Eye-witness accounts include
chapters in Berkman's _The Bolshevik Myth_ as well
as Goldman's _My Disillusionment in Russia_. Goldman's
autobiography _Living My Life_ also has useful material
on the events.

For the Leninist analysis, the anthology _Kronstadt_ 
contains Lenin and Trotsky's articles on the revolt
plus supplementary essays refuting anarchist accounts.
This work is recommended for those seeking the official 
Trotskyist version of events as it contains all the 
relevant documents by the Bolshevik leaders. Emma 
Goldman's _Trotsky Protests Too Much_ is a great
reply to Trotsky's comments and one of his followers
contained in this work. Victor Serge was another 
eye-witness to the Kronstadt revolt. An individualist
anarchist turned Bolshevik, his _Memoirs of a 
Revolutionary_ is worth looking at to discover why he 
supported what the Bolsheviks did, albeit reluctantly.

H.7.1 Why is the Kronstadt rebellion important?

The Kronstadt rebellion is important because, as Voline
put it, it was "the first entirely independent attempt
of the people to liberate itself from all yokes and
achieve the Social Revolution, an attempt made directly,
resolutely, and boldly by the working masses themselves
without political shepherds, without leaders or tutors.
It was the first step towards the third and social 
revolution." [_The Unknown Revolution_, pp. 537-8]

The Kronstadt sailors, solders and workers in 1917 had been 
the one of the first groups to support the slogan "All power 
to the Soviets" as well as one of the first towns to put it
into practice. The focal point of the 1921 revolt -- the sailors 
of the warships *Petropavlovsk* and *Sevastopol* -- had, in 1917, 
been supporters of the Bolsheviks. The sailors had been considered, 
until those fateful days in 1921, the pride and glory of the 
revolution and considered by all to be thoroughly revolutionary 
in spirit and action. They were the staunchest supporters of the 
Soviet system but, as the revolt showed, they were opposed to the 
dictatorship of any political party. 

Therefore Kronstadt is important in evaluating the honesty of 
Leninist claims to be in favour of soviet democracy and power. 
The civil war was effectively over, yet the regime showed no 
signs of stopping the repression against working class protest 
or rights. Opposing re-elections to soviets, the Bolshevik
regime was repressing strikers in the name of "soviet power" 
and "the political power of the proletariat." In the countryside, 
the Bolsheviks continued their futile, evil and counterproductive
policies against the peasants (ignoring the fact that their 
government was meant to be at the head of a workers *and* 
peasants' state). Occurring as it did after the end of the
civil war, Kronstadt played a key role in opening the eyes of
anarchists like Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman to the
real role of Bolshevism in the revolution. Until then, they
(like many others) supported the Bolsheviks, rationalising 
their dictatorship as a temporary measure necessitated by 
the civil war. Kronstadt smashed that illusion, "broke the 
last thread that held me to the Bolsheviki. The wanton
slaughter they had instigated spoke more eloquently against 
than aught else. Whatever the pretences of the past, the 
Bolsheviki now proved themselves the most pernicious enemies 
of the Revolution. I would have nothing further to do with 
them." [Emma Goldman, _My Disillusionment in Russia_, p. 200]

The events at Kronstadt cannot be looked at in isolation,
but rather as part of a general struggle of the Russian
working people against "their" government. Indeed, as
we indicate in the next section, this repression *after*
the end of the Civil War followed the same pattern as
that started *before* it. Just as the Bolsheviks had
repressed soviet democracy in Kronstadt in 1921 in favour
of party dictatorship, they had done so regularly elsewhere 
in early 1918.

The Kronstadt revolt was a popular movement from below
aiming at restoring soviet power. As Alexander Berkman
notes, the "spirit of the Conference [of delegates which
elected the Provisional Revolutionary Committee] was 
thoroughly Sovietist: Kronstadt demanded Soviets free
from interference by any political party; it wanted 
non-partisan Soviets that should truly reflect the 
needs and express the will of the workers and peasants. 
The attitude of the delegates was antagonistic to the 
arbitrary rule of bureaucratic commissars, but friendly 
to the Communist Party as such. They were staunch adherents 
of the Soviet *system* and they were earnestly seeking to 
find, by means friendly and peaceful, a solution of the 
pressing problems" facing the revolution. [_The Russian
Tragedy_, p. 67] The attitude of the Bolsheviks indicated
that, for them, soviet power was only useful in so far
as it ensured their party's power and if the two came
into conflict then the later must survive over the
corpse of the former. Thus Berkman:

"But the 'triumph' of the Bolsheviks over Kronstadt held within 
itself the defeat of Bolshevism. It exposes the true character 
of the Communist dictatorship. The Communists proved themselves 
willing to sacrifice Communism, to make almost any compromise 
with international capitalism, yet refused the just demands of 
their own people -- demands that voiced the October slogans of 
the Bolsheviks themselves: Soviets elected by direct and secret 
ballot, according to the Constitution of the Russian Socialist
Federal Soviet Republic; and freedom of speech and press for the 
revolutionary parties." [Op. Cit., p. 90]

Investigating the Kronstadt revolt forces intelligent and 
honest minds into a critical examination of Bolshevik theories 
and practices. It exploded the Bolshevik myth of the Communist 
State being the "Workers' and Peasants' Government". It proved 
that the Communist Party dictatorship and the Russian Revolution 
are opposites, contradictory and mutually exclusive. While it
may be justifiable to argue that the repression directed 
by the Bolsheviks against working class people *during* the
civil war could be explained by the needs of the war, the
same cannot be said for Kronstadt. Similarly, the Leninist
justifications for their power and actions at Kronstadt
have direct implications for current activity and future
revolutions. As we argue in section H.7.15, the logic of
these rationales simply mean that modern day Leninists 
will, if in the same position, destroy soviet democracy to 
defend "soviet power" (i.e. the power of their party).

In effect, Kronstadt was the clash between the reality of 
Leninism and its image or rhetoric. It raises many important 
issues as regards Bolshevism and the rationale it has produced 
to justify certain actions. "The Kronstadt experience," as 
Berkman argues, "proves once more that government, the 
State -- whatever its name or form -- is ever the mortal enemy 
of liberty and popular self-determination. The state has no soul, 
no principles. It has but one aim -- to secure power and hold 
it, at any cost. That is the political lesson of Kronstadt."
[Op. Cit., p. 89]

Kronstadt is also important in that it, like most of the
Russian Revolution and Civil War, confirmed anarchist
analysis and predictions. This can be seen when *Izvestiia* 
(the paper produced during the rebellion by the Provisional 
Revolutionary Committee) argued that in Kronstadt "there 
have been laid the foundations of the Third Revolution, 
which will break the last chains of the workers and lay 
open the new highway to socialist construction." [quoted 
by Voline, _The Unknown Revolution_, p. 508] 

This confirmed the arguments of Russian anarchists in 1917, 
who had predicted that "if the 'transfer of power to the 
soviets' comes in fact to signify the seizure of political 
authority by a new political party with the aim of guiding 
reconstruction from above, 'from the centre'" then "there 
is no doubt that this 'new power' can in no way satisfy 
even the most immediate needs and demands of the people, 
much less begin the task of 'socialist reconstruction' . . .
Then, after a more or less prolonged interruption, the 
struggle will inevitably be renewed. Then will begin a 
third and last stage of the Great Revolution. There will 
begin a struggle between the living forces arising from 
the creative impulse of the popular masses on the spot, 
on the one hand, namely the local workers' and peasants' 
organisations acting directly . . . and the centralist 
Social Democratic power defending its existence, on the 
other; a struggle between authority and freedom." 
[quoted by Paul Avrich, _Anarchists in the Russian 
Revolution_, p. 94]

Thus Kronstadt is a symbol of the fact that state power 
cannot be utilised by the working class and always becomes
a force for minority rule (in this case of former workers
and revolutionaries, as Bakunin predicted).

There is another reason why the study of Kronstadt is important.
Since the suppression of the revolt, Leninist and Trotskyist 
groups have continually *justified* the acts of the Bolsheviks.
Moreover, they have followed Lenin and Trotsky in slandering the
revolt and, indeed, have continually lied about it. When 
Trotskyist John Wright states that the supporters of Kronstadt
have "distort[ed] historical facts, monstrously exaggerat[ed]
every subsidiary issue or question . . . and throw[n] a veil
. . . over the *real* program and aims of the mutiny" he is,
in fact, describing his and his fellow Trotskyists. [Lenin and 
Trotsky, _Kronstadt_, p. 102] Indeed, as we will prove, 
anarchist accounts have been validated by later research while 
Trotskyist assertions have been exploded time and time again. 
Indeed, it would be a useful task to write a companion to 
Trotsky's book _The Stalin School of Falsification_ about Trotsky 
and his followers activities in the field of re-writing history.

Similarly, when Trotsky argues that anarchists like Goldman 
and Berkman "do not have the slightest understanding of the 
criteria and methods of scientific research" and just "quote 
the proclamations of the insurgents like pious preachers quoting 
Holy Scriptures" he is, in fact, just describing himself and his 
followers (as we shall see, the later just repeat his and Lenin's 
assertions regardless of how silly or refuted they are). Ironically, 
he states that "Marx has said that it is impossible to judge 
either parties or peoples by what they say about themselves."
[Lenin and Trotsky, Op. Cit., p. 88] As Emma Goldman argued,
"[h]ow pathetic that he does not realise how much this applies to 
him!" [_Trotsky Protests Too Much_] Kronstadt shows what the 
Bolsheviks said about their regime was the opposite of what
it really was, as show by its actions.

What will also become clear from our discussion is the way 

Trotskyists have doctored the academic accounts to fit their 

ideological account of the uprising. The reason for this will 
become clear. Simply put, the supporters of Bolshevism cannot 
help lie about the Kronstadt revolt as it so clearly exposes 
the *real* nature of Bolshevik ideology. Rather than support 
the Kronstadt call for soviet democracy, the Bolsheviks crushed 
the revolt, arguing that in so doing they were defending "soviet 
power." Their followers have repeated these arguments.

This expression of Leninist double-think (the ability to know
two contradictory facts and maintain both are true) can be
explained. Once it is understood that "workers' power" and
"soviet power" actually mean *party power* then the contradictions
disappear. Party power had to be maintained at all costs,
including the destruction of those who desired real soviet
and workers' power (and so soviet democracy).

For example, Trotsky argued that in 1921 "the proletariat had 
to hold political power in its hands" yet later Trotskyists 
argue that the proletariat was too exhausted, atomised and 
decimated to do so. [Lenin and Trotsky, _Kronstadt_, p. 81]
Similarly, the Trotskyist Pierre Frank states that for the 
Bolsheviks, "the dilemma was posed in these terms: either 
keep the workers' state under their leadership, or see the 
counterrevolution begin, in one or other political disguise, 
ending in a counterrevolutionary reign of terror that would 
leave not the slightest room for democracy." [Op. Cit., p. 15] 
Of course the fact that there was "not the slightest room for 
democracy" under Lenin is not mentioned, nor is the fact that
the "dictatorship of the party" had been a fundamental aspect of
Bolshevik ideology since early 1919 and practice since mid-1918
(by the latest). Nor does Frank consider it important to note 
that a "reign of terror" did develop under Stalin from the terror, 
repression and dictatorship practised in 1921 by Lenin and Trotsky.

Most Leninists follow Frank and argue that the suppression of 
the rebellion was essential to defend the "gains of the revolution." 
What exactly were these gains? Not soviet democracy, freedom of
speech, assembly and press, trade union freedom and so on as the 
Kronstadters were crushed for demanding these. No, apparently the 
"gains" of the revolution was a Bolshevik government pure and simple. 
Never mind the fact it was a one-party dictatorship, with a strong 
and privileged bureaucratic machine and no freedom of speech, press,
association or assembly for working people. The fact that Lenin and 
Trotsky were in power is enough for their followers to justify the 
repression of Kronstadt and subscribe to the notion of a "workers' 
state" which excludes workers from power.

Thus the double-think of Bolshevism is clearly seen from the
Kronstadt events. The Bolsheviks and their supporters 
argue that Kronstadt was suppressed to defend soviet power
yet argue that the Kronstadt demand for free soviet elections
was "counter-revolutionary", "backward", "petty-bourgeois"
and so on. How soviet power could mean anything without
free elections is never explained. Similarly, they argue
that it was necessary to defend the "workers state" by
slaughtering those who called for workers to have some
kind of say in how that state operated. It appears that
the role of workers in a workers' state was simply that 
of following orders without question (indeed, Trotsky was 
arguing in the 1930s that the Russian working class was still 
the ruling class under Stalin -- "So long as the forms of 
property that have been created by the October Revolution 
are not overthrown, the proletariat remains the ruling class."
[_The Class Nature of the Soviet State_]).

How can the Bolshevik repression be justified in terms of
defending workers power when the workers were powerless? How
can it be defended in terms of soviet power when the soviets
were rubber stamps of the government?

The logic of the Bolsheviks and their latter-day apologists and 
supporters is the same character as that of the U.S. Officer 
during the Vietnam War who explained that in order to save 
the village, they first had to destroy it. In order to save
soviet power, Lenin and Trotsky had to destroy soviet democracy.

One last point, while the Kronstadt revolt is a key event
in the Russian Revolution, one that signified its end, we
must not forget that it is just one in a long series of 
Bolshevik attacks on the working class. As we indicated
in section H.6 (and provide an overview in the next section), 
the Bolshevik state had proven itself to be anti-revolutionary 
continually since October 1917. However, Kronstadt is important 
simply because it so clearly pitted soviet democracy against 
"soviet power" and occurred *after* the end of the civil war. 
As it brings the Russian Revolution to an end, it deserves
to be remembered, analysed and discussed by all revolutionaries
who seek to understand the past in order not to repeat the
same mistakes again.

H.7.2 What was the context of the Kronstadt revolt?

The Kronstadt revolt cannot be understood in isolation. Indeed,
to do so misses the real reason why Kronstadt is so important. 
Kronstadt was the end result of four years of revolution and 
civil war, the product of the undermining of soviet democracy 
by a combination of Bolshevism and war. The actions of the 
Bolsheviks in 1921 and their ideological justifications for 
their actions (justifications, of course, when they got beyond
lying about the revolt -- see section H.7.5) merely reproduced
in concentrated form what had been occurring ever since they
had seized power.

Therefore it is necessary to present a short summary of
Bolshevik activities before the events of Kronstadt (see
section H.6 for fuller details). In addition, we have
to sketch the developing social stratification occurring
under Lenin and the events immediate before the revolt 
which sparked it off (namely the strike wave in Petrograd).
Once this has been done, we will soon see that Kronstadt
was not an isolated event but rather an act of solidarity
with the oppressed workers of Petrogard and an attempt
to save the Russian Revolution from Communist dictatorship
and bureaucracy. 

Alexander Berkman provides an excellent overview of what had
happened in Russia after the October Revolution:

"The elective system was abolished, first in the army and
navy, then in the industries. The Soviets of peasants and
workers were castrated and turned into obedient Communist
Committees, with the dreaded sword of the Cheka [political
para-military police] ever hanging over them. The labour
unions governmentalised, their proper activities suppressed,
they were turned into mere transmitters of the orders of
the State. Universal military service, coupled with the
death penalty for conscientious objectors; enforced labour,
with a vast officialdom for the apprehension and punishment
of 'deserters'; agrarian and industrial conscription of
the peasantry; military Communism in the cities and the
system of requisitioning in the country . . . ; the 
suppression of workers' protests by the military; the
crushing of peasant dissatisfaction with an iron hand. . ."
[_The Russian Tragedy_, p. 27]

We discussed each of these features in more detail in
section H.6. Here we will simply indicate that the
Bolsheviks had systematically undermined the effective
power of the soviets. Both locally and nationally, 
post-October power was centralised into the hands of
the soviet executives rather than the general assemblies.
At the top, power was concentrated even further with
the creation of a Bolshevik government *above* the
Central Executive Council elected by the (then) quarterly
soviet congress. This is not all. Faced with growing 
opposition to their policies, the Bolsheviks responded
in two ways. Either the soviet was gerrymandered to
make the workplace soviet elections irrelevant (as in,
say, Petrograd) or they simply disbanded any soviet
elected with a non-Bolshevik majority (as in *all* 
provincial soviets for which records exist). So 
Bolshevik opposition to the soviet democracy demanded 
by the Kronstadt revolt had a long pedigree. It had 
started a few months after the Bolsheviks seizure of 
power in the name of the soviets. 

They repressed opposition parties to maintain their
position (for example, suppressing their newspapers).
Similarly, the Bolsheviks attacked the anarchists in Moscow
on the 11-12 of April, 1918, using armed detachments of
the Cheka (the political police). The Kronstadt soviet,
incidentally, condemned the action by a vote of 81 to
57 against (with 15 abstentions). [Getzler, _Kronstadt
1917-1921_, p. 186] As we discuss in section H.6.24, this
repression was political in nature, aiming to neutralise
a potential political threat and was not the only example
of political repression in this period (see section H.6.23).

This is just a summary of what was happening in Russia 
in early 1918 (see section H.8.3 for more details). This 
Bolshevik assault on the soviets occurred during the 
spring of 1918 (i.e. in March, April and May). That is 
*before* the Czech rising and the onset of full scale 
civil war which occurred in late May. Clearly, any attempt
to blame the Civil War for the elimination of soviet power 
and democracy seems woefully weak given the actions of the 
Bolsheviks in the spring of 1918. And, equally clearly, the 
reduction of local soviet influence cannot be fully understood 
without factoring in the Bolshevik prejudice in favour of 
centralisation (as codified in the Soviet Constitution of 1918) 
along with this direct repression. Indeed, the net effect of 
the Russian Civil War helped the Bolsheviks as it would make 
many dissident workers support the Bolsheviks during the war. 
This, however, did not stop mass resistance and strikes breaking 
out periodically during the war when workers and peasants could no 
longer put up with Bolshevik policies or the effects of the war
(see section H.8.5).

Which, incidentally, answers Brian Bambery's rhetorical question
of "why would the most militant working class in the world, 
within which there was a powerful cocktail of revolutionary 
ideas, and which had already made two revolutions (in 1905 and 
in February 1917), allow a handful of people to seize power 
behind its back in October 1917?" ["Leninism in the 21st 
Century", _Socialist Review_, no. 248, January 2001] Once 
the Russian workers realised that a handful of people *had*
seized power they *did* protest the usurpation of their power 
and rights by the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks repressed them. 
With the start of the Civil War, the Bolsheviks played their 
trump card -- "Us or the Whites." This ensured their power 
as the workers had few choices but to agree. Indeed, it 
may explain why the Bolsheviks finally eliminated opposition 
parties and groups *after* the end of the Civil War and only 
repressed them during it. With the Whites gone, the opposition 
were rising in influence again and the "White card" could
no longer be played.

Economically, the Bolshevik regime imposed a policy later
called "War Communism" (although, as Victor Serge noted,
"any one who, like myself, went so far as to consider it
purely temporary was locked upon with disdain." [_Memoirs
of a Revolutionary_, p. 115] This regime was marked by
extreme hierarchical and dictatorial tendencies. The 
leading lights of the Communist Party were expressing
themselves on the nature of the "socialist" regime they
desired. Trotsky, for example, put forward ideas for the
"militarisation of labour" (as expounded in his infamous
work _Terrorism and Communism_). Here are a few 
representative selections from that work:

"The very principle of compulsory labour service is for the 
Communist quite unquestionable. . . . But hitherto it has 
always remained a mere principle. Its application has always 
had an accidental, impartial, episodic character. Only now, 
when along the whole line we have reached the question of the 
economic re-birth of the country, have problems of compulsory 
labour service arisen before us in the most concrete way 
possible. The only solution of economic difficulties that 
is correct from the point of view both of principle and 
of practice is to treat the population of the whole country 
as the reservoir of the necessary labour power . . . and to 
introduce strict order into the work of its registration, 
mobilisation, and utilisation." [_Terrorism and Communism_,
p. 135]

"The introduction of compulsory labour service is unthinkable 
without the application, to a greater or less degree, of the 
methods of militarisation of labour." [Op. Cit., p. 137]

"Why do we speak of *militarisation*? Of course, this is only 
an analogy -- but an analogy very rich in content. No social 
organisation except the army has ever considered itself 
justified in subordinating citizens to itself in such a 
measure, and to control them by its will on all sides to 
such a degree, as the State of the proletarian dictatorship 
considers itself justified in doing, and does." [Op. Cit., 
p. 141]

"Both economic and political compulsion are only forms of the expression 
of the dictatorship of the working class in two closely connected
regions . . . under Socialism there will not exist the apparatus of 
compulsion itself, namely, the State: for it will have melted away 
entirely into a producing and consuming commune. None the less, the 
road to Socialism lies through a period of the highest possible 
intensification of the principle of the State . . . Just as a lamp, 
before going out, shoots up in a brilliant flame, so the State, before 
disappearing, assumes the form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, 
i.e., the most ruthless form of State, which embraces the life of 
the citizens authoritatively in every direction. . .  No organisation 
except the army has ever controlled man with such severe compulsion 
as does the State organisation of the working class in the most 
difficult period of transition. It is just for this reason that 
we speak of the militarisation of labour." [Op. Cit., pp. 169-70]

This account was written as a policy to be followed now that the 
"internal civil war is coming to an end." [Op. Cit., p. 132] It was 
not seen as a temporary policy imposed upon the Bolsheviks by the 
war but rather, as can be seen, as an expression of "principle" 
(perhaps because Marx and Engels had written about the 
"[e]stablishment of industrial armies" in the _Communist 
Manifesto_? [Selected Writings, p. 53]).

In the same work, Trotsky justified the elimination of soviet
power and democracy by party power and dictatorship (see
sections H.7.10 and H.7.15). Thus we have the application
of state serfdom by the Bolsheviks (indeed, Trotsky was
allowed to apply his ideas on the militarisation of labour
to the railways). 

This vision of strict centralisation and top-down military
structures built upon Bolshevik policies of the first months 
after the October revolution. The attempts at workers'
self-management organised by many factory committees was
opposed in favour of a centralised state capitalist system,
with Lenin arguing for appointed managers with "dictatorial" 
powers (see Maurice Brinton's _The Bolsheviks and Workers' 
Control_ for full details as well as section H.6.10). 

Strikes were repressed by force. In early May, 1918, a major
wave of labour protest started which climaxed in early July.
In Petrograd it included strikes, demonstrations and 
anti-Bolshevik factory meetings. Of the meetings unconnected 
to the Petrograd Soviet elections, "the greatest number by
far were protests against some form of Bolshevik repression:
shootings, incidents of 'terrorist activities', and arrests."
During the opposition organised strike of July 2nd, "Zinoviev
and others took quick counteraction . . . Any sign of
sympathy for the strike was declared a criminal act. More
arrests were made . . . On July 1 . . . machine guns were
set up at main points throughout Petrograd and Moscow
railroad junctions, and elsewhere in both cities as well.
Controls were tightened in the factories. Meetings were
forcefully dispersed." [William G. Rosenberg, _Russian 
Labour and Bolshevik Power_, pp. 123-4 and p. 127]

In 1918, workers who took strike action "were afraid to lose 
their jobs" as "a strike inevitably led to a closure of the 
factory, a dismissal of the workers, and a careful screening 
of those rehired to determine their political preferences." 
By 1920, as well as these methods, workers also faced arrest 
by the Cheka and "internment in a concentration camp." During 
the first six months of 1920 there were strikes in 77 percent 
of the medium- and large-size enterprises in Russia. As an 
example of the policies used to crush strikes, we can take 
the case of a strike by the workers of the Ryazan-Urals 
railroad in May 1921 (i.e. *after* the end of the Civil War). 
The authorities "shut down the depot, brought in troops,
and arrested another hundred workers" in addition to
the strikers delegates elected to demand the release of
a railroad worker (whose arrest had provoked the strike).
Ironically, those "who had seized power in 1917 in the
name of the politically conscious proletariat were in
fact weeding out all these conscious workers." [V. Brovkin, 
_Behind the Front Lines of the Civil War_, pp. 287-8, 
pp. 290-1 and p. 298] 

In the Red Army and Navy, anti-democratic principles were
again imposed. At the end of March, 1918, Trotsky reported 
to the Communist Party that "the principle of election is 
politically purposeless and technically inexpedient, 
and it has been, in practice, abolished by decree." 
Soldiers did not have to fear this system of top-down
appointment as "political power is in the hands of the 
same working class from whose ranks the Army is recruited"
(i.e. in the hands of the Bolshevik party). There could
"be no antagonism between the government and the mass of 
the workers, just as there is no antagonism between the 
administration of the union and the general assembly of 
its members, and, therefore, there cannot be any grounds 
for fearing the *appointment* of members of the commanding 
staff by the organs of the Soviet Power." [_Work, Discipline, 
Order_] Of course, as any worker in struggle can tell
you, they almost always come into conflict with the union's
bureaucracy (as Trotskyists themselves often point out).

In the Navy, a similar process occurred -- much to the
disgust and opposition of the sailors. As Paul Avrich
notes, "Bolshevik efforts to liquidate the ship committees
and impose the authority of the centrally appointed
commissars aroused a storm of protest in the Baltic
Fleet. For the sailors, whose aversion to external
authority was proverbial, any attempt to restore
discipline meant a betrayal of the freedoms for which
they had struggles in 1917." [_Kronstadt 1921_, p. 66]
This process "began in earnest on 14 May 1918 with
the *appointment* of Ivan Flerovsky as general commissar
of the Baltic Fleet and chairman of its Council of
Commissars, a body which replaced the disbanded elective
Central Committee of the Baltic Fleet. Flerovsky 
promptly appointed bridge commissars to whom all
ships' committees were subordinated . . . Naval democracy
was finally destroyed on 18 January 1919 when Trotsky
. . . decreed the abolition of all ships' committees,
the appointment of commissars to all ships, and the
setting up of revolutionary tribunals to maintain
discipline, a function previously vested in elected
'comradely courts.'" [I. Getzler, _Kronstadt 1917-1921_,
p. 191]

In the countryside, grain requisitioning was resulting in
peasant uprisings as food was taken from the peasants by
force. While the armed detachments were "instructed to
leave the peasants enough for their personal needs, it
was common for the requisitioning squads to take at
gun-point grain intended for personal consumption or
set aside for the next sowing." The villagers predictably
used evasive tactics and cut back on the amount of
land they tilled as well as practising open resistance.
Famine was a constant problem as a result. [Avrich, 
Op. Cit., pp. 9-10] 

Thus Voline:

"the Bolshevik government evidently understood the slogan
'power to the soviets' in a peculiar way. It applied it
in reverse. Instead of giving assistance to the working
masses and permitting them to conquer and enlarge their
own autonomous activity, it began by taking all 'power'
from them and treating them like subjects. It bent the
factories to its will and liberated the workers from the
right to make their own decisions; it took arbitrary and
coercive measures, without even asking the advice of the
workers' concerned; it ignored the demands emanating
from the workers' organisations. And, in particular, it
increasingly curbed, under various pretexts, the freedom
of action of the Soviets and of other workers' organisations,
everywhere imposing its will arbitrarily and even by
violence." [_The Unknown Revolution_, pp. 459-60]

From before the start of Civil War, the Russian
people had been slowly but surely eliminated from any
meaningful say in the progress of the revolution. The
Bolsheviks undermined (when not abolishing) workers'
democracy, freedom and rights in the workplaces, the 
soviets, the unions, the army and the navy. Unsurprisingly, 
the lack of any real control from below heightened the
corrupting effects of power. Inequality, privilege and 
abuses were everywhere in the ruling party and bureaucracy
("Within the party, favouritism and corruption were rife. 
The Astoria Hotel, where many high officials lived, was 
the scene of debauchery, while ordinary citizens went 
without the bare necessities." [Paul Avrich, _Bolshevik 
Opposition to Lenin: G. T. Miasnikov and the Workers' 
Group_]).

With the end of the Civil War in November 1920, many workers 
expected a change of policy. However, months passed and the
same policies were followed. "The Communist State," as
Alexander Berkman summarised, "showed no intention of 
loosening the yoke. The same policies continued, with labour 
militarisation still further enslaving the people, embittering 
them with added oppression and tyranny, and in consequence 
paralysing every possibility of industrial revival." [_The
Russian Tragedy_, p. 61] Finally, in the middle of
February, 1921, "a rash of spontaneous factory meetings"
began in Moscow. Workers called for the immediate scrapping
of War Communism. These meetings were "succeeded by strikes
and demonstrations." Workers took to the streets demanding
"free trade", higher rations and "the abolition of grain
requisitions." Some demanded the restoration of political
rights and civil liberties. Troops had to be called in
to restore order. [Paul Avrich, Op. Cit., pp. 35-6]

Then a far more serious wave of strikes and protests swept
Petrograd. The Kronstadt revolt was sparked off by these
protests. Like Moscow, these "street demonstrations were
heralded by a rash of protest meetings in Petrograd's
numerous but depleted factories and shops." Like Moscow,
speakers "called for an end to grain requisitioning, the
removal of roadblocks, the abolition of privileged
rations, and permission to barter personal possessions
for food." On the 24th of February, the day after a 
workplace meeting, the Trubochny factory workforce
downed tools and walked out the factory. Additional
workers from nearby factories joined in. The crowd
of 2,000 was dispersed by armed military cadets.
The next day, the Trubochny workers again took to
the streets and visited other workplaces, bringing
them out on strike too. [Avrich, Op. Cit., pp. 37-8]  

The strikers started to organise themselves. "As in
1918, workers from various plants elected delegates
to the Petrograd Assembly of Plenipotentiaries."
[V. Brovkin, _Behind the Front Lines of the Civil War_,
p. 393]

A three-man Defence Committee was formed and Zinoviev 
"proclaimed martial law" on February 24th. [Avrich, 
Op. Cit., p. 39] A curfew of 11pm was proclaimed, all 
meetings and gatherings (indoor and out) were banned 
unless approved of by the Defence Committee and all 
infringements would "be dealt with according to 
military law." [Ida Mett, _The Kronstadt Uprising_,
p. 37]

The workers "were ordered to return to their factories,
failing which they would be denied their rations. That,
however, had no impact: but in addition, a number of
trade unions was disbanded, their leaders and the most
die-hard strikers tossed into prison." [Emma Goldman,
_No Gods, No Masters_, vol. 2, p. 168] 

As part of this process of repression, the Bolshevik government 
had to rely on the *kursanty* (Communist officer cadets) as the 
local garrisons had been caught up the general ferment and 
could not be relied upon to carry out the government's 
orders. Hundreds of *kursanty* were called in from 
neighbouring military academies to patrol the city. 
"Overnight Petrograd became an armed camp. In every quarter 
pedestrians were stopped and their documents checked
. . . the curfew [was] strictly enforced." The
Petrograd Cheka made widespread arrests. [Avrich,
Op. Cit., pp. 46-7]

The Bolsheviks also stepped up their propaganda drive.
The strikers were warned not to play into the hands of
the counterrevolution. As well as their normal press,
popular party members were sent to agitate in the streets, 
factories and barracks. They also made a series of 
concessions such as providing extra rations. On March 1st 
(after the Kronstadt revolt had started) the Petrograd 
soviet announced the withdrawal of all road-blocks and
demobilised the Red Army soldiers assigned to labour
duties in Petrograd. [Avrich, Op. Cit., pp. 48-9]

Thus a combination of force, propaganda and concessions
was used to defeat the strike (which quickly reached
a near general strike level). As Paul Arvich notes, 
"there is no denying that the application of military
force and the widespread arrests, not to speak of the
tireless propaganda waged by the authorities had been
indispensable in restoring order. Particularly impressive
in this regard was the discipline shown by the local
party organisation. Setting aside their internal disputes,
the Petrograd Bolsheviks swiftly closed ranks and 
proceeded to carry out the unpleasant task of repression
with efficiency and dispatch." [Op. Cit., p. 50]

This indicates the immediate context of the Kronstadt rebellion.
Yet Trotskyist J. G. Wright wonders whether the Kronstadt's paper
"lied  when in the very first issue . . . it carried a sensational 
headline: 'General Insurrection in Petrograd'" and states that 
people "spread . . . lies about the insurrection in Petrograd." 
[Lenin and Trotsky, _Kronstadt_, p. 109] Yes, of course a near 
general strike, accompanied by mass meetings and demonstrations 
and repressed by force and martial law, is a everyday occurrence
and has nothing in common with an "insurrection"! If such events
occurred in a state not headed by Lenin and Trotsky it is
unlikely Mr. Wright would have such difficulty in recognising
them for what there were. Historian V. Brovkin states the
obvious when he wrote "[t]o anyone who had lived through
the events of February 1917, this chain of events appeared
strikingly similar. It looked as if a popular insurrection
had begun." [Brovkin, Op. Cit., p. 393]

It was these labour protests and their repression which started 
the events in Kronstadt. While many sailors had read and listened 
to the complaints of their relatives in the villages and had 
protested on their behalf to the Soviet authorities, it took 
the Petrograd strikes to be the catalyst for the revolt. Moreover, 
they had other political reasons for protesting against the 
policies of the government. Navy democracy had been abolished 
by decree and the soviets had been turned into fig-leaves of 
party dictatorship.

Unsurprisingly, the crew of the battleships *Petropavlovsk*
and *Sevastopol* decided to act once "the news of strikes,
lockouts, mass arrests and martial law" in Petrograd
reached them. They "held a joint emergency meeting in
the face of protests and threats of their commissars
. . . [and] elected a fact-finding delegation of 
thirty-two sailors which, on 27 February, proceeded
to Petrograd and made the round of the factories. . .
They found the workers whom they addressed and questioned
too frightened to speak up in the presence of the 
hosts of Communist factory guards, trade union officials,
party committee men and Chekists." [Gelzter, _Kronstadt
1917-1921_, p. 212] 

The delegation returned the next day and reported its
findings to a general meeting of the ship's crews and
adopted the resolutions which were to be the basis of
the revolt (see next section). The Kronstadt revolt had
started.

H.7.3 What was the Kronstadt Programme?

It is rare for a Trotskyist to actually list the demands of
the Kronstadt revolt in their entirety. For example, John
Rees does not provide even a summary of the 15 point programme.
He asserts that the "sailors represented the exasperated
of the peasantry with the War Communism regime" while, rather
lamely, noting that "no other peasant insurrection reproduced
the Kronstadters demands." ["In Defence of October", pp. 3-82, 
_International Socialism_, no. 52, p. 63] Similarly, it is only
the "Editorial Preface" in the Trotskyist work _Kronstadt_
which presents even a summary of the demands. This summary
states:

"The resolution demanded free elections in the soviets
with the participation of anarchists and Left SRs,
legalisation of the socialist parties and the anarchists,
abolition of the Political Departments [in the fleet]
and the Special Purpose Detachments, removal of
the *zagraditelnye ottyady* [Armed troops used to
prevent unauthorised trade], restoration of free
trade, and the freeing of political prisoners."
[Lenin and Trotsky, _Kronstadt_, pp. 5-6]

They assert in the "Glossary" that it "demanded political
and economic changes, many of which were soon realised
with the adoption of the NEP." [Op. Cit., p. 148] Which,
ironically enough, contradicts Trotsky who claimed
that it was an "illusion" to think "it would have been
sufficient to inform the sailors of the NEP decrees to 
pacify them." Moreover, the "insurgents did not have a
conscious program, and they could not have had one 
because of the very nature of the petty bourgeoisie.
They themselves did not clearly understand that their
fathers and brothers needed first of all was free
trade." [Op. Cit., p. 91-2]

So we have a uprising which was peasant in nature, but
whose demands did not have anything in common with
other peasant revolts. It apparently demanded free
trade and did not demand it. It was similar to the NEP,
but the NEP decrees would not have satisfied it. It
produced a platform of political and economic demands
but did not, apparently, have a "conscious program." 
The contradictions abound. Why these contradictions
exist will become clear after we list the 15 demands.

The full list of demands are as follows:

"1. Immediate new elections to the Soviets. The present 
   Soviets no longer express the wishes of the workers and
   peasants. The new elections should be by secret ballot, 
   and should be preceded by free electoral propaganda.

2. Freedom of speech and of the press for workers and 
   peasants, for the Anarchists, and for the Left Socialist
   parties.

3. The right of assembly, and freedom for trade union 
   and peasant organisations.

4. The organisation, at the latest on 10th March 1921, of 
   a Conference of non-Party workers, solders and sailors of
   Petrograd, Kronstadt and the Petrograd District.

5. The liberation of all political prisoners of the Socialist 
   parties, and of all imprisoned workers and peasants,
   soldiers and sailors belonging to working class and 
   peasant organisations.

6. The election of a commission to look into the dossiers of 
   all those detained in prisons and concentration camps.

7. The abolition of all political sections in the armed forces. 
   No political party should have privileges for the propagation 
   of its ideas, or receive State subsidies to this end. In the 
   place of the political sections various cultural groups should 
   be set up, deriving resources from the State.

8. The immediate abolition of the militia detachments set up 
   between towns and countryside.

9. The equalisation of rations for all workers, except those 
   engaged in dangerous or unhealthy jobs.

10. The abolition of Party combat detachments in all military 
    groups. The abolition of Party guards in factories
    and enterprises. If guards are required, they should be 
    nominated, taking into account the views of the workers.

11. The granting to the peasants of freedom of action on their 
    own soil, and of the right to own cattle, provided they look 
    after them themselves and do not employ hired labour.

12. We request that all military units and officer trainee groups 
    associate themselves with this resolution. 

13. We demand that the Press give proper publicity to this 
    resolution.

14. We demand the institution of mobile workers' control groups.

15. We demand that handicraft production be authorised provided 
    it does not utilise wage labour." [quoted by Ida Mett, _The
Kronstadt Revolt_, pp. 37-8]

This is the program described by the Soviet government as
a "SR-Black Hundreds resolution"! This is the program which
Trotsky maintains was drawn up by "a handful of reactionary 
peasants and soldiers." [Lenin and Trotsky, _Kronstadt_,
p. 65 and p. 98] As can be seen, it was nothing of the
kind. Indeed, this resolution is largely in the spirit of 
the political slogans of the Bolsheviks before they seized 
of power in the name of the soviets. Moreover, it reflected
ideals expounded in 1917 and were formalised in the Soviet
State's 1918 constitution. In the words of Paul Avrich,
"[i]n effect, the *Petropavlovsk* resolution was an
appeal to the Soviet government to live up to its own
constitution, a bold statement of those very rights 
and freedom which Lenin himself had professed in 1917.
In spirit, it was a throwback to October, evoking the
old Leninist watchword of 'All power to the soviets.'"
[_Kronstadt 1921_, pp. 75-6] Hardly an example of 
"reactionary" politics, unless the slogans of 1917 and 
the 1918 constitution of the U.S.S.R. are also 
"reactionary." 

While these fifteen demands are central to the revolt,
looking at the paper produced by the revolt helps us
understand the nature of these demands and place them in
a fuller political context. "The pages of *Izvestiia*,"
as Voline argued, "give abundant proof of th[e] general
enthusiasm, which re-appeared once the masses felt they
had regained, in the free Soviets, the true road to
emancipation and the hope of achieving the real 
revolution." [_Unknown Revolution_, p. 495] For example, 
food rations were equalised, except for the sick and
to children, who received a larger one. Left-wing
political parties were legalised. The Provisional
Revolutionary Committee was elected by a "Conference
of Delegates" made up of over two hundred delegates from
military units and workplaces. This body elected the
Provisional Revolutionary Committee on March 2nd and
enlarged it (again by election) on March 4th.

The March 4th Conference of Delegates also "decided that 
all workers, without exception, should be armed and put
in charge of guarding the interior of the city" and to 
organise re-elections for "the administrative commissions 
of all the unions and also of the Council of Unions" (which 
could "become the principle organ of the workers"). 
[*Izvestiia* quoted by Voline, _The Unknown Revolution_, 
p. 494]

In the article "The Goals for Which We Fight," the rebels 
argue that "[w]ith the aid of state unions" the Communists 
have "chained the workers to the machines, and transformed 
work into a new slavery instead of making it pleasant." Moreover, 
to the "protests of the peasants, which have gone so far as 
spontaneous revolts, to the demands of the workers, compelled 
by the very conditions of their life to resort to strikes, 
they reply with mass shootings and a ferocity that the Tsarist 
generals might have envied." An "inevitable third revolution"
was coming, shown by "increasing" workers' strikes, which will 
be "achieved by the labouring masses themselves." This would be 
based on "freely elected soviets" and the reorganisation of 
"the state unions into free associations of workers, peasants 
and intellectuals." [*Izvestiia* quoted by Voline, Op. Cit., 
pp. 507-8]

Thus the rebels saw clearly the real nature of nationalisation.
Rather than being the basis of socialism, it simply produced
more wage slavery, this time to the state ("From a slave of
the capitalist the worker was transformed into a slave of
state enterprises." [*Izvestiia* quoted by Voline, Op. Cit.,
p. 518]). They clearly saw the need to replace wage slavery to
the state (via nationalised property) with free associations
of free workers and peasants. Such a transformation would
come from the collective direct action and self-activity 
of working people, as expressed in the strikes which had 
so recently swept across the country. 

This transformation from the bottom up was stressed 
elsewhere. The unions, *Izvestiia* argued, would "fulfil 
the great and urgent task of educating the masses for an
economic and cultural renovation of the country. . . The
Soviet Socialist Republic cannot be strong unless its 
administration be exercised by the working class, with
the help of renovated unions." These should "become real
representatives of the interests of the people." The
current unions did "nothing" to promote "economic activity
of a co-operative nature" or the "cultural education" of
their members due centralised system imposed by the
Communist regime. This would change with "true union 
activity by the working class." [*Izvestiia* quoted by
Voline, Op. Cit., p. 510] A strong syndicalist perspective
clearly can be seen here, urging self-managed unions to
be at the forefront of transforming the economy into a
free association of producers. They opposed any "socialist"
system in which the peasant "has been transformed into a serf 
in the 'soviet' economy," the worker "a simple wage-worker 
in the State factories" and those who protest are "thrown
into the jails of the Cheka." [*Izvestiia* quoted by
Voline, Op. Cit., p. 512]

The rebels saw that soviet power cannot exist while
a political party dominated the soviets. They argued 
that Russia was just "State Socialism with Soviets of
functionaries who vote docilely what the authorities
and their infallible commissars dictate to them." Without
real working class power, without "the will of the worker"
expressed in their free soviets, corruption had become 
rampant ("Communists . . . live in ease and the commissars
get fat."). Rather than a "time of free labour in the
fields, factories and workshops," where "power" was in 
"the hands of the workers," the "Communists ha[d] brought 
in the rule of the commissars, with all the despotism of 
personal power." [*Izvestiia*, quoted by Voline, Op. Cit., 
p. 519, p. 518, p. 511 and p. 518]

In opposition to this, the rebels argued that "Revolutionary 
Kronstadt . . . fights for the true Soviet Republic of the 
workers in which the producer himself will be owner of the 
products of his labour and can dispose of them as he wishes." 
They desired "a life animated by free labour and the free 
development of the individual" and so proclaimed "All power 
to the Soviets and not to the parties" and "the power of the
free soviets." [*Izvestiia* quoted by Voline, Op. Cit., p. 519]

As can be seen, while the 15 demands are the essence of the
revolt, looking at *Izvestiia* confirms the revolutionary
nature of the demands. The rebels of 1921, as in 1917,
looked forward to a system of free soviets in which 
working people could transform their society into one
based on free associations which would encourage individual
freedom and be based on working class power. They looked to
a combination of renewed and democratic soviets and unions
to transform Russian society into a *real* socialist system
rather than the system of state capitalism the Bolsheviks
had imposed (see Maurice Brintin's _The Bolsheviks and
Workers' Control_ for details of Lenin's commitment to
building state capitalism in Russia from 1917 onwards).

Clearly, Kronstadt's political programme was deeply socialist
in nature. It opposed the new wage slavery of the workers to
the state and argued for free associations of free producers. 
It was based on the key slogan of 1917, "All power to the soviets"
but built upon it by adding the rider "but not to parties."
The sailors had learned the lesson of the October revolution,
namely that if a party held power the soviets did not. The
politics of the revolt were not dissimilar to those of 
libertarian socialists and, as we argue in section H.7.9,
identical to the dominant ideas of Kronstadt in 1917.

The question now arises, whose interests did these demands 
and politics represent. According to Trotskyists, it is the 
interests of the peasantry which motivated them. For anarchists, 
it is an expression of the interests of all working people 
(proletarian, peasant and artisan) against those who would 
exploit their labour and govern them (be it private capitalists 
or state bureaucrats). We discuss this issue in the next section.

H.7.4 Did the Kronstadt rebellion reflect "the exasperation of 
      the peasantry"?

This is a common argument of Trotskyists. While rarely providing
the Kronstadt demands, they always assert that (to use John Rees' 
words) that the sailors "represented the exasperation of the 
peasantry with the War Communist regime." ["In Defence of 
October", _International Socialism_ no. 52, p. 63]

As for Trotsky, the ideas of the rebellion "were deeply
reactionary" and "reflected the hostility of the backward
peasantry toward the worker, the self-importance of the
soldier or sailor in relation to 'civilian' Petrograd, the 
hatred of the petty bourgeois for revolutionary discipline." 
The revolt "represented the tendencies of the land-owning 
peasant, the small speculator, the kulak." [Lenin and Trotsky, 
_Kronstadt_, p. 80 and p. 81]

How true is this? Even a superficial analysis of the events of 
the revolt and of the *Petropavlovsk* resolution (see last section) 
can allow the reader to dismiss Trotsky's assertions. 

Firstly, according to the definition of "kulak" proved by the 
Trotskyists' themselves, we discover that kulak refers to 
"well-to-do peasants who owned land and hired poor peasants 
to work it." [Lenin and Trotsky, Op. Cit., p. 146] Point 11
of the Kronstadt demands explicitly states their opposition 
to rural wage labour. How could Kronstadt represent "the kulak" 
when it called for the abolition of hired labour on the land? 
Clearly, the revolt did not represent the "small speculator, 
the kulak" as Trotsky asserted. Did it represent the land-owning 
peasant? We will return to this issue shortly. 

Secondly, the Kronstadt revolt started after the sailors at 
Kronstadt sent delegates to investigate the plight of striking 
workers in Petrograd. Their actions were inspired by solidarity
for these workers and civilians. This clearly shows that 
Trotsky's assertion that the revolt "reflected the hostility 
of the backward peasantry toward the worker, the self-importance 
of the soldier or sailor in relation to 'civilian' Petrograd" to 
be utter and total nonsense.

As for the being "deeply reactionary," the ideas that motivated 
the revolt clearly were not. They were the outcome of solidarity 
with striking workers and called for soviet democracy, free speech, 
assembly and organisation for workers and peasants. These express
the demands of most, if not all, Marxist parties (including the 
Bolsheviks in 1917) before they take power. They simply repeat 
the demands and facts of the revolutionary period of 1917 and of 
the Soviet Constitution. As Anton Ciliga argues, these demands
were "impregnated with the spirit of October; and no calumny in 
the world can cast a doubt on the intimate connection existing 
between this resolution and the sentiments which guided the 
expropriations of 1917." ["The Kronstadt Revolt", _The Raven_, 
no, 8, pp. 330-7, p. 333] If the ideas of the Kronstadt revolt 
are reactionary, then so is the slogan "all power to the soviets."

Not that the Kronstadters had not been smeared before by their
opponents. The ex-Bolshevik turned Menshevik Vladimir Voitinsky 
who had visited the base in May 1917 later remembered them
as being "degraded and demoralised" and "lack[ing] proletarian
class-consciousness. It has the psychology of a *Lumpenproletariat*,
a stratum that is a danger to a revolution rather than its
support." They were "material suitable for a rebellion *a la*
Bakunin." [quoted by I. Getzler, _Kronstadt 1917-1921_, p. 253]

So did the demands represent the interests of the (non-kulak) 
peasantry? To do so we must see whether the demands reflected 
those of industrial workers or not. If the demands do, in fact, 
match those of striking workers and other proletarian elements 
then we can easily dismiss this claim. After all, if the demands 
of the Kronstadt rebellion reflected those of proletarians then 
it is impossible to say that they simply reflected the needs of 
peasants (of course, Trotskyists will argue that these proletarians 
were also "backward" but, in effect, they are arguing that any 
worker who did not quietly follow Bolshevik orders was "backward"
-- hardly a sound definition of the term!). 

We can quickly note that demands echoed those raised during the 
Moscow and Petrograd strikes that preceded the Kronstadt revolt. 
For example, Paul Avrich records that the demands raised in the 
February strikes included "removal of roadblocks, permission to 
make foraging trips into the countryside and to trade freely with
the villagers, [and] elimination of privileged rations for special 
categories of working men." The workers also "wanted the special 
guards of armed Bolsheviks, who carried out a purely police function, 
withdrawn from the factories" and raised "pleas for the restoration 
of political and civil rights." One manifesto which appeared 
(unsigned but bore earmarks of Menshevik origin) argued that 
"the workers and peasants need freedom. They do not want to live
by the decrees of the Bolsheviks. They want to control their own 
destinies." It urged the strikers to demand the liberation of all 
arrested socialists and nonparty workers, abolition of martial law,
freedom of speech, press and assembly for all who labour, free 
elections of factory committees, trade unions, and soviets. 
[Avrich, _Kronstadt 1921_, pp. 42-3]

In the strikes of 1921, according to Lashevich (a Bolshevik 
Commissar) the "basic demands are everywhere the same: free 
trade, free labour, freedom of movement, and so on." Two 
key demands raised in the strikes dated back to at least 1920. 
These were "for free trade and an end to privilege." In March 
1919, "the Rechkin coach-building plant demanded equal rations 
for all *workers*" and that one of the "most characteristic 
demands of the striking workers at that time were for the 
free bringing-in of food." [Mary McAuley, _Bread and Justice_, 
p. 299 and p. 302] 

As can be seen, these demands related almost directly to points 
1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 13 of the Kronstadt demands. As 
Paul Avrich argues, the Kronstadt demands "echoed the discontents 
not only of the Baltic Fleet but of the mass of Russians in towns 
and villages throughout the country. Themselves of plebeian stock,
the sailors wanted relief for their peasant and worker kinfolk. 
Indeed, of the resolution's 15 points, only one -- the abolition 
of the political departments in the fleet -- applied specifically 
to their own situation. The remainder . . . was a broadside aimed 
at the policies of War Communism, the justification of which, in 
the eyes of the sailors and of the population at large, had long 
since vanished." Avrich argues that many of the sailors had
returned home on leave to see the plight of the villagers with 
their own eyes played at part in framing the resolution (particularly
of point 11, the *only* peasant specific demand raised) but "[b]y 
the same token, the sailors' inspection tour of Petrograd's factories 
may account for their inclusion of the workingmen's chief demands -- 
the abolition of road-blocks, of privileged rations, and of armed 
factory squads -- in their program." [Avrich, Op. Cit., pp. 74-5]
Simply put, the Kronstadt resolution "merely reiterated long
standing workers' demands." [V. Brovkin, _Behind the Front
Lines of the Civil War_, p. 395]

Which means, of course, that Ida Mett had been correct to 
argue that the "Kronstadt revolution had the merit of stating 
things openly and clearly. But it was breaking no new ground. 
Its main ideas were being discussed everywhere. For having, 
in one way or another, put forward precisely such ideas, 
workers and peasants were already filling the prisons and 
the recently set up concentration camps." [_The Kronstadt 
Uprising_, p. 39]

Nor can it be claimed that these workers were non-proletarians
(as if class is determined by thought rather than social
position). Rather than being those workers with the closest
relations with the countryside who were protesting, the
opposite was the case. By 1921 "[a]ll who had relatives in 
the country had rejoined them. The authentic proletariat 
remained till the end, having the most slender connections 
with the countryside." [Ida Mett, Op. Cit., p. 36]

Thus the claims that the Kronstadt demands reflected peasant
needs is mistaken. They reflected the needs of the whole
working population, including the urban working class who
raised these demands continually throughout the Civil War
period in their strikes. Simply put, the policies of the
Bolsheviks as regards food were not only evil, they did
not work and were counter-productive. As many of the 
Russian working class recognised from the start and took 
strike action over again and again. 

Moreover, by focusing on the "free trade" issue, Leninists
distort the real reasons for the revolt. As Ida Mett points 
out, the Kronstadt rebellion did not call for "free trade" 
as the Trotskyists argue, but rather something far more
important: 

"In the Kronstadt Isvestia of March 14th we find a 
characteristic passage on this subject. The rebels 
proclaimed that 'Kronstadt is not asking for freedom 
of trade but for genuine power to the Soviets.' The 
Petrograd strikers were also demanding the reopening 
of the markets and the abolition of the road blocks 
set up by the militia. But they too were stating that
freedom of trade by itself would not solve their problems."
[Op. Cit., p. 77]

Thus we have the Petrograd (and other) workers calling
for "free trade" (and so, presumably, expressing their
economic interests or those of their fathers and brothers)
while the Kronstadt sailors were demanding first and
foremost soviet power! Their programme called for the
"granting to the peasants of freedom of action on
their own soil, and of the right to own cattle, 
provided they look after them themselves and do not
employ hired labour." This was point 11 of the 15
demands, which showed the importance it ranked in
their eyes. This would have been the basis of trade
between town and village, but trade between worker
and peasant and not between worker and kulak. So rather 
than call for "free trade" in the abstract (as many 
of the workers were) the Kronstadters (while reflecting
the needs of both workers and peasants) were calling for the 
free exchange of products between workers, not workers and 
rural capitalists (i.e. peasants who hired wage slaves). 
This indicates a level of political awareness, an awareness 
of the fact that wage labour is the essence of capitalism. 

Thus Ante Ciliga:

"People often believe that Kronstadt forced the introduction 
of the New Economic Policy (NEP) -- a profound error. The 
Kronstadt resolution pronounced in favour of the defence of 
the workers, not only against the bureaucratic capitalism of 
the State, but also against the restoration of private 
capitalism. This restoration was demanded -- in opposition to
Kronstadt -- by the social democrats, who combined it with a 
regime of political democracy. And it was Lenin and Trotsky
who to a great extent realised it (but without political 
democracy) in the form of the NEP. The Kronstadt resolution 
declared for the opposite since it declared itself against 
the employment of wage labour in agriculture and small industry.
This resolution, and the movement underlying, sought for a 
revolutionary alliance of the proletarian and peasant workers 
with the poorest sections of the country labourers, in order 
that the revolution might develop towards socialism. The NEP, 
on the other hand, was a union of bureaucrats with the upper 
layers of the village against the proletariat; it was the 
alliance of State capitalism and private capitalism against 
socialism. The NEP is as much opposed to the Kronstadt demands 
as, for example, the revolutionary socialist programme of the 
vanguard of the European workers for the abolition of the 
Versailles system, is opposed to the abrogation of the
Treaty of Versailles achieved by Hitler." 
[Op. Cit., pp. 334-5]

Point 11 did, as Ida Mett noted, "reflected the demands of the 
peasants to whom the Kronstadt sailors had remained linked -- 
as had, as a matter of fact, the whole of the Russian proletariat 
. . . In their great majority, the Russian workers came directly 
from the peasantry. This must be stressed. The Baltic sailors
of 1921 were, it is true, closely linked with the peasantry. 
But neither more nor less than had been the sailors of 1917." 
To ignore the peasantry in a country in which the vast majority 
were peasants would have been insane (as the Bolsheviks proved).
Mett stresses this when she argued that a "workers and peasants' 
regime that did not wish to base itself exclusively on lies and 
terror, had to take account of the peasantry." [Op. Cit., p. 40]

Given that the Russian industrial working class were also 
calling for free trade (and often without the political,
anti-capitalist, riders Kronstadt added) it seems dishonest 
to claim that the sailors purely expressed the interests of 
the peasantry. Perhaps this explains why point 11 becomes 
summarised as "restoration of free trade" by Trotskyists. 
["Editorial Preface", Lenin and Trotsky, _Kronstadt_, p. 6] 
John Rees does not even mention any of the demands (which 
is amazing in a work which, in part, tries to analyse the 
rebellion).

Similarly, the working class nature of the resolution
can be seen from who agreed to it. The resolution passed 
by the sailors on the battleships was ratified by a mass 
meeting and then a delegate meeting of workers, soldiers 
and sailors. In other words, by workers *and* peasants.

J.G. Wright, following his guru Trotsky without question 
(and using him as the sole reference for his "facts"), 
stated that "the incontestable facts" were the "sailors 
composed the bulk of the insurgent forces" and "the 
garrison and the civil population remained passive." 
[Lenin and Trotsky, Op. Cit., p. 123] This, apparently, 
is evidence of the peasant nature of the revolt. Let us 
contest these "incontestable facts" (i.e. assertions by 
Trotsky).

The first fact we should mention is that the meeting of 1st 
March in Anchor Square involved "some fifteen to sixteen 
thousand sailors, soldiers and civilians." [Getzler, Op. Cit., 
p. 215] This represented over 30% of Kronstadt's total population. 
This hardly points to a "passive" attitude on behalf of the
civilians and soldiers. 

The second fact is that the conference of delegates had a 
"membership that fluctuated between which two and three 
hundred sailors, soldiers, and working men." This body 
remained in existence during the whole revolt as the 
equivalent of the 1917 soviet and, like that soviet, had 
delegates from Kronstadt's "factories and military units." It 
was, in effect, a "prototype of the 'free soviets' for which 
the insurgents had risen in revolt." In addition, a new Trade 
Union Council was created, free from Communist domination. 
[Avrich, Op. Cit., p. 159 and p. 157] Trotsky expects us to 
believe  that the soldiers and civilians who elected these
delegates were "passive"? The very act of electing these 
delegates would have involved discussion and decision making 
and so active participation. It is extremely doubtful that 
the soldiers and civilians would have so apathetic and apolitical
to not have taken an active part in the revolt. 

Thirdly, the declarations by sailors, soldiers and workers 
printed in *Izvestiia* which expressed their support for 
the revolt and those which announced they had left the 
Communist Party also present evidence which clearly 
contests Trotsky's and Wright's "incontestable facts." One 
declaration of the "soldiers of the Red Army from the fort
Krasnoarmeietz" stated they were "body and soul with the
Revolutionary Committee." [quoted by Voline, _The Unknown
Revolution_, p. 500] 

Lastly, given that the Red Army troops manned the main bastion 
and the outlying forts and gun emplacements at Kronstadt and 
that the Bolshevik troops had to take these forts by force, 
we can safely argue that the Red Army soldiers did not play 
a "passive" role during the rebellion. [Paul Avrich, Op. Cit., 
p. 54 and pp. 205-6]

This is confirmed by later historians. Based on such facts, Paul 
Avrich states that the townspeople "offered their active support" 
and the Red Army troops "soon fell into line." [Op. Cit., p. 159] 
Fedotoff-White notes that the "local land forces of the Kronstadt
garrison . . . fell in and joined the seamen." [_The Growth of the 
Red Army_, p. 154] Getzler notes that elections were held for the 
Council of Trade Unions on the 7th and 8th of March and this was 
a "Council committee consisting of representatives from all trade 
unions." He also notes that the Conference of Delegates "had been 
elected by Kronstadt's body politic at their places of work, in 
army units, factories, workshops and Soviet institutions." He 
adds that the revolutionary troikas (the equivalent of the 
commissions of the Executive Committee of the Soviet in 1917) 
were also "elected by the base organisations." Likewise, "the 
secretariats of the trade unions and the newly founded Council 
of Trade Unions were both elected by the entire membership of 
trade unions." [Op. Cit., pp. 238-9 and p. 240] 

That is a lot of activity for "passive" people.

In other words, the *Petropavlovsk* resolution not only reflected 
the demands of proletarians in Petrograd, it gained the support of
proletarians in Kronstadt in the fleet, the army and the civilian 
workforce. Thus the claim that the Kronstadt resolution purely
reflected the interests of the peasantry is, yet again, refuted.

As can be seen, the Kronstadters' (like the Petrograd workers) 
raised economic and political demands in 1921 just as they had 
four years earlier when they overthrew the Tsar. Which, again, 
refutes the logic of defenders of Bolshevism. For example, Wright 
excelled himself when he argued the following:

"The supposition that the soldiers and sailors could
venture upon an insurrection under an abstract political
slogan of 'free soviets' is absurd in itself. It is
doubly absurd in the view of the fact [!] that the
rest of the Kronstadt garrison consisted of backward
and passive people who could not be used in the civil
war. These people could have been moved to an insurrection
only by profound economic needs and interests. These
were the needs and interests of the fathers and brothers
of these sailors and soldiers, that is, of peasants as
traders in food products and raw materials. In other
words the mutiny was the expression of the petty
bourgeoisie's reaction against the difficulties
and privations imposed by the proletarian revolution.
Nobody can deny this class character of the two
camps." [Lenin and Trotsky,  Op. Cit., pp. 111-2]

Of course, no worker or peasant could possibly reach
beyond a trade union consciousness by their own efforts, 
as Lenin so thoughtfully argued in _What is to be Done?_.
Neither could the experience of two revolutions have
an impact on anyone, nor the extensive political
agitation and propaganda of years of struggle. Indeed, 
the sailors were so backward that they had no "profound 
economic needs and interests" of their own but rather 
fought for their fathers and brothers interests! Indeed, 
according to Trotsky they did not even understand that 
("They themselves did not clearly understand that what 
their fathers and brothers needed first of all was free 
trade." [Lenin and Trotsky, Op. Cit., p. 92])! And these 
were the sailors the Bolsheviks desired to man some of 
the most advanced warships in the world?

Sadly for Wright's assertions history has proven him
wrong time and time again. Working people have constantly
raised political demands which were far in advance of
those of the "professional" revolutionaries (a certain 
German and the Paris Commune springs to mind, never mind 
a certain Russian and the soviets). The fact that the
Kronstadt sailors not only "venture[d] upon an insurrection 
under an abstract political slogan of 'free soviets'"
but actually *created* one (the conference of delegates)
goes unmentioned. Moreover, as we prove in section H.7.8,
the majority of sailors in 1921 had been there in 
1917. This was due to the fact that the sailors could 
not be quickly or easily replaced due to the technology 
required to operate Kronstadt's defences and battleships.

Given that the "a smaller proportion of the Kronstadt
sailors were of peasant origin than was the case of
the Red Army troops supporting the government," perhaps
we will discover Trotskyists arguing that because 
"ordinary Red Army soldiers . . . were reluctant and
unreliable fighters against Red Kronstadt, although
driven at gunpoint onto the ice and into battle" that
also proves the peasant nature of the revolt? [Sam
Farber, Op. Cit., p. 192; Israel Getzler, _Kronstadt
1917-1921_, p. 243] Given the quality of the previous
arguments presented, it is only a matter of time before
this one appears!

Indeed, Trotskyists also note this non-peasant nature of the
Kronstadt demands (as indicated in the last section). Thus
was have John Rees pathetically noting that "no other
peasant insurrection reproduced the Kronstadters' demands."
[Rees, Op. Cit., p. 63] As we have indicated above, *proletarian* 
strikes, resolutions and activists all produced demands similar
or identical to the Kronstadt demands. These facts, in
themselves, indicate the truth of Trotskyist assertions
on this matter. Rees mentions the strikes in passing,
but fails to indicate that Kronstadt's demands were raised
after a delegation of sailors had returned from visiting
Petrograd. Rather than their "motivation" being "much
closer to that of the peasantry" that to the "dissatisfaction
of the urban working class" the facts suggest the opposite
(as can be seen from the demands raised). [Rees, Op. Cit., p. 61] 
The motivation for the resolution was a product of the strikes 
in Petrograd and it also, naturally enough, included the 
dissatisfaction of the peasantry (in point 11). For the 
Kronstadters, it was a case of the needs of *all* the 
toilers and so their resolution reflected the needs 
and demands of both.

Unfortunately for Rees, another revolt *did* reproduce the 
Kronstadt demands and it was by urban workers, *not* peasants. 
This revolt took place in Ekaterinoslavl (in the Ukraine) in
May, 1921. It started in the railway workshops and became 
"quickly politicised," with the strike committee raising a
"series of political ultimatums that were very similar in 
content to the demands of the Kronstadt rebels." Indeed,
many of the resolutions put to the meeting almost completely
coincided with the Kronstadt demands. The strike "spread to
the other workshops" and on June 1st the main large 
Ekaterinoslavl factories joined the strike. The strike was
spread via the use of trains and telegraph and soon an 
area up to fifty miles around the town was affected. The
strike was finally ended by the use of the Cheka, using 
mass arrests and shootings. Unsurprisingly, the local 
communists called the revolt a "little Kronstadt." [Jonathan
Aves, _Workers Against Lenin_, pp. 171-3]

Therefore to claim that Kronstadt solely reflected the
plight or interests of the peasantry is nonsense. Nor
were the *economic* demands of Kronstadt alarming to
the Bolshevik authories. After all, Zinovioev was about
to grant the removal of the roadblock detachments
(point 8) and the government was drafting what was
to become known as the New Economic Policy (NEP) which 
would satisfy point 11 partially (the NEP, unlike the
Kronstadters, did not end wage labour and so, ironically,
represented the interests of the Kulaks!). It was the
*political* demands which were the problem. They
represented a clear challenge to Bolshevik power and
their claims at being the "soviet power."

H.7.5 What lies did the Bolsheviks spread about Kronstadt?

From the start, the Bolsheviks lied about the uprising.
Indeed, Kronstadt provides a classic example of how Lenin 
and Trotsky used slander against their political opponents. 
Both attempted to paint the revolt as being organised and 
lead by the Whites. At every stage in the rebellion, they
stressed that it had been organised and run by White
guard elements. As Paul Avrich notes, "every effort was
made to discredit the rebels" and that the "chief 
object of Bolshevik propaganda was to show that the
revolt was not a spontaneous outbreak of mass protest
but a new counterrevolutionary conspiracy, following
the pattern established during the Civil War. According
to the Soviet press, the sailors, influenced by 
Mensheviks and SR's in their ranks, had shamelessly
cast their lot with the 'White Guards,' led by a
former tsarist general named Kozlovsky . . . This,
in turn, was said to be part of a carefully laid
plot hatched in Paris by Russian emigres in league
with French counterintelligence." [Op. Cit., p. 88
and p. 95] 

Lenin, for example, argued in a report to the Tenth
Congress of the Communist Party on March 8th that 
"White Guard generals were very active over there.
There is ample proof of this" and that it was "the
work of Social Revolutionaries and White Guard
emigres." [Lenin and Trotsky, _Kronstadt_, p. 44] 

The first government statement on the Kronstadt events 
was entitled "The Revolt of Ex-General Kozlovsky and the 
Warship Petropavlovsk" and read, in part, that the revolt
was "expected by, and undoubtedly prepared by, French 
counterintelligence." It continues by stating that
on the morning of March 2 "the group around ex-General 
Kozlovsky . . . had openly appeared on the scene . . . 
[he] and three of his officers . . . have openly assumed 
the role of insurgents. Under their direction . . . a 
number  of . . . responsible individuals, have been 
arrested. . . Behind the SRs again stands a tsarist 
general." [Op. Cit., pp. 65-6]

Victor Serge, a French anarchist turned Bolshevik,
remembered that he was first told that "Kronstadt
is in the hands of the Whites" and that "[s]mall
posters stuck on the walls in the still empty
streets proclaimed that the counter-revolutionary
General Kozlovsky had seized Kronstadt through
conspiracy and treason." Later the "truth seeped
through little by little, past the smokescreen
put out by the Press, which was positively berserk
with lies" (indeed, he states that the Bolshevik
press "lied systematically"). He found out that 
the Bolshevik's official line was "an atrocious 
lie" and that "the sailors had mutinied, it was 
a naval revolt led by the Soviet." However, the
"worse of it all was that we were paralysed by
the official falsehoods. It had never happened
before that our Party should lie to us like this.
'It's necessary for the benefit of the public,'
said some . . . the strike [in Petrograd] was
now practically general" (we should note that
Serge, a few pages previously, mentions "the 
strenuous calumnies put out by the Communist Press" 
about Nestor Makhno, "which went so far as to accuse 
him of signing pacts with the Whites at the very moment 
when he was engaged in a life-and-death struggle 
against them" which suggests that Kronstadt was
hardly the first time the Party had lied to them). 
[_Memoirs of a Revolutionary_, pp. 124-6 and p. 122]
(In the interests of honesty, it should be noted that
Serge himself contributed to the Bolshevik lie 
machine about Kronstadt. For example, in March 1922 
he happily repeated the Soviet regime's falsifications 
about the rebels. [_The Serge-Trotsky Papers_, pp. 18-9]).

Even Isaac Deutscher, Trotsky's biographer said that 
the Bolsheviks "denounced the men of Kronstadt as 
counter-revolutionary mutineers, led by a White 
general. The denunciation appears to have been 
groundless." [_The Prophet Armed_, p. 511]

Thus the claim that the Kronstadt rebellion was the 
work of Whites and led by a White/Tzarist General
was a lie -- a lie deliberately and consciously
spread. This was concocted to weaken support for 
the rebellion in Petrograd and in the Red Army,
to ensure that it did not spread. Lenin admitted
as much on the 15th of March when he stated at the
Tenth Party Conference that in Kronstadt "they did
not want the White Guards, and they do not want our
power either." [quoted by Avrich, Op. Cit., p. 129]

If you agree with Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci that 
"to tell the truth is a communist and revolutionary act" 
then its clear that the Bolsheviks in 1921 (and for a 
long time previously) were not communist or revolutionary
(and as the subsequent Leninist accounts of Kronstadt show,
Bolshevism is still neither). In stark contrast to the
Bolsheviks, the Kronstadt paper *Izvestiia* published
Bolshevik leaflets, paper articles and radio broadcasts
so that the inhabitants of the island could see exactly
what lies the Bolsheviks were telling about them.

The Trotskyist editors of _Kronstadt_ show the same
contempt for their readers as the Bolsheviks showed
for the truth. They include an "Introduction" to their
work by Pierre Frank in which he argues that the Bolsheviks 
merely "state that [White] generals, counterrevolutionaries,
sought to manipulate the insurgents" and that anarchists
"turn this into a claim that these generals had
launched the rebellion and that 'Lenin, Trotsky and
the whole Party leadership knew quite well that this 
was no mere 'generals' revolt.'" [quoting Ida Mett] This 
apparently shows how "[a]nything having to do with the 
facts" gets treated by such authors. He states that
Mett and others "merely distort the Bolsheviks' positions."
[Lenin and Trotsky, Op. Cit., p. 22] 

This is argued in the same work that quotes Lenin actually 
stating on March 8th, 1921, that "the familiar figures of 
White Guard generals" were "very quickly revealed," that 
"White generals were very active" there, that it was "quite 
clear that it is the work of Social Revolutionaries and White
Guard emigres" and that Kronstadt was "bound up initially" 
with "the White Guards." Lenin is also quoted, on March 9th, 
arguing that "the Paris newspapers reported the events two
weeks before they actually occurred, and a White general
appeared on the scene. That is what actually happened." 
[Op. Cit., pp. 44-5 and p. 48] This is stated in spite of 
presenting the government statement we have quoted above in 
which the Bolshevik government clearly argued that two 
Communist leaders had been arrested under Kozlovsky's 
"direction" and he "stands" behind the right-SRs whose 
agitation had started the revolt (according to the
Bolsheviks).

Nor can it be said that Ida Mett claims that the Lenin
and Trotsky had said a general had "launched" the revolt.
She quotes Moscow radio as stating that the revolt ("Just 
like other White Guard insurrections") was in fact "the 
mutiny of ex-General Kozlovsky and the crew of the battle 
ship 'Petropavlovsk'" had been organised by Entene spies, 
while Socialist Revolutionaries had "prepared" the ground 
and that their real master was a "Tsarist general" on the 
page *before* that quoted by Frank, so indicating who the 
Bolsheviks did claim had launched the revolt. [Mett, 
Op. Cit., p. 43] It seems strange that Frank complains 
that others "distort" the Bolsheviks position when, 
firstly, the person he quotes does not and, secondly, 
he distorts that persons' actual position. 

Mett simply acknowledging the Bolshevik lies spewed
out at the time. Then she said that "Lenin, Trotsky and
the whole Party leadership knew quite well that this 
was no mere 'generals' revolt." [Op. Cit., p. 43] She
*then* turns to General Kozlovsky whom the Bolsheviks
indicated by name as the leader of the revolt and had
outlawed in the statement of March 2nd quoted above.
Who was he and what part did he play? Mett sums up
the evidence:

"He was an artillery general, and had been one of the 
first to defect to the Bolsheviks. He seemed devoid of 
any capacity as a leader. At the time of the insurrection 
he happened to be in command of the artillery at Kronstadt. 
The communist commander of the fortress had defected. 
Kozlovsky, according to the rules prevailing in the 
fortress, had to replace him. He, in fact, refused, 
claiming that as the fortress was now under the 
jurisdiction of the Provisional Revolutionary Committee, 
the old rules no longer applied. Kozlovsky remained, it 
is true, in Kronstadt, but only as an artillery specialist. 
Moreover, after the fall of Kronstadt, in certain 
interviews granted to the Finnish press, Kozlovsky 
accused the sailors of having wasted precious time on 
issues other than the defence of the fortress. He 
explained this in terms of their reluctance to resort 
to bloodshed. Later, other officers of the garrison were 
also to accuse the sailors of military incompetence, and 
of complete lack of confidence in their technical advisers. 
Kozlovsky was the only general to have been present at 
Kronstadt. This was enough for the Government to make use 
of his name.

"The men of Kronstadt did, up to a point, make use of the 
military know how of certain officers in the fortress at 
the time. Some of these officers may have given the men 
advice out of sheer hostility to the Bolsheviks. But in 
their attack on Kronstadt, the Government forces were also
making use of ex Tsarist officers. On the one side there 
were Kozlovsky, Salomianov, and Arkannihov; On the other, 
ex-Tsarist officers and specialists of the old regime, such 
as Toukhatchevsky. Kamenev, and Avrov. On neither side 
were these officers an independent force." [Op. Cit., 
p. 44]

Not that this is good enough for Trotskyists. Wright,
for example, will have none of it. He quotes Alexander 
Berkman's statement that there was "a former general, 
Kozlovsky, in Kronstadt. It was Trotsky who had placed 
him there as an Artillery specialist. He played no role 
whatever in the Kronstadt events." [_The Russian Tragedy_,
p. 69]

Wright protests that this is not true and, as evidence, 
quotes from an interview by Kozlovsky and states that 
"[f]rom the lips of the counterrevolutionary general 
himself . . . we get the unambiguous declaration that 
*from the very first day*, he and his colleagues had 
openly associated themselves with the mutiny, had 
elaborated the 'best' plans to capture Petrograd . . . 
If the plan failed it was only because Kozlovsky and 
his colleagues were unable to convince the 'political 
leaders', i.e. his SR allies [!], that the moment was 
propitious for exposing their true visage and program." 
[Lenin and Trotsky, _Kronstadt_, p. 119] 

In other words, because the Provisional Revolutionary 
Committee *failed* to take the advice of the military 
specialists it proves that, in fact, they were in 
league! That is very impressive. We wonder if the 
Kronstadters *had* taken their advice then this would 
have proved that they were not, in fact, in league 
with them after all? Similarly, by failing to take 
over the command of the fortress Kozlovsky *must* have 
shown how he was leading the revolt as the Bolshevik 
radio said!

Every non-Leninist account agrees that Kozlovsky played
no part in the revolt. Paul Avrich notes that when trouble 
erupted "the Bolsheviks at once denounced him as the evil 
genius of the movement," "outlawed" him and seized his 
family as hostages. He confirms that the military 
specialists "threw themselves into the task of planning 
military operations on behalf of the insurrection" and 
that Kozlovsky had refused to succeed as the commander 
of the fortress after the old one had fled to the 
mainland (as demanded by military rules). He stresses 
that "the officers remained in a purely advisory capacity 
throughout the rebellion. They had no share, as far as 
one can tell, in initiating or directing the revolt, or 
in framing its political program, which was alien to their 
way of thinking." Their role "was confined to providing 
technical advice, just as it had been under the Bolsheviks." 
The Provisional Revolutionary Committee "showed its distrust 
of the specialists by repeatedly rejecting their counsel,
however sound and appropriate it might be." And, of course, 
we should mention that "[f]or all the government's accusations 
that Kronstadt was a conspiracy of White Guard generals, 
ex-tsarist officers played a much more prominent role in 
the attacking force than among the defenders." [Op. Cit., 
p. 99, p. 100, p. 101 and p. 203]

Indeed, Kozlovsky "had served the Bolsheviks so loyally
that on 20 October 1920 the chief commander of the Baltic
Fleet . . . had awarded him a watch 'for courage and feat
of arms in the battle against Yudenich'" [I. Getzler,
_Kronstadt 1917-1921_, p. 219] This was simply officially
confirming the award made on the 3rd of December, 1919,
by the Petrograd Soviet "for military feats and energetic
activities during the attack of the Yudenich bands on
Petrograd." Indeed, he was one of the first generals who
entered into service of the Bolsheviks and the Kronstadt
soviet had elected him Chief-of-Staff of the fortress in
the wake of the February revolution. All this did not stop
the Bolsheviks claiming on March 3rd, 1921, that Kozlovsky 
was a "supporter of Yudenich and Kolchak"! [quoted by 
Israel Getzler, "The Communist Leaders' Role in the 
Kronstadt Tragedy of 1921 in the Light of Recently 
Published Archival Documents", _Revolutionary Russia_, 
pp. 24-44, Vol. 15, No. 1, June 2002, p. 43 and p. 31]

Berkman was clearly correct. Kozlovsky took no role in the 
revolt. What he did do was offer his expertise to the 
Kronstadt rebels (just as he had to the Bolsheviks) and 
make plans which were rejected. If associating yourself 
with an event and making plans which are rejected by 
those involved equals a role in that event then Trotsky's 
role in the Spanish revolution equalled that of Durruti's! 

Finally, it should be noted that Victor Serge reported that
it "was probably [the leading Bolshevik] Kalinin who, on his
return to Petrograd [from attending the initial rebel meetings
at Kronstadt], invented 'the White General Kozlovsky.'" 
[_Memoirs of a Revolutionary_, p. 127] The ironic thing is,
if the Kronstadt rebels *had* been following Kozlovsky and
the other Bolshevik appointed "military specialists" then
the defences of Kronstadt would have been strengthened 
considerably. However, as Kozlovsky later explained, the
sailors refused to co-operate because of their congenital
mistrust of officers. [Paul Avrich, Op. Cit., pp. 138-9]

It is hard to find a Leninist who subscribes to this 
particular Bolshevik lie about Kronstadt. It has, for 
the main, been long abandoned by those who follow those 
who created it, despite the fact it was the cornerstone 
of the official Bolshevik account of the rebellion.
As the obvious falseness of the claims became more
and more well-known, Trotsky and his followers turned
to other arguments to slander the uprising. The most
famous is the assertion that the "Kronstadt sailors
were quite a different group from the revolutionary
heroes of 1917." [Wright, Op. Cit., p. 129] We turn
to this question in the section H.7.8 and indicate
that research as refuted it (and how Trotskyists
have misused this research to present a drastically
false picture of the facts). However, first we must
discuss whether the Kronstadt revolt was, in fact, 
a White conspiracy (the next section) and its real
relationship to the Whites (section H.7.7).

H.7.6 Was the Kronstadt revolt a White plot?

At the time, the Bosheviks portrayed the Kronstadt revolt as
a White plot, organised by the counter-revolution (see last
section for full details). In particular, they portrayed
the revolt as a conspiracy, directed by foreign spies and
executed by their SR and White Guardist allies.

For example, Lenin argued on March 8th that "White Guard 
generals were very active" at Kronstadt. "There is ample 
proof of this. Two weeks before the Kronstadt events, 
the Paris newspapers reported a mutiny at Kronstadt. It 
is quite clear that it is the work of Social Revolutionaries
and White Guard emigres." [Lenin and Trotsky, _Kronstadt_, 
p. 44] 

Trotsky, on March 16th, made the same point, arguing that 
"in a number of foreign newspapers . . . news of an uprising
in Kronstadt appeared as far back as the middle of
February . . . How [to] explain this? Very simply . . . The 
Russian counterrevolutionary organisers promised to stage 
a mutiny at a propitious moment, while the impatient 
yellow and financial press write about it as an already 
accomplished fact." [Op. Cit., p. 68] 

This appears to be the greatest "evidence" for Lenin and 
Trotsky as regards the White-Guardist nature of the revolt. 
Indeed, Trotsky on the "basis of the dispatch . . . sent a 
warning to Petrograd to my naval colleagues." [Ibid.]

However, to see the truth of these claims it is simply a
case of looking at how the Bolsheviks reacted to this
announcement of an uprising in Kronstadt. They did 
nothing. As the Trotskyist editors of a book justifying 
the repression note, the "Red Army command was caught
unprepared by the rebellion." [Op. Cit., p. 6] J.G.
Wright, in his defence of Trotsky's position (a defence 
recommended by Trotsky himself), acknowledged that the 
"Red Army command" was "[c]aught off guard by the 
mutiny." [Op. Cit., p. 123] This clearly shows how 
little weight the newspaper reports were held *before* 
the rebellion. Of course, *during* and *after* the 
rebellion was a different matter and they quickly became 
a focal point for Bolshevik smears.

Moreover, as proof of a White plot, this evidence is
pathetic. As Ida Mett argued out, the "publication of 
false news about Russia was nothing exceptional. Such 
news was published before, during and after the Kronstadt 
events. . . To base an accusation on a 'proof' of this 
kind is inadmissible and immoral." [Mett, _The Kronstadt
Uprising_, p. 76] 

Even Trotsky admitted that "the imperialist press . . . prints
. . . a great number of fictitious reports about Russia" but
maintained that the reports on Kronstadt were examples of
"forecasts" of "attempts at overturns in specific centres
of Soviet Russia" (indeed, the "journalistic agents of
imperialism only 'forecast' that which is entrusted for
execution to other agents of this very imperialism.").
Lenin also noted, in an article entitled "The Campaign of 
Lies", that "the West European press [had] indulged in such 
an orgy of lies or engaged in the mass production of fantastic 
inventions about Soviet Russia in the last two weeks" and 
listed some of them (such as "Petrograd and Moscow are in 
the hands of the insurgents"). [Lenin and Trotsky, _Kronstadt_, 
p. 69, p. 50 and p. 51] 

Yet this same press can be used as evidence for a White 
conspiracy in Kronstadt? Unsurprisingly, as Mett notes, 
"[i]n 1938 Trotsky himself was to drop this accusation." 
[Mett, Op. Cit., p. 76] Little wonder, given its pathetic 
nature -- although this does not stop his loyal follower John G. 
Wright from asserting these reports are the "irrefutable 
facts" of the "connection between the counterrevolution and 
Kronstadt." [Lenin and Trotsky, Op. Cit., p. 115] The question 
of *why* the counterrevolutionary plotters would given their 
enemies advance notice of their plans never crossed his mind.


As can be seen, at the time *no* evidence was forthcoming 
that the Whites organised or took part in the revolt. As 
Ida Mett argues:

"If, at the time the Bolshevik Government had proofs of 
these alleged contacts between Kronstadt and the 
counter-revolutionaries why did it not try the rebels 
publicly? Why did it not show the working masses of 
Russia the 'real' reasons for the uprising? If this wasn't 
done it was because no such proofs existed." [Mett, Op. Cit.,
p. 77]

Unsurprisingly, the first soviet investigation into the revolt
came to the conclusion that it was spontaneous. Iakov Agranov,
a special plenipotentiary of the Secret-Operation Department of
the *Vecheka*" (and later to become its head), was sent the
presidium of that body to Kronstadt soon after the crushing of
the uprising. His mandate was "to ascertain the role of various
parties and groups in the start and development of the uprising
and the ties of its organisers and inspirers with 
counter-revolutionary parties and organisations operating both
in and outside Soviet Russia." He produced a report on the 5th 
of April, 1921, which expressed his considered opinion that
the "uprising was entirely spontaneous in origin and drew into
its maelstrom almost the entire population and the garrison of
the fortress. . . the investigation failed to show the outbreak
of the mutiny was preceded by the activity of any 
counter-revolutionary organisation at work among the fortress's
command or that it was the work of the *entente.* The entire
course of the movement speaks against that possibility. Had the
mutiny been the work of some secret organisation which predated
its outbreak, then that organisation would not have planned 
it for a time when the reserves of fuel and provisions were
hardly sufficient for two weeks and when the thawing of the 
ice was still far off." He notes that the "masses" in Kronstadt
"were fully aware of the spontaneity of their movement." [quoted 
by Israel Getzler, "The Communist Leaders' Role in the Kronstadt 
Tragedy of 1921 in the Light of Recently Published Archival 
Documents", _Revolutionary Russia_, pp. 24-44, Vol. 15, No. 1, 
June 2002, p. 25] 

Agranov's conclusion was also that of Aleksei Nikolaev's, who,
as chairman of the Extraordinary *Troika* of the First and 
Second Special Section, was given the double assignment of "the
punishment of the mutineers and the unmasking of all the
organisations that prepared and led the mutiny." He reported
on April 20th, 1921, that "in spite of all efforts we have been 
unable to discover the presence of any organisation and to seize 
any agents." [quoted by Getzler, Op. Cit., p. 26] Ironically enough,
a prominent SR leader and head of the SR Administrative Centre
in Finland wrote a letter on the 18th of March that stated the
revolt was "absolutely spontaneous," that the "movement began
spontaneously, without any organisation and quite unexpectedly.
After all, a month later, Kronstadt would have been inaccessible
to the Bolsheviks and a hundred times more dangerous to them."
[quoted by Getzler, Op. Cit., pp. 25-6] 

This did not stop the Bolsheviks reiterating the official line 
that the revolt was a White plot, with SR help (nor has it stopped
their latter-day supporters repeating these lies since). For 
example, Bukharin was still pedalling the official lies in July 
1921, stating that, as regards Kronstadt, the "documents which 
have since been brought to light show clearly that the affair 
was instigated by purely White Guard centres." [contained in 
_In Defence of the Russian Revolution_, Al Richardson (ed.), 
p. 192] It is redundant to note that said "documents" were not
"brought to light" then or since. 

It should be noted here that the Bolsheviks were quite willing 
to invent "evidence" of a conspiracy. Trotsky, for example, raised,
on the 24th of March 1921, the possibility of a "Political Trial
of Kronstadters and Makhnovites." This show trial would be part 
of the "struggle" against "anarchism (Kronstadt and Makhno)." This 
was "presently an important task" and so it "seems . . . appropriate 
to organise trials of Kronstadters . . . and of Makhnovites." The
"effect of the reports and the speeches of the prosecutor etcetera
would be far more powerful than the effects of brochures and 
leaflets about . . . anarchism." [quoted by Getzler, Op. Cit., 
pp. 39] While Trotsky's show trial was never staged, the fact 
that the idea was taken seriously can be seen from the invented 
summaries of the testimonies of three men considered by the 
Bolsheviks as ringleaders of the revolt. Perhaps the fact that 
the three (Kozlovsky, Petrichenko, Putilin) managed to escape to 
Finland ensured that Trotsky's idea was never carried out. Stalin, 
of course, utilised the "powerful" nature of such trials in the 1930s.

Decades later historian Paul Avrich *did* discover an 
unsigned hand written manuscript labelled "Top Secret" 
and entitled "Memorandum on the Question of Organising an 
Uprising in Kronstadt." Trotskyist Pierre Frank considered
it "so convincing" that he "reproduced it in its entirety"
to prove a White Conspiracy existed behind the Kronstadt
revolt. Indeed, he considers it as an "indisputable"
revelation and that Lenin and Trotsky "were not mistaken
in their analysis of Kronstadt." [Lenin and Trotsky,
Op. Cit., p. 26 and p. 32] 

However, reading the document quickly shows that
Kronstadt was not a product of a White conspiracy but
rather that the White "National Centre" aimed to try and
use a spontaneous "uprising" it thought was likely to
"erupt there in the coming spring" for its own ends. 
The report notes that "among the sailors, numerous and
unmistakable signs of mass dissatisfaction with the
existing order can be noticed." Indeed, the "Memorandum" 
states that "one must not forget that even of the French 
Command and the Russian anti-Bolshevik organisations do 
not take part in the preparation and direction of the 
uprising, a revolt in Kronstadt will take place all the 
same during the coming spring, but after a brief period
of success it will be doomed to failure." [quoted by
Avrich, _Kronstadt 1921_, p. 235 and p. 240] 

As Avrich notes, an "underlying assumption of the Memorandum 
is that the revolt would not occur until after the springtime 
thaw, when the ice had melted and Kronstadt was immune from an 
invasion from the mainland." [_Kronstadt 1921_, pp. 106-7]
Voline stated the obvious when he argued that the revolt 
"broke out spontaneously" for if it "had been the result 
of a plan conceived and prepared in advance, it would 
certainly not have occurred at the beginning of March, the 
least favourable time. A few weeks later, and Kronstadt, 
freed of ice, would have become an almost impregnable fortress 
. . . The greatest opportunity of Bolshevik government was
precisely the spontaneity of the movement and the absence of 
any premeditation, of any calculation, in the action of the 
sailors." [_The Unknown Revolution_, p. 487] As can be seen, 
the "Memorandum" also recognised this need for the ice to 
thaw and it was the basic assumption behind it. In other 
words, the revolt *was* spontaneous and actually undercut 
the assumptions behind the "Memorandum." 

Avrich rejects the idea that the "Memorandum" explains 
the revolt:

"Nothing has come to light to show that the Secret
Memorandum was ever put into practice or that any
links had existed between the emigres and the sailors
before the revolt. On the contrary, the rising bore
the earmarks of spontaneity . . .  there was little
in the behaviour of the rebels to suggest any careful
advance preparation. Had there been a prearranged
plan, surely the sailors would have waited a few
weeks longer for the ice to melt . . . The rebels,
moreover, allowed Kalinin [a leading Communist] to
return to Petrograd, though he would have made a
valuable hostage. Further, no attempt was made to
take the offensive . . . Significant too, is the
large number of Communists who took part in the 
movement. . .

"The Sailors needed no outside encouragement to raise 
the banner of insurrection. . . Kronstadt was clearly 
ripe for a rebellion. What set it off were not the 
machinations of emigre conspirators and foreign 
intelligence agents but the wave of peasant risings 
throughout the country and the labour disturbances in
neighbouring Petorgrad. And as the revolt unfolded, it 
followed the pattern of earlier outbursts against the 
central government from 1905 through the Civil War." 
[Op. Cit., pp. 111-2]

He explicitly argues that while the National Centre 
had "anticipated" the revolt and "laid plans to help 
organise it," they had "no time to put these plans 
into effect." The "eruption occurred too soon, several 
weeks before the basic conditions of the plot . . . could 
be fulfilled." It "is not true," he stresses, "that the 
emigres had engineering the rebellion." The revolt was 
"a spontaneous and self-contained movement from beginning 
to end." [Op. Cit., pp. 126-7]

Moreover, whether the Memorandum played a part in the revolt 
can be seen from the reactions of the White "National Centre" 
to the uprising. Firstly, they failed to deliver aid to the rebels 
nor get French aid to them. Secondly, Professor Grimm, the chief 
agent of the National Centre in Helsingfors and General Wrangel's 
official representative in Finland, stated to a colleague after 
the revolt had been crushed that if a new outbreak should occur 
then their group must not be caught unawares again. Avrich also 
notes that the revolt "caught the emigres off balance" and that
"[n]othing . . . had been done to implement the Secret Memorandum, 
and the warnings of the author were fully borne out." [Paul Avrich, 
Op. Cit., p. 212 and p. 123]

If Kronstadt was a White conspiracy then how could the organisation 
of the conspiracy have been caught unawares?

Clearly, the attempts of certain later-day Trotskyists
to justify and prove their heroes slanders against
Kronstadt are pathetic. No evidence of a White-Guardist
plot existed until 1970 when Paul Avrich produced
his study of the revolt and the single document in
question clearly does not support the claim that the 
Whites organised the revolt. Rather, the Whites aimed 
to use a sailors "uprising" to further their cause, an 
"uprising" which they predicted would occur in the spring 
(with or without them). The predicted revolt *did* take 
place, but earlier than expected and was not a product of 
a conspiracy. Indeed, the historian who discovered 
this document explicitly argues that it proves nothing 
and that the revolt was spontaneous in nature.

Therefore, the claim that Kronstadt was a White plot
cannot be defended with anything but assertions. No
evidence exists to back up such claims.

H.7.7 What was the *real* relationship of Kronstadt to 
	the Whites?

As we proved in the last section, the Kronstadt revolt
was not a White conspiracy. It was a popular revolt
from below. However, some Trotskyists still try and
smear the revolt by arguing that it was, in fact,
really or "objectively" pro-White. We turn to this
question now.

We must first stress that the Kronstadters' rejected
every offer of help from the National Centre and other
obviously pro-White group (they did accept help towards
the end of the rebellion from the Russian Red Cross when 
the food situation had become critical). Historian Israel 
Getzler stressed that "the Kronstadters were extremely 
resentful of all gestures of sympathy and promises of help 
coming from the White-Guardist emigres." He quotes a Red 
Cross visitor who stated that Kronstadt "will admit no White 
political party, no politician, with the exception of the 
Red Cross." [Getzler, _Kronstadt 1917-1921_, p. 235]

Avrich notes that the Kronstadter's "passionately 
hated" the Whites and that "both during and afterwards
in exile" they "indignantly rejected all government
accusations of collaboration with counterrevolutionary
groups either at home or abroad." As the Communists 
themselves acknowledged, no outside aid ever reached 
the insurgents. [Avrich, Op. Cit., p. 187, p. 112 and 
p. 123]

In other words, there was no relationship between the revolt 
and the Whites.

Needless to say, the Whites *were* extremely happy that
Kronstadt revolted. There is no denying that. However,
it would be weak politics indeed that based itself on
the reactions of reactionaries to evaluate social 
struggles. If we did then we would have to conclude
that the overthrow of Stalinism in 1989 was nothing
more than a counter-revolution rather than a popular
revolt against a specific form of capitalism (namely
state capitalism). Indeed, many orthodox Trotskyists
took this position (and supported the attempted coup
organised by a section of the Stalinist bureaucracy
to re-impose its dictatorship). 

Indeed, the Kronstadters themselves acknowledged that
the Whites were happy to support their actions (indeed,
*any* actions against the Bolsheviks) but that this
joy was for different reasons than theirs:

"The . . . Kronstadt sailors and workers have wrested
the tiller from the Communists' hands and have taken
over the helm . . . Comrades, keep a close eye upon
the vicinity of the tiller: enemies are even now 
trying to creep closer. A single lapse and they will
wrest the tiller from you, and the soviet ship may
go down to the triumphant laughter from tsarist
lackeys and henchmen of the bourgeoisie.

"Comrades, right now you are rejoicing in the great,
peaceful victory over the Communists' dictatorship.
Now, your enemies are celebrating too.

"Your grounds for such joy, and theirs, are quite
contradictory.

"You are driven by a burning desire to restore the
authentic power of the soviets, by a noble hope of
seeing the worker engage in free labour and the
peasant enjoy the right to dispose, on his land,
of the produce of his labours. *They* dream of
bringing back the tsarist knout and the privileges
of the generals.

"Your interests are different. They are not fellow
travellers with you.

"You needed to get rid of the Communists' power over
you in order to set about creative work and peaceable
construction. Whereas they want to overthrow that
power to make the workers and peasants their slaves
again.

"You are in search of freedom. They want to shackle
you as it suits them. Be vigilant! Don't let the
wolves in sheep's clothing get near the tiller."
[_No Gods, No Masters_, vol. 2, pp. 187-8]

Of course, this is not enough for the followers of
Lenin and Trotsky. John Rees, for example, quotes 
Paul Avrich to support his assertion that the 
Kronstadt revolt was, in fact, pro-White. He argues 
as follows:

"Paul Avrich . . . says there is 'undeniable evidence'
that the leadership of the rebellion came to an 
agreement with the Whites after they had been crushed
and that 'one cannot rule out the possibility that this
was the continuation of a longstanding relationship.'"
[Op. Cit., p. 64]

What Rees *fails* to mention is that Avrich *immediately*
adds "[y]et a careful search has yielded no evidence to
support such a belief." He even states that "[n]othing
has come to light to show that . . . any links had
existed between the emigres and the sailors before the
revolt." [Avrich, Op. Cit., p. 111] How strange that Rees 
fails to quote or even mention Avrich's conclusion to 
his own speculation! As for the post-revolt links between
the "leadership" of the rebellion and the Whites, 
Avrich correctly argues that "[n]one of this proves
that there were any ties between the [National] Centre
and the Revolutionary Committee either before or
during the revolt. It would seem, rather, that the
mutual experience of bitterness and defeat, and a
common determination to overthrow the Soviet regime,
led them to join hands in the aftermath." [Op. Cit.,
p. 129] Seeing you friends and fellow toilers murdered
by dictators may affect your judgement, unsurprisingly
enough.

Let us, however, assume that certain elements in the
"leadership" of the revolt were, in fact, scoundrels.
What does this mean when evaluating the Kronstadt revolt? 

Firstly, we must point out that this "leadership" was 
elected by and under the control of the "conference 
of delegates," which was in turn elected by and under
the control of the rank-and-file sailors, soldiers and
civilians. This body met regularly during the revolt "to 
receive and debate the reports of the Revolutionary committee 
and to propose measures and decrees." [Getzler, Op. Cit., 
p. 217] The actions of the "leadership" were not independent 
of the mass of the population and so, regardless of their 
own agendas, had to work under control from below. In 
other words, the revolt cannot be reduced to a discussion 
of whether a few of the "leadership" were "bad men" or not. 
Indeed, to do so just reflects the elitism of bourgeois 
history.

And Rees does just that and reduces the Kronstadt revolt
and its "ideology" down to just one person (Petrichenko). 
Perhaps we can evaluate Bolshevism with this method? Or
Italian Socialism. After all, influential figures in both 
these movements ended up making contacts and deals with 
extremely suspect organisations and acting in ways we 
(and the movements they sprang from) would oppose. Does 
that mean we gain an insight into their natures by mentioning
Stalin's or Mussolini's later activities? Or evaluating
their revolutionary nature from such individuals? Of course
not. Indeed, Rees's article is an attempt to argue that
objective circumstances rather than Bolshevism as such
lead to Stalinism. Rather than do the same for Kronstadt,
he prefers to concentrate on an individual. This indicates
a distinctly bourgeois perspective:

"What passes as socialist history is often only a mirror
image of bourgeois historiography, a percolation into the
ranks of the working class movement of typically bourgeois
methods of thinking. In the world of this type of 'historian'
leaders of genius replace the kings and queens of the 
bourgeois world. . . . The masses never appear independently
on the historic stage, making their own history. At best
they only 'supply the steam', enabling others to drive
the locomotive, as Stalin so delicately put it . . . This
tendency to identify working class history with the
history of its organisations, institutions and leaders is
not only inadequate -- it reflects a typically bourgeois
vision of mankind, divided in almost pre-ordained 
manner between *the few* who will manage and decide,
and *the many*, the malleable mass, incapable of acting
consciously on its own behalf . . . Most histories of
the degeneration of the Russian Revolution rarely
amount to more than this." ["Solidarity's Preface" 
to Ida Mett's _The Kronstadt Uprising_, pp. 18-9]

Secondly, the question is one of whether workers are in 
struggle and what they aim for and definitely *not* one 
of whether some of the "leaders" are fine upstanding citizens. 
Ironically, Trotsky indicates why. In 1934, he had argued 
"[a]nyone who had proposed that we not support the British 
miners' strike of 1926 or the recent large-scale strikes 
in the United States with all available means on the 
ground that the leaders of the strikes were for the most part 
scoundrels, would have been a traitor to the British and 
American workers." ["No Compromise on the Russian Question",
_Writings of Leon Trotsky: Supplement (1934-40)_, p. 539] 

The same applies to Kronstadt. Even if we assume that some
of the "leadership" did have links with the National Centre 
(an assumption we must stress has no evidence to support it), 
this in no way invalidates the Kronstadt revolt. The movement 
was not produced by the so-called "leaders" of the revolt
but rather came from below and so reflected the demands and 
politics of those involved. If it was proved, as KGB and other
soviet sources argued, that some of the "leaders" of the Hungary 
uprising of 1956 had CIA links or were CIA agitators, would that
make the revolution and its workers' councils somehow invalid?
Of course not. If some of the "leadershp" were scoundrels, as 
Trotsky argued, this does not invalid the revolt itself. The
class criteria is the decisive one.

(As an aside, we must point out that Trotsky was arguing against 
those claiming, correctly, that to unconditionally defend the 
Soviet Union was to give an endorsement to Stalinism. He stated 
immediately after the words we have quoted above: "Exactly the 
same thing applies to the USSR!" However, there was a few obvious 
differences which invalidates his analogy. Firstly, the Stalinist 
leadership was exploiting and oppressing the workers by means of 
state power. Trade Union bureaucrats, for all their faults, are 
not mass murdering butchers at a head of a dictatorship defended 
by troops and secret police. Secondly, strikes are examples of 
proletarian direct action which can, and do, get out of control 
of union structures and bureaucrats. They can be the focal point 
of creating new forms of working class organisation and power 
which can end the power of the union bureaucrats and replace 
it with self-managed strikers assemblies and councils. The 
Stalinist regime was organised to repress any attempts at 
unseating them and was not a form of working class self-defence 
in even the limited form that trade unions are.)

John Rees continues by arguing that:

"As it became clear that the revolt was isolated 
Petrichenko was forced to come to terms with the 
reality of the balance of class forces. On 13 March 
Petrichenko wired David Grimm, the chief of the 
National Centre and General Wrangel's official
representative in Finland, for help in gaining food. 
On 16 March Petrichenko accepted an offer of help
from Baron P V Vilkin, an associate of Grimm's whom 
'the Bolsheviks rightly called a White agent.' None
of the aid reached the garrison before it was crushed,
but the tide of events was pushing the sailors into
the arms of the Whites, just as the latter had always
suspected it would." [Op. Cit., p. 64]

We should note that it was due to the "food situation in 
Kronstadt . . . growing desperate" that Petrichenko contacted 
Grimm. [Avrich, Op. Cit., p. 121] If the revolt had spread to 
Petrograd and the striking workers there, such requests would 
have been unnecessary. Rather than isolation being due to 
"the reality of the balance of class forces" it was due to 
the reality of coercive forces -- the Bolsheviks had successfully 
repressed the Petrograd strikes and slandered the Kronstadt 
revolt (see section H.7.10). As historian V. Brovkin notes,
the "key here us that the Communists suppressed the workers
uprising in Petrograd in the first days of March. The sailors'
uprising in Kronstadt, which was an outgrowth of the uprising
in Petrograd, was now cut off from its larger social base
and localised on a small island. From this moment on the
Kronstadt sailors were on the defensive." [_Behind the
Lines during the Civil War_, pp. 396-7]

So, given that the Bolshevik dictatorship had lied to and
repressed the Petrograd working class, the Kronstadters
had few options left as regards aid. Rees's argument smacks 
of the "logic" of Right as regards the Spanish Civil War,
the Cuban revolution and the Sandinistas. Isolated, each 
of these revolts turned to the Soviet Union for aid thus 
proving what the Right had always known from the start, 
namely their objectively Communist nature and their part 
in the International Communist Conspiracy. Few revolutionaries 
would evaluate these struggles on such a illogical and 
narrow basis but Rees wants us to do so with Kronstadt.
 
The logic of Rees arguments was used by the Stalinists 
later. Indeed, he would have to agree with Stalinists 
that the fact the Hungarian revolution of 1956 called 
on Western aid against the Red Army shows that it was 
objectively counter-revolutionary and pro-capitalist,
just as the Communist Party bureaucrats had argued.
The fact that during that revolt many messages of 
support for the rebels also preached bourgeois values 
would also, according to Rees's logic, damn that revolt 
in the eyes of all socialists. Similarly, the fact that 
the Polish union _Solidarity_ got support from the West 
against the Stalinist regime does not mean that its
struggle was counter-revolutionary. So the arguments 
used by Rees are identical to those used by Stalinists
to support their repression of working class revolt
in the Soviet Empire. Indeed, orthodox Trotskyists also
called "Solidarnosc" a company union of the CIA, bankers,
the Vatican and Wall Street for capitalist counterrevolution 
in Poland and considered the fall of the Soviet Union as a 
defeat for the working class and socialism, in other words, 
a counterrevolution. As evidence they pointed to the
joy and support each generated in Western elite circles
(and ignored the popular nature of those revolts).

In reality, of course, the fact that others sought to 
take advantage of these (and other) situations is 
inevitable and irrelevant. The important thing is
whether working class people where in control of the
revolt and what the main objectives of it were. By
this class criteria, it is clear that the Kronstadt
revolt was a *revolutionary* revolt as, like Hungry
1956, the core of the revolt was working people and 
their councils. It was they who were in control and 
called the tune. That Whites tried to take advantage 
of it is as irrelevant to evaluating the Kronstadt revolt 
as the fact that Stalinists tried to take advantage of 
the Spanish struggle against Fascism.

Moreover, in his analysis of the "balance of class forces", 
Rees fails to mention the class which had real power (and 
the related privileges) in Russia at the time -- the state 
and party bureaucracy. The working class and peasantry were 
officially powerless. The only influence they exercised in 
the "workers' and peasants state" was when they rebelled, 
forcing "their" state to make concessions or to repress them 
(sometimes both happened). The balance of class forces was 
between the workers and peasants and ruling bureaucracy. To 
ignore this factor means to misunderstand the problems facing 
the revolution and the Kronstadt revolt itself.

Lastly, we must comment upon the fact that members of Kronstadt's 
revolutionary Committee took refuge in Finland along with "[s]ome 
8,000 people (some sailors and the most active part of the civilian 
population)." [Mett, Op. Cit., p. 57] This was as the Bolsheviks had 
predicted on March 5th ("At the last minute, all those generals, the 
Kozlovskvs, the Bourksers, and all that riff raff, the Petrichenkos, 
and the Tourins will flee to Finland, to the White guards" [cited
by Mett, Op. Cit., p. 50]). However, this does not indicate any "White
guardist" connections. After all, where else *could* they go? Anywhere
else would have been in Soviet Russia and so a Bolshevik prison and
ultimately death. The fact that active participants in the revolt
ended up in the only place they could end up to avoid death has
no bearing to that nature of that revolt nor can it be used as
"evidence" of a "white conspiracy."

In other words, the attempts of Trotskyists to smear the Kronstadt 
sailors with having White links is simply false. The actions of some 
rebels *after* the Bolsheviks had crushed the revolt cannot be used to 
discredit the revolt itself. The real relationship of the revolt to
the Whites is clear. It was one of hatred and opposition.

H.7.8 Did the rebellion involve new sailors?

The most common Trotskyist assertion to justify the repression
of the Kronstadt revolt is that of Trotsky. It basically 
consists of arguing that the sailors in 1921 were different 
than those in 1917. Trotsky started this line of justification 
during the revolt when he stated on March 16th that the Baltic 
Fleet had been "inevitably thinned out with respect to personnel" 
and so a "great many of the revolutionary sailors" of 1917 had 
been "transferred" elsewhere. They had been "replaced in 
large measure by accidental elements." This "facilitated"
the work of the "counterrevolutionary organisers" who 
had "selected" Kronstadt. He repeated this argument in 1937 
and 1938 [Lenin and Trotsky, _Kronstadt_, pp. 68-9, p. 79, 
p. 81 and p. 87] 

His followers repeated his assertions. Wright argues that "the 
personnel of the fortress could not possibly have remained 
static throughout the years between 1917 and 1921." He
doubts that the revolutionary sailors of 1917 could have 
remained behind in the fortress while their comrades fought 
the Whites. [Op. Cit., pp. 122-3] These sailors had been
replaced by peasant conscripts. John Rees, continuing this
line of rationale, argued that "the composition of the garrison
had changed . . . it seems likely that the peasants had 
increased their weight in the Kronstadt, as Trotsky suggested." 
[Rees, Op. Cit., p. 61] 

As can be seen, the allegation that the Kronstadt sailors
were a "grey mass" and had changed in social composition
is a common one in Trotskyist circles. What are we to 
make of these claims?

Firstly, we must evaluate what are the facts as regards
the social composition and turnover of personnel in
Kronstadt. Secondly, we must see how Trotskyists have
misused these sources in order to indicate how far
they will abuse the truth. 

The first task is now, thanks to recent research, easy
to do. Where the majority of the sailors during the 
uprising new recruits or veterans from 1917? The answer 
is that it was predominantly the latter. Academic Israel 
Getzler investigated this issue and demonstrated that 
of those serving in the Baltic fleet on 1st January 
1921 at least 75.5% were drafted before 1918. Over 80% were 
from Great Russian areas, 10% from the Ukraine and 9% from 
Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Poland. He argues that the 
"veteran politicised Red sailor still predominated in 
Kronstadt at the end of 1920" and presents more "hard 
statistical data" like that just quoted. He investigated 
the crews of the two major battleships, the *Petropavlovsk* 
and the *Sevastopol* (both renown since 1917 for their
revolutionary zeal and revolutionary allegiance and, in
Paul Avrich's words, "the powder kegs of the rising."
[Avrich, Op. Cit., p. 93]). His findings are conclusive,
showing that of the 2,028 sailors where years of enlistment 
are known, 93.9% were recruited into the navy before and 
during the 1917 revolution (the largest group, 1,195, joined 
in the years 1914-16). Only 6.8% of the sailors were recruited
in the years 1918-21 (including three who were conscripted 
in 1921) and they were the only ones who had not been there 
during the 1917 revolution. [Getzler, _Kronstadt 1917-1921_, 
pp. 207-8] Historian Fedotoff-White indicates that the cruiser 
_Rossiia_ had joined in the decision to re-elect the Kronstadt 
Soviet and its "crew consisted mostly of old seamen." [_The 
Growth of the Red Army_, p. 138]

Moreover, the majority of the revolutionary committee were 
veterans of the Kronstadt Soviet and the October revolution.
[Ida Mett, Op. Cit., p. 42] "Given their maturity and
experience, not to speak of their keen disillusionment
as former participants in the revolution, it was only
natural that these seasoned bluejackets should be thrust
into the forefront of the uprising." [Avrich, Op. Cit., 
p. 91] 

Getzler stresses that it was "certainly the case" that  
the "activists of the 1921 uprising had been participants 
of the 1917 revolutions" for the "1,900 veteran sailors
of the *Petropavlovsk* and the *Sevastopol* who spearheaded
it. It was certainly true of a majority of the Revolutionary
Committee and of the intellectuals . . . Likewise, at least
three-quarters of the 10,000 to 12,000 sailors -- the
mainstay of the uprising -- were old hands who had
served in the navy through war and revolution." [Op. Cit.,
p. 226] 

Little wonder, then, that Paul Avrich argues (in a review
of Getzler's book) that "Getzler draws attention to the 
continuity in institutions, ideology, and personnel linking 
1921 with 1917. In doing so he demolishes the allegation of 
Trotsky and other Bolshevik leaders that the majority of 
veteran Red sailors had, in the course of the Civil War, 
been replaced by politically retarded peasant recruits 
from the Ukraine and Western borderlands, thereby diluting 
the revolutionary character of the Baltic fleet. He shows, 
on the contrary, that no significant change had taken place 
in the fleet's political and social composition, that at least 
three-quarters of the sailors on active duty in 1921 had been 
drafted before 1918 and were drawn predominantly from Great 
Russian areas." [_Soviet Studies_, vol. XXXVI, 1984, pp. 139-40]

Other research confirms Getzler's work. Evan Mawdsley argues
that "it seems reasonable to challenge the previous 
interpretation" that there had been a "marked change in the
composition of the men in the fleet . . . particularly . . .
at the Kronstadt Naval Base." "The composition of the DOT
[Active Detachment]," he concludes, "had not fundamentally 
changed, and anarchistic young peasants did not predominate
there. The available data suggests that the main difficulty
was not . . . that the experienced sailors were being 
demobilised. Rather, they were not being demobilised rapidly
enough." The "relevant point is length of service, and
available information indicates that as many as three-quarters
of the DOT ratings -- the Kronstadt mutineers -- had served
in the fleet at least since the World War." In a nutshell,
"the majority of men seem to have been veterans of 1917."
He presents data which shows that of the "2,028 ratings 
aboard the DOT battleships *Petropavlovsk* and *Sevastopol*
at the time of the uprising, 20.2% had begun service before
1914, 59% between 1914 and 1916, 14% in 1917, and 6.8% from
1918 to 1921." For the DOT as a whole on 1st January, 1921,
23.5% could have been drafted before 1911, 52% from 1911 to
1918 and 24.5% after 1918. ["The Baltic Fleet and the 
Kronstadt Mutiny", pp. 506-521, _Soviet Studies_, vol. 24, 
no. 4, pp. 508-10]

This is not the end of the matter. Unfortunately for Trotsky
recently released documents from the Soviet Archives also refutes 
his case. A report by Vasilii Sevei, Plenipotentiary of the 
Special Section of the *Vecheka,* dated March 7th, 1921, stated 
that a "large majority" of the sailors of Baltic Fleet "were 
and still are professional revolutionaries and could well form 
the basis for a possible third revolution." He notes that the 
"disease from which they suffer has been too long neglected."
What is significant about this social-political profile of the
"large majority" of sailors was that it was *not* written in 
response of the Kronstadt revolt but that it was formulated 
well before. As its author put it in the report, "I stated these
views more than a month ago in my memorandum to comrade Krestinskii"
(then secretary of the Communist Party). [quoted by Israel Getzler, 
"The Communist Leaders' Role in the Kronstadt Tragedy of 1921 in 
the Light of Recently Published Archival Documents", _Revolutionary
Russia_, pp. 24-44, Vol. 15, No. 1, June 2002, pp. 32-3]

In other words, some time in January, 1921, a leading member 
of the Cheka was of the opinion that the "large majority" of 
sailors in the Baltic fleet "were and still are professional 
revolutionaries." No mention was made of new recruits, indeed 
the opposite is implied as the sailors' "disease" had been 
"too long neglected." And the recipient of this March 7th, 
1921, report? Leon Trotsky. Unsurprisingly, Trotsky did not 
mention this report during the crisis or any time afterward.

Needless to say, this statistical and archival information 
was unavailable when anarchists and others wrote their 
accounts of the uprising. All they could go on were the 
facts of the uprising itself and the demands of the rebels. 
Based on these, it is little wonder that anarchists like 
Alexander Berkman stressed the continuity between the Red 
Kronstadters of 1917 and the rebels of 1921. Firstly, the 
rebels in 1921 took action in *solidarity* with the striking 
workers in Petrograd. In the words of Emma Goldman, it was 
"after the report of their Committee of the real state of
affairs among the workers in Petrograd that the Kronstadt 
sailors did in 1921 what they had done in 1917. They 
immediately made common cause with the workers. The part 
of the sailors in 1917 was hailed as the red pride and 
glory of the Revolution. Their identical part in 1921 was 
denounced to the whole world as counter-revolutionary 
treason" by the Bolsheviks. [_Trotsky Protests Too Much_] 
Secondly, their demands were thoroughly in-line with the 
aspirations and politics of 1917 and clearly showed a 
socialist awareness and analysis. Thirdly, Emma Goldman 
spoke to some of those wounded in the attack on Kronstadt.
She records how one "had realised that he had been duped
by the cry of 'counter-revolution.' There were no Tsarist
generals in Kronstadt, no White Guardists -- he found only
his own comrades, sailors and soldiers who had heroically
fought for the Revolution." [_My Disillusionment in Russia_,
pp. 199-200]

The later research has just confirmed what is obvious from an 
analysis of such facts, namely that the rebels in 1921 were 
acting in the spirit of their comrades of 1917 and this implies 
a significant continuity in personnel (which perhaps explains 
the unwillingness of Leninists to mention that the revolt was 
in solidarity with the strikers or the demands of the rebels). 
Thus the research provides empirical evidence to support the 
political analysis of the revolt conducted by revolutionaries 
like Berkman, Voline and so on. 

In summary, the bulk of the sailors at the start of 1921 
had been there since 1917. Even if this was not the case
and we assume that a majority of the sailors at Kronstadt
were recent recruits, does this invalidate the rebellion?
After all, the Red sailors of 1917 were once raw recruits.
They had become politicised over time by debate, discussion
and struggle. So had the workers in Petrograd and elsewhere.
Would Leninists have denounced strikers in 1905 or 1917 if 
it was discovered that most of them were recent peasant
arrivals in the city? We doubt it. 

Indeed, the Bolsheviks were simply repeating old Menshevik 
arguments. Between 1910 and 1914, the industrial workforce 
grew from 1,793,000 workers to 2,400,000. At the same time, 
the influence of the Bolsheviks grew at Menshevik expense. 
The Mensheviks considered this a "consequence of the changes
that were taking place in the character of urban Russia"
with peasants joining the labour force. ["introduction",
_The Mensheviks in the Russian Revolution_, Abraham Archer
(Ed.), p. 24] Somewhat ironically, given later Leninist
arguments against Kronstadt, the Mensheviks argued 
that the Bolsheviks gained their influence from such 
worker-peasant industrial "raw recruits" and not from the 
genuine working class. [Orlando Figes, _A People's Tragedy_,
p. 830] As Robert Service noted in his study of the Bolshevik
party during the 1917 revolution, "Menshevik critics were fond 
of carping that most Bolshevik newcomers were young lads fresh 
from the villages and wanting in long experience of industrial 
life and political activity. It was not completely unknown for 
Bolshevik spokesmen to come close to admitting this." [_The 
Bolshevik Party in Revolution_, p. 44] And, of course, it 
was the industrial "raw recruits" who had taken part in 
the 1905 and 1917 revolutions. They helped formulate demands 
and oorganise soviets, strikes and demonstrations. They 
helped raised slogans which were to the left of the 
Bolsheviks. Does this process somehow grind to a halt 
when these "raw recruits" oppose Trotsky? Of course not. 

Given the political aspects of the Kronstadt demands we can 
safely argue that even if the rebellion had been the work of 
recent recruits they obviously had been influenced by the 
veteran sailors who remained. They, like the peasant-workers 
of 1905 and 1917, would have been able to raise their own 
political demands and ideas while, at the same time, listening 
to those among them with more political experience. In other 
words, the assumption that the sailors could not raise
revolutionary political demands if they were "raw recruits" 
only makes sense if we subscribe to Lenin's dictum that the 
working class, by its own efforts, can only reach a trade 
union consciousness (i.e. that toiling people cannot liberate 
themselves). In other words, this Trotsky inspired sociology 
misses the point. Sadly, we have to address it in order to 
refute Leninist arguments.

Therefore, Getzler's research refutes the claims of 
Trotskyists such as Chris Harman who follow Trotsky and 
argue that "Kronstadt in 1921 was not Kronstadt of 1917. 
The class composition of its sailors had changed. The best 
socialist elements had long ago gone off to fight in the 
army in the front line. They were replaced in the main by 
peasants whose devotion to the revolution was that of their 
class." [quoted by Sam Farber, _Before Stalinism_, p. 192] 
As can be seen, the ship crews were remarkably consistent
over the period in question. It is, however, useful to
discuss this question further in order to show what
passes as analysis in Trotskyist circles.

Harman is, of course, following Trotsky. Writing in 1937 
Trotsky argued that Kronstadt had "been completely 
emptied of proletarian elements" as "[a]ll the sailors" 
belonging to the ships' crews "had become commissars, 
commanders, chairmen of local soviets." Later, realising 
the stupidity of this claim, he changed it to Kronstadt
being "denuded of all revolutionary forces" by "the 
winter of 1919." He also acknowledged that "a certain 
number of qualified workers and technicians" remained 
to "take care of the machinery" but these were 
"politically unreliable" as proven by the fact they 
had not been selected to fight in the civil war.
As evidence, he mentions that he had wired a "request at
the end of 1919, or in 1920, to 'send a group of Kronstadt
sailors to this or that point'" and they had answered
"No one left to send." [Lenin and Trotsky, _Kronstadt_, 
p. 87, p. 90 and p. 81] Obviously, the Communist 
commander at Kronstadt had left his fortress and its 
ships totally unmanned! Such common sense is sadly 
lacking from Trotsky (as indicated above, the evidence 
supports the common sense analysis and not Trotsky's claims). 

Moreover, does this claim also apply to the Communist Party
membership at Kronstadt? Is Trotsky *really* arguing that 
the Bolsheviks in Kronstadt after the winter of 1919 were 
not revolutionary? Given that the bulk of them had joined 
the CP during or after this time, we must obviously conclude
that the recruiters let anyone join. Moreover, there had
been a "rigorous local purge" of the party conducted in 
the autumn of 1920 by the commander of the Baltic Fleet. 
[I. Getzler, _Kronstadt 1917-1921_, p. 211 and p. 205] Must 
we also conclude that this purge did not have revolutionary 
politics as a factor when determining whether a party member 
should be expelled or not?

Trotsky claims too much. Based on his claims we must conclude
one of two possibilities. The first possibility is that the 
Kronstadt Communist Party was not revolutionary and was made 
up of politically backward individuals, careerists and so on. 
If that was the case in Kronstadt then it must also have been 
the case elsewhere in Russia and this discredits any attempt 
to argue that the Bolshevik party dictatorship was 
revolutionary. The second possibility is that it *did* have 
revolutionary elements. If so, then the fact that hundreds 
of these members left the party during the revolt and only 
a minority of them opposed it makes the claim that the 
rebellion was "counter-revolutionary" difficult (indeed, 
impossible) to maintain (of the 2,900 members of the 
Communist Party in Kronstadt, 784 officially resigned and 
327 had been arrested). And it also makes Trotsky's claims
that Kronstadt was "denuded" of revolutionary elements false.

J.G. Wright, as noted above, thought that it was "impossible" 
to believe that the sailors of 1917 could leave their comrades
to fight the Whites while they stayed at Kronstadt. This
may have been a valid argument *if* the Soviet armed forces
were democratically run. However, as we indicated in
section H.7.2, it was organised in a typically bourgeois
fashion. Trotsky had abolished democratic soldiers and
sailors councils and the election of officers in favour
of appointed officers and hierarchical, top-down, military
structures. This meant that the sailors would have stayed in 
Kronstadt if they had been ordered to. The fact that they had 
to defend Petrograd combined with the level of technical 
knowledge and experience required to operate the battleships 
and defences at Kronstadt would have meant that the 1917 
sailors would have been irreplaceable and so had to remain 
at Kronstadt. This is what, in fact, did happen. In the 
words of Israel Gelzter:

"One reason for the remarkable survival in Kronstadt of 
these veteran sailors, albeit in greatly diminished
numbers, was precisely the difficulty of training, in
war-time conditions, a new generation competent in the
sophisticated technical skills required of Russia's
ultra-modern battleships, and, indeed, in the fleet
generally." [Op. Cit., p. 208]

We should also note here that "by the end of 1919 thousands
of veteran sailors, who had served on many fronts of the
civil war and in the administrative network of the
expanding Soviet state, had returned to the Baltic
Fleet and to Kronstadt, most by way of remobilisation."  
[Getzler, Op. Cit., pp. 197-8] Thus the idea that the
sailors left and did not come back is not a valid one.

Trotsky obviously felt that this (recently refuted) argument of
changing social composition of the sailors would hold more water 
than claims White Guards organised it. He continued this theme:

"The best, most self-sacrificing sailors were completely
withdrawn from Kronstadt and played an important role at 
the fronts and in the local soviets throughout the country
What was left was the grey mass with big pretensions ('We
are from Kronstadt'), but without the political education
and unprepared for revolutionary sacrifice. The country
was starving. The Kronstadters demanded privileges. The
uprising was dictated by a desire to get privileged food
rations." [Lenin and Trotsky, _Kronstadt_, p. 79]

This was Trotsky's first comment on the uprising for 16 
years and it contained a lie. As Ida Mett notes, "[s]uch 
a demand was never put forward by the men of Kronstadt"
and so Trotsky "started his public accusations with a lie." 
[_The Kronstadt Uprising_, p. 73] He repeated the claim
again, six months later [Lenin and Trotsky, Op. Cit., 
p. 92] Unfortunately for him, the opposite was the case. 
Point 9 of the Kronstadt demands explicitly called for 
an *end* of privileges by the "equalisation of rations 
for all workers." This was implemented during the uprising.

As an aside, Trotsky later states that "[w]hen conditions
became very critical in hungry Petrograd, the Political
Bureau more than once discussed the possibility of
securing an 'internal loan' from Kronstadt, where a
quantity of old provisions still remained. But delegates
of the Petrograd workers answered: 'You will get nothing
from them by kindness. They speculate in cloth, coal,
and bread. At present in Kronstadt every kind of riffraff
has raised its head.'" [Lenin and Trotsky, Op. Cit.,
pp. 87-8] As Ida Mett pointed out, "[w]e should add that 
before the insurrection these 'stores' were in the hands 
of communist functionaries and that it was upon these 
people alone that consent to the proposed 'loan' depended. 
The rank and file sailor, who took part in the insurrection, 
had no means open to him whereby he could have opposed the 
loan, even if he had wanted to." [_The Kronstadt Uprising_,
pp. 74-5] If Trotsky's words were true, then they were
a crushing indictment of Bolshevik practice, *not* the
Kronstadt sailors. 

As for Trotsky's claim of a "lack of political education," 
the 15 point resolution voted upon by the sailors exposes 
this as nonsense and the fact the sailors fought the Red 
Army to the end indicates that there were prepared to die
for their ideals. Similarly, Trotsky's argument that
"in 1917-18, the Kronstadt sailor stood considerably
higher than the average level of the Red Army" but
by 1921 they "stood  . . . on a level considerably
lower, in general, than the average level of the Red
Army." In fact, as we indicate in section H.7.9, the
political programme of the revolt was fundamentally the
same as Kronstadt's soviet democracy of 1917 and, we should 
note, opposed the introduction of wage labour, a basic 
socialist idea (and one missing from the Bolshevik's 
NEP policies). Moreover, the mass meeting that agreed 
the resolution did so unanimously, meaning old and new 
sailors agreed to it. So much for Trotsky's assertions.

Others have pointed out the weak nature of Trotsky's
arguments as regards the changing nature of the
sailors. We will quote Emma Goldman's evaluation of 
Trotsky's assertions. As will be seen, Trotsky's 
assertions seem to be based on expediency (and, 
significantly, were not uttered before the revolt):

"Now, I do not presume to argue what the Kronstadt 
sailors were in 1918 or 1919. I did not reach Russia 
until January, 1920. From that time on until Kronstadt 
was 'liquidated' the sailors of the Baltic fleet were 
held up as the glorious example of valour and unflinching 
courage. Time on end I was told not only by Anarchists, 
Mensheviks and social revolutionists, but by many 
Communists, that the sailors were the very backbone of 
the Revolution. On the 1st of May, 1920, during the 
celebration and the other festivities organised for 
the first British Labour Mission, the Kronstadt 
sailors presented a large clear-cut contingent, and 
were then pointed out as among the great heroes who 
had saved the Revolution from Kerensky, and Petrograd 
from Yudenich. During the anniversary of October the 
sailors were again in the front ranks, and their 
re-enactment of the taking of the Winter Palace was 
wildly acclaimed by a packed mass. 

"Is it possible that the leading members of the party, 
save Leon Trotsky, were unaware of the corruption and 
the demoralisation of Kronstadt, claimed by him? I do 
not think so. Moreover, I doubt whether Trotsky himself 
held this view of the Kronstadt sailors until March, 
1921. His story must, therefore, be an afterthought, 
or is it a rationalisation to justify the senseless 
'liquidation' of Kronstadt?" [_Trotsky Protests Too 
Much_]

Ante Ciliga quoted the testimony regarding Kronstadt of a 
fellow political prisoner in Soviet Russia:

"'It is a myth that, from the social point of view, Kronstadt 
of 1921 had a wholly different population from that of 1917,' 
[a] man from Petrograd, Dv., said to me in prison. In 1921 he 
was a member of the Communist youth, and was imprisoned in 
1932 as a 'decist' (a member of Sapronov's group of 
'Democratic Centralists')." [Op. Cit., pp. 335-6]

Since then, both Paul Avrich and Israel Gelzter have analysed 
this question and confirmed the arguments and accounts of Goldman 
and Ciliga. Moreover, continuity between the sailors of 1917
and 1921 can also been seen from their actions (rising in
solidarity with the Petrograd workers) and in their politics
(as expressed in their demands and in their paper). 

Now we turn to our second reason for looking into this issue, 
namely the misuse of these sources to support their case. This 
indicates well the nature of Bolshevik ethics. "While the 
revolutionaries," argued Ciliga with regards to the Bolsheviks, 
"remaining such only in words, accomplished in fact the task 
of the reaction and counter-revolution, they were compelled, 
inevitably, to have recourse to lies, to calumny and falsification." 
[Op. Cit., p. 335] Defending these acts also pays its toll on 
those who follow this tradition, as we shall see.

Needless to say, such evidence as provided by Avrich and Getzler
is rarely mentioned by supporters of Bolshevism. However, rather 
than ignore new evidence, the Trotskyists use it in their own 
way, for their own purposes. Every new work about Kronstadt 
has been selectively quoted from by Trotskyists to support 
their arguments, regardless of the honesty of such activity. 
We can point to two works, Paul Avrich's _Kronstadt 1921_
and _Kronstadt 1917-1921_ by Israel Getzler, which have
been used to support Bolshevist conclusions when, in 
fact, they do the opposite. The misuse of these references
is quite unbelievable and shows the mentality of
Trotskyism well.

Pierre Frank argues that Paul Avrich's work has "conclusions" 
which are "similar to Trotsky's" and "confirms the changes in 
the composition of the Kronstadt garrison that took place during 
the civil war, although with a few reservations." [Lenin and 
Trotsky, Op. Cit., p. 25] A quick look at these reservations 
shows how false Frank is. It is worth quoting Avrich at length 
to show this:

"There can be little doubt that during the Civil War
years a large turnover had indeed taken place within
the Baltic Fleet, and that many of the old-timers
had been replaced by conscripts from rural districts
who brought with them the deeply felt discontent of
the Russian peasantry. By 1921, according to official
figures, more than three-quarters of the sailors were
of peasant origin, a substantially higher proportion
that in 1917 . . . Yet this does not necessarily mean
that the behavioural patterns of the fleet had 
undergone any fundamental change. On the contrary,
alongside the technical ratings, who were largely
drawn from the working class, there had always been
a large and unruly peasant element among the sailors
. . . Indeed, in 1905 and 1917 it was these very youths
from the countryside who had given Kronstadt its
reputation as a hotbed of revolutionary extremism.
And throughout the Civil War the Kronstadters had
remained an independent and headstrong lot, difficult
to control and far from constant in their support
for the government. It was for this reason so many
of them . . . had found themselves transferred to
new posts remote from the centres of Bolshevik
powers. Of those who remained, many hankered for 
the freedoms they had won in 1917 before the
new regime began to establish its one-party
dictatorship throughout the country.

"Actually, there was little to distinguish the 
old-timers from the recent recruits in their midst.
Both groups were largely of peasant background . . .
Not unexpectedly, when the rebellion finally erupted,
it was the older seamen, veterans of many years of
service (dating in some cases before the First
World War) who took the lead . . . Given their
maturity and experience, not to speak of their
keen disillusionment as former participants of the
revolution, it was only natural that these seasoned
bluejackets should be thrust into the forefront of
the uprising . . . The proximity of Petrograd,
moreover, with its intense intellectual and political
life, had contributed towards sharpening their
political awareness, and a good many had engaged in
revolutionary activity during 1917 and after. . .

"As late as the autumn of 1920, Emma Goldman recalled,
the sailors were still held up by the Communists 
themselves as a glowing example of valour and
unflinching courage; on November 7, the third
anniversary of the Bolshevik seizure of power,
they were in the front ranks of the celebrations . . .
No one at the time spoke of any 'class degeneration'
at Kronstadt. The allegation that politically
retarded *muzhiks* had diluted the revolutionary
character of the fleet, it would seem, was largely
a device to explain away dissident movements among
the sailors, and had been used as such as early as
October 1918, following the abortive mutiny at the
Petrograd naval station, when the social composition
of the fleet could not yet have undergone any 
sweeping transformation." [_Kronstadt 1921_, pp. 89-92] 

As can be seen, Avrich's "reservations" are such as
to make clear he does *not* share Trotsky's "conclusions"
as regards the class make-up of Kronstadt and, indeed,
noted the ideological bias in this "explanation." 

Moreover, Avrich points to earlier revolts which the 
Bolsheviks had also explained in terms of a diluting of 
the revolutionary sailors of the Baltic Fleet by peasants. 
In April 1918 "the crews of several Baltic vessels 
passed a strongly worded resolution" which "went so 
far as to call for a general uprising to dislodge 
the Bolsheviks and install a new regime that would 
adhere more faithfully to the principles of the 
revolution." In October that year, "a mass meeting 
at the Petrograd naval base adopted a resolution"
which included the sailors going "on record against
the Bolshevik monopoly of political power. Condemning
the suppression of the anarchists and opposition
socialists, they called for free elections to the
soviets . . . [and] denounced the compulsory seizure
of gain." Their demands, as Avrich notes, "strikingly
anticipated the Kronstadt programme of 1921, down to
the slogans of 'free soviets' and 'Away with the
commissarocracy.'" He stresses that a "glance at the
behaviour of the Baltic Fleet from 1905 to 1921 
reveals many elements of continuity." [Avrich, 
Op. Cit., pp. 63-4]

However, a worse example of Trotskyist betrayal of the
truth is provided by the British SWP's John Rees. The 
evidence Rees musters for the claim that the "composition"
of the Kronstadt sailors "had changed" between 1917 and 1921 
is a useful indication of the general Leninist method when it 
comes to the Russian revolution. Rees argues as follows: 

"In September and October 1920 the writer and the Bolshevik 
party lecturer Ieronymus Yasinksky went to Kronstadt to lecture
400 naval recruits. They were 'straight from the plough'. And 
he was shocked to find that many, 'including a few party members,
were politically illiterate, worlds removed from the highly 
politicised veteran Kronstadt sailors who had deeply impressed him'.
Yasinsky worried that those steeled in the revolutionary fire' 
would be replaced by 'inexperienced freshly mobilised young
sailors'." [Op. Cit., p. 61]

This quote is referenced to Israel Getzler's _Kronstadt 1917-1921_.
Rees account is a fair version of the first half of Yasinskys' 
report. The quote however continues exactly as reproduced below:

"Yasinsky was apprehensive about the future when, 'sooner or 
later, Kronstadt's veteran sailors, who were steeled in
revolutionary fire and had acquired a clear revolutionary 
world-view would be replaced by inexperienced, freshly mobilised
young sailors'. Still he comforted himself with the hope that 
Kronstadt's sailors would gradually infuse them with their 'noble
spirit of revolutionary self-dedication' to which Soviet Russia 
owed so much. As for the present he felt reassured that 'in
Kronstadt the red sailor still predominates.'" [Getzler, 
Op. Cit., p. 207]

Rees handy 'editing' of this quote transforms it from one 
showing that three months before the rising that Kronstadt 
had retained its revolutionary spirit to one implying the 
garrison had indeed been replaced. 

Rees tries to generate "[f]urther evidence of the changing
class composition" by looking at the "social background of
the Bolsheviks at the base." However, he goes on to contradict 
himself about the composition of the Bolshevik party at the 
time. On page 61 he says the "same figures for the Bolshevik 
party as a whole in 1921 are 28.7% peasants, 41% workers and 
30.8% white collar and others". On page 66 however he says the 
figures at the end of the civil war (also 1921) were 10% factory 
workers, 25% army and 60% in "the government or party machine". 
An endnote says even of those classed as factory workers "most 
were in administration." [Op. Cit., p. 61 and p. 78] The 
first set of figures is more useful for attacking Kronstadt 
and so is used. 

What is the basis of Rees "further evidence"? Simply that in
"September 1920, six months before the revolt, the Bolsheviks
had 4,435 members at Kronstadt. Some 50 per cent of these
were peasants, 40 percent workers and 10 percent intellectuals 
. . . Thus the percentage of peasants in the party was considerably 
higher than nationally . . .  If we *assume* [our emphasis] that 
the Bolshevik party was more working class in composition than
the base as a whole, then it seems *likely* [our emphasis]
that the peasants had increased their weight in the Kronstadt,
as Trotsky suggested." [Op. Cit., p. 61] 

So on the basis of an assumption, it may be "likely" that 
Trotsky was correct! Impressive "evidence" indeed!

The figures Rees uses are extracted from D. Fedotoff-White's 
_The Growth of the Red Army_. Significantly, Rees fails to 
mention that the Kronstadt communists had just undergone a 
"re-registration" which saw about a quarter of the 4,435 
members in August 1920 voluntarily resigning. By March 1921, 
the party had half as many members as in the previous August 
and during the rebellion 497 members (again, about one-quarter 
of the total membership) voluntarily resigned, 211 were 
excluded after the defeat of the rebellion and 137 did not 
report for re-registration. [Fedotoff-White, _The Growth of 
the Red Army_, p. 140] It seems strange that the party 
leadership had not taken the opportunity to purge the 
Kronstadt party of "excessive" peasant influence in August 
1920 when it had the chance. 

Other questions arise from Rees' argument. He uses the figures 
of Communist Party membership in an attempt to prove that the 
class composition of Kronstadt had changed, favouring the 
peasantry over the workers. Yet this is illogical. Kronstadt 
was primarily a military base and so its "class composition" 
would be skewed accordingly. Since the Bolshevik military 
machine was made up mostly of peasants, can we be surprised 
that the Communist Party in Kronstadt had a higher percentage 
of peasants than the national average? Significantly, Rees 
does not ponder the fact that the percentage of workers in 
the Kronstadt Communist Party was around the national average 
(indeed, Fedotoff-White notes that it "compares favourably in 
that respect with some of the large industrial centres." 
[Op. Cit., p. 142]). 

Also, given that Rees acknowledges that by December 1920 only 
1,313 new recruits had arrived in the Baltic Fleet, his pondering 
of the composition of the Communist organisation at Kronstadt 
smacks more of desperation than serious analysis. By arguing 
that we "do not know how many more new recruits arrived in 
the three months before Kronstadt erupted," Rees fails to see 
that this shows the irrelevance of his statistical analysis. 
[Op. Cit., p. 61] After all, how many of these "new recruits" 
would been allowed to join the Communist Party in the first 
place? Given that the Bolshevik membership had halved between 
August 1920 and March 1921, his analysis is simply pointless, 
a smokescreen to draw attention away from the weakness of his 
own case.

Moreover, as evidence of *changing* class composition these 
figures are not very useful. This is because they do not compare 
the composition of the Kronstadt Bolsheviks in 1917 to those in
1921. Given that the Kronstadt base always had a high percentage 
of peasants in its ranks, it follows that in 1917 the percentage 
of Bolsheviks of peasant origin could have been higher than normal 
as well. If this was the case, then Rees argument falls. Simply
put, he is not comparing the appropriate figures.

It would have been very easy for Rees to inform his readers of
the real facts concerning the changing composition of the 
Kronstadt garrison. He could quoted Getzler's work on this
subject. As noted above, Getzler demonstrates that the crew of 
the battleships *Petropavlovsk* and *Sevastopol*, which formed 
the core of the rising, were recruited into the navy before 1917, 
only 6.9% having been recruited between 1918 and 1921. These figures 
are on the same page as the earlier quotes Rees uses but are ignored 
by him. Unbelievably Rees even states "[w]e do not know how many
new recruits arrived in the three months before Kronstadt erupted"
in spite of quoting a source which indicates the composition
of the two battleships which started the revolt! [Op. Cit., p. 61]

Or, then again, he could have reported Samuel Farber's summary
of Getzler's (and others) evidence. Rees rather lamely notes
that Farber "does not look at the figures for the composition
of the Bolsheviks" [Op. Cit., p. 62] Why should he when he has 
the appropriate figures for the sailors? Here is Farber's account 
of the facts:

"this [Trotsky's class composition] interpretation has failed
to meet the historical test of the growing and relatively
recent scholarship on the Russian Revolution. . . . In fact,
in 1921, a smaller proportion of Kronstadt sailors were of
peasant social origin than was the case of the Red Army 
troops supporting the government . . . recently published
data strongly suggest that the class composition of the
ships and naval base had probably remained unchanged since
before the Civil War. We now know that, given the war-time
difficulties of training new people in the technical skills
required in Russia's ultra-modern battleships, very few
replacements had been sent to Kronstadt to take the place
of the dead and injured sailors. Thus, at the end of the
Civil War in late 1920, no less than 93.9 per cent of the
members of the crews of the *Petropavlovsk* and the
*Sevastopol* . . . were recruited into the navy before
and during the 1917 revolutions. In fact, 59 per cent
of these crews joined the navy in the years 1914-16, 
while only 6.8 per cent had been recruited in the years
1918-21 . . . of the approximately 10,000 recruits who were 
supposed to be trained to replenish the Kronstadt garrison, 
only a few more than 1,000 had arrived by the end of 1920, 
and those had been stationed not in Kronstadt, but in Petrograd, 
where they were supposed to be trained." '[_Before Stalinism_,
pp. 192-3]

And Rees bemoans Farber for not looking at the Bolshevik
membership figures! Yes, assumptions and "likely" conclusions 
drawn from assumptions are more important than hard statistical
evidence! 

After stating "if, for the sake of argument, we accept Sam 
Farber's interpretation of the evidence" (evidence Rees refuses 
to inform the reader of) Rees then tries to save his case. He 
states Farber's "point only has any validity if we take the 
statistics in isolation. But in reality this change [!] in 
composition acted on a fleet whose ties with the peasantry 
had recently been strengthened in other ways. In particular, 
the Kronstadt sailors had recently been granted leave for the 
first time since the civil war. Many returned to their villages
and came face to face with the condition of the countryside
and the trials of the peasantry faced with food detachments." 
[Op. Cit., p. 62] 

Of course, such an argument has *nothing to do with Rees 
original case.* Let us not forget that he argued that the 
class composition of the garrison had changed, *not* that 
its *political* composition had changed. Faced with 
overwhelming evidence against his case, he not only does 
not inform his readers of it, he changes his original 
argument! Very impressive.

So, what of this argument? Hardly an impressive one. Let
us not forget that the revolt came about in response to
the wave of strikes in Petrograd, *not* a peasant revolt.
Moreover, the demands of the revolt predominantly reflected
workers demands, *not* peasant ones (Rees himself acknowledges
that the Kronstadt demands were not reproduced by any
other "peasant" insurrection). The political aspects of
these ideas reflected the political traditions of Kronstadt,
which were not, in the main, Bolshevik. The sailors
supported soviet power in 1917, not party power, and
they again raised that demand in 1921 (see section H.7.9
for details). In other words, the *political* composition 
of the garrison was the same as in 1917. Rees is clearly 
clutching at straws.

The fact that the class composition of the sailors was
similar in 1917 and in 1921 *and* that the bulk of the
sailors at the heart of the revolt were veterans of 1917,
means that Trotskyists can only fall back on their 
ideological definition of class. This perspective involves 
defining a specific "proletarian" political position (i.e. 
the politics of Bolshevism) and arguing that anyone who 
does not subscribe to that position is "petty-bourgeois" 
regardless of their actual position in society (i.e. their 
class position). As Ida Mett notes:

"When Trotsky asserts that all those supporting the 
government were genuinely proletarian and progressive, 
whereas all others represented the peasant counterrevolution, 
we have a right to ask of him that he present us with a 
serious factual analysis in support of his contention."
[Op. Cit., pp. 75-6]

As we show in the next section, the political composition
of the Kronstadt rebels, like their class composition,
was basically unchanged in 1921 when compared to that 
which pre-dominated in 1917.

H.7.9 Was Kronstadt different politically?

As we proved in the last section, the Kronstadt garrison had not 
fundamentally changed by 1921. On the two battleships which were
the catalyst for the rebellion, over 90% of the sailors for whom
years of enlistment are know had been there since 1917. However, 
given that most Leninists mean "support the party" by the term 
"class politics," it is useful to compare the political perspectives 
of Kronstadt in 1917 to that expressed in the 1921 revolt. As will 
soon become clear, the political ideas expressed in 1921 were 
essentially similar to those in 1917. This similarly also proves
the continuity between the Red sailors of 1917 and the rebels
of 1921.

Firstly, we must point out that Kronstadt in 1917 was *never* 
dominated by the Bolsheviks. At Kronstadt, the Bolsheviks were
always a minority and a "radical populist coalition of Maximalists
and Left SRs held sway, albeit precariously, *within* Kronstadt
and its Soviet" ("*externally* Kronstadt was a loyal stronghold
of the Bolshevik regime"). [I. Getzler, _Kronstadt 1917-1921_,
p. 179] In 1917 Trotsky even stated that the Kronstadters "are 
anarchists." [quoted by Getzler, Op. Cit., p. 98] Kronstadt 
was in favour of soviet power and, unsurprisingly, supported
those parties which claimed to support that goal.

Politically, the climate in Kronstadt was "very close to the 
politics of the Socialist Revolutionary Maximalists, a left-wing 
split-off from the SR Party, politically located somewhere 
between the Left SRs and the Anarchists." [Farber, _Before Stalinism_, 
p. 194] In Kronstadt this group was led by Anatolii Lamanov and 
according to Getzler, "it rejected party factionalism" and "stood for 
pure sovietism". They sought an immediate agrarian and urban social 
revolution, calling for the "socialisation of power, of the land 
and of the factories" to be organised by a federation of soviets 
based on direct elections and instant recall, as a first step towards 
socialism. [Getzler, Op. Cit., p. 135] The similarities with
anarchism are clear.

During the October revolution, the Bolsheviks did not prevail 
in the Kronstadt soviet. Instead, the majority was made up of 
SR Maximalists and Left SRs. Kronstadt's delegates to the
third Congress of Soviets were an Left-SR (157 votes), a
SR-Maximalist (147 votes) and a Bolshevik (109 votes). It was 
only in the January elections in 1918 that the Bolsheviks 
improved their position, gaining 139 deputies compared to 
their previous 96. In spite of gaining their highest ever 
vote during the era of multi-party soviets the Bolsheviks 
only gained 46 percent of seats in the soviet. Also elected 
at this time were 64 SRs (21 percent), 56 Maximalists 
(19 percent), 21 non-party delegates (7 percent), 15 Anarchists 
(5 percent) and 6 Mensheviks (2 percent). The soviet elected a 
Left SR as its chairman and in March it elected its three 
delegates to the Fourth Congress of Soviets, with the Bolshevik 
delegate receiving the lowest vote (behind a Maximalist and an 
anarchist with 124, 95 and 79 votes respectively). [I. Getzler,
Op. Cit., pp. 182-4]

By the April 1918 elections, as in most of Russia, the Bolsheviks 
found their support had decreased. Only 53 Bolsheviks were elected 
(29 per cent) as compared to 41 SR Maximalists (22 percent), 39 
Left SRs (21 percent), 14 Menshevik Internationalists (8 percent), 
10 Anarchists (5 percent) and 24 non-party delegates (13 percent). 
Indeed, Bolshevik influence at Kronstadt was so weak that on April 
18th, the Kronstadt soviet denounced the Bolsheviks attack against 
the anarchists in Moscow, April 12th by a vote of 81 to 57. The
"Bolshevisation" of Kronstadt "and the destruction of its
multi-party democracy was not due to internal developments
and local Bolshevik strength, but decreed from outside and
imposed by force." [Getzler, Op. Cit., p. 186]

Thus the dominant political perspective in 1917 was one of 
"sovietism" -- namely, all power to the soviets and not to 
parties. This was the main demand of the 1921 uprising. 
Politically, Kronstadt had not changed.

In addition to the soviet, there was the "general meetings 
in Anchor square, which were held nearly every day." [Avrich, 
Op. Cit., p. 57] The Kronstadt Soviet was itself constantly 
pressurised by mass meetings, generally held in Anchor Square. 
For example, on 25 May 1917, a large crowd, inspired by 
Bolshevik and anarchist speakers, marched to the Naval 
Assembly and forced the leaders of the Soviet to rescind 
their agreement with the more moderate Petrograd Soviet. 
In February 1921, the Kronstadt rebels met in Anchor square 
to pass the *Petropavlovsk* resolution -- just as happened 
before in 1917. And as in 1917, they elected a "conference 
of delegates" to manage the affairs of the Kronstadt. In 
other words, the sailors re-introduced exactly the same 
political forms they practised in 1917.

These facts suggest that any claims that the majority of 
sailors, soldiers and workers in Kronstadt had changed ideas 
politically are unfounded. This, ironically enough, is 
confirmed by Trotsky.

Trotsky's memory (which, after all, seems to be the basis
of most of his and his followers arguments) does play
tricks on him. He states that there "were no Mensheviks
at all in Kronstadt." As for the anarchists, "most" 
of them "represented the city petty bourgeoisie and 
stood at a lower level than the SRs." The Left SRs
"based themselves on the peasant part of the fleet 
and of the shore garrison." All in all, "in the days of
the October insurrection the Bolsheviks constituted less
than one-half of the Kronstadt soviet. The majority
consisted of SRs and anarchists." [Lenin and Trotsky,
_Kronstadt_, p. 86] 

So we have Trotsky arguing that the majority of the "pride 
and glory" of the revolution in 1917 voted for groups
of a "lower level" than the Bolsheviks (and for a party,
the Mensheviks, Trotsky said did not exist there!). 

Looking at the politics of these groups, we discover
some strange inconsistencies which undermine the validity 
of Trotsky's claims. 

For example, in the beginning of 1918, "the working 
population of Kronstadt, after debating the subject 
at many meetings, decided to proceed to socialise 
dwelling places. . . A final monster meeting definitely 
instructed several members of the Soviet -- Left 
Social-Revolutionaries and Anarcho-Syndicalists -- 
to raise the question at the next [soviet] plenary 
session." While the Bolshevik delegates tried to 
postpone the decision (arguing in the soviet that the 
decision was too important and should be decided by 
the central government) the "Left Social-Revolutionaries, 
Maximalists and Anarcho-Syndicalists asked for an 
immediate discussion and carried the vote." [Voline, 
_The Unknown Revolution_, pp. 460-1] 

This fits in exactly with the communist-anarchist 
programme of socialisation but it is hardly an expression
of representatives of "the city petty bourgeoisie."

Let us quote a "representative" of the "city petty
bourgeoisie":

"I am an anarchist because contemporary society is
divided into two opposing classes: the impoverished
and dispossessed workers and peasants . . . and the
rich men, kings and presidents . . .

"I am an anarchist because I scorn and detest all
authority, since all authority is founded on 
injustice, exploitation and compulsion over the
human personality. Authority dehumanises the
individual and makes him a slave.

"I am an opponent of private property when it is
held by individual capitalist parasites, for private
property is theft. . .

"I am an anarchist because I believe only in the
creative powers and independence of a united 
proletariat and not of the leaders of political
parties of various kinds.

"I am an anarchist because I believe that the
present struggle between the classes will end
only when the toiling masses, organised as a
class, gain their true interests and conquer,
by means of a violent social revolution, all
the riches of the earth . . . having abolished
all institutions of government and authority,
the oppressed class must proclaim a society of
free producers . . . The popular masses themselves
will conduct their affairs on equal and communal
lines in free communities." [N. Petrov, cited by
Paul Avrich, _Anarchists in the Russian Revolution_, 
pp. 35-6]

Very "petty bourgeois"! Of course Trotsky could argue that 
this represented the minority of "real revolutionaries," 
the "elements most closely linked to the Bolsheviks" 
among the anarchists, but such an analysis cannot be

taken seriously considering the influence of the
anarchists in Kronstadt. [Lenin and Trotsky, Op. Cit., 
p. 86] For example, a member of the Petrograd Committee 
and the Helsingfors party organisation in 1917 recalled
that the Anarchist-Communists had great influence
in Kronstadt. Moreover, according to historian
Alexander Rabinowitch, they had an "undeniable
capacity to influence the course of events" and 
he speaks of "the influential Anarcho-Syndicalist
Communists [of Kronstadt] under Iarchuk." Indeed,
anarchists "played a significant role in starting
the July uprising" in 1917. [_Prelude to Revolution_,
p. 62, p. 63, p. 187 and p. 138] This confirms Paul
Avrich's comments that the "influence of the anarchists
. . . had always been strong within the fleet" and
"the spirit of anarchism" had been "powerful in
Kronstadt in 1917" (and "had by no means dissipated"
in 1921). [Arvich, Op. Cit., p. 168 and p. 169]

A similar analysis of the Maximalists would produce
the same results for Trotsky's claims. Paul Avrich 
provides a useful summary of their politics. He notes 
the Maximalists occupied "a place in the revolutionary
spectrum between the Left SR's and the anarchists
while sharing elements of both." They "preached a
doctrine of total revolution" and called for a
"'toilers' soviet republic' founded on freely elected
soviets, with a minimum of central state authority.
Politically, this was identical with the objective
of the Kronstadters [in 1921], and 'Power to the
soviets but not the parties' had originally been a
Maximalist rallying-cry." [Op. Cit., p. 171] 

Economically, the parallels "are no less striking."
They denounced grain requisitioning and demanded that
"all the land be turned over to the peasants."
For industry they rejected the Bolshevik theory
and practice of "workers' control" over bourgeois
administrators in favour of the "social organisation
of production and its systematic direction by
representatives of the toiling people." Opposed
to nationalisation and centralised state management
in favour of socialisation and workers' 
self-management of production. Little wonder he 
states that the "political group closest to the 
rebels in temperament and outlook were the SR 
Maximalists." [Paul Avrich, Op. Cit., pp. 171-2] 

Indeed, "[o]n nearly every important point the
Kronstadt program, as set forth in the rebel
*Izvestiia*, coincided with that of the Maximalists."
[Avrich, Op. Cit., p. 171] This can be quickly seen 
from reading both the *Petropavlovsk* resolution and 
the Kronstadt newspaper *Izvestiia* (see _No Gods, No 
Masters_, vol. 2, pp. 183-204). The political continuity
is striking between 1917 and 1921.

As can be seen, the Maximalists were in advance of
the Bolsheviks too. They argued for soviet power,
not party power, as well as workers' self-management
to replace the state capitalism of the Bolsheviks.
 
Clearly, the political outlook of the Kronstadt rebels
had not changed dramatically. Heavily influenced by 
anarchist and semi-anarchists in 1917, in 1921 the same
political ideas came to the fore again once the sailors,
soldiers and civilians had freed themselves from Bolshevik
dictatorship and created the "conference of delegates."

According to the logic of Trotsky's argument, the
Kronstadt sailors were revolutionary simply because of
the actions of the Bolshevik minority, as a "revolution
is 'made' directly by a *minority.* The success of a
revolution is possible, however, only where this
minority finds more or less support . . . on the
part of the majority. The shift in different stages
of the revolution . . . is directly determined by
changing political relations between the minority
and the majority, between the vanguard and the class."
It is this reason that necessitates "the dictatorship
of the proletariat" as the level of the masses cannot
be "equal" and of "extremely high development." Trotsky 
argued that the "political composition of the Kronstadt 
Soviet reflected the composition of the garrison and the 
crews." [Lenin and Trotsky, Op. Cit., p. 85, p. 92 and 
p. 86] 

In other words, with the vanguard (the minority of Bolsheviks) 
gone, the majority of the Kronstadters fell back to their less 
developed ways. So, if the political composition of the revolt 
reflected the composition of the crews, then Trotsky's argument
suggests that this composition was remarkably unchanged! It
also suggests that this "composition" had changed in the
early months of 1918 as the Bolsheviks saw their vote 
nearly half between late January and April 1918!

Similarly, we find John Rees, in contradiction to his main 
argument, mentioning that the "ideology of the Kronstadt 
garrison was one factor" in the revolt because "in its 
heroic days the garrison had an ultra-left air." [Rees, 
Op. Cit., p. 62] If, as he maintains, the sailors *were* 
new, how could they had time to be influenced by this 
ideology, the ideology of sailors he claims were not 
there? And if the new recruits he claims were there 
*had* been influenced by the sailors of 1917 then it 
is hard to maintain that the revolt was alien to the 
spirit of 1917.

This can also be seen from Rees' comment that while we did 
not know the composition of the sailors, we did "know about 
the composition of some of the other units based at Kronstadt, 
like the 2,5000 Ukrainians of the 160th Rifle Regiment, 
recruited from areas particularly friendly to the Makhno 
guerrillas and with less than 2 percent of Bolsheviks in 
its ranks." [Op. Cit., p. 61] In other words, we know the 
origin of *one* other unit at Kronstadt, not the class 
"composition" of "some of the other units" there. Yet
again, Rees does not see how this fact undermines his 
argument. Firstly, Rees does not think it important to 
note that Communists numbered less than 2 per cent of 
metal-workers in Petrograd and only 4 per cent of 2,200 
employed in metal works in Moscow. [D. Fedotoff-White, 
_The Growth of the Red Army_, p. 132] As such the low 
figure for Communists in the 160th Rifle Regiment does 
not tell us much about its class composition. Secondly, as 
Fedotoff-White (the source of Rees' information) notes, 
while "the soldiers were also disaffected and had no 
love of the Communists and the commissars," they were "unable 
to formulate their grievances clearly and delineate the issues 
at stake . . . They did not have it in them to formulate a
plan of action. All that was done at Kronstadt was the work 
of the bluejackets [the sailors], who were the backbone of
the movement." [Op. Cit., p. 154] 

If, as Rees argues, that "new recruits" explain the uprising, 
then how can we explain the differences between the army 
and navy? We cannot. The difference can be explained only 
in terms of what Rees is at pains to deny, namely the 
existence and influence of sailors who had been there 
since 1917. As Fedotoff-White speculates, "the younger 
element among the seamen" would "easily [fall] under the 
spell of the . . . older men they served with on board 
ships" and of the "large number of old-ex-sea men, 
employed in the industrial enterprises of Kronstadt." 
He notes that "a good many" of the rebels "had had ample
experience in organisational and political work since 
1917. A number had long-standing associations with Anarchists
and the Socialist Revolutionaries of the Left." Thus the
"survival of the libertarian pattern of 1917 . . . made
it possible for the bluejackets not only to formulate, 
but carry out a plan of action, no doubt under a certain
amount of influence of the Anarchists, and those who had
left the party in such great numbers during the 
September 1920 re-registration." [Op. Cit., p. 155] The 
political continuity of the Kronstadt rebellion is 
clear from the way the revolt developed and who took a
leading role in it.

All of which raises an interesting question. If revolutions
are made by a minority who gain the support of the majority, 
what happens when the majority reject the vanguard? As we 
indicate in sections H.7.13 and H.7.15, Trotsky was not shy in 
providing the answer -- party dictatorship. In this he just 
followed the logic of Lenin's arguments. In 1905, Lenin argued 
(and using Engels as an authority) "the principle, 'only from 
below' is an *anarchist* principle." For Lenin, Marxists must 
be in favour of "From above as well as from below" and 
"renunciation of pressure also from above is *anarchism.*" 
According to Lenin, "[p]ressure from below is pressure by the 
citizens on the revolutionary government. Pressure from above is 
pressure by the revolutionary government on the citizens." 
[Marx, Engels and Lenin, _Anarchism and Anarcho-Syndicalism_, 
p. 192, p. 196 and pp. 189-90]

As Kronstadt shows, "pressure from above" has a slight advantage 
over "pressure from below" as it has the full power of the
state apparatus to use against the citizens. In other words, 
the seeds for Bolshevik dictatorship and the repression of 
Kronstadt lie in Trotsky's argument and arguments like it 
(see section H.7.15 for further details).

Simply put, the evidence shows that the political ideas
dominant in Kronstadt, like the bulk of the personnel themselves,
had not changed (indeed, it is these politics which visibly
show the statistical evidence we present in the last section). 
The revolt of 1921 reflected the politics and aspirations of 
those active in 1917. It were these politics which had made 
Kronstadt the "pride and glory" of the revolution in 1917 and, 
four years later, made it so dangerous to the Bolsheviks.

H.7.10 Why did the Petrograd workers not support Kronstadt?

For Trotskyists, the inaction of the Petrograd workers
during the revolt is a significant factor in showing its
"backward peasant" character. Trotsky, for example, argued
that from "the class point of view" it is "extremely
important to contrast the behaviour of Kronstadt to that
of Petrograd in those critical days." He argues that
the "uprising did not attract the Petrograd workers.
It repelled them. The stratification proceeded along
class lines. The workers immediately felt that the
Kronstadt mutineers stood on the opposite side of
the barricades -- and they supported the Soviet
power. The political isolation of Kronstadt was the
cause of its internal uncertainty and its military
defeat." [Lenin and Trotsky, _Kronstadt_, pp. 90-1]

Firstly, it should be noted that Trotsky's claims in 1937
are at odds with his opinion during the crisis. In a cable
dated March 5th, 1921, to a member of the Council of Labour 
and Defence Trotsky insisted that "only the seizure of Kronstadt 
will put an end to the political crisis in Petrograd." [quoted 
by Israel Getzler, "The Communist Leaders' Role in the Kronstadt 
Tragedy of 1921 in the Light of Recently Published Archival 
Documents", _Revolutionary Russia_, pp. 24-44, Vol. 15, No. 1, 
June 2002, p. 32] Thus, in 1921, Trotsky was well aware of the
links between the Kronstadt revolt and the Petrograd strikes,
seeing the destruction of the former as a means to defeating 
the latter. Simply put, the crushing of Kronstadt would give 
the rebel workers in Petrograd a clear message of what to 
expect if they persisted in their protests. 

Secondly, needless to say, Trotsky's later arguments leave a 
lot to be desired. For example, he fails to note (to use Victor 
Serge's words -- see section H.7.5) that the state and Communist 
Press "was positively berserk with lies." The press and radio 
campaign directed against Kronstadt stated that the revolt had 
been organised by foreign spies and was led by ex-Tsarist generals. 

On 5th March the Petrograd Defence Committee put out a call 
to the insurgents, inviting them to surrender. It stated:

"You are being told fairy tales when they tell you that 
Petrograd is with you or that the Ukraine supports you. 
These are impertinent lies. The last sailor in Petrograd 
abandoned you when he learned that you were led by generals 
like Kozlovskv. Siberia and the Ukraine support the Soviet 
power. Red Petrograd laughs at the miserable efforts of a 
handful of White Guards and Socialist Revolutionaries."
[cited by Mett, _The Kronstadt Uprising_, p. 50]

These lies would, of course, alienate many workers in Petrograd. 
Two hundred emissaries were sent from Kronstadt to distribute 
their demands but only a few avoided capture. The Party had 
brought the full weight of its propaganda machine to bear, 
lying about the revolt and those taking part in it. The government 
also placed a "careful watch" on the "trains from Petrograd to
mainland points in the direction of Kronstadt to prevent any 
contact with the insurgents." [Avrich, Op. Cit., p. 140 and
p. 141]

Unsurprising, in such circumstances many workers, soldiers and 
sailors would have been loath to support Kronstadt. Isolated 
from the revolt, the Petrograd workers had to reply on official
propaganda (i.e. lies) and rumours to base any judgement
on what was happening there. However, while this is a factor
in the lack of active support, it is by no means the key one.
This factor, of course, was state repression. Emma Goldman 
indicates the situation in Petrograd at the time:

"An exceptional state of martial law was imposed throughout the 
entire province of Petrograd, and no one except officials with 
special passes could leave the city now. The Bolshevik press 
launched a campaign of calumny and venom against Kronstadt,
announcing that the sailors and soldiers had made common cause 
with the 'tsarist General Kozlovsky;' they were thereby declaring 
the Kronstadters outlaws." [_No Gods, No Masters_, vol. 2, p. 171]

Given what everyone knew what happened to people outlawed by the 
Bolsheviks, is it surprising that many workers in Petrograd (even 
if they knew they were being lied to) did not act? Moreover,
the threat made against Kronstadt could be seen on the streets 
of Petrograd:

"On March 3 [the day after the revolt] the Petrograd Defence
Committee, now vested with absolute power throughout the
entire province, took stern measures to prevent any further
disturbances. The city became a vast garrison, with troops
patrolling in every quarter. Notices posted on the walls
reminded the citizenry that all gatherings would be 
dispersed and those who resisted shot on the spot. During
the day the streets were nearly deserted, and, with the
curfew now set at 9 p.m., night life ceased altogether."
[Avrich, Op. Cit., p. 142]

Berkman, an eyewitness to the repression, states that:

"The Petrograd committee of defence, directed by Zinoviev, 
its chairman, assumed full control of the city and Province 
of Petrograd. The whole Northern District was put under 
martial law and all meetings prohibited. Extraordinary 
precautions were taken to protect the Government 
institutions and machine guns were placed in the 
Astoria, the hotel occupied by Zinoviev and other high 
Bolshevik functionaries. The proclamations posted on the 
street bulletin boards ordered the immediate return of 
all strikers to the factories, prohibited suspension of 
work, and warned the people against congregating on the 
streets. 'In such cases', the order read, 'the soldiery 
will resort to arms. In case of resistance, shooting on 
the spot.'

"The committee of defence took up the systematic 'cleaning 
of the city.' Numerous workers, soldiers and sailors suspected 
of sympathising with Kronstadt, placed under arrest. All 
Petrograd sailors and several Army regiments thought to be 
'politically untrustworthy' were ordered to distant points, 
while the families of Kronstadt sailors living in Petrograd 
were taken into custody as *hostages.*" [_The Russian
Tragedy_, p. 71]

However, part of the Petrograd proletariat continued to strike 
during the Kronstadt events. Strikes were continuing in the 
biggest factories of Petrograd: Poutilov, Baltisky, Oboukhov, 
Nievskaia Manoufactura, etc. However, the Bolsheviks acted 
quickly shut down some of the factories and started the 
re-registration of the workers. For workers to be locked 
out of a factory meant to be "automatically deprived of 
their rations." [Avrich, Op. Cit., p. 41]

At the "Arsenal" factory, "the workers organised a mass meeting on 
7th March, (the day the bombardment of Kronstadt began). This 
meeting adopted a resolution of the mutinous sailors! It elected 
a commission which was to go from factory to factory, agitating 
for a general strike." [Mett, Op. Cit., p. 52] The Cheka confirms
this event, reporting to Zinoviev on March 8th that "[a]t a rally 
of workers of the Arsenal Plant a resolution was passed to join the
Kronstadt uprising. The general meeting had elected a delegation
to maintain contact with Kronstadt." This delegation had already
been arrested. This was a common practice and during this period
the Cheka concentrated its efforts on the leaders and on
disrupting communication: all delegates to other workplaces,
all Mensheviks and SRs who could be found, all speakers at
rallies were being arrested day after day. On the day the 
Bolsheviks attacked Kronstadt (March 7th) the Cheka reported 
that it was launching "decisive actions against the workers."
[quoted by Brovkin, _Behind the Front Lines of the Civil
War_, p. 396]

These "decisive actions" involved a "massive purge of Petrograd
factories and plants." The Communists "suppressed the workers'
uprising in Petrograd in the first days of March." Unlike
the Kronstadt sailors, the workers did not have weapons and
"were essentially defenceless vis-a-vis the Cheka." [Brovkin,
Op. Cit., p. 396]

The state of siege was finally lifted on the 22nd of March, 
five days after the crushing of Kronstadt.

In these circumstances, is it surprising that the Petrograd 
workers did not join in the rebellion?

Moreover, the Petrograd workers had just experienced the 
might of the Bolshevik state. As we noted in section H.7.2, 
the events in Kronstadt were in solidarity with the strike 
wave in Petrograd at the end of February. Then the Bolsheviks 
had repressed the workers with "arrests, the use of armed 
patrols in the streets and in the factories, and the closing 
and re-registration of an enterprise labour force." [Mary
McAuley, Op. Cit., p. 409] 

A three-man Defence Committee was formed and Zinoviev 
"proclaimed martial law" on February 24th (this was later 
"vested with absolute power throughout the entire province" 
on March 3rd). [Avrich, Op. Cit., p. 39 and p. 142] As
part of this process, they had to rely on the *kursanty*
(Communist officer cadets) as the local garrisons had
been caught up the general ferment and could not be
relied upon to carry out the government's orders. 
Hundreds of *kursanty* were called in from neighbouring
military academies to patrol the city. "Overnight
Petrograd became an armed camp. In every quarter 
pedestrians were stopped and their documents checked
. . . the curfew [was] strictly enforced." The
Petrograd Cheka made widespread arrests. [Avrich,
Op. Cit., pp. 46-7]

As can be seen, Trotsky is insulting the intelligence of his 
readers by arguing that the lack of support in Petrograd for 
Kronstadt reflected "class lines." Indeed, by failing
to mention (to use Emma Goldman's words) "the campaign 
of slander, lies and calumny against the sailors" conducted
by the Soviet Press (which "fairly oozed poison against the 
sailors") or that "Petrograd was put under martial law" 
Trotsky, quite clearly, "deliberately falsifies the facts." 
[_Trotsky Protests Too Much_]

Ida Mett states the obvious:

"Here again Trotsky is saying things which are quite untrue. 
Earlier on we showed how the wave of strikes had started in 
Petrograd and how Kronstadt had followed suit. It was against 
the strikers of Petrograd that the Government had to organise 
a special General Staff: the Committee of Defence. The repression 
was first directed against the Petrograd workers and against 
their demonstrations, by the despatch of armed detachments 
of Koursantys.

"But the workers of Petrograd had no weapons. They could not 
defend themselves as could the Kronstadt sailors. The military 
repression directed against Kronstadt certainly intimidated the
Petrograd workers. The demarcation did not take place 'along 
class lines' but according to the respective strengths of the 
organs of repression. The fact that the workers of Petrograd 
did not follow those of Kronstadt does not prove that they 
did not sympathise with them. Nor, at a later date, when 
the Russian proletariat failed to follow the various 
'oppositions' did this prove that they were in agreement 
with Stalin! In such instances it was a question of the 
respective strengths of the forces confronting one
another." [Mett, Op. Cit., p. 73]

So, unlike the Kronstadt sailors, the Petrograd workers did 
not have arms and so could not take part in an "armed revolt" 
against the well armed Red Army unless part of that force 
sided with the strikers. The Communist leaders recognised 
this danger, with untrustworthy troops being confined to their
barracks and in place of regular troops they had shipped 
in *kursanty* (they had obviously learned the lessons of
the 1917 February revolution!). Ultimately, the city was 
"appeased by concessions and cowed by the presence of 
troops." [Avrich, Op. Cit., p. 200] 

Not that this was the first time Trotsky confused force
with class. In his infamous work _Terrorism and Communism_
he defended the fact of Communist Party dictatorship (i.e.
"of having substituted for the dictatorship of the Soviets 
the dictatorship of our party"). He argued that "it can 
be said with complete justice that the dictatorship of 
the Soviets became possible only by means of the dictatorship 
of the party" and that there is "no substitution at all" when
the "power of the party" replaces that of the working class.
The rule of the party "has afforded to the Soviets the 
possibility of becoming transformed from shapeless parliaments 
of labour into the apparatus of the supremacy of labour." 
[_Terrorism and Communism_, p. 109] He continued by arguing:

"But where is your guarantee, certain wise men ask us, 
that it is just your party that expresses the interests 
of historical development? Destroying or driving underground 
the other parties, you have thereby prevented their political 
competition with you, and consequently you have deprived 
yourselves of the possibility of testing your line of action. 

"This idea is dictated by a purely liberal conception of the 
course of the revolution. In a period in which all antagonisms 
assume an open character, and the political struggle swiftly 
passes into a civil war, the ruling party has sufficient 
material standard by which to test its line of action, 
without the possible circulation of Menshevik papers. Noske 
crushes the Communists, but they grow. We have suppressed 
the Mensheviks and the S.R.s-and they have disappeared. 
This criterion is sufficient for us." [Op. Cit., pp. 109-10]

An interesting criterion, to say the least. The faulty
logic he displayed with regards to Petrograd and Kronstadt
had a long history. By this logic Hitler expressed the "interests 
of historical development" when the German Communists and
Trotskyists "disappeared" by leaps and bounds. Similarly,
the Trotskyists in Russia "disappeared" under Stalin. Is 
this a Trotskyist justification of Stalinism? All it 
proves is the power of the repressive system -- just as 
the "passivity" of the Petrograd workers during the Kronstadt 
revolt indicates the power of the Bolshevik regime rather than 
the class basis of the Kronstadt uprising.

On this theme, we can see the depths which Trotskyists go to 
re-write history from Pierre Frank's "Introduction" to the work 
_Kronstadt_. He decides to quote Paul Avrich's work (after, of 
course, warning the reader that Avrich "is not a Bolshevik or a 
Trotskyist" and his "political features are blurred"). Frank 
states that Avrich "done his work conscientiously, without 
skipping over the facts." It is a shame that the same cannot 
be said of Frank! Frank states that Avrich "discusses the 
strikes in Petrograd preceding Kronstadt and comes to the 
following conclusion":

"For many intellectuals and workers, moreover, the Bolsheviks,
with all their faults, were still the most effective barrier
to a White resurgence and the downfall of the revolution.

"For these reasons, the strikes in Petrograd were fated 
to lead a brief existence. Indeed, they ended almost as 
suddenly as they had begun, never having reached the
point of armed revolt against the regime." [Lenin and
Trotsky, Op. Cit., pp. 24-35]

It is the "moreover" in the first paragraph that gives the 
game away. Avrich lists a few more reasons than the one listed
by Frank. Here is what Avrich actually lists as the reasons
for the end of the strike wave:

"after several days of tense excitement, the Petrograd
disturbances petered out . . . The concessions had done
their work, for more than anything else it was cold
and hunger which had stimulated popular disaffection.
Yet there is no denying that the application of military
force and the widespread arrests, not to speak of the
tireless propaganda waged by the authorities had been
indispensable in restoring order. Particularly impressive
in this regard was the discipline shown by the local
party organisation. Setting aside their internal disputes,
the Petrograd Bolsheviks swiftly closed ranks and 
proceeded to carry out the unpleasant task of repression
with efficiency and dispatch . . .

"Then, too, the collapse of the movement would not have
come so soon but for the utter demoralisation of 
Petrograd's inhabitants. The workers were simply too
exhausted to keep up any sustained political activity
. . . What is more, they lacked effective leadership
and a coherent program of action. In the past these
had been supplied by the radical intelligentsia . . .
[but they] were themselves in no condition to lend
the workers any meaningful support, let alone active
guidance . . . they now felt too weary and terrorised
. . . to raise their voices in opposition. With most
of their comrades in prison or exile, and some already
executed, few of the survivors were willing to risk
the same fate, especially when the odds against them
were so overwhelming and when the slightest protest
might deprive their families of their rations. For 
many intellectuals and workers, moreover, the Bolsheviks,
with all their faults, were still the most effective barrier
to a White resurgence and the downfall of the revolution.

"For these reasons, the strikes in Petrograd were fated 
to lead a brief existence. Indeed, they ended almost as 
suddenly as they had begun, never having reached the
point of armed revolt against the regime." [Paul
Avrich, _Kronstadt_, pp. 49-51]

As can be seen, Frank "skips over" most of Avrich's
argument and the basis of his conclusion. Indeed, 
what Frank calls Avrich's "conclusion" cannot be
understood by providing, as Frank does, the *last*
reason Avrich gives for it.

The dishonesty is clear, if not unexpected nor an
isolated case. John Rees, to use another example,
states that the revolt was "preceded by a wave of
serious but quickly resolved strikes." [Rees, Op. Cit.,
p. 61] No mention that the strikes were "resolved"
by force nor that the Kronstadt revolt was not only 
"preceded" by the strikes but was directly inspired by
them, was in *solidarity with them* and raised many
of the same demands!

Similarly, he argues that the Kronstadters' "insistence 
that they were fighting for a 'third revolution', freedom 
of expression and for 'soviets without parties' [although, 
in fact, they *never* raised that slogan and so we have to 
wonder who Rees is quoting here] has convinced many historians 
that this revolt was fundamentally distinct from the White 
Rebellions." But this, apparently, is not the case as "one 
must be careful to analyse the difference between the conscious 
aims of the rebels and the possible outcome of their actions. 
The Bolshevik regime still rested on the shattered remnants 
of the working class. The Kronstadt sailors' appeals to the 
Petrograd workers had met with little or no response."
[Op. Cit., p. 63]

One has to wonder what planet Rees is on. After all, *if* the
Bolsheviks *had* rested on the "shattered remnants of the
working class" then they would *not* have had to turn 
Petrograd into an armed camp, repress the strikes, impose
martial law and arrest militant workers. The Kronstadt sailors
appeals "met with little or no response" due to the Bolshevik
coercion exercised in those fateful days. To not mention the
Bolshevik repression in Petrograd is to deliberately deceive 
the reader. That the Kronstadt demands would have met with 
strong response in Petrograd can be seen from the actions of 
the Bolsheviks (who did not rest upon the workers but rather 
arrested them). Given that the Kronstadt demands simply reflected
those raised by the Petrograd strikers *themselves* we can 
safely say that Rees is talking nonsense (see section H.7.4).
Moreover, the sailors' resolution *had* meet with strong support 
from the workers of Kronstadt. Thus Rees' "class analysis" of
the Kronstadt revolt is pathetic and has no bearing to the
reality of the situation in Petrograd nor to the history of 
the revolt itself.

As can be seen, any attempt to use the relative inaction
of the Petrograd workers as evidence of the class nature
of the revolt has to do so by ignoring all the relevant
facts of the situation. This can go so far as to selectively
quote from academic accounts to present a radically false
conclusion to that of the misused author's.

H.7.11 Were the Whites a threat during the Kronstadt revolt?

The lack of foreign intervention during the Kronstadt
revolt suggests more than just the fact that the revolt
was not a "White conspiracy." It also suggests that 
the White forces were in no position to take advantage 
of the rebellion or even support it.

This is significant simply because the Bolsheviks and their
supporters argue that the revolt had to be repressed simply
because the Soviet State was in danger of White and/or
foreign intervention. How much danger was there? According
to John Rees, a substantial amount:

"The Whites, even though their armies had been beaten
in the field, were still not finished -- as the emigre
response to the Kronstadt rising shows . . . They had
predicted a rising at Kronstadt and the White National
Centre abroad raised a total of nearly 1 million French
Francs, 2 million Finnish marks, 5000, $25,000 and 900
tons of flour in just two weeks; Indeed, the National
Centre was already making plans for the forces of the
French navy and those of General Wrangel, who still
commanded 70,000 men in Turkey, to land in Kronstadt
if the revolt were to succeed." [Op. Cit., pp. 63-4]

To back up his argument, Rees references Paul Avrich's
book. We, in turn, will consult that work to evaluate his 
argument. 

Firstly, the Kronstadt revolt broke out months after the end 
of the Civil War in Western Russia. Wrangel had fled from the 
Crimea in November 1920. The Bolsheviks were so afraid of White 
invasion that by early 1921 they demobilised half the Red Army 
(some 2,500,000 men). [Paul Avrich, Op. Cit., p. 13] 

Secondly, the Russian emigres "remained as divided and 
ineffectual as before, with no prospect of co-operation 
in sight." [Avrich, Op. Cit., p. 219]

Thirdly, as far as Wrangel, the last of the White 
General, goes, his forces were in no state to re-invade 
Russia. His troops were "dispersed and their moral sagging" 
and it would have taken "months . . . merely to mobilise
his men and transport them from the Mediterranean to the
Baltic." A second front in the south "would have meant 
almost certain disaster." Indeed, in a call issued by 
the Petrograd Defence Committee on March 5th, they asked
the rebels: "Haven't you heard what happened to Wrangel's men, 
who are dying like flies, in their thousands of hunger and 
disease?" The call goes on to add "[t]his is the fate that 
awaits you, unless you surrender within 24 hours." [Avrich, 
Op. Cit., p. 219, p. 146 and p. 105] 

Clearly, the prospect of a White invasion was slim. This 
leaves the question of capitalist governments. Avrich has 
this to say on this:

"Apart from their own energetic fund-raising campaign,
the emigres sought the assistance of the Entene powers.
. . . the United States government, loath to resume
the interventionist policies of the Civil War, turned
a deaf ear to all such appeals. The prospects of British
aid were even dimmer . . . The best hope of foreign
support came from France . . . the French refused to
interfere either politically or militarily in the
crisis." [Op. Cit., pp. 117-9]

The French had also "withdrew its recognition of Wrangel's 
defunct government" in November 1920 "but continued to feed 
his troops on 'humane grounds,' meanwhile urging him to 
disband." [Op. Cit., p. 105]

Thus, the claim that foreign intervention was likely seems 
without basis. Indeed, the Communist radio was arguing that
"the organisation of disturbances in Kronstadt have the sole 
purpose of influencing the new American President and changing 
his policy toward Russia. At the same time the London Conference 
is holding its sessions, and the spreading of similar rumours 
must influence also the Turkish delegation and make it more 
submissive to the demands of the Entente. The rebellion the 
*Petropavlovsk* crew is undoubtedly part of a great conspiracy 
to create trouble within Soviet Russia and to injure our 
international position." [quoted by Berkman, _The Russian
Tragedy_, p. 71] Lenin himself argued on March 16th that "the 
enemies" around the Bolshevik state were "no longer able to 
wage their war of intervention" and so were launching a press 
campaign "with the prime object of disrupting the negotiations 
for a trade agreement with Britain, and the forthcoming trade 
agreement with America." [Lenin and Trotsky, Op. Cit., p. 52] 
The demobilising of the Red Army seems to confirm this perspective.

Moreover, these governments had to take into account
of its own working class. It was doubtful that they
would, after years of war, been able to intervene,
particularly if there was a clearly socialist revolt

coming from below. Their own working class, in such a
situation, would have prevented intervention by 
foreign capitalist states (a fact Lenin acknowledged
in July 1921 [Lenin and Trotsky, Op. Cit., p. 62]).

So in spite of massive social unrest and the revolt of a
key fortress protecting Petrograd, the Western powers took
no action. The Whites were disorganised and could only raise
non-military supplies (none of which reached Kronstadt). Could
this situation have changed if Kronstadt had spread to the
mainland? It is doubtful simply because the Western governments,
as Lenin argued, had to take into account the anti-interventionist
position of their own working classes. The Whites had no military
forces available (as the Bolsheviks themselves argued). Avrich
notes it would have taken months for these forces to reach
Kronstadt by which time soviet democracy would have been
consolidated and ready to protect itself.

Even if we assume that Kronstadt had survived until the ice
melted while Petrograd remained under Bolshevik dictatorship
it, again, is doubtful that it would have been the basis
for renewed White attacks. Neither Wrangel's troops nor
foreign government forces would have been welcomed by Red 
Kronstadt. While non-military aid would have been welcome 
(i.e. food supplies and so on), it is hard to believe that 
the Conference of Delegates would have allowed troops to
arrive or pass them by to attack Petrograd. Simply put,
the Kronstadters were fighting for soviet power and were
well aware that others may try to support the revolt for 
their own, anti-revolutionary, reasons (see section H.7.7).

So it seems that the possibility of foreign intervention was 
not a real threat at the time. The arguments of Lenin at the
time, plus the demobilisation of the Red Army, points in
that direction. Moreover, the total lack of response by
Western governments during the revolt indicates that they
were unlikely to take advantage of continuing unrest in Kronstadt,
Petrograd and other towns and cities. Their working classes,
sick of war and class consciousness enough to resist another
intervention in Russia, would have been a factor in this
apathetic response. Wrangel's troops, as the Bolsheviks
were aware, were not a threat. 

The only real threat to Bolshevik power was internal --
from the workers and peasants the Bolsheviks claimed
to be representing. Many of the ex-soldiers swelled
the ranks of peasant guerrilla forces, fighting the
repressive (and counter-productive) food collection
squads. In the Ukraine, the Bolsheviks were fighting
the remnants of the Makhnovist army (a fight, incidentally,
brought upon the Bolsheviks by themselves as they had
betrayed the agreements made with the anarchist forces
and attacked them once Wrangel had been defeated). 

Thus the only potential danger facing the "soviet power" (i.e.
Bolshevik power) was soviet democracy, a danger which had 
existed since the October revolution. As in 1918, when the 
Bolsheviks disbanded and repressed any soviet electorate 
which rejected their power, they met the danger of soviet 
democracy with violence. The Bolsheviks were convinced that 
their own dictatorship was equivalent to the revolution 
and that their power was identical to that of the working 
class. They considered themselves to be the embodiment of
"soviet power" and it obviously did not bother them that
the demand for free soviets can hardly be considered as
actions against the power of the soviets. 

In such circumstances, the Bolshevik government viewed 
the Kronstadt revolt *not* as socialists should but rather 
as a ruling class. It was suppressed for "reasons of state" 
and not to defend a revolutionary regime (which was, by 
this stage, revolutionary in name only). As Bakunin had
argued decades before, the "workers' state" would not remain
controlled by the workers for long and would soon became
a dictatorship *over* the proletariat by an elite which
claimed to know the interests of the working class better
than they did themselves (see section H.7.15).

The only possible justification for maintaining the party
dictatorship was the argument that soviet democracy would
have lead to the defeat of the Communists at the polls
(which would mean recognising it was a dictatorship *over*
the proletariat and had been for some time). This would,
it is argued, have resulted in (eventually) a return of the
Whites and an anti-working class dictatorship that would
have slaughtered the Russian workers and peasants en mass.

Such a position is self-serving and could have been used
by Stalin to justify *his* regime. Unsurprisingly enough,
the Hungarian Stalinists argued after crushing the 1956
revolution that "the dictatorship of the proletariat, if
overthrown, cannot be succeeded by any form of government
other than fascist counter-revolution." [quoted by Andy
Anderson, _Hungary '56_, p. 101] And, of course, an even
more anti-working class dictatorship than Lenin's did appear 
which did slaughter the Russian workers and peasants en mass, 
namely Stalinism. No other option was possible, once party 
dictatorship was fully embraced in 1921 (repression against
dissidents was *more* extreme after the end of the Civil War 
than during it). It is utopian in the extreme to believe that 
the good intentions of the dictators would have been enough 
to keep the regime within some kind of limits. Thus this 
argument is flawed as it seriously suggests that dictatorship 
and bureaucracy can reform itself (we discuss this in more 
detail in section H.7.13).

H.7.12 Was the country too exhausted to allow soviet democracy?

Trotskyists have, in general, two main lines of attack with
regards the Kronstadt revolt. The main one is the claim that
the garrison in 1921 was not of the same class composition
as the one in 1917. This meant that the 1921 revolt expressed
the peasant counter-revolution and had to be destroyed. We
have indicated that, firstly, the garrison was essentially
the same in 1921 as it had been in 1917 (see section H.7.8).
Secondly, we have shown that politically the ideas expressed
in its program were the same as those in 1917 (see section
H.7.9). Thirdly, that this program had many of the same points
as strikers resolutions in Petrograd and, indeed, were
*more* socialist in many cases by clearly calling for soviet 
democracy rather the constituent assembly (see section H.7.4).

Now we turn to the second excuse, namely that the country was 
too exhausted and the working class was decimated. In such
circumstances, it is argued, objective conditions meant that 
soviet democracy was impossible and so the Bolsheviks had
to maintain their dictatorship at all costs to defend what
was left of the revolution. Leninist Pat Stack of the
British SWP is typical of this approach. It is worth
quoting him at length:

"Because anarchists dismiss the importance of material 
reality, events such as the 1921 Kronstadt rising against 
the Bolshevik government in Russia can become a rallying 
cry. The revolutionary Victor Serge was not uncritical 
of the Bolshevik handling of the rising, but he poured 
scorn on anarchist claims for it when he wrote, 'The 
third revolution it was called by certain anarchists 
whose heads were stuffed by infantile delusions.'

"This third revolution, it was argued, would follow the
first one in February 1917 and the second in October. 
The second had swept away the attempts to create 
capitalist power, had given land to the peasants 
and had extracted Russia from the horrible imperialist 
carnage of the First World War. The revolution had 
introduced a huge literacy programme, granted women 
abortion rights, introduced divorce and accepted the 
rights of the various Russian republics to self 
determination. It had done so, however, against a 
background of a bloody and horrendous civil war 
where the old order tried to regain power. Sixteen 
imperialist powers sent armies against the regime, 
and trade embargoes were enforced.

"The reality of such actions caused huge suffering throughout 
Russia. The regime was deprived of raw materials and fuel, 
transportation networks were destroyed, and the cities began 
running out of food. By 1919 the regime only had 10 percent 
of the fuel that was available in 1917, and the production 
of iron ore in the same year stood at 1.6 percent of that 
in 1914. By 1921 Petrograd had lost 57 percent of its 
population and Moscow 44.5 percent. Workers were either 
dead, on the frontline of the civil war, or were fleeing 
the starvation of the city. The force that had made the 
revolution possible was being decimated. . . 

"The choice facing the regime in Russia was either to crush 
the uprising and save the revolution, or surrender to the 
rising and allow the forces of reaction to march in on their 
back. There was no material basis for a third way. A destroyed 
economy and infrastructure, a population faced with starvation 
and bloody war, and a hostile outside world were not circumstances 
in which the revolution could move forward. Great efforts would 
have to be made to solve these problems. There were no overnight 
solutions and preserving the revolutionary regime was crucial. 
Ultimately real solutions could only be found if the revolution 
were to spread internationally, but in the meantime to have 
any chance of success the regime had to survive. Only the right 
and the imperialist powers would have benefited from its 
destruction." ["Anarchy in the UK?", _Socialist Review_,
no. 246, November 2000]

Anarchists, in spite of Stack's assertions, were and are well 
aware of the problems facing the revolution. Alexander Berkman 
(who was in Petrograd at the time) pointed out the "[l]ong 
years of war, revolution, and civil struggle" which "had bled 
Russia to exhaustion and brought her people to the brink of 
despair." [_The Russian Tragedy_, p. 61] Like every worker, 
peasant, sailor and soldier in Russia, anarchists knew 
(and know) that reconstruction would not take place 
"overnight." The Kronstadters' recognised this in the 
first issue of their newspaper _Isvestia_:

"Comrades and citizens, our country is passing through
a tough time. For three years now, famine, cold and
economic chaos have trapped us in a vice-like grip. The
Communist Party which governs the country has drifted
away from the masses and proved itself powerless to
rescue them from a state of general ruination . . .
All workers, sailors and Red soldiers today can clearly
see that only concentrated efforts, only the concentrated
determination of the people can afford the country
bread, wood and coal, can clothe and shoe the people
and rescue the Republic from the impasse in which it
finds itself." [cited in _No Gods, No Masters_, vol. 2,
p. 183]

In the Kronstadt *Izvestiia* of March 8 they wrote that
it was "here in Kronstadt that the foundation stone was 
laid of the Third Revolution that will smash the last 
shackles on the toiler and open up before him the broad new
avenue to socialist construction." They stress that the 
"new revolution will rouse the toiling masses of the Orient 
and Occident. For it will offer the example of fresh socialist 
construction as opposed to mechanical, governmental 'Communist'
construction." [Op. Cit., p. 194] Clearly, the Kronstadt
rebels knew that construction would take time and were
arguing that the only means of rebuilding the country was
via the participation of what of left of the working class
and peasantry in free class organisations like freely
elected soviets and unions.

The experience of the revolt provides evidence that
this analysis was far from "utopian." A Finish 
reporter at Kronstadt was struck by the "enthusiasm" 
of its inhabitants, by their renewed sense of purpose 
and mission. Avrich argues that for a "fleeting interval 
Kronstadt was shaken out if its listlessness and despair." 
[_Kronstadt_, p. 159] The sailors, soldiers and civilians 
sent their delegates to delegates, started to re-organise 
their trade unions and so on. Freedom and soviet democracy
was allowing the masses to start to rebuild their
society and they took the opportunity. The Kronstadter's
faith in "direct mass democracy of and by the common 
people through free soviets" did seem to be justified 
in the response of the people of Kronstadt. This suggests 
that a similar policy implemented by the workers who had 
just organised general strikes, demonstrations and protest 
meetings all across Russia's industrial centres was not
impossible or doomed to failure. 

Indeed, this wave of strikes refutes Stack's claim that 
"[w]orkers were either dead, on the frontline of the civil 
war, or were fleeing the starvation of the city. The force 
that had made the revolution possible was being decimated." 
Clearly, a sizeable percentage of the workers were still 
working and so not dead, on the frontline or fleeing the 
cities. As we discuss below, approximately one-third of 
factory workers were still in Petrograd (the overall
decrease of urban working people throughout Russia exceeded
50 percent [Avrich, Op. Cit., p. 24]). The working class,
in other words, still existed and were able to organise
strikes, meetings and mass demonstrations in the face of
state repression. The fact, of course, is that the majority 
of what remained of the working class would not have voted 
Communist in free soviet elections. Thus political 
considerations have to be factored in when evaluating 
Stack's arguments. 

The question for anarchists, as for the Kronstadt rebels,
was what the necessary pre-conditions for this reconstruction
were. Could Russia be re-built in a socialist way while
being subject to a dictatorship which crushed every sign
of working class protest and collective action? Surely
the first step, as Kronstadt shows, would have to be the 
re-introduction of workers' democracy and power for only 
this would give allow expression to the creative powers
of the masses and interest them in the reconstruction of
the country. Continuing party dictatorship would never 
do thus:

"by its very essence a dictatorship destroys the creative 
capacities of a people. . . The revolutionary conquest could 
only be deepened through a genuine participation of the masses. 
Any attempt to substitute an 'elite' for those masses could 
only be profoundly reactionary.

"In 1921 the Russian Revolution stood at the cross roads. 
The democratic or the dictatorial way, that was the question. 
By lumping together bourgeois and proletarian democracy the 
Bolsheviks were in fact condemning both. They sought to 
build socialism from above, through skilful manoeuvres of 
the Revolutionary General Staff. While waiting for a world 
revolution that was not round the corner, they built a state 
capitalist society, where the working class no longer had 
the right to make the decisions most intimately concerning 
it." [Mett, Op. Cit., pp. 82-3]

The Russian revolution had faced economic crisis all through 1917
and 1918. Indeed, by the spring of 1918 Russia was living through
an almost total economic collapse, with a general scarcity of
all resources and mass unemployment. According to Tony Cliff
(the leader of the SWP) in the spring of 1918 Russia's 
"[w]ar-damaged industry continued to run down. 'The bony hand 
of hunger' . . . gripped the whole population . . . One of the
causes of the famine was the breakdown of transport. . . 
Industry was in a state of complete collapse. Not only was
there no food to feed the factory workers; there was no
raw materials or fuel for industry. The oilfields of the
Baku, Grozny and Emba regions came to a standstill. The
situation was the same in the coalfields. The production
of raw materials was in no better a state . . . The collapse
of industry meant unemployment for the workers." [_Lenin:
The Revolution Besieged_, vol. 3, pp. 67-9] The industrial workforce
dropped to 40% of its 1917 levels. The similarities to Stack's
description of the situation in early 1921 is striking.

Does this mean that, for Leninists, soviet democracy was impossible 
in early 1918 (of course, the Bolsheviks *in practice* were making 
soviet democracy impossible by suppressing soviets that elected the 
wrong people)? After all, in the start of 1918 the Russian
Revolution also faced a "destroyed economy and infrastructure, a 
population faced with starvation and bloody war, and a hostile 
outside world." If these "were not circumstances in which the 
revolution could move forward" then it also applied in 1918 
as well as in 1921. And, if so, then this means admitting that 
soviet democracy is impossible during a revolution, marked as it 
will always be marked by exceptionally difficult circumstances. 
Which, of course, means to defend party power and not soviet
power and promote the dictatorship of the party over the
working class, positions Leninists deny holding.

Incredibly, Stack fails to even mention the power and privileges
of the bureaucracy at the time. Officials got the best food,
housing and so on. The lack of effective control or influence
from below ensured that corruption was widespread. One of the 
leaders of the Workers' Opposition gives us an insight of the
situation which existed at the start of 1921:

"The rank and file worker is observant. He sees that so far
. . . the betterment of the workers' lot has occupied the
last place in our policy . . . We all know that the housing
problem cannot be solved in a few months, even years, and
that due to our poverty, its solution is faced with serious
difficulties. But the facts of ever-growing inequality between
the privileged groups of the population in Soviet Russia
and the rank and file workers, 'the frame-work of the
dictatorship', breed and nourish the dissatisfaction.

"The rank and file worker sees how the Soviet official
and the practical man lives and how he lives . . . 
[It will be objected that] 'We could not attend to that;
pray, there was the military front.' And yet whenever
it was necessary to make repairs to any of the houses
occupied by the Soviet institutions, they were able
to find both the materials and the labour." [Alexandra 
Kollontai, _The Workers' Opposition_, p. 10]

A few months earlier, the Communist Yoffe wrote to Trotsky
expressing the same concerns. "There is enormous inequality,"
he wrote, "and one's material position largely depends on
one's post in the party; you'll agree that this is a 
dangerous situation." [quoted by Orlando Figes, _A People's
Tragedy_, p. 695] To talk about anarchists dismiss the
importance of material reality and a "revolutionary regime" 
while ignoring the inequalities in power and wealth, and 
the bureaucratisation and despotism which were their root, 
is definitely a case of the pot calling the kettle black!

Under the harsh material conditions facing Russia at the time,
it goes without saying that the bureaucracy would utilise its
position to gather the best resources around it. Indeed, part
of the factors resulting in Kronstadt was "the privileges 
and abuses of commissars, senior party functionaries and
trade union officials who received special rations, 
allocations and housing and . . . quite openly enjoying
the good life." [Getzler, Op. Cit., p. 210] Stack fails 
to mention this and instead talks about the necessity of
defending a "workers' state" in which workers had no power
and where bureaucratic abuses were rampant. If anyone is denying
reality, it is him! Thus Ciliga:

"The Soviet Government and the higher circles in the Communist 
Party applied their own solution [to the problems facing the
revolution] of *increasing the power of the bureaucracy*. The
attribution of powers to the 'Executive Committees' which had 
hitherto been vested in the soviets, the replacement of the 
dictatorship of the class by the dictatorship of the party, 
the shift of authority even within the party from its members 
to its cadres, the replacement of the double power of the
bureaucracy and the workers in the factory by the sole power 
of the former - to do all this was to 'save the Revolution!' 
[. . .] The Bureaucracy prevented the bourgeois restoration 
. . . by eliminating the proletarian character of the 
revolution." [Op. Cit., p. 331]

Perhaps, in light of this, it is significant that, in his list of 
revolutionary gains from October 1917, Stack fails to mention what
anarchists would consider the most important, namely workers'
power, freedom, democracy and rights. But, then again, the 
Bolsheviks did not rate these gains highly either and were more 
than willing to sacrifice them to ensure their most important gain, 
state power (see section H.7.15 for a fuller discussion of this issue). 
Again, the image of revolution gains a victory over its content!

When Stack argues that it was necessary to crush Kronstadt to "save 
the revolution" and "preserv[e] the revolutionary regime" we feel 
entitled to ask what was there left to save and preserve? The
dictatorship and decrees of "Communist" leaders? In other words,
party power. Yes, by suppressing Kronstadt Lenin and Trotsky
saved the revolution, saved it for Stalin. Hardly something to
be proud of.

Ironically, given Stack's assertions that anarchists 
ignore "material reality", anarchists had predicted 
that a revolution would be marked by economic disruption. 
Kropotkin, for example, argued that it was "certain that 
the coming Revolution . . . will burst upon us in the 
middle of a great industrial crisis . . . There are 
millions of unemployed workers in Europe at this moment. 
It will be worse when Revolution has burst upon us . . . 
The number of the out-of-works will be doubled as soon 
as barricades are erected in Europe and the United 
States . . . we know that in time of Revolution exchange 
and industry suffer most from the general upheaval . . . 
A Revolution in Europe means, then, the unavoidable 
stoppage of at least half the factories and workshops." 
He stressed that there would be "the complete 
disorganisation" of the capitalist economy and that 
during a revolution "[i]nternational commerce will come 
to a standstill" and "the circulation of commodities and 
of provisions will be paralysed." [_The Conquest of Bread_, 
pp. 69-70 and p. 191]

Elsewhere, he argued that a revolution would "mean the 
stoppage of hundreds of manufactures and workshops, and 
the impossibility of reopening them. Thousands of workmen 
will find no employment . . . The present want of employment 
and misery will be increased tenfold." He stressed that "the 
reconstruction of Society in accordance with more equitable 
principles *will* necessitate a disturbed period" and argued 
that any revolution will be isolated to begin with and so 
(with regards to the UK) "the imports of foreign corn will 
decrease" as will the "exports of manufactured wares." A 
revolution, he argued, "is not the work of one day. It 
means a whole period, mostly lasting for several years, 
during which the country is in a state of effervescence." 
To overcome these problems he stressed the importance 
of reconstruction from the bottom up, organised directly 
by working people, with local action being the basis 
of wider reconstruction. The "immense problem -- the 
re-organisation of production, redistribution of wealth
and exchange, according to new principles -- cannot be
solved by . . . any kind of government. It must be a natural
growth resulting from the combined efforts of all interested
in it, freed from the bonds of the present institutions. It
must grow naturally, proceeding from the simplest up to 
complex federations; and it cannot be something schemed by
a few men and ordered from above. In this last shape it
surely would have no chance of living at all." [_Act for 
Yourselves_, pp. 71-2, p. 67, pp, 72-3, pp. 25-6 and p. 26]

Anarchists had predicted the problems facing the Russian
Revolution decades previously and, given the lack of success
of Bolshevik attempts to solve these problems via centralism,
had also predicted the only way to solve them. Far from
ignoring "material reality" it is clear that anarchists 
have long been aware of the difficulties a revolution
would face and had organised our politics around them. In
contrast, Stack is arguing that these inevitable effects 
of a revolution create "circumstances" in which the revolution 
cannot "move forward"! If this is so, then revolution is 
an impossibility as it will always face economic disruption
and isolation at some stage in its development, for a longer
or shorter period. If we base our politics on the "best-case
scenario" then they will soon be proven to be lacking.

Ultimately, Stack's arguments (and those like it) are the ones 
which ignore "material reality" by arguing that Lenin's state 
was a "revolutionary regime" and reconstruction could be anything 
but to the advantage of the bureaucracy without the active 
participation of what was left of the working class. Indeed,
the logic of his argument would mean rejecting the idea of
socialist revolution *as such* as the problems he lists will
affect *every* revolution and had affected the Russian 
Revolution from the start. 

The problems facing the Russian working class were difficult 
in the extreme in 1921 (some of which, incidentally, were due 
to the 
results of Bolshevik economic policies which compounded 
economic chaos via centralisation), but they could never be
solved by someone else bar the thousands of workers taking
strike action all across Russia at the time: "And if the 
proletariat was that exhausted how come it was still capable 
of waging virtually total general strikes in the largest and 
most heavily industrialised cities?" [Ida Mett, Op. Cit.,
p. 81]

So, as far as "material reality" goes, it is clear that it is
Stack who ignores it, not anarchists or the Kronstadt rebels.
Both anarchists and Kronstadters recognised that the country 
was in dire straits and that a huge effort was required for 
reconstruction. The material basis at the time offered two 
possibilities for reconstruction -- either from above or from
below. Such a reconstruction could *only* be socialist in 
nature if it involved the direct participation of the working 
masses in determining what was needed and how to do it. In 
other words, the process had to start *from below* and no 
central committee utilising a fraction of the creative 
powers of the country could achieve it. Such a bureaucratic, 
top-down re-construction would rebuild the society in a way 
which benefited a few. Which, of course, was what happened.

John Rees joins his fellow party member by arguing that the 
working class base of the workers' state had  "disintegrated" 
by 1921. The working class was reduced "to an atomised, 
individualised mass, a fraction of its former size, and 
no longer able to exercise the collective power that it 
had done in 1917." The "bureaucracy of the workers' state 
was left suspended in mid-air, its class base eroded and 
demoralised." He argues that Kronstadt was "utopian" as "they 
looked back to the institutions of 1917 when the class which 
made such institutions possible no longer had the collective 
capacity to direct political life." [Rees, Op. Cit., p. 65 and 
p. 70]

There are two problems with this kind of argument. Firstly, 
there are factual problems with it. Second, there are 
ideological problems with it. We will discuss each in 
turn.

The factual problems are clear. All across Russia in
February 1921 the Russian working class were going on
strike, organising meetings and demonstrations. In 
other words, *taking collective action* based on 
demands collectively agreed in workplace meetings.
One factory would send delegates to others, urging
them to join the movement which soon became a general
strike in Petrograd and Moscow. In Kronstadt, workers,
soldiers and sailors went the next step and organised
a delegate conference. In other places they tried to
do so, with various degrees of success. During the
strikes in Petrograd "workers from various plants
elected delegates to the Petrograd Assembly of
Plenipotentiaries" which raised similar demands as
that of Kronstadt. Its activities and other attempts
to organise collectively were obviously hindered by 
the fact the Cheka arrested "all delegates to other
enterprises" the strikers sent. Brovkin states that
following the example of Petrograd, "workers in some
cities set up assemblies of plenipotentiaries" as
well. In Saratov "such a council grew out of a strike 
co-ordination committee." [V. Brovkin, _Behind the 
Lines of the Russian Civil War_, p. 393, p. 396 and 
p. 398]

Any claim that the Russian working class had no capacity 
for collective action seems invalidated by such events. Not 
that Rees is not unaware of these strikes. He notes that 
the Kronstadt revolt was "preceded by a wave of serious
but quickly resolved strikes." [Op. Cit., p. 61] An 
"atomised, individualised mass" which was "no longer 
able to exercise the collective power" being able to 
conduct a "wave of serious . . . strikes" all across 
Russia? That hardly fits. Nor does he mention the
repression which "quickly resolved" the strikes and
which, by its very nature, atomised and individualised
the masses in order to break the collective action being
practised.

The fact that these strikes did not last longer of course
suggests that the strikers could not sustain this activity
indefinitely. However, this was more a product of state
repression and the lack of rations while on strike than
any objectively predetermined impossibility of collective
decision making. The workers may have been too exhausted
to wage indefinite general strikes against a repressive
state but that does not imply they could not practice
continual collective decision making in less extreme
circumstances in a soviet democracy.

Of course, these striking workers would have been 
unlikely to voted Communist en mass if free soviet
elections were organised (in Kronstadt, Communists 
made up one-third of the conference of delegates).
Thus there were pressing *political* reasons to 
deny free elections rather than an objective
impossibility. Moreover, the actions of the 
Soviet state were designed to break the collective
resistance of the working force. The use of armed
patrols on the streets and in the factories, and
the closing and re-registration of an enterprise
labour force were designed to break the strike
and atomise the workforce. These actions would not
have been needed if the Russian working class was,
in fact, atomised and incapable of collective 
action and decision making.

The size of the working class in 1921 *was* smaller in
1921 than it was in 1917. However, the figures for 
May 1918 and 1920 were nearly identical. In 1920,
the number of factory workers in Petrograd was 148,289 
(which was 34% of the population and 36% of the number
of workers in 1910). [Mary McAuley, Op. Cit., p. 398] 
In January 1917, the number was 351,010 and in April 
1918, it was 148,710. [S.A. Smith, _Red Petrograd_, 
p. 245] Thus factory worker numbers were about 40% of 
the pre-Civil War number and remained so throughout 
the Civil War. A proletarian core remained in every 
industrial town or city in Russia. 

Nor was this work force incapable of collective action 
or decision making. All through the civil war they organised
strikes and protests for specific demands (and faced
Bolshevik repression for so doing). In March 1919,
for example, tens of thousands of workers went on strike
in Petrograd. The strikes were broken by troops. Strikes 
regularly occurred throughout 1919 and 1920 (and, again, 
usually met with state repression). In 1921, the strike 
wave resurfaced and became near general strikes in many 
cities, including Petrograd and Moscow (see section H.7.2). 
If the workers could organise strikes (and near general 
strikes in 1921), protest meetings and committees to 
co-ordinate their struggles, what could stop them starting 
to manage their own destinies? Does soviet democracy become 
invalid once a certain number of workers is reached?

Given that Rees gets the key slogan of Kronstadt wrong
(they called for all power to the soviets and not to
parties rather than Rees' "soviets without parties")
it is hard to evaluate whether Rees claims that without 
Bolshevik dictatorship the Whites would inevitably have 
taken power. After all, the Kronstadt delegate meeting had 
one-third Communists in it. Ultimately, he is arguing
that working people cannot manage their own fates themselves
without it resulting in a counter-revolution!

In addition, the logic of Rees' argument smacks of
double-think. On the one hand, he argues that the
Bolsheviks represented the "dictatorship of the
proletariat." On the other hand, he argues that
free soviet elections would have seen the Bolsheviks
replaced by "moderate socialists" (and eventually
the Whites). In other words, the Bolsheviks did not,
in fact, represent the Russian working class and
their dictatorship was *over*, not *of*, the 
proletariat. The basic assumption, therefore, is
flawed. Rees and his fellow Trotskyists seriously
want us to believe that a dictatorship will not
become corrupt and bureaucratic, that it can 
govern in the interests of its subjects and, moreover, 
reform itself. And he calls the Kronstadters "utopians"!

Given these factors, perhaps the real reason for the lack 
of soviet democracy and political freedom and rights was 
that the Bolsheviks knew they would lose any free elections 
that would be held? As we noted in section H.7.2, they had 
not been shy in disbanding soviets with non-Bolshevik majorities
before the start of the civil war nor in suppressing strikes
and workers' protests before, during and after the Civil War. 
In effect, the Bolsheviks would exercise the dictatorship of 
the proletariat over and above the wishes of that proletariat 
if need be (as Trotsky made clear in 1921 at the Tenth Party 
Congress). Thus the major factor restricting soviet democracy
was Bolshevik power -- this repressed working class collective
action which promoted atomisation in the working class and 
the unaccountability of the Bolshevik leadership. The 
bureaucracy was "left suspended in mid-air" simply because
the majority of the workers and peasants did not support
it and when they protested against the party dictatorship
they were repressed. 

Simply put, objective factors do not tell the whole story.

Now we turn to these objective factors, the economic breakdown
affecting Russia in 1921. This is the basis for the ideological 
problem with Rees' argument.

The ideological problem with this argument is that both Lenin 
and Trotsky had argued that revolution inevitably implied 
civil war, "exceptional circumstances" and economic crisis.
For example, in _Terrorism and Communism_ Trotsky argued
that "[a]ll periods of transition  have been characterised 
by . . . tragic features" of an "economic depression" such
as exhaustion, poverty and hunger. Every class society "is 
violently swept off [the arena] by an intense struggle, 
which immediately brings to its participants even greater 
privations and sufferings than those against which they rose."
He gave the example of the French Revolution "which attained 
its titanic dimensions under the pressure of the masses 
exhausted with suffering, itself deepened and rendered more 
acute their misfortunes for a prolonged period and to an 
extraordinary extent." He asked: "Can it be otherwise?" 
[_Terrorism and Communism_, p. 7]

Indeed, he stressed that "revolutions which drag into their 
whirlpool millions of workers" automatically affect the 
"economic life of the country." By "[d]ragging the mass of 
the people away from labour, drawing them for a prolonged 
period into the struggle, thereby destroying their connection 
with production, the revolution in all these ways strikes 
deadly blows at economic life, and inevitably lowers 
the standard which it found at its birth." This affects
the socialist revolution as the "more perfect the 
revolution, the greater are the masses it draws in; 
and the longer it is prolonged, the greater is the destruction 
it achieves in the apparatus of production, and the more 
terrible inroads does it make upon public resources. From 
this there follows merely the conclusion which did not 
require proof -- that a civil war is harmful to economic 
life." [Ibid.]

Lenin in 1917 argued the similarly, mocking those who
argued that revolution was out of the question because
"the circumstances are exceptionally complicated." He
noting that any revolution, "in its development, would give 
rise to exceptionally complicated circumstances" and that 
it was "the sharpest, most furious, desperate class war 
and civil war. Not a single great revolution in history 
has escaped civil war. No one who does not live in a shell 
could imagine that civil war is conceivable without 
exceptionally complicated circumstances. If there were
no exceptionally complicated circumstances there would
be no revolution." [_Will the Bolsheviks Maintain Power?_, 
p. 80 and p. 81]

A few months early, Lenin argues that "[w]hen unavoidable
disaster is approaching, the most useful and indispensable
task confronting the people is that of organisation. Marvels
of proletarian organisation -- this is our slogan at the
present, and shall become our slogan and our demand to an
even greater extent, when the proletariat is in power. . .
There are many such talents [i.e. organisers] among the
people. These forces lie dormant in the peasantry and the
proletariat, for lack of application. They must be mobilised
from below, by practical work . . ." [_The Threatening
Catastrophe and how to avoid it_, pp. 49-50]

The problem in 1921 (as during the war), of course, was that 
when the proletariat *did* organise itself, it was repressed 
as counterrevolutionary by the Bolsheviks. The reconstruction 
from below, the organisation of the proletariat, automatically 
came into conflict with party power. The workers and peasants 
could not act because soviet and trade union democracy would
have ended Bolshevik dictatorship.

Therefore, Rees' and Stack's arguments fail to convince. As 
noted, their ideological gurus clearly argued that revolution
without civil war and economic exhaustion was impossible.
Sadly, the means to mitigate the problems of Civil War and 
economic crisis (namely workers' self-management and power) 
inevitably came into conflict with party power and could not 
be encouraged. If Bolshevism cannot meet the inevitable problems 
of revolution and maintain the principles it pays lip-service 
to (i.e. soviet democracy and workers' power) then it clearly 
does not work and should be avoided.

Stack's and Rees' argument, in other words, represents the bankruptcy 
of Bolshevik ideology rather than a serious argument against the 
Kronstadt revolt.


H.7.13 Was there a real alternative to Kronstadt's "third 
	 revolution"?

Another Trotskyist argument against Kronstadt and in favour 
of the Bolshevik repression is related to the country was 
exhausted argument we discussed in the last section. It 
finds its clearest expression in Victor Serge's argument:

"the country was exhausted, and production practically
at a standstill; there was no reserves of any kind, not
even reserves of stamina in the hearts of the masses. The
working-class *elite* that had been moulded in the struggle
against the old regime was literally decimated. The Party,
swollen by the influx of power-seekers, inspired little
confidence . . .  Soviet democracy lacked leadership,
institutions and inspiration . . . 

"The popular counter-revolution translated the demand for
freely-elected soviets into one for 'Soviets without
Communists.' If the Bolshevik dictatorship fell, it was 
only a short step to chaos, and through chaos to a peasant 
rising, the massacre of the Communists, the return 
of the emigres, and in the end, through the sheer force of 
events, another dictatorship, this time anti-proletarian."
[_Memoirs of a Revolutionary_, pp. 128-9]

Serge supported the Bolsheviks, considering them as the
only possible means of defending the revolution. Some 
modern day Leninists follow this line of reasoning
and want us to believe that the Bolsheviks were defending 
the remaining gains of the revolution. What gains, exactly?
The only gains that remained were Bolshevik power and
nationalised industry -- both of which excluded the
real gains of the Russian Revolution (namely soviet
power, the right to independent unions and to strike, 
freedom of assembly, association and speech for working 
people, the beginnings of workers' self-management of 
production and so on). Indeed, both "gains" were the
basis for the Stalinist bureaucracy's power. 


Anarchists and libertarian Marxists who defend the Kronstadt
revolt and oppose the actions of the Bolsheviks are not foolish
enough to argue that Kronstadt's "third revolution" would have 
definitely succeeded. Every revolution is a gamble and may fail. 
As Ante Ciliga correctly argues:

"Let us consider, finally, one last accusation which is 
commonly circulated: that action such as that at Kronstadt 
could have *indirectly* let loose the forces of the 
counter-revolution. It is *possible* indeed that even 
by placing itself on a footing of workers' democracy 
the revolution might have been overthrown; but what 
is *certain* is that it has perished, and that it has
perished on account of the policy of its leaders. The 
repression of Kronstadt, the suppression of the democracy 
of workers and soviets by the Russian Communist party, 
the elimination of the proletariat from the management 
of industry, and the introduction of the NEP, already 
signified the death of the Revolution." [Op. Cit., p. 335]

No revolution is guaranteed to succeed. The same with Kronstadt's 
"Third Revolution." Its call for soviet power may have lead to
defeat via renewed intervention. That is possible -- just as it
was possible in 1917. One thing is sure, by maintaining the
Bolshevik dictatorship the Russian Revolution *was* crushed. 

The only alternative to the "third revolution" would have 
been self-reform of the party dictatorship and, therefore, 
of the soviet state. Such an attempt was made after 1923 by 
the _Left Opposition_ (named "Trotskyist" by the Stalinists 
because Trotsky was its main leader). John Rees discusses 
the _Left Opposition_, arguing that "without a revival of 
struggle in Russia or successful revolution elsewhere" it 
"was doomed to failure." [Op. Cit., p. 68] Given the logic 
of Serge's arguments, this is the only option left for
Leninists. 

How viable was this alternative? Could the soviet dictatorship 
reform itself? Was soviet democracy more of a danger than the 
uncontrolled dictatorship of a party within a state marked by 
already serious levels of corruption, bureaucracy and despotism? 
History provides the answer with the rise of Stalin.

Unfortunately for the _Left Opposition_, the bureaucracy had 
gained experience in repressing struggle in breaking the wave 
of strikes in 1921 and crushing the Kronstadt rebellion. Indeed, 
Rees incredulously notes that by 1923 "the well-head of renewal 
and thorough reform -- the activity of the workers -- had dried 
to a trickle" and yet does not see that this decline was aided 
by the example of what had happened to Kronstadt and the repression 
of the 1921 strike wave. The _Left Opposition_ received the 
crop that Lenin and Trotsky sowed the seeds of in 1921. 

Ironically, Rees argues that the Stalinist bureaucracy could 
betray the revolution without "an armed counter-revolutionary
seizure of power" (and so "no martial law, no curfew or street 
battles") because of "the atomisation of the working class." 
However, the atomisation was a product of the armed 
counter-revolutionary activities of Lenin and Trotsky in 
1921 when they broke the strikes and crushed Kronstadt
by means of martial law, curfew and street battles. The 
workers had no interest in which branch of the bureaucracy 
would govern and exploit them and so remained passive. Rees 
fails to see that the Stalinist coup simply built upon the 
initial counter-revolution of Lenin. There *was* martial
law, curfew and street battles but they occurred in 1921,
not 1928. The rise of Stalinism was the victory of one
side of the new bureaucratic class over another but that
class had defeated the working class in March 1921.

As for the idea that an external revolution could have
regenerated the Soviet bureaucracy, this too was 
fundamentally utopian. In the words of Ida Mett:

"Some claim that the Bolsheviks allowed themselves such 
actions (as the suppression of Kronstadt) in the hope of 
a forthcoming world revolution, of which they considered 
themselves the vanguard. But would not a revolution in 
another country have been influenced by the spirit of 
the Russian Revolution? When one considers the enormous 
moral authority of the Russian Revolution throughout the 
world one may ask oneself whether the deviations of this 
Revolution would not eventually have left an imprint on 
other countries. Many historical facts allow such a 
judgement. One may recognise the impossibility of genuine 
socialist construction in a single country, yet have doubts 
as to whether the bureaucratic deformations of the Bolshevik 
regime would have been straightened out by the winds coming 
from revolutions in other countries." [Op. Cit., p. 82]

The Bolsheviks had already been manipulating foreign Communist
Parties in the interests of their state for a number of years.
That is part of the reason why the Left-Communists around 
Pannekoek and Gorter broke with the Third International
later in 1921. Just as the influence of Lenin had been a key
factor in fighting the anti-Parliamentarian and libertarian
communist tendencies in Communist Parties all across the
world, so the example and influence of the Bolsheviks would
have made its impact on any foreign revolution. The successful
revolutionaries would have applied such "lessons" of October
such as the dictatorship of the proletariat being impossible
without the dictatorship of the communist party, centralism, 
militarisation of labour and so on. This would have distorted
any revolution from the start (given how obediently the 
Communist Parties around the world followed the insane
policies of Stalinism, can we doubt this conclusion?).

Not that the Left Opposition's political platform could have
saved the revolution. After all, it was utopian in that it 
urged the party and state bureaucracy to reform itself as
well as contradictory. It did not get at the root of the 
problem, namely Bolshevik ideology. The theoretical 
limitations of the "Left Opposition" can be found in more
detail in section H.10.3. Here we will restrict ourselves to
looking at _The Platform of the Opposition_ written in 1927 
(unless otherwise specified all quotes come from this document).

It urged a "consistent development of a workers' democracy in 
the party, the trade unions, and the soviets" and to "convert the 
urban soviets into real institutions of proletarian power." It
states that "Lenin, as long ago as in the revolution of 1905, 
advanced the slogan of soviets as organs of the democratic 
dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasants." The Kronstadt
sailors argued the same, of course, and were branded "White
Guardists" and "counter-revolutionary". At the same time as this
call for democracy, we find affirmation of the "Leninist principle" 
("inviolable for every Bolshevik") that "the dictatorship of the 
proletariat is and can be realised only through the dictatorship 
of the party." It repeats the principle by mentioning that "the
dictatorship of the proletariat demands a single and united 
proletarian party as the leader of the working masses and the 
poor peasantry." It stresses that a "split in our party, the 
formation of two parties, would represent an enormous danger 
to the revolution." This was because:

"Nobody who sincerely defends the line of Lenin can entertain 
the idea of 'two parties' or play with the suggestion of a split. 
Only those who desire to replace Lenin's course with some other 
can advocate a split or a movement along the two-party road.
 
"We will fight with all our power against the idea of two parties, 
because the dictatorship of the proletariat demands as its very core 
a single proletarian party. It demands a single party. It demands 
a proletarian party -- that is, a party whose policy is determined 
by the interests of the proletariat and carried out by a proletarian 
nucleus. Correction of the line of our party, improvement of its 
social composition -- that is not the two-party road, but the 
strengthening and guaranteeing of its unity as a revolutionary 
party of the proletariat."

We can note, in passing, the interesting notion of party (and
so "proletarian" state) policy "determined by the interests of 
the proletariat and carried out by a proletarian nucleus" but 
which is *not* determined *by* the proletariat itself. Which
means that the policy of the "workers' state" must be determined 
by some other (unspecified) group and not by the workers. What 
possibility can exist that this other group actually knows
what is in the interests of the proletariat? None, of course,
as any form of democratic decision can be ignored when those
who determine the policy consider the protests of the proletariat
to be not "in the interests of the proletariat." 

This was the opinion of Trotsky, who argued against the 
Workers' Opposition faction of the Communist Party who urged 
re-introducing some elements of democracy at the Tenth
Party Conference at the time of the Kronstadt uprising (while,
of course, keeping the Communist Party dictatorship intact). 
As he put it, they "have come out with dangerous slogans. 
They have made a fetish of democratic principles. They have
placed the workers' right to elect representatives above 
the party. As if the Party were not entitled to assert its 
dictatorship even if that dictatorship clashed with the 
passing moods of the workers' democracy!" He continued 
by stating that the "Party is obliged to maintain its 
dictatorship . . . regardless of temporary vacillations 
even in the working class . . . The dictatorship does not 
base itself at every moment on the formal principle of a 
workers' democracy." [quoted by M. Brinton, _The Bolsheviks 
and Workers' Control_, p. 78]
 
Thus the call for democracy is totally annulled by other 
arguments in the Platform, arguments which logically 
eliminates democracy and results in such acts as the 
repression of Kronstadt (see section H.7.15). 

The question, of course, arises as to how democracy can
be introduced in the soviets and unions when party 
dictatorship is essential for the "realisation" of the 
"proletarian" dictatorship and there can only be *one* 
party? What happens if the proletariat vote for someone 
else (as they did in Kronstadt)? If "proletarian"
dictatorship is impossible without the dictatorship of the
party then, clearly, proletarian democracy becomes meaningless.
All the workers would be allowed to do would be to vote for
members of the same party, all of whom would be bound by
party discipline to carry out the orders of the party
leadership. Power would rest in the party hierarchy and
definitively *not* in the working class, its unions or
its soviets (both of which would remain mere fig-leafs
for party rule). Ultimately, the only guarantee that the 
party dictatorship would govern in the interests of the 
proletariat would be the good intentions of the party. 
However, being unaccountable to the masses, such a 
guarantee would be worthless -- as history shows.

Kronstadt is the obvious end result of such politics. The
starting point was the disbanding of soviets which had
been elected with a majority of "wrong" parties (as the
Bolsheviks did in early 1918, *before* the start of the 
civil war). While the Platform may be useful as an 
expression of the usual Leninist double-think on the 
"workers' state", its practical suggestions are useless. 
Unlike the Kronstadt Platform, it was doomed to failure 
from the start. The new bureaucratic class could only be 
removed by a "third revolution" and while this, possibly, 
could have resulted in a bourgeois counter-revolution the 
alternative of maintaining Bolshevik dictatorship would 
*inevitably* have resulted in Stalinism. When supporters 
of Bolshevism argue that Kronstadt would have opened the 
gate to counter-revolution, they do not understand that 
the Bolsheviks *were* the counter-revolution in 1921 and
that by suppressing Kronstadt the Bolsheviks not only
opened the gate to Stalinism but invited it in and gave
it the keys to the house.

The Platform, moreover, smacks of the re-writing of history
Trotsky correctly accused Stalinism of. 

It argues, for example, that the urban soviets "in recent 
years have been losing importance. This undoubtedly reflects 
a shift in the relation of class forces to the disadvantage 
of the proletariat." In fact, the soviets had lost their 
importance since the October revolution (see section H.7.2 
for details). The "shift" in the relation of class forces 
started immediately after the October revolution, when the 
*real* gains of 1917 (i.e. soviet democracy, workers' rights
and freedom) were slowly and surely eliminated by the bureaucratic 
class forming around the new state -- a class who could justify 
their actions by claiming it was in the "interests" of the 
masses whose wishes they were ignoring.

As regards the Communist Party itself, it argues for introducing 
("in deeds and not words") "a democratic regime. Do away with 
administrative pressure tactics. Stop the persecution and 
expulsion of those who hold independent opinions about party 
questions." No mention, of course, that these tactics were 
used by Lenin and Trotsky against Left-wing dissidents after 
the October revolution. 

The Left-Communists in early 1918 were subject to such 
pressure. For example, they were ousted from leading 
positions in the Supreme Economic Council in March 1918. 
After their views were denounced by Lenin a "campaign was 
whipped up in Leningrad which compelled *Kommunist* [their 
paper] to transfer publication to Moscow . . . After the 
appearance of the first issue of the paper a hastily 
convened Leningrad Party Conference produced a majority 
for Lenin and 'demanded that the adherents of *Kommunist*
cease their separate organisational existence.'" The
paper lasted four issues, with the last having to be
published as a private factional paper. The issue had
been settled by a high pressure campaign in the
Party organisation, backed by a barrage of violent
invective in the Party press and in the pronouncements
of the Party leaders. [Maurice Brinton, Op. Cit., 
pp. 39-40]

Similarly, the Workers' Opposition three years later also 
experienced them. At the Tenth Party congress, A. Kollontai
(author of their platform) stated that the circulation
of her pamphlet had been deliberately impeded. "So
irregular were some of these that the Moscow Party
Committee at one stage voted a resolution *publicly*
censuring the Petrograd organisation 'for not observing
the rules of proper controversy.'" The success of the 
Leninist faction in getting control of the party machine 
was such that "there is serious doubt as to whether they 
were not achieved by fraud." [Brinton, Op. Cit., p. 75 
and p. 77] Victor Serge witnessed the rigging of an 
election to ensure Lenin's victory in the trade union 
debate. [_Memoirs of a Revolutionary_, p. 123] Kollontai
herself mentions (in early 1921) that comrades "who dare 
to disagree with decrees from above are *still* being 
persecuted." [our emphasis, _The Workers' Opposition_,
p. 22]

The Platform states that "the dying out of inner-party democracy 
leads to a dying out of workers' democracy in general -- in the 
trade unions, and in all other nonparty mass organisations." 
In fact, the opposite causation is correct. The dying out 
of workers' democracy in general leads to a dying out of
inner-party democracy. The dictatorship of the party by necessity
clashes with the "democratic dictatorship of the working masses
and the poor peasantry." As the party dictatorship replaces
the working masses, eliminating democracy by the dictatorship
of a single party, democracy in that party must wither. If the
workers can join that party and influence its policies then
the same problems that arose in the soviets and unions appear
in the party (i.e. voting for the wrong policies and people).
This necessitates a corresponding centralisation in power
within the party as occurred in the soviets and unions, all
to the detriment of rank and file power and control.

As Ida Mett argued:

"There is no doubt that the discussion taking place within 
the [Communist] Party at this time [in early 1921] had profound 
effects on the masses. It overflowed the narrow limits the 
Party sought to impose on it. It spread to the working class 
as a whole, to the solders and to the sailors. Heated local 
criticism acted as a general catalyst. The proletariat had 
reasoned quite logically: if discussion and criticism were 
permitted to Party members, why should they not be permitted 
to the masses themselves who had endured all the hardships 
of the Civil War?

"In his speech to the Tenth Congress -- published in the Congress 
Proceedings -- Lenin voiced his regret at having 'permitted' such 
a discussion. 'We have certainly committed an error,' he said, 
'in having authorised this debate. Such a discussion was harmful 
just before the Spring months that would be loaded with such 
difficulties.'" [_The Kronstadt Uprising_, pp. 34-5]

Unsurprisingly, the Tenth Congress voted to ban factions within
the Party. The elimination of discussion in the working class
led to its ban in the party. Having the rank-and-file of the
Party discuss issues would give false hopes to the working
class as a whole who may attempt to influence policy by
joining the party (and, of course, vote for the wrong people
or policies).

Thus the only alternative to Kronstadt's "Third Revolution"
and free soviets was doomed to failure. 

Lastly, we should draw some parallels between the fates
of the Kronstadt sailors and the Left Opposition.

John Rees argues that the Left Opposition had "the whole 
vast propaganda machine of the bureaucracy . . . turned
against them," a machine used by Trotsky and Lenin in 1921 
against Kronstadt. Ultimately, the Left Opposition "were 
exiled, imprisoned and shot," again like the Kronstadters and 
a host of revolutionaries who defended the revolution but 
opposed the Bolshevik dictatorship. [Op. Cit., p. 68] 

As Murray Bookchin argued:

"All the conditions for Stalinism were prepared for by the
defeat of the Kronstadt sailors and Petrograd strikers."
["Introduction", Ida Mett, _The Kronstadt Uprising_, 
p. 13]

Thus, the argument that Kronstadt was "utopian" is false.
The third revolution was the only *real* alternative in
Bolshevik Russia. Any struggle from below post-1921 would 
have raised the same problems of soviet democracy and
party dictatorship which Kronstadt raised. Given that
the _Left Opposition_ subscribed to the "Leninist principle" 
of "the dictatorship of the party," they could not appeal
to the masses as they would not vote for them. The arguments
raised against Kronstadt that soviet democracy would lead
to counter-revolution are equally applicable to movements
which appealed, as Rees desires, to the Russian working
class post-Kronstadt. 

In summary, the claim that Kronstadt would inevitably
have lead to an anti-proletarian dictatorship fails. Yes,
it might have but the Bolshevik dictatorship itself was
anti-proletarian (it had repressed proletarian protest,
organisation, freedom and rights on numerous occasions)
and it could never be reformed from within by the very
logic of its "Leninist principle" of "the dictatorship
of the party." The rise of Stalinism was inevitable after
the crushing of Kronstadt. 

H.7.14 How do modern day Trotskyists misrepresent Kronstadt?

We have discussed how Trotskyists have followed their heroes 
Lenin and Trotsky in abusing the facts about the Kronstadt
sailors and uprising in previous sections. In section H.7.8,
we have indicated how they have selectively quoted from academic
accounts of the uprising and suppressed evidence which 
contradicts their claims. In section H.7.7 we have shown
how they have selectively quoted from Paul Avrich's book
on the revolt to paint a false picture of the connections
between the Kronstadt sailors and the Whites. Here we
summarise some of the other misrepresentations of 
Trotskyists about the revolt.

John Rees, for example, asserts that the Kronstadters

were fighting for "soviets without parties." Indeed, he
makes the assertion twice on one page. [Op. Cit., p. 63]
Pat Stack goes one further and asserts that the "central 
demand of the Kronstadt rising though was 'soviets without 
Bolsheviks'in other words, the utter destruction of the 
workers' state." ["Anarchy in the UK?", _Socialist Review_,
no. 246, November 2000] Both authors quote from Paul 
Avrich's book _Kronstadt 1921_ in their articles. Let 
us turn to that source:

"'Soviets without Communists' was not, as is often 
maintained by both Soviet and non-Soviet writers, 
a Kronstadt slogan." [_Kronstadt 1921_, p. 181]

Nor did they agitate under the banner "soviets without
parties." They argued for "all power to the soviets
and not to parties." Political parties were not to
be excluded from the soviets, simply stopped from
dominating them and substituting themselves for
them. As Avrich notes, the Kronstadt program "did
allow a place for the Bolsheviks in the soviets,
alongside the other left-wing organisations . . .
Communists . . . participated in strength in the
elected conference of delegate, which was the
closest thing Kronstadt ever had to the free soviets
of its dreams." [Ibid.] The index for Avrich's
work handily includes this page in it, under the
helpful entry "soviets: 'without Communists.'" 

The central demand of the uprising was simply soviet 
democracy and a return to the principles that the 
workers and peasants had been fighting the whites for.
In other words, both Leninists have misrepresented
the Kronstadt revolt's demands and so misrepresented
its aims.

Rees goes one step further and tries to blame the 
Bolshevik massacre on the sailors themselves. He argues 
"in Petrograd Zinoviev had already essentially withdrawn 
the most detested aspects of War Communism in response to 
the strikes." Needless to say, Zinoviev did not withdraw 
the *political* aspects of War Communism, just some of 
the *economic* ones and, as the Kronstadt revolt was 
mainly *political*, these concessions were not enough
(indeed, the repression directed against workers rights
and opposition socialist and anarchist groups *increased*). 
He then states the Kronstadters "response [to these
concessions] was contained in their "What We Are Fighting 
For" and quotes it as follows:

"there is no middle ground in the struggle against
the Communists . . . They give the appearance of
making concessions: in Petrograd province road-block
detachments have been removed and 10 million roubles
have been allotted for the purchase of foodstuffs. . .
But one must not be deceived . . . No there can be
no middle ground. Victory or death!"

What Rees fails to inform the reader is that this was 
written on March 8th, while the Bolsheviks had started
military operations on the previous evening. Moreover,
the fact the "response" clearly stated "[w]ithout a
single shot, without a drop of blood, the first step
has been taken [of the "Third Revolution"]. The toilers
do not need blood. They will shed it only at a moment
of self-defence" is not mentioned. [Avrich, Op. Cit., 
p. 243] In other words, the Kronstadt sailors reaffirmed
their commitment to non-violent revolt. Any violence
on their part was in self-defence against Bolshevik
actions. Not that you would know that from Rees' work.
Indeed, as one of Rees' sources indicates, the rebels
"had refrained from taking any communist lives. The 
Soviet Government, on the other hand, as early as 
March 3, already had executed forty-five seamen at
Oranienbaum -- a quite heavy proportion of the total
personnel of the men at the Naval Aviation Detachment.
These men had voted for the Kronstadt resolution, but
did not take arms against the government. This mass
execution was merely a prelude to those that took place
after the defeat of the mutineers." These executions at
Oranienbaum, it should be noted, exceeded the total 
of 36 seamen who had paid with their lives for the two
large rebellions of the 1905 revolution at Kronstadt 
and Sveaborg. [D. Fedotoff-White, _The Growth of the
Red Army_, p. 156]

Ted Grant, of the UK's _Socialist Appeal_ re-writes
history significantly in his work _Russia: From revolution
to counter-revolution_. For example, he claims (without
providing any references) that the "first lie" of 
anti-Bolshevik writers on the subject "is to identify 
the Kronstadt mutineers of 1921 with the heroic Red sailors 
of 1917." As we have indicated in section H.7.8, research
has *proven* that over 90% of the sailors on the two 
battleships which started the revolt had been recruited 
before and during the 1917 revolution and at least 
three-quarters of the sailors were old hands who had
served in the navy through war and revolution. So was
the majority of the Provisional Revolutionary Committee. 
Grant asserts that the sailors in 1917 and 1921 "had nothing 
in common" because those "of 1917 were workers and Bolsheviks." 
In fact, as we indicated section H.7.9, the Bolsheviks were 
a minority in Kronstadt during 1917 (a fact even Trotsky 
admitted in 1938). Moreover, the demands raised in the
revolt matched the politics dominant in 1917.

Grant then claims that "almost the entire Kronstadt 
garrison volunteered to fight in the ranks of the Red Army 
during the civil war." Are we to believe that the Bolshevik
commanders left Kronstadt (and so Petrograd) defenceless
during the Civil War? Or drafted the skilled and trained
(and so difficult to replace) sailors away from their ships,
so leaving them unusable? Of course not. Common sense
refutes Grant's argument (and statistical  evidence 
supports this common sense position -- on 1st January,
1921, at least 75.5% of the Baltic Fleet was likely 
to have been drafted before 1918 and over 80% were 
from Great Russian areas and some 10% from the Ukraine.
[Gelzter, Op. Cit., p. 208]).

Not to be outdone, he then states that the "Kronstadt 
garrison of 1921 was composed mainly of raw peasant 
levies from the Black Sea Fleet. A cursory glance at 
the surnames of the mutineers immediately shows that 
they were almost all Ukrainians." According to Paul
Avrich, "[s]ome three or four hundred names appear
in the journal of the rebel movement . . . So far
as one can judge from these surnames alone . . .
Great Russians are in the overwhelming majority."
Of the 15 person Provisional Revolutionary Committee,
"three . . . bore patently Ukrainian names and two
others. . . Germanic names." [Paul Avrich, Op. Cit.,
pp. 92-3] Of the three Ukrainians, two were sailors
of long standing and "had fought on the barricades in 
1917." [Avrich, Op. Cit., p. 91] So much for a "cursory 
glance at the surnames of the mutineers." To top it off, 
he states: "That there were actual counter-revolutionary 
elements among the sailors was shown by the slogan 
'Soviets without Bolsheviks'." Which, of course, the 
Kronstadt sailors *never* raised as a slogan!

And *Grant* talks about the "[m]any falsifications. . . 
written about this event," that it "has been virtually 
turned into a myth" and that "these allegations bear no 
relation to the truth." Truly amazing. As can be seen,
his words apply to his own inventions.

Another SWP member, Abbie Bakan, asserts that, for 
example, "more than three quarters of the sailors" at 
Kronstadt "were recent recruits of peasant origin" but 
refuses to provide a source for this claim. ["A Tragic 
Necessity", _Socialist Worker Review_, no. 136, 
November 1990, pp. 18-21] As noted in section H.7.8, 
such a claim is false. The likely source for the
assertion is Paul Avrich, who noted that more than 
three-quarters of the sailors were of peasant origin 
but Avrich does *not* say they were all recent recruits. 
While stating that there could be "little doubt" that
the Civil War produced a "high turnover" and that
"many" old-timers had been replaced by conscripts 
from rural areas, he does not indicate that all the
sailors from peasant backgrounds were new recruits.
He also notes that "there had always been a large
and unruly peasant element among the sailors."
[Op. Cit., pp. 89-90]

Bakan asserts that anti-semitism "was vicious and 
rampant" yet fails to provide *any* official Kronstadt 
proclamations expressing this perspective. Rather, we 
are to generalise from the memoirs of *one* sailor 
and the anti-semitic remark of Vershinin, a member
of the Revolutionary Committee. Let us not forget
that the opinions of these sailors and others
like them were irrelevant to the Bolsheviks when
they drafted them in the first place. And, more
importantly, this "vicious and rampant" anti-semitism
failed to mark the demands raised nor the Kronstadt
rebels' newspaper or radio broadcasts. Nor did the 
Bolsheviks mention it at the time.

Moreover, it is true that the "worse venom of the 
Kronstadt rebels was levelled against Trotsky and
Zinoviev" but it was *not* because, as Bakan asserts,
they were "treated as Jewish scapegoats." Their
ethnical background was not mentioned by the Kronstadt 
sailors. Rather, they were strong *political* reasons
for attacking them. As Paul Avrich argues, "Trotsky in 
particular was the living symbol of War Communism, of 
everything the sailors had rebelled against. His name 
was associated with centralisation and militarisation, 
with iron discipline and regimentation." As for
Zinoviev, he had "incurred the sailors' loathing as 
the party boss who had suppressed the striking workers 
and who had stooped to taking their own families as 
hostages." Good reasons to attack them and nothing
to do with them being Jewish. [Op. Cit., p. 178
and p. 176]

Bakan states that the "demands of the Kronstadt
sailors reflected the ideas of the most backward
section of the peasantry." As can be seen from
section H.7.3, such a comment cannot be matched
with the actual demands of the revolt (which,
of course, he does not provide). So what ideas
did these demands of the "most backward section
of the peasantry" state? Free elections to the
Soviets, freedom of speech and of the press for
workers and peasants, right of assembly, freedom
for trade union and peasant organisations, a
conference of workers, soldiers and sailors, 
liberation of all political, worker and
peasant prisoners, equalisation of rations,
freedom for peasants as long as they do not
employ hired labour, and so on. What would, in
other words, be included in most socialist parties
programmes and was, in fact, key elements of 
Bolshevik rhetoric in 1917. And, of course, all 
of the political aspects of the Kronstadt demands 
reflected key aspects of the Soviet Constitution. 

How "backward" can you get! Indeed, these "backward"
peasants send a radio message marking International
Woman's Day, hoping that women would "soon 
accomplish" their "liberation from every form
of violence and oppression." [quoted by Alexander
Berkman, _The Russian Tragedy_, p. 85]

Bakan pathetically acknowledges that their demands 
included "calls for greater freedoms" yet looks at 
the "main economic target" (not mentioning they were 
points 8, 10 and 11 of the 15 demands, the bulk of 
the rest are political). These, apparently, were
aimed at "the programme of forced requisitioning of 
peasant produce and the roadblock detachments that 
halted the black market in grain." Given that he admits
that the Bolsheviks were "already discussing" the
end of these features (due to their lack of success) 
it must be the case that the Bolsheviks also 
"reflected the ideas of the most backward section 
of the peasantry"! Moreover, the demand to end the 
roadblocks was also raised by the Petrograd and
Moscow workers during their strikes, as were most
of the other demands raised by Kronstadt. [Paul 
Avrich, Op. Cit., p. 42] Surely the "most backward 
section of the peasantry" was getting around in 
those days, appearing as they were in the higher 
reaches of the Bolshevik party bureaucracy and the 
factories of Petrograd and other major cities! 

In reality, of course, the opposition to the forced
requisitioning of food was a combination of ethical
and practical considerations -- it was evil and it
was counterproductive. You did not have to be a peasant
to see and know this (as the striking workers show).
Similarly, the roadblocks were also a failure. Victor 
Serge, for example, recollected he would "have died 
without the sordid manipulations of the black market." 
[_Memoirs of a Revolutionary_, p.79] He was a government 
official. Think how much worse it would have been for an 
ordinary worker. The use of roadblock detachments harmed 
the industrial workers -- little wonder they struck for
their end and little wonder the sailors expressed
solidarity with them and included it in their demands.
Therefore, *nothing* can be drawn from these demands
about the class nature of the revolt.

In an interesting example of double-think, Bakan then
states that the sailors "called for the abolition
of Bolshevik authority in the army, factories and
mills." What the resolution demanded was, in fact,
"the abolition Party combat detachments in all
military groups" as well as "Party guards in 
factories and enterprises" (point 10). In other words, 
to end the intimidation of workers and soldiers by armed
communist units in their amidst! When Bakan states
that "the real character of the rebellion" can be 
seen from the opening declaration that "the
present soviets do not express the will of the
workers and peasants" he could not have made a
truer comment. The Kronstadt revolt was a revolt
for soviet democracy and against party dictatorship.
And soviet democracy would only abolish "Bolshevik
authority" if the existing soviets, as the resolution 
argued, did not express the will of their electors!

Similarly, he asserts that the Provisional Revolutionary
Committee was "non-elected" and so contradicts every
historian who acknowledges it was elected by the
conference of delegates on March 2nd and expanded
by the next conference a few days later. He even
considers the fact the delegate meeting's "denial
of party members' usual role in chairing the proceedings"
as one of many "irregularities" while, of course, the 
*real* irregularity was the fact that *one* party (the 
government party) had such a "usual role" in the 
first place! Moreover, given that that Petrograd
soviet meeting to discuss the revolt had Cheka guards
(Lenin's political police) on it, his notion that
sailors guarded the conference of delegates meeting
(a meeting held in opposition to the ruling party)
was "irregular" seems ironic.

Lastly, he raises the issue of the "Memorandum" of
the White "National Centre" and uses it as evidence
that "Lenin's suspicion of an international conspiracy
linked up with the Kronstadt events has been vindicated."
Needless to say, he fails to mention that the historian
who discovered the document rejected the notion that
it proved that Kronstadt was linked to such a conspiracy
(see section H.7.6 for a full discussion). Ironically,
he mentions that "[t]wo weeks after the Kronstadt 
rebellion the ice was due to melt." Two weeks *after*
the rebellion was crushed, of course, and he fails to
mention that the "Memorandum" he uses as evidence assumes
that the revolt would break out *after* the ice had
melted, not before. While he claims that "[h]olding
out until the ice melted was identified as critical
in the memorandum," this is not true. The Memorandum
in fact, as Paul Avrich notes, "assumes that the
rising will occur after the ice has melted." [Op.
Cit., p. 237f] No other interpretation can be gathered
from the document.

Altogether, Bakan's article shows how deeply the
supporters of Leninism will sink to when attempting
to discuss the Kronstadt rebellion. Sadly, as we
have indicated many, many times, this is not an
isolated occurrence. 

H.7.15 What does Kronstadt tell us about Bolshevism?

The rationales used by Lenin, Trotsky and their followers 
are significant aids to getting to the core of the Bolshevik 
Myth. These rationales and activities allow us to understand
the limitations of Bolshevik theory and how it contributed
to the degeneration of the revolution.

Trotsky stated that the "Kronstadt slogan" was "soviets 
without Communists." [Lenin and Trotsky, _Kronstadt_, p. 90] 
This, of course, is factually incorrect. The Kronstadt slogan 
was "all power to the soviets but not to the parties" (or 
"free soviets"). From this incorrect assertion, Trotsky argued 
as follows:

"to free the soviets from the leadership [!] of the Bolsheviks 
would have meant within a short time to demolish the soviets 
themselves. The experience of the Russian soviets during the
period of Menshevik and SR domination and, even more clearly, 
the experience of the German and Austrian soviets under the 
domination of the Social Democrats, proved this. Social 
Revolutionary-anarchist soviets could only serve as a bridge 
from the proletarian dictatorship. They could play no other 
role, regardless of the 'ideas' of their participants. The 
Kronstadt uprising thus had a counterrevolutionary character." 
[Op. Cit., p. 90]

Interesting logic. Let us assume that the result of free 
elections would have been the end of Bolshevik "leadership" 
(i.e. dictatorship), as seems likely. What Trotsky is arguing 
is that to allow workers to vote for their representatives 
would "only serve as a bridge from the proletarian dictatorship"! 
This argument was made (in 1938) as a *general point* and is 
*not* phrased in terms of the problems facing the Russian 
Revolution in 1921. In other words Trotsky is clearly arguing 
for the dictatorship of the party and contrasting it to soviet 
democracy. So much for "All Power to the Soviets" or "workers'
power"! 

Indeed, Trotsky was not shy in explicitly stating this on occasion.
As we noted in section H.7.13, the _Left Opposition_ based itself
on "Leninist principle" ("inviolable for every Bolshevik") that 
"the dictatorship of the proletariat is and can be realised only 
through the dictatorship of the party." Trotsky stressed ten years
later that the whole working class cannot determine policy in the 
so-called "workers' state" (as well as indicating his belief that 
one-party dictatorship is an inevitable stage in a "proletarian" 
revolution):

"The revolutionary dictatorship of a proletarian party is for
me not a thing that one can freely accept or reject: It is an
objective necessity imposed upon us by the social realities
-- the class struggle, the heterogeneity of the revolutionary
class, the necessity for a selected vanguard in order to 
assure the victory. The dictatorship of a party belongs to 
the barbarian prehistory as does the state itself, but we can 
not jump over this chapter, which can open (not at one stroke) 
genuine human history. . . The revolutionary party (vanguard)
which renounces its own dictatorship surrenders the masses
to the counter-revolution . . . Abstractly speaking, it would 
be very well if the party dictatorship could be replaced by 
the 'dictatorship' of the whole toiling people without any 
party, but this presupposes such a high level of political 
development among the masses that it can never be achieved 
under capitalist conditions. The reason for the revolution 
comes from the circumstance that capitalism does not permit 
the material and the moral development of the masses." [Trotsky, 
_Writings 1936-37_, pp. 513-4]

This is the very essence of Bolshevism. Trotsky is clearly
arguing that the working class, as a class, is incapable
of making a revolution or managing society itself -- hence
the party must step in on its behalf and, if necessary,
ignore the wishes of the people the party claims to
represent. To re-quote Trotsky's comments against the
_Workers' Opposition_ at the Tenth Party Congress in early
1921: "They have made a fetish of democratic principles!
They have placed the workers' right to elect representatives
above the Party. As if the Party were not entitled to assert 
its dictatorship even if that dictatorship clashed with the 
passing moods of the workers' democracy!" He stressed that
the "Party is obliged to maintain its dictatorship . . . 
regardless of temporary vacillations even in the working 
class . . . The dictatorship does not base itself at every 
moment on the formal principle of a workers' democracy." 
[quoted by M. Brinton, _The Bolsheviks and Workers' Control_, 
p. 78] 

In 1957, after crushing the 1956 workers' revolution, the 
Hungarian Stalinists argued along *exactly* the same lines 
as Trotsky had after the Bolsheviks had crushed Kronstadt. 
The leader of the Hungarian Stalinist dictatorship argued 
that "the regime is aware that the people do not always know
what is good for them. It is therefore the duty of the
leadership to act, not according to the *will* of the people,
but according to what the leadership knows to be in the
best *interests* of the people." [quoted by Andy Anderson,
_Hungary '56_, p. 101]

Little wonder, then, that Samuel Farber notes that "there is 
no evidence indicating that Lenin or any of the mainstream 
Bolshevik leaders lamented the loss of workers' control or 
of democracy in the soviets, or at least referred to these
losses as a retreat, as Lenin declared with the replacement
of War Communism by NEP in 1921." [_Before Stalinism_, p. 44]

Such a perspective cannot help have disastrous consequences
for a revolution (and explains why the Bolsheviks failed to
pursue a peaceful resolution to the Kronstadt revolt). The
logic of this argument clearly implies that when the party 
suppressed Kronstadt, when it disbanded non-Bolshevik soviets 
in early 1918 and robbed the workers and soviets of their 
power, the Bolsheviks were acting in the best interests 
of masses! The notion that Leninism is a revolutionary 
theory is invalidated by Trotsky's arguments. Rather than 
aim for a society based on workers' power, they aim for a 
"workers' state" in which workers *delegate* their power to 
the leaders of the party. Which confirmed Bakunin's argument 
that Marxism meant "the highly despotic government of the 
masses by a new and very small aristocracy of real or 
pretended scholars. The people are not learned, so they 
will be liberated from the cares of government and included 
in entirety in the governed herd." [_Statism and Anarchy_, 
pp. 178-9]

Such an approach is doomed to failure -- it cannot produce 
a socialist society as such a society (as Bakunin stressed) 
can only be built from below by the working class itself.

As Vernon Richards argues:

"The distinction between the libertarian and authoritarian
revolutionary movements in their struggle to establish
the free society, is the means which each proposes should
be used to this end. The libertarian maintains that the
initiative must come from below, that the free society
must be the result of the will to freedom of a large
section of the population. The authoritarian . . . 
believes that the will to freedom can only emerge once
the existing economic and political system has be replaced
by a dictatorship of the proletariat [as expressed by
the dictatorship of the party, according to Trotsky] 
which, as the awareness and sense of responsibility 
of the people grows, will wither away and the free 
society emerge.

"There can be no common ground between such approaches.
For the authoritarian argues that the libertarian 
approach is noble but 'utopian' and doomed to failure
from the start, while the libertarian argues on the
evidence of history, that the authoritarian *methods*
will simply replace one coercive state by another,
equally despotic and remote from the people, and 
which will no more 'wither away' than its capitalist
predecessor." [_Lessons of the Spanish Revolution_, 
p. 206]

Modern day Leninists follow Trotsky's arguments (although they
rarely acknowledge where they logically led or that their
heroes explicitly acknowledged this conclusion and justified 
it). They do not state this position as honestly as did 
Trotsky. 

Chris Bambery of the British SWP, for example, argues in his 
article "Leninism in the 21st century" that "in Lenin's 
concept of the party, democracy is balanced by centralism"
and the first of three reasons for this is:

"The working class is fragmented. There are always those who 
wish to fight, those who will scab and those in between. Even 
in the soviets those divisions will be apparent. Revolutionary 
organisation does not aspire to represent the working class as 
a whole. It bases itself on those workers who want to challenge 
capitalism, and seeks to organise those to win the majority of 
workers to the need to take power." [_Socialist Review_, no.
248, January 2001]

This, of course, has *exactly* the same basis of Trotsky's
defence of the need of party dictatorship and why Kronstadt
was counterrevolutionary. Bambery notes that even "in the 
soviets" there will be "divisions." Thus we have the basic 
assumption which, combined with centralisation, vanguardism
and other aspects of Bolshevism, leads to events like Kronstadt
and the destruction of soviet power by party power. The
arguments for centralisation mean, in practice, the 
concentration of power in the centre, in the hands of
the party leaders, as the working masses cannot be trusted
to make the correct ("revolutionary") decisions. This 
centralised power is then used to impose the will of 
the leaders, who use state power against the very class 
they claim to represent:

"Without revolutionary coercion directed against the 
avowed enemies of the workers and peasants, it is 
impossible to break down the resistance of these 
exploiters. On the other hand, revolutionary coercion 
is bound to be employed towards the wavering and unstable 
elements among the masses themselves." [Lenin, _Collected 
Works_, vol. 42, p. 170] 

In other words, whoever protests against the dictatorship
of the party. 

Of course, it will be replied that the Bolshevik dictatorship
used its power to crush the resistance of the bosses (and
"backward workers"). Sadly, this is not the case. First,
we must stress that anarchists are *not* against defending
a revolution or expropriating the power and wealth of the
ruling class, quite the reverse as this is about *how* a
revolution does this. Lenin's argument is flawed as it 
confuses the defence of the revolution with the defence of
the party in power. These are two totally different things. 

The "revolutionary coercion" Lenin speaks of is, apparently,
directed against one part of the working class. However, this 
will also intimidate the rest (just as bourgeois repression
not only intimidates those who strike but those who may think 
of striking). As a policy, it can have but one effect -- to
eliminate *all* workers' power and freedom. It is the violence 
of an oppressive minority against the oppressed majority, not 
vice versa. Ending free speech harmed working class people. 
Militarisation of labour did not affect the bourgeoisie. 
Neither did eliminating soviet democracy or union independence. 
As the dissident (working class) Communist Gavriii Miasnokov 
argued in 1921 (in reply to Lenin):

"The trouble is that, while you raise your hand against the
capitalist, you deal a blow to the worker. You know very well that
for such words as I am now uttering hundreds, perhaps thousands,
of workers are languishing in prison. That I myself remain at
liberty is only because I am a veteran Communist, have suffered
for my beliefs, and am known among the mass of workers. Were it
not for this, were I just an ordinary mechanic from the same
factory, where would I be now? In a Cheka prison or, more likely,
made to 'escape,' just as I made Mikhail Romanov 'escape.' Once
more I say: You raise your hand against the bourgeoisie, but it is
I who am spitting blood, and it is we, the workers, whose jaws are
being cracked." [quoted by Paul Avrich, _G. T. Miasnikov and the 
Workers' Group_]

This can be seen from the make-up of Bolshevik prisoners. Of the 
17 000 camp detainees on whom statistical information was available 
on 1 November 1920, peasants and workers constituted the largest 
groups, at 39% and 34% respectively. Similarly, of the 40 913 
prisoners held in December 1921 (of whom 44% had been committed 
by the Cheka) nearly 84% were illiterate or minimally educated, 
clearly, therefore, either peasants of workers. [George Leggett, 
_The Cheka: Lenin's Political Police_, p. 178] Unsurprisingly, 
Miasnikov refused to denounce the Kronstadt insurgents nor would 
he have participated in their suppression had he been called upon 
to do so. 

Thus, the ideas of centralisation supported by Leninists are 
harmful to the real gains of a revolution, namely working class 
freedom and power (as we noted in section H.7.12, some of them
do not even mention these when indicating the gains of 1917). 
Indeed, this can be seen all through the history of Bolshevism.

Bambery states (correctly) that "Lenin and the Bolsheviks 
initially opposed" the spontaneously formed soviets of 1905. 
Incredulously, however, he assigns this opposition to the
assertion that their "model of revolution was still shaped 
by that of the greatest previous revolution in France in 1789."
[Ibid.] In reality, it was because they considered, to quote
a leading Bolshevik, that "only a strong party along class 
lines can guide the proletarian political movement and preserve 
the integrity of its program, rather than a political mixture 
of this kind, an indeterminate and vacillating political
organisation such as the workers council represents and cannot 
help but represent." [P. N. Gvozdev, quoted by, Oskar Anweilier, 
_The Soviets_, p. 77] 

The soviet, in other words, could not represent the interests
of the working class because it was elected by them! Trotsky
repeated this argument almost word for word in 1920 when he 
argued that "it can be said with complete justice that the 
dictatorship of the Soviets became possible only by means 
of the dictatorship of the party" and that there is "no 
substitution at all" when the "power of the party" replaces 
that of the working class. The party, he stressed, "has 
afforded to the Soviets the possibility of becoming 
transformed from shapeless parliaments of labour into 
the apparatus of the supremacy of labour." [_Communism
and Terrorism_] How labour could express this "supremacy"
when it could not even vote for its delegates (never mind
manage society) is never explained.

In 1905, the Bolsheviks saw the soviets as a rival to their 
party and demanded it either accept their political program or
simply become a trade-union like organisation. They feared
that it pushed aside the party committee and thus led to
the "subordination of consciousness to spontaneity."
[Oskar Anweilier, Op. Cit., p. 78] This was following 
Lenin in _What is to be Done?_, where he had argued that 
the "*spontaneous* development of the labour movement leads
to it being subordinated to bourgeois ideology." [_Essential
Works of Lenin_, p. 82] This perspective is at the root
of all Bolshevik justifications for party power after
the October revolution. 

Such a combination of political assumptions inevitably
leads to such events as Kronstadt. With the perception
that spontaneous developments inevitably leads to
bourgeois domination, any attempt to revoke Bolshevik
delegates and elect others to soviets *must* represent
counter-revolutionary tendencies. As the working class
is divided and subject to "vacillations" due to "wavering 
and unstable  elements among the masses themselves,"
working class people simply cannot manage society themselves.
Hence the need for "the Leninist principle" of "the
dictatorship of the party." And, equally logically, to
events like Kronstadt. 

Thus Cornellius Castoriadis:

"To manage the work of others -- this is the beginning and 
the end of the whole cycle of exploitation. The 'need' for 
a specific social category to manage the work of others in 
production (and the activity of others in politics and in 
society), the 'need' for a separate business management and 
for a Party to rule the State -- this is what Bolshevism 
proclaimed as soon as it seized power, and this is what it 
zealously laboured to impose. We know that it achieved its 
ends. Insofar as ideas play a role in the development of 
history -- and, *in the final analysis*, they play an enormous 
role -- the Bolshevik ideology (and with it, the Marxist
ideology lying behind it) was a decisive factor in the 
birth of the Russian bureaucracy." [_Political and Social 
Writings_, vol. 3, p. 104]

Moreover, the logic of the Bolshevik argument is flawed:

"if you consider these worthy electors as unable to look 
after their own interests themselves, how is it that they 
will know how to choose for themselves the shepherds who 
must guide them? And how will they be able to solve this 
problem of social alchemy, of producing a genius from the 
votes of a mass of fools? And what will happen to the 
minorities which are still the most intelligent, most 
active and radical part of a society?" [Malatesta, 
_Anarchy_, p. 53]

Hence the need for soviet democracy and self-management, of
the demands of the Kronstadt revolt. As Malatesta put it, 
"[o]nly freedom or the struggle for freedom can be the 
school for freedom." [_Life and Ideas_, p. 59] The "epic
of Kronstadt" proves "*conclusively* that what belongs
really to *the workers and peasants* can be *neither
governmental nor statist*, and what is *governmental
and statist* can belong *neither to the workers nor
the peasants.*" [Voline, _The Unknown Revolution_,
p. 503]

Anarchists are well aware that differences in political
perspective exists within the working class. We are also
aware of the importance of revolutionaries organising
together to influence the class struggle, raising the
need for revolution and the creation of working class
organisations which can smash and replace the state with
a system of self-managed communes and workers' councils.
However, we reject the Bolshevik conclusion for centralised
power (i.e. power delegated to the centre) as doomed to
failure. Rather, we agree with Bakunin who argued that
revolutionary groups must "not seek anything for themselves, 
neither privilege nor honour nor power" and reject "any 
idea of dictatorship and custodial control." The "revolution 
everywhere must be created by the people, and supreme control 
must always belong to the people organised into a free 
federation of agricultural and industrial associations . . . 
organised from the bottom upwards by means of revolutionary 
delegations . . . [who] will set out to administer public 
services, not to rule over peoples." [_Michael Bakunin: 
Selected Writings_, p. 172] 

Anarchists seek to influence working people directly, via
their natural influence in working class organisations
like workers' councils, unions and so on. Only by discussion,
debate and self-activity can the political perspectives
of working class people develop and change. This is impossible
in a centralised system based on party dictatorship. Debate
and discussion are pointless if they have no effect on the
process of the revolution nor if working people cannot elect
their own delegates. Nor can self-activity be developed if
the government uses "revolutionary coercion" against "waving
or unstable elements" (i.e. those who do not unquestioningly
follow the orders of the government or practice initiative). 

In other words, the fact Bolshevism uses to justify its support 
for party power is, in fact, the strongest argument against it. 
By concentrating power in the hands of a few, the political
development of the bulk of the population is hindered.
No longer in control of their fate, of *their* revolution,
they will become pray to counter-revolutionary tendencies.

Nor was the libertarian approach impossible to implement during 
a revolution or civil war. Anarchists applied their ideas
very successfully in the Makhnovist movement in the Ukraine.
In the areas they protected, the Makhnovists refused to
dictate to the workers and peasants what to do: 

"The freedom of the peasants and workers, said the Makhnovists,
resides in the peasants and workers themselves and may
not be restricted. In all fields of their lives it is
up to the workers and peasants to construct whatever
they consider necessary. As for the Makhnovists -- they
can only assist them with advice, by putting at their
disposal the intellectual or military forced they need,
but under no circumstances can the Makhnovists prescribe
for them in advance." [Peter Arshinov, _The History of
the Makhnovist Movement_, p. 148]

The Makhnovists urged workers to form free soviets and
labour unions and to use them to manage their own fates.
They organised numerous conferences of workers' and peasants'
delegates to discuss political and military developments
as well as to decide how to re-organise society from the
bottom up in a self-managed manner. After they had liberated
Aleksandrovsk, for example, they "invited the working
population to participant in a general conference of the
workers of the city . . . and it was proposed that the
workers organise the life in the city and the functioning
of the factories with their own forces and their own
organisations." [Op. Cit., p. 149] In contrast, the
Bolsheviks tried to *ban* congresses of workers', peasants'
and soldiers' delegates organised by the Makhnovists
(once by Dybenko and once by Trotsky). [Op. Cit., pp. 98-104 
and 120-5]
 
The Makhnovists replied by holding the conferences anyway, 
asking "[c]an there exist laws made by a few people who 
call themselves revolutionaries, which permit them to outlaw 
a whole people who are more revolutionary than they are 
themselves?" and "[w]hose interests should the revolution 
defend: those of the Party or those of the people who set 
the revolution in motion with their blood?" Makhno himself
stated that he "consider[ed] it an inviolable right of the 
workers and peasants, a right won by the revolution, to call 
conferences on their own account, to discuss their affairs." 
[Op. Cit., p. 103 and p. 129] 

These actions by the Bolsheviks should make the reader ponder 
if the elimination of workers' democracy during the civil war 
can be fully explained by the objective conditions facing 
Lenin's government or whether Leninist ideology played an 
important role in it. Indeed, the Kronstadt revolt occurred, 
in part, because in February 1921 the administration of the 
Baltic Fleet and the Communist Party organisation had collapsed, 
so allowing "unauthorised meetings of ships' crews . . . [to] 
tak[e] place behind the backs of their commissars, there being
too few loyal rank and file party members left to nip them in 
the bud." [I. Getzler, _Kronstadt 1917-1921_, p. 212]

Thus, the anarchist argument is no utopian plan. Rather, 
it is one which has been applied successfully in the same 
circumstances which Trotskyists argue forced the Bolsheviks
to act as they did. As can be seen, a viable alternative
approach existed and was applied (see section H.11 for more
on the Makhnovists).

The terrible objective circumstances facing the revolution
obviously played a key role in the degeneration of the
revolution. However, this is not the whole story. The
*ideas* of the Bolsheviks played a key role as well. The
circumstances the Bolsheviks faced may have shaped certain 
aspects of their actions, but it cannot be denied that the 
impulse for these actions were rooted in Bolshevik theory.

In regards to this type of analysis, the Trotskyist Pierre 
Frank argues that anarchists think that bureaucratic 
conceptions "beget bureaucracy" and that "it is ideas, 
or deviations from them, that determine the character of 
revolutions. The most simplistic kind of philosophical 
idealism has laid low historical materialism." This means, 
apparently, that anarchists ignore objective factors in the 
rise of the bureaucracy such as "the country's backwardness, 
low cultural level, and the isolation of the revolution."
[Lenin and Trotsky, _Kronstadt_, pp. 22-3]

Nothing could be further from the truth, of course. What
anarchists argue (like Lenin before the October revolution)
is that *every* revolution will suffer from isolation,
uneven political development, economic problems and so
on (i.e. "exceptional circumstances," see section H.7.12). 
The question is whether your revolution can survive them 
and whether your political ideas can meet these challenges 
without aiding bureaucratic deformations. As can be seen
from the Russian Revolution, Leninism fails that test. 

Moreover, Frank is being incredulous. If we take his 
argument seriously then we have to conclude that Bolshevik 
ideology played *no* role in how the revolution developed. 
In other words, he subscribes to the contradictory position 
that Bolshevik politics were essential to the success of 
the revolution and yet played no role in its outcome.

The facts of the matter is that people are faced with choices, 
choices that arise from the objective conditions they face. 
What decisions they make will be influenced by the ideas they 
hold -- they will not occur automatically, as if people were 
on auto-pilot -- and their ideas are shaped by the social 
relationships they experience. Thus, someone placed into a 
position of power over others will act in certain ways, have 
a certain world view, which would be alien to someone subject 
to egalitarian social relations. 

So, obviously "ideas" matter, particularly during a revolution. 
Someone in favour of centralisation, centralised power and who 
equates party rule with class rule (like Lenin and Trotsky), 
will act in ways (and create structures) totally different from 
someone who believes in decentralisation and federalism. In other 
words, political ideas do matter in society. Nor do anarchists 
leave our analysis at this obvious fact, we also argue 
that the types of organisation people create and work in 
shapes the way they think and act. This is because specific 
kinds of organisation have specific authority relations and 
so generate specific social relationships. These obviously affect
those subject to them -- a centralised, hierarchical system will 
create authoritarian social relationships which shape those 
within it in totally different ways than a decentralised, 
egalitarian system. That Frank denies this obvious fact 
suggests he knows nothing of materialist philosophy and
subscribes to the distinctly lobotomised (and bourgeois)
"historical materialism" of Lenin (see Anton Pannekoek's
_Lenin as Philosopher_ for details). 

The attitude of Leninists to the Kronstadt event shows quite 
clearly that, for all their lip-service to history from below, 
they are just as fixated with leaders as is bourgeois history. 
As Cornellius Castoriadis argues:

"Now, we should point out that it is not workers who write 
history. It is always the *others*. And these others, whoever 
they may be, have a historical existence only insofar as the 
masses are passive, or active simply to support them, and 
this is precisely what 'the others' will tell us at every 
opportunity. Most of the time these others will not even 
possess eyes to see and ears to hear the gestures and 
utterances that express people's autonomous activity. In 
the best of instances, they will sing the praises of this 
activity so long as it *miraculously* coincides with their 
own line, but they will radically condemn it, and impute 
to it the basest motives, as soon as it strays therefrom. 
Thus Trotsky describes in grandiose terms the anonymous 
workers of Petrograd moving ahead of the Bolshevik party 
or mobilising themselves during the Civil War, but later 
on he was to characterise the Kronstadt rebels as 'stool 
pigeons' and 'hirelings of the French High Command.' They
lack the categories of thought -- the brain cells, we might 
dare say -- necessary to understand, or even to record, 
this activity as it really occurs: to them, an activity 
that is not instituted, that has neither boss nor program, 
has no status; it is not even clearly perceivable, except 
perhaps in the mode of 'disorder' and 'troubles.' The 
autonomous activity of the masses belongs by definition 
to what is *repressed* in history." [Op. Cit., p. 91]

The Trotskyist accounts of the Kronstadt revolt, with 
their continual attempts to portray it as a White 
conspiracy, proves this analysis is correct. Indeed, the
possibility that the revolt was a spontaneous mass revolt
with political aims was dismissed by one of them as "absurd"
and instead was labelled the work of "backward peasants"
being mislead by SRs and spies. Like the capitalist who
considers a strike the work of "outside agitators" and
"communists" misleading their workers, the Trotskyists 
present an analysis of Kronstadt reeking of elitism and
ideological incomprehension. Independence on behalf of
the working class is dismissed as "backward" and to be
corrected by the "proletarian dictatorship." Clearly
Bolshevik ideology played a key role in the rise of
Stalinism.

Lastly, the supporters of Bolshevism argue that in suppressing 
the revolt "the Bolsheviks only did their duty. They defended 
the conquests of the revolution against the assaults of 
the counterrevolution." [Wright, Op. Cit., p. 123] In 
other words, we can expect more Kronstadts if these 
"revolutionaries" gain power. The "temporary vacillations"
of future revolutions will, like Kronstadt, be rectified
by bullets when the Party "assert[s] its dictatorship
even if its dictatorship clashes even with the passing
moods of the workers' democracy." [Trotsky, quoted by
M. Brinton, Op. Cit., p. 78] No clearer condemnation of
Bolshevism as a socialist current is required.

And, we must ask, what, exactly, *were* these "conquests" 
of the revolution that must be defended? The suppression of 
strikes, independent political and labour organisations, 
elimination of freedom of speech, assembly and press and, 
of course, the elimination of soviet and union democracy 
in favour of part dictatorship? Which, of course, for all 
Leninists, is the *real* revolutionary conquest. Any one 
who attacks that is, of course, a counter-revolutionary 
(even if they are workers). Thus:

"Attitudes to the Kronstadt events, expressed . . . years
after the event often provide deep insight into the
political thinking of contemporary revolutionaries. They
may in fact provide a deeper insight into their conscious
or unconscious aims than many a learned discussion about
economics, or philosophy or about other episodes of
revolutionary history.

"It is a question of one's basic attitude as to what socialism
is all about. what are epitomised in the Kronstadt events
are some of the most difficult problems of revolutionary
strategy and revolutionary ethics: the problems of ends 
and means, of the relations between Party and masses, in
fact whether a Party is necessary at all. Can the working
class by itself only develop a trade union consciousness?
. . .

"Or can the working class develop a deeper consciousness
and understanding of its interests than can any
organisations allegedly acting on its behalf? When
Stalinists or Trotskyists speak of Kronstadt as 'an
essential action against the class enemy' when some
more 'sophisticated' revolutionaries refer to it as
a 'tragic necessity,' one is entitled to pause for
thought. One is entitled to ask how seriously they
accept Marx's dictum that 'the emancipation of the
working class is the task of the working class itself.'
Do they take this seriously or do they pay mere lip
service to the words? Do they identify socialism
with the autonomy (organisational and ideological)
of the working class? Or do they see themselves,
with their wisdom as to the 'historic interests'
of others, and with their judgements as to what
should be 'permitted,' as the leadership around
which the future elite will crystallise and develop?
One is entitled not only to ask . . . but also
to suggest the answer!" ["Preface", Ida Mett's
_The Kronstadt Uprising_, pp. 26-7]

The issue is simple -- either socialism means the 
self-emancipation of the working class or it does 
not. Leninist justifications for the suppression of 
the Kronstadt revolt simply means that for the 
followers of Bolshevism, when necessary, the party 
will paternalistically repress the working class for 
their own good. The clear implication of this 
Leninist support of the suppression of Kronstadt is 
that, for Leninism, it is dangerous to allow working 
class people to manage society and transform it as they 
see fit as they will make wrong decisions (like vote for 
the wrong party). If the party leaders decide a decision 
by the masses is incorrect, then the masses are 
overridden (and repressed). So much for "all power
to the soviets" or "workers' power."

Ultimately, Wright's comments (and those like it) show 
that Bolshevism's commitment to workers' power and 
democracy is non-existent. What is there left of 
workers' self-emancipation, power or democracy when 
the "workers state" represses the workers for trying 
to practice these essential features of any real form 
of socialism? It is the experience of Bolshevism in 
power that best refutes the Marxist claim that the 
workers' state "will be democratic and participatory." 
The suppression of Kronstadt was just one of a series of 
actions by the Bolsheviks which began, *before* the start 
of the Civil War, with them abolishing soviets which 
elected non-Bolshevik majorities, abolishing elected 
officers and soldiers soviets in the Red Army and Navy 
and replacing workers' self-management of production by 
state-appointed managers with "dictatorial" powers (see 
sections H.6.10 and H.7.2 for details). 

As Bakunin predicted, the "workers' state" did not, 
could not, be "participatory" as it was still a state.
Kronstadt is part of the empirical evidence which proves 
Bakunin's predictions on the authoritarian nature of Marxism. 
These words by Bakunin were confirmed by the Kronstadt 
rebellion and the justifications made at the time and 
afterwards by the supporters of Bolshevism:

"What does it mean, 'the proletariat raised to a governing class?'
Will the entire proletariat head the government? The Germans
number about 40 million. Will all 40 million be members of the
government? The entire nation will rule, but no one would be
ruled. Then there will be no government, there will be no
state; but if there is a state, there will also be those who
are ruled, there will be slaves.

"In the Marxists' theory this dilemma is resolved in a simple
fashion. By popular government they mean government of the
people by a small number of representatives elected by the
people. So-called popular representatives and rulers of
the state elected by the entire nation on the basis of
universal suffrage -- the last word of the Marxists, as
well as the democratic school -- is a lie behind which
the despotism of a ruling minority is concealed, a lie
all the more dangerous in that it represents itself as the
expression of a sham popular will.

"So . . . it always comes down to the same dismal result:
government of the vast majority of the people by a privileged 
minority. But this minority, the Marxists say, will consist of 
workers. Yes, perhaps, of *former* workers, who, as soon as 
they become rulers or representatives of the people will 
cease to be workers and will begin to look upon the whole 
workers' world from the heights of the state. They will no 
longer represent the people but themselves and their own 
pretensions to govern the people. . . 

"They say that this state yoke, this dictatorship, is a
necessary transitional device for achieving the total
liberation of the people: anarchy, or freedom, is the
goal, and the state, or dictatorship, the means. Thus,
for the masses to be liberated they must first be 
enslaved. . . . They claim that only a dictatorship
(theirs, of course) can create popular freedom. We
reply that no dictatorship can have any other objective
than to perpetuate itself, and that it can engender
and nurture only slavery in the people who endure it.
Liberty can only be created by liberty, by an
insurrection of all the people and the voluntary
organisation of the workers from below upward." 
[_Statism and Anarchy_, pp. 178-9]

H.8 What caused the degeneration of the Russian Revolution?

As is well known, the Russian Revolution failed. Rather than 
produce socialism, the Bolshevik revolution gave birth to an
autocratic party dictatorship residing over a state capitalist
economy. In turn, this regime gave rise to the horrors of 
Stalin's system. While Stalinism was denounced by all genuine 
socialists, a massive debate has existed within the Marxist
movement over when, exactly, the Russian Revolution failed 
and why it did. Some argue around 1924, others say around 1928,
some (libertarian Marxists) argue from the Bolshevik seizure of
power. The reasons for the failure tend to be more readily 
agreed upon: isolation, the economic and social costs of civil 
war, the "backward" nature of Russian society and economy are
usually listed as the key factors. Moreover, what the Stalinist 
regime was is also discussed heatedly in such circles. Some
(orthodox Trotskyists) claiming it was a "degenerated workers
state," others (such as the neo-Trotskyist UK SWP) that it was
"state capitalist."

For anarchists, however, the failure of Bolshevism did not come
as a surprise. In fact, just as with the reformist fate of the 
Social Democrats, the failure of the Russian Revolution provided
empirical evidence for Bakunin's critique of Marx. As Emma Goldman
recounts in her memoirs

"Professor Harold Laski . . . expressed the opinion that I ought
to take some comfort in the vindication anarchism had received 
by the Bolsheviki. I agreed, adding that not only their regime, 
but their stepbrothers as well, the Socialists in power in 
other countries, had demonstrated the failure of the Marxian
State better than any anarchist argument. Living proof was always
more convincing than theory.  Naturally I did not regret the
Socialist failure but I could not rejoice in it in the face of
the Russian tragedy." [_Living My Life_, vol. 2, p. 969]

Given that Leninists claim that the Russian revolution was a 
success (at least initially) and so proves the validity of 
their ideology, anarchists have a special duty to analysis and
understand what went wrong. Simply put, if the Russian Revolution
was a "success," Leninism does not need "failures"!

This section of the FAQ will discuss these explanations for the
failure of Bolshevism. Simply put, anarchists are not convinced 
by Leninist explanations on why Bolshevism created a new class 
system, not socialism. 

This subject is very important. Unless we learn the lessons of
history we will be doomed to repeat them. Given the fact that 
many people who become interested in socialist ideas will come
across the remnants of Leninist parties it is important that 
anarchists explains clearly and convincingly why the Russian 
Revolution failed and the role of Bolshevik ideology in that
process. We need to account why a popular revolution became 
in a few short years a state capitalist party dictatorship.
As Noam Chomsky put it:

"In the stages leading up to the Bolshevik coup in October 1917,
there *were* incipient socialist institutions developing in 
Russia -- workers' councils, collectives, things like that. 
And they survived to an extent once the Bolsheviks took over
-- but not for very long; Lenin and Trotsky pretty much 
eliminated them as they consolidated their power. I mean,
you can argue about the *justification* for eliminating them,
but the fact is that the socialist initiatives were pretty
quickly eliminated.

"Now, people who want to justify it say, 'The Bolsheviks had
to do it' -- that's the standard justification: Lenin and
Trotsky had to do it, because of the contingencies of the 
civil war, for survival, there wouldn't have been food 
otherwise, this and that. Well, obviously the question is,
was that true. To answer that, you've got to look at the 
historical facts: I don't think it was true. In fact, I 
think the incipient socialist structures in Russia were 
dismantles *before* the really dire conditions arose . . .
But reading their own writings, my feeling is that Lenin 
and Trotsky knew what they were doing, it was conscious
and understandable." [_Understanding Power_, p. 226] 

As we discussed in section H.8.3, Chomsky's feelings are more
than supported by the historical record. The elimination of
meaningful working class freedom and self-management started
from the start and was firmly in place before the start of 
the civil war at the end of May, 1918. The civil war simply 
accelerated processes which had already started, strengthened
policies that had already been applied. And it could be argued
that rather than impose alien policies onto Bolshevism, the
civil war simply brought the hidden (and not-so-hidden) state
capitalist and authoritarian politics of Marxism and Leninism
to the fore. 

Which is why analysing the failure of the revolution is important. 
If the various arguments presented by Leninists on why Bolshevism
failed (and, consequently, Stalinism developed) can be refuted, 
then we are left with the key issues of revolutionary politics -- 
whether Bolshevik politics had a decisive negative impact on the 
development of the Russian Revolution and, if so, there is an
alternative to those politics. As regards the first issue, as we
discussed in section H.9, anarchists argue that this was the case.
Bolshevik ideology itself played a key role in the degeneration of
the revolution. And as regards the second one, anarchists can point
to the example of the Makhnovists, which proves that alternative 
policies were possible and could be applied with radically different 
outcomes (see section H.11 for more on the Makhnovist movement). 

This means that anarchists stress the interplay between the 
"objective factors" and the subjective one (i.e. party ideology). 
Faced with difficult circumstances, people and parties react in 
different ways. If they did not then it would imply what they 
thought has no impact at all on their actions. It also means 
that the politics of the Bolsheviks played no role in their 
decisions. As we discussed in section H.9, this position simply
cannot be maintained. Leninist ideology itself played a key role
in the rise of Stalinism. A conclusion Leninists reject. They, 
of course, try to distance themselves from Stalinism, correctly 
arguing that it was a brutal and undemocratic system. The 
problem is that it was Lenin and Trotsky rather then Stalin 
who first shot strikers, banned left papers, radical organisations 
and party factions, sent workers and revolutionaries to the gulags, 
advocated and introduced one-man management and piece-work in the 
workplace, eliminated democracy in the military and shut down 
soviets elected with the "wrong" (i.e. non-Bolshevik) delegates.

Many Leninists know nothing of these facts. Their parties simply 
do not tell them the whole story of when Lenin and Trotsky were 
in power. Others do know and attempt to justify these actions. 
When anarchists discuss why the Russian Revolution failed, 
these Leninists have basically one reply. They argue that 
anarchists never seem to consider the objective forces at play 
during the Russian revolution, namely the civil war, the legacy 
of World War One, the international armies of counter-revolution 
and economic disruption. These "objective factors" meant that the 
revolution was, basically, suffocated and where the overriding 
contribution to the rise of militarism and the crushing of 
democracy within the soviets. 

For anarchists such "objective factors" do not (and must not) 
explain why the Russian Revolution failed. This is because, as
we argue in the following sections, almost all revolutions 
will face the same, or similar, problems. Indeed, in sections
H.8.1 and H.8.2 both anarchists like Kropotkin and Marxists 
like Lenin argued that this was the case. As we discussed in
section H.2.1, Leninists like to claim that they are "realistic"
(unlike the "utopian" anarchists) and recognise civil war is
inevitable in a revolution. As section H.8.3 indicates, any 
defence of Bolshevism based on blaming the impact of the civil
war is both factually and logically flawed. As far as economic
disruption goes, as we discuss in section H.8.4 this explanation
of Bolshevik authoritarianism is unconvincing as *every* revolution
will face this problem. Then section H.8.5 analyses the common 
Leninist argument that the revolution failed because the Russian
working class became "atomised" or "declassed." As that section
indicates, the Russian working class was more than capable of
collective action throughout the 1918 to 1921 period (and
beyond). The problem was that it was directed *against* the
Bolshevik party. Finally, section H.8.6 indicates whether 
the Bolshevik leaders explained their actions in terms of 
the "objective factors" they faced. 

It should be stressed that we are discussing this factors 
individually simply because it is easier to do so. It 
reality, it is less hard to do so. For example, civil war 
will, undoubtedly, mean economic disruption. Economic 
disruption will mean unemployment and that will affect the 
working class via unemployment and less goods available 
(for example). So just because we separate the specific 
issues for discussion purposes, it should not be taken to 
imply that we are not aware of their combined impact on 
the Russian Revolution.

Of course there is the slight possibility that the failure of
Bolshevism can be explained *purely* in these terms. Perhaps
a future revolution will be less destructive, less isolated, 
less resisted than the Russian (although, as we noted in the
section H.8.2, leading Bolsheviks like Lenin, Trotsky and Bukharin
doubted this). That *is* a possibility. However, should we embrace
an ideology whose basic, underlying, argument is based on the
hope that fate will be kinder to them this time? As Lenin argued
against the Russian left-communists in early 1918:

"Yes, we shall see the world revolution, but for the time being it
is a very good fairy-tale . . . But I ask, is it proper for a serious
revolutionary to believe in fairy-tales? . . . [I]f you tell the 
people that civil war will break out in German and also guarantee
that instead of a clash with imperialism we shall have a field
revolution on a world-wide scale, the people will say you are
deceiving them. In doing this you will be overcoming the difficulties
with which history has confronted us only in your minds, by your
wishes . . . You are staking everything on this card! If the 
revolution breaks out, everything is saved . . . But if it does
not turn out as we desire, if it does not achieve victory tomorrow
-- what then? Then the masses will say to you, you acted like 
gamblers -- you staked everything on a fortunate turn of events
that did not take place . . . " [_Collected Works_, vol. 27, 
p. 102]

Anarchists have always recognised that a revolution would face
problems and difficult "objective factors" and has developed
our ideas accordingly. We argue that to blame "objective factors"
on the failure of the Russian Revolution simply shows that 
believing in fairy-tales is sadly far too common on the "serious"
Leninist "revolutionary" left. And as we discuss in Section H.9, 
the impact of Bolshevik ideology on the failure of the revolution
was important and decisive. Even *if* the next revolution is less
destructive, it cannot be argued that socialism will be the result
if Bolshevik ideology is reapplied. And as Cornelius Castoriadis
argues, "this 'response' [of explaining the failure of the Russian
Revolution on "objective factors"] teaches us nothing we could 
extend beyond the confines of the Russian situation in 1920. The 
sole conclusion to be drawn from this kind of 'analysis' is that 
revolutionaries should ardently hope that future revolutions break 
out in more advanced countries, that they should not remain 
isolated, and that civil wars should not in the least be 
devastating." [_The Role of Bolshevik Ideology in the Birth of 
the Bureaucracy_, p. 92] While this may be sufficient for the
followers of Bolshevism, it cannot be sufficient for anyone who
wants to learn from history, not to repeat it.

Ultimately, if difficult times back in 1918-21 justified suppressing 
working class freedom and self-management, imprisoning and shooting 
anarchists and other socialists, implementing and glorifying party
dictatorship, what might we expect in difficult times in the future? 
Simply put, if your defence of the Bolsheviks rests simply on 
"difficult circumstances" then it can only mean one thing, namely 
if "difficult circumstances" occur again we can expect the same
outcome. 

One last point. We should stress that libertarians do not think 
any future revolution will suffer as terrible conditions as that 
experienced by the Russian one. However, it might and we need 
to base our politics on the worse case possibility. That said, 
we argue that Bolshevik policies made things worse -- by 
centralising economic and political power, they automatically 
hindered the participation of working class people in the 
revolution, smothering any creative self-activity under the 
dead-weight of state officialdom (see section H.9.7). As a 
libertarian revolution would be based on maximising working 
class self-activity (at all levels, locally and upwards) we 
would argue that it would be better placed to respond to even 
the terrible conditions facing the Russian Revolution.

That is not all. As we argue in section H.9 we are of the opinion 
that Bolshevism itself undermined the socialist potential of the 
revolution, irrespective of the actual circumstances involved 
(which, to some degree, will affect *any* revolution). For example, 
the Bolshevik preference for centralisation and nationalisation
would negatively affect a revolution conducted in even the best 
circumstances, as would the seizure of state power rather than its
destruction. As is clear from section H.9, only the elimination of
what makes Bolshevism Bolshevik would ensure that a revolution would
be truly libertarian. So anarchists stress that rather than be
forced upon them by "objective factors" many of these policies 
were, in fact, in line with pre-civil war Bolshevik ideas. The
Bolshevik vision of socialism, in other words, ensured that they
smothered the (libertarian) socialist tendencies and institutions 
that existed at the time. As Chomsky summarises, "Lenin and
Trotsky, shortly after seizing state power in 1917, moved to
dismantle organs of popular control, including factory committees
and Soviets, thus proceeding to deter and overcome socialist
tendencies." [_Deterring Democracy_, p. 361] That they *thought*
their system of state capitalism was a form of "socialism" is
irrelevant -- they systematically combated (real) socialist 
tendencies in favour of state capitalist ones and did so knowingly
and deliberately (see sections H.3.1 and H.3.13 on the differences
between real socialism and Marxism in its Bolshevik mode and, of
course, section H.6 on Bolshevik practice itself).

So it is important to stress that even *if* the Russian 
Revolution had occurred in better circumstances, it is 
unlikely that Bolshevism would have resulted in socialism 
rather than state capitalism. Certain Bolshevik principles 
ensure that any revolution lead by a vanguard party would 
not have succeeded. This can be seen from the experience of
Bolshevism immediately after it seized power, before the start of
the civil war and major economic collapse. In the circumstances of 
post-world war I Russia, these principles were attenuated but their 
application in even the best of situations would have undermined 
socialist tendencies in the revolution. Simply put, a statist 
revolution will have statist, not libertarian, ends.

The focusing on "objective factors" (particularly the civil war) 
has become the traditional excuse for people with a romantic 
attachment to Leninism but who are unwilling to make a stand 
over what the Bolsheviks actually did in power. This excuse is 
not viable if you seek to build a revolutionary movement today: 
you need to choose between the real path of Lenin and the real, 
anarchist, alternative. As Lenin constantly stressed, a revolution 
will be difficult -- fooling ourselves about what will happen now 
just undermines our chances of success in the future and ensure
that history will repeat itself.

Essentially, the "objective factors" argument is not a defence 
of Leninism, but rather one that seeks to evade having to make 
such a defence. This is very typical of Leninist parties today. 
Revolutionary politics would be much better served by confronting 
this history and the politics behind it head on. Perhaps, if
Leninists did do this, they would probably remain Leninists, 
but at least then their party members and those who read their
publications would have an understanding of what this meant.
And they would have to dump Lenin's _State and Revolution_ into
the same place Lenin himself did when in power -- into the rubbish
bin -- and admit that democracy and Bolshevik revolution do not
go together.

It is precisely these rationalisations for Bolshevism based on 
"objective" factors which this section of the FAQ discusses and 
refutes. However, it is important to stress that it was *not* 
a case of the Bolshevik regime wanting to introduce communism 
but, being isolated, ended up imposing state capitalism instead. 
Indeed, the idea that "objective factors" caused the degeneration 
of the revolution is only valid if and only if the Bolsheviks were 
implementing socialist policies during the period immediately after 
the October revolution. That was not the case. Rather than objective 
factors undermining socialist policies, the facts of the matter are 
that the Bolsheviks pursued a statist and (state) capitalist policy 
from the *start.* As we discuss in section H.9 the likes of Lenin 
explicitly argued for these policies as essential for building 
socialism (or, at best, the preconditions of socialism) in Russia
and Bolshevik practice flowed from these comments. As we discuss 
in more detail in section H.6.10, the Bolsheviks happily introduced 
authoritarian and state capitalist policies *from the start.* Many 
of the policies denounced as "Stalinist" by Leninists were being 
advocated and implemented by Lenin in the spring of 1918, i.e. 
before the start of the civil war and massive economic chaos.
In other words, the usual excuses for Bolshevik tyranny do not hold
much water, both factually and logically -- as this section of the 
FAQ seeks to show.

And, ironically, the framework which Leninists use in this discussion 
shows the importance of Bolshevik ideology and the key role it played 
in the outcome of the revolution. After all, pro-Bolsheviks argue that 
the "objective factors" forced the *Bolsheviks* to act as they did. 
However, the proletariat is meant to be the "ruling class" in the 
"dictatorship of the proletariat." As such, to argue that the 
Bolsheviks were forced to act as they did due to circumstances means 
to implicitly acknowledge that the party held power in Russia, 
*not* the working class. That a ruling party could become a party 
dictatorship is not that unsurprising. Nor that *its* vision of what
"socialism" was would be given preference over the desires of the 
working class in whose name it ruled.

Ultimately, the discussion on why the Bolshevik party failed shows
the validity of Bakunin's critique of Marxism. As he put it:

"Nor can we comprehend talk of freedom of the proletariat or 
true deliverance of the masses within the State and by the State.
State signifies domination, and all domination implies subjection
of the masses, and as a result, their exploitation to the 
advantage of some governing minority.

"Not even as revolutionary transition will we countenance national
Conventions, nor Constituent Assemblies, nor provisional governments,
nor so called revolutionary dictatorships: because we are persuaded
that revolution is sincere, honest and real only among the masses 
and that, whenever it is concentrated in the hands of a few 
governing individuals, it inevitably and immediately turns into
reaction." [_No Gods, No Masters_, vol. 1, p. 160]

The degeneration of the Russian Revolution can be traced from when 
the Bolsheviks seized power *on behalf of* the Russian working 
class and peasantry. The state implies the delegation of power 
and initiative into the hands of a few leaders who form the 
"revolutionary government." Yet the power of any revolution, as
Bakunin recognised, derives from the decentralisation of power, 
from the active participation of the masses in the collective 
social movement and the direct action it generates. As soon as 
this power passes out of the hands of the working class, the 
revolution is doomed: the counter-revolution has begun and it 
matters little that it is draped in a red flag. Hence anarchist 
opposition to the state.

Sadly, many socialists have failed to recognise this. Hopefully this
section of our FAQ will show that the standard explanations of the
failure of the Russian revolution are, at their base, superficial 
and will only ensure that history will repeat itself.

H.8.1 Do anarchists ignore the objective factors facing the 
      Russian revolution?
      
It is often asserted by Leninists that anarchists simply ignore
the "objective factors" facing the Bolsheviks when we discuss the
degeneration of the Russian Revolution. Thus, according to this
argument, anarchists present a basically idealistic analysis of
the failure of Bolshevism, one not rooted in the material 
conditions facing (civil war, economic chaos, etc.) facing Lenin
and Trotsky. 

According to one Trotskyist, anarchists "do not make the slightest
attempt at a serious analysis of the situation" and so "other 
considerations, of a different, 'theoretical' nature, are to be
found in their works." Thus:

"Bureaucratic conceptions beget bureaucracy just as opium begets
sleep by virtue of its sleep-inducing properties. Trotsky was 
wrong to explain the proliferation and rise of the bureaucracy 
on the basis of the country's backwardness, low cultural level,
and the isolation of the revolution. No, what have rise to a
social phenomenon like Stalinism was a conception or idea . . .
it is ideas, or deviations from them, that determine the 
character of revolutions. The most simplistic kind of 
philosophical idealism has laid low historical materialism." 
[Pierre Frank, "Introduction," Lenin and Trotsky, _Kronstadt_, 
pp. 22-3]

Many other Trotskyists take a similar position (although 
most would include the impact of the Civil War on the rise 
of Bolshevik authoritarianism and the bureaucracy). Duncan 
Hallas, for example, argues that the account of the Bolshevik 
counter-revolution given in the Cohn-Bendit brothers' _Obsolete
Communism_ is marked by a "complete omission of any consideration
of the circumstances in which they [Bolshevik decisions] took 
place. The ravages of war and civil war, the ruin of Russian
industry, the actual disintegration of the Russian working 
class: all of this, apparently, has no bearing on the outcome."
[_Towards a Revolutionary Socialist Party_, p. 41] Thus the
"degree to which workers can 'make their own history' depends
on the weight of objective factors bearing down on them . . .
To decide in any given circumstance the weight of the subjective
and objective factors demands a concrete analysis of the 
balance of forces." The conditions in Russia meant that 
the "subjective factor" of Bolshevik ideology "was reduced to
a choice between capitulation to the Whites or defending the
revolution with whatever means were at hands. Within these
limits Bolshevik policy was decisive. But it could not wish
away the limits and start with a clean sheet. It is a tribute
to the power of the Bolsheviks' politics and organisation that
they took the measures necessary and withstood the siege for
so long." [John Rees, "In Defence of October," pp. 3-82, 
_International Socialism_, no. 52, p. 30]

So, it is argued, by ignoring the problems facing the Bolsheviks 
and concentrating on their *ideas,* anarchists fail to understand 
*why* the Bolsheviks acted as they did. Unsurprisingly anarchists 
are not impressed with this argument. This is for a simple reason. 
According to anarchist theory the "objective factors" facing 
the Bolsheviks are to be expected in *any* revolution. Indeed, 
the likes of Bakunin and Kropotkin predicted that a revolution 
would face the very "objective factors" which Leninists use to 
justify and rationalise Bolshevik actions (see next section). As 
such, to claim that anarchists ignore the "objective factors" 
facing the Bolsheviks during the Russian Revolution is simply a 
joke. How can anarchists be considered to ignore what they 
consider to be the inevitable results of a revolution? Moreover, 
these Bolshevik assertions ignore the fact that the anarchists 
who wrote extensively about their experiences in Russia never 
failed to note that difficult objective factors facing it. 
Alexander Berkman in _The Bolshevik Myth_ paints a clear picture 
of the problems facing the revolution, as does Emma Goldman in 
her _My Disillusionment in Russia_. This is not to mention 
anarchists like Voline, Arshinov and Maximoff who took part in
the Revolution, experiencing the "objective factors" first hand
(and in the case of Voline and Arshinov, participating in the
Makhnovist movement which, facing the same factors, managed *not*
to act as the Bolsheviks did).

However, as the claim that anarchists ignore the "objective 
circumstances" facing the Bolsheviks is relatively common, it 
is important to refute it once and for all. This means that 
while have we discussed this issue in association with Leninist 
justifications for repressing the Kronstadt revolt (see section 
H.7.12), it is worthwhile repeating them here. We are sorry for 
the duplication.

Anarchists take it for granted that, to quote Bakunin, revolutions
"are not child's play" and that they mean "war, and that implies
the destruction of men and things." The "Social Revolution must 
put an end to the old system of organisation based upon violence,
giving full liberty to the masses, groups, communes, and associations,
and likewise to individuals themselves, and destroying once and for
all the historic cause of all violences, the power and existence of
the State." This meant a revolution would be "spontaneous, chaotic,
and ruthless, always presupposes a vast destruction of property."
[_The Political Philosophy of Bakunin_, p. 372, p. 373, p. 380]
In other words:

"The way of the anarchist social revolution, which will come
from the people themselves, is an elemental force sweeping away
all obstacles. Later, from the depths of the popular soul, there
will spontaneously emerge the new creative forms of life."
[_Bakunin on Anarchism_, p. 325]

He took it for granted that counter-revolution would exist, 
arguing that it was necessary to "constitute the federation
of insurgent associations, communes and provinces . . . to
organise a revolutionary force capable of defeating reaction"
and "for the purpose of self-defence." [_Selected Writings_,
p. 171]

It would, of course, be strange if this necessity for defence
and reconstruction would have little impact on the economic
conditions in the revolutionised society. The expropriation of
the means of production and the land by a free federation of 
workers' associations would have an impact on the economy.
Kropotkin built upon Bakunin's arguments, stressing that a 
*social* revolution would, by necessity, involve major 
difficulties and harsh objective circumstances. It is
worth quoting one of his many discussions of this at 
length:

"Suppose we have entered a revolutionary period, with or
without civil war -- it does not matter, -- a period when
old institutions are falling into ruins and new ones are
growing in their place. The movement may be limited to
one State, or spread over the world, -- it will have
nevertheless the same consequence: an immediate slackening
of individual enterprise all over Europe. Capital will
conceal itself, and hundreds of capitalists will prefer to
abandon their undertakings and go to watering-places 
rather than abandon their unfixed capital in industrial
production. And we know how a restriction of production in
any one branch of industry affects many others, and these
in turn spread wider and wider the area of depression.

"Already, at this moment, millions of those who have created
all riches suffer from want of what must be considered 
*necessaries* for the life of a civilised man. . . Let the
slightest commotion be felt in the industrial world, and it
will take the shape of a general stoppage of work. Let the
first attempt at expropriation be made, and the capitalist
production of our days will at once come to a stop, and 
millions and millions of 'unemployed' will join the ranks 
of those who are already unemployed now.

"More than that . . . The very first advance towards a 
Socialist society will imply a thorough reorganisation of 
industry as *to what we have to produce.* Socialism implies 
. . . a transformation of industry so that it may be adapted 
to the needs of the customer, not those of the profit-maker. 
Many a branch of industry must disappear, or limits its 
production; many a new one must develop. We are now producing 
a great deal for export. But the export trade will be the 
first to be reduced as soon as attempts at Social Revolution 
are made anywhere in Europe . . . 

"All that *can* be, and *will* be reorganised in time -- not
by the State, of course (why, then, not say by Providence?),
but by the workers themselves. But, in the meantime, the 
worker . . . cannot wait for the gradual reorganisation of
industry. . .

"The great problem of how to supply the wants of millions 
will thus start up at once in all its immensity. And the
necessity of finding an *immediate solution* for it is the
reason we consider that a step in the direction of 
[libertarian] Communism will be imposed on the revolted 
society -- not in the future, but as soon as it applies
its crowbar to the first stones of the capitalist edifice."
[_Act for Yourselves_, pp. 57-9]

As noted in section H.7.12, the perspective was at the core
of Kropotkin's politics. His classic work _Conquest of Bread_
was based on this clear understanding of the nature of a
social revolution and the objective problems it will face.
As he put it, while a "political revolution can be 
accomplished without shaking the foundations of industry"
a revolution "where the people lay hands upon property will
inevitably paralyse exchange and production . . . This point
cannot be too much insisted upon; the reorganisation of
industry on a new basis . . . cannot be accomplished in a
few days." Indeed, he considered it essential to "show how
tremendous this problem is." [_The Conquest of Bread_, 
pp. 72-3]

Therefore, "[o]ne of the great difficulties in every Revolution 
is the feeding of the large towns." This was because the "large 
towns of modern times are centres of various industries that 
are developed chiefly for the sake of the rich or for the
export trade" and these "two branches fail whenever any crisis 
occurs, and the question then arises of how these great urban
agglomerations are to be fed." This crisis, rather than making
revolution impossible, spurred the creation of what Kropotkin
terms "the communist movement" in which "the Parisian proletariat
had already formed a conception of its class interests and had
found men to express them well." [Kropotkin, _The Great French 
Revolution_, vol. II, p. 457 and p. 504]

As for self-defence, he reproached the authors of classic
syndicalist utopia _How we shall bring about the Revolution_
for "considerably attenuat[ing] the resistance that the Social
Revolution will probably meet with on its way." He stressed
that the "check of the attempt at Revolution in Russia has
shown us all the danger that may follow from an illusion of
this kind." ["preface," Emile Pataud and Emile Pouget, _How
we shall bring about the Revolution_, p. xxxvi]

It must, therefore, be stressed that the very "objective factors"
supporters of Bolshevism use to justify the actions of Lenin and
Trotsky were predicted correctly by anarchists decades before 
hand. Indeed, rather than ignore them anarchists like Kropotkin 
based their political and social ideas on these difficulties. As
such, it seems ironic for Leninists to attack anarchists for 
allegedly ignoring these factors. It is even more ironic as these
very same Leninists are meant to know that *any* revolution will
involve these exact same "objective factors," something that Lenin
and other leading Bolsheviks acknowledged (see next section).

Therefore, as noted, when anarchists like Emma Goldman and 
Alexander Berkman arrived in Russia they were aware of the 
problems it, like any revolution, would face. In the words 
of Berkman, "what I saw and learned as in such crying contrast 
with my hopes and expectations as to shake the very foundation 
of my faith in the Bolsheviki. Not that I expected to find 
Russia a proletarian Eldorado. By no means. I knew how great 
the travail of a revolutionary period, how stupendous the 
difficulties to be overcome. Russia was besieged on numerous 
fronts; there was counter-revolution within and without; the 
blockade was starving the country and denying even medical 
aid to sick women and children. The people were exhausted by 
long war and civil strive; industry was disorganised, the 
railroads broken down. I fully realised the dire situation, 
with Russia shedding her blood on the alter of the Revolution." 
[_The Bolshevik Myth_, p. 329] Emma Goldman expressed similar 
opinions. [_My Disillusionment in Russia_, pp. xlvii-xlix]

Unsurprisingly, therefore this extremely realistic 
perspective can be found in their later works. Berkman, 
for example, stressed that "when the social revolution 
had become thoroughly organised and production is 
functioning normally there will be enough for 
everybody. But in the first stages of the revolution, 
during the process of re-construction, we must take 
care to supply the people the best we can, and 
equally, which means rationing." This was because the 
"first effect of the revolution is reduced production." 
This would be initially due to the general strike which 
is its "starting point." However, "[w]hen the social 
revolution begins in any land, its foreign commerce 
stops: the importation of raw materials and finished 
products is suspended. The country may even be blockaded 
by the bourgeois governments." In addition, he thought 
it important not to suppress "small scale industries" 
as they would be essential when "a country in revolution 
is attacked by foreign governments, when it is blockaded 
and deprived of imports, when its large-scale industries 
threaten to break down or the railways do break down." 
[_ABC of Anarchism_, p. 67, p. 74 p. 78-9 and p. 79]

He, of course, considered it essential that to counteract 
isolation workers must understand "that their cause is 
international" and that "the organisation of labour" must 
develop "beyond national boundaries." However, "the
probability is not to be discounted that the revolution
may break out in one country sooner than in another" and
"in such a case it would become imperative . . . not to
wait for possible aid from outside, but immediately to
exert all her energies to help herself supply the most
essential needs of her people by her own efforts." [Op. 
Cit., p. 78]

Emma Goldman, likewise, noted that it was "a tragic fact 
that all revolutions have sprung from the loins of war. 
Instead of translating the revolution into social gains 
the people have usually been forced to defend themselves 
against warring parties." "It seems," she noted, "nothing 
great is born without pain and travail" as well as "the 
imperative necessity of defending the Revolution." However,
in spite of these inevitable difficulties she point to
how the Spanish anarchists "have shown the first example 
in history *how Revolutions should be made*" by "the 
constructive work" of "socialising of the land, the 
organisation of the industries." [_Vision on Fire_, p. 218, 
p. 222 and p. 55-56] 

These opinions were, as can be seen, to be expected from 
revolutionary anarchists schooled in the ideas of Bakunin 
and Kropotkin. Clearly, then, far from ignoring the "objective 
factors" facing the Bolsheviks, anarchists have based their 
politics around them. We have always argued that a social 
revolution would face isolation, economic disruption and 
civil war and have, for this reason, stressed the importance 
of mass participation in order to overcome them. As such, 
when Leninists argue that these inevitable "objective factors" 
caused the degeneration of Bolshevism, anarchists simply reply 
that if it cannot handle the inevitable then Bolshevism should 
be avoided. Just as we would avoid a submarine which worked 
perfectly well until it was placed in the sea or an umbrella 
which only kept you dry when it was not raining.

Moreover, what is to be made of this Leninist argument against 
anarchism? In fact, given the logic of their claims we have to
argument we have to draw the conclusion that the Leninists seem 
to think a revolution *could* happen *without* civil war and 
economic disruption. As such it suggests that the Leninists 
have the "utopian" politics in this matter. After all, if 
they argue that civil war is inevitable then how can they 
blame the degeneration of the revolution on it? Simply put, 
if Bolshevism cannot handle the inevitable it should be
avoided at all costs.

Ironically, as indicated in the next section, we can find ample 
arguments to refute the Trotskyist case against the anarchist 
analysis in the works of leading Bolsheviks like Lenin, Trotsky 
aand Bukharin. Indeed, their arguments provide a striking 
confirmation of the anarchist position as they, like Kropotkin, 
stress that difficult "objective factors" will face *every* 
revolution. This means to use these factors to justify Bolshevik 
authoritarianism simply results in proving that Bolshevism is 
simply non-viable or that a liberatory social revolution is, 
in fact, impossible (and, as a consequence, genuine socialism).
 
There are, of course, other reasons why the Leninist critique 
of the anarchist position is false. The first is theoretical. 
Simply put, the Leninist position is the crudest form of 
economic determinism. Ideas *do* matter and, as Marx himself 
stressed, can play a key in how a social process develops. 
As we discuss in section H.9, Marxist ideology played a key 
role in the degeneration of the revolution and in laying the 
groundwork for the rise of Stalinism. 

Ultimately, any Leninist defence of Bolshevism based purely
on stressing the "objective factor" implies that Bolshevik 
ideology played *no role* in the decisions made by the party 
leaders, that they simply operated on autopilot from October 
1917 onwards. Yet, at the same time, they stress the importance 
of Leninist ideology in ensuring the "victory" of the revolution. 
They seek to have it both ways. However, as Samuel Farber puts it:

"determinism's characteristic and systemic failure is to understand 
that what the masses of people do and think politically is as much 
part of the process determining the outcome of history as are the 
objective obstacles that most definitely limit peoples' choices." 
[_Before Stalinism_, p. 198]

This is equally applicable when discussing the heads of a highly
centralised state who have effectively expropriated political, 
economic and social power from the working class and are ruling 
in their name. Unsurprisingly, rather than just select policies 
at random the Bolshevik leadership pursued consistently before,
during and after the civil war policies which reflected their 
ideology. Hence there was a preference in policies which 
centralised power in the hands of a few (politically *and* 
economically), that saw socialism as being defined by 
nationalisation rather than self-management, that stressed 
that role and power of the vanguard above that of the working 
class, that saw class consciousness as being determined by 
how much a worker agreed with the party leadership rather 
than whether it expressed the actual needs and interests 
of the class as a whole.

Then there is the empirical evidence against the Trotskyist 
explanation.

As we indicate in section H.8.3, soviet democracy and workers' 
power in the workplace was *not* undermined by the civil war. 
Rather, the process had began before the civil war started and,
equally significantly, continued after its end in November 1920. 
Moreover, the "gains" of October Trotskyists claim that Stalinism 
destroyed were, in fact, long dead by 1921. Soviet democracy, 
working class freedom of speech, association and assembly, 
workers' self-management or control in the workplace, trade union 
freedom, the ability to strike, and a host of other, elementary, 
working class rights had been eliminated long before the end of 
the civil war (indeed, often before it started) and, moreover, 
the Bolsheviks did not lament this. Rather, "there is no evidence 
indicating that Lenin or any mainstream Bolshevik leaders lamented 
the loss of workers' control or of democracy in the soviets , or 
at least referred to these losses as a retreat, as Lenin declared 
with the replacement of War Communism by NEP in 1921." [Samuel 
Farber, Op. Cit., p. 44]

And then there is the example of the Makhnovist movement. Operating 
in the same "objective circumstances," facing the same "objective 
factors," the Makhnovists did *not* implement the same policies as 
the Bolsheviks. As we discussed in section H.11, rather than undermine 
soviet, soldier and workplace democracy and replace all with party 
dictatorship, the Makhnovists applied these as fully as they could. 
Now, if "objective factors" explain the actions of the Bolsheviks, 
then why did the Makhnovists not pursue identical policies? 

Simply put, the idea that Bolshevik policies did not impact on 
the outcome of the revolution is a false assertion, as the 
Makhnovists show. Beliefs are utopian if subjective ideas are 
not grounded in objective reality. Anarchists hold that part 
of the subjective conditions required before socialism can 
exist is the existence of free exchange of ideas and working 
class democracy (i.e. self-management). To believe that revolution 
is possible without freedom, to believe those in power can, through 
their best and genuine intentions, impose socialism from above, 
as the Bolsheviks did, is indeed utopian. As the Bolsheviks proved.
The Makhnovists shows that the received wisdom is that there was 
no alternative open to the Bolsheviks is false. 

So while it cannot be denied that objective factors influenced how
certain Bolshevik policies were shaped and applied, the inspiration
of those policies came from Bolshevik ideology. An acorn will grow 
and develop depending on the climate and location it finds itself 
in, but regardless of the "objective factors" it will grow into 
an oak tree. Similarly with the Russian revolution. While the 
circumstances it faced influenced its growth, Bolshevik ideology 
could not help but produce an authoritarian regime with no relationship
with *real* socialism.

In summary, anarchists do not ignore the objective factors
facing the Bolsheviks during the revolution. As indicated, we 
predicted the problems they faced and developed our ideas to 
counter them. As the example of the Makhnovists showed, our ideas
were more than adequate for the task. Unlike the Bolsheviks.

H.8.2 Can "objective factors" really explain the failure of Bolshevism?

As noted in the previous section, Leninists tend to argue that
anarchists downplay (at best) or ignore (at worse) the "objective
factors" facing the Bolsheviks during the Russian Revolution. As
noted in the same section, this argument is simple false. For
anarchists have long expected the "objective factors" usually 
used to explain the degeneration of the revolution.

However, there is more to it than that. Leninists claim to be
revolutionaries. They claim to know that revolutions face problems,
the civil war is inevitable and so forth. It therefore strikes
anarchists as being somewhat hypocritical for Leninists to blame
these very same "objective" but allegedly inevitable factors for
the failure of Bolshevism in Russia.

Ironically enough, Lenin and Trotsky agree with these anarchist 
arguments. Looking at Trotsky, he dismissed the CNT's leaderships'
arguments in favour of collaborating with the bourgeois state:

"The leaders of the Spanish Federation of Labour (CNT) . . . 
became, in the critical hour, bourgeois ministers. They explained 
their open betrayal of the theory of anarchism by the pressure of 
'exceptional circumstances.' But did not the leaders of the German 
social democracy invoke, in their time, the same excuse? Naturally, 
civil war is not a peaceful and ordinary but an 'exceptional 
circumstance.' Every serious revolutionary organisation, however, 
prepares precisely for 'exceptional circumstances' . . . We have 
not the slightest intention of blaming the anarchists for not 
having liquidated the state with the mere stroke of a pen. A 
revolutionary party , even having seized power (of which the 
anarchist leaders were incapable in spite of the heroism of the 
anarchist workers), is still by no means the sovereign ruler of 
society. But all the more severely do we blame the anarchist 
theory, which seemed to be wholly suitable for times of peace, 
but which had to be dropped rapidly as soon as the 'exceptional 
circumstances' of the... revolution had begun. In the old days 
there were certain generals - and probably are now - who 
considered that the most harmful thing for an army was war. 
Little better are those revolutionaries who complain that 
revolution destroys their doctrine." [_Stalinism and Bolshevism_]

Thus to argue that the "exceptional circumstances" caused by the
civil war are the only root cause of the degeneration of the Russian
Revolution is a damning indictment of Bolshevism. After all, Lenin
did not argue in _State and Revolution_ that the application of
soviet democracy was dependent only in "times of peace." Rather,
he stressed that they were for the "exceptional circumstance" of
revolution and the civil war he considered its inevitable consequence.
As such, we must note that Trotsky's followers do not apply this 
critique to their own politics, which are also a form of the 
"exceptional circumstances" excuse. Given how quickly Bolshevik 
"principles" (as expressed in _The State and Revolution_) were 
dropped, we can only assume that Bolshevik ideas are also suitable 
purely for "times of peace" as well. As such, we must note the 
irony of Leninist claims that "objective circumstances" explains 
the failure of the Bolshevik revolution. 

Saying that, we should not that Trotsky was not above using such 
arguments himself (making later-day Trotskyists at least ideologically
consistent in their hypocrisy). In the same essay, for example, he 
justifies the prohibition of other Soviet parties in terms of a 
"measure of defence of the dictatorship in a backward and devastated 
country, surrounded by enemies on all sides." In other words, an 
appeal to the exceptional circumstances facing the Bolsheviks! 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, his followers have tended to stress this
(contradictory) aspect of his argument rather than his comments 
that those "who propose the abstraction of Soviets to the party
dictatorship should understand that only thanks to the party 
dictatorship were the Soviets able to lift themselves out of the 
mud of reformism and attain the state form of the proletariat. The 
Bolshevik party achieved in the civil war the correct combination 
of military art and Marxist politics." [Op. Cit.] Which, of course, 
suggests that the prohibition of other parties had little impact 
on levels of soviet "democracy" allowed under the Bolsheviks (see
section H.6.6 for more on this).

This dismissal of the "exceptional circumstances" argument 
did not originate with Trotsky. Lenin repeatedly stressed 
that any revolution would face civil war and economic disruption. 
In early January, 1918, he was pointing to "the incredibly 
complications of war and economic ruin" in Russia and noting 
that "the fact that Soviet power has been established . . . is 
why civil war has acquired predominance in Russia at the present 
time." [_Collected Works_, vol. 26, p. 453 and p. 459] 

A few months later he states quite clearly that "it will never be 
possible to build socialism at a time when everything is running
smoothly and tranquilly; it will never be possible to realise 
socialism without the landowners and capitalists putting up a
furious resistance." He reiterated this point, acknowledging 
that the "country is poor, the country is poverty-stricken, 
and it is impossible just now to satisfy all demands; that is
why it is so difficult to build the new edifice in the midst
of disruption. But those who believe that socialism can be 
built at a time of peace and tranquillity are profoundly mistake:
it will be everywhere built at a time of disruption, at a time
of famine. That is how it must be." [Op. Cit., vol. 27, p. 520
and p. 517]

As regards civil war, he noted that "not one of the great revolutions
of history has take place" without one and "without which not a
single serious Marxist has conceived the transition from capitalism
to socialism." Moreover, "there can be no civil war -- the inevitable
condition and concomitant of socialist revolution -- without 
disruption." [Op. Cit., p. 496 and p. 497] He considered this 
disruption as being applicable to advanced capitalist nations as 
well:

"In Germany, state capitalism prevails, and therefore the 
revolution in Germany will be a hundred times more devastating 
and ruinous than in a petty-bourgeois country -- there, too, 
there will be gigantic difficulties and tremendous chaos and 
imbalance." [Op. Cit., vol. 28, p. 298] 

And from June, 1918:

"We must be perfectly clear in our minds about the new disasters
that civil war brings for every country. The more cultured a 
country is the more serious will be these disasters. Let us 
picture to ourselves a country possessing machinery and 
railways in which civil war is raging., and this civil war cuts
off communication between the various parts of the country. 
Picture to yourselves the condition of regions which for decades
have been accustomed to living by the interchange of manufactured
goods and you will understand that every civil war brings forth
disasters." [Op. Cit., vol. 27, p. 463]

As we discuss in section H.8.4, the economic state of Germany
immediately after the end of the war suggests that Lenin had a 
point. Simply put, the German economy was in a serious state of
devastation, a state equal to that of Russia during the equivalent
period of its revolution. If economic conditions made party 
dictatorship inevitable in Bolshevik Russia (as pro-Leninists
argue) it would mean that soviet democracy and revolution cannot
go together.

Lenin reiterated this point again and again. He argued that "we 
see famine not only in Russia, but in the most cultured, advanced
countries, like Germany . . . it is spread over a longer period
than in Russia, but it is famine nevertheless, still more severe
and painful than here." In fact, "today even the richest countries 
are experiencing unprecedented food shortages and that the 
overwhelming majority of the working masses are suffering 
incredible torture." [Op. Cit., vol. 27, p. 460 and p. 461]

Lenin, unlike many of his latter day followers, did not consider
these grim objective conditions are making revolution impossible.
Rather, for him, there was "no other way out of this war" which
is causing the problems "except revolution, except civil war
. . . a war which always accompanies not only great revolutions
but every serious revolution in history." He continued by arguing 
that we "must be perfectly clear in our minds about the new 
disasters that civil war brings for every country. The more 
cultured a country is the more serious will be these disasters. 
Let us picture to ourselves a country possessing machinery and 
railways in which civil war is raging, and this civil war cuts 
communication between the various parts of the country. Picture 
to yourselves the condition of regions which for decades have 
been accustomed to living by interchange of manufactured goods 
and you will understand that every civil war brings fresh 
disasters." [Op. Cit., p. 463] The similarities to Kropotkin's
arguments made three decades previously are clear (see section
H.7.1 for details).

Indeed, he mocked those who would argue that revolution could
occur with "exceptional circumstances":

"A revolutionary would not 'agree' to a proletarian revolution
only 'on the condition' that it proceeds easily and smoothly,
that there is, from the outset, combined action on the part
of proletarians of different countries, that there are 
guarantees against defeats, that the road of the revolution is
broad, free and straight, that it will not be necessary during
the march to victory to sustain the heaviest casualties, to
'bide one's time in a besieged fortress,' or to make one's
way along extremely narrow, impassable, winding and dangerous
mountain tracks. Such a person is no revolutionary." 
[_Selected Works_, vol. 2, p. 709]

He then turned his fire on those who failed to recognise the
problems facing a revolution and instead simply blamed the
Bolsheviks:

"The revolution engendered by the war cannot avoid the terrible
difficulties and suffering bequeathed it by the prolonged, 
ruinous, reactionary slaughter of the nations. To blame us
for the 'destruction' of industry, or for the 'terror', is
either hypocrisy or dull-witted pedantry; it reveals an
inability to understand the basic conditions of the fierce
class struggle, raised to the highest degree of intensity,
that is called revolution." [Op. Cit., pp. 709-10]

Thus industrial collapse and terrible difficulties would face
any revolution. It goes without saying that if it was "hypocrisy"
to blame Bolshevik politics for these problems, it would be the
same to blame these problems for Bolshevik politics. As Lenin
noted, "in revolutionary epochs the class struggle has always,
inevitably, and in every country, assumed the form of
*civil war,* and civil war is inconceivable without the
severest destruction, terror and the restriction of formal
democracy in the interests of this war." Moreover, "[w]e know 
that fierce resistance to the socialist revolution on the part 
of the bourgeoisie is inevitable in all countries, and
that this resistance will *grow* with the growth of the 
revolution." [Op. Cit., p. 710 and p. 712] To blame the 
inevitable problems of a revolution for the failings of 
Bolshevism suggests that Bolshevism is simply not suitable 
for revolutionary situations.

At the 1920 Comintern Congress Lenin lambasted a German socialist
who argued against revolution because "Germany was so weakened by
the War" that if it had been "blockaded again the misery of the 
German masses would have been even more dreadful." Dismissing this
argument, Lenin argued as follows:

"A revolution . . . can be made only if it does not worsen the
workers' conditions 'too much.' Is it permissible, in a communist
party, to speak in a tone like this, I ask? This is the language
of counter-revolution. The standard of living in Russia is 
undoubtedly lower than in Germany, and when we established the
dictatorship, this led to the workers beginning to go more
hungry and to their conditions becoming even worse. The workers'
victory cannot be achieved without sacrificing, without a 
temporary deterioration of their conditions. . . If the German 
workers now want to work for the revolution, they must make
sacrifices and not be afraid to do so . . . The labour aristocracy,
which is afraid of sacrifices, afraid of 'too great' impoverishment
during the revolutionary struggle, cannot belong to the party.
Otherwise the dictatorship is impossible, especially in western
European countries." [_Proceedings and Documents of the Second 
Congress 1920_, pp. 382-3]

In 1921 he repeated this, arguing that "every revolution entails
enormous sacrifice on the part of the class making it. . .  The
dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia has entailed for the
ruling class -- the proletariat -- sacrifices, want and privation
unprecedented in history, and the case will, in all probability,
be the same in every other country." [_Collected Works_, vol. 32, 
p. 488] Thus Lenin is on record as saying these "objective factors" 
will always be the circumstances facing a socialist revolution. 
Indeed, in November 1922 he stated that "Soviet rule in Russia is 
celebrating its fifth anniversary, It is now sounder than ever." 
[Op. Cit., vol. 33, p. 417]

All of which must be deeply embarrassing to Leninists. After all,
here is Lenin arguing that the factors Leninist's list as being
responsible for the degeneration of the Russian Revolution were
inevitable side effects of *any* revolution!

Nor was this perspective limited to Lenin. The inevitability of 
economic collapse being associated with a revolution was not 
lost on Trotsky either (see section H.7.12). Nikolai Bukharin
even wrote the (infamous) _The Economics of the Transition 
Period_ to make theoretical sense of (i.e. rationalise and 
justify) the party's changing policies and their social 
consequences since 1918 in terms of the inevitability of 
bad "objective factors" facing the revolution. While some 
Leninists like to paint Bukharin's book (like most Bolshevik 
ideas of the time) as "making a virtue out of necessity," 
Bukharin (like the rest of the Bolshevik leadership) did not. 
As one commentator notes, Bukharin "belive[d] that he was 
formulating universal laws of proletarian revolution." [Stephan 
F. Cohen, _In Praise of War Communism: Bukharin's The 
Economics of the Transition Period_, p. 195] 

Bukharin listed four "real costs of revolution," namely "the 
physical destruction or deterioration of material and living elements
of production, the atomisation of these elements and of sectors
of the economy, and the need for unproductive consumption (civil
war materials, etc.). These costs were interrelated and followed
sequentially. Collectively they resulted in '*the curtailment of
the process of reproduction*' (and 'negative expanded reproduction')
and Bukharin's main conclusion: 'the production "anarchy" . . . ,
"the revolutionary disintegration of industry," is an historically
inevitable stage which no amount of lamentation will prevent.'"
This was part of a general argument and his "point was that great 
revolutions were always accompanied by destructive civil wars . . . 
But he was more intent on proving that a proletarian revolution 
resulted in an even greater temporary fall in production than did 
its bourgeois counterpart." To do this he formulated the "costs of
revolution" as "a law of revolution." [Op. Cit., pp. 195-6 and 
p. 195]

Cohen notes that while this "may appear to have been an obvious
point, but it apparently came as something of a revelation to
many Bolsheviks. It directly opposed the prevailing Social 
Democratic assumption that the transition to socialism would
be relatively painless . . . Profound or not, Bolsheviks 
generally came to accept the 'law' and to regard it as a 
significant discovery by Bukharin." [Op. Cit., p. 196] To 
quote Bukharin:

"during the transition period the labour apparatus of society 
inevitably disintegrates, that reorganisation presupposes 
disorganisation, and that there the temporary collapse of 
productive forces is a law inherent to revolution." [quoted
by Cohen, Op. Cit., p. 196]

It would appear that this "obvious point" would *still* come 
"as something of a revelation to many Bolsheviks" today! 
Significantly, of course, Kropotkin had formulated this 
law decades previously! How the Bolsheviks sought to cope 
with this inevitable law is what signifies the difference 
between anarchism and Leninism. Simply put, Bukharin endorsed 
the coercive measures of war communism as the means to go 
forward to socialism. As Cohen summarises, "force and coercion 
. . . were the means by which equilibrium was to be forged out 
of disequilibrium." [Op. Cit., p. 198] Given that Bukharin 
argued that a workers' state, by definition, could not exploit 
the workers, he opened up the possibility for rationalising 
all sorts of abuses as well as condoning numerous evils 
because they were "progressive." Nor was Bukharin alone 
in this, as Lenin and Trotsky came out with similar nonsense.

It should be noted that Lenin showed "ecstatic praise for the 
most 'war communist' sections" of Bukharin's work. "Almost 
every passage," Cohen notes, "on the role of the new state,
statisation in general, militarisation and mobilisation met
with 'very good,' often in three languages,  . . . Most 
striking, Lenin's greatest enthusiasm was reserved for the
chapter on the role of coercion . . . at the end [of which]
he wrote, 'Now this chapter is superb!'" [Op. Cit., pp. 202-3]
Compare this to Kropotkin's comment that the "revolutionary
tribunal and the guillotine could not make up for the lack
of a constructive communist theory." [_The Great French
Revolution_, vol. II, p. 519]

Ultimately, claims that "objective factors" caused the 
degeneration of the revolution are mostly attempts to 
let the Bolsheviks of the hook for Stalinism. This approach
was started by Trotsky and continued to this day. Anarchists, 
unsurprisingly, do not think much of these explanations. For 
anarchists, the list of "objective factors" listed to explain
the degeneration of the revolution are simply a list of factors 
*every* revolution would (and has) faced -- as Lenin, Bukharin 
and Trotsky all admitted at the time! 

So we have the strange paradox of Leninists dismissing and
ignoring the arguments of their ideological gurus. For Trotsky,
just as for Lenin, it was a truism that revolutionary politics 
had to handle "objective" factors and "exceptional circumstances." 
And for both, they thought they had during the Russian revolution. 
Yet for their followers, these explain the failure of Bolshevism. 
Tony Cliff, one of Trotsky's less orthodox followers, gives us 
a means of understanding this strange paradox. Discussing the 
_Platform of the United Opposition_ he notes that it "also 
suffered from the inheritance of the exceptional conditions 
of the civil war, when the one-party system was transformed 
from a necessity into a virtue." [_Trotsky_, vol. 3, pp. 248-9] 
Clearly, "exceptional circumstances" explain nothing and are 
simply an excuse for bad politics while "exceptional conditions" 
explain everything and defeat even the best politics!

As such, it seems to us extremely ironic that Leninists blame 
the civil war for the failure of the revolution as they 
continually raise the inevitability of civil war in a 
revolution to attack anarchism (see section H.2.1 for an 
example). Did Lenin not explain in _State and Revolution_
that his "workers' state" was designed to defend the revolution
and suppress capitalist resistance? If it cannot do its 
proclaimed task then, clearly, it is a flawed theory. 
Ultimately, if "civil war" and the other factors listed by 
Leninists (but considered inevitable by Lenin) preclude the 
implementation of the radical democracy Lenin argued for 
in 1917 as the means to suppress the resistance of the 
capitalists then his followers should come clean and say 
that that work has no bearing on their vision of revolution.
Therefore, given that the usual argument for the "dictatorship 
of the proletariat" is that it is required to repress 
counter-revolution, it seems somewhat ironic that the event 
it was said to be designed for (i.e. revolution) should be 
responsible for its degeneration! 

As such, anarchists tend to think these sorts of explanations
of Bolshevik dictatorship are incredulous. After all, as 
*revolutionaries* the people who expound these "explanations" 
are meant to know that civil war, imperialist invasion and 
blockade, economic disruption, and a host of other "extremely 
difficult circumstances" are part and parcel of a revolution. 
They seem to be saying, "if only the ruling class had not 
acted as our political ideology predicts they would then the 
Bolshevik revolution would have been fine"! As Bertrand Russell 
argued after his trip to Soviet Russia, while since October 
1917 "the Soviet Government has been at war with almost all 
the world, and has at the same time to face civil war at 
home" this was "not to be regarded as accidental, or as a 
misfortune which could not be foreseen. According to Marxian 
theory, what has happened was bound to happen." [_The Theory 
and Practice of Bolshevism_, p. 103]

In summary, anarchists are not at all convinced by the claims
that "objective factors" can explain the failure of the Russian
Revolution. After all, according to Lenin and Trotsky these 
factors were to be expected in *any* revolution -- civil war 
and invasion, economic collapse and so forth were not restricted
to the Russian revolution. That is why they say they want a 
"dictatorship of the proletariat," to defend against 
counter-revolution (see section H.3.8 on how, once in power,
Lenin and Trotsky revised this position). Now, if Bolshevism 
cannot handle what it says is inevitable, then it should be 
avoided. To use an analogy:

Bolshevik: "Join with us, we have a great umbrella which will 
            keep us dry."

Anarchist: "Last time it was used, it did not work. We all got 
            soaked!"

Bolshevik: "But what our anarchist friend fails to mention is 
            that it was raining at the time!"

Not very convincing! Yet, sadly, this is the logic of the common
Leninist justification of Bolshevik authoritarianism during the
Russian Revolution.  

H.8.3 Can the civil war explain the failure of Bolshevism?

One of the most common assertions against the anarchists case
against Bolshevism is that while we condemn the Bolsheviks, 
we fail to mention the civil war and the wars of intervention.
Indeed, for most Leninists the civil war is usually considered
the key event in the development of Bolshevism, explaining and
justifying all anti-socialist acts conducted by them after they
seized power.

For anarchists, such an argument is flawed on two levels, namely
logical and factual. The logical flaw is that Leninist argue 
that civil war is inevitable after a revolution. They maintain,
correctly, that it is unlikely that the ruling class will 
disappear without a fight. Then they turn round and complain that
because the ruling class did what the Marxists predicted, the
Russian Revolution failed! And they (incorrectly) harp on about 
anarchists ignoring civil war (see section H.2.1).

So, obviously, this line of defence is nonsense. If civil war is 
inevitable, then it cannot be used to justify the failure of the
Bolshevism. Marxists simply want to have their cake and eat it to. 
You simply cannot argue that civil war is inevitable and then blame
it for the failure of the Russian Revolution. 

The other flaw in this defence of Bolshevism is the factual one,
namely the awkward fact that Bolshevik authoritarianism started
*before* the civil war broke out. Simply put, it is difficult to 
blame a course of actions on an event which had not started yet.
Moreover, Bolshevik authoritarianism *increased* after the civil 
war finished. This, incidentally, caused anarchists like Alexander
Berkman to re-evaluate their support for Bolshevism. As he put it, 
"I would not concede the appalling truth. Still the hope persisted
that the Bolsheviki, though absolutely wrong in principle and
practice, yet grimly held on to *some* shreds of the revolutionary
banner. 'Allied interference,' 'the blockade and civil war,' 'the
necessity of the transitory stage' -- thus I sought to placate
my outraged conscience . .  . At last the fronts were liquidated,
civil war ended, and the country at peace. But Communist policies
did not change. On the contrary . . . The party groaned under the
unbearable yoke of the Party dictatorship. . . . Then came 
Kronstadt and its simultaneous echoes throughout the land . . . 
Kronstadt was crushed as ruthlessly as Thiers and Gallifet 
slaughtered the Paris Communards. And with Kronstadt the entire
country and its last hope. With it also my faith in the 
Bolsheviki." [_The Bolshevik Myth_, p. 331]

If Berkman had been in Russia in 1918, he may have realised that
the Bolshevik tyranny during the civil war (which climaxed, post
civil war, with the attack on Kronstadt -- see section H.7 for
more on the Kronstadt rebellion) was not at odds with their 
pre-civil war activities to maintain their power. The simple 
fact is that Bolshevik authoritarianism was *not* caused by the 
pressures of the civil war, rather they started before then. All 
the civil war did was strengthen certain aspects of Bolshevik
ideology and practice which had existed from the start (see 
section H.9).

While we discuss the Russian Revolution in more detail in 
section H.6, it is useful to summarise the Bolshevik attacks
on working class power and autonomy before the civil war broke
out (i.e. before the end of May 1918).

The most important development during this period was the 
suppression of soviet democracy and basic freedoms. As
we discuss in section H.6.6, the Bolsheviks pursued a
policy of systematically undermining soviet democracy 
from the moment they seized power. The first act was the
creation of a Bolshevik government over the soviets, so
marginalising the very organs they claimed ruled in Russia.
The process was repeated in the local soviets, with the
executive committees holding real power while the plenary
sessions become infrequent and of little consequence. 
Come the spring of 1918, faced with growing working class
opposition they started to delay soviet elections. When
finally forced to hold elections, the Bolsheviks responded
in two ways to maintain their power. Either they gerrymandered
the soviets, packing them with representatives of Bolshevik
dominated organisation or they simply disbanded them by 
force if they lost the soviet elections (and repressed by 
force any protests against this). This was the situation
at the grassroots. At the summit of the soviet system, 
the Bolsheviks simply marginalised the Central Executive
Committee of the soviets. Real power was held by the 
Bolshevik government. The power of the soviets had simply
become a fig-leaf for a "soviet power" -- the handful of
Bolsheviks who made up the government and the party's
central committee.

It should be stressed that the Bolshevik assault on the soviets
occurred in March, April and May 1918. That is, *before* the
Czech uprising and the onset of full-scale civil war. So, to 
generalise, it cannot be said that it was the Bolshevik party 
that alone whole-heartedly supported Soviet power. The facts 
are that the Bolsheviks only supported "Soviet power" when the 
soviets were Bolshevik. As recognised by the left-Menshevik 
Martov, who argued that the Bolsheviks loved Soviets only when 
they were "in the hands of the Bolshevik party." [quoted by 
Getzler, _Martov_, p. 174] If the workers voted for others, 
"soviet power" was quickly replaced by party power (the real 
aim). The Bolsheviks had consolidated their position in early 
1918, turning the Soviet State into a de facto one party state 
by gerrymandering and disbanding of soviets before the start of 
the Civil War. 

Given this legacy of repression, Leninist Tony Cliff's assertion 
that it was only "under the iron pressure of the civil war [that] 
the Bolshevik leaders were forced to move, as the price of survival, 
to *a one-party system*" needs serious revising. Similarly, his
comment that the "civil war undermined the operation of the 
local soviets" is equally inaccurate, as his is claim that "for
some time -- i.e. until the armed uprising of the Czechoslovak
Legion -- the Mensheviks were not much hampered in their 
propaganda work." Simply put, Cliff's statement that "it was
about a year after the October Revolution before an actual
monopoly of political power was held by one party" is false.
Such a monopoly existed *before* the start of the civil war,
with extensive political repression existing *before* the 
uprising of the Czechoslovak Legion which began it. There 
was a *de facto* one-party state by the spring of 1918. 
[_Lenin_, vol. 3, p. 163, p. 150, p. 167 and p. 172]

The suppression of Soviet democracy reached it logical conclusion 
in 1921 when the Kronsdadt soviet, heart of the 1917 revolution, 
was stormed by Bolshevik forces, its leaders executed or forced 
into exile and the rank and file imprisoned, and scattered all 
over the USSR. Soviet democracy was not just an issue of debate 
but one many workers died in fighting for. As can be seen, 
similar events to those at Kronstadt had occurred three years 
previously.

Before turning to other Bolshevik attacks on working class power
and freedom, we need to address one issue. It will be proclaimed
that the Mensheviks (and SRs) were "counter-revolutionaries" and
so Bolshevik actions against them were justified. However, the
Bolsheviks' started to suppress opposition soviets *before* the 
civil war broke out, so at the time neither group could be called
"counter-revolutionary" in any meaningful sense of the word. The
Civil War started on the 25th of May and the SRs and Mensheviks 
were expelled from the Soviets on the 14th of June. While the 
Bolsheviks "offered some formidable fictions to justify the 
expulsions" there was "of course no substance in the charge 
that the Mensheviks had been mixed in counter-revolutionary 
activities on the Don, in the Urals, in Siberia, with the 
Czechoslovaks, or that they had joined the worst Black Hundreds." 
[Getzler, Op. Cit., p. 181] The charge that the Mensheviks
"were active supporters of intervention and of counter-revolution"
was "untrue . . . and the Communists, if they ever believed it,
never succeeded in establishing it." [Schapiro, Op. Cit., p. 193]
The Bolsheviks expelled the Mensheviks in the context of political 
loses before the Civil War. As Getzler notes the Bolsheviks "drove 
them underground, just on the eve of the elections to the Fifth 
Congress of Soviets in which the Mensheviks were expected to make 
significant gains." [Op. Cit., p. 181]

Attacks on working class freedoms and democracy were not limited
to the soviets. As well as the gerrymandering and disbanding of 
soviets, the Bolsheviks had already presented economic visions 
much at odds with what most people consider as fundamentally 
socialist. Lenin, in April 1918, was arguing for one-man
management and "[o]bedience, and unquestioning obedience at 
that, during work to the one-man decisions of Soviet directors, 
of the dictators elected or appointed by Soviet institutions, 
vested with dictatorial powers." [_Six Theses on the Immediate 
Tasks of the Soviet Government_, p. 44] His support for a new
form of wage slavery involved granting state appointed "individual 
executives dictatorial powers (or 'unlimited' powers)." Large-scale 
industry ("the foundation of socialism") required "thousands 
subordinating their will to the will of one," and so the revolution 
"demands" that "the people *unquestioningly* obey the single will 
of the leaders of labour." Lenin's "superior forms of labour 
discipline" were simply hyper-developed capitalist forms. The 
role of workers in production was the same, but with a novel 
twist, namely "unquestioning obedience to the orders of individual 
representatives of the Soviet government during the work." [Lenin, 
_Selected Writings_, vol. 2, p. 610, p. 611, p. 612] 

This simply replaced private capitalism with *state* 
capitalism. "In the shops where one-man management 
(Lenin's own preference) replaced collegial management," 
notes Diane Koenker, "workers faced the same kinds of 
authoritarian management they thought existed only under 
capitalism." [_Labour Relations in Socialist Russia_, 
p. 177] If, as many Leninists claim, one-man management 
was a key factor in the rise of Stalinism and/or 
"state-capitalism" in Russia, then, clearly, Lenin's 
input in these developments cannot be ignored. After 
advocating "one-man management" and "state capitalism" 
in early 1918, he remained a firm supporter of them. 
In the light of this it is bizarre that some later day 
Leninists claim that the Bolsheviks only introduced one-man 
management because of the Civil War. Clearly, this was *not* 
the case. It was *this* period (before the civil war) that saw
Lenin advocate and start to take the control of the economy 
out of the hands of the workers and placed into the hands of 
the Bolshevik party and the state bureaucracy.

Needless to say, the Bolshevik undermining of the factory 
committee movement and, consequently, genuine worker's 
self-management of production in favour of state capitalism 
cannot be gone into great depth here (see section H.6.10 for a 
fuller discussion). Suffice to say, the factory committees 
were deliberately submerged in the trade unions and state 
control replaced workers' control. This involved practising 
one-man management and, as Lenin put in at the start of May 
1918, "our task is to study the state capitalism of the 
Germans, to spare *no effort* in copying it and not to shrink 
from adopting *dictatorial* methods to hasten the copying of 
it." He stressed that this was no new idea, rather he "gave
it *before* the Bolsheviks seized power." [_Selected Writings_, 
vol. 2, p. 635 and p. 636] 

It will be objected that Lenin advocated "workers' control." 
This is true, but a "workers' control" of a *very* limited 
nature. As we discuss in section H.3.14, rather than seeing 
"workers' control" as workers managing production directly, 
he always saw it in terms of workers' "controlling" those who 
did and his views on this matter were *radically* different
to those of the factory committees. This is not all, as 
Lenin always placed his ideas in a statist context -- rather 
than base socialist reconstruction on working class 
self-organisation from below, the Bolsheviks started "to 
build, from the top, its 'unified administration'" based on 
central bodies created by the Tsarist government in 1915 and 
1916. [Maurice Brinton, _The Bolsheviks and Workers' Control_, 
p. 36] The institutional framework of capitalism would 
be utilised as the principal (almost exclusive) instruments 
of "socialist" transformation. Lenin's support for "one-man 
management" must be seen in this context, namely his 
vision of "socialism." 

Bolshevik advocating and implementing of "one-man management" was 
not limited to the workplace. On March 30th Trotsky, as Commissar 
of Military Affairs, set about  reorganising the army. The death 
penalty for disobedience under fire was reintroduced, as was 
saluting officers, special forms of address, separate living 
quarters and privileges for officers. Officers were no longer 
elected. Trotsky made it clear: "The elective basis is politically 
pointless and technically inexpedient and has already been set 
aside by decree." [quoted by Brinton, Op. Cit., pp. 37-8] The
soldiers were given no say in their fate, as per bourgeois armies.

Lenin's proposals also struck at the heart of workers' power 
in other ways. For example, he argued that "we must raise the 
question of piece-work and apply it . . . in practice." [_The 
Immediate Tasks Of The Soviet Government_, p. 23] As Leninist 
Tony Cliff (of all people) noted, "the employers have at 
their disposal a number of effective methods of disrupting th[e] 
unity [of workers as a class]. Once of the most important of these 
is the fostering of competition between workers by means of 
piece-work systems." He notes that these were used by the Nazis 
and the Stalinists "for the same purpose." [_State Capitalism in 
Russia_, pp. 18-9] Obviously piece-work is different when Lenin 
introduces it!

Finally, there is the question of general political freedom. It
goes without saying that the Bolsheviks suppressed freedom of
the press (for left-wing opposition groups as well as capitalist
ones). It was also in this time period that the Bolsheviks first 
used the secret police to attack opposition groups. Unsurprisingly, 
this was not directed against the right. The anarchists in Moscow 
were attacked on the night of April 11-12, with armed detachments
of the Cheka raiding 26 anarchist centres, killing or wounding 40 
and jailing 500. Shortly afterwards the Cheka carried out similar 
raids in Petrograd and in the provinces. In May _Burevestnik_, 
_Anarkhiia_, _Golos Truda_ and other leading anarchist periodicals 
closed down. [Paul Avrich, _The Russian Anarchists_, pp. 184-5]
It must surely be a coincidence that there had been a "continued
growth of anarchist influence among unskilled workers" after
the October revolution and, equally coincidentally, that "[b]y 
the spring of 1918, very little was heard from the anarchists in 
Petrograd." [David Mandel, _The Petrograd Workers and the Soviet 
Seizure of Power_, p. 357]

All this *before* the Trotsky provoked revolt of the Czech 
legion at the end of May, 1918, and the consequent "democratic 
counter-revolution" in favour of the Constituent Assembly (which
the right-Socialist Revolutionaries led). This, to repeat, was 
months before the rise of the White Armies and Allied intervention. 
In summary, it was *before* large-scale civil war took place, 
in an interval of relative peace, that we see the introduction of 
most of the measures Leninists now try and pretend were 
necessitated by the Civil War itself.

So if anarchists appear to "downplay" the effects of the civil war
it is not because we ignore. We simply recognise that if you think
it is inevitable, you cannot blame it for the actions of the 
Bolsheviks. Moreover, when the Bolsheviks eliminated military
democracy, undermined the factory committees, started to disband 
soviets elected with the "wrong" majority, repress the anarchists 
and other left-wing opposition groups, and so on, *the civil war 
had not started yet.* So the rot had started before civil war 
(and consequent White Terror) and "imperialist intervention" 
started. Given that Lenin said that civil war was inevitable, 
blaming the inevitable (which had not even started yet!) for 
the failure of Bolshevism is *not* very convincing.

This factual problem with the "civil war caused Bolshevik 
authoritarianism" is the best answer to it. If the Bolsheviks 
pursued authoritarian policies before the civil war started, 
it is hard to justify their actions in terms of something that 
had not started yet. This explains why some Leninists have 
tried to muddy the waters somewhat by obscuring when the 
civil war started. For example, John Rees states that "[m]ost
historians treat the revolution and the civil war as separate
processes" yet "[i]n reality they were one." He presents a
catalogue of "armed resistance to the revolution," including
such "precursors of civil war before the revolution" as the
suppression after the July days and the Kornilov revolt in 1917.
[John Rees, "In Defence of October," pp. 3-82, _International 
Socialism_, no. 52, p. 31-2] 

Ironically, Rees fails to see how this blurring of when the
civil war started actually *harms* Leninism. After all, most
historians place the start of the civil war when the Czech
legion revolted *because* it marked large-scale conflict 
between armies. It is one thing to say that authoritarianism
was caused by large-scale conflict, another to say *any* form
of conflict caused it. Simply put, if the Bolshevik state could
not handle relatively minor forms of counter-revolution then
where does that leave Lenin's _State and Revolution_? So while 
the period from October to May of 1918 was not trouble free, 
it was not one where the survival of the new regime looked 
to be seriously threatened as it was after that, particularly 
in 1919 and 1920. Thus "civil war" will be used, as it is
commonly done, to refer to the period from the Czech revolt
(late May 1918) to the final defeat of Wrangel (November 1920).

So, the period from October to May of 1918, while not trouble 
free, was not one where the survival of the new regime looked 
to be seriously threatened as it was to be in 1919 and 1920. 
This means attempts to push the start of the civil war back
to October 1917 (or even earlier) simply weakens the Leninist
argument. It still leaves the major problem for the "blame it 
on the civil war" Leninists, namely to explain why the months 
*before* May of 1918 saw soviets being closed down, the start 
of the suppression of the factory committees, restrictions on 
freedom of speech and association, plus the repression of 
opposition groups (like the anarchists). Either any level of
"civil war" makes Lenin's _State and Revolution_ redundant or
the source of Bolshevik authoritarianism must be found elsewhere.

That covers the period *before* the start of the civil war. 
we now turn to the period *after* it finished. Here we find
the same problem, namely an *increase* of authoritarianism
even after the proclaimed cause for it (civil war) had ended.

After the White General Wrangel was forced back into the Crimea,
he had to evacuate his forced to Constantinople in November 1920. 
With this defeat the Russian civil war had come to an end. Those 
familiar with the history of the revolution will realise that 
it was some 4 months *later* that yet another massive strike wave
occurred, the Kronstadt revolt took place and the 10th Party 
Congress banned the existence of factions within the Bolshevik 
party itself. The repression of the strikes and Kronstadt revolt 
effectively destroying hope for mass pressure for change from 
below and the latter closing off the very last "legal" door for 
those who opposed the regime from the left.

It could be argued that the Bolsheviks were still fighting peasant 
insurrections and strikes across the country, but this has 
everything to do with Bolshevik policies and could only be 
considered "counter-revolutionary" if you think the Bolsheviks
had a monopoly of what socialism and revolution meant. In the
case of the Makhnovists in the Ukraine, the Bolsheviks started
that conflict by betraying them once Wrangel had been defeated.
As such, any resistance to Bolshevik rule by the working class
and peasantry of Russia indicated the lack of democracy within
the country rather than some sort of "counter-revolutionary"
conflict.

So even the end of the Civil War causes problems for this 
defence of the Bolsheviks. Simply put, with the defeat of
the Whites it would be expected that some return to democratic
norms would happen. It did not, in fact the reverse happened.
Factions were banned, even the smallest forms of opposition 
was finally eliminated from both the party and society as a
whole. Those opposition groups and parties which had been 
tolerated during the civil war were finally smashed. Popular
revolts for reform, such as the Kronstadt rebellion and the
strike wave which inspired it, were put down by force (see
section H.7 on these events). No form of opposition was 
tolerated, no freedom allowed. If civil war *was* the cause 
of Bolshevik authoritarianism, it seems strange that it got 
worse after it was finished.

So, to conclude. Bolshevik authoritarianism did not begun with
the start of the civil war. Anti-socialist policies were being
implemented before it started. Similarly, these policies did
not stop when the civil war ended, indeed the reverse happened.
This, then, is the main factual problem with the "blame the civil 
war" approach. Much of the worst of the suppression of working 
class democracy either happened *before* the Civil War started 
or *after* it had finished.

As we discuss in section H.9, the root causes for Bolshevik 
authoritarian post-October was Bolshevik ideology combined with 
state power. After all, how "democratic" is it to give all power 
to the Bolshevik party central committee? Surely socialism 
involves more than voting for a new government? Is it not about 
mass participation, the kind of participation centralised 
government precludes and Bolshevism fears as being influenced 
by "bourgeois ideology"? In such circumstances, moving from party 
rule to party dictatorship is not such leap. 

That "civil war" cannot explain what happened can be shown by a
counter-example which effectively shows that civil war did not 
inevitably mean party dictatorship over a state capitalist 
economy (and protesting workers and peasants!). The Makhnovists 
(an anarchist influenced partisan army) managed to defend the 
revolution and encourage soviet democracy, freedom of speech, 
and so on, while doing so (section H.11 discusses the Makhnovists 
in some detail). In fact, the Bolsheviks tried to *ban* their 
soviet congresses. Which, of course, does not really fit in 
with the Bolsheviks being forced to be anti-democratic due to 
the pressures of civil war. 

So, in summary, civil war and imperialist intervention cannot be 
blamed for Bolshevik authoritarianism simply because the latter
had started before the former existed. Moreover, the example of
the Makhnovists suggests that Bolshevik policies during the civil
war were also not driven purely by the need for survival. As
Kropotkin argued at the time, "all foreign armed intervention
necessarily strengthens the dictatorial tendencies of the
government . . . The evils inherent in a party dictatorship
have been accentuated by the conditions of war in which this 
party maintains its power. This state of war has been the pretext
for strengthening dictatorial methods which centralise the control
of every detail of life in the hands of the government, with the
effect of stopping an immense part of the ordinary activity of
the country. The evils natural to state communism have been 
increased ten-fold under the pretext that all our misery is 
due to foreign intervention." [_Kropotkin's Revolutionary
Pamphlets_, p. 253] 

In other words, while the civil war may have increased Bolshevik 
authoritarianism, it did not create it nor did it end with the 
ending of hostilities.

H.8.4 Did economic collapse and isolation destroy the revolution?

One of the most common explanations for the failure revolution is
that the Bolsheviks faced a terrible economic conditions, which 
forced them to be less than democratic. Combined with the failure 
of the revolution to spread to more advanced countries, party 
dictatorship, it is argued, was inevitable. In the words of
one Leninist:

"In a country where the working class was a minority of the
population, where industry had been battered by years of war
and in conditions of White and imperialist encirclement, the
balance gradually titled towards greater coercion. Each
step of the way was forced on the Bolsheviks by dire and
pressing necessities." [John Rees, "In Defence of October,"
_International Socialism_, no. 52, p. 41]

He talks of "economic devastation" [p. 31] and quotes various
sources, including Victor Serge. According to Serge, the 
"decline in production was uninterrupted. It should be noted 
that this decline had already begun before the revolution.
In 1916 the output of agricultural machinery, for example, was
down by 80 per cent compared with 1913. The year 1917 had been
marked by a particularly general, rapid and serious downturn.
The production figures for the principal industries in 1913 and
1918 were, in millions of *poods*: coal, from 1,738 to 731 
(42 per cent); iron ore, from 57, 887 to 1,686; cast-iron, 
from 256 to 31.5 (12.3 per cent); steel, from 259 to 24.5;
rails, from 39.4 to 1.1. As a percentage of 1913 production, 
output of linen fell to 75 per cent, of sugar to 24 per cent,
and tobacco to 19 per cent." Moreover, production continued 
"to fall until the end of civil war . . . For 1920, the following 
indices are given as a percentage of output in 1913: coal, 27 
per cent; cast iron, 2.4 per cent; linen textiles, 38 per cent." 
[_Year One of the Russian Revolution_, p. 352 and p. 425]

According to Tony Cliff (another of Rees's references), the
war-damaged industry "continued to run down" in the spring of
1918: "One of the causes of famine was the breakdown of 
transport . . . Industry was in a state of complete collapse.
Not only was there no food to feed the factory workers; there
was no raw material or fuel for industry . . . The collapse
of industry meant unemployment for the workers." Cliff provides
economic indexes. For large scale industry, taking 1913 as the
base, 1917 saw production fall to 77%. In 1918, it was at 35%
of the 1913 figure, 1919 it was 26% and 1920 was 18%. 
Productivity per worker also fell, from 85% in 1917, to 
44% in 1918, 22% in 1919 and then 26% in 1920. [_Lenin_,
vol. 3, pp. 67-9, p. 86 and p. 85]

In such circumstances, it is argued, how can you expect the
Bolsheviks to subscribe to democratic and socialist norms?
This meant that the success or failure of the revolution
depended on whether the revolution spread to more advanced
countries. Leninist Duncan Hallas argues that the "failure
of the German Revolution in 1918-19 . . . seems, in retrospect,
to have been decisive . . . for only substantial economic aid
from an advanced economy, in practice from a socialist 
Germany, could have reversed the disintegration of the 
Russian working class." ["Towards a revolutionary socialist
party," pp. 38-55, _Party and Class_, Alex Callinicos (ed.),
p. 44]

Anarchists are not convinced by these arguments. This is for
two reasons. 

Firstly, we are aware that revolutions are disruptive no matter 
where they occur (see section H.8.1) Moreover, Leninists are
meant to know this to. Simply put, there is a certain incredulous 
element to these arguments. After all, Lenin himself had argued 
that "[e]very revolution . . . by its very nature implies a 
crisis, and a very deep crisis at that, both political and 
economic. This is irrespective of the crisis brought about 
by the war." [_Collected Works_, vol. 30, p. 341] Serge 
also considered crisis as inevitable, arguing that the
"conquest of production by the proletariat was in itself a
stupendous victory, one which saved the revolution's life. 
Undoubtedly, so thorough a recasting of all the organs of
production is impossible without a substantial decline in
output; undoubtedly, too, a proletariat cannot labour and
fight at the same time." [Op. Cit., p. 361] As we discussed in 
detail in section H.8.2, this was a common Bolshevik position 
at the time (which, in turn, belatedly echoed anarchist 
arguments -- see section H.8.1). And if we look at other 
revolutions, we can say that this is the case.

Secondly, and more importantly, every revolution or near 
revolutionary situation has been accompanied by economic
crisis. For example, as we will shortly prove, Germany 
itself was in a state of serious economic collapse in 1918 
and 1919, a collapse which would have got worse is a 
Bolshevik-style revolution had occurred there. This means
that *if* Bolshevik authoritarianism is blamed on the 
state of the economy, it is not hard to conclude that 
*every* Bolshevik-style revolution will suffer the same
fate as the Russian one.

As we noted in section H.8.1, Kropotkin had argued from the
1880s that a revolution would be accompanied by economic 
disruption. Looking at subsequent revolutions, he has been
vindicated time and time again. Every revolution has been 
marked by economic disruption and falling production. This
suggests that the common Leninist idea that a successful
revolution in, say, Germany would have ensured the success
of the Russian Revolution is flawed. Looking at Europe 
during the period immediately after the first world war, we 
discover great economic hardship. To quote one Trotskyist 
editor:

"In the major imperialist countries of Europe, production still
had not recovered from wartime destruction. A limited economic
upswing in 1919 and early 1920 enabled many demobilised 
soldiers to find work, and unemployment fell somewhat. 
Nonetheless, in 'victorious' France overall production in
1920 was still only two-thirds its pre-war level. In Germany
industrial production was little more than half its 1914
level, human consumption of grains was down 44 per cent,
and the economy was gripped by spiralling inflation. Average
per capita wages in Prague in 1920, adjusted for inflation,
were just over one-third of pre-war levels." [John Riddell,
"Introduction," _Proceedings and Documents of the Second
Congress, 1920_, vol. I, p. 17]

Now, if economic collapse was responsible for Bolshevik 
authoritarianism and the subsequent failure of the revolution,
it seems hard to understand why an expansion of the revolution
into similarly crisis ridden countries would have had a major
impact in the development of the revolution. Since most Leninists
agree that the German Revolution, we will discuss this in more
detail before going onto other revolutions.

By 1918, Germany was in a bad state. Victor Serge noted "the 
famine and economic collapse which caused the final ruin of
the Central Powers." [Op. Cit., p. 361] The semi-blockade of 
Germany during the war badly effected the economy, the 
"dynamic growth" of which before the war "had been largely 
dependent on the country's involvement in the world market". 
The war "proved catastrophic to those who had depended on 
the world market and had been involved in the production of 
consumer goods . . . Slowly but surely the country slithered 
into austerity and ultimately economic collapse." Food 
production suffered, with "overall food production declined 
further after poor harvests in 1916 and 1917. Thus grain 
production, already well below its prewar levels, slumped 
from 21.8 million to 14.9 million tons in those two years." 
[V. R. Berghahn, _Modern Germany_, p. 47, pp. 47-8, p. 50]

The parallels with pre-revolution Russia are striking and 
it is hardly surprising that revolution did break out in 
Germany in November 1918. Workers' councils sprang up all 
across the country, inspired in part by the example of the 
Russian soviets (and what people *thought* was going on in 
Russia under the Bolsheviks). A Social-Democratic government 
was founded, which used the Free Corps (right-wing volunteer 
troops) to crush the revolution from January 1919 onwards.
This meant that Germany in 1919 was marked by extensive civil 
war within the country. In January 1920, a state of siege 
was re-introduced across half the country. 

This social turmoil was matched by economic turmoil. As in 
Russia, Germany faced massive economic problems, problems 
which the revolution inherited. Taking 1928 as the base year, 
the index of industrial production in Germany was slightly 
lower in 1913, namely 98 in 1913 to 100 in 1928. In other 
words, Germany effectively lost 15 years of economic 
activity. In 1917, the index was 63 and by 1918 (the year 
of the revolution), it was 61 (i.e. industrial production 
had dropped by nearly 40%). In 1919, it fell again to 37, 
rising to 54 in 1920 and 65 in 1921. Thus, in 1919, the 
"industrial production reached an all-time low" and it 
"took until the late 1920s for [food] production to recover 
its 1912 level . . . In 1921 grain production was still . . . 
some 30 per cent below the 1912 figure." Coal production
was 69.1% of its 1913 level in 1920, falling to 32.8% in
1923. Iron production was 33.1% in 1920 and 25.6% in 1923.
Steel production likewise fell to 48.5% in 1920 and fell
again to 36% in 1923. [V. R. Berghahn, Op. Cit., p. 258, 
pp. 67-8, p. 71 and p. 259]

Significantly, one of the first acts of the Bolshevik government
towards the new German government was to "the offer by the
Soviet authorities of two trainloads of grain for the 
hungry German population. It was a symbolical gesture and,
in view of desperate shortages in Russia itself, a generous
one." The offer, perhaps unsurprisingly, was rejected in 
favour of grain from America. [E.H. Carr, _The Bolshevik 
Revolution_, vol. 3, p. 106]

The similarities between Germany and Russia are clear. As
noted above, in Russia, the index for large scale industry 
fell to 77 in 1917 from 100 in 1913, falling again to 35 in 
1918, 26 in 1919 and 18 in 1920. [Tony Cliff, _Lenin_, vol. 3, 
p. 86] In other words, a fall of 23% between 1913 and 1917, 
54.5% between 1917 and 1918, 25.7% in 1918 and 30.8% in 1919. 
A similar process occurred in Germany, where the fall 
production was 37.7% between 1913 and 1917, 8.2% between 
1917 and 1918 and 33.9% between 1918 and 1919 (the year of 
revolution). While production did rise in 1920 by 45.9%, 
production was still around 45% less than before the war. 

Thus, comparing the two countries we discover a similar 
picture of economic collapse. In the year the revolution
started, production had fallen by 23% in Russia (from 
1913 to 1917) and by 43% in Germany (from 1913 to 1918).
Once revolution had effectively started, production fell
even more. In Russia, it fell to 65% of its pre-war level
in 1918, in Germany it fell to 62% of its pre-war level 
in 1919. Of course, in Germany revolution did not go as
far as in Russia, and so production did rise somewhat in 
1920 and afterwards. What is significant is that in 1923,
production fell dramatically by 34% (from around 70% of its
pre-war level to around 45% of that level). This economic
collapse did not deter the Communists from trying to provoke 
a revolution in Germany that year, so suggesting that economic 
disruption played no role in their evaluation of the success 
of a revolution. 

This economic chaos in Germany is never mentioned by Leninists
when they discuss the "objective factors" facing the Russian
Revolution. However, once these facts are taken into account,
the superficiality of the typical Leninist explanation for the
degeneration of the revolution becomes obvious. The very 
problems which, it is claimed, forced the Bolsheviks to 
act as they did also were rampant in Germany. If economic
collapse made socialism impossible in Russia, it would 
surely have had the same effect in Germany (and any social 
revolution would also have faced more disruption than actually 
faced post 1919 in Germany). This means, given that the economic 
collapse in both 1918/19 and 1923 was as bad as that facing 
Russia in 1918 and that the Bolsheviks had started to undermine 
soviet and military democracy along with workers' control by 
spring and summer of that year (see section H.8.3), to blame 
Bolshevik actions on economic collapse would mean that any 
German revolution would have been subject to the same 
authoritarianism *if* the roots of Bolshevik authoritarianism
were forced by economic events rather than a product of applying
a specific political ideology via state power. Few Leninists 
draw this obvious conclusion from their own arguments although 
there is no reason for them not to.
 
So the German Revolution was facing the same problems the 
Russian one was. It seems unlikely, therefore, that a 
successful German revolution would have been that much aid 
to Russia. This means that when John Rees argues that giving
machinery or goods to the peasants in return for grain instead 
of simply seizing it required "revolution in Germany, or at
least the revival of industry" in Russia, he completely fails
to indicate the troubles facing the German revolution. "Without 
a successful German revolution," he writes, "the Bolsheviks 
were thrown back into a bloody civil war with only limited 
resources. The revolution was under siege." [John Rees, "In 
Defence of October," pp. 3-82, _International Socialism_, 
no. 52, p. 40 and p. 29] Yet given the state of the German 
economy at the time, it is hard to see how much help a
successful German revolution would have been. As such, his
belief that a successful German Revolution would have mitigated
Bolshevik authoritarianism seems exactly that, a belief without
any real evidence to support it (and let us not forget, Bolshevik
authoritarianism had started before the civil war broke out -- 
see section H.8.3). Moreover, *if* the pro-Bolshevik argument 
Rees is expounding *is* correct, then the German Revolution 
would have been subject to the same authoritarianism as befell 
the Bolshevik one simply because it was facing a similar economic
crisis. Luckily, anarchists argue, that this need not be the case
if libertarian principles are applied in a revolution:

"The first months of emancipation will inevitably increase
consumption of goods and production will diminish. And, 
furthermore, any country achieving social revolution will be
surrounded by a ring of neighbours either unfriendly or
actually enemies . .  . The demands upon products will increase
while production decreases, and finally famine will come. There
is only one way of avoiding it. We should understand that as
soon as a revolutionary movement begins in any country the only
possible way out will consist in the workingmen [and women]
and peasants from the beginning taking the whole national
economy into their hands and organising it themselves . . . 
But they will not be convinced of this necessity except when
all responsibility for national economy, today in the hands of
a multitude of ministers and committees, is presented in a
simple form to each village and city, in every factory and shop,
as their own affair, and when they understand that they must
direct it themselves." [_Kropotkin's Revolutionary Pamphlets_,
pp. 77-8]

So, as regards the Russian and German revolution, Kropotkin's 
arguments were proven correct. The same can be said of other 
revolutions as well. Basing himself on the actual experiences 
of both the French Revolution and the Paris Commune, we can 
see why Kropotkin argued as he did. The Paris Commune, for 
example, was born after a  four-month-long siege "had left 
the capital in a state of economic collapse. The winter had 
been the severest in living memory. Food and fuel had been 
the main problems . . . Unemployment was widespread. Thousands 
of demobilised soldiers wandered loose in Paris and joined in 
the general hunt for food, shelter and warmth. For most working 
men the only source of income was the 1.50 francs daily pay 
of the National Guard, which in effect had become a form of 
unemployment pay." The city was "near starving" and by March 
it was "in a state of economic and political crisis." [Stewart 
Edwards, "Introduction," _The Communards of Paris, 1871_, 
p. 23] Yet this economic collapse and isolation did not stop 
the commune from introducing and maintaining democratic forms 
of decision making, both political and economic. A similar
process occurred during the French Revolution, where mass 
participation via the "sections" was not hindered by economic
collapse. It was finally stopped by state action organised by
the Jacobins to destroy popular participation and initiative
(see Kropotkin's _The Great French Revolution_ for details).

During the Spanish Revolution, "overall Catalan production 
fell in the first year of war by 30 per cent, and in the 
cotton-working sector of the textile industry by twice as 
much. Overall unemployment (complete and partial) rose by 
nearly a quarter in the first year, and this despite the 
military mobilisation decreed in September 1936. The cost
of living quadrupled in just over two years; wages . . .
only doubled." [Ronald Fraser, _Blood of Spain_, p. 234] 
Markets, both internally and externally, for goods and raw 
materials were disrupted, not to mention the foreign blockade 
and the difficulties imposed in trying to buy products from 
other countries. These difficulties came on top of problems
caused by the great depression of the 1930s which affected
Spain along with most other countries. Yet, democratic norms 
of economic and social decision making continued in spite of
economic disruption. Ironically, given the subject of this
discussion, it was only once the Stalinist counter-revolution 
got going were they fatally undermined or destroyed.

Thus economic disruption need not automatically imply 
authoritarian policies. And just as well, given the fact that
revolution and economic disruption seem to go hand in hand.

Looking further afield, even *revolutionary* situations can
be accompanied with economic collapse. For example, the 
Argentine revolt which started in 2001 took place in the face
of massive economic collapse. The economy was a mess, with 
poverty and unemployment at disgusting levels. Four years of 
recession saw the poverty rate balloon from 31 to 53 percent 
of the population of 37 million, while unemployment climbed 
from 14 to 21.4 percent, according to official figures. Yet
in the face of such economic problems, working class people
acted collectively, forming popular assemblies and taking 
over workplaces.

The Great Depression of the 1930s in America saw a much deeper
economic contradiction. Indeed, it was as bad as that associated
with revolutionary Germany and Russia after the first world war.
According to Howard Zinn, after the stock market crash in 1929
"the economy was stunned, barely moving. Over five thousand
banks closed and huge numbers of businesses, unable to get
money, closed too. Those that continued laid off employees and
cut the wages of those who remained, again and again. Industrial
production fell by 50 percent, and by 1933 perhaps 15 million
(no knew exactly) -- one-forth or one-third of the labour
force --  were out of work." [_A People's History of the 
United States_, p. 378]

Specific industries were badly affected. For example, total GNP 
fell to 53.6% in 1933 compared to its 1929 value. The production 
of basic goods fell by much more. Iron and Steel saw a 59.3% 
decline, machinery a 61.6% decline and "non-ferrous metals and 
products" a 55.9% decline. Transport was also affected, with 
transportation equipment declining by 64.2% railroad car 
production dropping by 73.6% and locomotion production declining 
by 86.4%. Furniture production saw a decline of 57.9%. The 
workforce was equally affected, with unemployment reaching 25%
in 1933. In Chicago 40% of the workforce was unemployed. Union
membership, which had fallen from 5 million in 1920 to 3.4
million in 1929 fell to less than 3 million by 1933. [Lester 
V. Chandler, _America's Greatest Depression, 1929-1941_, p. 20,
p. 23, p. 34, p. 45 and p. 228]

Yet in the face of this economic collapse, no Leninist proclaimed
the impossibility of socialism. In fact, the reverse what the case.
Similar arguments could apply to, say, post-world war two Europe,
when economic collapse and war damage did not stop Trotskyists
looking forward to, and seeking, revolutions there. Nor did the
massive economic that occurred after the fall of Stalinism in 
Russia in the early 1990s deter Leninist calls for revolution. 
Indeed, you can rest assured that any drop in economic activity, 
no matter how large or small, will be accompanied by Leninist 
articles arguing for the immediate introduction of socialism.
And this was the case in 1917 as well, when economic crisis had 
been a fact of Russian life throughout the year. Lenin, for 
example, argued at the end of September of that "Russia is 
threatened with an inevitable catastrophe . . .A catastrophe 
of extraordinary dimensions, and a famine, are unavoidably 
threatening . . . Half a year of revolution has passed. The 
catastrophe has come still closer. Things have come to a state 
of mass unemployment. Think of it: the country is suffering from 
a lack of commodities." [_The Threatening Catastrophe and how
to Fight It_, p. 5] This did not stop him calling for revolution
and seizing power. Nor did this crisis stop the creation of 
democratic working class organisations, such as soviets, trade 
unions and factory committees being formed. It did not stop mass 
collective action to combat those difficulties. It appears, 
therefore, that while the economic crisis of 1917 did not stop 
the development of socialist tendencies to combat it, the 
seizure of power by a socialist party did. 

Given that no Leninist has argued that a revolution could take
place in Germany after the war or in the USA during the darkest
months of the Great Depression, the argument that the grim economic
conditions facing Bolshevik Russia made soviet democracy impossible
seem weak. By arguing that both Germany and the USA could create
a viable socialist revolution in economic conditions just as bad
as those facing Soviet Russia, the reasons why the Bolsheviks
created a party dictatorship must be looked for elsewhere. Given
this support for revolution in 1930s America and post-world war
I and II Europe, you would have to conclude that, for Leninists, 
economic collapse only makes socialism impossible once *they* are 
in power! Which is hardly convincing, or inspiring.

H.8.5 Was the Russian working class atomised or "declassed"?

A standard Leninist explanation for the dictatorship of the
Bolshevik party (and subsequent rise of Stalinism) is based
on the "atomisation" or "declassing" of the proletariat. John
Rees summarises this argument as follows:

"The civil war had reduced industry to rubble. The working 
class base of the workers' state, mobilises time and again
to defeat the Whites, the rock on which Bolshevik power 
stood, had disintegrated. The Bolsheviks survived three 
years of civil war and wars in intervention, but only at
the cost of reducing the working class to an atomised,
individualised mass, a fraction of its former size, and
no longer able to exercise the collective power that it
had done in 1917 . . . The bureaucracy of the workers'
state was left suspended in mid-air, its class base 
eroded and demoralised. Such conditions could not help
but have an effect on the machinery of the state and
organisation of the Bolshevik Party." ["In Defence of 
October," pp. 3-82, _International Socialism_, no. 52,
p. 65]

It is these objective factors which, it is argued, explain why
the Bolshevik party substituted itself for the Russian working
class. "Under such conditions," argues Tony Cliff, "the class
base of the Bolshevik Party disintegrated -- not because of 
some mistakes in the policies of Bolshevism, not because of one
or another conception of Bolshevism regarding the role of the
party and its relation to the class -- but because of mightier
historical factors. The working class had become declassed . . .
Bolshevik 'substitutionism' . . . did not jump out of Lenin's
head as Minerva out of Zeus's, but was born of the objective
conditions of civil war in a peasant country, where a small
working class, reduced in weight, became fragmented and 
dissolved into the peasant masses." [_Trotsky on Substitutionism_,
pp. 62-3] In other words, because the working class was so 
decimated the replacement of class power by party power was 
inevitable. 

Before discussing this argument, we should point out that this
argument dates back to Lenin. For example, he argued in 1921
that the proletariat, "owning to the war and to the desperate 
poverty and ruin, has become declassed, i.e. dislodged from
its class groove, and had ceased to exist as proletariat . . .
the proletariat has disappeared." [_Collected Works_, vol. 33,
p. 66] However, unlike his later-day followers, Lenin was sure
that while it "would be absurd and ridiculous to deny that the 
fact that the proletariat is declassed is a handicap" it could 
still " fulfil its task of wining and holding state power." 
[Op. Cit., vol. 32, p. 412] As we will see, the context in
which Lenin started to make these arguments is important. 

Anarchists do not find these arguments particularly convincing.
This is for two reasons. Firstly, it seems incredulous to 
blame the civil war for the "substitution" of Bolshevik power
for working class power as party power had been Lenin's stated
aim in 1917 and October saw the seizure of power by the 
Bolsheviks, *not* the soviets. As we saw in section H.6.6, 
the Bolsheviks started to gerrymander and disband soviets to
remain in power *before* the civil war started. As such, to
blame the civil war and the problems it caused for the usurpation
of power by the Bolsheviks seems unconvincing. Simply put, the
Bolsheviks had "substituted" itself for the proletariat from
the start, from the day it seized power in the October revolution.

Secondly, the fact is the Russian working class was far from
"atomised." Rather than being incapable of collective action,
as Leninists assert, Russia's workers were more than capable
of taking collective action throughout the civil war period.
The problem is, of course, that any such collective action
was directed *against* the Bolshevik party. This caused the
party no end of problems. After all, if the working class 
*was* the ruling class under the Bolsheviks, then who was
it striking against? Emma Goldman explains the issue well:

"In my early period the question of strikes had puzzled me
a great deal. People had told me that the least attempt of
that kind was crushed and the participants sent to prison.
I had not believed it, and, as in all similar things, I 
turned to Zorin [a Bolshevik] for information. 'Strikes under 
the dictatorship of the proletariat!' he had proclaimed;
'there's no such thing.' He had even upbraided me for 
crediting such wild and impossible tales. Against whom, 
indeed, should the workers strike in Soviet Russia, he
argued. Against themselves? They were the masters of the
country, politically as well as industrially. To be sure,
there were some among the toilers who were not yet fully
class-conscious and aware of their own true interests.
These were sometimes disgruntled, but they were elements
incited by . . . self-seekers and enemies of the Revolution."
[_Living My Life_, vol. 2, p. 872]

This, unfortunately, still seems to be the case in pro-Bolshevik
accounts of the Revolution and its degeneration. After the
Bolshevik seizure of power, the working class as an active
agent almost immediately disappears from the accounts. This
is unsurprising, as it does not bode well for maintaining the
Bolshevik Myth to admit that workers were resisting the 
so-called "proletarian dictatorship" from the start. The notion
that the working class had "disappeared" fits into this selective
blindness well. Why discuss the actions of a class which did not
exist? Thus we have a logical circle from which reality can be
excluded: the working class is "atomised" and so cannot take
industrial action, evidence of industrial action need not be
looked for because the class is "atomised."

This can be seen from Lenin. For example, he proclaimed in 
October 1921 that "the proletariat had disappeared." Yet
this non-existent class had, in early 1921, taken collective
action which "encompassed most of the country's industrial
regions." [J. Aves, _Workers Against Lenin_, p. 111] 
Significantly, the Communists (then and now) refused to call 
the movement a strike, preferring the word "volynka" which
means "go-slow." The Menshevik leader Dan explained why:
"The Bolshevik press carefully tried, at first, to hush up
the movement, then to hide its real size and character. 
Instead of calling the strike a strike, they thought up
various new terms -- *yolynka,* *buza* and so on." [quoted
by Aves, Op. Cit., p. 112] As Russian anarchist Ida Mett 
succinctly put it: "And if the proletariat was that exhausted 
how come it was still capable of waging virtually total general 
strikes in the largest and most heavily industrialised cities?" 
[Ida Mett, _The Kronstadt Rebellion_, p. 81] 

The year after Lenin proclaimed the proletariat "disappeared"
we discover similar evidence of working class collective
action. Ironically, it is Leninist Tony Cliff who presents
the evidence that "the number of workers involved in labour 
conflicts was three and a half million, and in 1923, 1,592,800." 
Strikes in state-owned workplaces in 1922 involved 192,000 
workers. [_State Capitalism in Russia_, p. 28] Given that
Cliff states that in 1921 there was only "one and a quarter
million" industrial workers "proper" (compared to over 
three million in 1917), this level of strikes is extremely
large -- particular for members of a class which did not,
according to Lenin which had "disappeared"!

Before providing more evidence for the existence of working
class collective struggle throughout the period 1918 to 1923,
it is necessary to place Lenin's comments on the "declassing"
of the working class in context. Rather than being the result
of a lack of industrial protest, Lenin's arguments were the
product of its opposite -- the rise in collective struggle by
the Russian working class. As one historian notes: "As 
discontent amongst workers became more and more difficult to 
ignore, Lenin . . . began to argue that the consciousness of 
the working class had deteriorated . . . workers had become 
'declassed.'" "Lenin's analysis," he continues, "had a 
superficial logic but it was based on a false conception of
working-class consciousness. There is little evidence to suggest 
that the demands that workers made at the end of 1920 . . . 
represented a fundamental change in aspirations since 1917
. . . [Moreover] an analysis of the industrial unrest in 1921 
shows that long-standing workers were prominent in protest."
[J. Aves, Op. Cit., p. 90 and pp. 90-1]

Lenin's pessimistic analysis of 1921 is in sharp contrast to
the optimistic mood of early 1920, reproduced by the defeat
of the White armies, in Bolshevik ranks. For example, writing 
in May, 1920, Trotsky seemed oblivious to the "atomisation" 
of the Russian working class, arguing that "in spite of 
political tortures, physical sufferings and horrors, the 
labouring masses are infinitely distinct from political
decomposition, from moral collapse, or from apathy . . . Today, 
in all branches of industry, there is going on an energetic 
struggle for the establishment of strict labour discipline, 
and for the increase of the productivity of labour. The party 
organisations, the trade unions, the factory and workshop 
administrative committees, rival each one another in this 
respect, with the undivided support of the working class as
a whole." Indeed, they "concentrate their attention and will 
on collective problems" ("Thanks to a regime which . . . 
given their life a pursue"!). Needless to say, the party had 
"the undivided support of the public opinion of the working 
class as a whole." [_Terrorism and Communism_, p. 6] 

The turn around in perspective after this period did not happen
by accident, independently of the working class resistance to
Bolshevik rule. After all, the defeat of the Whites in early
of 1920 saw the Bolsheviks take "victory as a sign of the 
correctness of its ideological approach and set about the task 
of reconstruction on the basis of an intensification of War
Communism policies with redoubled determination." This led
to "an increase in industrial unrest in 1920," including 
"serious strikes." The resistance was "becoming increasingly
politicised." Thus, the stage was set for Lenin's turn around
and his talk of "declassing." In early 1921 "Lenin argued that 
workers, who were no more demoralised than they were in early 
1920, had become 'declassed' in order to justify a political 
clamp-down." [J. Aves, Op. Cit., p. 37, p. 80 and p. 18]

Other historians also note this context. For example, while the 
"working class had decreased in size and changed in composition,
. . . the protest movement from late 1920 made clear that it was 
not a negligible force and that in an inchoate way it retained a 
vision of socialism which was not identified entirely with Bolshevik 
power . . . Lenin's arguments on the declassing of the proletariat 
was more a way of avoiding this unpleasant truth than a real 
reflection of what remained, in Moscow at least, a substantial 
physical and ideological force." [Richard Sakwa, _ Soviet 
Communists in Power_, p. 261] In the words of Diane Koenker,
"[i]f Lenin's perceptions of the situation were at all 
representative, it appears that the Bolshevik party made 
deurbanisation and declassing the scapegoat for its political
difficulties, when the party's own policies and its unwillingness
to accept changing proletarian attitudes were also to blame."
Ironically, this was not the first time that the Bolsheviks
had blamed its problems on the lack of a "true" proletariat
and its replacement by "petty-bourgeois" elements, "[t]his
was the same argument used to explain the Bolsheviks' lack
of success in the early months of 1917 -- that the cadres of
conscious proletarians were diluted by non-proletarian 
elements." ["Urbanisation and Deurbanisation in the Russian
Revolution and Civil War," pp. 424-450, _The Journal of 
Modern History_, vol. 57, no. 3, p. 449 and p. 428]

It should be noted that the "declassing" argument does have a 
superficial validity if you accept the logic of vanguardism.
After all, if you accept the premise that the party alone 
represents socialist consciousness and that the working class,
by its own efforts, can only reach a reformist level of 
political conscious (at best), then any deviation in working 
class support for the party obviously represents a drop in 
class consciousness or a "declassing" of the proletariat (see 
section H.5.1 -- "Why are vanguard parties anti-socialist?").
Thus working class protest against the party can be dismissed
as evidence of "declassing" which has to be suppressed rather 
than what it really is, namely evidence of working class 
autonomy and collective struggle for what it considers *its* 
interests to be against a new master class. In fact, the
"declassing" argument is related to the vanguardist position
which, in turn, justifies the dictatorship of the party *over*
the class (see section H.5.3 -- "Why does vanguardism imply 
party power?").

So the "declassing" argument is not some neutral statement of
fact. It was developed as a weapon on the class struggle, to
justify Bolshevik repression of collective working class 
struggle. To justify the continuation of Bolshevik party
dictatorship *over* the working class. This in turn explains 
why working class struggle during this period generally fails 
to get mentioned by later day Bolsheviks -- it simply undermines 
their justifications for Bolshevik dictatorship. After all, 
how can they say that the working class could not exercise
"collective power" when it was conducting mass strikes 
throughout Russia during the period 1918 to 1923?

As such, it does not seem that strange that in most Leninist 
account of the revolution post-October rarely, if ever, mention 
what the working class was actually doing. We do get statistics 
on the drop of the numbers of industrial workers in the cities 
(usually Petrograd and Moscow), but any discussion on working 
class protest and strikes is generally, at best, mentioned in 
passing or, usually, ignored utterly. Given this was meant to 
be a "proletarian" dictatorship, it seems strange this silence. 
It could be argued that this silence is due to the working class 
being decimated in number and/or "declassed" in terms of itself
perspective. This, however, seems unlikely, as collective working 
class protest was common place in Bolshevik Russia. The silence 
can be better understood by the fact this protest was directed 
*against* the Bolsheviks.

Which shows the bankruptcy of what can be called the "statistical
tendency" of analysing the Russian working class. While statistics
can tell us how many workers remained in Russia in, say, 1921, 
it does not prove any idea of their combativeness or their 
ability to take collective decisions and action. If numbers alone 
indicated the ability of workers to take part in collective 
struggle, then the massive labour struggles in 1930s American 
would not have taken place. Millions had been made redundant. 
At the Ford Motor Company, 128,000 workers had been employed in 
the spring of 1929. There were only 37,000 by August of 1931 (only 
29% of the 1929 figure). By the end of 1930, almost half of the 
280,000 textile mill workers in New England were out of work. 
[Howard Zinn, _A People's History of the United States_, 
p. 378] Yet in the face of these massive redundancies, the 
workers organised themselves and fought back. As we will 
indicate, the reduction in the number of Russian workers 
did not restrict their ability to make collective decisions 
and act collectively on them -- Bolshevik repression *did.*

Moreover, while Leninists usually point to the fall in 
population in Petrograd and Moscow during the civil war, 
concentrating on these cities can be misleading. "Using 
the Petrograd figures," notes Daniel R. Bower, "historians 
have painted a lurid picture of flight from the cities. In 
1918 alone the former capital lost 850,000 people and was 
by itself responsible for one-half of the total urban 
population decline of the Civil War years. If one sets 
aside aggregate figures to determine the trend 
characteristic of most cities, however, the 
experiences of Petrograd appears exception. Only a
handful of cities . . . lost half their population between
1917 and 1920, and even Moscow, which declined by over
40 percent, was not typical of most towns in the northern,
food-importing areas. A study of all cities . . . found
that the average decline in the north (167 towns in all,
excluding the capital cities) amounted to 24 percent 
between 1917 and 1920. Among the towns in the food-producing
areas in the southern and eastern regions of the Russian
Republic (a total of 128), the average decline came to
only 14 percent." ["'The city in danger': The Civil War
and the Russian Urban Population," _Party, State, and 
Society in the Russian Civil War_, Diane P. Koenker, 
William G. Rosenberg and Ronald Grigor Suny (eds.), 
p. 61] Does this mean that the possibility of soviet 
democracy declined less in these towns? Yet the Bolsheviks
applied their dictatorships even there, suggesting that
declining urban populations was not the source of their
authoritarianism.

Equally, what are we to make of towns and cities which 
increased their populations? Some towns and cites actually 
grew in size. For example, Minsk, Samara, Khar'kov, Tiflis, 
Baku, Rostov-on-don, Tsaritsyn and Perm all grew in population 
(often by significant amounts) between 1910 and 1920 while other
cities shrunk. [Diane Koenker, "Urbanisation and Deurbanisation 
in the Russian Revolution and Civil War," pp. 424-450, _The 
Journal of Modern History_, vol. 57, no. 3, p. 425] Does that
mention soviet democracy was possible in those towns but not
in Petrograd or Moscow? Or does the fact that the industrial 
workforce grew by 14.8% between October 1920 and April 1921 
mean that the possibility for soviet democracy also grew by 
a similar percentage? [J. Aves, _Workers Against Lenin_, 
p. 159]
 
Then there is the question of when the reduction of workers
makes soviet democracy impossible. After all, between May 1917 
and April 1918 the city of Moscow lost 300,000 of its two
million inhabitants. Was soviet democracy impossible in April
1918 because of this? During the civil war, Moscow lost 
another 700,000 by 1920 (which is basically the same amount
per year). [Diane Koenker, Op. Cit., p. 424] When did this 
fall in population mean that soviet democracy was impossible?
Simply put, comparing figures of one year to another simply
fails to understand the dynamics at work, such as the impact 
of "reasons of state" and working class resistance to Bolshevik
rule. It, in effect, turns the attention away from the state
of working class autonomy and onto number crunching. 

Ultimately, the question of whether the working class was too
"atomised" to govern can only be answered by looking at the
class struggle in Russia during this period, by looking at
the strikes, demonstrations and protests that occurred.
Something Leninists rarely do. Needless to say, certain 
strike waves just cannot be ignored. The most obvious case 
is in Petrograd just before the Kronstadt revolt in early 
1921. After all, the strikes (and subsequent Bolshevik 
repression) inspired the sailors to revolt in solidarity 
with them. Faced with such events, the scale of the protest 
and Bolshevik repression is understated and the subject quickly 
changed. As we noted in section H.7.10, John Rees states that 
Kronstadt was "preceded by a wave of serious but quickly 
resolved strikes." [Rees, Op. Cit., p. 61] Needless to say, 
he does not mention that the strikes were "resolved" by 
"serious" force. Nor does he explain how "an atomised, 
individualised mass" *could* conduct such "serious" strikes, 
strikes which required martial law to break. Little wonder, 
then, Rees does expound on the strikes and what they meant 
in terms of the revolution and his own argument. 

Similarly, we find Victor Serge arguing that the "working class 
often fretted and cursed; sometimes it lent an ear to the Menshevik 
agitators, as in the great strikes at Petrograd in the spring of 
1919. But once the choice was posed as that between the dictatorship 
of the White Generals and the dictatorship of its own party -- and 
there was not and could not be any other choice -- every fit man 
. . . came to stand . . . before the windows of the local party 
offices." [_Year One of the Russian Revolution_, pp. 365-6] An 
exhausted and atomised working class capable of "great strikes"? 
That seems unlikely. Significantly, Serge does not mention the 
Bolshevik acts of repression used against the rebel workers (see 
below). This omission cannot help distort any conclusions to be
drawn from his account.

Which, incidentally, shows that the civil war was not all bad news
for the Bolsheviks. Faced with working class protest, they could
play the "White card" -- unless the workers went back to work, the
Whites would win. This explains why the strikes of early 1921 
were larger than before and explains why they were so important.
As the "White card" could no longer be played, the Bolshevik 
repression could not be excused in terms of the civil war. Indeed,
given working class opposition to the party, it would be fair to 
say that civil war actually *helped* the Bolsheviks remain in power. 
Without the threat of the Whites, the working class would *not* have 
tolerated the Bolsheviks longer than the Autumn of 1918.

The fact is that working class collective struggle against the new
regime and, consequently, Bolshevik repression, started before the 
outbreak of the civil war. It continued throughout the civil war
period and reached a climax in the early months of 1921. Even the
repression of the Kronstadt rebellion did not stop it, with strikes
continuing into 1923 (and, to a lesser degree, afterward). Indeed,
the history of the "workers' state" is a history of the state 
repressing the revolt of the workers. 

Needless to say, it would be impossible to give a full account
of working class resistance to Bolshevism. All we can do here is
give a flavour of what was happening and the sources for further
information. What should be clear from our account is that the 
idea that the working class in this period was incapable of 
collective organisation and struggle is false. As such, the idea
that Bolshevik "substitutionism" can be explained in such term is
also false. In addition, it will become clear that Bolshevik 
repression explicitly aimed to break the ability of workers to
organise and exercise collective power. As such, it seems 
hypocritical for modern-day Leninists to blame Bolshevik power 
on the "atomisation" of the working class when Bolshevik power 
was dependent on smashing working class collective organisation 
and resistance. Simply put, to remain in power Bolshevism, from
the start, had to crush working class power. This is to be 
expected, given the centralised nature of the state and the
assumptions of vanguardism. If you like, October 1917 did not
see the end of "dual power." Rather the Bolshevik state replaced
the bourgeois state and working class power (as expressed in its
collective struggle) came into conflict with it.

This struggle of the "workers' state" against the workers started
early in 1918. "By the early summer of 1918," records one historian, 
"there were widespread anti-Bolshevik protests. Armed clashes 
occurred in the factory districts of Petrograd and other industrial 
centres. Under the aegis of the Conference of Factory and Plant
Representatives . . . a general strike was set for July 2." 
[William Rosenberg, "Russian labour and Bolshevik Power," 
pp. 98-131, _The Workers' revolution in Russia_, 1917, Daniel H. 
Kaiser (ed.), p. 107] According to another historian, economic 
factors "were soon to erode the standing of the Bolsheviks 
among Petrograd workers . . .  These developments, in turn, 
led in short order to worker protests, which then precipitated 
violent repressions against hostile workers. Such treatment 
further intensified the disenchantment of significant segments 
of Petrograd labour with Bolshevik-dominated Soviet rule." 
[Alexander Rabinowitch, _Early Disenchantment with Bolshevik 
Rule_, p. 37]

The reasons for these protest movement were both political and
economic. The deepening economic crisis combined with protests
against Bolshevik authoritarianism to produce a wave of strikes
aiming for political change. Feeling that the soviets were 
distant and unresponsive to their needs (with good reason, given
Bolshevik postponement of soviet elections and gerrymandering
of the soviets), workers turned to direct action and the 
initially Menshevik inspired "Conference of Factory and Plant
Representatives" (also known as the "Extraordinary Assembly of 
Delegates from Petrograd Factories and Plants") to voice their 
concerns. At its peak, reports "estimated that out of 146,000 
workers still in Petrograd, as many as 100,000 supported the 
conference's goals." [Op. Cit., p. 127] The aim of the Conference
(as per Menshevik policy) was to reform the existing system 
"from within" and, as such, the Conference operated openly.
As Alexander Rabinowitch notes, "[F]or the Soviet authorities 
in Petrograd, the rise of the Extraordinary Assembly of 
Delegates from Petrograd Factories and Plants was an ominous 
portent of worker defection." [Op. Cit., p. 37]

The first wave of outrage and protests occurred after Bolshevik 
Red Guards opened fire on a demonstration for the Constituent 
Assembly in early January (killing 21, according to Bolshevik 
sources). This demonstration "was notable as the first time 
workers came out actively against the new regime. More ominously, 
it was also the first time forces representing soviet power used
violence against workers." [David Mandel, _The Petrograd Workers 
and the Soviet Seizure of Power_, p. 355] It would not be the
last -- indeed repression by the "workers' state" of working 
class protest became a recurring feature of Bolshevism. 

By April "it appeared that the government was now ready to go to 
whatever extremes it deemed necessary (including sanctioning the 
arrest and even shooting of workers) to quell labour unrest. This 
in turn led to intimidation, apathy, lethargy and passivity of 
other workers. In these circumstances, growth in support of the 
Assembly slowed down." [Rabinowitch, Op. Cit., p. 40] The Assembly
aborted its plans for a May Day demonstration to protest the
government's policies were cancelled because of workers did not
respond to the appeals to demonstrate (in part because of 
"Bolshevik threats against 'protesters'" [Op. Cit., pp. 40-1]).

This apathy did not last long. After early May events "served 
to reinvigorate and temporarily radicalise the Assembly. These 
developments included yet another drastic drop in food supplies, 
the shooting of protesting housewives and workers in the
Petrograd suburb of Kolpino, the arbitrary arrest and abuse of 
workers in another Petrograd suburb, Sestroresk, the closure of 
newspapers and the arrests of individuals who had denounced the 
Kolpino and Sestroresk events, the intensification of labour 
unrest and conflict with the authorities in the Obukhov plant 
and in other Petrograd factories and districts." [Op. Cit., 
p. 41]
 
So the next major protest wave occurred in early May, 1918, after 
armed guards opened fire on protesting workers in Kolpino -- 
"while the incident was hardly the first of its kind, it 
triggered a massive wave of indignation." Work temporarily 
stopped in a number of plants. Between Kolpino and early July, 
more than seventy incidents occurred in Petrograd, including 
strikes, demonstrations and anti-Bolshevik meetings. Many of 
these meetings "were protests against some form of Bolshevik 
repression: shootings, incidents of 'terroristic activities,' 
and arrests." In some forty incidents "worker's protests 
focused on these issues, and the data is surely understate 
the actual number by a wide margin. There were as well some 
eighteen separate strikes or some other work stoppages with 
an explicitly anti-Bolshevik character." [Rosenberg, Op. Cit., 
p. 123 and pp. 123-4] Then, "[a]t the very end of May and the 
beginning of June, when a wave of strikes to protest at bread 
shortages broke out in the Nevskii district, a majority of 
Assembly delegates . . . resolved to call on striking Nevskii 
district workers to return to work and continue preparation 
for a general city-wide strike." [Rabinowitch, Op. Cit., p. 42]
Unfortunately, for the Assembly postponing the strikes until
a "better time" rather than encouraging them gave the authorities
time to prepare.

Things came to a head during and after the soviet elections in
June. On June 20th the Obukhov works issued an appeal to the 
Conference of Factory and Plant Representatives "to declare a 
one-day strike of protest on June 25th" against Bolshevik 
reprisals for the assassination of a leading Bolshevik. "The 
Bolsheviks responded by 'invading' the whole Nevskii district 
with troops and shutting down Obukhov completely. Meetings 
everywhere were forbidden." The workers were not intimidated
and "[i]n scores of additional factories and shops protests
mounted and rapidly spread along the railroads." At the June
26th "extraordinary session" of the Conference a general strike
was declared for July 2nd. Faced with this, the Bolsheviks set up 
"machine guns . . . at main points throughout the Petrograd and 
Moscow railroad junctions, and elsewhere in both cities as well. 
Controls were tightened in factories. Meetings were forcefully 
dispersed." [Rosenberg, Op. Cit., pp. 126-7 and p. 127] In
other words, "as a result of extreme government intimidation, 
the response to the Assembly's strike call on 2 July was 
negligible." [Rabinowitch, Op. Cit., p. 42] This repression
was not trivial:

"Among other things, all newspapers were forced to print on
their front pages Petrograd soviet resolutions condemning the
Assembly as part of the domestic and foreign counter-revolution.
Factories participating in the strike were warned that they
would be shut down and individual strikers were threatened
with the loss of work -- threats that were subsequently made
good. Printing plants suspected of opposition sympathies were
sealed, the offices of hostile trade unions were raided, 
martial law declared on rail lines, and armed strike-breaking
patrols with authority to take whatever action was necessary
to prevent work stoppages were formed and put on 24-hour
duty at key points throughout Petrograd." [Op. Cit., p. 45]

Needless to say, "the Petrograd authorities drew on the dubious 
mandate provided by the stacked soviet elections to justify 
banning the Extraordinary Assembly." [Op. Cit., p. 42] While
the Bolsheviks had won around 50% of workplace votes, as we
note in section H.6.6 they had gerrymandered the soviet
making the election results irrelevant. The fact the civil
war had started undoubtedly aided the Bolsheviks during this
election and the fact that the Mensheviks and SRs had campaigned
on a platform to win the soviet elections as the means of
replacing soviet democracy by the Constituent Assembly. Many
workers still viewed the soviets are *their* organisations
and aimed for a functioning soviet system rather than its end.

The Bolsheviks turned on the Conference, both locally and 
nationally, and arrested its leading activists, so decapitating 
the only independent working class organisation left in Russia.
As Rabinowitch argues, "the Soviet authorities were profoundly 
worried by the threat posed by the Assembly and fully aware if 
their growing isolation from workers (their only real social 
base) . . . Petrograd Bolsheviks developed a siege mentality 
and a corresponding disposition to consider any action -- from 
suppression of the opposition press and manipulation of
elections to terror even against workers -- to be justified
in the struggle to retain power until the start of the
imminent world revolution." [Op. Cit., pp. 43-4]

Similar events happened in other cities. As we discuss in 
section H.6.6, the Bolsheviks had disbanded soviets elected
with non-Bolshevik majorities all across Russia and suppressed 
the resulting working class protest. In Moscow, workers also
organised a "Conference" movement and "[r]esentment against 
the Bolsheviks was expressed through strikes and disturbances, 
which the authorities treated as arising from supply 
difficulties, from 'lack of consciousness,' and because of 
the 'criminal demagogy' of certain elements. Lack of support 
for current Bolshevik practices was treated as the absence 
of worker consciousness altogether, but the causes of the 
unrest was more complicated. In 1917 political issues 
gradually came to be perceived through the lens of party 
affiliation, but by mid-1918 party consciousness was
reversed and a general consciousness of workers' needs
restored. By July 1918 the protest movement had lost its
momentum in the face of severe repression and was engulfed
by the civil war." In the light of the fate of workers'
protest, the May 16th resolution by the Bogatyr' Chemical
Plant calling (among other things) for "freedom of 
speech and meeting, and an end to the shooting of 
citizens and workers" seems to the point. Unsurprisingly,
"[f]aced with political opposition within the soviets
and worker dissatisfaction in the factories Bolshevik 
power increasingly came to reply on the party apparatus
itself." [Richard Sakwa, "The Commune State in Moscow in 
1918," pp. 429-449, _Slavic Review_, vol. 46, no. 3/4, 
p. 442-3, p. 442 and p. 443]

Repression occurred elsewhere: "In June 1918 workers in
Tula protested a cut in rations by boycotting the local
soviet. The regime declared martial law and arrested
the protestors. Strikes followed and were suppressed by
violence. In Sormovo, when a Menshevik-Social Revolutionary
newspaper was closed, 5,000 workers went on strike. Again
firearms were used to break the strike." Other techniques 
were used to break resistance. For example, the regime
often threatened rebellious factories with a lock out,
which involved numerous layouts, new rules of discipline,
purges of workers' organisations and the introduction of
piece work. [Thomas F. Remington, _Building Socialism in 
Bolshevik Russia_, p. 105 and p. 107]

Rather than the Civil War disrupting the relationship between 
the vanguard party and the class it claimed to lead, it was 
in fact the Bolsheviks who did so in face of rising working 
class dissent and disillusionment in the spring of 1918. In 
fact, "after the initial weeks of 'triumph' . . . Bolshevik 
labour relations after October" changed and "soon lead to 
open conflict, repression, and the consolidation of Bolshevik 
dictatorship over the proletariat in place of proletarian 
dictatorship itself." [Rosenberg, Op. Cit., p. 117]

Given this, the outbreak of the civil war consolidated workers
support for the Bolsheviks and saved it from even more 
damaging workers' unrest. As Thomas F. Remington puts it:

"At various times groups of workers rebelled against Bolshevik 
rule But for the most part, forced to choose between 'their'
regime and the unknown horrors of a White dictatorship, 
most willingly defended the Bolshevik cause. The effect of
this dilemma may be seen in the periodic swings in the
workers' political temper. When Soviet rule stood in peril,
the war simulated a spirit of solidarity and spared the 
regime the defection of its proletarian base. During lulls
in the fighting, strikes and demonstrations broke out."
[Op. Cit., p. 101]

Which, as we will discuss, explains the increased repression
in 1921 and onwards. Without the Whites, the Bolsheviks had
to enforce their rule directly onto workers who did not want
it. Ironically, the Whites *helped* the Bolsheviks remain in 
power. Without the start of the civil war, labour protest
would have either ended Bolshevik rule or exposed it as a 
dictatorial regime.

This process of workers protest and state repression continued 
in 1919 and subsequent years. It followed a cyclical pattern.
There was a "new outbreak of strikes in March 1919 after the
collapse of Germany and the Bolshevik re-conquest of the
Ukraine. The pattern of repression was also repeated. A strike
at a galosh factory in early 1919 was followed by the closing
of the factory, the firing of a number of workers, and
the supervised re-election of its factory committee. The
Soviet garrison at Astrakhan mutinied after its bread ration
was cut. A strike among the city's workers followed in support.
A meeting of 10,000 Astrakhan workers was suddenly surrounded
by loyal troops, who fired on the crowd with machine guns and
hand grenades, killing 2,000. Another 2,000, taken prisoner,
were subsequently executed. In Tula, when strikes at the defence
factories stopped production for five days, the government
responded by distributing more grain and arresting the strike
organisers . . . strikes at Putilov again broke out, at first
related to the food crisis . . . The government treated the
strike as an act of counter-revolution and responded with a
substantial political purge and re-organisation. An official
investigation . . . concluded that many shop committees were
led by [Left] Social Revolutionaries . . . These committees 
were abolished and management representatives were appointed 
in their stead." [Remington, Op. Cit., pp. 109-10]

The strikes in Petrograd centred around the Putilov shows the
response of the authorities to the "atomised" workers who
were taking collective action. "In March fifteen factories
struck together (roughly 35,000 workers were involved) . . . 
workers at Putilov assembled and sent a delegation to the
works committee . .  .and put forward a number of demands
. . . On 12 March Putilov stopped work. Its workers called
to others to join them, and some of them came out in a
demonstration where they were fired upon by Cheka troops.
Strikes then broke out at fourteen other enterprises . . .
On Sunday 16 March an appeal was made to the Putilovtsy
to return to normal working the following day or . . . 
the sailors and soldiers would be brought in. After a
poor showing on the Monday, the sailor went in, and 
120 workers were arrested; the sailors remained until the
21st and by the 22nd normal work had been resumed." In
July strikes broke out again in response to the cancellation
of holidays which involved 25,000 workers in 31 strikes. 
[Mary McAuley, _Bread and Justice_, pp. 251-253 and p. 254]

In the Moscow area, while it is "impossible to say what proportion 
of workers were involved in the various disturbances," following 
the lull after the defeat of the workers' conference movement in 
mid-1918 "each wave of unrest was more powerful than the last, 
culminating in the mass movement from late 1920." For example, 
at the end of June 1919, "a Moscow committee of defence (KOM) 
was formed to deal with the rising tide of disturbances . . . 
KOM concentrated emergency power in its hands, overriding the 
Moscow Soviet, and demanding obedience from the population. The 
disturbances died down under the pressure of repression." 
[Richard Sakwa, _Soviet Communists in Power_, p. 94 and pp. 94-5] 

Vladimir Brovkin summarises the data he provides in his
essay "Workers' Unrest and the Bolshevik Response in 1919"
(reproduced along with data from other years in his book 
_Behind the Front Lines of the Civil War_) as follows:

"Data on one strike in one city may be dismissed as incidental.
When, however, evidence is available from various sources on
simultaneous independent strikes in different cities and
overall picture begins to emerge . . . Workers' unrest took 
place in Russia's biggest and most important industrial 
centres: Moscow, Petrograd, Tver', Tula, Briansk, and Sormovo.
 Strikes affected the largest industries . . . Workers' 
demands reflected their grievances . .  . The greatest 
diversity was in workers' explicitly political demands or 
expression of political opinion . . . all workers' resolutions
demanded free and fair elections to the soviets . . . some
workers . . . demanded the Constituent Assembly . . . 

"The strikes of 1919 . . . fill an important gap in the 
development of the popular movement between October 1917
and February 1921. On the one hand, they should be seen as
antecedents of similar strikes in February 1921, which 
forced the Communists to abandon war communism. In the 
capitals, workers, just as the Kronstadt sailors had,
still wanted fairly elected soviets and not a party
dictatorship. On the other hand, the strikes continued
the protests that had began in the summer of 1918. The
variety of behavioural patterns displayed during the 
strikes points to a profound continuity. . .

"In all known cases the Bolsheviks' initial response to
strikes was to ban public meetings and rallies . . . In
several cities . . . the authorities confiscated strikers'
food rations in order to suppress the strike. In at least
five cities . . . the Bolsheviks occupied the striking
plant and dismissed the strikers en masse . . . In all 
known cases the Bolsheviks arrested strikers . . . In 
Petrograd, Briansk, and Astrakhan' the Bolsheviks executed
striking workers." [_Slavic Review_, vol. 49, no. 3,
pp. 370-2]


Nor was this collective struggle stop in 1919 -- "strike action 
remained endemic in the first nine months of 1920" and "in the 
first six months of 1920 strikes had occurred in seventy-seven 
per cent of middle-sized and large works." For the Petrograd 
province, soviet figures state that in 1919 there were 52 strikes 
with 65,625 participants and in 1920 73 strikes with 85,645, both 
high figures as according to one set of figures, which are by no 
means the lowest, there were 109,100 workers there. "Strikes 
in 1920," recounts Aves, "were frequently a direct protest 
against the intensification of War Communist labour policies, 
the militarisation of labour, the implementation of one-man 
management and the struggle against absenteeism, as well as 
food supply difficulties. The Communist Party press carried 
numerous articles attacking the slogan of 'free labour.'" 
[J. Aves, _Workers Against Lenin_, p. 69 and p. 74]

The spring of 1920 "saw discontent on the railways all over 
the country." This continued throughout the year. For example, 
the Aleksansrovskii locomotive works at the end of August, 
workers sent three representatives to the works commissar 
who had them arrested. Three days later, the workers stopped 
work and demanded their release. The authorities locked the 
workers out of the works and a guard of 70 sailors were placed 
outside the enterprise. The Cheka arrested the workers' soviet 
delegates (who were from the SR (Minority) list) as well as 
thirty workers. "The opportunity was taken to carry out a 
general round-up" and arrests were made at other works. 
After the arrests, "a meeting was held to elect new soviet 
delegates but the workers refused to co-operate and a 
further 150 were arrested and exiled to Murmansk or 
transferred to other workshops." [Aves, Op. Cit., p. 44 
and pp. 46-7]

Strikes occurred in other places, such as Tula were the
workforce "contained a high proportion of skilled, 
long-standing, hereditary workers." The "all-out strike" 
started at the start of June and on 8 June the local
newspaper published a declaration from the Tula soviet
threatening the strikers with "the most repressive measures,
including the application of the highest measure of
punishment" (i.e. executions). The following day the 
city was declared to be under a "state of siege" by the
local military authorities. The strikers lost ration cards
and by 11 June there had been a return to work. Twenty-three
workers were sentenced to a forced labour camp until the
end of the war. However, the "combined impact of these
measures did not prevent further unrest and the workers
put forward new demands." On 19 June, the soviet approved
"a programme for the suppression of counter-revolution"
and "the transfer of Tula to the position of an armed 
camp." The Tula strike "highlights the way in which workers,
particularly skilled workers who were products of 
long-standing shop-floor subcultures and hierarchies,
retained the capability as well as the will to defend
their interests." [Aves, Op. Cit., p. 50-55]

While strike activity "was most common in Petrograd,
where there had been 2.5 strikers for every workman,"
the figure for Moscow was 1.75 and 1.5 in Kazan. In
early March "a wave of strikes hit the Volga town of
Samara" when a strike by printers in spread to other
enterprises. "Strike action in Moscow did not just
include traditionally militant male metal workers."
Textile workers, tram workers and printers all took
strike action. [Aves, Op. Cit., p. 69, p. 72 and 
pp. 77-8]

Thus strike action was a constant feature of civil war
Bolshevik Russia. Rather than being an "atomised" mass,
the workers repeatedly organised themselves, made their
demands and took collective action to achieve them. In
response, the Bolshevik regime used state repression to
break this collective activity. As such, *if* the rise
of Stalinism can, as modern-day Leninists argue, be 
explained by the "atomisation" of the working class
during the civil war then the Bolshevik regime and its
repression should be credited with ensuring this happened.

The end of the civil war did not see the end of working 
class protest. Quite the reverse. In February and March 1921 
"industrial unrest broke out in a nation-wide wave of 
discontent . . . General strikes, or very widespread 
unrest, hit Petrograd, Moscow, Saratov and Ekaterinoslavl." 
Only one major industrial region was unaffected. As noted
above, the Bolsheviks refused to call this movement a 
strike wave, preferring the term *volynka* (which means
"go-slow"), yet "the continued use of the term can be
justified not to hide its significance but to show that
workers' protest consisted not just of strikes but also 
of factory occupations, 'Italian strikes,' demonstrations,
mass meetings, the beating up of communists and so on."
[Aves, Op. Cit., p. 109 and p. 112]

In Petrograd in the beginning of February "strikes were
becoming an everyday occurrence" and by "the third week
of February the situation rapidly deteriorated." The city
was rocked by strikes, meetings and demonstrations. In 
response to the general strike the Bolsheviks replied 
with a "military clamp-down, mass arrests and other coercive 
measures, such as the closure of enterprises, the purging of 
the workforce and stopping of rations which accompanied 
them." As we discuss in section H.7, these strikes produced
the Kronstadt revolt (and, as noted in section H.7.10, the
Bolshevik repression ensured the Petrograd workers did not
act with the sailors). [Aves, Op. Cit., p. 113, p. 120]

A similar process of workers revolt and state repression 
occurred in Moscow at the same time. There "industrial
unrest" also "turned into open confrontation and protest
spilled on to the streets." Meetings were held, followed
by demonstrations and strikes. Over the next few days 
strikes spread to other districts. Workers demanded now
elections to the soviets be held. Striking railway workers
sent emissaries along the railway to spread the strike
and strikes spread to outside Moscow city itself and into
the surrounding provinces. Unsurprisingly, Moscow and
Moscow province were put under martial law and SR and
menshevik leaders were arrested. [Aves, Op. Cit., p. 130
pp. 139-144] However, "military units called in" against 
striking workers "refused to open fire, and they were 
replaced by the armed communist detachments" who did. 
"The following day several factories went on strike" 
and troops "disarmed and locked in as a precaution" by 
the government against possible fraternising. On February 
23rd, "Moscow was placed under martial law with a 24-hour 
watch on factories by the communist detachments and 
trustworthy army units." [Richard Sakwa, _Soviet 
Communists in Power_, p. 94 and pp. 94-5 and p. 245] The 
mixture of (economic) concessions and coercion broke the
will of the strikers.

Strikes and protests occurred all across Russia at this
time (see Aves, Op. Cit.). In Saratov, the strike started
on March 3 when railroad shop workers did not return to
their benches and instead rallied to discuss an anticipated
further reduction in food rations. "Led by a former 
Communist, the railroad workers debated resolutions recently
carried by the Moscow proletariat . . . The next day the
strike spread to the metallurgical plants and to most other
large factories, as Saratov workers elected representatives
to an independent commission charged with evaluating the
functioning of all economic organs. When it convened, the
body called for the re-election of the soviets and immediate
release of political prisoners." The ration cut "represent[ed]
the catalyst, but not the cause, of the labour unrest." 
While "the turmoil touched all strata of the proletariat,
male and female alike, the initiative for the disturbances
came from the skilled stratum that the Communists normally
deemed the most conscious." The Communists shut down the
commission and they "expected workers to protest the
dissolution of their elected representatives" and so they
"set up a Provincial Revolutionary Committee . . . which
introduced martial law both in the city and the garrison.
It arrested the ringleaders of the workers' movement . . .
the police crackdown depressed the workers' movement and
the activities of the rival socialist parties." The
Cheka sentenced 219 people to death. [Donald J. Raleigh,
_Experiencing Russia's Civil War_, p. 379, p. 387, p. 388, 
pp. 388-9]

A similar "little Kronstadt" broke out in the Ukrainian town
of Ekaterinoslavl at the end of May. The workers there
"clearly had strong traditions of organisation" and elected
a strike committee of fifteen which "put out a series of
political ultimatums that were very similar in content to
the demands of the Kronstadt rebels." On 1 June, "by a 
pre-arranged signal" workers went on strike throughout the
town, with workers joining a meeting of the railway workers.
The local Communist Party leader was instructed "to put 
down the rebellion without mercy . . . Use Budennyi's 
cavalry." The strikers prepared a train and its driver
instructed to spread the strike throughout the network.
Telegraph operators were told to send messages throughout
the Soviet Republic calling for "free soviets" and soon
an area up to fifty miles around the town was affected.
The Communists used the Cheka to crush the movement,
carrying out mass arrests and shooting 15 workers (and
dumping their bodies in the River Dnepr). [Aves, Op. Cit., 
pp. 171-3]

So faced with an "atomised" working class during the period
of 1918 and 1921, the Bolsheviks had to respond with martial 
law, mass arrests and shootings:

"It is not possible to estimate with any degree of accuracy 
how many workers were shot by the Cheka during 1918-1921 for 
participation in labour protest. However, an examination of
individual cases suggests that shootings were employed to
inspire terror and were not simply used in the occasional
extreme case." [Aves, Op. Cit., p. 35]

Post-Kronstadt, similar Bolshevik responses to labour unrest 
continued. The economic crisis of 1921 which accompanied the 
introduction of the NEP saw unemployment rise yet "[d]espite
the heavy toll of redundancies, the ability to organise strikes 
did not disappear. Strike statistics for 1921 continue to 
provide only a very rough indicator of the true scale of
industrial unrest and appear not to include the first half
of the year." The spring of 1922 saw Soviet Russia "hit by
a new strike wave" and the strikes "continued to reflect 
enterprise traditions." That year saw 538 strikes with 
197,022 participants recorded. [Aves, Op. Cit., p. 183 and
p. 184]

The following year saw more strikes: "In July 1923 more than 
100 enterprises employing a total of some 50,000 people were 
on strike. In August figures totalled some 140 enterprises 
and 80,00 workers. In September and November the strike
wave continued unabated." As in the civil war, the managers 
shut down plants, fired the workers and rehired them on an
individual basis. In this way, trouble-makers were dismissed
and "order" restored. "The pattern of workers' action and
Bolshevik reaction played itself out frequently in dozens of
other strikes. The Bolsheviks acted with the explicit purpose
of rooting out the possibility of further protest. They tried
to condition workers that labour protest was futile." The
GPU "used force to disperse workers demonstrating with the
arrested strike leaders." [Vladimir Brovkin, _Russia 
After Lenin_, p. 174, pp. 174-5 and p. 175]

In Moscow, for example, "[b]etween 1921 and 1926, all branches
of industry and transport . . . experienced wildcat strikes
or other spontaneous labour disturbances. Strike waves peaked
in the winter of 1920-21 . . . and in the summer and fall of
1922 and 1923 . . . during July-December 1922, for example,
65 strikes and 209 other industrial disturbances were recorded
in Moscow's state enterprises." Metalworkers were arguably
the most active sector at this time while "a number of large
strikes" took place in the textile industry (where "strikes
were sometimes co-ordinated by spontaneously organised strike
committees or 'parallel' factory committees"). And in spite
of repression, "politicisation continued to characterise many
labour struggles" and, as before, "spontaneous labour activism
hindered not only the party's economic program but also the
political and social stabilisation of the factories." [John 
B. Hatch, _Labour Conflict in Moscow, 1921-1925_, p. 62, p. 63, 
p. 65, pp. 66-7 and p. 67]

Given this collective rebellion all across the industrial centres 
of Russia throughout the Civil War and after, it hard to take 
seriously claims that Bolshevik authoritarian was the product
of an "atomisation" or "declassing" of the working class or
that it had ceased to exist in any meaningful sense. Clearly it 
had and was capable of collective action and organisation -- 
until it was repressed by the Bolsheviks and even then it keep
returning. This implies that a key factor in rise of Bolshevik 
authoritarian was political -- the simple fact that the workers 
would not vote Bolshevik in free soviet and union elections and 
so they were not allowed to. As one Soviet Historian put it, 
"taking the account of the mood of the workers, the demand for 
free elections to the soviets [raised in early 1921] meant the 
implementation in practice of the infamous slogan of soviets 
without communists," although there is little evidence that the 
strikers actually raised that "infamous" slogan. [quoted by Aves, 
Op. Cit., p. 123] It should also be noted that Bolshevik orthodoxy 
at the time stressed the necessity of Party dictatorship *over*
the workers (see section H.1.2 for details). 

Nor can it be said that this struggle can be blamed on "declassed"
elements within the working class itself. In her study of this
question, Diane Koenker notes that 90% of the change in the number 
of workers in Moscow "is accounted for by men. Working women did
not leave the city," their numbers dropping from 90,000 in 1918
to 80,000 in 1920. Why these 80,000 women workers should be denied
a say in their own revolution is not clear, given the arguments of
the pro-Bolshevik left. After all, the same workers remained in
roughly the same numbers. Looking at the male worker population, 
their numbers fell from 215,000 to 124,000 during the same period.
However, "the skilled workers whose class consciousness and 
revolutionary zeal had helped win the October revolution did not
entirely disappear, and the women who remained were likely to 
be family members of these veterans of 1917." It was "the loss
of young activists rather than all skilled and class conscious
urban workers that caused the level of Bolshevik support to
decline during the civil war." Indeed "the workers who remained
in the city were among the most urbanised elements." In summary,
"the deurbanisation of those years represented a change in
quantity but not entirely in quality in the cities. The proletariat
declined in the city, but it did not wither away . . . a core
of the city's working class remained." [Op. Cit., p. 440, p. 442, 
p. 447 and p. 449] 

As Russian anarchist Ida Mett argued decades before in relation 
to the strikes in early 1921:

"The population was drifting away from the capital. All who had 
relatives in the country had rejoined them. The authentic
proletariat remained till the end, having the most slender 
connections with the countryside.

"This fact must be emphasised, in order to nail the official lies 
seeking to attribute the Petrograd strikes that were soon to break
out to peasant elements, 'insufficiently steeled in proletarian 
ideas.' The real situation was the very opposite. A few workers
were seeking refuge in the countryside. The bulk remained. There 
was certainly no exodus of peasants into the starving towns! . . .
It was the famous Petrograd proletariat, the proletariat which had 
played such a leading role in both previous revolutions, that was 
finally to resort to the classical weapon of the class struggle: 
the strike." [_The Kronstadt Uprising_, p. 36]

In terms of struggle, links between the events in 1917 and
those during the civil war also exist. For example Jonathan
Aves writes that there were "distinct elements of continuity
between the industrial unrest in 1920 and 1917. This is not
surprising since the form of industrial unrest in 1920, as
in the pre-revolutionary period and in 1917, was closely
bound up with enterprise traditions and shop-floor 
sub-cultures. The size of the Russian industrial workforce
had declined steeply during the Civil War but where enterprises
stayed open . . . their traditions of industrial unrest in
1920 shows that such sub-cultures were still capable of 
providing the leaders and shared values on which resistance
to labour policies based on coercion and Communist Party
enthusiasm could be organised. As might be anticipated,
the leaders of unrest were often to be found amongst the
skilled male workers who enjoyed positions of authority
in the informal shop-floor hierarchies." Moreover, "despite
intense repression, small groups of politicised activists
were also important in initiating protest and some enterprises
developed traditions of opposition to the communists." 
[Op. Cit., p. 39]

Looking at the strike wave of early 1921 in Petrograd, the 
"strongest reason for accepting the idea that it was established 
workers who were behind the *volynka* [i.e. the strike wave] is 
the form and course of protest. Traditions of protest reaching 
back through the spring of 1918 to 1917 and beyond were an 
important factor in the organisation of the *volynka.* . . . 
There was also a degree of organisation . . . which belies the 
impression of a spontaneous outburst." [Aves, Op. Cit., p. 126]

Clearly, then, the idea that the Russian working class was 
atomised or declassed cannot be defended given this series of
struggles and state repression. In fact, as noted, the notion
that the workers were "declassed" was used to justify state 
repression of collective working class struggle. "The thought 
oppressed me," wrote Emma Goldman, "that what [the Bolsheviks] 
called 'defence of the Revolution' was really only the defence 
of [their] party in power." [_My Disillusionment in Russia_, 
p. 57] She was right -- the class struggle in Bolshevik Russia 
did not stop, it continued except the ruling class had changed
from bourgeoisie to Bolshevik dictatorship.

Faced with this collective resistance to Bolshevism, the Leninist
could argue that while the working class was capable of collective
decision making and action, the nature of that action was suspect.
This arguments rests on the premise that the "advanced" workers
(i.e. party members) left the workplace for the front or for 
government posts, leaving the "backward" workers behind. This 
argument is often used, particularly in regard to the Kronstadt
revolt of 1921 (see section H.7.8). 

Of course, this argument raises more problems that its solves.
In *any* revolution the "most politically consciousness" tend 
to volunteer to go to the front first and, of course, tend to
be elected as delegates to committees of various kinds (local, 
regional and national). There is little that can be done about it.
Needless to say, if "soviet democracy" depends on the "advanced"
workers being there in order for it to work, then it suggests that 
the commitment to democracy is lacking in those who argue along
these lines. It suggests that if the "backward" masses reject 
the "advanced" ones then the latter have the right, even the
duty, to impose their will on the former. And it also begs the 
question of who determines what constitutes "backward" -- if it 
means "does not support the party" then it becomes little more 
than a rationale for party dictatorship (as it did under Lenin 
and Trotsky).

Writing in 1938, Trotsky inadvertently exposes the logic of
this position. Asserting that a "revolution is 'made' directly
by a *minority*," he argued that the "success" of a revolution 
is "possible" when "this minority finds more or less support, or 
at least friendly neutrality, on the part of the majority." So
what happens if the majority expresses opposition to the party?
Unfortunately Trotsky does not raise this question, but he does
answer it indirectly. As we discuss in section H.7.15, Trotsky
argues that "to free the soviets from the leadership [sic!] of 
the Bolsheviks would have meant within a short time to demolish 
the soviets themselves. The experience of the Russian soviets 
during the period of Menshevik and SR domination and, even more 
clearly, the experience of the German and Austrian soviets under 
the domination of the Social Democrats, proved this. Social 
Revolutionary-anarchist soviets could only serve as a bridge 
from the proletarian dictatorship. They could play no other role, 
regardless of the 'ideas' of their participants." [Lenin and 
Trotsky, _Kronstadt_, p. 85 and p. 90]

Thus to let the working masses (the "majority") have free soviet
elections and reject the vanguard (the "minority") would mean the 
end of soviet power. Thus allowing the proletariat a say in 
progress of the revolution means the end of the "proletarian 
dictatorship"! Which, of course, is interesting logic. The
authoritarian core of the Bolshevik vision of revolution is
thus exposed.

Victor Serge also presents an insight into the Bolshevik 
perspective on the revolution. He states that "[a]gitation 
conducted by the SRs and Mensheviks called demonstrations 
in the streets and prepared for a general strike. The 
demands were: free trade, wage increases, payment of wages 
one, two or three months in advance and 'democracy.' The 
intention was to incite the working class itself against 
the revolution." Which only makes sense once you realise 
that by "the revolution" Serge simply meant "the Bolsheviks" 
and the obvious truth that the working class was *not* 
managing the revolution at all, was *not,* in any sense, 
"in power." "The best elements among the workers," explains 
Serge, "were away fighting; those in the factories were 
precisely the less energetic, less revolutionary sections, 
along with the petty folk, yesterday's small shopkeepers 
and artisans, who had come there to find refuge. This 
proletariat of the reserve often allowed itself to fall 
under the sway of Menshevik propaganda." [_Year One of the 
Russian Revolution_, p. 229] 

Given that Serge is discussing the period *before* the
Czechoslovak revolt, a greater indictment of Bolshevism
cannot be found. After all, what does "workers' democracy" 
mean unless the proletariat can vote for its own delegates?
Little wonder Daniel Guerin described Serge's book as 
"largely a justification of the liquidation of the soviets 
by Bolshevism." [_Anarchism_, p. 97] After all, what point 
is there having genuine soviet elections if the "less 
revolutionary sections" (i.e. Trotsky's "majority") will 
not vote for the vanguard? And can socialism exist without 
democracy? Can we expect an unaccountable vanguard to 
govern in the interests of anyone but its own? Of course 
not!

Thus the Bolsheviks did not solve the answer the questions 
Malatesta raised in 1891, namely "if you consider these 
worthy electors as unable to look after their own interests 
themselves, how is it that they will know how to choose for 
themselves the shepherds who must guide them? And how will 
they be able to solve this problem of social alchemy, of
producing the election of a genius from the votes of a 
mass of fools?" [_Anarchy_, p. 53]

Given this, is it surprising that the Bolsheviks revised 
the Marxist theory of the state to justify elite rule? As 
discussed in section H.3.8, once in power Lenin and Trotsky
stressed that the "workers' state" had to be independent of
the working class in order to overcome the "wavering" and
"vacillation of the masses themselves." Or, to quote Serge,
the "party of the proletariat must know, at hours of decision, 
how to break the resistance of the backward elements among the 
masses; it must know how to stand firm sometimes against the 
masses . . . it must know how to go against the current, and 
cause proletarian consciousness to prevail against lack of
consciousness and against alien class influences." [Op. Cit., 
p. 218] Of course, by definition, *every* group is "backward" 
compared to the vanguard and so Serge's argument amounts to 
little more than a justification for party dictatorship 
*over* the proletariat.

The reason why such a system would not result in socialism does 
not take long to discover. For anarchists, freedom is not just 
a goal, a noble end to be achieved, but rather a necessary 
part of the process of creating socialism. Eliminate freedom 
(and, as a necessary result, workplace and community 
self-management) and the end result will be anything *but* 
socialism. Ultimately, as Malatesta argued, "the only way that 
the masses can raise themselves" is by freedom "for it is only 
through freedom that one educates oneself to be free." [Op. Cit., 
p. 52] Ironically, by using state repression to combat "backward"
elements, the Bolsheviks ensured that they stayed that way and,
more importantly, disempowered the *whole* working class so
ensuring that Bolshevik dictatorship came into constant conflict
with it and its continuing struggle for autonomy. Rather than
base itself on the creative powers of the masses, Bolshevism 
crushed it as a threat to its power and so ensured that the
economic and social problems affecting Russia increased.

And need it be pointed out that "low" culture and/or "backward" 
social life have been used by numerous imperialist and authoritarian
states to justify their rule over a given population? It matters 
little whether the population are of the same nationality of the
rulers or from a subjugated people, the arguments and the logic are
the same. Whether dressed up in racist or classist clothing, the 
same elitist pedigree lies behind the pro-Bolshevik argument that
democracy would have brought "chaos" or "capitalist restoration." 
The implicit assumption that working class people are not fit for 
self-government is clear from these rationales. Equally obvious
is the idea that the party knows better than working class people
what is best for them. 

Sounding like Bolshevik Henry Kissingers, the Leninists argue that
Lenin and Trotsky had to enforce their dictatorship *over* the 
proletariat to stop a "capitalist restoration" (Kissinger was the 
US state's liaison with the Chilean military when it helped their 
coup in 1973 and infamously stated that the country should not be 
allowed to turn communist due to the stupidity of its own people). 
Needless to say, anarchists argue that even if the Bolshevik 
regime had not already need capitalist (specifically, *state* 
capitalist) this logic simply represents an elitist position
based on "socialism from above." Yes, soviet democracy *may* have
resulted in the return of (private) capitalism but by maintaining 
party dictatorship the possibility of socialism was automatically 
nullified. Simply put, the pro-Leninist argument implies that 
socialism can be implemented from above as long as the right 
people are in power. The authoritarian core of Leninism is 
exposed by these arguments and the repression of working class 
revolt which they justified. 

Given this, it seems incredulous for Leninists like Chris Harman
to argue that it was the "decimation of the working class" which
caused (by "necessity") the "Soviet institutions" to take "on a 
life independently of the class they had arisen from. Those workers 
and peasants who fought the Civil War could not govern themselves 
collectively from their places in the factories." [_How the 
revolution was lost_] Given that this "independent" life is
required to allow the party to "go against the current," Harman
simply fails to understand the dynamics of the revolution, the
position of the vanguard and the resistance of the working class
subject to it. Moreover, the reason *why* the "workers and peasants"
could not govern themselves collectively was because the party
had seized power for itself and systematically destroyed soviet,
workplace and military democracy to remain there. Then there is 
the way the Bolsheviks reacted to such collective unrest. Simply 
put, they sought to break the workers as a collective force. The 
use of lockouts, re-registration was typical, as was the arresting 
of "ringleaders." It seems ironic, therefore, to blame "objective
factors" for the "atomisation" of the working class when, in fact,
this was a key aim of Bolshevik repression of labour protest.

Little wonder, then, that the role of the masses in the Russian 
Revolution after October 1917 is rarely discussed by pro-Bolshevik 
writers. Indeed, the conclusion to be reached is simply that their 
role is to support the party, get it into power and then do what 
it tells them. Unfortunately for the Bolsheviks, the Russian 
working class refused to do this. Instead they practised collective
struggle in defence of their economic *and* political interests,
struggle which inevitably brought them into conflict both with
the "workers' state" and their role in Bolshevik ideology. Faced
with this collective action, the Bolshevik leaders (starting with
Lenin) started to talk about the "declassing" of the proletariat
to justify their repression of (and power *over*) the working class.
Ironically, it was the aim of Bolshevik repression to "atomise"
the working class as, fundamentally, their rule depended on it.
While Bolshevik repression did, in the end, win out it cannot be
said that the working class in Russia did not resist the usurpation
of power by the Bolshevik party. As such, rather than "atomisation"
or "declassing" being the cause for Bolshevik power and repression,
it was, in fact, one of *results* of them.

H.8.6 Did the Bolsheviks blame "objective factors" for their actions?

In a word, no. At the time of the revolution and for some period
afterwards, the idea that "objective factors" were responsible for
their policies was one which few, if any, Bolshevik leaders 
expressed. As we discussed in section H.8.2, Bolsheviks like 
Lenin, Trotsky and Bukharin argued that *any* revolution would
face civil war and economic crisis. Lenin *did* talk about the
"declassing" of the proletariat from 1920 onwards, but that did 
not seem to affect the proletarian and socialist character of his 
regime (as we noted in section H.8.5, Lenin's argument was developed
in the context of *increasing* working class collective action,
*not* its absence).

This is not to say that the Bolshevik leaders were 100% happy with
the state of their revolution. Lenin, for example, expressed concern
about the rising bureaucratic deformations he saw in the soviet state
(particularly after the end of the civil war). Yet Lenin, while 
concerned about the bureaucracy, was not concerned about the Party's 
monopoly of power. Unsurprisingly, he fought the bureaucracy by 
"top-down" and, ironically, bureaucratic methods, the only ones left 
to him. A similar position was held by Trotsky, who was quite explicit 
in supporting the party dictatorship throughout the 1920s (and, indeed,
the 1930s). Needless to say, both failed to understand how bureaucracy 
arises and how it could be effectively fought.

This position started to change, however, as the 1920s drew on and
Trotsky was increasingly sidelined from power. Then, faced with the 
rise of Stalinism, Trotsky had to find a theory which allowed him 
to explain the degeneration of the revolution and, at the same time, 
absolve Bolshevik ideology (and his own actions and ideas!) from 
all responsibility for it. He did so by invoking the objective
factors facing the revolution. Since then, his various followers
have utilised this argument, with various changes in emphasis, to 
attack Stalinism while defending Bolshevism.

The problem with this type of argument is that all the major evils
usually associated with Stalinism already existed under Lenin and
Trotsky. Party dictatorship, one-man management, repression of 
opposition groups and working class protest, state bureaucracy 
and so on all existed before Stalin manoeuvred himself into 
absolute power. And with the exception of state bureaucracy, none
of the mainstream Bolshevik leaders found anything to complain 
about. Indeed, the reverse. Whether it is Lenin or Trotsky, the 
sad fact of the matter is that a party dictatorship presiding 
over an essentially state capitalism economy was not considered
a bad thing. Which, of course, causes problems for those who 
seek to distance Lenin and Trotsky from Stalinism and claim that
Bolshevism is fundamentally "democratic" in nature.

The knots Leninists get into to do this can be ludicrous. A
particularly crazy example of this can be seen from the UK's
Socialist Workers' Party. For John Rees, it is a truism that 
"it was overwhelmingly the force of circumstance which obliged 
the Bolsheviks to retreat so far from their own goals. They 
travelled this route in opposition to their own theory, not 
because of it -- no matter what rhetorical justifications were 
given at the time." ["In Defence of October," pp. 3-82, 
_International Socialism_, no. 52, p. 70]

However, this sort of position has little substance to it.
It is both logically and factually flawed. Logically, it
simply makes little sense as anything but an attempt to
narrow political discussion and whitewash Bolshevik practice
and politics. Rees, in effect, is saying that not only are 
we *not* to judge the Bolsheviks by their actions, we must 
also discount what they said -- unless it was something modern 
day Leninists approve of! Given that Leninists constantly
quote from Lenin's (and Trotsky's) post-1918 works, it seems
strange that they try to stop others so doing! Strange, but
not surprising, given their task is to perpetuate the Bolshevik
Myth. Where that leaves revolutionary politics is left unsaid,
but it seems to involve worshipping at the shrine of October
and treating as a heretic anyone who dares suggest we analysis
it in any depth and perhaps learn lessons from it and the
Bolshevism that dominated it. 

Of course Rees' comments are little more than assertions. Given
that he dismisses the idea that we can actually take what any
Bolshevik says at face value, we are left with little more than
a mind reading operation in trying to find out what the likes
of Lenin and Trotsky "really" thought. Perhaps the root explanation
of Rees' position is the awkward fact that there are no quotes
from any of the leading Bolsheviks which support it? After all,
if they were quotes from the hallowed texts expounding the position
Rees says the Bolshevik leaders "really" held then he would have
provided them. The simple fact is that Lenin and Trotsky, like 
all the Bolshevik leaders, considered a one-party dictatorship 
ruling over a state capitalist economy as some form of "socialism."
That was certainly Trotsky's position and he was *not* shy in 
expressing. But, of course, we can dismiss this simply as 
"rhetorical justifications" rather than an expression of
"their own theory"! We will never know, as they never expressed
"their own theory" and instead made do with the "rhetorical 
justifications" Rees is at such pains for us to ignore!

Which shows that a major problem in discussing the failure of the
Russian Revolution is the attitude of modern day Leninists. Rees
presents us with another example when he asserts that "what is 
required of historians, particularly Marxists, is to separate 
phrase from substance." The Bolsheviks, Rees argues, were
"inclined to make a virtue of necessity, to claim that the harsh
measures of the civil war were the epitome of socialism." Thus the
Bolsheviks cannot be blamed either for what they did or what they
said. Indeed, he states that non-Leninists "take Lenin or Trotsky's
shouts of command in the midst of battle and portray them as 
considered analyses of events." [Op. Cit., p. 46]

This argument is simply incredulous. After all, neither Lenin nor
Trotsky could be said to be anything *but* political activists 
who took the time to consider events and analyse them in detail. 
Moreover, they defended their arguments in terms of Marxism. Would
Rees consider Lenin's _State and Revolution_ as an unimportant work?
After all, this was produced in the midst of the events of 1917, in
often difficult circumstances. If so, then why not his other, less
appealing, political proclamations (never mind actions)? Moreover, 
looking at some of the works produced in this period it is clear 
that they are anything *but* "shouts of command in the midst of
battle." Trotsky's _Terrorism and Communism_ is a substantial book, 
for example It was not an ad hoc comment made during a conference 
or "in the midst of battle." Quite the reverse, it was a detailed,
substantial and thought-out reply to the criticism by the influential
German social democrat Karl Kaustky (and, before Lenin, the most 
internationally respected Marxist thinker). Indeed, Trotsky 
explicitly asks the question "[i]s there still theoretical 
necessity to justify revolutionary terrorism?" and answers yes, 
his "book must serve the ends of an irreconcilable struggle against 
the cowardice, half-measures, and hypocrisy of Kautskianism in all 
countries." [_Terrorism and Communism_, p. 9 and p. 10] 

Therefore, on the face of it, Rees's comments are hard to take
seriously. It is even harder to take when it becomes clear that
Rees does not apply his comments consistently or logically. He
does not object to quoting Lenin and Trotsky during this period
when they say something he *approves* of, regardless of how well
it fits into their actions. It would be no exaggeration to say
that his "argument" is simply an attempt to narrow the area of
debate, marking off limits any comments by his heroes which would
place his ideology in a bad light. It is hardly convincing, 
particularly when their "good" quotes are so at odds with their
practice and their "bad" quotes so in line with them. And as
Marx argued, we should judge people by what they do, *not* by
what they say. This seems a basic principle of scientific 
analysis and it is significant, if not surprising, that Leninists
like Rees want to reject it.

Ultimately, the theoretical problem with this position is that
it denies the importance of implementing ideas. After all, even
if it where true that the "theory" of Bolshevism was different
to its practice and the justifications for that practice, it
would leave us with the conclusion that this "theory" was not
sufficient when faced with the rigours of reality. In other
words, that it is impractical. A conclusion that Leninists do
not want to draw, hence the stress on "objective factors" to
explain the failure of Bolshevism. As Marx said, judge people 
by what they do, not what they say (unless, of course, as with
the Bolsheviks post-October, what they said reflects what they 
did!)

Similarly, there seems to be an idealist tint to Leninist 
accounts of the Russian Revolution. After all, they seem to
think that the Lenin of 1921 was, essentially, the same person
as the Lenin of 1917! That seems to violate the basic ideas
of materialism. As Herbert Read points out, "the phrase 'the 
dictatorship of the proletariat' . . . became fatal through the 
interventions of two political expedients -- the identification 
of the proletariat with the Bolshevik Party, and the use of the 
State as an instrument of revolution. Expedients and compromises
may have been necessary for the defeat of the reactionary 
forces; but there is no doubt whatsoever that what took place
was a progressive brutalisation of Lenin's own mind under the
corrupting influence of the exercise of power." [_A One-Man
Manifesto_, p. 51] It seems common sense that if a political 
strategy exposes its followers to the corrupting effects of 
power we should factor this into any evaluation of it. Sadly,
Leninists fail to do this -- even worse, they attempt to 
whitewash the post-October Lenin (and Trotsky) by excluding
the "bad" quotes which reflect their practice, a practice 
which they are at pains to downplay (or ignore)!

Then, of course, there is the attitude of the Bolshevik leaders 
themselves to these so-called "shouts of command in the midst of
battle." Rather than dismiss them as irrelevant, they continued
to subscribe to them years later. For example, Trotsky was still
in favour of party dictatorship in the late 1930s (see section 
H.1.2). Looking at his justly infamous _Terrorism and Communism_,
we discover Trotsky in the 1930s reiterating his support for his 
arguments of 1920. His preface to the 1936 French edition sees 
him state that it was "devoted to a clarification of the methods 
of the proletariat's revolutionary policy in our epoch." He 
concluded as follows: "Victory is conceivable only on the 
basis of Bolshevik methods, to the defence of which the present 
work is devoted." The previous year, in his introduction to 
the second English edition, he was equally unrepentant. "The
British proletariat," he argued, "will enter upon a period of 
political crisis and theoretical criticism . . . The teachings
of Marx and Lenin for the first time will find the masses as 
their audience. Such being the case, it may be also that the
present book will turn out to be not without its use." He 
dismissed the "consoling illusion" that "the arguments of this
book [were] true for backward Russia" but "utterly without
application to advanced lands." The "wave of Fascist or 
militarised police dictatorships" in the 1920s and 1930s was 
the reason. It seems ironic that Trotsky's self-proclaimed 
followers are now repeating the arguments of what he termed 
"incurable Fabians." [_Terrorism and Communism_, p. xix, 
p. xxxv, p. xlvii and p. xxxix] 

Rather than distance himself from the authoritarian and state 
capitalist policies modern day Leninists claim were thrust upon
an unwilling Bolshevik party by "objective factors," Trotsky 
defends them! Moreover, as we noted in section H.7.12, Trotsky
himself argues that these "objective factors" would face *every*
revolution. As it is, he argues that it was only the "slow
development of the revolution in the West" which stopped "a 
direct passage from military Communism to a Socialistic system
of production." Rather than admit to "illusions" caused by the
"iron necessity" of willing the civil war, he talks about "those
economic hopes which were bound up with the development of the
world revolution." He even links Bolshevik practice with Stalinism,
noting that the "idea of five-year plans was not only formulated 
in that period [1918-1920], but in some economic departments it
was also technically worked out." [Op. Cit., p. xliii]

Even his essay outlining what he considers the differences between
Stalinism and Bolshevism does not see him fundamentally distancing
himself from the positions modern day Leninists like to explain by
"objective factors." He stated that the "Bolshevik party achieved 
in the civil war the correct combination of military art and Marxist 
politics." What did that involve? Immediately before making that
claim he argued that the "Bolshevik party has shown the entire world 
how to carry out armed insurrection and the seizure of power. Those 
who propose the abstraction of the Soviets from the party dictatorship 
should understand that only thanks to the party dictatorship were the 
Soviets able to lift themselves out of the mud of reformism and attain 
the state form of the proletariat." Thus the "party dictatorship" is 
seen as being an example of "Marxist politics" being successfully
applied and not something to be opposed. Moreover, "the Bolshevik 
party was able to carry on its magnificent 'practical' work only 
because it illuminated all its steps with theory." [_Stalinism and 
Bolshevism_] Clearly, rather than denounce the power of the party
as being against Bolshevik theory, as Rees claims, for Trotsky it
represented its application. While he excuses some Bolshevik actions
(such as the banning of opposition groups) as a product of "objective
factors," he clearly sees the degeneration of the revolution coming 
*after* the civil war and its "correct combination" of "Marxist 
politics" and "military art," which included "party dictatorship"
over the soviets. 

This lack of distancing is to be expected. After, the idea that
"objective factors" caused the degeneration of the Russian 
Revolution was first developed by Trotsky to explain, after his
fall from power) the rise of Stalinism. While *he* was head of 
the Soviet state no such "objective" factors seemed to be 
required to "explain" the party dictatorship over the working 
class. Indeed, quite the reverse. As he argued in 1923 "[i]f 
there is one question which basically not only does not require 
revision but does not so much as admit the thought of revision, 
it is the question of the dictatorship of the Party." [_Leon 
Trotsky Speaks_, p. 158] 

Trotsky was just stating mainstream Bolshevik ideology, echoing 
a statement made in March 1923 by the Central Committee (of 
which he and Lenin were members) to mark the 25th anniversary 
of the founding of the Communist Party. It sums up the lessons 
gained from the revolution and states that "the party of the 
Bolsheviks proved able to stand out fearlessly against the 
vacillations within its own class, vacillations which, with 
the slightest weakness in the vanguard, could turn into an
unprecedented defeat for the proletariat." Vacillations, of 
course, are expressed by workers' democracy. Little wonder the
statement rejects it: "The dictatorship of the working class 
finds its expression in the dictatorship of the party." ["To 
the Workers of the USSR" in G. Zinoviev, _History of the 
Bolshevik Party_, p. 213, p. 214] It should be noted that
Trotsky had made identical comments before and immediately
after the civil war -- as well as long after (see section H.3.8
for details).

So, as with all the leading Bolsheviks, he considered the party 
dictatorship as an inevitable result of any proletarian revolution 
Moreover, he did not question the social relationships within 
production either. One-man management held no fears for him 
and he called the state capitalist regime under himself and 
Lenin as "socialist" and defended it as such. He was fully 
supportive of one-man management. Writing in 1923, he argued 
that the "system of actual one-man management must be applied 
in the organisation of industry from top to bottom. For leading 
economic organs of industry to really direct industry and to 
bear responsibility for its fate, it is essential for them to 
have authority over the selection of functionaries and their 
transfer and removal." These economic organs must "in actual 
practice have full freedom of selection and appointment." 
[quoted by Robert V. Daniels, _A Documentary History of 
Communism_, vol. 1, p. 237] 

All of these post-civil war opinions of course, fit in well
with his civil war opinions on the matter. Which, incidentally,
explains why, to quote a Leninist, Trotsky "continued to 
his death to harbour the illusion that somehow, despite the 
lack of workers' democracy, Russia was a 'workers' state.'" 
Simply put, there had been no workers' democracy under
Lenin and Trotsky and he considered that regime a "workers'
state." The question arises why Harman thinks Lenin's Russia
was some kind of "workers' state" if workers' democracy is the
criteria by which such things are to be judged. But, then 
again, he thinks Trotsky's _Left Opposition_ "framed a policy
along [the] lines" of "returning to genuine workers' democracy"!
[Chris Harman,_Bureaucracy and Revolution in Eastern Europe_, 
p. 20 and p. 19]

Now, it seems strange that rather than present what he "really" 
thought, Trotsky expounded what presumably is the *opposite* of 
it. Surely the simplistic conclusion to draw is that Trotsky said 
what he really did think and that this was identical to his 
so-called "shouts of command" made during the civil war? But, 
of course, all these comments can be dismissed as "rhetorical 
justifications" and not reflective of Trotsky's real "theory." Or
can they? Ultimately, either you subscribe to the idea that Lenin
and Trotsky were able to express their ideas themselves or you 
subscribe to the notion that they hid their "real" politics and
only modern-day Leninists can determine what they, in fact, "really"
meant to say and what they "really" stood for. And as for all those
"awkward" quotes which express the *opposite* of the divined true
faith, well, they can be ignored.

Which is, of course, hardly a convincing position to take. 
Particularly as Lenin and Trotsky were hardly shy in justifying 
their authoritarian policies and expressing a distinct lack of 
concern over the fate of any *meaningful* working class conquest 
of the revolution like, say, soviet democracy. As Samuel Farber 
notes that "there is no evidence indicating that Lenin or any of 
the mainstream Bolshevik leaders lamented the loss of workers' 
control or of democracy in the soviets, or at least referred to 
these losses as a retreat, as Lenin declared with the replacement 
of War Communism by NEP in 1921." [_Before Stalinism_, p. 44]

The sad fact is that the inter-party conflicts of the 1920s 
were *not* about "workers' democracy," rather party democracy.
The Bolsheviks simply relabelled "party democracy" as "workers'
democracy." Little wonder in 1925 that Max Eastman, one of 
Trotsky's main supporters at the time, stated "this programme of 
democracy within the party [was] called 'Workers' Democracy' by 
Lenin" and that "Trotsky merely revived this original plea." 
[_Since Lenin Died_, p. 35] Trotsky held this position throughout 
the 1920s and 1930s. As we noted in section H.7.13, the 1927
_Platform of the Opposition_ restated its belief in party 
dictatorship and argued that Stalin was undermining it in 
favour of rule by the bureaucracy. Ironically, Trotskyists
in soviet prisons in the early 1930s "continued to consider
that 'Freedom to choose one's party -- that is Menshevism'"
and this was their "final verdict." [Ante Ciliga, _The Russian
Enigma_, p. 280] No wonder they seemed surprised to be there!

Trotsky's issue with Stalinism was not based on *real* socialist
principles, such as meaningful working class freedoms and power.
Rather it was a case of "the political centre of gravity ha[ving]
shifted from the proletarian vanguard to the bureaucracy" and
this caused "the party" to change "its social structure as 
well as in its ideology." [_Stalinism and Bolshevism_] The
party dictatorship had been replaced by the dictatorship of
the state bureaucracy, in other words. Once this happened, 
Trotsky sought to explain it. As analysing the impact of 
Bolshevik ideology and practice were, by definition, out 
of the question, that left the various objective factors 
Trotsky turned to to explain developments after 1923. Now the 
concern for "objective factors" appeared, to explain Stalinism
while keeping true to Bolshevik ideology *and* practice.

So, in summary, the leading Bolsheviks did not view "objective
factors" as explaining the failure of the revolution. Indeed,
until Trotsky was squeezed out of power they did not think that
the revolution *had* failed. Party dictatorship and one-man
management were *not* considered as expressions of a failed 
revolution, rather a successful one. Trotsky's issue with 
Stalinism was simply that the bureaucracy had replaced the
"the proletarian vanguard" (i.e. himself and his followers) 
as the dominant force in the Soviet State and it had started
to use the techniques of political repression developed against
opposition parties and groups against him. The idea that 
"objective factors" caused the failure of the revolution was 
not used until the late 1920s and even then not used to explain
the party dictatorship but rather the usurpation of *its*
power by the bureaucracy.

H.9 How did Bolshevik ideology contribute to the failure 
    of the Revolution?

It is a truism of Leninism that Stalinism has nothing to do
with the ideas of Bolshevism. Moreover, most are at pains to
stress that these ideas have no relation to the actual practice
of the Bolshevik Party after the October Revolution. To 
re-quote one Leninist:

"it was overwhelmingly the force of circumstance which obliged 
the Bolsheviks to retreat so far from their own goals. They 
travelled this route in opposition to their own theory, not 
because of it -- no matter what rhetorical justifications were 
given at the time." [John Rees, "In Defence of October," 
pp. 3-82, _International Socialism_, no. 52, p. 70]

His fellow party member Duncan Hallas argued that it was "these 
desperate conditions" (namely terrible economic situation
combined with civil war) which resulted in "the Bolshevik Party 
[coming] to substitute its own rule for that of a decimated, 
exhausted working class" anarchists disagree. [_Towards a 
Revolutionary Socialist Party_, p. 43] 

We have discussed in section H.8 why the various "objective 
factors" explanations favoured by Leninists to explain the
defeat of the Russian Revolution are unconvincing. Ultimately,
they rest on the spurious argument that if only what most
revolutionaries (including, ironically, Leninists!) consider
as inevitable side effects of a revolution did not occur, then
Bolshevism would have been fine. It is hard to take seriously
the argument that if only the ruling class disappeared without
a fight, if the imperialists had not intervened and if the
economy was not disrupted then Bolshevism would have resulted
in socialism. This is particularly the case as Leninists argue
that only *their* version of socialism recognises that the
ruling class will *not* disappear after a revolution, that we
will face counter-revolution and so we need a state to defend
the revolution! As we argue in sections H.2.1 and H.8.1, this 
is not the case. Anarchists have long recognised that a 
revolution will require defending and that it will provoke a 
serious disruption in the economic life of a country.

Given the somewhat unrealistic tone of these kinds of assertions,
it is necessary to look at the ideological underpinnings of 
Bolshevism and how they played their part in the defeat of the 
Russian Revolution. This section, therefore, will discuss why 
such Leninist claims are not true. Simply put, Bolshevik ideology 
*did* play a role in the degeneration of the Russian Revolution. 
This is obvious once we look at most aspects of Bolshevik 
ideology as well as the means advocated by the Bolsheviks to 
achieve their goals. Rather than being in opposition to the
declared aims of the Bolsheviks, the policies implemented by
them during the revolution and civil war had clear relations 
with their pre-revolution ideas and visions. To quote Maurice 
Brinton's conclusions after looking at this period:

"there is a clear-cut and incontrovertible link between what 
happened under Lenin and Trotsky and the later practices of 
Stalinism. We know that many on the revolutionary left will 
find this statement hard to swallow. We are convinced however 
that any honest reading of the facts cannot but lead to this 
conclusion. The more one unearths about this period the more 
difficult it becomes to define - or even to see - the 'gulf'
allegedly separating what happened in Lenin's time from what 
happened later. Real knowledge of the facts also makes it
impossible to accept . . . that the whole course of events 
was 'historically inevitable' and 'objectively determined'. 
Bolshevik ideology and practice were themselves important 
and sometimes decisive factors in the equation, at every 
critical stage of this critical period. Now that more facts 
are available self-mystification on these issues should no 
longer be possible. Should any who have read these pages 
remain 'confused' it will be because they want to remain 
in that state -- or because (as the future beneficiaries 
of a society similar to the Russian one) it is their interest 
to remain so." [_The Bolsheviks and Workers' Control_, 
p. 84]

This is unsurprising. The Leninist idea that politics of the 
Bolsheviks had no influence on the outcome of the revolution,
that their policies during the revolution were a product purely 
of objective forces, is unconvincing. The facts of the matter is 
that people are faced with choices, choices that arise from the 
objective conditions that they face. What decisions they make 
will be influenced by the ideas they hold -- they will *not* 
occur automatically, as if people were on auto-pilot -- and 
their ideas are shaped by the social relationships they 
experience. Thus, someone who favours centralisation and sees 
nationalisation as the defining characteristic of socialism 
will make different decisions than someone who favours 
decentralising power and sees self-management as the key 
issue. The former will also create *different* forms of 
social organisation based on their perceptions of what
"socialism" is and what is "efficient." Similarly, the 
different forms of social organisation favoured will also 
impact on how a revolution develops and the political 
decisions they make. For example, if you have a vision which
favours centralised, hierarchical organisation then those 
placed into a position of power over others within such 
structures will act in certain ways, have a certain world 
view, which would be alien to someone subject to egalitarian 
social relations. 

In summary, the ideas in people's heads matter, including during 
a revolution. Someone in favour of centralisation, centralised 
power and who equates party rule with class rule (like Lenin and 
Trotsky), will act in ways (and create structures) totally different 
from someone who believes in decentralisation and federalism. The
organisation they create will create specific forms of social 
relationships which, in turn, will shape the ideas of those subject
to them. This means that a centralised, hierarchical system will 
create authoritarian social relationships and these will shape 
those within them and the ideas they have in totally different 
ways than a decentralised, egalitarian system. 

Similarly, if Bolshevik policies hastened the alienation of working
class people and peasants from the regime which, in turn, resulted
in resistance to them then some of the "objective factors" facing
Lenin's regime were themselves the products of earlier political
decisions. Unwelcome and unforeseen (at least to the Bolshevik 
leadership) consequences of specific Bolshevik practices and 
actions, but still flowing from Bolshevik ideology all the same.
So, for example, when leading Bolsheviks had preconceived biases
against decentralisation, federalism, "petty-bourgeois" peasants, 
"declassed" workers or "anarcho-syndicalist" tendencies, this 
would automatically become an ideological determinant to the 
policies decided upon by the ruling party. While social 
circumstances may have limited Bolshevik options, these social
circumstances were also shaped by the results of Bolshevik 
ideology and practice and, moreover, possible solutions to 
social problems were also limited by Bolshevik ideology and
practice.

So, *political ideas do matter.* And, ironically, the very 
Leninists who argue that Bolshevik politics played no role 
in the degeneration of the revolution accept this. Modern 
day Leninists, while denying Bolshevik ideology had a negative 
on the development of the revolution also subscribe to the 
contradictory idea that Bolshevik politics were essential for
its "success"! Indeed, the fact that they *are* Leninists shows 
this is the case. They obviously think that Leninist ideas on 
centralisation, the role of the party, the "workers' state" and 
a host of other issues are correct and, moreover, essential for 
the success of a revolution. They just dislike the results when
these ideas were applied in practice within the institutional 
context these ideas promote, subject to the pressures of the 
objective circumstances they argue *every* revolution will face! 

Little wonder anarchists are not convinced by Leninist arguments
that their ideology played no role in the rise of Stalinism in
Russia. Simply put, if you use certain methods then these will be
rooted in the specific vision you are aiming for. If you think
socialism is state ownership and centralised planning then you
will favour institutions and organisations which facilitate that
end. If you want a highly centralised state and consider a state
as simply being an "instrument of class rule" then you will see 
little to worry about in the concentration of power into the hands 
of a few party leaders. However, if you see socialism in terms of
working class managing their own affairs then you will view such
developments as being fundamentally in opposition to your goals
and definitely *not* a means to that end.

So part of the reason why Marxist revolutions yield such anti-working 
class outcomes is to do with its ideology, methods and goals. It has
little to do with the will to power of a few individuals (important
a role as that can play, sometimes, in events). In a nutshell, the 
ideology and vision guiding Leninist parties incorporate hierarchical 
values and pursue hierarchical aims. Furthermore, the methods and 
organisations favoured to achieve (their vision of) "socialism" are 
fundamentally hierarchical, aiming to ensure that power is centralised 
at the top of pyramidal structures in the hands of the party leaders.

It would be wrong, as Leninists will do, to dismiss this as simply a 
case of "idealism." After all, we are talking about the ideology of a 
ruling party. As such, these ideas are more than just ideas: after 
the seizure of power, they became a part of the real social situation 
within Russia. Individually, party members assumed leadership posts 
in all spheres of social life and started to apply their ideology. 
Then, overtime, the results of this application ensured that the 
party could not be done otherwise as the framework of exercising 
power had been shaped by its successful application (e.g. Bolshevik 
centralism ensured that all its policies were marked by centralist 
tendencies, simply because Bolshevik power had become centralised). 
Soon, the only real instance of power is the Party, and very soon, 
only the summits of the Party. This cannot help but shape its 
policies and actions. As Castoriadis argues:

"If it is true that people's real social existence determines 
their consciousness, it is from that moment illusory to expect 
the Bolshevik party to act in any other fashion than according 
to its real social position. The real social situation of the 
Party is that of a directorial organ, and its point of view 
toward this society henceforth is not necessarily the same as 
the one this society has toward itself." [_The role of Bolshevik
Ideology in the birth of the Bureaucracy_, p. 97]

As such, means and ends are related and cannot be separated.
As Emma Goldman argued, there is "no greater fallacy than the
belief that aims and purposes are one thing, while methods and 
tactics are another. This conception is a potent menace to social 
regeneration. All human experience teaches that methods and means 
cannot be separated from the ultimate aim. The means employed 
become, through individual habit and social practice, part and 
parcel of the final purpose; they influence it, modify it, and 
presently the aims and means become identical. . . The great and 
inspiring aims of the Revolution became so clouded with and 
obscured by the methods used by the ruling political power 
that it was hard to distinguish what was temporary means and 
what final purpose. Psychologically and socially the means 
necessarily influence and alter the aims. The whole history of 
man is continuous proof of the maxim that to divest one's 
methods of ethical concepts means to Sink into the depths of 
utter demoralisation. In that lies the real tragedy of the 
Bolshevik philosophy as applied to the Russian Revolution. May 
this lesson not be in vain." In summary, "[n]o revolution can 
ever succeed as a factor of liberation unless the MEANS used to 
further it be identical in spirit and tendency with the PURPOSES 
to be achieved." [_My Disillusionment in Russia_, pp. 260-1]

If this analysis of the anarchists against Bolshevism is true 
then it follows that the Bolsheviks were not just wrong on one 
or two issues but their political outlook right down to the core 
was wrong. Its vision of socialism was flawed, which produced a
flawed perspective on the potentially valid means available to
achieve it. Leninism, we must never forget, does not aim for 
the same kind of society anarchism does. As we discussed in 
section H.3.1, the short, medium and long term goals of both 
movements are radically different. While both claim to aim for 
"communism," what is mean by that word is radically different 
in details if somewhat similar in outline. The anarchist ideal 
of a classless, stateless and free society is based on a 
decentralised, participatory and bottom-up premise. The 
Leninist ideal is the product of a centralised, party ruled 
and top-down paradigm. 

This explains why Leninists advocate a democratic-centralist 
"Revolutionary Party." It arises from the fact that their 
programme is the capture of state power in order to abolish 
the "anarchy of the market." Not the abolition of wage labour, 
but its universalisation under the state as one big boss. Not 
the destruction of alienated forces (political, social and 
economic) but rather their capture by the party on behalf of 
the masses. In other words, this section of the FAQ is based
on the fact that Leninists are not (libertarian) communists; 
they have not broken sufficiently with Second International 
orthodoxy, with the assumption that socialism is basically 
state capitalism ("The idea of the State as Capitalist, to
which the Social-Democratic fraction of the great Socialist
Party is now trying to reduce Socialism." [Peter Kropotkin,
_The Great French Revolution_, vol. 1, p. 31]). Just as
one cannot abolish alienation with alienated means, so we 
cannot attack Leninist "means" also without distinguishing 
our libertarian "ends" from theirs.

This means that both Leninist means and ends are flawed. Both
will fail to produce a socialist society. As Kropotkin said
at the time, the Bolsheviks "have shown how the Revolution is
*not* to be made." [quoted by Berkman, _The Bolshevik Myth_,
p. 75] If applied today, Leninist ideas will undoubtedly fail
from an anarchist point of view while, as under Lenin, 
"succeeding" from the limited perspective of Bolshevism. Yes,
the party may be in power and, yes, capitalist property may
be abolished by nationalisation but, no, a socialist society
would be no nearer. Rather we would have a new hierarchical 
and class system rather than the classless and free society
which non-anarchist socialists claim to be aiming for.

Let us be perfectly clear. Anarchists are *not* saying that 
Stalinism will be the inevitable result of any Bolshevik
revolution. What we are saying is that some form of class
society will result from any such a revolution. The exact
form this class system will take will vary depending on the
objective circumstances it faces, but no matter the specific
form of such a post-revolutionary society it will not be a
socialist one. This is because of the ideology of the party
in power will shape the revolution in specific ways which, 
by necessity, form new forms of hierarchical and class 
exploitation and oppression. The preferred means of Bolshevism 
(vanguardism, statism, centralisation, nationalisation, and 
so on) will determine the ends, the ends being not communist
anarchism but some kind of bureaucratic state capitalist society
labelled "socialism" by those in charge. Stalinism, in this 
perspective, was the result of an interaction of certain 
ideological goals and positions as well as organisational 
principles and preferences with structural and circumstantial 
pressures resulting from the specific conditions prevalent at 
the time. For example, a Leninist revolution in an advanced
western country would not require the barbaric means used by
Stalinism to industrialise Russia.

This section of the FAQ will, therefore, indicate the key
areas of Bolshevik ideology which, when applied, will 
undermine any revolution as they did the Russian. As such, 
it is all fine and well for Trotskyist Max Shachtman (like
so many others) to argue that the Bolsheviks had "convert[ed] 
the expediencies and necessities of the civil war period into 
virtues and principles which had never been part of their 
original program." Looking at this "original program" we can 
see elements of what was latter to be applied. Rather than 
express a divergence it could be argued that it was this that 
undermined the more democratic aspects of their original program. 
In other words, perhaps the use of state power and economic 
nationalisation came into conflict with, and finally destroyed, 
the original proclaimed socialist principles? And, perhaps, 
the "socialist" vision of Bolshevism was so deeply flawed that 
even attempting to apply it destroyed the aspirations for 
liberty, equality and solidarity that inspired it? For, after 
all, as we indicated in section H.3.1, the anarchist and 
mainstream Marxist visions of socialism and how to get there 
*are* different. Can we be surprised if Marxist means cannot 
achieve anarchist (i.e. authentic socialist) ends? To his 
credit, Shachtman acknowledges that post-civil war salvation 
"required full democratic rights" for all workers, and that 
this was "precisely what the Bolsheviks . .  . were determined 
not to permit." Sadly he failed to wonder *why* the democratic 
principles of the "original program" were only "honoured in the 
breach" and why "Lenin and Trotsky did not observe them." The 
possibility that Bakunin was right and that statism and socialism 
cannot go together was not raised. ["Introduction" to Trotsky's 
_Terrorism and Communism_, p. xv] 

Equally, there is a tendency of pro-Leninists to concentrate
on the period between the two revolutions of 1917 when specifying
what Bolshevism "really" stood for, particularly Lenin's book
_State and Revolution_. To use an analogy, when Leninists do this
they are like politicians who, when faced with people questioning
the results of their policies, ask them to look at their election 
manifesto rather than what they have done when in power. As
we discuss in section H.6.4 Lenin's book was never applied in
practice. From the very first day, the Bolsheviks ignored it.
After 6 months *none* of its keys ideas had been applied. 
Indeed, in all cases the exact opposite had been imposed. As
such, to blame (say) the civil war for the reality of "Bolshevik 
in power" (as Leninists do) seems without substance. Simply put,
_State and Revolution_ is no guide to what Bolshevism "really"
stood for. Neither is their position *before* seizing power if
the realities of their chosen methods (i.e. seizing state power) 
quickly changed their perspective, practice *and* ideology (i.e.
shaped the desired ends). Assuming of course that most of their
post-October policies were radically different from their 
pre-October ones, which (as we indicate here) they were not.

With that said, what do anarchists consider the key aspects of
Bolshevik ideology which helped to ensure the defeat of the 
Russian Revolution and had, long before the civil war started,
had started its degeneration into tyranny? These factors are 
many and so we will, by necessity, concrete on the key ones. 
These are believe in centralisation, the confusion of party
power with popular power, the Marxist theory of the state, 
the negative influence of Engels' infamous essay "On Authority", 
the equation of nationalisation and state capitalism with 
socialism, the lack of awareness that working class economic 
power was a key factor in socialism, the notion that "big" was 
automatically "more efficient," the identification of class 
consciousness with supporting the party, how the vanguard 
party organises itself and, lastly, the underlying assumptions 
that vanguardism is based on.

Each one of these factors had a negative impact on the development
of the revolution, combined they were devastating. Nor can it be
a case of keeping Bolshevism while getting rid of some of these
positions. Most go to the heart of Bolshevism and could only be
eliminated by eliminating what makes Leninism Leninist. Thus some
Leninists now pay lip service to workers' control of production
and recognise that the Bolsheviks saw the form of property (i.e.,
whether private or state owned) as being far more important that
workers' management of production. Yet revising Bolshevism to 
take into account this flaw means little unless the others are
also revised. Simply put, workers' management of production would
have little impact in a highly centralised state ruled over by a
equally centralised vanguard party. Self-management in production
or society could not co-exist with a state and party power nor 
with "centralised" economic decision making based on nationalised 
property. In a nutshell, the only way Bolshevism could result
in a genuine socialist society is if it stopped being Bolshevik!

H.9.1 How did the Marxist historical materialism affect Bolshevism?

As is well known, Marx argued that history progressed through distinct
stages. After his death, this "materialist conception of history"
became known as "historical materialism." The basic idea of this
is that the "totality of [the] relations of production constitutes
the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which
arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond
definite forms of social consciousness . . . At a certain stage
of development, the material productive forces of society come
into conflict with the existing relations of production or --
this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms -- with the
property relations within the framework of which they have
operated hitherto. From forms of development of productive
forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an
era of social revolution." [_A Contribution to the Critique of
Political Economy_, pp. 20-1]

Thus slavery was replaced by feudalism, feudalism with capitalism.
For Marx, the "bourgeois mode of production is the last antagonistic
form of the social process of production" and "the productive 
forces developing within bourgeois society create also the 
material conditions for a solution of this antagonism." [Op. Cit.,
p. 21] In other words, after capitalism there would be socialism:

"The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of 
production which has flourished alongside and under it. The
centralisation of the means of production and the socialisation 
of labour reach a point at which they become incompatible with
their capitalist integument. The integument is burst asunder.
The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators
are expropriated." [Karl Marx, _Capital_, vol. 1, p. 929]

Socialism replaces capitalism once the "*proletariat seized
political power and turns the means of production into
state property."* By so doing, "it abolishes itself as 
proletariat, abolishes all class distinctions and class
antagonisms, abolishes also the state as state." [Engels,
_The Marx-Engels Reader_, p. 713] 

Most Marxists subscribe to this schema of historical progress. 
For example, Tony Cliff noted that, "[f]or Lenin, whose
Marxism was never mechanical or fatalistic, the definition
of the dictatorship of the proletariat as a *transition
period* meant that there could be *two* outcomes of this
phase: going forward to socialism, or backsliding to 
capitalism. The policy of the party would tip the balance."
[_Revolution Besieged_, p. 364] 

Marxists, like Marx, argue that socialism was the society 
which would come after capitalism. Thus the Bolsheviks had 
the mindset that whatever they did there was only two 
possibilities: (their version of) socialism or the 
restoration of capitalism. However, this is based on a 
false premise. Is it valid to assume that there is only 
one possible post-capitalist future, one that, by definition, 
is classless? If so, then any action or structure could be 
utilised to fight reaction as after victory there can be 
only one outcome. However, if there is more that one 
post-capitalist future then the question of means becomes 
decisive. If we assume just two possible post-capitalist 
futures, one based on self-management and without classes 
and another with economic, social and political power 
centralised in a few hands, then the means used in a 
revolution become decisive in determining which 
possibility will become reality. 

If we accept the Marxist theory and assume only one 
possible post-capitalist system, then all that is 
required of revolutionary anti-capitalist movements 
is that they only need to overthrow capitalism and 
they will wind up where they wish to arrive as there 
is no other possible outcome. But if the answer no, then 
in order to wind up where we wish to arrive, we have to 
not only overthrow capitalism, we have use means that 
will push us toward the desired future society. As such, 
*means* become the key and they cannot be ignored or 
downplayed in favour of the ends -- particularly as 
these ends will never be reached if the appropriate 
means are not used.

This is no abstract metaphysical or ideological/theoretical 
point. The impact of this issue can be seen from the practice 
of Bolshevism in power. For Lenin and Trotsky, *any* and 
*all* means could and were used in pursuit of their ends. 
They simply could not see how the means used shaped the 
ends reached. Ultimately, there was only two possibilities
-- socialism (by definition classless) or a return to
capitalism.

Once we see that because of their flawed perspective on what
comes after capitalism we understand why, for the Bolsheviks,
the means used and institutions created were meaningless. We
can see one of the roots for Bolshevik indifference to working 
class self-management. As Samuel Farber notes that "there is 
no evidence indicating that Lenin or any of the mainstream 
Bolshevik leaders lamented the loss of workers' control or 
of democracy in the soviets, or at least referred to these 
losses as a retreat, as Lenin declared with the replacement 
of War Communism by NEP in 1921." [_Before Stalinism_, p. 44] 
There was no need, for such means had no impact on achieving
the ends Bolshevik power had set itself. As we discuss in 
section H.9.6, such questions of meaningful working class
participation in the workplace or the soviets were considered
by the likes of Trotsky as fundamentally irrelevant to whether
Bolshevik Russia was socialist or whether the working class was
the ruling class or not, incredible as it may seem.

So if we accept Marx's basic schema, then we simply have to conclude
that what means we use are, ultimately, irrelevant as there is only
one outcome. As long as property is nationalised and a non-capitalist
party holds state power, then the basic socialist nature of the regime
automatically flows. This was, of course, Trotsky's argument with
regard to Stalinist Russia and why he defended it against those who
recognised that it was a new form of class society. Yet it is 
precisely the rise of Stalinism out of the dictatorship of the 
Bolsheviks which exposes the limitations in the Marxist schema of
historical development.

Simply put, there is no guarantee that getting rid of capitalism
will result in a decent society. As anarchists like Bakunin argued
against Marx, it is possible to get rid of capitalism while not
creating socialism, if we understand by that term a free, classless
society of equals. Rather, a Marxist revolution would "concentrate
all the powers of government in strong hands, because the very
fact that the people are ignorant necessitates strong, solicitous
care by the government. [It] will create a single State bank,
concentrating in its hands all the commercial, industrial,
agricultural, and even scientific production; and they will
divide the mass of people into two armies -- industrial and
agricultural armies under the direct command of the State
engineers who will constitute the new privileged 
scientific-political class." [_The Political Philosophy of
Bakunin_, p. 289] As Bolshevism proved, there *was* always an
alternative to socialism or a reversion to capitalism,
in this case *state* capitalism.

So libertarians have long been aware that actually existing 
capitalism could be replaced by another form of class society.
As the experience of Bolshevik tyranny proves beyond doubt,
this perspective is the correct one. And that perspective 
ensured that during the Russian Revolution the Makhnovists 
*had* to encourage free soviets and workers' self-management, 
freedom of speech and organisation in order for the revolution 
to remain socialist (see section H.11). In contrast, the 
Bolsheviks implemented party dictatorship, nationalisation
and one-man management while proclaiming this had something to
do with socialism. Little wonder Trotsky had such difficulties
understanding the obvious truth that Stalinism has *nothing*
to do with socialism.

H.9.2 Why did the Marxist theory of the state undermine 
      working class power?

As discussed in section H.3.7, anarchists and Marxists have
fundamentally different definitions of what constitutes a
state. These different definitions resulted, in practice,
to the Bolsheviks undermining *real* working class power 
during the Russian Revolution in favour of an abstract
"power" which served as little more than a fig-leaf for
Bolshevik power.

For anarchists, the state is marked by centralised power
in the hands of a few. The state, we argue, is designed
to ensure minority rule and, consequently, cannot be used
by the majority to manage their own affairs. Every bourgeois
revolution, moreover, has been marked by a conflict between 
centralised power and popular power and, unsurprisingly,
the bourgeois favoured the former over the latter. As such,
we would expect centralised power (i.e. a state) to be the
means by which a minority class seized power *over* the 
masses and never the means by which the majority managed 
society themselves. It was for this reason that anarchists 
refuse to confuse a federation of self-managed organisations 
with a state:

"The reader knows by now that the anarchists refused to use 
the term 'State' even for a transitional situation. The gap 
between authoritarians and libertarians has not always been 
very wide on this score. In the First International the 
collectivists, whose spokesman was Bakunin, allowed the 
terms 'regenerate State,' 'new and revolutionary State,' 
or even 'socialist State' to be accepted as synonyms for 
'social collective.' The anarchists soon saw, however, 
that it was rather dangerous for them to use the same 
word as the authoritarians while giving it a quite 
different meaning. They felt that a new concept called 
for a new word and that the use of the old term could be 
dangerously ambiguous; so they ceased to give the name 
'State' to the social collective of the future." [Daniel 
Guerin, _Anarchism_, pp. 60-1]

This is no mere semantics. The essence of statism is the
removal of powers that should belong to the community as 
whole (though they may for reasons of efficiency delegate 
their actual implementation to elected, mandated and 
recallable committees) into the hands of a tiny minority 
who claim to act on our behalf and in our interests but
who are not under our direct control. In other words it 
continues the division into rulers and ruled. Any confusion 
between two such radically different forms of organisation 
can only have a seriously negative effect on the development 
of any revolution. At its most basic, it allows those in power 
to develop structures and practices which disempower the 
many while, at the same time, taking about extending 
working class "power."

The roots of this confusion can be found at the root of
Marxism. As discussed in section H.3.7, Marx and Engels had 
left a somewhat contradictory inheritance on the nature and 
role of the state. Unlike anarchists, who clearly argued that 
only confusion would arise by calling the organs of popular 
self-management required by a revolution a "state," the 
founders of Marxism confused two radically different ideas. On 
the one hand, there is the idea of a radical and participatory 
democracy (as per the model of the Paris Commune). On the other, 
there is a centralised body with a government in charge (as
per the model of the democratic state). By using the term 
"state" to cover these two radically different concepts, it 
allowed the Bolsheviks to confuse party power with popular 
power and, moreover, replace the latter by the former without 
affecting the so-called "proletarian" nature of the state. 
The confusion of popular organs of self-management with a 
state ensured that these organs *were* submerged by state 
structures and top-down rule. 

By confusing the state (delegated power, necessarily concentrated 
in the hands of a few) with the organs of popular self-management
Marxism opened up the possibility of a "workers' state" which is
simply the rule of a few party leaders over the masses. The "truth
of the matter," wrote Emma Goldman, "is that the Russian people
have been *locked out* and that the Bolshevik State -- even as
the bourgeois industrial master -- uses the sword and the gun
to keep the people out. In the case of the Bolsheviki this
tyranny is masked by a world-stirring slogan . . . Just because
I am a revolutionist I refuse to side with the master class,
which in Russia is called the Communist Party." [_My 
Disillusionment in Russia_, p. xlix] In this, she simply saw
in practice that which Bakunin had predicted would happen.
For Bakunin, like all anarchists, "every state power, every
government, by its nature and by its position stands outside
the people and above them, and must invariably try to subject
them to rules and objectives which are alien to them." It
was for this reason "we declare ourselves the enemies of every
government and state every state power . . . the people can
only be happy and free when they create their own life,
organising themselves from below upwards." [_Statism and
Anarchy_, p. 136]

The "workers' state" proved no exception to that generalisation.
The roots of the problem, which expressed itself from the start
during the Russian revolution, was the fatal confusion of the
state with organs of popular self-management. Lenin argued in
"State and Revolution" that, on the one hand, "the armed 
proletariat itself shall *become the government*" while, on
the other, that "[w]e cannot imagine democracy, not even 
proletarian democracy, without representative institutions." 
If, as Lenin asserts, democracy "means equality" he has 
reintroduced inequality into the "proletarian" state as
the representatives have, by definition, more power than
those who elected them. [_Essential Works of Lenin_, p. 363, 
p. 306 and p. 346] Yet, as noted in section H.1.2, 
representative bodies necessarily place policy-making in 
the hands of deputies and do not (and cannot) mean that
the working class *as a class* can manage society. 
Moreover, such bodies ensure that popular power can be
usurped without difficulty by a minority. After all, a
minority already *does* hold power.

True equality implies the abolition of the state and its 
replacement by a federation of self-managed communes. The
state, as anarchists have long stressed, signifies a power
*above* society, a concentration of power into a few hands.
Lenin, ironically, quotes Engels on the state being marked 
by "the establishment of a *public power,* which is no longer 
directly identical with the population organising itself as 
an armed power." [quoted by Lenin, Op. Cit., p. 275] As Lenin
supported *representative* structures rather than one based
on elected, mandated and recallable *delegates* then he has
created a "public power" no longer identical with the population.

Combine this with an awareness that bureaucracy must continue
to exist in the "proletarian" state then we have the ideological
preconditions for dictatorship *over* the proletariat. "There 
can be no thought," asserted Lenin, "of destroying officialdom 
immediately everywhere, completely. That is utopia. But to *smash* 
the old bureaucratic machine at once and to begin immediately to 
construct a new one that will enable all officialdom to be 
gradually abolished is *not* utopia." In other words, Lenin 
expected "the gradual 'withering away' of all bureaucracy." 
[Op. Cit., p. 306 and p. 307] 

Yet why expect a "new" bureaucracy to be as easy to control as 
the old one? Regular election to posts does not undermine the 
institutional links, pressures and powers a centralised 
"officialdom" will generate around itself, even a so-called
"proletarian" one. Significantly, Lenin justified this defence
of temporary state bureaucracy by the kind of straw man
argument against anarchism "State and Revolution" is riddled
with. "We are not utopians," asserted Lenin, "we do not indulge 
in 'dreams' of dispensing *at once* with all administration, 
with all subordination: these anarchist dreams . . . are 
totally alien to Marxism, and, as a matter of fact, serve 
only to postpone the socialist revolution until human nature 
has changed. No, we want the socialist revolution with human 
nature as it is now, with human nature that cannot dispense 
with subordination, control and 'managers.'" [Op. Cit., 
p. 307] Yet anarchists do not wish to "dispense" with 
"all administration," rather we wish to replace 
government *by* administration, hierarchical positions 
("subordination") with co-operative organisation. Equally, we 
see the revolution as a process in which "human nature" is 
changed by the struggle itself so that working class people
become capable of organising itself and society without 
bosses, bureaucrats and politicians. If Lenin says that
socialism "cannot dispense" with the hierarchical structures
required by class society why should we expect the same kinds
of structures and social relationships to have different ends
just because "red" managers are in power?

Thus Lenin's work is deeply ambiguous. He is confusing 
popular self-management with a state structure. Anarchists
argue that states, by their very nature, are based on 
concentrated, centralised, alienated power in the hands of
a few. Thus Lenin's "workers' state" is just the same as
any other state, namely rule by a few over the many. This 
is confirmed when Lenin argues that "[u]nder socialism, 
*all* will take part in the work of government in turn and 
will soon become accustomed to no one governing." In fact,
once the "overwhelming majority" have "learned to administer
the state *themselves*, have taken this business into their
own hands . . . the need for government begins to disappear.
The more complete democracy becomes, the nearer the moment 
approaches when it becomes unnecessary. The more democratic
the 'state' of the armed workers -- which is 'no longer a
state in the proper sense of the word' -- becomes, the more
rapidly does *the state* begin to wither away." Moreover,
"[u]ntil the 'higher' phase of communism arrives, the Socialists
demand the *strictest* control, by society *and by the state,*
of the amount of labour and of consumption." [Op. Cit., p. 361, 
p. 349 and p. 345] 

Clearly, the "proletarian" state is *not* based on direct, 
mass, participation by the population but, in fact, on giving 
power to a few representatives. It is *not* identical with
"society," i.e. the armed, self-organised people. Rather 
than look to the popular assemblies of the French revolution, 
Lenin, like the bourgeoisie, looked to representative structures 
-- structures designed to combat working class power and influence.
(at one point Lenin states that "for a certain time not only 
bourgeois right, but even the bourgeois state remains under 
communism, without the bourgeoisie!" This was because "bourgeois 
right in regard to the distribution of articles of *consumption* 
inevitably presupposes the existence of the *bourgeois state,* 
for right is nothing without an apparatus capable of *enforcing* 
the observance of the standards of right." [Op. Cit., p. 346]).

Can we expect the same types of organs and social relationships
to produce different results simply because Lenin is at the head 
of the state? Of course not. 

As the Marxist theory of the state confused party/vanguard
power with working class power, we should not be surprised
that Lenin's "State and Revolution" failed to discuss the
practicalities of this essential question in anything but a
passing and ambiguous manner. For example, Lenin notes that
"[b]y educating the workers' party, Marxism educates the
vanguard of the proletariat which is capable of assuming
power and of *leading the whole people* to socialism, of
directing and organising the new order." [Op. Cit., p. 288]
It is not clear whether it is the vanguard or the proletariat
as a whole which assumes power. Later, he states that "the 
dictatorship of the proletariat" was "the organisation of the 
vanguard of the oppressed as the ruling class for the purpose 
of crushing the oppressors." [Op. Cit., p. 337] Given that
this fits in with subsequent Bolshevik practice, it seems
clear that it is the vanguard which assumes power rather
than the whole class. The negative effects of this are 
discussed in section H.9.8.

However, the assumption of power by the party highlights the
key problem with the Marxist theory of the state and how it
could be used to justify the destruction of popular power.
It does not matter in the Marxist schema whether the class
or the party is in power, it does not impact on whether the
working class is the "ruling class" or not. As Lenin put it.
"democracy is *not* identical with the subordination of the
minority to the majority. Democracy is a *state* which 
recognises the subordination of the minority to the majority,
i.e. an organisation for the systematic use of *violence*
by one class against the other, by one section of the
population against another." [Op. Cit., p. 332] Thus the
majority need not actually "rule" (i.e. make the fundamental
decisions) for a regime to be considered a "democracy" or
an instrument of class rule. That power can be delegated to
a party leadership (even dictatorship) without harming the
"class nature" of the state. This results of such a theory
can be seen from Bolshevik arguments in favour of party 
dictatorship during the civil war period (and beyond).

The problem with the centralised, representative structures
Lenin favours for the "dictatorship of the proletariat" is that
they are rooted in the inequality of power. They constitute in
fact, if not initially in theory, a power *above* society. As
Lenin put it, "the *essence* of bureaucracy" is "privileged 
persons divorced from the masses and *superior to* the masses."
[Op. Cit., p. 360] In the words of Malatesta, a "government,
that is a group of people entrusted with making laws and 
empowered to use the collective power to oblige each individual
to obey them, is already a privileged class and cut off from
the people. As any constituted body would do, it will 
instinctively seek to extend its powers, to be beyond public
control, to impose its own policies and to give priority to
its special interests. Having been put in a privileged position,
the government is already at odds with the people whose
strength it disposes of." [_Anarchy_, p. 34] As we discussed
in section H.6, Lenin's regime provides more than enough 
evidence to support such an analysis.

This is the fatal flaw in the Marxist theory of the state.
As Bakunin put it, "the theory of the state" is "based on this 
fiction of pseudo-popular representation -- which in actual 
fact means the government of the masses by an insignificant
handful of privileged individuals, elected (or even not
elected) by mobs of people rounded up for voting and never
knowing what or whom they are voting for -- on this 
imaginary and abstract expression of the imaginary thought
and will of the all the people, of which the real, living
people do not have the faintest idea." Thus the state 
represents "government of the majority by a minority in
the name of the presumed stupidity of the one and the
presumed intelligence of the other." [Op. Cit., pp. 136-7]

By confusing popular participation with a state, by ignoring
the real inequalities of power in any state structure, Marxism
allowed Lenin and the Bolsheviks to usurp state power, implement
party dictatorship *and* continue to talk about the working 
class being in power. Because of Marxism's metaphysical 
definition of the state (see section H.3.7), actual working 
class people's power over their lives is downplayed, if not 
ignored, in favour party power. 

As parties represent classes in this schema, if the party is 
in power then, by definition, so is the class. This raises the 
possibility of Lenin asserting the "working class" held power 
even when his party was exercising a dictatorship *over* the 
working class and violently repressing any protests by it. 
As one socialist historian puts it, "while it is true that 
Lenin recognised the different functions and democratic 
raison d'etre for both the soviets and his party, in the 
last analysis it was the party that was more important than 
the soviets. In other words, the party was the final 
repository of working-class sovereignty. Thus, Lenin did not 
seem to have been reflected on or have been particularly 
perturbed by the decline of the soviets after 1918." [Samuel 
Farber, _Before Stalinism_, p. 212] This can be seen from how
the Marxist theory of the state was changed *after* the
Bolsheviks seized power to bring into line with its new role
as the means by which the vanguard ruled society (see section 
H.3.8).

This confusion between two radically different concepts and
their submersion into the term "state" had its negative impact 
from the start. Firstly, the Bolsheviks constantly equated 
rule by the Bolshevik party (in practice, its central committee)
with the working class as a whole. Rather than rule by all the
masses, the Bolsheviks substituted rule by a handful of leaders.
Thus we find Lenin talking about "the power of the Bolsheviks
-- that is, the power of the proletariat" as if these things
were the same. Thus it was a case of "the Bolsheviks" having
"to take the whole governmental power into their own hands,"
of "the complete assumption of power by the Bolsheviks alone,"
rather than the masses. Indeed, Russia had been "ruled by 
130,000 landowners" and "yet they tell us that Russia will
not be able to be governed by the 240,000 members of the
Bolshevik Party -- governing in the interests of the
poor and against the rich." [_Will the Bolsheviks Maintain 
Power?_, p. 102, p. 7 and pp. 61-2]

However, governing in the "interests" of the poor is *not*
the same as the poor governing themselves. Thus we have the
first key substitution that leads to authoritarian rule,
namely the substitution of the power of the masses by the
power of a few members who make up the government. Such a
small body will require a centralised state system and,
consequently, we have the creation of a hierarchical body
around the new government which, as we discuss in section
H.9.7, will become the real master in society. 

The preconditions for a new form of class society have been 
created and, moreover, they are rooted in the basic ideas
of Marxism. Society has been split into two bodies, the
masses and those who claim to rule in their name. Given this
basic inequality in power we would, according to anarchist
theory, expect the interests of the masses and the rulers
to separate and come into conflict. While the Bolsheviks 
had the support of the working class (as they did in the 
first few months of their rule), this does not equal mass
participation in running society. Quite the reverse. So 
while Lenin raised the vision of mass participation in 
the "final" stage of communism, he unfortunately blocked 
the means to get there. 

Simply put, a self-managed society can only be created by 
self-managed means. To think we can have a "public power" 
separate from the masses which will, slowly, dissolve 
itself into it is the height of naivety. Unsurprisingly, 
once in power the Bolsheviks held onto power by all means 
available, including gerrymandering and disbanding soviets, 
suppressing peaceful opposition parties and violently 
repressing the very workers it claimed ruled in "soviet" 
Russia (see section H.6). Significantly, this conflict 
developed before the start of the civil war (see section
H.7.3 for details). So when popular support was lost, the
basic contradictions in the Bolshevik position and theory
became clear. Rather than be a "soviet" power, the Bolshevik 
regime was simply rule over the workers in their name, 
nothing more. And equally unsurprising, the Leninists 
revised their theory of the state to take into account the 
realities of state power and the need to justify minority
power *over* the masses (see section H.3.8).

Needless to say, even electoral support for the Bolsheviks should 
not and cannot be equated to working class management of society.
Echoing Marx and Engels at their most reductionist (see section 
H.3.9), Lenin stressed that the state was "an organ or machine 
for the subjection of one class by another . . . when the State 
has become proletarian, when it has become a machine for the 
domination of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie, then we shall 
fully  and unreservedly for a strong government and centralism." 
[Op. Cit., p. 75] The notions that the state could have interests 
of its own, that it is not simply an instrument of class rule but
rather *minority* class rule are nowhere to be found. The 
implications of this simplistic analysis had severe ramifications
for the Russian Revolution and Trotskyist explanations of both
Stalinism and its rise.

Which brings us to the second issue. It is clear that by considering 
the state simply as an instrument of class rule Lenin could downplay, 
even ignore, such important questions of *how* the working class 
can "rule" society, how it can be a "ruling" class. Blinded by the
notion that a state could not be anything *but* an instrument 
of class rule, the Bolsheviks simply were able to justify any
limitation of working class democracy and freedom and argue that
it had no impact on whether the Bolshevik regime was really a
"dictatorship of the proletariat" or not. This can be seen from
Lenin's polemic with German Social-Democrat Karl Kautsky, where
he glibly stated that "*[t]he form of government,* has absolutely 
nothing to so with it." [_Collected Works_, vol. 28, p. 238] 

Yet the idea that there is a difference between *who* rules in a
revolutionary situation and *how* they rule is a key one, and
one raised by the anarchists against Marxism. After all, if the
working class is politically expropriated how can you maintain
that a regime is remotely "proletarian"? Ultimately, the working
class can only "rule" society through its collective participation
in decision making (social, economic and "political"). If working
class people are not managing their own affairs, if they have
delegated that power to a few party leaders then they are *not*
a ruling class and could never be. While the bourgeoisie can,
and has, ruled economically under an actual dictatorship, the
same cannot be said to be the case with the working class. Every
class society is marked by a clear division between order takers
and order givers. To think that such a division can be implemented
in a socialist revolution and for it to remain socialist is pure
naivety. As the Bolshevik revolution showed, representative
government is the first step in the political expropriation of
the working class from control over their fate.

This can best be seen by Trotsky's confused analyses of Stalinism.
He simply could not understand the nature of Stalinism with the
simplistic analytical tools he inherited from mainstream Marxism
and Bolshevism. Thus we find him arguing in 1933 that:

"The dictatorship of a class does not mean by a long shot 
that its entire mass always participates in the management 
of the state. This we have seen, first of all, in the case 
of the propertied classes. The nobility ruled through the 
monarchy before which the noble stood on his knees. The 
dictatorship of the bourgeoisie took on comparatively 
developed democratic forms only under the conditions 
of capitalist upswing when the ruling class had nothing 
to fear. Before our own eyes, democracy has been supplanted 
in Germany by Hitler's autocracy, with all the traditional 
bourgeois parties smashed to smithereens. Today, the 
German bourgeoisie does not rule directly; politically 
it is placed under complete subjection to Hitler and his 
bands. Nevertheless, the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie 
remains inviolate in Germany, because all the conditions 
of its social hegemony have been preserved and strengthened. 
By expropriating the bourgeoisie politically, Hitler saved 
it, even if temporarily, from economic expropriation. The 
fact that the bourgeoisie was compelled to resort to the 
fascist regime testifies to the fact that its hegemony was 
endangered but not at all that it had fallen." [Trotsky, 
_The Class Nature Of The Soviet State_]

Yet Trotsky is confusing the matter. He is comparing the 
actions of class society with those a socialist revolution. 
While a minority class need not "participate" *en mass* the 
question arises does this apply to the transition from class 
society to a classless one? Can the working class *really* 
can be "expropriated" politically and still remain "the
ruling class"? Moreover, Trotsky fails to note that the 
working class was *economically* and *politically* 
expropriated under Stalinism as well. This is unsurprising, 
as both forms of expropriation had occurred when he and Lenin 
held the reins of state power. Yet Trotsky's confused 
ramblings do serve a purpose in showing how the Marxist 
theory of the state can be used to rationalise the 
replacement of popular power by party power. With such 
ideological baggage, can it be a surprise that the 
Bolshevik replacement of workers' power by party power 
could be a revolutionary goal? Ironically, the Marxist 
theory of the state as an instrument of class rule helped
ensure that the Russian working class did *not* become the 
ruling class post-October. Rather, it ensured that the 
Bolshevik party did.

To conclude, by its redunctionist logic, the Marxist theory 
of the state ensured that the substitution of popular power 
by party power could go ahead and, moreover, be justified 
ideologically. The first steps towards party dictatorship 
can be found in such apparently "libertarian" works as 
Lenin's "State and Revolution" with its emphasis on 
"representation" and "centralisation." The net effect
of this was to centralise power into fewer and fewer hands, 
replacing the essential constructive working class 
participation and self-activity required by a social 
revolution with top-down rule by a few party leaders. 
Such rule could not avoid becoming bureaucratised and
coming into conflict with the real aspirations and interests 
of those it claimed to represent. In such circumstances, 
in a conflict between the "workers' state" and the actual 
workers the Marxist theory of the state, combined with 
the assumptions of vanguardism, made the shift to party 
dictatorship inevitable. As we discussed in section H.7.3, 
authoritarian tendencies had surfaced before the civil war 
began. 

The strange paradox of Leninism, namely that the theoretical 
dictatorship of the proletariat was, in practice, a dictatorship 
*over* the proletariat comes as no surprise. In spite of Lenin 
announcing "all power to the soviets" he remained committed to 
a disciplined party wielding centralised power. This regime 
soon expropriated the soviets while calling the subsequent 
regime "Soviet." Rather that create the authoritarian tendencies 
of the Bolshevik state the "objective factors" facing Lenin's 
regime simply increased their impact. The preconditions for 
the minority rule which the civil war intensified to extreme
levels already existed within Marxist theory. Consequently, 
a Leninist revolution which avoided the (inevitable) problems 
facing a revolution would still create some kind of class society
simply because it reproduces minority rule by creating a "workers'
state" as its first step. Sadly, Marxist theory confuses popular
self-government with a state so ensuring the substitution of rule
by a few party leaders for the popular participation required to
ensure a successful revolution.

H.9.3 How did Engels' essay "On Authority" affect the 
      revolution?

We have discussed Engels' infamous diatribe against anarchism 
already (see section H.4 and subsequent sections). Here we 
discuss how its caricature of anarchism helped disarm the 
Bolsheviks theoretically to the dangers of their own actions, 
so helping to undermine the socialist potential of the Russian 
revolution. While the Marxist theory of the state, with its 
ahistoric and ambiguous use of the word "state" undermined 
popular autonomy and power in favour of party power, Engels' 
essay "On Authority" helped undermine popular self-management.

Simply put, Engels essay contained the germs from which Lenin 
and Trotsky's support for one-man management flowed. He provided 
the Marxist orthodoxy required to undermine real working class 
power by confusing all forms of organisation with "authority" and 
equating the necessity of self-discipline with "subordination"
to one will. Engels' infamous essay helped Lenin to destroy
self-management in the workplace and replace it with appointed
"one-man management" armed with "dictatorial powers."

For Lenin and Trotsky, familiar with Engels' "On Authority," 
it was a truism that any form of organisation was based on 
"authoritarianism" and, consequently, it did not really matter
*how* that "authority" was constituted. Thus Marxism's agnostic
attitude to the patterns of domination and subordination within
society was used to justify one-man management and party 
dictatorship. Indeed, "Soviet socialist democracy and individual 
management and dictatorship are in no way contradictory . . . 
the will of a class may sometimes be carried by a dictator, who 
sometimes does more alone and is frequently more necessary." 
[Lenin, _Collected Works_, vol. 30, p. 476]

Like Engels, Lenin defended the principle of authority. The 
dictatorship of the Party over the proletariat found its 
apology in this principle, thoroughly grounded in the practice 
of bureaucracy and modern factory production. Authority, 
hierarchy, and the need for submission and domination is 
inevitable given the current mode of production, they argued. 
And no foreseeable change in social relations could ever 
overcome this blunt necessity. As such, it was (fundamentally)
irrelevant *how* a workplace is organised as, no matter what,
it would be "authoritarian." Thus "one-man management" would
be, basically, the same as worker's self-management via an
elected factory committee.

For Engels, any form of joint activity required as its
"first condition" a "dominant will that settles all 
subordinate questions, whether this will is represented
by a single delegate or a committee charged with the
execution of the resolutions of the majority of persons
interested. In either case there is very pronounced
authority." Thus the "necessity of authority, and of
imperious authority at that." Collective life, he 
stressed, required "a certain authority, no matter
how delegated" and "a certain subordination, are
things which, independently of all social organisation,
are imposed upon us." [_The Marx-Engels Reader_, p. 732]

Lenin was aware of these arguments, even quoting from this
essay in his _State and Revolution_. Thus he was aware
that for Engels, collective decisions meant "the will of
the single individual will always have to subordinate 
itself, which means that questions are settled in an
authoritarian way." Thus there was no difference if
"they are settled by decision of a delegate placed at
the head of each branch of labour or, if possible, by 
a majority vote." The more advanced the technology,
the greater the "despotism": "The automatic machinery
of a big factory is much more despotic than the small
capitalist who employ workers ever have been." [Op. Cit.,
p. 731] Thus Engels had used the modern factory system of 
mass production as a direct analogy to argue against the 
anarchist call for workers' councils and self-management
in production, for workers' autonomy and participation.
Like Engels, Lenin stressed the necessity of central 
authority in industry. 

It can be argued that it was this moment that ensured the
creation of state capitalism under the Bolsheviks. This 
is the moment in Marxist theory when the turn from economics 
to technics, from proletarian control to technocracy, from
workers' self-management to appointed state management 
was ensured. Henceforth the end of any critique of alienation
in mainstream Marxism was assured. Submission to technique under 
hierarchical authority effectively prevents active participation 
in the social production of values. And there was no alternative.

As noted in sections H.6.8 and H.3.14, during 1917 Lenin did
not favour workers' self-management of production. He raised
the idea of "workers' control" after the workers spontaneously
raised the idea and practice themselves during the revolution.
Moreover, he interpreted that slogan in his own way, placing
it within a statist context and within institutions inherited
from capitalism (see section H.3.12). Once in power, it was
(unsurprisingly) *his* vision of socialism and workers' control
that was implemented, *not* the workers' factory committees.
The core of that vision he repeatedly stressed had been 
raised *before* the October revolution.

This vision can be best seen in _The Immediate Tasks of the 
Soviet Government_, written by Lenin and published on the 25th 
of April 1918. This occurred before the start of the civil war
and, indeed, he starts by arguing that "[t]hanks to the peace
which has been achieved" the Bolsheviks had "gained an opportunity
to concentrate its efforts for a while on the most important
and most difficult aspect of the socialist revolution, namely
the task of organisation." The Bolsheviks, who had "managed
to complete the conquest of power," now faced "the principal
task of convincing people" and doing "*practical organisational
work.*" Only when this was done "will it be possible to say
that Russia *has become* not only a Soviet, but also a
socialist, republic." [_The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet 
Government_, p. 2 and p. 8] 

Sadly, this "organisation" was riddled with authoritarianism 
and was fundamentally top-down in nature. His "socialist" 
vision was simply state capitalism (see section H.9.5). However,
what interests us here is that his arguments to justify the 
"socialist" policies he presented are similar to those put 
forward by Engels in "On Authority." As such, we can only
reach the following conclusions. Firstly, that the "state
capitalist" vision of socialism imposed upon Russia by the
Bolsheviks was what they had always intended to introduce.
It was their limited support for workers' control in 1917 
that was atypical and not part of their tradition, *not* 
their policies once in power (as modern day Leninists 
assert). Secondly, that this vision had its roots in classical
Marxism, specifically Engels' "On Authority" and the 
identification of socialism with nationalised property
(see section H.3.13 for more on this).

That Engels diatribe had a negative impact on the development
of the Russian revolution can easily be seen from Lenin's
arguments. For example, Lenin argues that the "tightening
of discipline" and "harmonious organisation" calls "for
coercion -- coercion precisely in the form of dictatorship."
He did not object to granting "individual executives dictatorial 
power (or 'unlimited' powers)" and did not think "the appointment
of individual, dictators with unlimited power" was incompatible
with "the fundamental principles of the Soviet government."
After all, "the history of revolutionary movements" had "shown" 
that "the dictatorship of individuals was very often the 
expression, the vehicle, the channel of the dictatorship of 
revolutionary classes." He notes that "[u]ndoubtably, the 
dictatorship of individuals was compatible with bourgeois 
democracy." [Op. Cit., p. 28 and p. 32] It would be churlish
to note that previous revolutionary movements had not been
*socialist* in nature and did not aim to *abolish* classes.
In such cases, the government appointing people with dictatorial
powers would not have harmed the nature of the revolution,
which was transferring power from one minority class to 
another.

Lenin mocked the "exceedingly poor arguments" of those who objected,
saying that they "demand of us a higher democracy than bourgeois
democracy and say: personal dictatorship is absolutely incompatible 
with your, Bolshevik (i.e. not bourgeois, *but socialist*) Soviet 
democracy." As the Bolsheviks were "not anarchists," he admitted
the need "coercion" in the "transition from capitalism to socialism,"
its form being determined "by the degree of development of the
given revolutionary class, and also by special circumstances." In
general, he stressed, there was "absolutely *no* contradiction in
principle between Soviet (*that is,* socialist) democracy and the
exercise of dictatorial powers by individuals." [Op. Cit., pp. 32-3
and p. 33] Which is, of course, sophistry as dictatorship by a
few people in some aspects of live will erode democracy in others.
For example, being subject to the economic power of the capitalist
during work harms the individual and reduces their ability to
participate in other aspects of social life. Why should being
subject to "red" bosses be any different?

In particular, Lenin argued that "individual dictatorial power"
was required because "large-scale machine industry" (which is
the "foundation of socialism") calls for "absolute and strict
*unity of will,* which directs the joint labours of hundreds,
thousands and tens of thousands of people. . . But how can 
strict unity of will be ensured? By thousands subordinating 
their will to the will of one." He reiterated that the 
"*unquestioning subordination* to a single will is absolutely
necessary for the success of processes organised on the pattern
of large-scale machine industry." The people must "*unquestioningly 
obey the single will* of the leaders of labour." And so it was
a case (for the workers, at least) of "[o]bedience, and 
unquestioning obedience at that, during work to the one-man 
decisions of Soviet directors, of the dictators elected or 
appointed by Soviet institutions, vested with dictatorial 
powers." [Op. Cit., p. 33, p. 34 and p. 44] 

The parallels with Engels' "On Authority" could not be clearer, 
as are the fallacies of Lenin's assertions (see, for example, 
section H.4.5). Lenin, like Engels, uses the example of modern
industry to bolster his arguments. Yet the net effect of Lenin's
argument was to eliminate working class economic power at the
point of production. Instead of socialist social relationships,
Lenin imposed capitalist ones. Indeed, no capitalist would 
disagree with Lenin's workplace regime -- they try to create
such a regime by breaking unions and introducing technologies
and techniques which allow them to control the workers. 
Unsurprisingly, Lenin also urged the introduction of two 
such techniques, namely "piece-work" and "applying much 
of what is scientific and progressive in the Taylor system." 
[Op. Cit., pp. 23-4] As Trotskyist Tony Cliff reminds us, 
"the employers have at their disposal a number of effective 
methods of disrupting th[e] unity [of workers as a class]. Once 
of the most important of these is the fostering of competition 
between workers by means of piece-work systems." He notes that 
these were used by the Nazis and the Stalinists "for the same 
purpose." [_State Capitalism in Russia_, pp. 18-9] Obviously 
piece-work is different when Lenin introduces it! Similarly,
when Trotsky notes that "[b]lind obedience is not a thing to 
be proud of in a revolutionary," it is somewhat different when
Lenin calls upon workers to do so (or, for that matter, Trotsky
himself when in power -- see section H.9.6 for Trotsky's 
radically different perspective on blind obedience of the 
worker to "his" state in 1920!). [_Terrorism and Communism_, 
p. xlvii] 

The *economic* dominance of the bourgeoisie ensures the political
dispossession of the working class. Why expect the introduction
of capitalist social relations in production to have different
outcomes just because Lenin was the head of the government? In 
the words of libertarian socialist Maurice Brinton:

"We hold that the 'relations of production' -- the relations 
which individuals or groups enter into with one another in 
the process of producing wealth - are the essential foundations 
of any society. A certain pattern of relations of production 
is the common denominator of all class societies. This pattern 
is one in which the producer does not dominate the means of 
production but on the contrary both is 'separated from them' 
and from the products of his own labour. In all class societies 
the producer is in a position of subordination to those who 
manage the productive process. Workers' management of 
production -- implying as it does the total domination of 
the producer over the productive process -- is not for us 
a marginal matter. It is the core of our politics. It is 
the only means whereby authoritarian (order-giving, 
order-taking) relations in production can be transcended 
and a free, communist or anarchist, society introduced. 

"We also hold that the means of production may change hands 
(passing for instance from private hands into those of a 
bureaucracy, collectively owning them) with out this 
revolutionising the relations of production. Under such 
circumstances -- and whatever the formal status of property 
-- the society is still a class society for production is 
still managed by an agency other than the producers 
themselves. Property relations, in other words, do not 
necessarily reflect the: relations of production. They 
may serve to mask them -- and in fact they often have."
[_The Bolsheviks and Workers' Control_, p. vii-viii]

The net effect of Lenin's arguments, as anarchist Peter Arshinov 
noted a few years later, was that the "fundamental fact" of the 
Bolshevik revolution was "that the workers and the peasant 
labourers remained within the earlier situation of 'working 
classes' -- producers managed by authority from above." He 
stressed that Bolshevik political and economic ideas may 
have "remov[ed] the workers from the hands of individual 
capitalists" but they "delivered them to the yet more rapacious 
hands of a single ever-present capitalist boss, the State. The 
relations between the workers and this new boss are the same as 
earlier relations between labour and capital . . . Wage labour 
has remained what it was before, expect that it has taken on 
the character of an obligation to the State. . . . It is clear 
that in all this we are dealing with a simple substitution of 
State capitalism for private capitalism." [_The History of the 
Makhnovist Movement_, p. 35 and p. 71] Moreover, Lenin's position 
failed to understand that unless workers have power at the point 
of production, they will soon loose it in society as a whole.
Which, of course, they soon did in Bolshevik Russia, even in
the limited form of electing a "revolutionary" government.

So while the causes of the failure of the Russian Revolution were 
many fold, the obvious influence of Engels' "On Authority" on 
the fate of the workers' control movement should be noted. After
all, Engels' argument confuses the issues that Bakunin and other 
anarchists were trying to raise (namely on the nature of the 
organisations we create and our relationships with others). If,
as Engels' argues, all organisation is "authoritarian," then does
this mean that there no real difference between organisational
structures? Is a dictatorship just the same as a self-managed 
group, as they are both organisations and so both "authoritarian"? 
If so, surely that means the kinds of organisation we create
are irrelevant and what *really* matters is state ownership?
Such logic can only lead to the perspective that working class
self-management of production is irrelevant to socialism and,
unfortunately, the experience of the Russian Revolution tends to
suggest that for mainstream Marxism this is the case. The 
Bolsheviks imposed distinctly authoritarian social structures 
while arguing that they were creating socialism. 

Like Engels, the Bolsheviks defended the principle of authority. 
The dictatorship of the Party over the proletariat in the 
workplace (and, indeed, elsewhere) ultimately found its apology 
in this principle, thoroughly grounded in the practice 
of bureaucracy and modern factory production. Authority, 
hierarchy, and the need for submission and domination is 
inevitable, given the current mode of production, they argued. 
And, as Engels had stressed, no foreseeable change in social 
relations could ever overcome this blunt necessity. As such, 
it was (fundamentally) irrelevant for the leading Bolsheviks
*how* a workplace is organised as, no matter what, it would 
be "authoritarian." Thus "one-man management" would be, 
basically, the same as worker's self-management via an
elected factory committee. As Trotsky made clear in 1920, for
the Bolsheviks the "dictatorship of the proletariat is expressed
in the abolition of private property in the means of production,
in the supremacy over the whole Soviet mechanism of the 
collective will of the workers [i.e. the party, which Trotsky
cheerfully admits is exercising a *party* dictatorship], and not
at all in the form in which individual economic enterprises
are administered." Thus, it "would be a most crying error to
confuse the question as to the supremacy of the proletariat
with the question of boards of workers at the head of the
factories." [_Terrorism and Communism_, p. 162]

By equating "organisation" with "authority" (i.e. hierarchy)
and dismissing the importance of revolutionising the social
relationships people create between themselves, Engels opened
the way for the Bolsheviks' advocacy of "one-man management." His
essay is at the root of mainstream Marxism's agnostic attitude 
to the patterns of domination and subordination within society 
and was used to justify one-man management. After all, if 
Engels was right, then it did not matter *how* the workplace 
was organised. It would, inherently, be "authoritarian" and 
so what mattered, therefore, was who owned property, *not* 
how the workplace was run. Perhaps, then, "On Authority" 
was a self-fulfilling prophecy -- by seeing any form 
of organisation and any form of advanced technology 
as needing hierarchy, discipline and obedience, as being 
"authoritarian," it ensured that mainstream Marxism 
became blinded to the key question of *how* society was 
organised. After all, if "despotism" was a fact of life within 
industry regardless of how the wider society was organised, then 
it does not matter if "one-man management" replaces workers' 
self-management. Little wonder then that the continued alienation 
of the worker was widespread long before Stalin took power and, 
more importantly, before the civil war started. 

As such, the dubious inheritance of classical Marxism had
started to push the Bolshevik revolution down an authoritarian
path and create economic structures and social relationships
which were in no way socialist and, moreover, laid the 
foundations for Stalinism. Even if the civil war had not
occurred, capitalist social relationships would have been
dominant within "socialist" Russia -- with the only difference
being that rather than private capitalism it would have been 
state capitalism. As Lenin admitted, incidentally. It is
doubtful that this state capitalism would have been made to
serve "the whole people" as Lenin naively believed.

In another way Engels identification of organisation with 
authority affected the outcome of the revolution. As *any* 
form of organisation involved, for Engels, the domination 
of individuals and, as such, "authoritarian" then the nature 
of the socialist state was as irrelevant as the way 
workplaces were run. As both party dictatorship and 
soviet democracy meant that the individual was "dominated" 
by collective decisions, so both were "authoritarian." 
As such, the transformation of the soviet state into a 
party dictatorship did not fundamentally mean a change 
for the individuals subject to it. Little wonder that 
no leading Bolshevik called the end of soviet democracy 
and its replacement by party dictatorship as a "retreat"
or even as something to be worried about (indeed, they 
all argued the opposite, namely that party dictatorship 
was essential and not an issue to be worried about).

Perhaps this analogy by the SWP's Tony Cliff of the relationship
between the party and the working class provides an insight:

"In essence the dictatorship of the proletariat *does not*
represent a combination of abstract, immutable elements
like democracy and centralism, independent of time and
space. The actual level of democracy, as well as centralism, 
depends on three basic factors: 1. the strength of the 
proletariat; 2. the material and cultural legacy left to 
it by the old regime; and 3. the strength of capitalist 
resistance. The level of democracy feasible must be indirect 
proportion to the first two factors, and in inverse 
proportion to the third. The captain of an ocean liner can 
allow football to be played on his vessel; on a tiny raft 
in a stormy sea the level of tolerance is far lower." 
[_Lenin_, vol. 3, p. 179] 

Ignoring the obvious points (such as comparing working class 
freedom and democracy to a game!), we can see shades of Engels 
in Cliff's words. Let us not forget that Engels argued that 
"a ship on the high seas" at a "time of danger" required 
"the necessity of authority, and of imperious authority at 
that." [Op. Cit., p. 732] Here Cliff is placing the party 
into the Captain's role and the workers as the crew. The 
Captain, in Engels argument, exercised "imperious authority." 
In Cliff's, the party decides the freedoms which working 
class people are allowed to have -- and so subjects them 
to its "imperious authority." 

Little wonder Bolshevism failed. By this simple analogy 
Cliff shows the authoritarian essence of Bolshevism and 
who really has "all power" under that system. Like the 
crew and passengers dominated by the will of the captain,
the working class under Leninism will be dominated by the party.
It does not bode well that Cliff thinks that democracy can be
"feasible" in some circumstances, but not others and it is
up to those in power (i.e. the party leaders) to determine 
when it was. In his rush to justify Bolshevik party dictatorship
in terms of "objective conditions" he clearly forgot his 
earlier comments that the "liberation of the working class
can only be achieved through the action of the working class.
Hence one can have a revolution with more or less violence,
with more or less suppression of civil rights of the 
bourgeoisie and its hangers-on [a general catch-all category
which, if Bolshevik practice is anything to go by, can include 
rebel workers, indeed the whole working class!], with more
or less political freedom, but one *cannot* gave a revolution,
as the history of Russia conclusively demonstratives, without
workers' democracy -- even if restricted and distorted.
Socialist advance must be gauged by workers' freedom, by
their power to shape their own destiny . . . Without workers'
democracy the immediate means leads to a very different
end, to an end that is prefigured in these same means."
[Op. Cit., p. 110] Obviously if Lenin and Trotsky are the
captains of the ship of state, such considerations are
less important. When it is Lenin wielding "imperious 
authority" then workers' democracy can be forgotten and
the regime remain a "workers' state"!

By ignoring the key issue Bakunin and other anarchists drew
attention to by attacking "authority" (and let us not forget
that by that they meant hierarchical organisations in which
power is concentrated at the top in a few hands -- see
section H.4), Engels opened up the way of seeing democratic
decision as being less than important. This is *not* to
suggest that Engels favoured dictatorship. Rather we are
suggesting that by confusing two radically different forms
of organisation as self-management and hierarchy he blunted
latter Marxists to the importance of participation and 
collective decision making from below. After all, if all
organisation is "authoritarian" then it matters little,
in the end, how it is structured. Dictatorship, 
representative democracy and self-management were all 
equally "authoritarian" and so the issues raised by 
anarchism can safely be ignored (namely that electing 
bosses does not equate to freedom). Thus the Bolshevik 
willingness to equate their dictatorship with rule by
the working class is not such a surprise after all.

To conclude, rather than the anti-authoritarians not knowing
"what they are talking about," "creating nothing but confusion,"
"betraying the movement of the proletariat" and "serv[ing] the
reaction," it was Engels' essay that aided the Bolshevik 
counter-revolution and helped, in its own small way, to lay
the foundations for Leninist tyranny and state capitalism.
[Engels, Op. Cit., p. 733] Ultimately, Engels "On Authority"
helped give Lenin the ideological premises by which to 
undermine workers' economic power during the revolution and
recreate capitalist social relations and call it "socialism."
His ill thought out diatribe had ramifications even he would 
never have guessed (but were obvious at the time to 
libertarians). His use of the modern factory system to 
argue against the anarchist call for workers' councils, 
federalism and workers' autonomy, for participation, for 
self-management, became the basis for re-imposing 
*capitalist* relations of production in revolutionary Russia. 

H.9.4 How did the Bolshevik vision of "democracy" affect the 
      revolution?

As discussed in section H.3.2, Marx and Engels had left their
followers which a contradictory legacy as regards "socialism
from below." On the one hand, their praise for the Paris Commune
and its libertarian ideas pointed to a participatory democracy
run from below. On the other, Marx's comments during the German 
Revolution in 1850 that the workers must "strive for . . . the 
most determined centralisation of power in the hands of the state 
authority" because "the path of revolutionary activity" can 
"proceed only from the centre" suggests a top-down approach. 
He stressed that centralisation of power was essential to overcome 
local autonomy, which would allow "every village, every town and 
every province" to put "a new obstacle in the path" the revolution 
due to "local and provincial obstinacy." [_Marx-Engels Reader_, 
p. 509] 

Building upon this contradictory legacy, Lenin unambiguously 
stressed the "from above" aspect of it (see section H.3.3 for
details). The only real exception to this perspective occurred
in 1917, when Lenin was trying to win mass support for his
party. However, even this support for democracy from below
was always tempered by reminding the reader that the Bolsheviks
stood for centralisation and strong government once they were
in power (see section H.9.7). 

Once in power, the promises of 1917 were quickly forgotten.
Unsurprisingly, modern day Leninists argue that this was
due to the difficult circumstances facing the Bolsheviks at
the time. They argue that the words of 1917 represent the
true democratic vision of Bolshevism. Anarchists are not
impressed. After all, for an idea to be useful it must be
practical -- even in "exceptional circumstances." If the
Bolshevik vision is not robust enough to handle the problems
that have affected every revolution then we have to question
the validity of that vision or the strength of commitment
its supporters hold it.

Given this, the question becomes which of these two aspects of
Marxism was considered its "essence" by Lenin and the Bolsheviks.
Obviously, it is hard to isolate the real Bolshevik vision of
democracy from the influence of "objective factors." However,
we can get a taste by looking at how the Bolsheviks acted and
argued during the first six months in power. During this period,
the problems facing the revolution were hard but not as bad as 
those facing it after the Czech revolt at the end of May, 1918.
Particularly after March, 1918, the Bolsheviks were in a position
to start constructive work as in the middle of that month Lenin
claimed that the "Soviet Government has triumphed in the Civil 
War." [quoted by Maximoff, _The Guillotine at Work_, p. 53]

So the question as to whether the Bolsheviks were forced into 
authoritarian and hierarchical methods by the practical necessities 
of the civil war or whether all this was inherent in Leninism all 
along, and the natural product of Leninist ideology, can be answered
by looking at the record of the Bolsheviks prior to the civil war. 
From this we can ascertain the effect of the civil war. And the
obvious conclusion is that the record of the initial months of 
Bolshevik rule point to a less than democratic approach which
suggests that authoritarian policies were inherent in Leninism
and, as such, pointed the revolution into a path were further
authoritarian policies were not only easy to implement, but had
to be as alternative options had been eliminated by previous 
policies. Moreover, Bolshevik ideology itself made such policies
easy to accept and to justify.

As discussed in section H.6.6, it was during this period that 
the Bolsheviks started to gerrymander soviets and disband any 
they lost elections to. As we indicate in section H.6.9, they 
undermined the factory committees, stopping them federating 
and basically handed the factories to the state bureaucracy. 
Lenin argued for and implemented one-man management, piecework, 
Taylorism and other things Stalinism is condemned for (see 
section H.9.3, for example). In the army, Trotsky disbanded 
the soldier committees and elected officers by decree.

How Trotsky defended this policy of appointing officers is 
significant. It mirrors Lenin's argument in favour of 
appointed one-man management and, as such, reflects the 
basic Bolshevik vision of democracy. By looking at his
argument we can see how the Bolshevik vision of democracy
fatality undermined the Russian Revolution and its socialist
content. The problems of the civil war simply deepened the
abscess in democracy created by Lenin and Trotsky in the
spring of 1918.

Trotsky acknowledged that that "the soldier-workers and 
soldier-peasants" needed "to elect commanders for themselves"
in the Tzarist army "not [as] military chiefs, but simply 
[as] representatives who could guard them against attacks
of counter-revolutionary classes." However, in the new Red
Army this was not needed as it was the "workers' and
peasants' Soviets, i.e. the same classes which compose the
army" which is building it. He blandly asserted that "[h]ere
no internal struggle is possible." To illustrate his point
he pointed to the trade unions. "The metal workers," he
noted, "elect their committee, and the committee finds a
secretary, a clerk, and a number of other persons who are
necessary. Does it ever happen that the workers should
say: 'Why are our clerks and treasurers appointed, and
not elected?' No, no intelligent workers will say so."
[_Leon Trotsky Speaks_, p. 112-3]

Thus in less than six months, Lenin's call in "State and
Revolution" that "[a]ll officials, without exception,
[would be] elected and subject to recall *at any time*"
was dismissed as the demand that "no intelligent workers"
would raise! [_Essential Works of Lenin_, p. 302] But, 
then again, Trotsky *was* in the process of destroying 
another apparent "principle" of Leninism, namely (to
quote, like Lenin, Marx) "the suppression of the standing
army, and the substitution for it of the armed people."
[quoted by Lenin, Op. Cit., p. 300] 

Trotsky continues his argument. The Trade union committee,
he asserts, would say "You yourselves have chosen the
committee. If you don't like us, dismiss us, but once you
have entrusted us with the direction of the union, then 
give us the possibility of choosing the clerk or the
cashier, since we are able to judge in the matter than 
you, and if our way of conducting business is bad, then
throw us out and elect another committee." After this 
defence of elected dictatorship, he states that the
"Soviet government is the same as the committee of a
trade union. It is elected by the workers and peasants,
and you can at the All-Russian Congress of the Soviets,
at any moment you like, dismiss that government and 
appoint another." Until that happens, he was happy to
urge blind obedience by the sovereign people to their
servants: "But once you have appointed it, you must give 
it the right to choose the technical specialists, the clerks, 
the secretaries in the broad sense of the word, and in military
affairs, in particular." He tried to calm the nerves of those
who could see the obvious problems with this argument by
asking whether it was "possible for the Soviet government
to appoint military specialists against the interests of
the labouring and peasant masses?" [Op. Cit., p. 113]

And the answer to that question is, of course, an empathic
yes. Even looking at his own analogy, namely that of a
trade union committee, it is obvious that an elected body
can have interests separate from and in opposition to those
who elected it. The history of trade unionism is full of
examples of committees betraying the membership of the unions.
And, of course, the history of the Soviet government under
Lenin and Trotsky (never mind Stalin!) shows that just because
it was once elected by a majority of the working people 
does not mean it will act in their best interests.

Trotsky even went one better. "The army is now only in the process
of formation," he noted. "How could the soldiers who have just 
entered the army choose the chiefs! Have they have any vote to 
go by? They have none. And therefore elections are impossible." 
[Op. Cit., p. 113] If only the Tsar had thought of that one!
If he had, he would still be in power. And, needless to say,
Trotsky did not apply that particular logic to himself. After
all, he had no experience of holding governmental office or
building an army (or even being in combat). Nor did any of the
other Bolshevik leaders. By the logic of his argument, not only
should the workers not been allowed to vote for a soviet 
government, he and his fellow Bolsheviks should not have 
assumed power in 1917. But, clearly, sauce for the goose is
definitely *not* sauce for the gander.

For all his talk that the masses could replace the Bolsheviks
at the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, Trotsky failed to
realise that these proposals (and other ones like it) ensured
that this was unlikely to happen. Even assuming that the 
Bolsheviks had not gerrymandered and disbanded soviets, the
fact is that the Bolshevik vision of "democracy" effectively
hollowed out the grassroots participation required to make
democracy at the top anything more than a fig-leaf for party
power. He honestly seemed to believe that eliminating mass
participation in other areas of society would have no effect
on the levels of participation in soviet elections. Would
people subjected to one-man management in the workplace and
in the army really be truly free and able to vote for parties
which had not appointed their bosses? Could workers who were
disenfranchised economically and socially remain in political
power (assuming you equate voting a handful of leaders into
power with "political power")? And does being able to elect
a representative every quarter to the All-Russian congress
really mean that the working class was really in charge of
society? Of course not.

This vision of top-down "democracy" can, of course, be traced
back to Marx's arguments of 1850 and Lenin's comments that
the "organisational principle of revolutionary Social-Democracy"
was "to proceed from the top downward." (see sections H.3.2 and
H.3.3). By equating centralised, top-down decision making by an 
elected government with "democracy," the Bolsheviks had the 
ideological justification to eliminate the functional democracy 
associated with the factory committees and soldiers committees. 
In place of workers' and soldiers' direct democracy and 
self-management, the Bolsheviks appointed managers and officers 
and justified because a workers' party was in power. After all, 
had not the masses elected the Bolsheviks into power? This 
became the means by which *real* democracy was eliminated in 
area after area of Russian working class life. Needless to 
say, a state which eliminates functional democracy in the 
grassroots will not stay democratic in any meaningful sense
for long. At best, it will be like a bourgeois republic with
purely elections where people elect a party to misrepresent
them every four or so years while real economic, political
and social power rests in the hands of a few. At worse, it 
would be a dictatorship with "elections" whose results are 
known before hand.

The Leninist vision of "democracy" is seen purely as a means of 
placing the party into power. Thus power in society shifts to 
the top, to the leaders of the centralised party in charge of 
the centralised state. The workers' become mere electors rather 
than actual controllers of the revolution and are expected to 
carry out the orders of the party without comment. In other 
words, a decidedly bourgeois vision of "democracy." Anarchists, 
in contrast, seek to dissolve power back into the hands of 
society and empower the individual by giving them a 
direct say in the revolution through their workplace and 
community assemblies and their councils and conferences.

This vision was not a new development. Far from it. While, 
ironically enough, Lenin's and Trotsky's support for the 
appointment of officers/managers can be refuted by looking 
at Lenin's _State and Revolution_, the fact is that the
undemocratic perspectives they are based on can be found in 
Lenin's _What is to be Done?_. This suggests that his 1917 
arguments were the aberration and against the true essence 
of Leninism, not his and Trotsky's policies once they were 
in power (as Leninists like to argue). 

Forgetting that he had argued against "primitive democracy" in 
_What is to Be Done?_, Lenin had lambasted the opportunists and 
"present Kautskyists" for "repeat[ing] the vulgar bourgeois jeers 
at 'primitive' democracy." Now, in 1917, it was a case that "the 
transition from capitalism to socialism is *impossible* without 
some 'reversion' to 'primitive' democracy (how else can the 
majority, even the whole population, proceed to discharge state 
functions?)" [Op. Cit., p. 302] Very true. As Leninism in power
showed, the conscious elimination of "primitive democracy" in 
the army and workplace ensured that socialism *was* "impossible."
And this elimination was not justified in terms of "difficult"
circumstances but rather in terms of principle and the inability
of working people to manage their own affairs directly.

Particularly ironic, given Trotsky's trade union committee analogy
was Lenin's comment that "Bernstein [the arch revisionist and
reformist] combats 'primitive democracy' . . . To prove that 
'primitive democracy' is worthless, Bernstein refers to the 
experience of the British trade unions, as interpreted by the 
Webbs. Seventy years of development . . . convinced the trade 
unions that primitive democracy was useless, and they substituted 
ordinary democracy, i.e. parliamentarism, combined with bureaucracy, 
for it." Lenin replied that because the trade unions operated 
"*in absolute capitalist slavery*" a "number of concessions to
the prevailing evil, violence, falsehood, exclusion of the poor 
from the affairs of the 'higher' administration 'cannot be avoided.' 
Under socialism much of the 'primitive' democracy will inevitably 
be revived, since, for the first time in history of civilised 
society, the *mass* of the population will rise to *independent* 
participation, not only in voting and elections, *but also in 
the everyday administration of affairs*" [Op. Cit., p. 361]
Obviously things looked a bit different once he and his fellow
Bolshevik leaders were in power. Then the exclusion of the
poor from the affairs of the "higher" administration was
seen as normal practice, as proven by the practice of the 
trade unions! And as we note in section H.3.8, this "exclusion"
was taken as a key lesson of the revolution and built into the
Leninist theory of the state.

This development was not unexpected. After all, as we noted in
section H.8.5, over a decade before Lenin had been less than 
enthralled by "primitive democracy" and more in agreement with
Bernstein than he lets on in _State and Revolution_. In _What
is to Be Done?_, he based his argument for centralised, top-down
party organisation on the experiences of the labour movement in
democratic capitalist regimes. He quotes the same book by
the Webb's to defend his position. He notes that "in the 
first period of existence in their unions, the British workers 
thought it was an indispensable sign of democracy for all members 
to do all the work of managing the unions." This involved "all 
questions [being] decided by the votes of all the members" and 
all "official duties" being "fulfilled by all the members in 
turn." He dismisses "such a conception of democracy" as 
"absurd" and "historical experience" made them "understand 
the necessity for representative institutions" and "full-time 
professional officials." Ironically, Lenin records that in
Russia the "'primitive' conception of democracy" existed in 
two groups, the "masses of the students and workers" and the 
"Economists of the Bernstein persuasion." [Op. Cit., pp. 162-3] 

Thus Trotsky's autocratic and top-down vision of democracy has
its roots within Leninism. Rather than being forced upon the
Bolsheviks by difficult circumstances, the eroding of grassroots,
functional ("primitive") democracy was at the core of Bolshevism.
Lenin's arguments in 1917 were the exception, not his practice
after he seized power. 

This fundamentally undemocratic perspective can be found today in
modern Leninism. As well as defending the Bolshevik dictatorship
during the civil war, modern Leninists support the continuation of
party dictatorship after its end. In particular, they support the
Bolshevik repression of the Kronstadt rebellion (see section H.7
for more details). As Trotsky put it in 1937, if the Kronstadt 
demand for soviet elections had been implemented then "to free 
the soviets from the leadership [sic!] of the Bolsheviks would 
have meant within a short time to demolish the soviets themselves 
. . . Social-Revolutionary-anarchist soviets would serve only as 
a bridge from the proletarian dictatorship [sic!] to capitalist
restoration." He generalised this example, by pointing to the
"experience of the Russian soviets during the period of Menshevik
and SR domination and, even more clearly, the experience of the 
German and Austrian soviets under the domination of the Social
Democrats." [Lenin and Trotsky, _Kronstadt_, p. 90] Modern day
Leninists repeat this argument, failing to note that they 
sound like leftist Henry Kissingers (Kissinger, let us not
forget, ensured US aid for Pinochet's coup in Chile and argued
that "I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country 
go communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people").

Today we have Leninists combining rhetoric about democratic
socialism, with elections and recall, with a mentality which
justifies the suppression of working class revolt because they
are not prepared to stand by and watch a country go capitalist
due to the irresponsibility of its own people. Perhaps,
unsurprisingly, previously in 1937 Trotsky expressed his support 
for the "objective necessity" of the "revolutionary dictatorship 
of a proletarian party" and, two years later, that the "vanguard 
of the proletariat" must be "armed with the resources of the 
state in order to repel dangers, including those emanating from 
the backward layers of the proletariat itself." (see section H.3.8).
If only modern day Leninists were as honest!

So the Bolshevik contempt for working class self-government still
exists. While few, however, explicitly proclaim the logic of 
this position (namely party dictatorship) most defend the
Bolsheviks implementing this conclusion in practice. Can we
not conclude that, faced with the same problems the Bolsheviks
faced, these modern day Leninists will implement the same 
policies? That they will go from party power to party 
dictatorship, simply because they know better than those who
elected them on such matters? That answer seems all too 
obvious.

As such, the Bolshevik preference for centralised state power and
of representative forms of democracy involved the substitution of
the party for the class and, consequently, will facilitate the 
dictatorship *over* the proletariat when faced with the inevitable
problems facing any revolution. As Bakunin put it, a "people's
administration, according to [the Marxists], must mean a people's
administration by virtue of a small number of representatives
chosen by the people . . . [I]t is a deception which would conceal
the despotism of a governing minority, all the more dangerous 
because it appears as a sham expression of the people's will . . .
[T]he vast majority, the great mass of people, would be governed
by a privileged minority . . . [of] *former* workers, who would
stop being workers the moment they became rulers or representatives,
and would then come to regard the whole blue-collared world from
governmental heights, and would not represent the people but 
themselves and their pretensions." So the Marxist state would 
be "the reign of the *scientific mind,* the most aristocratic, 
despotic, arrogant and contemptuous of all regimes. There will 
be a new class, a new hierarchy of real of bogus learning, and 
the world will be divided into a dominant, science-based minority 
and a vast, ignorant majority. And then let the ignorant masses 
beware!" [_Michael Bakunin: Selected Writings_, p. 268, pp. 268-9
and p. 266]

In summary, Trotsky's deeply undemocratic justification for 
appointing officers, like Lenin's similar arguments for 
appointing managers, express the logic and reality of 
Bolshevism far better than statements made before the 
Bolsheviks seized power and never implemented. Sadly, 
modern Leninists concentrate on the promises of the
election manifesto rather than the grim reality of 
Bolshevik power and its long standing top-down vision of 
"democracy." A vision which helped undermine the revolution 
and ensure its degeneration into a party dictatorship presiding 
over a state capitalist economy.

H.9.5 What was the effect of the Bolshevik vision of "socialism"?

As we discussed in section H.3.1, anarchists and most Marxists
are divided not only by *means* but also by *ends*. Simply put,
libertarians and Leninist do *not* have the same vision of 
socialism. Given this, anarchists are not surprised at the 
negative results of the Bolshevik revolution -- the use of
anti-socialist means to attain anti-socialist ends would
obviously have less than desirable results.

The content of the Bolshevik vision of "socialism" is criticised
by anarchists on two main counts. Firstly, it is a top-down,
centralised vision of "socialism." This can only result in the
destruction of working class economic power at the point of
production in favour of centralised bureaucratic power. Secondly,
for Bolshevism nationalisation, *not* workers' self-management,
was the key issue. We will discuss the first issue here and the 
second in the following section.

The Bolshevik vision of "socialism" was inherently centralised
and top-down. This can be seen from the organisational schemas
and arguments made by leading Bolsheviks before and immediately
after the Revolution. For example, we discover Trotsky arguing
in March 1918 that workplaces "will be subject to policies 
laid down by the local council of workmen's deputies" who,
in turn, had "their range of discretion . . . limited in 
turn by regulations made for each class of industry by the
boards or bureaux of the central government." He dismissed
Kropotkin's communalist ideas by saying local autonomy
was not "suited to the state of things in modern industrial
society" and "would result in endless frictions and difficulties."
As the "coal from the Donets basin goes all over Russia, and
is indispensable in all sorts of industries" you could not
allow "the organised people of that district [to] do what they
pleased with the coal mines" as they "could hold up all the
rest of Russia." [contained in Al Richardson (ed.), _In Defence 
of the Russian Revolution_, p. 186]

Lenin repeated this centralised vision in June of that year,
arguing that "Communism requires and presupposes the greatest 
possible centralisation of large-scale production throughout 
the country. The all-Russian centre, therefore, should 
definitely be given the right of direct control over all
the enterprises of the given branch of industry. The 
regional centres define their functions depending on local
conditions of life, etc., in accordance with the general 
production directions and decisions of the centre." He 
continued by explicitly arguing that "[t]o deprive the 
all-Russia centre of the right to direct control over 
all the enterprises of the given industry . . . would be 
regional anarcho-syndicalism, and not communism." [Marx, 
Engels and Lenin, _Anarchism and Anarcho-Syndicalism_, 
p. 292]

Thus the Bolshevik economic ideal was centralised and
top-down. This is not unsurprising, as Lenin had promised 
precisely this when the Bolsheviks got into power. As in 
the Bolshevik party itself, the lower organs were controlled 
by the higher ones (and as we will discuss, these higher ones
were not directly elected by the lower ones). The problems 
with this vision are many fold.

Firstly, to impose an "ideal" solution would destroy a revolution 
-- the actions and decisions (*including what others may consider
mistakes*) of a free people are infinitely more productive and 
useful than the decisions and decrees of the best central committee. 
Moreover, a centralised system by necessity is an imposed system 
(as it excludes by its very nature the participation of the mass 
of the people in determining their own fate). Thus *real* 
socialisation must proceed from below, reflecting the real 
development and desires of those involved. Centralisation can 
only result in replacing socialisation with nationalisation and 
the elimination of workers' self-management with hierarchical 
management. Workers' again would be reduced to the level of
order-takers, with control over their workplaces resting not in 
their hands but in those of the state.

Secondly, Trotsky seems to think that workers at the base of
society would be so unchanged by a revolution that they would
hold their fellow workers ransom. And, moreover, that other
workers would let them. That, to say the least, seems a strange
perspective. But not as strange as thinking that giving extensive
powers to a central body will *not* produce equally selfish 
behaviour (but on a wider and more dangerous scale). The basic 
fallacy of Trotsky's argument is that the centre will not start 
to view the whole economy as its property (and being centralised, 
such a body would be difficult to effectively control). Indeed, 
Stalin's power was derived from the state bureaucracy which ran 
the economy in its own interests. Not that did not suddenly arise 
with Stalin. It was a feature of the Soviet system from the start. 
Samuel Farber, for example, notes that, "in practice, [the] 
hypercentralisation [pursued by the Bolsheviks from early 1918
onwards] turned into infighting and scrambles for control among 
competing bureaucracies" and he points to the "not untypical 
example of a small condensed milk plant with few than 15 workers 
that became the object of a drawn-out competition among six 
organisations including the Supreme Council of National Economy, 
the Council of People's Commissars of the Northern Region, the 
Vologda Council of People's Commissars, and the Petrograd Food
Commissariat." [_Before Stalinism_, p. 73] 

In other words, centralised bodies are not immune to viewing 
resources as their own property and doing as they please with
it. Compared to an individual workplace, the state's power to 
enforce its viewpoint against the rest of society is
considerably stronger and the centralised system would be 
harder to control. The requirements of gathering and processing
the information required for the centre to make intelligent
decisions would be immense, thus provoking a large bureaucracy
which would be hard to control and soon become the *real* power
in the state. A centralised body, therefore, effectively 
excludes the mass participation of the mass of workers -- power 
rests in the hands of a few people which, by its nature, 
generates bureaucratic rule. If that sounds familiar, it
should. It is precisely what *did* happen in Lenin's Russia
and laid the basis for Stalinism.

Thirdly, to eliminate the dangers of workers' self-management 
generating "propertarian" notions, the workers' have to have
their control over their workplace reduced, if not eliminated. 
This, by necessity, generates bourgeois social relationships 
and, equally, appointment of managers from above (which the 
Bolsheviks did embrace). Indeed, by 1920 Lenin was boasting 
that in 1918 he had "pointed out the necessity of recognising 
the dictatorial authority of single individuals for the pursue 
of carrying out the Soviet idea" and even claimed that at that 
stage "there were no disputes in connection with the question"
of one-man management. [quoted by Brinton, Op. Cit., p. 65] 
While the first claim is true (Lenin argued for one-man 
management appointed from above before the start of the Civil 
War in May 1918) the latter one is not true (excluding 
anarchists, anarcho-syndicalists and Maximalists, there 
were also the dissent "Left Communists" in the Bolshevik 
party itself). 

Fourthly, centralism was not that efficient. The central bodies 
the Bolsheviks created had little knowledge of the local 
situation and often gave orders that contradicted each other 
or had little bearing to reality, so encouraging factories to 
ignore the centre: "it seems apparent that many workers themselves
. . . had now come to believe . .  . that confusion and
anarchy [sic!] *at the top* were the major causes of their
difficulties, and with some justification. The fact was that
Bolshevik administration was chaotic . . . Scores of competitive
and conflicting Bolshevik and Soviet authorities issued
contradictory orders, often brought to factories by armed
Chekists. The Supreme Economic Council. . . issu[ed] dozens
of orders and pass[ed] countless directives with virtually
no real knowledge of affairs." [William G. Rosenberg, 
_Russian Labour and Bolshevik Power_, p. 116] The Bolsheviks, 
as Lenin had promised, built from the top-down their system 
of "unified administration" based on the Tsarist system of 
central bodies which governed and regulated certain industries 
during the war. [Brinton, Op. Cit., p. 36] This was very
centralised and very inefficient (see section H.9.7 for
more discussion). 

Moreover, having little real understanding of the 
circumstances on the ground they could not compare 
their ideological assumptions and preferences to reality.
As an example, the Bolshevik idea that "big" was automatically 
"more efficient" and "better" had a negative impact on the
revolution. In practice, as Thomas F. Remington notes, this
simply resulted generated waste:

"The waste of scare materials at [the giant] Putilov [plant]
was indeed serious, but not only political unrest had caused
it. The general shortage of fuel and materials in the city
took its greatest toll on the largest enterprises, whose
overhead expenditures for heating the plant and firing the
furnaces were proportionally greater than those for smaller
enterprises. This point -- explained by the relative constant
proportions among needed inputs to producers at any given
point in time -- only was recognised latter. Not until 
1919 were the regime's leaders prepared to acknowledge
that small enterprises, under the conditions of the time,
might be more efficient in using resources: and not until
1921 did a few Bolsheviks theorists grasp the economic
reasons for this apparent violation of their standing
assumption that larger units were inherently more
productive. Thus not only were the workers accused of
politically motivated resistance, but the regime blamed
them for the effects of circumstances which the workers
had no control." [_Building Socialism in Bolshevik Russia_, 
p. 106]

All in all, the Bolshevik vision of socialism was a 
disaster. Centralism was a source of massive economic 
mismanagement and, moreover, bureaucratisation from 
the start. As anarchists had long predicted. As we
discuss in section H.6.12, there was an alternative in
the form of the factory committees and the federation.
Sadly this was not part of the Bolshevik vision. At
best they were tacked onto this vision as a (very)
junior partner (as in 1917) or they were quickly 
marginalised and then dumped when they had outlived 
their usefulness in securing Bolshevik power (as in 
1918).

While some Leninists like to paint the economic policies of
the Bolsheviks in power as being different from what they 
called for in 1917, the truth is radically different. For
example, Tony Cliff of the UK's "Socialist Workers Party"
asserts, correctly, that in April 1918 the "defence of state 
capitalism constituted the essence of his economic policy 
for this period." However, he also states that this was "an 
entirely new formulation," which was not the case in the 
slightest. [Cliff, Op. Cit., p. 69] As Lenin himself 
acknowledged.

Lenin had always confused state capitalism with socialism. 
"State capitalism," he wrote, "is a complete *material* 
preparation for socialism, the threshold of socialism, a 
rung on the ladder of history between which and the rung 
called socialism *there are no gaps.*" He argued that 
socialism "is nothing but the next step forward from state 
capitalist monopoly. In other words, Socialism is merely 
state capitalist monopoly *made to benefit the whole 
people*; by this token it *ceases* to be capitalist 
monopoly." [_The Threatening Catastrophe and how to 
avoid it_, p. 38 and p. 37] This was in May, 1917. A 
few months latter, he was talking about how the 
institutions of state capitalism could be taken
over and used to create socialism (see section H.3.12). 
Unsurprisingly, when defending Cliff's "new formulation" 
against the "Left Communists" in the spring of 1918 he 
noted that he gave his "'high' appreciation of state 
capitalism" "*before* the Bolsheviks seized power." 
[_Selected Works_, vol. 2, p. 636]

And, indeed, his praise for state capitalism and its 
forms of social organisation can be found in his 
_State and Revolution_:

"the *post-office* [is] an example of the socialist system . . .
At present . . . [it] is organised on the lines of a state
*capitalist* monopoly. Imperialism is gradually transforming
all trusts into organisations of a similar type . . . the
mechanism of social management is here already to hand.
Overthrow the capitalists . . . Our immediate object is to
organise the *whole* of national economy on the lines of
the postal system . . . It is such a state, standing on such
an economic basis, that we need." [_Essential Works of 
Lenin_, pp. 307-8]

Given this, Lenin's rejection of the factory committee's
model of socialism comes as no surprise (see section H.6.10
for more details). As we noted in section H.3.14, rather 
than promote workers' control, Lenin effectively undermined
it. Murray Bookchin points out the obvious:

"In accepting the concept of worker's control, Lenin's
famous decree of November 14, 1917, merely acknowledged
an accomplished fact; the Bolsheviks dared not oppose 
the workers at this early date. But they began to whittle
down the power of the factory committees. In January
1918, a scant two months after 'decreeing' workers'
control, Lenin began to advocate that the administration
of the factories be placed under trade union control. 
The story that the Bolsheviks 'patiently' experimented
with workers' control, only to find it 'inefficient' and
'chaotic,' is a myth. Their 'patience' did not last more 
than a few weeks. Not only did Lenin oppose direct workers'
control within a matter of weeks . . . even union control
came to an end shortly after it had been established.
By the summer of 1918, almost all of Russian industry
had been placed under bourgeois forms of management."
[_Post-Scarcity Anarchism_, pp. 200-1]

Significantly, even his initial vision of workers' control
was hierarchical, centralised and top-down. In the workplace 
it was to be exercised by factory committees. The "higher 
workers' control bodies" were to be "composed of representatives 
of trade unions, factory and office workers' committees, 
and workers' co-operatives." The decisions of the lower bodies 
"may be revoked only by higher workers' control bodies." 
[quoted by Cliff, Op. Cit., p. 10] As Maurice Brinton notes:

"there [was] . . .  a firm hierarchy of control organs . . .
each Committee was to be responsible to a 'Regional Council 
of Workers' Control', subordinated in turn to an 
'All-Russian Council of Workers' Control'. The composition 
of these higher organs was decided by the Party.

"The trade unions were massively represented in the middle 
and higher strata of this new pyramid of 'institutionalised 
workers' control.' For instance the All-Russian Council of 
Workers' Control was to consist of 21 'representatives': 5 
from the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the 
Soviets, 5 from the Executive of the All-Russian Council 
of Trade Unions, 5 from the Association of Engineers and 
Technicians, 2 from the Association of Agronomists, 2 from 
the Petrograd Trade Union Council, 1 from each All-Russian 
Trade Union Federation numbering fewer than 100,000 members 
(2 for Federations of over this number)... and 5 from the 
All-Russian Council of Factory Committees! The Factory 
Committees often under anarcho-syndicalist influence had 
been well and truly 'cut down to size'." [Op. Cit., p. 18]

As we note in section H.6.9, this was a conscious preference
on Lenin's part. The factory committees had started to
federate, creating their own institutional framework of
socialism based on the workers own class organisation.
Lenin, as he had explained in 1917, favoured using the
institutions created by "state capitalism" and simply
tacked on a form of "workers' control" distinctly at
odds with the popular usage of the expression. He 
*rejected* the suggestions of factory committees themselves.
The Supreme Economic Council, established by the Soviet 
government, soon demonstrated how to really mismanage the 
economy. 

As such, the economic developments proposed by Lenin in
early 1918 and onwards were *not* the result of the
specific problems facing the Russian revolution. The
fact is while the dire problems facing the Russian
revolution undoubtedly made many aspects of the Bolshevik
system worse, they did not create them. Rather, the
centralised, bureaucratic and top-down abuses Leninists
like to distance themselves from where, in fact, built
into Lenin's socialism from the start. A form of socialism
Lenin and his government explicitly favoured and created
in opposition to other, authentically proletarian, versions.

The path to state capitalism was the one Lenin wanted to 
trend. It was not forced upon him or the Bolsheviks.
And, by re-introducing wage slavery (this time, to the state)
the Bolshevik vision of socialism helped undermine the 
revolution, workers' power and, sadly, build the foundations
of Stalinism.

H.9.6 How did Bolshevik preference for nationalisation
	affect the revolution?

As noted in the last section, unlike anarchism, for Bolshevism 
nationalisation, *not* workers' self-management, was the key 
issue in socialism. As noted in section H.9.3, Lenin had 
proclaimed the necessity for appointed one-man managers 
and implementing "state capitalism" in April 1918. Neither
policy was thought to harm the socialist character of the
regime. As Trotsky stressed in 1920, the decision to place 
a manager at the head of a factory instead of a workers' 
collective had no political significance:

"It would be a most crying error to confuse the question as 
to the supremacy of the proletariat with the question of boards 
of workers at the head of factories. The dictatorship of the 
proletariat is expressed in the abolition of private property 
in the means of production, in the supremacy of the collective
will of the workers and not at all in the form in which 
individual economic organisations are administered." 
[_Terrorism and Communism_, p. 162]

Nor was this considered a bad thing or forced upon the
Bolsheviks as a result of terrible circumstances. Quite 
the reverse: "I consider if the civil war had not plundered 
our economic organs of all that was strongest, most 
independent, most endowed with initiative, we should 
undoubtedly have entered the path of one-man management 
in the sphere of economic administration much sooner and 
much less painfully." [Op. Cit., pp. 162-3] As discussed
in the previous section, this evaluation fits perfectly 
into Bolshevik ideology and practice before and after they 
seized power. One can easily find dozens of quotations 
from Lenin expressing the same idea.

Needless to say, Trotsky's "collective will of the workers" 
was simply a euphemism for the Party, whose dictatorship 
*over* the workers Trotsky glibly justified:

"We have more than once been accused of having substituted for the 
dictatorship of the Soviets the dictatorship of the party. Yet it 
can be said with complete justice that the dictatorship of the 
Soviets became possible only by means of the dictatorship of the 
party. It is thanks to the . . . party . . . [that] the Soviets 
. . . [became] transformed from shapeless parliaments of labour 
into the apparatus of the supremacy of labour. In this 'substitution' 
of the power of the party for the power of the working class there 
is nothing accidental, and in reality there is no substitution at 
all. The Communists express the fundamental interests of the 
working class." [Op. Cit., p. 109]

While Trotsky's honesty on this matter is refreshing (unlike his
followers today who hypocritically talk about the "leadership"
of the Bolshevik party) we can say that this was a *fatal* position 
to take. Indeed, for Trotsky *any* system (including the 
militarisation of labour) was acceptable as the key "differences 
. . . is defined by a fundamental test: who is in power?" --
the capitalist class or the proletariat (i.e. the party) 
[Op. Cit., pp. 171-2] Thus working class control over their
own affairs was of little importance: "The worker does not 
merely bargain with the Soviet State; no, he is subordinated 
to the Soviet State, under its orders in every direction -- 
for it is *his* State." [Op. Cit., p. 168] This, of course,
echoed his own arguments in favour of appointment (see 
section H.9.4) *and* Lenin's demands for the "exercise of 
dictatorial powers by individuals" in the workplace (see
section H.9.3) in early 1918. Cornelius Castoriadis points
out the obvious:

"The role of the proletariat in the new State was thus quite 
clear. It was that of enthusiastic and passive citizens. And 
the role of the proletariat in work and in production was no 
less clear. On the whole, it was the same as before -- under 
capitalism -- except that workers of 'character and capacity'
[to quote Trotsky] were to be chosen to replace factory managers 
who had fled." [_The Role of the Bureaucracy in the birth
of the Bureaucracy_, p. 99]

Trotsky's position, it should be noted, remained consistent.
In the early 1930s he argued (in respect to Stalin's regime) 
that "anatomy of society is determined by its economic 
relations. So long as the forms of property that have been 
created by the October Revolution are not overthrown, the 
proletariat remains the ruling class." [_The Class Nature of 
The Soviet State_] Obviously, if the prime issue is property 
and not who *manages* the means of production (or even "the 
state") then having functioning factory-committees becomes 
as irrelevant as having democratic soviets when determining 
whether the working class is in power or not.

(As an aside, we should not by that surprised that Trotsky 
could think the workers were the "ruling class" in the
vast prison-camp which was Stalin's USSR, given that
he thought the workers were the "ruling class" when he and
Lenin headed the Bolshevik party dictatorship! Thus
we have the strange division Leninists make between Lenin's 
dictatorship and Stalin's (and those of Stalin's followers). 
When Lenin presides over a one-party dictatorship, breaks up 
strikes, bans political parties, bans Bolshevik factions, and 
imprisons and shoots political dissidents these are all 
regrettable but necessary steps in the protection of the 
"proletarian state." When Stalin does the exact same thing, 
a few years later, they are all terrible examples of the 
deformation of this same "proletarian state"!)

For anarchists (and other libertarian socialists) this was and 
is nonsense. Without workers' self-management in production,
socialism cannot exist. To focus attention of whether 
individuals own property or whether the state does is
fundamentally a red-herring. Without workers' self-management
of production, private capitalism will simply have been
replaced by *state* capitalism. As one anarchist active in
the factory committee movement argued in January, 1918,
it is "not the liberation of the proletariat when many
individual plunders are changed for one very powerful
plunder -- the state. The position of the proletariat
remains the same." Therefore, "[w]e must not forget that
the factory committees are the nuclei of the future
socialist order" nor must we forget "that the state . . . 
will try to maintain its own interests at the expense 
of the interests of the workers. There is no doubt that 
we will be witnesses of a great conflict between the state 
power in the centre and the organisations composed 
exclusively of workers which are found in the localities." 
He was proved right. Instead of centralised the Bolshevik 
vision of state capitalism, the anarchists argued that 
factory committees "be united on the basic of federalism, 
into industrial federations . . . [and] poly-industrial 
soviets of national economy." Only in that way could
*real* socialism be created. [quoted by Frederick I.
Kaplan, _Bolshevik Ideology and the Ethics of Soviet
Labour_, p. 163 and p. 166] (see section H.6.7 for more
on the factory committee movement).

The reason is obvious. It is worth quoting Cornelius 
Castoriadis at length on why the Bolshevik system was
doomed to failure:

"So we end up with the uncontested power of managers in the 
factories, and the Party's exclusive 'control' (in reality, 
what kind of control was it, anyway?). And there was the 
uncontested power of the Party over society, without any
control. From that point on, nobody could prevent these two 
powers from merging, could anyone stop the two strata 
embodying them from merging, nor could the consolidation 
of an irremovable bureaucracy ruling over all sectors of 
social life be halted. The process may have been accelerated 
or magnified by the entry of non-proletarian elements into 
the Party, as they rushed to jump on the bandwagon. But this 
was a consequence, and not a cause, of the Party's orientation
. . .

"Who is to manage production . . .? . . . the correct answer
[is] the collective organs of labouring people. What the 
party leadership wanted, what it had already imposed -- and 
on this point there was no difference between Lenin and Trotsky 
-- was a hierarchy directed from above. We know that this was 
the conception that triumphed. We know, too, where this 'victory'
led . . . 

"In all Lenin's speeches and writings of this period, what 
recurs again and again like an obsession is the idea that 
Russia ought to learn from the advanced capitalist countries; 
that there are not a hundred and one different ways of developing 
production and labour productivity if one wants to emerge from
backwardness and chaos; that one must adopt capitalist methods 
of 'rationalisation' and management as well as capitalist forms 
of work 'incentives.' All these, for Lenin, are just 'means' 
that apparently could freely be placed in the service of a 
radically different historical end, the building of socialism.

"Thus Trotsky, when discussing the merits of militarism, came 
to separate the army itself, its structure and its methods, 
from the social system it serves. What is criticisable in 
bourgeois militarism and in the bourgeois army, Trotsky says 
in substance, is that they are in the service of the bourgeoisie. 
Except for that, there is nothing in them to be criticised. The 
sole difference, he says, lies in this: '*Who is in power*?'" 
Likewise, the dictatorship of the proletariat is not expressed 
by the 'form in which individual economic enterprises are 
administered.'

"The idea that like means cannot be placed indifferently into 
the service of different ends; that there is an intrinsic 
relationship between the instruments used and the result 
obtained; that, especially, neither the army nor the factory 
are simple 'means' or 'instruments,' but social structures in 
which are organised two fundamental aspects of human relations 
(production and violence); that in them can be seen in condensed
form the essential expression of the type of social relations 
that characterise an era -- this idea, though perfectly obvious 
and banal for Marxists, was totally 'forgotten.' It was just 
a matter of developing production, using proven methods and 
structures. That among these 'proofs' the principal one was the
development of capitalism as a social system and that a factory 
produces not so much cloth or steel but proletariat and capital 
were facts that were utterly ignored.

"Obviously, behind this 'forgetfulness' is hidden something 
else. At the time, of course, there was the desperate concern 
to revive production as soon as possible and to put a collapsing 
economy back on its feet. This preoccupation, however, does not 
fatally dictate the choice of 'means.' If it seemed obvious to
Bolshevik leaders that the sole effective means were capitalist 
ones, it was because they were imbued with the conviction that 
capitalism was the only effective and rational system of 
production. Faithful in this respect to Marx, they wanted to 
abolish private property and market anarchy, but not the type of
organisation capitalism had achieved at the point of production. 
They wanted to modify the *economy,* not the relations between 
people at work or the nature of labour itself.

"At a deeper level still, their philosophy was to develop the 
forces of production. Here too they were the faithful inheritors 
of Marx -- or at least one side of Marx, which became the 
predominant one in his mature writings. The development of the 
forces of production was, if not the ultimate goal, at any rate 
the essential means, in the sense that everything else would 
follow as a by-product and that everything else had to be 
subordinated to it. . . 

"To manage the work of others -- this is the beginning and 
the end of the whole cycle of exploitation. The 'need' for a 
specific social category to manage the work of others in 
production (and the activity of others in politics and in 
society), the 'need' for a separate business management 
and for a Party to rule the State -- this is what Bolshevism 
proclaimed as soon as it seized power, and this is what it 
zealously laboured to impose. We know that it achieved its 
ends. Insofar as ideas play a role in the development of history 
-- and, *in the final analysis*, they play an enormous role --
the Bolshevik ideology (and with it, the Marxist ideology 
lying behind it) was a decisive factor in the birth of the 
Russian bureaucracy." [Op. Cit., pp. 100-4]

Therefore, we "may therefore conclude that, contrary to the 
prevailing mythology, it was not in 1927, or in 1923, or even 
in 1921 that the game was played and lost, but much earlier, 
during the period from 1918 to 1920. . . . [1921 saw] the 
beginning of the reconstruction of the productive apparatus. 
This reconstruction effort, however, was already firmly set 
in the groove of bureaucratic capitalism." [Op. Cit., p. 99] 
In this, they simply followed the economic ideas Lenin had 
expounded in 1917 and 1918, but in an even more undemocratic
way. Modern-day Leninism basically takes the revolutionised 
Russia of the Bolsheviks and, essentially, imposes upon it 
a more democratic form of government rather than Lenin's 
(and then Stalin's). Anarchists, however, still oppose the 
economy.

Ironically, proof that libertarians are right on this issue 
can be found in Trotsky's own work. In 1936, he argued that
the "demobilisation of the Red Army of five million played 
no small role in the formation of the bureaucracy. The 
victorious commanders assumed leading posts in the local 
Soviets, in economy, in education, and they persistently 
introduced everywhere that regime which had ensured success 
in the civil war. Thus on all sides the masses were pushed 
away gradually from actual participation in the leadership
of the country." [_The Revolution Betrayed_] Needless to
say, he failed to note who had abolished the election of
commanders in the Red Army in March 1918, namely himself 
(see section H.9.4). Similarly, he failed to note that the
"masses" had been "pushed . . . from actual participation
in the leadership of the country" well before the end of
the civil war and that, at the time, he was not concerned
about it. Equally, it would be churlish to note that back
in 1920 he thought that "'Military' qualities . . . are 
valued in every sphere. It was in this sense that I said 
that every class prefers to have in its service those of 
its members who, other things being equal, have passed 
through the military school . . . This experience is a 
great and valuable experience. And when a former regimental 
commissary returns to his trade union, he becomes not a bad 
organiser." [_Terrorism and Communism_, p. 173]

In 1937 Trotsky asserted that "liberal-anarchist thought 
closes its eyes to the fact that the Bolshevik revolution, with 
all its repressions, meant an upheaval of social relations 
in the interests of the masses, whereas Stalin's Thermidorian 
upheaval accompanies the reconstruction of Soviet society in 
the interest of a privileged minority." [Trotsky, _Stalinism
and Bolshevism_] Yet Stalin's "upheaval" was built upon the 
social relations created when Lenin and Trotsky held power. 
State ownership, one-man management, and so on where originally 
advocated and implemented by Lenin and Trotsky. The bureaucracy 
did not have to expropriate the working class economically -- 
"real" Bolshevism had already did so. Nor can it be said that 
the social relations associated with the political sphere had 
fundamentally changed under Stalin. He had, after all, 
inherited the one-party state from Lenin and Trotsky. In a 
nutshell, Trotsky is talking nonsense. 

Simply put, as Trotsky himself indicates, Bolshevik 
preference for nationalisation helped ensure the creation
and subsequent rise of the Stalinist bureaucracy. Rather
than be the product of terrible objective circumstances
as his followers suggest, the Bolshevik state capitalist
economic system was at the heart of their vision of what
socialism was. The civil war simply brought the underlying
logic of vision into the fore. 

H.9.7 How did Bolshevik preference for centralism affect the
      revolution?

The next issue we will discuss is centralisation. Before 
starting, it is essential that it be stressed that anarchists
are *not* against co-ordinated activity and organisation
on a large scale. Anarchists stress the need for federalism
to meet the need for such work (see section A.2.9, for
example). As such, our critique of Bolshevik centralism is
*not* a call for "localism" or isolation (as many Leninists
assert). Rather, it is a critique of *how* the social
co-operation essential for society will be conducted. Will
it be in a federal (and so bottom-up) way or will it be in
a centralised (and so top-down) way?

It goes almost without saying that Bolshevik ideology was 
centralist in nature. Lenin repeatedly stressed the importance 
of centralisation, arguing constantly that Marxism was, by its 
very nature, centralist (and top-down -- section H.3.3). Long 
before the revolution, Lenin had argued that within the party
it was a case of "the transformation of the power of ideas 
into the power of authority, the subordination of lower Party 
bodies to higher ones." [_Collected Works_, vol. 7, p. 367]
Such visions of centralised organisation were the model for
the revolutionary state. In 1917, he repeatedly stressed that 
after it the Bolsheviks would be totally in favour of 
"centralism" and "strong state power." [Lenin, _Selected 
Works_, vol. 2, p. 374] Once in power, they did not disappoint.

Anarchists argue that this prejudice in favour of centralisation
and centralism is at odds with Leninist claims to be in favour
of mass participation. It is all fine and well for Trotskyist
Tony Cliff to quote Lenin arguing that under capitalism the
"talent among the people" is "merely suppressed" and that it
"must be given an opportunity to display itself" and that
this can "save the cause of socialism," it is something else
for Lenin (and the Leninist tradition) to favour organisational
structures that allow that to happen. Similarly, it is fine to
record Lenin asserting that "living, creative socialism is the
product of the masses themselves" but it is something else to
justify the barriers Leninist ideology placed in the way of it
by its advocacy of centralism. [quoted by Tony Cliff, _Lenin_, 
vol. 3, p. 20 and p. 21] 

The central contradiction of Leninism is that while it (sometimes) 
talks about mass participation, it has always prefers an 
organisational form (centralism) which hinders, and ultimately 
destroys, the participation that *real* socialism needs.

That centralism works in this way should come as no surprise.
After all, it based on centralising power at the top of an
organisation and, consequently, into a few hands. It was for
this precise reason that *every* ruling class in history
has utilised centralisation against the masses. As we 
indicated in section B.2.5, centralisation has always been 
the tool of minority classes to disempower the masses. In 
the American and French revolutions, centralisation of state 
power was the means used to destroy the revolution, to take 
it out off the hands of the masses and concentrate it into 
the hands of a minority. In France:

"From the moment the bourgeoisie set themselves against the
popular stream they were in need of a weapon that could enable
them to resist pressure from the bras nus [working people];
they forced one by strengthening the central power . . . 
[This was] the formation of the state machinery through which 
the bourgeoisie was going to enslave the proletariat. Here is 
the centralised state, with its bureaucracy and police . . . 
[it was] a conscious attempt to reduce . . . the power of
the people." [Daniel Guerin, _Class Struggle in the First 
French Republic_, p. 176]

The reason is not hard to understand -- mass participation and 
class society do not go together. Thus, "the move towards 
bourgeois dictatorship" saw "the strengthening of the central 
power against the masses." [Guerin, Op. Cit., pp. 177-8] "To 
attack the central power," argued Kropotkin, "to strip it 
of its prerogatives, to decentralise, to dissolve authority, 
would have been to abandon to the people the control of its 
affairs, to run the risk of a truly popular revolution. That 
is why the bourgeoisie sought to reinforce the central 
government even more." [_Words of a Rebel_, p. 143] 

Can we expect a similar concentration of the central power 
under the Bolsheviks to have a different impact? And, as 
discussed in section H.6, we find a similar marginalisation 
of the working class from its own revolution. Rather than 
being actively participating in the transformation of 
society, they were transformed into spectators who simply 
were expected to implement the decisions made by the
Bolsheviks on their behalf. Bolshevik centralisation 
quickly ensured the disempowerment of working class people. 
Unsurprisingly enough, given its role in class society 
and in bourgeois revolutions.

In this section of the FAQ, we will indicate why this process 
happened, why Bolshevik centralisation undermined the socialist 
content of the revolution in favour of new forms of oppression 
and exploitation.

Therefore, anarchists argue, centralism cannot help 
but generate minority rule, not a classless society. 
Representative, and so centralised,  democracy, argued 
Malatesta, "substitutes the will of a few for that of 
all . . . and in the name of a fictitious collective 
interest, rides roughshod over every real interests, 
and by means of elections and the vote, disregards 
the wishes of each and everyone." [_Life and Ideas_, 
p. 147] 

This is rooted in the nature of the system, for democracy 
does not mean, in practice, "rule by all the people." 
Rather, as Malatesta pointed out, it "would be closer to 
the truth to say 'government of the majority of the 
people." And even this is false, as "it is never the case 
that the representatives of the majority of the people are 
in the same mind on all questions; it is therefore necessary 
to have recourse again to the majority system and thus we 
will get closer still to the truth with 'government of the 
majority of the elected by the majority of the electors.'" 
This, obviously, "is already beginning to bear a strong 
resemblance to minority government." And so, "it is easy 
to understand what has already been proven by universal 
historical experience: even in the most democratic of 
democracies it is always a small minority that rules and 
imposes its will and interests by force." And so centralism
turns democracy into little more than picking masters. 
Therefore, anarchists argue, "those who really want
'government of the people' . . . must abolish government." 
[_The Anarchist Revolution_, p. 78]

The Russian Revolution is a striking confirmation of this 
libertarian analysis. By applying centralism, the Bolsheviks 
disempowered the masses and concentrated power into the 
hands of the party leadership. This places power in a
distinct social class and subject to the pervasive effects
of their concrete social circumstances within their 
institutional position. As Bakunin predicted with amazing
accuracy:

"The falsehood of the representative system rests upon the
fiction that the executive power and the legislative chamber
issuing from popular elections must, or even can for that
matter, represent the will of the people . . . the instinctive 
aims of those who govern . . . are, because of their 
exceptional position diametrically opposed to the instinctive
popular aspirations. Whatever their democratic sentiments
and intentions may be, viewing society from the high position
in which they find themselves, they cannot consider this 
society in any other way but that in which a schoolmaster
views the pupils. And there can be no equality between
the schoolmaster and the pupils. . . Whoever says political
power says domination. And where domination exists, a more
or less considerable section of the population is bound
to be dominated by others. . . those who do the dominating
necessarily must repress and consequently oppress those 
who are subject to the domination . . . [This] explains
why and how men who were democrats and rebels of the reddest
variety when they were a part of the mass of governed
people, became exceedingly moderate when they rose to
power. Usually these backslidings are attributed to treason.
That, however, is an erroneous idea; they have for their
main cause the change of position and perspective . . .
if there should be established tomorrow a government . . .
made up exclusively of workers, those . . . staunch
democrats and Socialists, will become determined aristocrats,
bold or timid worshippers of the principle of authority,
and will also become oppressors and exploiters." [_The
Political Philosophy of Bakunun_, p. 218]

However, due to the inefficiencies of centralised bodies, 
this is not the end of the process. Around the new ruling 
bodies inevitably springs up officialdom. This is because 
a centralised body does not know what is happening in 
the grassroots. Therefore it needs a bureaucracy to gather 
and process that information and to implement its 
decisions. In the words of Bakunin:

"where is the head, however brilliant it may be, or if
one wishes to speak of a collective dictatorship, were it
formed of many hundreds of individuals endowed with 
superior faculties, where are those brains powerful enough
and wide-ranging enough to embrace the infinite multiplicity
and diversity of the real interests, aspirations, wishes
and needs whose sum total constitutes the collective will
of a people, and to invent a social organisation can which
can satisfy everybody? This organisation will never be
anything but a Procrustean bed which the more or less
obvious violence of the State will be able to force 
unhappy society to lie down on. . . Such a system . . .
would lead inevitably to the creation of a new State,
and consequently to the formation of a governmental
aristocracy, that is, an entire class of people, having
nothing in common with the mass of people . . . [and
would] exploit the people and subject them." [_Michael
Bakunin: Selected Writings_, pp. 204-6]

As the bureaucracy is permanent and controls information 
and resources, it soon becomes the main source of power 
in the state. The transformation of the bureaucracy from 
servant to the master soon results. The "official" 
government is soon controlled by it, shaping its 
activities in line with its interests. Being highly 
centralised, popular control is even more limited than 
government control -- people would simply not know where 
real power lay, which officials to replace or even what 
was going on within the distant bureaucracy. Moreover,
if the people did manage to replace the correct people, 
the newcomers would be subject to the same institutional 
pressures that corrupted the previous members and so
the process would start again (assuming their did not
come under the immediate influence of those who remained
in the bureaucracy). Consequently, a new bureaucratic 
class develops around the centralised bodies created by 
the governing party. This body would soon become riddled
with personal influences and favours, so ensuring that 
members could be sheltered from popular control. As 
Malatesta argued, they "would use every means available 
to those in power to have their friends elected as the
successors who would then in turn support and protect
them. And thus government would be passes to and fro in
the same hands, and *democracy,* which is the alleged
government of all, would end up, as usual, in an 
*oligarchy,* which is the government of a few, the
government of a class." [_Anarchy_, p. 34]

This state bureaucracy, of course, need not be dictatorial 
nor the regime it rules/administers be totalitarian (for
example, bourgeois states combine bureaucracy with many
real and important liberties). However, such a regime is 
still a class one and socialism would still not exist --
as proven by the state bureaucracies and nationalised 
property within bourgeois society.

So the danger to liberty of combining political *and* 
economic power into one set of hands (the state's) is 
obvious. As Kropotkin argued:

"the state was, and continues to be, the chief instrument 
for permitting the few to monopolise the land, and the 
capitalists to appropriate for themselves a quite
disproportionate share of the yearly accumulated surplus 
of production. Consequently, while combating the present 
monopolisation of land, and capitalism altogether, the 
anarchists combat with the same energy the state, as
the main support of that system. Not this or that special 
form, but the state altogether . . . The state organisation, 
having always been, both in ancient and modern history
. . . the instrument for establishing monopolies in favour 
of the ruling minorities, cannot be made to work for the 
destruction of these monopolies. The anarchists consider, 
therefore, that to hand over to the state all the main 
sources of economical life -- the land, the mines, the 
railways, banking, insurance, and so on - as also the 
management of all the main branches of industry, in 
addition to all the functions already accumulated in 
its hands (education, state-supported religions, defence 
of the territory, etc.), would mean to create a new 
instrument of tyranny. State capitalism would only 
increase the powers of bureaucracy and capitalism. True 
progress lies in the direction of decentralisation, both 
*territorial* and *functional*, in the development of the 
spirit of local and personal initiative, and of free 
federation from the simple to the compound, *in lieu* of 
the present hierarchy from the centre to the periphery."
[_Kropotkin's Revolutionary Pamphlets_, p. 286]

Thus we have the basic argument *why* centralism will 
result in the continuation of class society. Does the
Bolshevik experience contradict this analysis? Essentially,
it confirms to Kropotkin's predictions on the uselessness
of "revolutionary" government:

"Instead of acting for themselves, instead of marching 
forward, instead of advancing in the direction of the 
new order of things, the people confiding in their 
governors, entrusted to them the charge of taking 
initiative. This was the first consequence of the 
inevitable result of elections. . .  Shut up in the 
city hall, charged to proceed after the forms 
established by the preceding governments, these ardent 
revolutionists, these reformers found themselves 
smitten with incapacity and sterility. . .  but it 
was not the men who were the cause for this failure 
-- it was the system.. . 

"The will of the bulk of the nation once expressed, 
the rest would submit to it with a good grace, but 
this is not how things are done. The revolution bursts 
out long before a general understanding has come, and 
those who have a clear idea of what should be done 
the next day are only a very small minority. The 
great mass of the people have as yet only a general 
idea of the end which they wish realised, without 
knowing much how to advance towards that end, and 
without having much confidence in the direction to 
follow. The practical solution will not be found, 
will not be made clear until the change will have 
already begun. It will be the product of the 
revolution itself, of the people in action, -- 
or else it will be nothing, incapable of finding 
solutions which can only spring from the life of 
the people. . . The government becomes a parliament 
with all the vices of a middle-class parliament. 
Far from being a 'revolutionary' government it 
becomes the greatest obstacle to the revolution and at 
last the people find themselves compelled to put it out 
of the way, to dismiss those that but yesterday they 
acclaimed as their children. 

"But it is not so easy to do so. The new government 
which has hastened to organise a new administration 
in order to extend it's domination and make itself 
obeyed does not understand giving up so easily. Jealous 
of maintaining it's power, it clings to it with all the 
energy of an institution which has yet had time to fall 
into senile decay. It decides to oppose force with 
force, and there is only one means then to dislodge 
it, namely, to take up arms, to make another revolution 
in order to dismiss those in whom the people had placed 
all their hopes." [Op. Cit., pp. 240-2]

By the spring and summer of 1918, the Bolshevik party
had consolidated its power. It had created a new state,
marked as all states are by the concentration of power
in a few hands and bureaucracy. Effective power became
concentrated into the hands of the executive committees
of the soviets from top to bottom. Faced with rejection 
at soviet election after soviet election, the Bolsheviks
simply disbanded them and gerrymandered the rest. At 
the summit of the new state, a similar process was at 
work. The soviets had little real power, which was 
centralised in Lenin's new government. This is discussed
in more detail in section H.6.6. Thus centralisation 
quickly displaced popular power and participation. 
As predicted by Russia anarchists in November 1917:

"Once their power is consolidated and 'legalised', the 
Bolsheviks -- who are Social Democrats, that is, men of 
centralist and authoritarian action -- will begin to 
rearrange the life of the country and of the people 
by governmental and dictatorial methods, imposed by 
the centre. The[y] . . . will dictate the will of the 
party to all Russia, and command the whole nation. Your 
Soviets and your other local organisations will become 
little by little, simply executive organs of the will 
of the central government. In the place of healthy, 
constructive work by the labouring masses, in place 
of free unification from the bottom, we will see the 
installation of an authoritarian and statist apparatus 
which would act from above and set about wiping out 
everything that stood in its way with an iron hand. 
The Soviets and other organisations will have to obey 
and do its will. That will be called 'discipline.'"
[quoted by Voline, _The Unknown Revolution_, p. 235]

From top to bottom, the new party in power systematically 
undermined the influence and power of the soviets they 
claimed to be ensuring the power of. This process had 
begun, it should be stressed *before* the start of
the civil war in May, 1918. Thus Leninist Tony Cliff
is wrong to state that it was "under the iron pressure
of the civil war" which forced the Bolshevik leaders
"to move, as the price of survival, to a *one-party
system.*" [_Revolution Besieged_, p. 163] From the 
summer of 1918 (i.e. before the civil war even started),
the Bolsheviks had turned from the first of Kropotkin's 
"revolutionary" governments (representative government) 
to the other, dictatorship, with sadly predictable results.

So far, the anarchist predictions on the nature of
centralised revolutionary governments had been confirmed.
Being placed in a new social position and, therefore,
different social relationships, produced a dramatic
revision on the perspectives of the Bolsheviks. They
went from being in favour of party power to being in
favour of party dictatorship. They acted to ensure
their power by making accountability and recall 
difficult, if not impossible, and simply ignored any
election results which did not favour them.

What of the second prediction of anarchism, namely that
centralisation will recreate bureaucracy? That, too,
was confirmed. After all, some means were required to 
gather, collate and provide information by which the 
central bodies made their decisions. Thus a necessary 
side-effect of Bolshevik centralism was bureaucracy, which, 
as is well known, ultimately fused with the party and 
replaced Leninism with Stalinism. The rise of a state 
bureaucracy started immediately with the seizure of power 
by the Bolsheviks. Instead of the state starting to 
"wither away" from the start it grew:

"The old state's political apparatus was 'smashed,' but
in its place a new bureaucratic and centralised system 
emerged with extraordinary rapidity. After the transfer
of government to Moscow in March 1918 it continued to
expand . . . As the functions of the state expanded so
did the bureaucracy, and by August 1918 nearly a third
of Moscow's working population were employed in offices
[147,134 employed in state institutions and 83,886
in local ones. This was 13.7% of the total adult 
population and 29.6% of the independent population of
846,095]. The great increase in the number of employees 
. . . took place in early to mid-1918 and, thereafter, 
despite many campaigns to reduce their number, they 
remained a steady proportion of the falling population
. . . At first the problem was dismissed by arguments
that the impressive participation of the working class
in state structures was evidence that there was no
'bureaucratism' in the bureaucracy. According to the
industrial census of 31 August 1918, out of 123,578
workers in Moscow, only 4,191 (3.4 percent) were
involved in some sort of public organisation . . . 
Class composition is a dubious criterion of the level
of bureaucratism. Working class participation in state
structures did not ensure an organisation against
bureaucratism, and this was nowhere more true than
in the new organisations that regulated the economic
life of the country." [Richard Sakwa, "The Commune 
State in Moscow in 1918," pp. 429-449, _Slavic Review_, 
vol. 46, no. 3/4, pp. 437-8]

The "bureaucracy grew by leaps and bounds. Control over 
the new bureaucracy constantly diminished, partly because 
no genuine opposition existed. The alienation between 
'people' and 'officials,' which the soviet system was 
supposed to remove, was back again. Beginning in 1918, 
complaints about 'bureaucratic excesses,' lack of contact 
with voters, and new proletarian bureaucrats grew louder 
and louder." [Oskar Anweiler, _The Soviets_, p. 242] 

Overtime, this permanent collection of bodies would become 
the real power in the state, with the party members nominally 
in charge really under the control of an unelected and 
uncontrolled officialdom. This was recognised by Lenin in 
the last years of his life. As he noted in 1922:

"Let us look at Moscow . . . Who is leading whom? The
4,700 responsible Communists the mass of bureaucrats,
or the other way round? I do not believe that you can
say that the Communists are leading this mass. To put 
it honestly, they are not the leaders, but the led."
[quoted by Chris Harman, _Bureaucracy and Revolution
in Eastern Europe_, p. 13]

By the end of 1920, there were five times more state
officials than industrial workers. 5,880,000 were 
members of the state bureaucracy. However, the 
bureaucracy had existed since the start. As noted
above, the 231,000 people employed in offices in 
in Moscow in August 1918 represented 30 per cent 
of the workforce there. "By 1920 the general number 
of office workers . . . still represented about a 
third of those employed in the city." In November, 
1920, they were 200 000 office workers in Moscow, 
compared to 231 000 in August, 1918. By July, 
1921 (in spite of a plan to transfer 10,000 away) 
their numbers had increased to 228,000 and by October 
1922, to 243,000. [Richard Sakwa, _Soviet Communists
in Power_, p. 192, p. 191 and p. 193]

This makes perfect sense as "on coming to power the 
Bolsheviks smashed the old state but rapidly created 
their own apparatus to wage the political and economic 
offensive against the bourgeois and capitalism. As 
the functions of the state expanded, so did the 
bureaucracy . . .  following the revolution the 
process of institutional proliferation reached 
unprecedented heights." [Op. Cit., p. 191] And with
bureaucracy came the abuse of it simply because it
held *real* power:

"The prevalence of bureaucracy, of committees and
commissions . . . permitted, and indeed encouraged,
endless permutations of corrupt practices. These
raged from the style of living of communist
functionaries to bribe-taking by officials. With
the power of allocation of scare resources, such
as housing, there was an inordinate potential
for corruption." [Op. Cit., p. 193]

The growth in *power* of the bureaucracy should not,
therefore, come as a major surprise given that had
existed from the start in sizeable numbers. However, 
for the Bolsheviks "the development of a bureaucracy" 
was a puzzle, "whose emergence and properties mystified 
them." However, it should be noted that, "[f]or 
the Bolsheviks, bureaucratism signified the escape 
of this bureaucracy from the will of the party as 
it took on a life of its own." [Sakwa, Op. Cit., 
p. 182 and p. 190] This was the key. They did not 
object the usurpation of power by the party (need 
they placed party dictatorship at the core of their 
politics and universalised it to a universal 
principle of *all* "socialist" revolutions). Nor 
did they object to the centralisation of power and
activity (and so the bureaucratisation of life). 
They only objected to it when the bureaucracy was
not doing what the party wanted it to. Indeed, this
was the basic argument of Trotsky against Stalinism
(see section H.10.3).

Faced with this bureaucracy, the Bolsheviks tried
to combat it (unsuccessfully) and explain it. As
the failed to achieve the latter, they failed in the
former. Given the Bolshevik fixation for all things
centralised, they simply added to the problem rather
than solve it. Thus we find that "[o]n the eve of 
the VIII Party Congress Lenin had argued that 
centralisation was the only way to combat 
bureaucratism." [Sakwa, Op. Cit., p. 196] 

Unsurprisingly, Lenin's "anti-bureaucratic" policies
in the last years of his live were "organisational
ones. He purposes the formation of the Workers'
and Peasants' Inspection to correct bureaucratic
deformations in the party and state -- and this
body falls under Stalin's control and becomes
highly bureaucratic in its own right. Lenin then
suggests that the size of the Workers' and Peasants'
Inspection be reduced and that it be merged with
the Control Commission. He advocates enlarging the
Central Committee. Thus it rolls along; this body
to be enlarged, this one to be merged with another,
still a third to be modified or abolished. The
strange ballet of organisational forms continues
up to his very death, as though the problem could
be resolved by organisational means." [Murray 
Bookchin, _Post-Scarcity Anarchism_, p. 205]

Failing to understand the links between centralism
and bureaucracy, Lenin had to find another source
for the bureaucracy. He found one. He "argued that 
the low cultural level of the working class prevented 
mass involvement in management and this led to 
bureaucratism . . . the new state could only reply 
on a minuscule layer of workers while the rest were 
backward because of the low cultural level of the 
country." However, such an explanation is by no
means convincing: "Such culturalist assertions, 
which could neither be proved or disproved but 
which were politically highly effective in 
explaining the gulf, served to blur the political 
and structural causes of the problem. The working 
class was thus held responsible for the failings 
of the bureaucracy. At the end of the civil war 
the theme of the backwardness of the proletariat 
was given greater elaboration in Lenin's theory 
of the declassing of the proletariat." [Sakwa, 
Op. Cit., p. 195] Given that the bureaucracy had
existed from the start, it is hard to say that a
more "cultured" working class would have been in
a better position to control the officials of a
highly centralised state bureaucracy. Given the
problems workers in "developed" nations have in
controlling their (centralised) union bureaucracies,
Lenin's explanation seems simply inadequate and,
ultimately, self-serving.

Nor was this centralism particularly efficient. You need 
only read Goldman's or Berkman's accounts of their time 
in Bolshevik Russia to see how inefficient and wasteful 
centralisation and its resultant bureaucracy was in practice 
(see _My Disillusionment in Russia_ and _The Bolshevik 
Myth_, respectively). This can be traced, in part, to the 
centralised economic structures favoured by the Bolsheviks.
Rejecting the alternative vision of socialism advocated
and, in part created, by the factory committees (and
supported wholeheartedly by the Russian Anarchists at
the time), the Bolsheviks basically took over and used 
the "state capitalist" organs created under Tsarism as 
the basis of their "socialism" (see section H.9.5). As
Lenin promised *before* seizing power: 

"*Forced syndicatisation* -- that is, forced fusion into
unions [i.e. trusts] under the control of the State -- this 
is what capitalism has prepared for us -- this is what the 
Banker State has realised in Germany -- this is what will 
be completely realisable in Russia by the Soviets, by the
dictatorship of the proletariat." [_Will the Bolsheviks
Maintain Power?_, p. 53]

In practice, Lenin's centralised vision soon proved to be
a disaster (see section H.6.11 for details). It was highly
inefficient and simply spawned a vast bureaucracy. There
was an alternative, as we discuss in section H.6.12, the 
only reason that industry did not totally collapse in Russia 
during the early months of the revolution was the activity of 
the factory committees. However, such activity was not part 
of the Bolshevik vision of centralised socialism and so the 
factory committees were *not* encouraged. At the very moment 
when mass participation and initiative is required (i.e. 
during a revolution) the Bolsheviks favoured a system which 
killed it. As Kropotkin argued a few years later:

"production and exchange represented an undertaking so 
complicated that the plans of the state socialists, 
which lead to a party directorship, would prove to be 
absolutely ineffective as soon as they were applied to 
life. No government would be able to organise production 
if the workers themselves through their unions did not 
do it in each branch of industry; for in all production 
there arise daily thousands of difficulties which no 
government can solve or foresee . . . Only the efforts
of thousands of intelligences working on the problems 
can co-operate in the development of a new social system 
and find the best solutions for the thousands of local 
needs." [_Kropotkin's Revolutionary Pamphlets_, pp. 76-7]

No system is perfect. Any system will take time to develop
fully. Of course the factory committees made mistakes and, 
sometimes, things were pretty chaotic with different 
factories competing for scarce resources. But that does 
not prove that factory committees and their federations 
were not the most efficient way of running things under 
the circumstances. Unless, of course, you share the 
Bolsheviks a dogmatic belief that central planning is
always more efficient. Moreover, attacks on the factory
committees for lack of co-ordination by pro-Leninists
seem less than sincere, given the utter lack of 
encouragement (and, often, actual barriers) the
Bolsheviks placed in the way of the creation of 
federations of factory committees (see section H.6.9
for further details). 

Lastly, Bolshevik centralism (as well as being extremely
inefficient) also ensured that the control of production 
and the subsequent surplus would be in the hands of the 
state and, so, class society would continue. In Russia, 
capitalism became state capitalism under Lenin and Trotsky
(see sections H.9.5 and H.9.6 for more discussion of this).

So Bolshevik support for centralised power ensured that 
minority power replaced popular power, which, in turn, 
necessitated bureaucracy to maintain it. Bolshevism 
retained statist and capitalist social relations and, 
as such, could not develop socialist ones which, by 
their very nature, imply egalitarianism in terms of 
social influence and power (i.e. the abolition of 
concentrated power, both economic and political). 
Ironically, by being centralists, the Bolsheviks 
systematically eliminated mass participation and 
ensured the replacement of popular power with party 
power. This saw the rebirth of non-socialist social 
relationships within society, so ensuring the defeat 
of the socialist tendencies and institutions which had 
started to grow during 1917.

It cannot be said that this centralism was a product 
of the civil war. As best it could be argued that the 
civil war extenuated an existing centralist spirit 
into ultra-centralism, but it did not create it. After 
all, Lenin was stressing that the Bolsheviks were 
"convinced centralists . . . by their programme and 
the tactics of the whole of their party" in 1917. 
Ironically, he never realised (nor much cared, after
the seizure of power) that this position precluded 
his call for "the deepening and extension of democracy 
in the administration of a State of the of the proletarian 
type." [_Can the Bolsheviks Maintain Power?_, p. 74 and 
p. 55] Given that centralism exists to ensure minority 
rule, we should not be to surprised that party power 
replaced popular participation and self-government 
quickly after the October Revolution. Which it did.
Writing in September 1918, a Russian anarchist portrays 
the results of Bolshevik ideology in practice:

"Within the framework of this dictatorship [of the proletariat]
. . . we can see that the centralisation of power has begun to
crystallise and grow firm, that the apparatus of the state is
being consolidated by the ownership of property and even by an
anti-socialist morality. Instead of hundreds of thousands of
property owners there is now a single owner served by a whole
bureaucratic system and a new 'statised' morality.

"The proletariat is gradually being enserfed by the state. The
people are being transformed into servants over whom there has
risen a new class of administrators -- a new class . . . Isn't
this merely a new class system looming on the revolutionary
horizon . . .

"The resemblance is all too striking . . . And if the elements
of class inequality are as yet indistinct, it is only a matter
of time before privileges will pass to the administrators. We
do not mean to say . . . that the Bolshevik party set out to
create a new class system. But we do say that even the best
intentions and aspirations must inevitably be smashed against
the evils inherent in any system of centralised power. The
separation of management from labour, the division between
administrators and workers flows logically from, centralisation.
It cannot be otherwise . . . we are presently moving not 
towards socialism but towards state capitalism.

"Will state capitalism lead us to the gates of socialism? Of
this we see not the slightest evidence . . . Arrayed against
socialism are . . . thousands of administrators. And if the
workers . . . should become a powerful revolutionary force,
then it is hardly necessary to point out that the class of
administrators, wielding the state apparatus, will be a
far from weak opponent. The single owner and state capitalism
form a new dam before the waves of our social revolution. . . 

"Is it at all possible to conduct the social revolution 
through a centralised authority? Not even a Solomon could
direct the revolutionary struggle or the economy from one
centre . . ." [M. Sergven, cited by Paul Avrich, _Anarchists 
in the Russian Revolution_, pp. 123-5]

Subsequent developments proved this argument correct. Working
class revolts were crushed by the state and a new class society
developed. little wonder, then, Alexander Berkman's summary of 
what he saw first hand in Bolshevik Russia a few years later:

"Mechanical centralisation, run mad, is paralysing the
industrial and economic activities of the country. Initiative
is frowned upon, free effort systematically discouraged. The
great masses are deprived of the opportunity to shape the
policies of the Revolution, or take part in the administration
of the affairs of the country. The government is monopolising
every avenue of life; the Revolution is divorced from the
people. A bureaucratic machine is created that is appalling
in its parasitism, inefficiency and corruption. In Moscow
alone this new class of *sovburs* (Soviet bureaucrats)
exceeds, in 1920, the total of office holders throughout
the whole of Russia under the Tsar in 1914 . . . The 
Bolshevik economic policies, effectively aided by this
bureaucracy, completely disorganise the already crippled
industrial life of the country. Lenin, Zinoviev, and other
Communist leaders thunder philippics against the new Soviet
bourgeoisie, - and issue ever new decrees that strengthen
and augment its numbers and influence." [_The Russian 
Tragedy_, p. 26]

Bakunin would not have been remotely surprised. As such, 
the Bolshevik revolution provided a good example to support 
Malatesta's argument that "if . . . one means government
action when one talks of social action, then this is still the 
resultant of individual forces, but only of those individuals
who form the government . . . it follows. . . that far from 
resulting in an increase in the productive, organising and
protective forces in society, it would greatly reduce them, 
limiting initiative to a few, and giving them the right to do
everything without, of course, being able to provide them 
with the gift of being all-knowing." [_Anarchy_, pp. 36-7] 

By confusing "state action" with collective working class 
action, the Bolsheviks effectively eliminated the latter 
in favour of the former. The usurpation of all aspects of
life by the centralised bodies created by the Bolsheviks
left workers with no choice but to act as isolated individuals.
Can it be surprising, then, that Bolshevik policies aided the 
atomisation of the working class by replacing collective 
organisation and action by state bureaucracy? The potential
for collective action *was* there. You need only look at
the strikes and protests directed *against* the Bolsheviks
to see that was the case (see section H.7.5 for details).
Ironically, Bolshevik policies and ideology ensured that
the collective effort and action of workers was directed
not at solving the revolution's problems but resisting 
Bolshevik tyranny.

That centralism concentrates power in a few hands can be 
seen even in Leninist accounts of the Russian revolution. To
take one example, Tony Cliff may assert that the "mistakes 
of the masses were themselves creative" but when push comes 
to shove, he (like Lenin) simply does not allow the masses 
to make such mistakes and, consequently, learn from them. 
Thus he defends Lenin's economic policies of "state 
capitalism" and "one-man management" (and in the process 
misleadingly suggests that these were *new* ideas on 
Lenin's part, imposed by objective factors, rather than, 
as Lenin acknowledged, what he had advocated all along
-- see section H.9.5). Thus we discover that the collapse
of industry (which had started in the start of 1917) meant
that "[d]rastic measures had to be taken." But never fear,
"Lenin was not one to shirk responsibility, however 
unpleasant the task." He called for "state capitalism,"
and there "were more difficult decisions to be accepted. To 
save industry from complete collapse, Lenin argued for the 
need to impose one-man management." So much for the
creative self-activity of the masses, which was quickly
dumped -- precisely at the time when it was most desperately
needed. And it is nice to know that in a workers' state
it is not the workers who decide things. Rather it is
Lenin (or his modern equivalent, like Cliff) who would 
have the task of not shirking from the responsibility of
deciding which drastic measures are required. [Op. Cit., 
p. 21, p. 71 and p. 73] So much for "workers' power"!

Ultimately, centralism is designed to exclude the mass
participation anarchists have long argued is required by 
a social revolution. It helped to undermine what Kropotkin 
considered the key to the success of a social revolution 
-- "the people becom[ing] masters of their destiny." 
[Op. Cit., p. 133] In his words:

"We understand the revolution as a widespread popular movement,
during which in every town and village within the region of 
revolt, the masses will have to take it upon themselves *the
work of construction upon communistic bases,* without awaiting
any orders and directions from above . . . As to representative
government, whether self-appointed or elected . . . , we place
in it no hopes whatever. We know beforehand that it will be able
to do nothing to accomplish the revolution as long as the people
themselves do not accomplish the change by working out on the
spot the necessary new institutions . . . nowhere and never 
in history do we find that people carried into government by
a revolutionary wave, have proved equal to the occasion.

"In the task of reconstructing society on new principles, separate
men . . . are sure to fail. The collective spirit of the masses
is necessary for this purpose . . . a socialist government . . . 
would be absolutely powerless without the activity of the people
themselves, and that, necessarily, they would soon begin to act
fatally as a bridle upon the revolution." [Op. Cit., pp. 188-190]

The Bolshevik revolution and its mania for centralism proved
him right. The use of centralisation helped ensure that 
workers' lost any meaningful say in their revolution and 
helped alienate them from it. Instead of the mass participation
of all, the Bolsheviks ensured the top-down rule of a few. 
Unsurprisingly, as mass participation is what centralism 
was designed to exclude. Wishful thinking on behalf of the 
Bolshevik leaders (and their later-day followers) could not 
(and can not) overcome the structural imperatives of 
centralisation and its role in society. Nor could it 
stop the creation of a bureaucracy around these new 
centralised institutions. 

H.9.8 How did the aim for party power undermine the revolution?

As well as a passion for centralisation and state capitalism, 
Bolshevism had another aim which helped undermine the revolution. 
This was the goal of party power (see section H.6.5 for details). 
Given this, namely that the Bolsheviks had, from the start, 
aimed for party power it should not come as too surprising 
that Bolshevik dictatorship quickly replaced soviet democracy. 

Given this obvious fact, it seems strange for modern day 
Leninists to blame the civil war for the Bolsheviks 
substituting their rule for the masses. After all, when 
the Bolshevik Party took power in October 1917, it did 
"substitute" itself for the working class and did so 
deliberately and knowingly. As we note in section H.9.2, 
this usurpation of power by a minority was perfectly 
acceptable within the Marxist theory of the state, a 
theory which aided this process no end.

Thus the Bolshevik party would be in power, with the "conscious
workers" ruling over the rest. The question instantly arises of
what happens if the masses turn against the party. If the 
Bolsheviks embody "the power of the proletariat," what happens
if the proletariat reject the party? The undermining of soviet
power by party power and the destruction of soviet democracy in 
the spring and summer of 1918 answers that specific question
(see section H.7.3). This should have come as no surprise, given 
the stated aim (and implementation) of party power plus the 
Bolshevik identification of party power with workers' power. It 
is not a great step to party dictatorship *over* the proletariat
from these premises (particularly if we include the underlying
assumptions of vanguardism -- see section H.5.3). A step, we 
must stress, that the Bolsheviks quickly took when faced with 
working class rejection in the soviet elections of spring and 
summer of 1918. 

Nor was this destruction of soviet democracy by party power just
the result of specific conditions in 1917-8. This perspective had
been in Russian Marxist circles well before the revolution. As we
discuss in section H.5, vanguardism implies party power (see, as
noted, section H.5.3 in particular). The ideas of Lenin's _What 
is to be Done?_ give the ideological justification for party 
dictatorship over the masses. Once in power, the logic of 
vanguardism came into its own, allowing the most disgraceful 
repression of working class freedoms to be justified in terms of
"Soviet Power" and other euphemisms for the party. 

The identification of workers' power with party power has
deeply undemocratic results, as the experience of the 
Bolshevik proves. However, these results were actually
articulated in Russian socialist circles before hand. At 
the divisive 1903 congress of the Russian Social Democrats,
which saw the split into two factions (Bolshevik and Menshevism)
Plekhanov, the father of Russian Marxism, argued as follows:

"Every particular democratic principle must be considered not 
in itself, abstractly, . . . the success of the revolution is 
the highest law. And if, for the success of the revolution's 
ssuccess, we need temporarily to restrict the functioning of a 
particular democratic principle, then it would be criminal to 
refrain from imposing that restriction. . . And we must take 
the same attitude where the question of the length of 
parliaments is concerned. If, in an outburst of revolutionary 
enthusiasm, the people elect a very good parliament . . . it 
would suit us to try and make that a *long Parliament*; but if 
the elections turned out badly for us, we should have to try 
and disperse the resulting parliament not after two years but, 
if possible, after two weeks." [RSDLP, _Minutes of the Second 
Congress of the RSDLP_, p. 220]

Another delegate argued that "[t]here is not a single one 
among the principles of democracy which we ought not to 
subordinate *to the interests of our Party* . . . we
must consider democratic principles exclusively from the 
standpoint of the most rapid achievement of that aim [i.e.
revolution], from the standpoint of the interests of our
Party. If any particular demand is against our interests, we
must not include it." To which, Plekhanov replied, "I fully
associate myself with what Comrade Posadovksy has said."
[Op. Cit., p. 219 and p. 220] Lenin "agreed unreservedly
with this subordination of democratic principles to party
interests." [Oskar Anweiler, _The Soviets_, p. 211]

Plekhanov at this time was linked with Lenin, although this 
association lasted less than a year. After that, he became 
associated with the Mensheviks (before his support for Russia
in World War I saw him form his own faction). Needless to say,
he was mightily annoyed when Lenin threw his words back in 
his face in 1918 when the Bolsheviks disbanded the Constituent 
Assembly. Yet while Plekhanov came to reject this position 
(perhaps because the elections had not "turned out badly for" 
his liking) it is obvious that the Bolsheviks embraced it and 
keenly applied it to elections to soviets and unions as well 
as Parliaments once in power (see section H.8.3, for example). 
But, at the time, he sided with Lenin against the Mensheviks 
and it can be argued that the latter applied these teachings 
of that most respected pre-1914 Russian Marxist thinker.

This undemocratic perspective can also be seen when, in 1905, 
the St. Petersburg Bolsheviks, like most of the party, opposed 
the soviets. They argued that "only a strong party along class 
lines can guide the proletarian political movement and preserve 
the integrity of its program, rather than a political mixture 
of this kind, an indeterminate and vacillating political 
organisation such as the workers council represents and cannot 
help but represent." [quoted by Oskar Anweiler, _The Soviets_, 
p. 77] Thus the soviets could not reflect workers' interests 
because they were elected by the workers! 

The Bolsheviks saw the soviets as a rival to their party and 
demanded it either accept their political program or simply 
become a trade-union like organisation. They feared that it 
pushed aside the party committee and thus led to the 
"subordination of consciousness to spontaneity" and
under the label "non-party" allow "the rotten goods of 
bourgeois ideology" to be introduced among the workers. 
[quoted by Anweilier, Op. Cit., p. 78 and p. 79] In this, 
the St. Petersburg Bolsheviks were simply following Lenin's 
_What is to be Done?_, in which Lenin had argued that the 
"*spontaneous* development of the labour movement leads to 
it being subordinated to bourgeois ideology." [_Essential 
Works of Lenin_, p. 82] Lenin in 1905, to his credit, rejected 
these clear conclusions of his own theory and was more 
supportive of the soviets than his followers (although
"he sided in principle with those who saw in the soviet
the danger of amorphous nonpartisan organisation." 
[Anweilier, Op. Cit., p. 81]).

This perspective, however, is at the root of all Bolshevik 
justifications for party power after the October revolution. 
The logical result of this position can be found in the 
actions of the Bolsheviks in 1918 and onwards. For the
Bolsheviks in power, the soviets were less than important.
The key for them was to maintain Bolshevik party power and
if soviet democracy was the price to pay, then they were
more than willing to pay it. As such, Bolshevik attitudes
in 1905 are significant:

"Despite the failure of the Bolshevik assault on the
non-partisanship of the [St.] Petersburg Soviet, 
which may be dismissed as a passing episode . . . 
the attempt . . . is of particular significance 
in understanding the Bolshevik's mentality, 
political ambitions and *modus operandi.* First, 
starting in [St.] Petersburg, the Bolshevik campaign 
was repeated in a number of provincial soviets
such as Kostroma and Tver, and, possibly, Sormovo.
Second, the assault reveals that from the outset the
Bolsheviks were distrustful of, if not hostile towards
the Soviets, to which they had at best an instrumental
and always party-minded attitude. Finally, the attempt
to bring the [St.] Petersburg Soviet to heel is an
early and major example of Bolshevik take-over techniques
hitherto practised within the narrow confines of the
underground party and now extended to the larger arena
of open mass organisations such as soviets, with the
ultimate aim of controlling them and turning them into
one-party organisations, or, failing that, of destroying
them." [Israel Getzler, "The Bolshevik Onslaught on the 
Non-Party 'Political Profile' of the Petersburg Soviet of
Workers' Deputies October-November 1905", _Revolutionary
History_, pp. 123-146, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 124-5]

The instrumentalist approach of the Bolsheviks post-1917
can be seen from their arguments and attitudes in 1905.
On the day the Moscow soviet opened, a congress of the 
northern committees of the Social Democratic Party 
passed a resolution stating that a "council of workers
deputies should be established only in places where the
party organisation has no other means of directing the
proletariat's revolutionary action . . . The soviet of
workers deputies must be a technical instrument of the
party for the purpose of giving political leadership
to the masses through the RSDWP [the Social-Democratic 
Party]. It is therefore imperative to gain control of
the soviet and prevail upon it to recognise the
program and political leadership of the RSDWP." [quoted 
by Anweilier, Op. Cit., p. 79]

This perspective that the party should be given precedence
can be seen in Lenin's comment that while the Bolsheviks
should "go along with the unpoliticalised proletarians,
but on no account and at no time should we forget that
animosity among the proletariat toward the Social Democrats
is a remnant of bourgeois attitudes . . . Participation 
in unaffiliated organisations can be permitted to socialists
only as an exception . . . only if the independence of the
workers party is guaranteed and if within unaffiliated
organisations or soviets individual delegates or party
groups are subject to unconditional control and guidance
by the party executive." [quoted by Anweilier, Op. Cit., 
p. 81] These comments have clear links to Lenin's argument
in 1920 that working class protest against the Bolsheviks
showed that they had become "declassed" (see section H.8.5).
It similarly allows soviets to be disbanded if Bolsheviks
are not elected (which they were, see section H.8.3). It
also ensures that Bolshevik representatives to the soviets
are not delegates from the workplace, but rather a 
"transmission belt" (to use a phrase from the 1920s) 
for the decisions of the party leadership. In a nutshell,
Bolshevik soviets would represent the party's central 
committee, not those who elected them. As Oskar Anweiler
summarised:

"The 'revolutionary genius' of the people, which Lenin had
mentioned and which was present in the soviets, constantly
harboured the danger of 'anarcho-syndicalist tendencies'
that Lenin fought against all his life. He detected this
danger early in the development of the soviets and hoped
to subdue it by subordinating the soviets to the party. The 
drawback of the new 'soviet democracy' hailed by Lenin in
1906 is that he could envisage the soviets only as 
*controlled* organisations; for him they were the instruments
by which the party controlled the working masses, rather
than true forms of a workers democracy." [Op. Cit., p. 85]

As we noted in section H.3.11, Lenin had concluded in 1907
that while the party could "utilise" the soviets "for the purpose 
of developing the Social-Democratic movement," the party "must 
bear in mind that if Social-Democratic activities among the 
proletarian masses are properly, effectively and widely 
organised, such institutions may actually become superfluous." 
[Marx, Engels and Lenin, _Anarchism and Anarcho-Syndicalism_, 
p. 210] Thus the means by which working class can manage their 
own affairs would become "superfluous" once the party was 
in power. As Samuel Farber argues, Lenin's position before 1917 
was "clearly implying that the party could normally fulfil its
revolutionary role without the existence of broad class 
organisations . . . Consequently, Lenin's and the party's
eventual endorsement of the soviets in 1905 seems to have been
tactical in character. That is, the Bolshevik support for the
soviets did not at the time signify a theoretical and/or
principled commitment to these institutions as revolutionary
organs to overthrow the old society, let alone as key
structural ingredients of the post-revolutionary order. 
Furthermore, it is again revealing that from 1905 to 1917
the concept of soviets did not play an important role in the
thinking of Lenin or of the Bolshevik Party . . . [T]hese
strategies and tactics vis-a-vis the soviets . . . can be 
fairly seen as expressing a predisposition favouring the
party and downgrading the soviets and other non-party class
organisations, at least in relative terms." [_Before 
Stalinism_, p. 37] Such a perspective on the soviets can 
be seen once the party was in power when they quickly 
turned them, without concern, into mere fig-leafs for 
party power (see section H.6.6 for more details).

It cannot be mere coincidence that the ideas and
rhetoric against the soviets in 1905 should resurface
again once the Bolsheviks were in power. For example,
in 1905, in St. Petersburg "the Bolsheviks pressed on" 
with their campaign and, "according to the testimony of 
Vladimir Voitinskii, then a young Bolshevik agitator, 
the initial thrust of the Bolshevik 'plan' was to push 
the SRs [who were in a minority] out of the Soviet, 
while 'the final blow' would be directed against the 
Mensheviks. Voitinskii also recalled the heated 
argument advanced by the popular agitator Nikolai 
Krylenko ('Abram') for the 'dispersal of the Soviet' 
should it reject the 'ultimatum' to declare its 
affiliation with the RSDP." [Getzler, Op., Cit., 
pp. 127-8] This mirrored events in 1918. Then "at the 
local political level" Bolshevik majorities were 
attained ("by means fair, foul and terrorist") "in 
the plenary assemblies of the soviets, and with the 
barring of all those not 'completely dedicated to 
Soviet power' [i.e. Mensheviks and SRs] from the 
newly established network of soviet administrative 
departments and from the soviet militias. Soviets 
where Bolshevik majorities could not be achieved 
were simply disbanded." A similar process occurred 
at the summit (see section H.6.6). Thus "the October 
revolution marked [the soviets] transformation from 
agents of democratisation into regional and local 
administrative organs of the centralised, one-party 
Soviet state." [Israel Getzler, _Soviets as Agents 
of Democratisation_, p. 27 and pp. 26-7]

Can such an outcome really have *no* link at all with
the Bolshevik position and practice in period before
1917 and, in particular, during the 1905 revolution? 
Obviously not. As such, we should not be too surprised 
or shocked when Lenin replied to a critic who assailed
the "dictatorship of one party" in 1919 by clearly and
unashamedly stating: "Yes, the dictatorship of one party!
We stand upon it and cannot depart from this ground,
since this is the party which in the course of decades
has won for itself the position of vanguard of the whole
factory and industrial proletariat." [quoted by E.H.
Carr, _The Bolshevik Revolution_, vol. 1, p. 236] Or
when he replied to a critic in 1920 that "[h]e says 
we understand by the words dictatorship of proletariat 
what is actually the dictatorship of its determined 
and conscious minority. And that is the fact." This 
"minority . . . may be called a party," Lenin stressed. 
[quoted by Arthur Ransome, _The Crisis in Russia 1920_, 
p. 35] 

This perspective can be traced back to the underlying 
ideology expounded by the Bolsheviks before and during 
1917. For example, mere days after seizing power in
the October Revolution Lenin was stressing that the
Bolsheviks' "present slogan is: No compromise, i.e.
for a homogeneous Boshevik government." He did not 
hesitate to use the threat to "appeal to the sailors"
against the other socialist parties, stating "[i]f 
you get the majority, take power in the Central
Executive Committee and carry one. But we will go
to the sailors." [quoted by Tony Cliff, _Lenin_,
vol. 3, p. 26] Clearly soviet power was far from
Lenin's mind, rejecting soviet democracy if need 
be in favour of party power. Strangely, Cliff (a 
supporter of Lenin) states that Lenin "did not 
visualise one-party rule" and that the "first
decrees and laws issued after the October revolution
were full of repetitions of the word 'democracy.'"
[Op. Cit., p. 161 and p. 146] He goes on to quote 
Lenin stating that "[a]s a democratic government we 
cannot ignore the decision of the masses of the people,
even though we disagree with it." Cliff strangely
fails to mention that Lenin also applied this not
only to the land decree (as Cliff notes) but also
to the Constituent Assembly. "And even if," Lenin
continued, "the peasants continue to follow the
Socialist Revolutionaries, even if they give this
party a majority in the Constituent Assembly, we
shall still say -- what of it?" [Lenin, _Collected
Works_, vol. 26, pp. 260-1] But the Bolsheviks 
disbanded the Constituent Assembly after one session.
The peasants had voted for the SRs and the Assembly
went the same way as Lenin's promises. And if Lenin's
promises of 1917 on the Assembly proved to be of
little value, then why should his various commitments 
to soviet democracy be considered any different? In 
a clash between soviet democracy and party power,
the Bolsheviks consistently favoured the latter
(see section H.6.6 for some examples).

Thus Bolshevik ideology had consistently favoured party
power and had a long term ideological preference for it.
Combine this aim of party power with a vanguardism position 
(see section H.5) and party dictatorship will soon result. 
Neil Harding summarises the issue well:

"There were a number of very basic axioms that lay at the
very heart of the theory and practice of Leninism with
regard to the party . . . It was the party that disposed
of scientific or objective knowledge. Its analysis of the
strivings of the proletariat was, therefore, privileged
over the proletariat's own class goals and a single
discernible class will was, similarly, axiomatic to
both Marxism and Leninism. Both maintained that it was
the communists who alone articulated these goals and
this will -- that was the party's principal historical
role.

"At this point, Leninism (again faithful to the Marxist
original) resorted to a little-noticed definitional
conjuring trick -- one that proved to be of crucial
importance for the mesmeric effect of the ideology.
The trick was spectacularly simple and audacious -- 
the class was defined as class only to the extent that
it conformed to the *party's* account of its objectives,
and mobilised itself to fulfil them. . . . The messy,
real proletarians -- the aggregation of wage workers
with all their diverse projects and aspirations -- were
to be judged by their progress towards a properly class
existence by the party that had itself devised the criteria
for the class existence." [_Leninism_, pp. 173-4]

This authoritarian position, which allows "socialism" to be
imposed by force upon the working class, lies at the core
of Leninism. Ironically, while Bolshevism claims to be *the* 
party of the working class, representing it essentially or 
exclusively, they do so in the name of possessing a theory
that, qua theory, can be the possession of intellectuals
and, therefore, has to be "introduced" to the working class
from outside (see section H.5.1 for details).

This means that Bolshevism is rooted in the identification of 
"class consciousness" with supporting the party. Given the 
underlying premises of vanguardism, unsurprisingly the 
Bolsheviks took "class consciousness" to mean this. If
the workers protested against the policies of the party, 
this represented a fall in class consciousness and, therefore, 
working class resistance placed "class" power in danger. 
If, on the other hand, the workers remained quiet and followed
the party's decision then, obviously, they showed high levels
of class consciousness. The net effect of this position was, 
of course, to justify party dictatorship. Which, of course,
the Bolsheviks did create *and* justified ideologically.

Thus the Bolshevik aim for party power results in disempowering
the working class in practice. Moreover, the assumptions of
vanguardism ensure that only the party leadership is able to judge
what is and is not in the interests of the working class. Any
disagreement by elements of that class or the whole class itself
can be dismissed as "wavering" and "vacillation." While this
is perfectly acceptable within the Leninist "from above" 
perspective, from an anarchist "from below" perspective it means
little more than pseudo-theoretical justification for party
dictatorship *over* the proletariat and the ensuring that a
socialist society will *never* be created. Ultimately, socialism
without freedom is meaningless -- as the Bolshevik regime proved
time and time again.

As such, to claim that the Bolsheviks did not aim to "substitute"
party power for working class power seems inconsistent with both
Bolshevik theory and practice. Lenin had been aiming for party
power from the start, identifying it with working class power.
As the party was the vanguard of the proletariat, it was duty
bound to seize power and govern on behalf of the masses and,
moreover, take any actions necessary to maintain the revolution
-- even if these actions violated the basic principles required
to have any form of meaningful workers' democracy and freedom.
Thus the "dictatorship of the proletariat" had long become equated 
with party power and, once in power, it was only a matter of time
before it became the "dictatorship of the party." And once this 
did occur, none of the leading Bolsheviks questioned it. The 
implications of these Bolshevik perspectives came clear after 
1917, when the Bolsheviks raised the need for party dictatorship 
to an ideological truism.

Thus it seems strange to hear some Leninists complain that the
rise of Stalinism can be explained by the rising "independence"
of the state machine from the class (i.e. party) it claimed to in 
service of. Needless to say, few Leninists ponder the links between 
the rising "independence" of the state machine from the proletariat 
(by which most, in fact, mean the "vanguard" of the proletariat, 
the party) and Bolshevik ideology. As noted in section H.3.8, a key
development in Bolshevik theory on the state was the perceived need
for the vanguard to ignore the wishes of the class it claimed to
represent and lead. For example, Victor Serge (writing in the 1920s)
considered it a truism that the "party of the proletariat must know,
at hours of decision, how to break the resistance of the backward
elements among the masses; it must know how to stand firm sometimes
against the masses . . . it must know how to go against the current,
and cause proletarian consciousness to prevail against lack of
consciousness and against alien class influences." [_Year One of
the Russian Revolution_, p. 218]

The problem with this is that, by definition, *everyone* is 
backward in comparison to the vanguard party. Moreover, in 
Bolshevik ideology it is the party which determines what is
and is not "proletarian consciousness." Thus we have the party
ideologue presenting self-justifications for party power *over*
the working class. Now, is the vanguard is to be able to ignore 
the masses then it must have power *over* them. Moreover, to be 
independent of the masses the machine it relies on to implement 
its power must also, by definition, be independent of the masses. 
Can we be surprised, therefore, with the rise of the "independent"
state bureaucracy in such circumstances? If the state machine is 
to be independent of the masses then why should we expect it not 
to become independent of the vanguard? Surely it must be the 
case that we would be far more surprised if the state machine 
did *not* become "independent" of the ruling party?

Nor can it be said that the Bolsheviks learned from the 
experience of the Russian Revolution. This can be seen 
from Trotsky's 1937 comments that the "proletariat can 
take power only through its vanguard. In itself the 
necessity for state power arises from the insufficient 
cultural level of the masses and their heterogeneity." 
Thus "state power" is required *not* to defend the 
revolution against reaction but from the working 
class itself, who do not have a high enough 
"cultural level" to govern themselves. At best, 
their role is that of a passive supporter, for 
"[w]ithout the confidence of the class in the vanguard, 
without support of the vanguard by the class, there can 
be no talk of the conquest of power." While soviets 
"are the only organised form of the tie between the 
vanguard and the class" it does not mean that they 
are organs of self-management. No, a "revolutionary 
content can be given . . . only by the party. This 
is proved by the positive experience of the October 
Revolution and by the negative experience of other 
countries (Germany, Austria, finally, Spain)." 
[_Stalinism and Bolshevism_] 

Sadly, Trotsky failed to explicitly address the question 
of what happens when the "masses" stop having "confidence 
in the vanguard" and decides to support some other group. 
After all, if a "revolutionary content" can only be given 
by "the party" then if the masses reject the party then 
the soviets can no only be revolutionary. To save the
revolution, it would be necessary to destroy the democracy 
and power of the soviets. Which is *exactly* what the 
Bolsheviks did do in 1918. By equating popular power 
with party power Bolshevism not only opens the door 
to party dictatorship, it invites it in, gives it 
some coffee and asks it to make itself a home! Nor can 
it be said that Trotsky ever appreciated Kropotkin's 
"general observation" that "those who preach dictatorship 
do not in general perceive that in sustaining their 
prejudice they only prepare the way for those who later 
on will cut their throats." [_Kropotkin's Revolutionary 
Pamphlets_, p. 244]

In summary, it cannot be a coincidence that once in power
the Bolsheviks acted in ways which had clear links to the
political ideology it had been advocating before hand. As
such, the Bolshevik aim for party power helped undermine
the real power of working class people during the Russian
revolution. Rooted in a deeply anti-democratic political
tradition, it was ideologically predisposed to substitute
party power for soviet power and, finally, to create --
and justify -- the dictatorship *over* the proletariat.
The civil war may have shaped certain aspects of these
authoritarian tendencies but it did not create them.

H.10 Were any of the Bolshevik oppositions a real
     alternative?

The real limitations in Bolshevism can best be seen by the
various oppositions to the mainstream of that party. That
Bolshevik politics were not a suitable instrument for working
class self-liberation can be seen by the limited way which
opposition groups questioned Bolshevik orthodoxy -- even,
in the case of the opposition to the rising Stalinist
bureaucracy. Each opposition was fundamentally in favour
of the Bolshevik monopoly of power, basically seeking reforms
on areas which did not question it (such as economic policy).
This does not mean that the various oppositions did not
have valid points, just that they shared most of the key
assumptions of Bolshevism which undermined the Russian
revolution either by their application or their use to
justify specific (usually highly authoritarian) practice.

We will not cover all the various oppositions with the
Bolshevik party here (Robert V. Daniels' _The Conscience
of the Revolution_ discusses all of them in some detail,
as does Leonard Schapiro's _The Origin of the Communist
Autocracy_). We will concentrate on the "Left Communists" 
of 1918, the "Workers' Opposition" of 1920/1 and the 
Trotsky-led "Left Opposition" of 1923-7. It can be said 
that each opposition is a pale reflection of the one 
before it and each had clear limitations in their politics 
which fatally undermined any liberatory potential they 
had. Indeed, by the time of the "Left Opposition" we are
reduced to simply the more radical sounding faction of
the state and party bureaucracy fighting it out with the
dominant faction. 

To contrast these fake "oppositions" with a genuine opposition,
we will discuss (in section H.10.4) the "Workers' Group" of 
1923 which was expelled from the Communist Party and repressed 
because it stood for (at least until the Bolshevik party 
seized power) traditional socialist values. This repression 
occurred, significantly, under Lenin and Trotsky in 1922/3. 
The limited nature of the previous oppositions and the 
repression of a *genuine* dissident working class group 
within the Communist Party shows how deeply unlibertarian the
real Bolshevik tradition is. In fact, it could be argued that
the fate of all the non-Trotskyist oppositions shows what 
will inevitably happen when someone takes the more democratic
sounding rhetoric of Lenin at face value and compares it to 
his authoritarian practice, namely Lenin will turn round and 
say unambiguously that he had already mentioned his practice 
before hand and the reader simply had not been paying attention. 

H.10.1 Were the "Left Communists" of 1918 an alternative?

The first opposition of note to Lenin's state capitalist
politics was the "Left Communists" in early 1918. This 
was clustered around the Bolshevik leader Bukharin. This
grouping was focused around opposition to the Brest-Litovsk
peace treaty with Germany and Lenin's advocacy of "state
capitalism" and "one-man management" as the means of
both achieving socialism and getting Russia out of its
problems. It is the latter issue that concerns us here.

The first issue of their theoretical journal *Kommunist*
was published in April 1920 and it argued vigorously
against Lenin's advocacy of "one-man management" and
state capitalism for "socialist" Russia. They correctly
argued "for the construction of the proletarian society
by the class creativity of the workers themselves, not
by the Ukases of the captains of industry . . . If the
proletariat itself does not know how to create the 
necessary prerequisites for the socialist organisation
of labour, no one can do this for it and no one can
compel it to do this. The stick, if raised against the
workers, will find itself in the hands of a social
force which is either under the influence of another
social class or is in the hands of the soviet power;
but the soviet power will then be forced to seek
support against the proletariat from another class
(e.g. the peasantry) and by this it will destroy itself
as the dictatorship of the proletariat. Socialism and
socialist organisation will be set up by the proletariat
itself, or they will not be set up at all: something 
else will be set up -- state capitalism." [Osinsky,
quoted by Brinton, _The Bolsheviks and Workers' Control_,
p. 39]

Lenin reacted sharply, heaping insult upon insult on the
Left Communists and arguing against their ideas on workers'
self-management. Rather than see self-management (or
even workers' control) as the key, he argued forcefully
in favour of one-man management and state capitalism as
both the means of solving Russia's immediate problems *and*
building socialism. Moreover, he linked this with his
previous writings, correctly noting his "'high' appreciation
of state" had been given "*before* the Bolsheviks seized
power." For Lenin, "Socialism [was] inconceivable without
large scale capitalist engineering . . . [and] without
planned state organisation, which keeps tens of millions
of people to the strictest observance of a unified standard
in production and distribution." Thus "our task is to
study the state capitalism of the Germans, to spare *no
effort* in copying it and not shrink from adopting 
*dictatorial* methods to hasten the copying of it." 
[_Selected Works_, vol. 2, p. 636 and p. 635] This
required appointing capitalists to management positions,
from which the vanguard could learn. 

So, as long as a workers' party held power, the working 
class need not fear "state capitalism" and the lack of
economic power at the point of production. Of course, 
without economic power, working class political power
would be fatally undermined. In practice, Lenin simply
handed over the workplaces to the state bureaucracy
and created the social relationships which Stalinism 
thrived upon. Unfortunately, Lenin's arguments carried 
the day (see section H.6.10). How this conflict was resolved 
is significant, given that the banning of factions (which 
is generally seen as a key cause in the rise of Stalinism) 
occurred in 1921 (a ban, incidentally, Trotsky defended 
throughout the 1920s). As one historian notes:

"The resolution of the party controversy in the spring of 1918
set a pattern that was to be followed throughout the history of
the Communist Opposition in Russia. This was the settlement of
the issues not by discussion, persuasion, or compromise, but 
by a high-pressure campaign in the party organisations, backed 
by a barrage of violent invective in the party press and in the 
pronouncements of the party leaders. Lenin's polemics set the
tone, and his organisational lieutenants brought the membership
into line." [Daniels, Op. Cit., p. 87]

Indeed, "[s]oon after the party congress had approved the peace
[in the spring of 1918], a Petrograd city party conference produced 
a majority for Lenin. It ordered the suspension of the newspaper 
*Kommunist* which had been serving as a Left Communist organ . . .
The fourth and final issue of the Moscow *Kommunist* had to be
published as a private factional paper rather than as the official
organ of a party organisation." Ultimately, "[u]nder the conditions 
of party life established by Lenin, defence of the Opposition 
position became impossible within the terms of Bolshevik discipline."
[Op. Cit., p. 88 and p. 89] So much for faction rights -- three
years *before* they were officially prohibited in the 10th Party
Congress!

However, the "Left Communists," while correct on socialism
needing workers' economic self-management, were limited in
other ways. The major problems with the "Left Communists" 
were two-fold.

Firstly, by basing themselves on Bolshevik orthodoxy they
allowed Lenin to dominate the debate. This meant that their
more "libertarian" reading of Lenin's work could be nullified
by Lenin himself pointing to the authoritarian and state
capitalist aspects of those very same works. Which is ironic,
as today most Leninists tend to point to these very same
democratic sounding aspects of Lenin's ideas while downplaying
the more blatant anti-socialist ones. Given that Lenin had 
dismissed such approaches himself during the debate against
the Left Communists in 1918, it seems dishonest for his latter
day followers to do this.

Secondly, their perspective on the role of the party undermined
their commitment to true workers' power and freedom. This can
be seen from the comments of Sorin, a leading Left Communist.
He argued that the Left Communists were "the most passionate 
proponents of soviet power, but . . . only so far as this
power does not degenerate . . . in a petty-bourgeois
direction." [quoted by Ronald I. Kowalski, _The Bolshevik 
Party in Conflict_, p. 135] For them, like any Bolshevik, 
the party played the key role. The only true bastion of the 
interests of the proletariat was the party which "is in every 
case and everywhere superior to the soviets . . . The soviets
represent labouring democracy in general; and its interest,
and in particular the interests of the petty bourgeois 
peasantry, do not always coincide with the interests of the
proletariat." [quoted by Richard Sakwa, _Soviet Communists
in Power_, p. 182] This support for party power can also
be seen in Osinsky's comment that "soviet power" and the 
"dictatorship of the proletariat" could "seek support" 
from other social classes, so showing that the class
did not govern directly.

Thus soviet power was limited to approval of the party line
and any deviation from that line would be denounced as "petty
bourgeois" and, therefore, ignored. "Ironically," the historian
Kowalski notes, "Sorin's call for a revived soviet democracy
was becoming vitiated by the dominant role assigned, in the
final analysis, to the party." [Op. Cit., p. 136] Thus their
politics were just as authoritarian as the mainstream 
Bolshevism they attacked on other issues:

"Ultimately, the only criterion that they appeared able to
offer was to define 'proletarian' in terms of adherence to
their own policy prescriptions and 'non-proletarian' by
non-adherence to them. In consequence, all who dared to 
oppose them could be accused either of being non-proletarian,
or at the very least suffering from some form of 'false 
consciousness' -- and in the interests of building socialism
must recant or be purged from the party. Rather ironically,
beneath the surface of their fine rhetoric in defence of
the soviets, and of the party as 'a forum for all of 
proletarian democracy,' there lay a political philosophy
that was arguably as authoritarian as that of which they
accused Lenin and his faction." [Lowalski, Op. Cit., 
pp. 136-7]

This position can be traced back to the fundamentals of
Bolshevism (see section H.5 on vanguardism). "According
to the Left Communists, therefore," notes Richard Sakwa, 
"the party was the custodian of an interest higher than 
that of the soviets. Earlier theoretical considerations
on the vanguard role of the party, developed in response
to this problem, were confirmed by the circumstances of
Bolshevism in power. The political dominance of the party
over the soviets encouraged an administrative one as well. 
Such a development was further encouraged by the emergence
of a massive and unwieldy bureaucratic apparatus in 1918
. . . The Left Communists and the party leadership were
therefore in agreement that . . . the party should play
a tutelary role over the soviets." Furthermore, "[w]ith
such a formulation it proved difficult to maintain the 
vitality of the soviet plenum as the soviet was 
controlled by a party fraction, itself controlled by 
a party committee outside the soviet." [Op. Cit., p. 182 
and p. 182-3] 

With this ideological preference for party power and the 
ideological justification for ignoring soviet democracy, 
it is doubtful that their (correct) commitment to workers'
economic self-management would have been successful. An
economic democracy combined with what amounts to a party
dictatorship would be an impossibility that could never 
work in practice (as Lenin in 1921 argued against the 
"Workers' Opposition").

As such, the fact that Bukharin (one time "Left Communist") 
"continued to eulogise the party's dictatorship, sometimes 
quite unabashedly" during and after the civil war becomes
understandable. In this, he was not being extreme: 
"Bolsheviks no longer bothered to disclaim that the 
dictatorship of the proletariat as the 'dictatorship 
of the party.'" [Stephen F. Cohen, _Bukharin and the 
Bolshevik Revolution_, p. 145 and p. 142] All the leading 
Bolsheviks had argued this position for some time (see 
section H.1.2, for example). Bukharin even went so far as 
to argue that "the watchword" taken up by some workers 
("even metal workers"!) of "For class dictatorship, but 
against party dictatorship!" showed that the proletariat 
"was declassed." This also indicated that a "misunderstanding 
arose which threatened the whole system of the proletarian 
dictatorship." [contained in Al Richardson (ed.), _In 
Defence of the Russian Revolution_, p. 192] The echoes of
the positions argued before the civil war can be seen in
Bukharin's glib comment that proletarian management of the
revolution meant the end of the "proletarian" dictatorship!

Lastly, the arguments of the Left Communists against 
"one-man management" were echoed by the Democratic Centralists 
at the Ninth Party Congress. One member of this grouping (which 
included such "Left Communists" as Osinsky) argued against 
Lenin's dominate position in favour of appointed managers 
inside and outside the party as follows:

"The Central Committee finds that the [local] party committee
is a bourgeois prejudice, is conservatism bordering on the
province of treason, and that the new form is the replacement
of party committees by political departments, the heads of
which by themselves replace the elected committees . . . You 
transform the members of the party into an obedient gramophone, 
with leaders who order: go and agitate; but they haven't the 
right to elect their own committee, their own organs.

"I then put the question to comrade Lenin: Who will appoint the
Central Committee? You see, there can be individual authority 
here as well. Here also a single commander can be appointed."
[Sapronov, quoted by Daniels, Op. Cit., p. 114]

Obviously a man before his time. As Stalin proved, if one-man
management was such a good idea then why wasn't it being 
practised in the Council of People's Commissars. However,
we should not be surprised by this party regime. After all,
Trotsky had imposed a similar regime in the Army in 1918,
as had Lenin in industry in the same year. As discussed in
section H.9.7, the Bolshevik preference for centralised
"democracy" effectively hollowed out the real democracy at
the base which makes democracy more than just picking masters.

H.10.2 What were the limitations of the "Workers' Opposition" of
       1920?
 
The next major opposition group were the "Workers' Opposition"
of 1920 and early 1921. Significantly, the name "Workers' 
Opposition" was the label used by the party leadership to
describe what latter became a proper grouping within the
party. This group was more than happy to use the label
given to it. This group is generally better known
than other oppositions simply because it was the focus for
much debate at the tenth party congress and its existence
was a precipitating factor in the banning of factions within
the Communist Party. 

However, like the "Left Communists," the "Workers' Opposition"
did not extend their economic demands to political issues. 
Unlike the previous opposition, however, their support for
party dictatorship was more than logically implied, it was
taken for granted. Alexandra Kollontai's pamphlet, for example,
expounding the position of the "Workers' Opposition" fails
to mention political democracy at all, instead discussing
exclusively economic and party democracy. Thus it was a
case of the "Workers' Opposition" expressing the "basis
on which, in its opinions, the dictatorship of the 
proletariat must rest in the sphere of industrial
reconstruction." Indeed, the "whole controversy boils
down to one basic question: who shall build the communist
economy, and how shall it be build?" [_Selected Writings 
of Alexandra Kollontai_, p. 161 and p. 173]

Kollontai was right to state that the working class "can
alone by the creator of communism" and to ask the question
of "shall we achieve communist through the workers or
over their heads, by the hands of Soviet officials." As
she argued, "*it is impossible to decree communism.*"
However, her list of demand were purely economic in 
nature and she wondered "[w]hat shall we do then in order
to destroy bureaucracy in the party and replace it by
workers' democracy?" She stressed that the "Workers'
Opposition" struggle was "for establishing democracy
in the party, and for the elimination of all bureaucracy."
[Op. Cit., p. 176, p. 174, p. 187, p. 192 and p. 197] Thus
her demands were about the internal regime of the party,
*not* a call for wider democratic reforms in the state
or society as a whole. 

As one historian notes, the "arguments of Kollontai were
. . . strictly limited in their appeal to the communist
party . . . Nor did they in any form criticise the
domination of the communist minority over the majority
of the proletariat. The fundamental weakness of the case
of the Workers' Opposition was that, while demanding more
freedom of initiative for the workers, it was quite content
to leave untouched the state of affairs in which a few
hundred thousand imposed their will on many millions. 'And
since when have we [the Workers' Opposition] been enemies
of *komitetchina* [manipulation and control by communist
party committees], I should like to know?' Shlyapnikov
asked at the Tenth Party Congress. He went on to explain
that the trade union congress in which, as he and his
followers proposed, all control of industry should be
vested would 'of course' be composed of delegates nominated
and elected 'through the party cells, as we always do.'
But he argued that the local trade union cells would
ensure the election of men qualified by experience and
ability in pace of those who are 'imposed on us at present'
by the centre. Kollontai and her supporters had no wish 
to disturb the communist party's monopoly of political
power." [Leonard Schapiro, _The Origin of the Communist
Autocracy_, p. 294]

Even this extremely limited demand for more economic 
democracy were too much for Lenin. In January, 1921,
Lenin was arguing that the Bolsheviks had to "add to
our platform the following: we must combat the ideological
confusion of those unsound elements of the opposition who
go to the lengths of repudiating all 'militarisation of
economy,' of repudiating not only the 'method of appointing'
which has been the prevailing method up to now, but *all*
appointments. In the last analysis this means repudiating
the leading role of the Party in relation to the non-Party
masses. We must combat the syndicalist deviation which
will kill the Party if it is not completely cured of it."
Indeed, "the syndicate deviation leads to the fall of
the dictatorship of the proletariat." [quoted by Brinton,
Op. Cit., pp. 75-6] Maurice Brinton correctly notes that
by this Lenin meant that "working class power ('the
dictatorship of the proletariat') is impossible if there
are militants in the Party who think the working class
should exert more power in production ('the syndicalist
deviation')." Moreover, "Lenin here poses quite clearly
the question of 'power of the Party' or 'power of the
class.' He unambiguously opts for the former -- no doubt
rationalising his choice by equating the two. But he
goes even further. He not only equates 'workers power'
with the rule of the Party. He equates it with acceptance
of the ideas of the Party leaders!" [Op. Cit., p. 76]

At the tenth party congress, the "Workers' Opposition"
were labelled "petty-bourgeois," "syndicalist" and
even "anarchist" simply because they called for limited
participation by workers in the rebuilding of Russia.
The group was "caused in part by the entry into the ranks 
of the Party of elements which had still not completely
adopted the communist world view." Significantly, those
who *had* the "communist world view" did not really debate
the issues raised and instead called the opposition
"genuinely counter-revolutionary," "objectively 
counter-revolutionary" as well as "too revolutionary."
[quoted by Brinton, Op. Cit., p. 79]

For Lenin, the idea of industrial democracy was a nonsense.
In this he was simply repeating the perspective he had
held from spring 1918. As he put it, it was "a term that
lends itself to misinterpretations. It may be read as a
repudiation of dictatorship and individual authority."
Industry, he argued, "is indispensable, democracy is not"
and "on no account must we renounce dictatorship either."
Indeed, "[i]ndustry is indispensable, democracy is a
category proper only to the political sphere"." He did 
admit "[t]hat [the opposition] has been penetrating 
into the broad masses is evident" however it was the duty
of the party to ignore the masses. The "bidding for or
flirtation with the non-Party masses" was a "radical 
departure from Marxism." "Marxism teaches," Lenin said,
"and this tenet has not only been formally endorsed by the
whole Communist International in the decisions of the
Second (1920) Congress of the Comintern on the role of
the political party of the proletariat, but has also been
confirmed in practice by our revolution -- that only the
political party of the working class, i.e. the Communist
Party, is capable of uniting, training and organising a
vanguard of the proletariat . . . . that alone will be
capable of withstanding the inevitable petty-bourgeois
vacillation of this mass . . . Without this the 
dictatorship of the proletariat is impossible." 
[_Collected Works_, vol. 31, p. 82, p. 27, p. 26, p. 197
and p. 246] In other words, "Marxism" teaches that workers'
democracy and protest (the only means by which "vacillation" 
can be expressed) is a danger to the "dictatorship of
the proletariat"! (see also section H.5.3 on why this
position is the inevitable outcome of vanguardism).

It should be stresses that this opposition and the debate
it provoked occurred after the end of the Civil War in the
west. The Whites under Wrangel had been crushed in November,
1920, and the Russian revolution was no longer in immediate
danger. As such, there was an opportunity for constructive 
activity and mass participation in the rebuilding of Russia.
The leading Bolsheviks rejected such demands, even in the
limited form advocated by the "Workers' Opposition." Lenin
and Trotsky clearly saw *any* working class participation
as a danger to their power. Against the idea of economic
participation under Communist control raised by the "Workers'
Opposition," the leading Bolsheviks favoured the NEP. This
was a return to the same kind of market-based "state 
capitalist" strategy Lenin had advocated against the 
"Left Communists" *before* the outbreak of the civil war 
in May 1918 (and, as noted, he had argued for in 1917).
This suggests a remarkable consistency in Lenin's thoughts,
suggesting that claims his policies he advocated and 
implemented in power were somehow the opposite of what
he "really" wanted are weak.

As with the "Left Communists" of 1918, Lenin saw his 
opposition to the "Workers' Opposition" as reflecting 
the basic ideas of his politics. "If we perish," he 
said privately at the time according to Trotsky, "it 
is all the more important to preserve our ideological 
line and give a lesson to our continuators. This should 
*never* be forgotten, even in *hopeless* circumstances." 
[quoted by Daniels, Op. Cit., p. 147] 

In summary, like the "Left Communists", the "Workers'
Opposition" presented a platform of economic demands
rooted in the assumption of Bolshevik party domination.
It is, therefore, unsurprising that leading members of
the "Workers' Opposition" took part in the attack on
Kronstadt and that they wholeheartedly rejected the
consistent demands for political *and* economic that
the Kronstadt rebels had raised (see section H.7 for
more on the Kronstadt rebellion). Such a policy would 
be too contradictory to be applied. Either the economic 
reforms would remain a dead letter under party control 
or the economic reforms would provoke demands for 
political change. This last possibility may explain 
Lenin's vitriolic attacks on the "Workers' Opposition."

This opposition, like the "Left Communists" of 1918, was
ultimately defeated by organisational pressures within the
party and state. Victor Serge "was horrified to see the
voting rigged for Lenin's and Zinoviev's 'majority'" in
late 1920. [_Memoirs of a Revolutionary_, p. 123] Kollantai
complained that while officially one and a half million
copies of the "Workers' Opposition" manifesto was published,
in fact only 1500 were "and that with difficulty." [quoted
by Schaprio, Op. Cit., p. 291] This applied even more after 
the banning of factions, when the party machine used state 
power to break up the base of the opposition in the trade 
unions as well as its influence in the party. 

"Victimisation of supporters of the Workers' Opposition,"
notes Schapiro, "began immediately after the Tenth Party
Congress. 'The struggle,' as Shlyapnikov later recounted,
'took place not along ideological lines but by means . . .
of edging out from appointments, of systematic transfers
from one district to another, and even expulsion from the
party.' . . . the attack was levelled not for heretical
opinions, but for criticism of any kind of party shortcomings.
'Every member of the party who spoke in defence of the
resolution on workers' democracy [in the party -- see
next section] was declared a supporter of the Workers'
Opposition and guilty of disintegrating the party,' and
was accordingly victimised." [Op. Cit., pp. 325-6] Thus
"the party Secretariat was perfecting its technique of
dealing with recalcitrant individuals by the power of
removal and transfer, directed primarily at the adherents
of the Workers' Opposition. (Of the 37 Workers' Opposition
delegates to the Tenth Congress whom Lenin consulted when
he was persuading Shlyapnikov and Kutuzov to enter the
Central Committee, only four managed to return as voting
delegates to the next congress.)" [Daniels, Op. Cit., 
p. 161]

A similar process was at work in the trade unions. For 
example,"[w]hen the metalworkers' union held its congress 
in May 1921, the Central Committee of the party handed it 
a list of recommended candidates for the union leadership. 
The metalworkers' delegates voted down the party-backed 
list, but this gesture proved futile: the party leadership 
boldly appointed their own men to the union offices." This 
was "a show of political force" as the union was a centre 
of the Workers' Opposition. [Daniels, Op. Cit., p. 157]

This repression was practised under Lenin and Trotsky, using
techniques which were later used by the Stalinists against
Trotsky and his followers. Lenin himself was not above
removing his opponents from the central committee by 
undemocratic methods. At the Tenth Party Congress he had
persuaded Shlyapnikov to be elected to the Central Committee
in an attempt to undermine the opposition. A mere "five months
later, Lenin was demanding his expulsion for a few sharp 
words of criticism of the bureaucracy, uttered at a private
meeting of a local party cell. If he was looking for a 
pretext, he could scarcely have picked a weaker one." 
[Schapiro, Op. Cit., p. 327] Lenin failed by only one 
vote short of the necessary two thirds majority of the
Committee.
 
In summary, the "Workers' Opposition" vision was limited.
Politically, it merely wanted democracy within the party.
It did not question the party's monopoly of power. As
such, it definitely did not deserve the labels "anarchist" 
and "syndicalist" which their opponents called them. As
far as its economic policy goes, it, too, was limited.
Its demands for economic democracy were circumscribed
by placing it under the control of the communist cells
within the trade unions. 

However, Kollontai was right to state that only the working 
class "can alone by the creator of communism," that it was 
impossible to "achieve communist . . . over [the workers'] 
heads, by the hands of Soviet officials" and that "*it is 
impossible to decree communism.*" As Kropotkin put it
decades before:

"Communist organisation cannot be left to be constructed by 
legislative bodies called parliaments, municipal or communal 
council. It must be the work of all, a natural growth, a 
product of the constructive genius of the great mass. 
Communism cannot be imposed from above." [_Kropotkin's 
Revolutionary Pamphlets_, p. 140]

H.10.3 What about Trotsky's "Left Opposition" in the 1920s?

Finally, there is Trotsky's opposition between 1923 and
1927. Since 1918 Trotsky had been wholeheartedly in 
favour of the party dictatorship and its economic regime.
This position started to change once his own power came
under threat and he suddenly became aware of the necessity
for reform. Unsurprisingly, his opposition was the last
and by far the weakest politically. As Cornelius
Castoriadis points out:

"From the beginning of 1918 until the banning of factions 
in March 1921, tendencies within the Bolshevik party were 
formed that, with farsightedness and sometimes an 
astonishing clarity, expressed opposition to the Party's 
bureaucratic line and to its very rapid bureaucratisation. 
These were the 'Left Communists' (at the beginning of 1918), 
then the 'Democratic Centralist' tendency (1919), and finally 
the 'Workers' Opposition' (1920-21). . . these oppositions
were defeated one by one . . . The very feeble echoes of their 
critique of the bureaucracy that can be found later in the 
(Trotskyist) 'Left Opposition' after 1923 do not have the 
same signification. Trotsky was opposed to the *bad policies* 
of the bureaucracy and to the excesses of its power. He never 
put into question its essential nature. Until practically the 
end of his life, he never brought up the questions raised by 
the various oppositions of the period from 1918 to 1921 (in 
essence: 'Who manages production?' and 'What is the proletariat 
supposed to do during the 'dictatorship of the proletariat,' 
other than work and follow the orders of 'its' party?')."
[_Political and Social Writings_, vol. 3, p. 98]

While the "Left Communists" and "Workers' Opposition" had
challenged Lenin's state capitalist economic regime while 
upholding the Bolshevik monopoly of power (implicitly 
or explicitly), Trotsky did not even manage that. His 
opposition was firmly limited to internal reforms
to the party which he hoped would result in wider 
participation in the soviets and trade unions (he did
not bother to explain why continuing party dictatorship
would reinvigorate the soviets or unions).

Politically, Trotsky was unashamedly in favour of 
party dictatorship. Indeed, his basic opposition to
Stalinism was because he considered it as the end of
that dictatorship by the rule of the bureaucracy. 
He held this position consistently during the civil
war and into the 1920s (and beyond -- see section
H.3.8). For example, in April 1923, he asserted
quite clearly that "[i]f there is one question which 
basically not only does not require revision but does 
not so much as admit the thought of revision, it is 
the question of the dictatorship of the Party." 
[_Leon Trotsky Speaks_, p. 158] And was true to his
word. In "The New Course" (generally accepted as being
the first public expression of his opposition), he
stated that "[w]e are the only party in the country,
and in the period of the dictatorship it could not
be otherwise." Moreover, it was "incontestable that
factions [within the party] are a scourge in the 
present situation" and so the party "does not want
factions and will not tolerate them." [_The Challenge 
of the Left Opposition (1923-25)_, p. 78, p. 80 and
p. 86] In May 1924, he even went so far as to proclaim
that:

"Comrades, none of us wishes or is able to be right 
against his party. The party in the last analysis is 
always right, because the party is the sole historical 
instrument given to the proletariat for the solution of 
its basic problems . . . I know that one cannot be right 
against the party. It is only possible to be right with 
the party and through the party, for history has not 
created other ways for the realisation of what is right." 
[quoted by Daniels, _The Conscience of the Revolution_, 
p. 240] 

However, confusion creeps into the politics of the
Left Opposition simply because they used the term
"workers' democracy" a lot. However, a close reading 
of Trotsky's argument soon clarifies this issue.
Trotsky, following the Communist Party itself, had
simply redefined what "workers' democracy" meant. 
Rather than mean what you would expect it would mean,
the Bolsheviks had changed its meaning to become
"party democracy." Thus Trotsky could talk about
"party dictatorship" and "workers' democracy" without
contradiction. As his support Max Eastman noted in
the mid-1920s, Trotsky supported the "programme of
democracy within the party -- called 'Workers'
Democracy' by Lenin." This "was not something new 
or especially devised . . . It was part of the
essential policy of Lenin for going forward toward
the creation of a Communist society -- a principle
adopted under his leadership at the Tenth Congress of
the party, immediately after the cessation of the
civil war." [_Since Lenin Died_, p. 35] In the words
of historian Robert V. Daniels:

"The Opposition's political ideal was summed up in the slogan
'workers' democracy,' which referred particularly to two 
documents [from 1920 and 1923] . . . Both these statements
concerned the need to combat 'bureaucratism' and implement
party democracy." [Op. Cit., p. 300]

That this was the case can be seen from the Fourth 
All-Russian Congress of Trade Unions in 1921: 

"At the meeting of delegates who were party members, 
Tomsky submitted for routine approval a set of these 
on the tasks of trade unions. The approval was a matter 
of form, but an omission was noted, The theses made
no reference to the formula of 'proletarian democracy' 
with which the Tenth Congress had tried to assuage the 
rank and file. Riazanov . . . offered an amendment to 
fill the breach, in language almost identical with the 
Tenth Congress resolution: 'The party must observe with 
special care the normal methods of proletarian democracy, 
particularly in the trade unions, where most of all the 
selection of leaders should be done by the organised party
masses themselves.' . . . The party leadership reacted 
instantaneously to this miscarriage of their plans for 
curtailing the idea of union autonomy. Tomksy was 
summarily ejected from the trade union congress. Lenin 
put in appearance together with Bukharin and Stalin 
to rectify the unionists' action." [Daniels, Op. Cit.,
p. 157]

The "New Course Resolution" passed in December, 1923,
stresses this, stating that "Workers' democracy means
the liberty of frank discussion of the most important
questions of party life by all members, and the election
of all leading party functionaries and commissions . . .
It does not . . . imply the freedom to form factional
groupings, which are extremely dangerous for the ruling
party." [Trotsky, Op. Cit., p. 408] It made it clear 
that "workers' democracy" was no such thing:

"Worker's democracy signifies freedom of open discussion by all
members of the party of the most important questions of party 
life, freedom of controversy about them, and also electiveness
of the leading official individuals and collegia from below
upwards. However, it does not at all suggest freedom of 
factional groupings . . . It is self-evident that within the
party . . . it is impossible to tolerate groupings, the 
ideological contents of which are directed against the party
as a whole and against the dictatorship of the proletariat
(such as, for example, the 'Workers' Truth' and the 'Workers'
Group')." [quoted by Robert V. Daniels, Op. Cit., p. 222]

As "Left Oppositionist" Victor Serge himself pointed out in
the late 1930s, "the greatest reach of boldness of the Left 
Opposition in the Bolshevik Party was to demand the restoration 
of inner-Party democracy, and it never dared dispute the 
theory of single-party government -- by this time, it
was too late." Trotsky had "ever since 1923 [been] for the 
renovation of the party through inner party democracy and 
the struggle against bureaucracy." [_The Serge-Trotsky 
Papers_, p. 181 and p. 201] 

Thus Trotsky's opposition was hardly democratic. In 1926, 
for example, he took aim at Stalin's dismissal of the 
idea of "the dictatorship of the party" as "nonsense" 
the previous year. If he were the heroic defender of 
genuine workers democracy modern day Trotskyists assert, 
he would have agreed with Stalin while exposing his 
hypocrisy. Instead he defended the concept of "the 
dictatorship of the party" and linked it to Lenin (and
so Leninist orthodoxy):

"Of course, the foundation of our regime is the dictatorship
of a class. But this in turn . . . assumes it is class that has
come to self-consciousness through its vanguard, which is to
say, through the party. Without this, the dictatorship could
not exist . . . Dictatorship is the most highly concentrated 
function of function of a class, and therefore the basic
instrument of a dictatorship is a party. In the most fundamental
aspects a class realises its dictatorship through a party. That
is why Lenin spoke not only of the dictatorship of the class
but also the dictatorship of the party and, *in a certain sense*,
made them identical." [Trotsky, _The Challenge of the Left
Opposition (1926-27)_, pp. 75-6]

Trotsky argued that Stalin's repudiation of the "dictatorship of 
the party" was, in fact, a ploy to substitute the dictatorship of
the party "apparatus" for the dictatorship of the party (a theme
which would be raised in the following years _Platform of the
Opposition_). Such a substitution, he argued, had its roots in a 
"disproportion" between workers' democracy and peasants' democracy 
(or "the private sector of the economy" in general). As long as 
there was a "proper 'proportion'" between the two and "the advance 
of democratic methods in the party and working class organisations,"
then "the identification of the dictatorship of the class with 
that of the party is fully and completely justified historically
and politically." Needless to say, Trotsky did not bother to
ask how much democracy (of *any* kind) was possible under a party
dictatorship nor how a class could run society or have "democratic"
organisations if subjected to such a dictatorship. For him it was 
a truism that the "dictatorship of a party does not contradict 
the dictatorship of the class either theoretically or practically, 
but is an expression of it." [Op. Cit., p. 76] Needless to say, 
the obvious conclusion to draw from Trotsky's argument is that 
if a revolution occurred in a country without a peasantry then 
the "dictatorship of the party" would be of no real concern! 

This was no temporary (7 year!) aberration. As indicated 
in section H.3.8, Trotsky repeated this support for party 
dictatorship ten years later (and after). Furthermore,
Trotsky's defence of party dictatorship against Stalin was 
included in the 1927 _Platform of the Opposition_. This 
included the same contradictory demands for workers' 
democracy and the revitalising of the soviets and trade 
unions with deeply rooted ideological support for party 
dictatorship. This document made his opposition clear, 
attacking Stalin for *weakening* the party's dictatorship. 
In its words, the "growing replacement of the party by its 
own apparatus is promoted by a 'theory' of Stalin's which 
denies the Leninist principle, inviolable for every Bolshevik, 
that the dictatorship of the proletariat is and can be 
realised only through the dictatorship of the party." It 
repeats this principle by arguing that "the dictatorship of 
the proletariat demands a single and united proletarian 
party as the leader of the working masses and the poor 
peasantry." As such, "[w]e will fight with all our power 
against the idea of two parties, because the dictatorship of 
the proletariat demands as its very core a single 
proletarian party. It demands a single party." [_The
Platform of the Opposition_] Even in the prison camps
in the late 1920s and early 1930s, "almost all the
Trotskyists continued to consider that 'freedom of
party' would be 'the end of the revolution.' 'Freedom
to choose one's party -- that is Menshevism,' was the
Trotskyists' final verdict." [Ante Ciliga, _The Russian
Enigma_, p. 280]

Once we understand that "workers' democracy" had a 
very specific meaning to the Communist Party, we can
start to understand such apparently contradictory
demands as the "consistent development of a workers' 
democracy in the party, the trade unions, and the 
soviets." Simply put, this call for "workers' democracy"
was purely within the respective party cells and *not*
a call for *genuine* democracy in the unions or
soviets. Such a position in no way undermines the
dictatorship of the party.

Economically, Trotsky's opposition was far more backward
than previous oppositions. For Trotsky, economic democracy
was not an issue. It played no role in determining the
socialist nature of a society. Rather state ownership did.
Thus he did not question one-man management in the workplace
nor the capitalist social relationships it generated. For
Trotsky, it was "necessary for each state-owned factory,
with its technical director and with its commercial director,
to be subjected not only to control from the top -- by the
state organs -- but also from below, by the market which
will remain the regulator of the state economy for a long
time to come." In spite of the obvious fact that the workers
did not control their labour or its product, Trotsky asserted
that "[n]o class exploitation exists here, and consequently
neither does capitalism exist." Moreover, "socialist industry
. . . utilises methods of development which were invented by
capitalist economy." Ultimately, it was not self-management
that mattered, it was "the growth of Soviet state industry
[which] signifies the growth of socialism itself, a direct
strengthening of the power of the proletariat"! [_The First 
5 Years of the Communist International_, vol. 2, p. 237
and p. 245]

Writing in 1923, he argued that the "system of actual one-man
management must be applied in the organisation of industry
from top to bottom. For leading economic organs of industry
to really direct industry and to bear responsibility for its
fate, it is essential for them to have authority over the
selection of functionaries and their transfer and removal."
These economic organs must "in actual practice have full
freedom of selection and appointment." He also tied payment 
to performance (just as he did during the civil war), arguing
that "the payment of the directors of enterprises must be 
made to depend on their balance sheets, like wages depend 
on output." [quoted by Robert V. Daniels, _A Documentary 
History of Communism_, vol. 1, p. 237]

Moreover, Trotsky's key idea during the 1920s was to
industrialise Russia. As the 1927 Platform argued, it
was a case that the "present tempo of industrialisation
and the tempo indicated for the coming years are obviously
inadequate" and so the "necessary acceleration of 
industrialisation" was required. In fact, the "Soviet
Union must nor fall further behind the capitalist
countries, but in the near future must overtake them."
Thus industrialisation "must be sufficient to guarantee
the defence of the country and in particular an adequate
growth of war industries." [_The Platform of the 
Opposition_]

In summary, Trotsky's "opposition" in no way presented any
real alternative to Stalinism. Indeed, Stalinism simply 
took over and applied Trotsky's demands for increased
industrialisation. At no time did Trotsky question the
fundamental social relationships within Soviet society.
He simply wished the ruling elite to apply different
policies while allowing him and his followers more space
and freedom within the party structures. Essentially,
as the 1927 Platform noted, he saw Stalinism as the
victory of the state bureaucracy over the party and
its dictatorship. Writing ten years after the Platform, 
Trotsky reiterated this: "The bureaucracy won the upper 
hand. It cowed the revolutionary vanguard, trampled 
upon Marxism, prostituted the Bolshevik party . . .  
To the extent that the political centre of gravity has 
shifted form the proletarian vanguard to the bureaucracy, 
the party has changed its social structure as well as 
its ideology." [_Stalinism and Bolshevism_] He simply
wanted to shift the "political centre of gravity" back
towards the party, as it had been in the early 1920s
when he and Lenin were in power. He in no significant
way questioned the nature of the regime or the social
relationships it was rooted in.

This explains his continual self-imposed role after his 
exile of loyal opposition to Stalinism in spite of the violence
applied to him and his followers by the Stalinists. It 
also explains the lack of excitement by the working class 
over the "Left Opposition." There was really not that much 
to choose between the two factions within the ruling 
party/elite. As Serge acknowledged: "Outraged by the
Opposition, they [the bureaucrats] saw it as treason 
against them; which in a sense it was, since the 
Opposition itself belonged to the ruling bureaucracy."
[_Memoirs of a Revolutionary_, p. 225]

This may come as a shock to many readers. This is because
Trotskyists are notorious for their rewriting of the 
policies of Trotsky's opposition to the rise of what
became known as Stalinism. This revisionism can take
extreme forms. For example, Chris Harman (of the UK's 
SWP) in his summary of the rise Stalinism asserted
that after "Lenin's illness and subsequent death" the 
"principles of October were abandoned one by one." 
[_Bureaucracy and Revolution in Eastern Europe_, p. 14] 
Presumably, in that case, the "principles of October" 
included the practice of, and ideological commitment 
to, party dictatorship, one-man management, banning 
opposition groups/parties (as well as factions within 
the Communist Party), censorship, state repression of
working class strikes and protests, piece-work, 
Taylorism, the end of independent trade unions and
a host of other crimes against socialism implemented
under Lenin and normal practice at the time of his
death.

Harman is correct to say that "there was always an 
alternative to Stalinism. It meant, in the late 1920s,
returning to genuine workers' democracy and consciously
linking the fate of Russia to the fate of world revolution."
Yet this alternative was not Trotsky's. Harman even goes 
so far as to assert that the "historical merit of the Left 
Opposition" was that it "did link the question of the 
expansion of industry with that of working-class democracy
and internationalism." [Op. Cit., p. 19] 

However, in reality, this was *not* the case. Trotsky, nor 
the Left Opposition, supported "genuine" working-class 
democracy, unless by "genuine" Harman means "party 
dictatorship presiding over." This is clear from Trotsky's 
writings for the period in question. The Left Opposition did 
*not* question the Bolshevik's monopoly of power and explicitly 
supported the idea of party dictatorship. This fact helps 
explains what Harman seems puzzled by, namely that Trotsky 
"continued to his death to harbour the illusion that somehow, 
despite the lack of workers' democracy, Russia was a 'workers' 
state.'" [Op. Cit., p. 20] Strangely, Harman does not explain 
why Russia was a "workers' state" under Lenin and Trotsky, 
given its "lack of workers' democracy." But illusions are 
hard to dispel, sometimes.

So, for Trotsky, like all leading members of the Communist 
Party and its "Left Opposition", "workers' democracy" 
was *not* considered important and, in fact, was (at best) 
applicable only within the party. Thus the capitulation 
of many of the Left Opposition to Stalin once he started 
a policy of forced industrialisation comes as less of a 
surprise than Harman seems to think it was. As Ante Ciliga 
saw first hand in the prison camps, "the majority of the 
Opposition were . . . looking for a road to reconciliation; 
whilst criticising the Five Year Plan, they put stress not 
on the part of exploited class played by the proletariat, 
but on the technical errors made by the Government *qua* 
employer in the matter of insufficient harmony within the 
system and inferior quality of production. This criticism 
did not lead to an appeal to the workers against the 
Central Committee and against bureaucratic authority; it
restricted itself to proposing amendments in a programme of 
which the essentials were approved. The socialist nature of
State industry was taken for granted. They denied the fact 
that the proletariat was exploited; for 'we were in a 
period of proletarian dictatorship.'" [_The Russian Enigma_, 
p. 213]

As Victor Serge noted, "[f]rom 1928-9 onwards, the 
Politbureau turned to its own use the great fundamental
ideas of the now expelled Opposition (excepting, of
course, that of working-class democracy) and implemented
them with ruthless violence." While acknowledging that
the Stalinists had applied these ideas in a more extreme
form than the Opposition planned, he also acknowledged
that "[b]eginning in those years, a good many Oppositionists
rallied to the 'general line' and renounced their errors
since, as they put it, 'After all, it is our programme
that is being applied.'" Nor did it help that at "the
end of 1928, Trotsky wrote to [the Opposition] from his
exile . . . to the effect that, since the Right represented
the danger of a slide towards capitalism, we had to 
support the 'Centre' -- Stalin -- against it." [Op. Cit., 
p. 252 and p. 253]

However, Serge's comments on "working-class democracy" 
are somewhat incredulous, given that he knew fine well 
that the Opposition did not stand for it. His summary 
of the 1927 Platform was restricted to it aiming "to 
restore life to the Soviets . . . and above all to 
revitalise the Party and the trade unions. . . In 
conclusion, the Opposition openly demanded a Congress 
for the reform of the Party, and the implementation 
of the excellent resolutions on internal democracy that 
had been adopted in 1921 and 1923." [Op. Cit., pp. 224-5] 
Which is essentially correct: the Platform was based on 
redefining "workers' democracy" to mean "party democracy" 
within the context of its dictatorship.

We can hardly blame Harman, as it was Trotsky himself who 
started the process of revising history to exclude his own 
role in creating the evils he (sometimes) denounced his 
opponents within the party for. For example, the 1927 
Platform states that "[n]ever before have the trade unions 
and the working mass stood so far from the management of 
socialist industry as now" and that "[p]re-revolutionary 
relations between foremen and workmen are frequently found."
Which is hardly surprising, given that Lenin had argued for, 
and implemented, appointed one-man management armed with 
"dictatorial powers" from April 1918 and that Trotsky himself
also supported one-man management (see section H.6.10).

Even more ironically, Harman argues that the Stalinist 
bureaucracy became a ruling class in 1928 when it implemented
the first five year plan. This industrialisation was provoked
by military competition with the west, which forced the
"drive to accumulate" which caused the bureaucracy to attack
"the living standards of peasants and workers." He quotes
Stalin: "to slacken the pace (of industrialisation) would
mean to lag behind; and those who lag behind are beaten . . .
We must make good this lag in ten years. Either we do so or
they crush us." Moreover, the "environment in which we are
placed . . . at home and abroad . . . compels us to adopt a
rapid rate of industrialisation." [Harman, Op. Cit., pp. 15-6]
Given that this was exactly the same argument as Trotsky in
1927, it seems far from clear that the "Left Opposition"
presented any sort of alternative to Stalinism. After 
all, the "Left Opposition took the stand that large-scale 
new investment was imperative, especially in heavy industry,
and that comprehensive planning and new sources of capital
accumulation should be employed immediately to effect a
high rate of industrial expansion . . . They also stressed
the necessity of rapidly overtaking the capitalist powers
in economic strength, both as a guarantee of military 
security and as a demonstration of the superiority of the
socialist system." [Robert V. Daniels, _The Conscience of
the Revolution_, p. 290]

Would the Left Opposition's idea of "primitive socialist 
accumulation" been obtained by any means other than 
politically enforced exploitation and the repression of
working class and peasant protest? Of course not. Faced with
the same objective pressures and goals, would it have been
any different if that faction had become dominant in the
party dictatorship? It is doubtful, unless you argue that 
who is in charge rather than social relationships that
determine the "socialist" nature of a regime. But, then
again, that is precisely what Trotskyists like Harman do
do when they look at Lenin's Russia.

As for Harman's assertion that the Left Opposition stood for
"internationalism," that is less straight forward than he would
like. As noted, it favoured the industrialisation of Russia
to defend the regime against its foreign competitors. As such,
the Left Opposition were as committed to building "socialism"
in the USSR as were the Stalinist promoters of "socialism in
one country." The difference was that the Left Opposition 
also argued for spreading revolution externally as well. For
them, this was the *only* means of assuring the lasting victory 
of "socialism" (i.e. statised industry) in Russia. So, for the
Left Opposition, building Russia's industrial base was part 
and parcel of supporting revolution internationally rather,
as in the case of the Stalinists, an alternative to it.

The contradictions in Trotsky's position may best be seen 
from the relations between Lenin's Russia and the German
military. Negotiations between the two states started as
early as 1920 with an important aide of Trotsky's. The 
fruit of the German military's negotiations were "secret
military understandings." By September 1922 German officers
and pilots were training in Russia. An organisation of
German military and industrial enterprises in Russia
was established and under it's auspices shells, tanks 
and aircraft were manufactured in Russia for the German 
army (an attempt to produce poison gas failed). [E.H. 
Carr, _The Bolshevik Revolution_, vol. 3, p. 327 and 
pp. 431-2] In April, 1923, the German High Command ordered 
35 million gold marks worth of war material. [Aberdeen 
Solidarity, _Spartakism to National Bolshevism_, p. 24]

These relations had their impact on the politics of
the German Communist Party who enforced its so-called
"Schlageter Line" of co-operation with nationalist and
fascist groups. This policy was first promoted in the
Comintern by leading Communist Radek and inspired by
Zinoviev. According to Radek, "national Bolshevism" was
required as the "strong emphasis on the nation in 
Germany is a revolutionary act." [quoted in E.H. Carr,
_The Interregnum 1923-1924_, p. 177] During the summer 
of 1923, joint meetings with them were held and both 
communist and fascist speakers urged an alliance with 
Soviet Russia against the Entente powers. So, for 
several months, the German Communists worked with the 
Nazis, going so as far as to stage rallies and share 
podiums together. The Communist leader Ruth Fischer even
argued that "he who denounces Jewish capital . . . is 
already a warrior in the class war, even though he does 
not know it" (she latter said her remarks had been 
distorted). [quoted in E.H. Carr, Op. Cit., p. 182f] 
This continued until "the Nazis leadership placed a 
ban on further co-operation." [E.H. Carr, Op. Cit., 
p. 183] Thus the activities of the German communists 
were tailored to fit into the needs of Lenin's regime 
and Trotsky played a key role in the negotiations which 
started the process. 

How "internationalist" was it to arm and train the very 
forces which had crushed the German revolutionary workers 
between 1919 and 1921? How sensible was it, when pressing 
for world revolution, to enhance the power of the army 
which would be used to attack any revolution in Germany? 
Which, of course, was what happened in 1923, when the 
army repressed the Comintern inspired revolt in November 
that year. Trotsky was one of the staunchest in favour of
this insurrection, insisting that it be fixed for the 7th
of that month, the anniversary of the Bolshevik seizure of
power. [E.H. Carr, Op. Cit., p. 205] The attempted revolt 
was a dismal failure. Rather than a revolution in Berlin 
on the 7th of November, there was a diner at the Russian 
embassy for German officers, industrialists and officials 
to celebrate the anniversary of the Russian revolution. 
[Carr, Op. Cit., p. 226] The big question is how many
Communists and workers killed in the revolt had been at
the receiving end of weapons and training supplied to the
German army by Trotsky's Red Army? 

Moreover, the *nature* of any such revolution is what counts.
The Left Opposition would have encourage revolutions which
followed (to re-quote the _Platform of the Opposition_) the 
"Leninist principle" ("inviolable for every Bolshevik") that 
"the dictatorship of the proletariat is and can be realised 
only through the dictatorship of the party." It would have
opposed workers' self-management in favour of nationalisation
and one-man management. In other words, the influence of the
Left Opposition would have been as detrimental to the global
workers' movement and other revolutions as Stalin's was (or,
for that matter, Lenin's) although, of course, in a different
way. Generalising Lenin's state capitalism would not have
resulted in socialism, no matter how many revolutions in the
west the Left Opposition encouraged.

Finally, the fate of the "Left Opposition" should be noted.
As befell the previous oppositions, the party machine was
used against it. Ironically, the Stalinists began by using
the very techniques the Trotskyists had used against their
opponents years before. For example, the Eighth Party 
Congress in December 1919 agreed that "[a]ll decisions of 
the higher jurisdiction are absolutely binding for the lower." 
Moreover, "[e]ach decision must above all be fulfilled, and
only after this is an appeal to the corresponding party organ
permissible."  Centralism was reaffirmed: "The whole matter of
assignment of party workers is in the hands of the Central
Committee of the party. Its decision is binding for everyone..."
These decisions were used as a weapon against the opposition: 
"Translating this principle into practice, the Secretariat under
Krestinsky [a Trotsky supporter] began deliberately to transfer
party officials for political reasons, to end personal conflicts
and curb opposition." In 1923, the Secretariat "brought into 
play its power of transfer, which had already proven to be an 
effective political weapon against the Ukrainian Leftists and 
the Workers' Opposition." [Daniels, Op. Cit., p. 113 and p. 229]

The party itself had been reorganised, with "the replacement of 
local party committees, which were at least democratic in 
form, by bureaucratically constituted 'political departments.' 
With the institution of such bodies, all political activity 
. . . was placed under rigid control from above. This innovation 
was taken from the army; as its origin suggests, it was strictly 
a military, authoritarian institution, designed for transmitting 
propaganda downward rather than opinion upward." [Op. Cit., 
p. 114] Needless to say, it was Trotsky himself who implemented
that regime in the army to begin with.

It should also be remembered that when, in early in 1922, 
the "Workers' Opposition" had appealed to the Communist 
abroad in the form of a statement to a Comintern Congress, 
Trotsky defended the party against its claims. These 
claims, ironically, included the accusation that the 
"party and trade-union bureaucracy . . . ignore the 
decisions of our congresses on putting workers' 
democracy [inside the party] into practice." Their 
"effort to draw the proletarian masses closer to the 
state is declared to be 'anarcho-syndicalism,' and its 
adherents are subjected to persecution and discredit." 
They argued that the "tutelage and pressure by the 
bureaucracy goes so far that it is prescribed for members 
of the party, under threat of exclusion and other 
repressive measures, to elect not those whom the 
Communists want themselves, but those whom the ignorant 
high places want." [quoted by Daniels, Op. Cit., p. 162] 

Even more ironically, the dominant faction of the bureaucracy 
heaped upon Trotsky's opposition faction similar insults to 
those he (and Lenin) had heaped upon previous oppositions 
inside and outside the party. In 1924, the Trotskyist
opposition was accused of having "clearly violated the
decision of the Tenth Congress . . . which prohibited the
formation of factions within the party" and has "enlivened
the hopes of all enemies of the party, including the
West-European bourgeoisie, for a split in the ranks of
the Russian Communist Party." In fact, it was a "direct
departure of Leninism" and "also a clearly expressed
*petty-bourgeois deviation*" reflecting "the pressure
of the petty bourgeois on the position of the proletarian
party and its policy." [contained in Daniels, _A 
Documentary History of Communism_, vol. 1, pp. 247-8]
In 1927 the "United Opposition" was "[o]bjectively
. . . a tool of the bourgeois elements." [quoted by
Daniels, _The Conscience of the Revolution_, p. 318]

One of the ways which supporters of Leninism seek to 
differentiate it from Stalinism is on the issue of 
repression within the Communist Party itself. However, 
the suppression of opposition currents within Bolshevism 
did not start under Stalinism, it had existed to some 
degree from the start. Ironically, Trotsky's belated 
opposition faced exactly the same measures he had approved 
for use against groups like the "Workers' Opposition" within 
a party regime he himself had helped create.

Of course, the Stalinists did not stop there. Once the "Left
Opposition" was broken its members were brutally repressed. 
Some were simply murdered, many more arrested and placed 
into prison camps where many died. Which shows, in its own
way, a key difference between Lenin's and Stalin's regime.
Under Lenin, the opposition *outside* the party was brutally
repressed. Stalin simply applied the methods used by Lenin
outside the party to oppositions within it.

H.10.4 What do these oppositions tell us about the essence of 
       Leninism?

The history and ideas of these oppositions are important in 
evaluating the claims of pro-Bolsheviks. If, as modern-day 
supporters of Bolshevism argue, Leninism is inherently 
democratic and that before the revolution it stood for 
basic civil liberties for the working class then we have 
to come to the conclusion that none of the party oppositions
represented the "true" Leninist tradition. Given that
many Trotskyists support the "Left Opposition" as the
only "real" opposition to Stalin, defending the true
essence of Bolshevism, we can only wonder what the "real" 
Bolshevik tradition is. After all, the "Left Opposition" 
wholeheartedly supported party dictatorship, remained 
silent on workers' control and urged the speeding up of 
industrialisation to meet competition from the west.

However, there are groups which did raise more substantial
critiques of mainstream Bolshevism. They raised their ideas
between 1921 and 1923. How Lenin and Trotsky responded to
them is significant. Rather than embrace them as expressing
what the (according to Leninists) *really* stood for, they
used state repression to break them and they were kicked 
out of the Communist Party. All with the approval of Lenin 
and Trotsky.

The only groups associated with the Bolshevik party which 
advocated democracy and freedom for working people were 
the dissidents of the "Workers' Truth" and "Workers' Group." 
Material on both is hard to come by. The "Workers' Truth" 
group was labelled "Menshevik" by the ruling party while 
the "Workers' Group" was dismissed as "anarcho-syndicalist." 
Both were expelled from the party and their members arrested 
by the Bolsheviks. The latter group is better known than the 
former and so, by necessity, we will concentrate on that. 
It was also the largest, boldest and composed mainly of
workers. We find them labelled the NEP the "New Exploitation
of the Proletariat" and attacking, like the "Workers' Opposition",
the "purely bureaucratic way" industry was run and urging 
"the direct participation of the working class" in it. However,
unlike the "Workers' Opposition", the "Workers' Group" extended
their call for workers' democracy to beyond the workplace and
party. They wondered if the proletariat might not be "compelled
once again to start anew the struggle . . . for the overthrow
of the oligarchy." They noted that ruling clique in the party
"will tolerate no criticism, since it considers itself just as
infallible as the Pope of Rome." [quoted by E.H. Carr, _The 
Interregnum 1923-1924_, p. 82, p. 269]

The "Workers' Group" is associated with the old worker Bolshevik 
G. T. Miasnikov, its founder and leading thinker (see Paul Avrich's
essay _Bolshevik Opposition to Lenin: G. T. Miasnikov and the 
Workers' Group_ for more details -- any non-attributed quotes
can be found in this essay). As Ante Ciliga recounted in his
experiences of political debate in the prison camps in the late
1920s and early 1930s (ironically, there had always been more 
freedom of expression in prison than in Bolshevik society):

"In the criticism of the Lenin of the revolutionary period the
tone was set by . . . the Workers Group . . . [It was], in 
origin, from the Bolshevik old guard. But . . . they criticised
Lenin's course of action from the beginning, and not on details
but as a whole. The Workers Opposition denounced Lenin's
economic line. The Workers Group went even farther and attacked
the political regime and the single party established by Lenin
prior to the NEP . . . 

"Having put as the basis of its programme Marx's watchword for
the 1st International -- 'The emancipation of the workers must
be the task of the workers themselves' -- the Workers Group
declared war from the start on the Leninist concept of the
'dictatorship of the party' and the bureaucratic organisation
of production, enunciated by Lenin in the initial period of
the revolution's decline. Against the Leninist line, they
demanded organisation of production by the masses themselves,
beginning with factory collectives. Politically, the Workers
Group demanded the control of power and of the party by the
worker masses. These, the true political leaders of the country,
must have the right to withdraw power from any political party,
even from the Communist Party, if they judged that that party
was not defending their interests. Contrary to . . . the
majority of the Workers' Opposition, for whom the demand for
'workers' democracy' was practically limited to the economic
domain, and who tried to reconcile it with the 'single party,'
the Workers Group extended its struggle for workers' democracy
to the demand for the workers to choose among competing
political parties of the worker milieu. Socialism could 
only be the work of free creation by the workers. While that
which was being constructed by coercion, and given the name
of socialism, was for them nothing but bureaucratic State
capitalism from the very beginning." [Op. Cit., pp. 277-8]

Years before, Miasnikov had exposed the abuses he has seen
first hand under Lenin's regimed. In 1921, he stated the
obvious that "[i]t stands to reason that workers' democracy 
presupposes not only the right to vote but also freedom of 
speech and press. If workers who govern the country, manage
factories, do not have freedom of speech, we get a highly
abnormal state." He urged total freedom of speech for all.
He discussed corruption within the party, noting that a
"special type of Communist is evolving. He is forward,
sensible, and, what counts most, he knows how to please
his superiors, which the latter like only too much." 
Furthermore, "[i]f one of the party rank and file dares
to have an opinion of his own, he is looked upon as a
heretic and people scoff at him saying, 'Wouldn't Ilyitch
(Lenin) have come to this idea if it were timely now?
So you are the only clever man around, eh, you want to
be wiser than all? Ha, ha, ha! You want to be clever
than Ilyitch!' This is the typical 'argumentation' of
the honourable Communist fraternity." "Any one who
ventures a critical opinion of his own," he noted, "will
be labelled a Menshevik of Social-Revolutionist, with
all the consequences that entails." [quoted by G. P. 
Maximoff, _The Guillotine at Work_, p. 269 and p. 268]

Lenin tried to reply to Miasnikov's demand for freedom
of speech. Freedom of the press, Lenin argued, would, 
under existing circumstances, strengthen the forces of
counter-revolution. Lenin rejected "freedom" in the 
abstract. Freedom for whom? he demanded. Under what 
conditions? For which class? "We do not believe in 
'absolutes.' We laugh at 'pure democracy,'" he asserted.
"Freedom of press in the RSFSR," Lenin maintained, 
"surrounded by bourgeois enemies everywhere means freedom
for the bourgeoisie" and as "we do not want to commit 
suicide and that is why we will never do this" (i.e.
introduce freedom of speech). According to Lenin, freedom
of speech was a "non-party, anti-proletarian slogan" as
well as a "flagrant political error." After sober 
reflection, Lenin hoped, Miasnikov would recognise his 
errors and return to useful party work.

Miasnikov was not convinced by Lenin's arguments. He drafted 
a strong reply. Reminding Lenin of his revolutionary credentials, 
he wrote: "You say that I want freedom of the press for the 
bourgeoisie. On the contrary, I want freedom of the press for 
myself, a proletarian, a member of the party for fifteen years,
who has been a party member in Russia and not abroad. I spent
seven and a half of the eleven years of my party membership
before 1917 in prisons and at hard labour, with a total of
seventy-five days in hunger strikes. I was mercilessly beaten
and subjected to other tortures . . . I escaped not abroad,
but for party work here in Russia. To me one can grant at
least a little freedom of press. Or is it that I must leave
or be expelled from the party as soon as I disagree with 
you in the evaluation of social forces? Such simplified 
treatment evades but does not tackle our problems." [quoted
by Maximoff, Op. Cit., pp. 270-1] Lenin said, Miasnikov went 
on, that the jaws of the bourgeoisie must be cracked:

"To break the jaws of international bourgeoisie, is all very
well, but the trouble is that, you raise your hand against 
the bourgeoisie and you strike at the worker. Which class
now supplies the greatest numbers of people arrested on
charges of counter-revolution? Peasants and workers, to be
sure. There is no Communist working class. There is just
a working class pure and simple." [quoted by Maximoff, 
Op. Cit., p. 271]

"Don't you know," he asked Lenin, "that thousands of proletarians
are kept in prison because they talked the way I am talking now,
and that bourgeois people are not arrested on this source for the
simple reason that the are never concerned with these questions?
If I am still at large, that is so because of my standing as a
Communist. I have suffered for my Communist views; moreover, I
am known by the workers; were it not for these facts, were I just 
an ordinary Communist mechanic from the same factory, where would 
I be now? In the Che-Ka [prison] . . . Once more I say: you raise 
your hand against the bourgeoisie, but it is I who am spitting
blood, and it is we, the workers, whose jaws are being cracked." 
[quoted by Maximoff, Ibid.]

After engaging in political activity in his home area, Miasnikov 
was summoned to Moscow and placed under the control of the Central 
Committee. In defiance of the Central Committee, he returned to 
the Urals and resumed his agitation. At the end of August he 
appeared before a general meeting of Motovilikha party members 
and succeeded in winning them over to his side. Adopting a 
resolution against the Orgburo's censure of Miasnikov, they 
branded his transfer to Moscow a form of "banishment" and 
demanded that he be allowed "full freedom of speech and press 
within the party."  

On November 25 he wrote to a sympathiser in Petrograd urging a 
campaign of agitation in preparation for the 11th party congress. 
By now Miasnikov was being watched by the Cheka, and his letter 
was intercepted. For Lenin, this was the last straw: "We must 
devote greater attention to Miasnikov's agitation," he wrote 
to Molotov on December 5, "and to report on it to the Politburo 
twice a month." To deal with Miasnikov, meanwhile, the Orgburo 
formed a new commission. This commission recommended his expulsion 
from the party, which was agreed by the Politburo on February 20, 
1922. This was the first instance, except for the brief expulsion 
of S. A. Lozovsky in 1918, where Lenin actually expelled a 
well-known Bolshevik of long standing.

By the start of 1923, he had organised a clandestine opposition
and formed (despite his expulsion) the "Workers' Group of the 
Russian Communist Party." He claimed that it, and not the 
Bolshevik leadership, represented the authentic voice of 
the proletariat. Joining hands in the venture were P. B.
Moiseev, a Bolshevik since 1914, and N. V. Kuznetsov, the 
former Workers' Oppositionist. The three men, all workers,
constituted themselves as the "Provisional Central 
Organisational Bureau" of the group. Their first act, in 
February 1923, was to draw up a statement of principles 
in anticipation of the Twelfth Party Congress called the 
"Manifesto of the Workers' Group of the Russian Communist 
Party." The manifesto was "denouncing the New Exploitation 
of the Proletariat and urging the workers to fight for soviet 
democracy," according to Trotskyist historian I. Deutscher.
[_The Prophet Unarmed_, p.107] 

The manifesto recapitulated the program of Miasnikov's earlier 
writings: workers' self-determination and self-management, the
removal of bourgeois specialists from positions of authority, 
freedom of discussion within the party, and the election of new
soviets centred in the factories. It protested against 
administrative high-handedness, the expanding bureaucracy, the 
predominance of non-workers within the party, and the suppression 
of local initiative and debate. The manifesto denounced the New 
Economic Policy (NEP) as the "New Exploitation of the Proletariat." 
In spite of the abolition of private ownership, the worst features 
of capitalism had been preserved: wage slavery, differences of 
income and status, hierarchical authority, bureaucratism. In the
words of the manifesto, the "organisation of this industry since 
the Ninth Congress of the RCP(b) is carried out without the direct 
participation of the working class by nominations in a purely 
bureaucratic way." [quoted by Daniels, Op. Cit., p. 204]

The manifesto wondered whether the Russian proletariat might not be
compelled "to start anew the struggle -- and perhaps a bloody one
-- for the overthrow of the oligarchy." Not that it contemplated 
an immediate insurrection. Rather it sought to rally the workers, 
Communist and non-Communist alike, to press for the elimination 
of bureaucratism and the revival of proletarian democracy. Within 
the party the manifesto defended-the right to form factions and 
draw up platforms. "If criticism does not have a distinct point
of view," Miasnikov wrote to Zinoviev, "a platform on which to rally 
a majority of party members, on which to develop a new policy with 
regard to this or that question, then it is not really criticism but 
a mere collection of words, nothing but chatter." He went even further, 
calling into question the very Bolshevik monopoly of power. Under a 
single-party dictatorship, he argued, elections remained "an empty 
formality." To speak of "workers' democracy" while insisting on 
one-party government, he told Zinoviev, was to entwine oneself in a 
contradiction, a "contradiction in terms." 

Miasnikov was arrested by the GPU (the new name for the Cheka) on 
May 25, 1923, a month after the Twelfth Party Congress (the rest
of the group's leadership was soon to follow). Miasnikov was 
released from custody and permitted to leave the country and
left for Germany (this was a device not infrequently used by the 
authorities to rid themselves of dissenters). In Berlin he formed 
ties with the council communists of the German Communist Workers' 
Party (KAPD) and with the left wing of the German Communist Party.
With the aid of these groups, Miasnikov was able to publish the 
manifesto of the Workers' Group, prefaced by an appeal drafted by 
his associates in Moscow. The appeal concluded with a set of slogans 
proclaiming the aims of the Workers' Group: "The strength of the 
working class lies in its solidarity. Long live freedom of speech 
and press for the proletarians! Long live Soviet Power! Long live 
Proletarian Democracy! Long live Communism!"

Inside Russia the manifesto was having its effect. Fresh recruits 
were drawn into the Workers' Group. It established ties with
discontented workers in several cities and began negotiations 
with leaders of the now defunct Workers' Opposition. The group 
won support within the Red Army garrison quartered in the Kremlin, 
a company of which had to be transferred to Smolensk. By summer 
of 1923 the group had some 300 members in Moscow, as well as a 
sprinkling of adherents in other cities. Many were Old Bolsheviks, 
and all, or nearly all, were workers. Soon an unexpected 
opportunity for the group to extend its influence arrived. 
In August and September 1923 a wave of strikes (which recalled 
the events of February 1921) swept Russia's industrial centres. 
An economic crisis (named the "scissors' crisis") had been
deepening since the beginning of the year, bringing cuts in wages 
and the dismissal of large numbers of workers. The resulting strikes, 
which broke out in Moscow and other cities, were spontaneous and
no evidence existed to connect them with any oppositionist faction. 
The Workers' Group, however, sought to take advantage of the unrest 
to oppose the party leadership. Stepping up its agitation, it 
considered calling a one-day general strike and organising a mass 
demonstration of workers, on the lines of Bloody Sunday 1905, 
with a portrait of Lenin (rather than the Tzar!) at the lead. 

The authorities became alarmed. The Central Committee branded 
the Workers' Group as "anti-Communist and anti-Soviet" and ordered 
the GPU to suppress it. By the end of September its meeting places
had been raided, literature seized, and leaders arrested. Twelve 
members were expelled from the party and fourteen others received 
reprimands. As one Trotskyist historian put it, the "party leaders"
were "determined to suppress the Workers' Group and the Workers'
Truth." [I. Deutscher, Op. Cit., p. 108] Miasnikov was considered
such a threat that in the autumn of 1923 he was lured back to 
Russia on assurances from Zinoviev and Krestinsky, the Soviet 
ambassador in Berlin, that he would not be molested. Once in 
Russia he was immediately placed behind bars. The arrest was carried 
out by Dzerzhinsky himself (the infamous creator and head of the
Cheka), a token of the gravity with which the government viewed 
the case. 

This response is significant, simply because Trotsky was still
an influential member of the Communist Party leadership. As
Paul Avrich points out, "[i]n January 1924, Lenin died. By then 
the Workers' Group had been silenced. It was the last dissident 
movement within the party to be liquidated while Lenin was still 
alive. It was also the last rank-and-file group to be smashed with 
the blessing of all the top Soviet leaders, who now began their 
struggle for Lenin's mantle." [_Bolshevik Opposition To Lenin: 
G. Miasnikov and the Workers Group_]

The response of Trotsky is particularly important, given that 
for most modern day Leninists he raised the banner of "authentic"
Leninism against the obvious evils of Stalinism. What was
his reaction to the state repression of the Workers' Group? As 
Deutscher notes, Trotsky "did not protest when their adherents 
were thrown into prison . . . Nor was he inclined to countenance
industrial unrest . . . Nor was he at all eager to support the
demand for Soviet democracy in the extreme form in which the
Workers' Opposition and its splinter groups [like the Workers'
Group] had raised it." [Op. Cit., pp. 108-9] Dzerzhinsky was
given the task of breaking the opposition groups by the central
committee. He "found that even party members of unquestioned
loyalty regarded them as comrades and refused to testify against
them. He then turned to the Politburo and asked it to declare
it was the duty of any party member to denounce to the GPU
people inside the party engaged aggressive action against the
official leaders." Trotsky "did not tell the Politburo plainly
that it should reject Dzerzhinsky's demand. He evaded the
question." [Op. Cit., p. 108 and p. 109] 

Trotskyist Tony Cliff presents a similar picture of Trotsky's
lack of concern for opposition groups and his utter failure
to support working class self-activity or calls for *real*
democracy. He notes that in July and August 1923 Moscow and
Petrograd "were shaken by industrial unrest . . . Unofficial
strikes broke out in many places . . . In November 1923,
rumours of a general strike circulated throughout Moscow,
and the movement seems at the point of turning into a 
political revolt. Not since the Kronstadt rising of 1921
had there been so much tension in the working class and
so much alarm in the ruling circles." The ruling elite,
including Trotsky, acted to maintain their position and
the secret police turned on any political group which 
could influence the movement. The "strike wave gave a
new lease of life to the Mensheviks" and so "the GPU
carried out a massive round up of Mensheviks, and as
many as one thousand were arrested in Moscow alone."
When it was the turn of the Workers Group and Workers 
Truth, Trotsky "did not condemn their persecution" and
he "did not support their incitement of workers to
industrial unrest." Moreover, "[n]or was Trotsky ready
to support the demand for workers' democracy in the
extreme form to which the Workers Group and Workers
Truth raised it." [_Trotsky_, vol. 3, p. 25, p. 26
and pp. 26-7] 

By "extreme," Cliff obviously means "genuine" as Trotsky 
did not call for workers' democracy in any meaningful form.
Indeed, his "New Course Resolution" even went so far as to
say that "it is obvious that there can be no toleration of
the formation of groupings whose ideological content is
directed against the party as a whole and against the 
dictatorship of the proletariat. as for instance the
Workers' Truth and Workers' Group." Trotsky himself was
at pains to distance himself from Myainikov. [_The
Challenge of the Left Opposition (1923-25)_, p. 408
and p. 80] The resolution made it clear that it 
considered "the dictatorship of the proletariat" to be 
incompatible with *real* workers democracy by arguing
"it is impossible to tolerate groupings, the ideological 
contents of which are directed against the party as a 
whole and against the dictatorship of the proletariat
(such as, for example, the 'Workers' Truth' and the 
'Workers' Group')." [quoted by Robert V. Daniels, 
Op. Cit., p. 222] Given that both these groups advocated 
actual soviet and trade union democracy, the Politburo 
was simply indicating that *actual* "workers' democracy" 
was "against" the dictatorship of the proletariat (i.e. 
the dictatorship of the party).

Thus we come to the strange fact that it was Lenin and Trotsky 
themselves who knowingly destroyed the groups which represent 
what modern day Leninists assert is the "real" essence of 
Leninism. Furthermore, modern day Leninists generally ignore 
these opposition groups when they discuss alternatives to 
Stalinism or the bureaucratisation under Lenin. This seems a
strange fate to befall tendencies which, if we take Leninists
at their word, expressed what their tradition stands for. 
Equally, in spite of their support for party dictatorship,
the "Workers' Opposition" did have some constructive suggests 
to make as regards combating the economic bureaucratisation
which existed under Lenin. Yet almost all modern Leninists 
(like Lenin and Trotsky) dismiss them as "syndicalist" and 
utopian. Which is, of course, significant about the *real*
essence of Leninism.

Ultimately, the nature of the various oppositions within the
party and the fate of such real dissidents as the "Workers' 
Group" says far more about the real reasons the Russian 
revolution than most Trotskyist books on the matter. Little
wonder there is so much silence and distortion about these
events. They prove that the "essence" of Bolshevism is not
a democratic one but rather a deeply authoritarian one hidden
(at times) behind libertarian sounding rhetoric. Faced with
opposition which were somewhat libertarian, the response of
Lenin and Trotsky was to repress them. In summary, they show
that the problems of the revolution and subsequent civil war 
did not create but rather revealed Bolshevism's authoritarian 
core.

H.11 Why does the Makhnovist movement show there is an
     alternative to Bolshevism?

The key Leninist defence of the actions of the Bolsheviks in the
Russian revolution is that they had no other choice. Complaints
against the Bolshevik attacks on the gains of the revolution and
the pro-revolutionary Left in Russia are met with a mantra
involving the white terror, the primitive state of Russia and
the reactionary peasantry, the invading imperialist armies (although
the actual number can, and does, vary depending on who you are
talking to) and other such "forces of nature" which we are to believe
could only be met by a centralised authoritarian regime that would
flinch at nothing in order to survive.

However, this is not the case. This is for three reasons.

Firstly, there is the slight problem that many of the attacks
on the revolution (disbanding soviets, undermining the factory
committees, repressing socialists and anarchists, and so on)
started *before* the start of the civil war. As such, its
difficult to blame the degeneration of the revolution on
an event which had yet to happen (see section H.8.3 for
details).

Secondly, Leninists like to portray their ideology as "realistic,"
that it recognises the problems facing a revolution and can
provide the necessary solutions. Some even claim, flying in the
face of the facts, that anarchists think the ruling class will
just "disappear" (see section H.2.1) or that we think "full-blown"
communism will appear "overnight" (see section H.2.5). Only
Bolshevism, it is claimed, recognises that civil war is inevitable
during a revolution and only it provides the necessary solution,
namely a "workers state." Lenin himself argued that "[n]ot a
single great revolution in history has escaped civil war. No one
who does not live in a shell could imagine that civil war is
conceivable without exceptionally complicated circumstances."
[_Will the Bolsheviks Maintain Power?_, p. 81] As such, its
incredulous that modern day followers of Lenin blame the
degeneration of the Russian Revolution on the very factors
(civil war and exceptional circumstances) that they claim to
recognise an inevitable!

Thirdly, and even more embarrassingly for the Leninists, numerous
examples exist both from revolutionary Russia at the time and from
earlier and later revolutions that suggest far from Bolshevik
tactics being the most efficient way of defending the revolution
other methods existed which looked to the massive creative energies
of the working masses unleashed by the revolution.

During the Russian Revolution the biggest example of this is
found in South-Eastern Ukraine. For much of the Civil War
this area operated without a centralised state apparatus of the
Bolshevik type and was, instead, based on the anarchist idea of
Free Soviets. There "the insurgents raised the black flag of 
anarchism and set forth on the anti-authoritarian road of the
free organisation of the workers." [Arshinov, _The History of
the Makhnovist Movement_, p. 50] The space in which this 
happened was created by a partisan force that instead of 
using the "efficiency" of executions for desertion, tsarist 
officers appointed over the rank and file soldiers' wishes 
and saluting so loved by the Bolsheviks instead operated as 
a volunteer army with elected officers and voluntary discipline. 
This movement was the Makhnovists, named after its leader, the 
Ukrainian anarchist Nestor Makhno. The Black Flag which floated 
over the lead wagon of the Insurgent Army was inscribed with the 
slogans "Liberty or Death" and "The Land to the Peasants, the
Factories to the Workers." These slogans summarised what the 
Makhnovist were fighting for -- a libertarian socialist society.
At its height in the autumn of 1919, the Maknovists numbered 
around 40,000 and its extended area of influence corresponded 
to nearly one third of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, comprising 
a population of over seven million. 

It is this that explains the importance of the Makhnovists. As
historian Christopher Reed notes, the "Bolsheviks' main claim to
legitimacy rested on the argument that they were the only ones
capable of preventing a similar disaster [counter-revolution]
for the workers and peasants of Russia and that their harsh
methods were necessary in the face of a ruthless and unrelenting
enemy." However, Reed argues that "the Makhno movement in the
Ukraine suggests that there was more than one way to fight against
the counter-revolution." [_From Tsar to Soviets_, pp. 258-9] This
is why the Makhnovist movement is so important, why it shows that
there was, and is, an alternative to the ideas of Bolshevism. Here
we have a mass movement operating in the same "exceptional
circumstances" as the Bolsheviks which did *not* implement the
same policies. Indeed, rather than suppress soviet, workplace
and military democracy in favour of centralised, top-down party
power and modify their political line to justify their
implementation of party dictatorship, the Makhnovists did all
they could to implement and encourage working-class self-government.

As such, it is difficult to blame the development of Bolshevik
policies towards state-capitalist and party-dictatorship directions
on the problems caused during the revolution when the Makhnovists,
facing similar conditions, did all they could to protect working-
class autonomy and freedom. Indeed, it could be argued that the
problems facing the Makhnovists were greater in many ways. The
Ukraine probably saw more fighting in the Russian Civil War
then any other area. Unlike the Bolsheviks, the Makhnovists lost
the centre of their movement and had to re-liberate it. To do so
they fought the Austrian and German armies, Ukrainian Nationalists,
Bolsheviks and the White Armies of Denikin and then Wrangel. There
were smaller skirmishes involving Cossacks returning to the Don and
independent "Green" bands. The anarchists fought all these various
armies over the four years their movement was in existence. This
war was not only bloody but saw constant shifts of fronts, advances
and retreats and changes from near conventional war to mobile
partisan war. The consequences of this was that no area of the
territory was a safe "rear" area for any period of time and so
little constructive activity was possible. Section H.11.4
presents a summary of the military campaigns of these years.
A brief idea of the depth of fighting in these years can be
seen by considering the town at the centre of the Makhnovists,
Hulyai Pole which changed hands no less then 16 times in the
period from 1917-1921.

Clearly, in terms of conflict (and the resulting disruption
caused by it), the Makhnovists did not have the relative peace
the Bolsheviks had (who never once lost their main bases of
Petrograd or Moscow, although they came close). As such, the
problems used to justify the repressive and dictatorial
policies of the Bolsheviks also apply to the Makhnovists.
Despite this, the activity of the Makhnovists in the Ukraine
demonstrated that an alternative to the supposedly necessary
methods of the Bolsheviks did exist. Where the Bolsheviks
suppressed freedom of speech, assembly and press, the Makhnovists
encouraged it. Where the Bolsheviks turned the soviets into
mere cyphers of their government and undermined soviet power,
the Makhnovists encouraged working-class participation and
free soviets. As we discuss in section H.11.7, the Makhnovists
applied their ideas of working class self-management whenever
and wherever they could.

Sadly, the Makhnovist movement is a relatively unknown event
during the revolution. There are few non-anarchist accounts of
it and the few histories which do mention it often simply slander
it. However, as the Cohn-Bendit brothers correctly argue, the
movement, "better perhaps than any other movement, shows that
the Russian Revolution could have been a great liberating force."
Equally, the reason why it has been almost totally ignored (or
slandered, when mentioned) by Stalinist and Trotskyist writers
is simple: "It shows the Bolsheviks stifling workers and peasants
with lies and calumnies, and then crushing them in a bloody massacre."
[Daniel and Gabriel Cohn-Bendit, _Obsolete Communism: The Left-Wing
Alternative_, p. 200]

This section of our FAQ will indicate the nature and history of this
important social movement. As we will prove, "the Makhnovshchina . . .
was a true popular movement of peasants and workers, and . . . its
essential goal was to establish the freedom of workers by means of
revolutionary self-activity on the part of the masses." [Arshinov,
_The History of the Makhnovist Movement_, p. 209] They achieved this
goal in extremely difficult circumstances and resisted all attempts
to limit the freedom of the working class, no matter where it came
from. As Makhno himself once noted:

"Our practice in the Ukraine showed clearly that the peasant problem
had very different solutions from those imposed by Bolshevism. If our
experience had spread to the rest of Russia, a pernicious division
between country and city would not have been created. Years of
famine would have been avoided and useless struggles between
peasant and workers. And what is more important, the revolution
would have grown and developed along very different lines . . .
We were all fighters and workers. The popular assembly made the
decisions. In military life it was the War Committee composed of
delegates of all the guerrilla detachments which acted. To sum up,
everyone took part in the collective work, to prevent the birth
of a managing class which would monopolise power. And we were
successful. Because we had succeeded and gave lie to Bolshevik
bureaucratic practices, Trotsky, betraying the treaty between
the Ukraine and the Bolshevik authorities, sent the Red Army to
fight us. Bolshevism triumphed militarily over the Ukraine
and at Kronstadt, but revolutionary history will acclaim us one
day and condemn the victors as counter-revolutionary grave-diggers
of the Russian Revolution." [quoted by Abel Paz, _Durruti: The
People Armed_, p. 88-9]

Two distinct aspects of the anarchist movement existed in the
Ukraine at this time, a political and non-military structure
called the Nabat (Alarm) federation which operated through the
soviets and collectives and a military command structure usually
known after is commander Nestor Makhno as the _Makhnovshchina_
(which means the "Makhno movement") although its proper name was
the _Revolutionary Insurgent Army of the Ukraine_. This section
of the FAQ will cover both, although the Makhnovshchina will be
the main focus.

For more information on the Makhnovist movement, consult the
following books. Anarchist accounts of the movement can be
found in Peter Arshinov's excellent _The History of the
Makhnovist Movement_ and Voline's _The Unknown Revolution_
(Voline's work is based on extensive quotes from Arshinov's
work, but does contain useful additional material). For
non-anarchist accounts, Michael Malet's _Nestor Makhno in
the Russian Revolution_ is essential reading as it contains
useful information on both the history of the movement, its
social basis and political ideas. Malet considers his work as
a supplement to Michael Palij's _The Anarchism of Nestor Makhno,
1918-1921_ which is primarily a military account of the movement
but which does cover some of its social and political aspects.
Unfortunately, both books are rare. Paul Avrich's _The Russian
Anarchists_ contains a short account of the movement and his
_Anarchist Portraits_ has a chapter on Nestor Makhno. Makhnovist
source material is included in Avrich's _The Anarchists in the
Russian Revolution_. Daniel Guerin includes a section on Makhno 
and the Makhnovist Movement in volume 2 of _No Gods, No Masters_. 
As well as extracts from Arshinov's book, it has various 
manifestos from the movement as well as Makhno's account of 
his meeting with Lenin. Christopher Read's _From Tsar to 
Soviets_ has an excellent section on the Makhnovists. Serge 
Cipko presents an excellent overview of works on the Makhnovists
in his "Nestor Makhno: A Mini-Historiography of the Anarchist 
Revolution in Ukraine, 1917-1921" (_The Raven_, no. 13). 
Alexander Skirda presents an overview of perestroika soviet
accounts of Makhno in his essay "The Rehabilitation of 
Makhno" (_The Raven_, no. 8). Skirda's biography _Nestor
Makhno: Le Cosaque de l'anarchie_ is by far the best account
of the movement available.

Lastly, a few words on names. There is a large variation on the
spelling of names within the source material. For example,
Makhno's home town has been translated as Gulyai Pole, Gulyai
Polye Huliai-Pole and Hulyai Pole. Similarly, with other place
names. The bandit Grigor'ev has been also translated as Hryhor'iv 
and Hryhoriyiv. We generally take Michael Malet's translations
of names as a basis (i.e. we use Hulyai Pole and Hryhoriyiv,
for example). 

H.11.1 Who was Nestor Makhno?

The Makhnovist movement was named after Nestor Makhno, a
Ukrainian anarchist who played a key role in the movement
from the start. Indeed, Makhnoshchina literally means "Makhno
movement" and his name is forever linked with the revolution
in the South-East of the Ukraine. So who was Makhno?

Nestor Ivanovich Makhno was born on the 27th of October, 1889
in Hulyai Pole, which is situated in Katerynoslav province,
in the south east of the Ukraine between the Dnieper River
and the Sea of Azov. While it seems to be conventional for
many historians to call Hulyai Pole a "village," it was in
fact a town with a population of about 30,000 and boasted
several factories and schools.

Makhno was the son of a poor peasant family. His father died
when he was ten months old, leaving him and his four brothers
in the care of their mother. Due to the extreme poverty of
his family, he had to start work as a shepherd at the age
of seven. At eight he started to attend the Second Hulyai
Pole primary school in winter and worked for local landlords
during the summer. He left school when he was twelve and
took up full-time employment as a farmhand on the estates
of nobles and on the farms of the German colonist *kulaks.*
At the age of seventeen, he started to work in Hulyai Pole
itself, first as an apprentice painter, then as an unskilled
worker in a local iron foundry and, finally, as a founder in 
the same establishment.

It was when he was working in the iron foundry that he became
involved in revolutionary politics. In the stormy years following
the 1905 revolution, Makhno got involved in revolutionary
politics. This decision was based on his experiences of injustice
at work and seeing the terror of the Russian regime during the
1905 events (in Hulyai Pole there had been no serious disorder,
yet the regime sent a detachment of mounted police to suppress
gatherings and meetings in the town, terrorising the population
by whipping those caught in the streets and beating prisoners
with rifle butts). In 1906, Makhno decided to join the anarchist
group in Hulyai Pole (which had been formed the previous year
and consisted mainly of sons of poorer peasants).

At the end of 1906 and in 1907, Makhno was arrested and accused of
political assassinations, but was released due to lack of evidence.
In 1908, due to the denunciation of a police spy within the
anarchist group, he was arrested and put in jail. In March, 1910,
Makhno and thirteen others were tried by a military court and
sentenced to death by hanging. Due to his youth and the efforts
of his mother, the death penalty was commuted to life imprisonment
with hard labour. He served his time at the Butyrki prison in
Moscow, resisting the prison authorities by every means available
to him. Due to this resistance, he spent much of his time in
chains or in damp and freezing confinement. This experience
ensured that Makhno developed an intense hatred of prisons
(later, during the revolution, his first act in entering a
town or city was to release all prisoners and destroy the
prison).

It was during his time in Butykri that Makhno met Peter Arshinov,
a fellow anarchist prisoner and later activist and historian of
the Makhnovist movement. Arshinov was born in 1887 in the Ukrainian
industrial town of Katerinoslav. His father was a factory worker
and he was a metal worker. Originally a Bolshevik, he had become
an anarchist in 1906, taking a leading part in organising factory
workers and actions against the regime. In 1907 he was arrested
and sentenced to death, escaping to Western Europe. In 1909, he
returned to Russia and was again arrested and again escaped. In
1910, he was arrested and placed in the Butykri prison where he 
met Makhno. The two anarchists established a close personal and
political friendship, with Arshinov helping Makhno develop and
deepen his anarchist ideas.

On March 2nd, 1917, after eight years and eight months in prison,
Makhno was released along with all other political prisoners as
a result of the February Revolution. After spending three weeks
in Moscow with the Moscow anarchists, Makhno returned to Hulyai
Pole. As the only political prisoner who was returned to his
family by the revolution, Makhno became very well-respected
in his home town. After years of imprisonment, suffering but
learning, Makhno was no longer an inexperienced young activist,
but a tested anarchist militant with both a powerful will and
strong ideas about social conflict and revolutionary politics.
Ideas which he immediately set about applying.

Once home in Hulyai Pole, Makhno immediately devoted himself
to revolutionary work. Unsurprisingly, the remaining members
of the anarchist group, as well as many peasants, came to
visit him. After discussing ideas with them, Makhno proposed
beginning organisational work immediately in order to strengthen
links between the peasants in Hulyai Pole and its region with
the anarchist group. On March 28-29, a Peasant Union was
created with Makhno as its chairman. Subsequently, he organised
similar unions in other villages and towns in the area. Makhno
also played a large part in a successful strike by wood and
metal workers at a factory owned by his old boss (this defeat
led to the other bosses capitulating to the workers as well).
At the same time, peasants refused to pay their rent to the
landlords. [Michael Malet, _Nestor Makhno in the Russian Civil
War_, p. 4] Regional assemblies of peasants were called, both
at Hulyai Pole  and elsewhere, and on August 5-7, the provincial
congress at Katerinoslav decided to reorganise the Peasant Unions
into Soviets of Peasants' and Workers' Deputies.

In this way, "Makhno and his associates brought socio-political
issues into the daily life of the people, who in turn supported
his efforts, hoping to expedite the expropriation of large
estates." [Michael Palij, _The Anarchism of Nestor Makhno_,
p. 71] In Hulyai Pole, the revolution was moving faster than
elsewhere (for example, while the Aleksandrovsk soviet supported
the actions of the Provisional Government during the July days
in Petrograd, a meeting in Hulyai Pole saluted the rebellious
soldiers and workers). Peasants were drawn to Hulyai Pole for
advice and help from the neighbouring _volosts_ (administrative
districts). The peasantry wanted to seize the land of the large
landowners and the kulaks (rich peasants). Makhno presented this
demand at the first sessions of the regional Soviet, which were
held in Hulyai Pole. In August, Makhno called all the local
landlords and rich peasants (kulaks) together and all documents
concerning ownership (of land, livestock and equipment) were
taken from them. An inventory of this property was taken and
reported to the session of the local soviet and then at a
regional meeting. It was agreed that all land, livestock and
equipment was to be divided equally, the division to include
the former owners. This was the core of the agrarian program
of the movement, namely the liquidation of the property of the
landowners and kulaks. No-one could own more land than they
could work with their own labour. All this was in flat defiance
to the Provisional Government which was insisting that all such
questions be left to the Constituent Assembly. Free communes
were also created on ex-landlord estates.

Unsurprisingly, the implementation of these decisions was
delayed because of the opposition of the landlords and
kulaks, who organised themselves and appealed to the
provisional authorities. When General Kornilov tried
to march on Petrograd and take power, the Hulyai Pole soviet
took the initiative and formed a local "Committee for the
Salvation of the Revolution" headed by Makhno. The real
aim was to disarm the potential local enemy -- the landlords,
bourgeoisie, and kulaks -- as well as to expropriate their
ownership of the people's wealth: the land, factories, plants,
printing shops, theatres and so on. On 25 September a volost
congress of Soviets and peasant organisations in Hulyai Pole
proclaimed the confiscation of the landowners' land and its
transformation into social property. Raids on the estates of
landlords and rich peasants, including German colonists,
began and the expropriation of the expropriators began.

Makhno's activities came to a halt the following spring when
Lenin's government signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. This
treaty gave sizeable parts of the Russian Empire, including
the Ukraine, to Germany and Austria in return for peace. The
Treaty also saw the invasion of the Ukraine by large numbers
of German and Austrian troops, who conquered the entire
country in less than three months. Makhno succeeded in forming
several military units, consisting of 1700 men, but could
not stop Hulyai Pole being taken. After an anarchist congress
at the end of April in Taganrog, it was decided to organise
small combat units of five to ten peasants and workers, to
collect arms from the enemy and to prepare for a general peasant
uprising against the Austro-German troops and, finally, to
send a small group to Soviet Russia to see at first hand what
was happening there to both the revolution and to the anarchists
under Bolshevik rule. Makhno was part of that group.

By June, Makhno had arrived in Moscow. He immediately visited
a number of Russian anarchists (including his old friend Peter
Arshinov). The anarchist movement in Moscow was cowed, due to
a Cheka raid in April which broke the backbone of the movement,
so ending a political threat to the Bolsheviks from the left.
To Makhno, coming from an area where freedom of speech and
organisation was taken for granted, the low level of activity
came as a shock. He regarded Moscow as the capital of the
"paper revolution," whose red tape and meaninglessness had
affected even the anarchists. Makhno also visited Peter
Kropotkin, asking his advice on revolutionary work and the
situation in the Ukraine. To Makhno, "Moscow appeared as 
'the capital of the Paper Revolution,' a vast factory turning 
out empty resolutions and slogans while one political party, 
by means of force and fraud, elevated itself into the position 
of a ruling class." [David Footman, Op. Cit., p. 252]

While in Moscow, Makhno met with Lenin. This meeting came
about by chance. Visiting the Kremlin to obtain a permit
for free board and lodging, he met the chairman of the
All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets,
Jakov M. Sverdlov, who arranged for Makhno to meet Lenin.
Lenin asked Makhno, "How did the peasants of your region
understand the slogan ALL POWER TO THE SOVIETS IN THE
VILLAGES?" Makhno states that Lenin "was astonished" at
his reply:

"The peasants understood this slogan in their own way.
According to their interpretation, all power, in all
areas of life, must be identified with the consciousness
and will of the working people. The peasants understand
that the soviets of workers and peasants of village, country
and district are neither more nor less than the means of
revolutionary organisation and economic self-management of
working people in the struggle against the bourgeoisie and
its lackeys, the Right socialists and their coalition
government."

To this Lenin replied: "Well, then, the peasants of your region
are infected with anarchism!" [Nestor Makhno, _My Visit to the
Kremlin_, p. 18] Later in the interview, Lenin stated: "Do the 
anarchists ever recognise their lack of realism in present-day 
life? Why, they don't even think of it." Makhno replied:

"But I must tell you, comrade Lenin, that your assertion that
the anarchists don't understand 'the present' realistically,
that they have no real connection with it and so forth, is
fundamentally mistaken. The anarchist-communists in the
Ukraine . . . the anarchist-communists, I say, have already
given many proofs that they are firmly planted in 'the present.'
The whole struggle of the revolutionary Ukrainian countryside
against the Central Rada has been carried out under the
ideological guidance of the anarchist-communists and also
in part by the Socialist Revolutionaries . . . Your Bolsheviks
have scarcely any presence in our villages. Where they have
penetrated, their influence is minimal. Almost all the communes
or peasant associations in the Ukraine were formed at the
instigation of the anarchist-communists. The armed struggle
of the working people against the counter-revolution in
general and the Austro-German invasion in particular has
been undertaken with the ideological and organic guidance
of the anarchist-communists exclusively.

"Certainly it is not in your party's interest to give us
credit for all this, but these are the facts and you can't
dispute them. You know perfectly well, I assume, the
effective force and the fighting capacity of the free,
revolutionary forces of the Ukraine. It is not without
reason that you have evoked the courage with which they
have heroically defended the common revolutionary conquests.
Among them, at least one half have fought under the anarchist
banner. . .

"All this shows how mistaken you are, comrade Lenin, in alleging
that we, the anarchist-communists, don't have our feet on the
ground, that our attitude towards 'the present' is deplorable
and that we are too fond of dreaming about the future. What I
have said to you in the course of this interview cannot be
questioned because it is the truth. The account which I have
made to you contradicts the conclusions you expressed about
us. Everyone can see we are firmly planted in 'the present,'
that we are working and searching for the means to bring about
the future we desire, and that we are in fact dealing very
seriously with this problem."

Lenin replied: "Perhaps I am mistaken." [Makhno, Op. Cit.,
pp. 24-5]

The Bolsheviks helped Makhno to return to the Ukraine. The
trip was accomplished with great difficulty. Once Makhno
was almost killed. He was arrested by Austro-German troops
and was carrying libertarian pamphlets at the time. A
Jewish inhabitant of Hulyai Pole, who had know Makhno
for some time, succeeded in saving him by paying a 
considerable sum of money for his liberation. Once back
in Hulyai-Pole, he started to organise resistance to the 
occupying forces of the Austro-Germans and their puppet 
regime led by Hetman Skoropadsky. With the resistance, the 
Makhno movement can be said to have arisen (see section 
H.11.3 on why it was named after Makhno). From July 1918 to
August 1921, Makhno led the struggle for working class
freedom against all oppressors, whether Bolshevik, White
or Nationalist. During the course of this struggle, he
proved himself to be "a guerrilla leader of quite outstanding 
ability." [David Footman, _Civil War in Russia_, p. 245] The 
military history of this movement is discussed in section 
H.11.4, while other aspects of the movement are discussed 
in other sections.

After the defeat of the Makhnovist movement in 1921, Makhno
was exiled in Western Europe. In 1925 he ended up in Paris,
where he lived for the rest of his life. While there, he 
remained active in the anarchist movement, with the pen
replacing the sabre (to use Alexander Skirda's colourful
expression). Makhno contributed articles to various
anarchist journals and in particular to _Delo Truda_, 
an anarchist-communist paper started in Paris by Peter 
Arshinov (many of these articles have been published 
in the book _The Struggle Against the State and Other 
Essays_). He remained active in the anarchist movement 
to the end.

In Paris, Makhno met the famous Spanish anarchists
Buenaventura Durruti and Francisco Ascaso in 1927. He
argued that in Spain "conditions for a revolution with
a strong anarchist content are better than in Russia"
because not only was there "a proletariat and a peasantry
with a revolutionary tradition whose political maturity
is shown in its reactions," the Spanish anarchists had
"a sense of organisation which we lacked in Russia. It is
organisation which assures the success in depth of all
revolutions." Makhno recounted the activities of the
Hulyai Pole anarchist group and the events in revolutionary
Ukraine:

"Our agrarian commune was at once the economic and political
vital centre of our social system. These communities were
not based on individual egoism but rested on principles of
communal, local and regional solidarity. In the same way
that the members of a community felt solidarity among
themselves, the communities were federated with each
other . . . It is said against our system that in the
Ukraine, that it was able to last because it was based
only on peasant foundations. It isn't true. Our communities
were mixed, agricultural-industrial, and, even, some of them
were only industrial. We were all fighters and workers. The
popular assembly made the decisions. In military life
it was the War Committee composed of delegates of all the
guerrilla detachments which acted. To sum up, everyone
took part in the collective work, to prevent the birth
of a managing class which would monopolise power. And we
were successful." [quoted by Abel Paz, _Durruti: The People
Armed_, p. 88-9]

As can be seen from the social revolution in Aragon, Durruti
took Makhno's advice seriously (see section I.8 for more
on the Spanish Revolution). Unsurprisingly, in 1936 a number
of veterans of Makhno's Insurgent Army went to fight in the
Durruti column. Sadly, Makhno's death in 1934 prevented his
own concluding statement to the two Spaniards: "Makhno has
never refused to fight. If I am alive when you start your
struggle, I will be with you." [quoted by Paz, Op. Cit.,
p. 90]

Makhno's most famous activity in exile was his association
with, and defence of, the _Organisational Platform of
the Libertarian Communists_ (known as the "Platform"). As
discussed in section J.3.3, the Platform was an attempt
to analyse what had gone wrong in the Russian Revolution
and suggested a much tighter anarchist organisation in
future. This idea provoked intense debate after its
publication, with the majority of anarchists rejecting
it (for Makhno's discussion with Malatesta on this issue,
see _The Anarchist Revolution_ published by Freedom Press).
This debate often resulted in bitter polemics and left Makhno
somewhat isolated as some of his friends, like Voline,
opposed the Platform. However, he remained an anarchist
to his death in 1934.

Makhno died on the morning of July 25th and was cremated three
days later and his ashes placed in an urn within Pere Lachaise,
the cemetery of the Paris Commune. Five hundred Russian, French,
Spanish and Italian comrades attended the funeral, at which the
French anarchist Benar and Voline spoke (Voline used the occasion
to refute Bolshevik allegations of anti-Semitism). Makhno's wife,
Halyna, was too overcome to speak.

So ended the life of one great fighters for working-class freedom.
Little wonder Durruti's words to Makhno:

"We have come to salute you, the symbol of all those revolutionaries
who struggled for the realisation of Anarchist ideas in Russia.
We also come to pay our respects to the rich experience of the
Ukraine." [quoted by Abel Paz, Op. Cit., p. 88]

For fuller details of Makhno's life, see the accounts by Peter
Arshinov (_The History of the Makhnovist Movement_), Paul Avrich
("Nestor Makhno: The Man and the Myth," in _Anarchist Portraits_),
Michael Palij, (_The Anarchism of Nestor Makhno_) and Michael Malet
(_Nestor Makhno in the Russian Revolution_).

H.11.2 Why was the movement named after Makhno?

Officially, the Makhnovist movement was called the _Revolutionary
Insurrectionary Army of the Ukraine_. In practice, it was usually
called the "Makhno movement" ("Makhnovshchina" in Russian) or the
Makhnovists. Unsurprisingly, Trotsky placed great significance on
this:

"The anti-popular character of the Makhno movement is most clearly
revealed in the fact that the army of Hulyai Pole is actually
called 'Makhno's Army'. *There, armed men are united not around a
programme, not around an ideological banner, but around a man.*"
[_The Makhno Movement_]

Ignoring the irony of a self-proclaimed Marxist (and later
Leninist and founder of Trotskyism!) making such a comment, 
we can only indicate why the Makhnovists called themselves 
by that name:

"Because, first, in the terrible days of reaction in the
Ukraine, we saw in our ranks an unfailing friend and leader,
MAKHNO, whose voice of protest against any kind of coercion
of the working people rang out in all the Ukraine, calling
for a battle against all oppressors, pillagers and political
charlatans who betray us; and who is now marching together
with us in our common ranks unwavering toward the final
goal: liberation of the working people from any kind of
oppression." [contained in Arshinov, Op. Cit., p. 272]

The two of the anarchists who took part in the movement 
and later wrote its history concur. Voline argues that 
the reason why the movement was known as the "Makhnovist
movement" was because the "most important role in this
work of unification [of the peasant masses] and in the 
general development of the revolutionary insurrection in
the southern Ukraine was performed by the detachment of
partisans guided by a peasant native to the region:
Nestor Makhno." [_The Unknown Revolution_, p. 551] 
"From the first days of the movement," Arshinov notes, 
"up to its culminating point, when the peasants vanquished
the landowners, Makhno played a preponderant and central
role to such an extent that the whole insurgent region
and the most heroic moments of the struggle are linked
to his name. Later, when the insurrection had triumphed
completely over the Skoropadsky counter-revolution and
the region was threatened by Denikin, Makhno became the
rallying point for millions of peasants in several regions."
[Op. Cit., p. 50]

It must be stressed that Nestor Mahkno was not the boss of
the Mahknovista. He was not their ruler or general. As such,
the fact that the Makhnovists were (unofficially) named after
Makhno does not imply that it was his personal fiefdom, nor
that those involved followed him as an individual. Rather,
the movement was named after him because he was universally
respected within it as a leading militant. This fact also
explains why Makhno was nicknamed "Batko" (see next section).

This can be seen from how the movement was organised and was
run. As we discuss in section H.11.5, it was organised in a
fundamentally democratic way, by means of mass assemblies
of insurgents, elected officers, regular insurgent, peasant
and worker congresses and an elected "Revolutionary Military 
Soviet." The driving force in the Makhnovist movement was not, 
therefore, Makhno but rather the anarchist ideas of 
self-management. As Trotsky himself was aware, the 
Makhnovists were influenced by anarchist ideas:

"Makhno and his companions-in-arms are not non-party people
at all. They are all of the Anarchist persuasion, and send
out circulars and letters summoning Anarchists to Hulyai Pole
so as to organise their own Anarchist power there." [Trotsky,
Op. Cit.]

As part of this support for anarchist theory, the Makhnovists
organised insurgent, peasant and worker conferences to discuss
key issues in the revolution and the activities of the Makhno
movement itself. Three such conferences had been before Trotsky
wrote his diatribe _The Makhno Movement_ on June 2nd, 1919. A
fourth one was called for June 15th, which Trotsky promptly
banned (on pain of death) on June 4th (see section H.11.13 for
full details). Unlike the Bolshevik dictatorship, the Makhnovists
took every possibility of ensuring the participation of the working
people they were fighting for in the revolution. The calling
of congresses by the Makhnovists shows clearly that the movement
did not, as Trotsky asserted, follow a man, but rather ideas.

As Voline argued, "the movement would have existed without
Makhno, since the living forces, the living masses who 
created and developed the movement, and who brought Makhno
forward merely as their talented military leader, would
have existed without Makhno." Ultimately, the term 
"Makhnovshchina" is used "to describe a unique, completely
original and independent revolutionary movement of the working
class which gradually becomes conscious of itself and steps
out on the broad arena of historical activity." ["preface,"
Arshinov, Op. Cit., p. 19]

H.11.3 Why was Makhno called "Batko"?

Nestor Makhno was often called in the movement "Batko",
which is Ukrainian for "father." Peter Arshinov explains
how and in what circumstances Makhno was given this
name:

"It was . . . in September 1918, that Makhno received
the nickname *Batko* -- general leader of the revolutionary
insurrection in the Ukraine. This took place in the
following circumstances. Local *pomeshchiks* [landed gentry]
in the major centres, the *kulaks* [rich peasants], and
the German authorities [the Ukraine being occupied by them
at the time], decided to eliminate Makhno and his
detachment [of partisans] at any cost. The *pomeshchiks*
created a special volunteer detachment consisting of their
own sons and those of *kulaks* for the decisive struggle
against Makhno. On the 30th of September this detachment,
with the help of the Austro-Germans, corned Makhno in the
region of Bol'shaya Mihhailovka, setting up strong military
posts on all roads. At this time Makhno found himself with
only 30 partisans and one machine gun. He was forced to
make a fighting retreat, manoeuvring in the midst of
numerous enemy forces. Arriving in the forest of Dibrivki,
Makhno found himself in an extremely difficult situation.
The paths of retreat were occupied by the enemy. It was
impossible for the detachment to break through, and
escaping individually was beneath their revolutionary
dignity. No-one in the detachment would agree to abandon
their leader so as to save himself. After some reflection,
two days later, Makhno decided to return to the village
of Bol'shaya Mikhailovka (Dibrivki). Leaving the forest
the partisans met peasants who came to warn them that
there were large enemy forces in Dibrivki and that they
should make haste to go elsewhere. This information did
not stop Makhno and his partisans . . . [and] they set
out for Bol'shaya Mikhailovka. They approached the village
guardedly. Makhno himself and a few of his comrades went
on reconnaissance and saw a large enemy camp on the
church square, dozens of machine guns, hundreds of
saddle horses, and groups of cavalry. Peasants informed
them that a battalion of Austrians and a special
*pomeshchik* detachment were in the village. Retreat
was impossible. Then Makhno, with his usual stubbornness
and determination, said to his companions: 'Well, my
friends! We should all be ready to die on this spot . . .'
The movement was ominous, the men were firm and full of
enthusiasm. All 30 saw only one path before them -- the
path toward the enemy, who had about a thousand well-armed
men, and they all realised that this meant certain death
for them. All were moved, but none lost courage.

"It was at this movement that one of the partisans, Shchus',
turned to Makhno and said:

"'From now on you will be *Batko* to all of us, and we
vow to die with you in the ranks of the insurgents.'

"Then the whole detachment swore never to abandon the
insurgent ranks, and to consider Makhno the general
*Batko* of the entire revolutionary insurrection. Then
they prepared to attack. Shchus' with five to seven
men was assigned to attack the flank of the enemy.
Makhno with the others attacked from the front. With
a ferocious 'Hurrah!' the partisans threw themselves
headlong against the enemy, smiting the very centre
with sabres, rifles and revolvers. The attack had a
shattering effect. The enemy, who were expecting nothing
of the kind, were bowled over and began to flee in panic,
saving themselves in groups and individually, abandoning
arms, machine guns and horses. Without leaving them
time to come to themselves, to become aware of the
number of attacking forces, and to pass to a
counter-attack, the insurgents chased them in separate
groups, cutting them down in full gallop. A part of
the *pomeshchik* detachment fled to the Volchya River,
where they were drowned by peasants who had joined
the battle. The enemy's defeat was complete.

"Local peasants and detachments of revolutionary insurgents
came from all directions to triumphantly acclaim the heroes.
They unanimously agreed to consider Makhno as *Batko* of
the entire revolutionary insurrection in the Urkaine."
[Arshinov, Op. Cit., pp. 59-60]

This was how Makhno acquired the nickname "Batko," which
stuck to him thereafter.

It should be stressed that "Batko" was a nickname and
did not signify any form of autocratic or hierarchical
position within the movement:

"During the civil war, it signified the leadership and control
of a specific area and its population in both civil and
military fields. The central point of the use of the word,
rather than 'leader' or 'dictator' is that the leadership
is usually based on respect, as in Makhno's case, and
always on intimate knowledge of the home territory."
[Michael Malet, Op. Cit., p. 17]

That this was a nickname can be seen from the fact that
"[a]fter 1920 he was usually called 'Malyi' ('Shorty'),
a nickname referring to his short stature, which was
introduced by chance by one of the insurgents." [Peter
Arshinov, Op. Cit., p. 226] To attach significance to
the fact that the peasants called Makhno "Batko" (as
the Bolsheviks did) simply signifies an ignorance of
the Makhnovist movement and its social environment.

H.11.4 Can you give a short overview of the Makhnovist movement?

This section of the FAQ gives a short overview of the Makhnovists
from July 1918 (when Makhno returned to the Ukraine) and August
1921, when it was finally defeated by Bolshevik armed force.
It will be primarily a military history, with the socio-political
aspects of the movement discussed in sections H.11.6 (its theory)
and H.11.7 (its practice). For details of the rise of influence
of Makhno after his release from prison in 1917, see section
H.11.1.

The history of the Makhno movement can be broken up into 
roughly four periods -- from July 1918 to February 1919, then 
the rest of 1919, then January to October 1920 and, finally,
from October 1920 to August 1921. This section will give an
overview of each period in turn.

By the time Makhno arrived back in the Ukraine in July, 1918,
opposition to the German-backed Hetman's regime was mounting and
was frequently met with brutal repression, including reprisal
executions. Makhno was forced to live underground and on the
move, secretly meeting with others, with the Austrians always
close behind. Voline recounts Makhno's activities at this
time:

"Back in Hulyai Pole, Makhno came to the decision to die or
obtain victory for the peasants . . . He did not delay starting
his mission openly among the great masses of peasants,
speaking at improvised meetings, writing and distributing
letters and tracts. By pen and mouth, he called on the peasants
for a decisive struggle against the power of Skoropadsky and
the landlords. He declared tirelessly that the workers should
now take their fates into their own hands and not let their
freedom to act be taken from them . . .

"Besides his appeals, Makhno proceeded immediately to direct
action. His first concern was to form a revolutionary military
unit, sufficiently strong to guarantee freedom of propaganda
and action in the villages and towns and at the same time
to begin guerrilla operations. This unit was quickly organised
.. . .

"His first unit undertook two urgent tasks, namely, pursuing
energetically the work of propaganda and organisation among
the peasants and carrying out a stubborn armed struggle against
all their enemies. The guiding principle of this merciless
struggle was as follows. No lord who persecuted the peasants,
no policeman of the Hetman, no Russian or German officer who
was an implacable enemy of the peasants, deserved any pity;
he must be destroyed. All who participated in the oppression
of the poor peasants and workers, all who sought to suppress
their rights, to exploit their labour, should be executed.

"Within two or three weeks, the unit had already become the
terror, not only of the local bourgeoisie, but also of the
Austro-German authorities." [_The Unknown Revolution_, p. 558]

The night of 26 September saw Hulyai Pole briefly liberated
from Hetman and Austrian troops by the actions of Makhno's
troops in association with local people. On the retreat
from this Makhno's small band grew when he met the partisan
troops headed by Schus. When the Austrians cornered them,
they launched a surprise counter attack and routed the
opposition. This became known as the battle of Dibrivki
and it is from this date, 5 October 1918 that Makhno is
given the nickname 'Batko', meaning "father" (see section
H.11.3 for details). For the next two months already-
existing partisan groups sought out and joined the growing
army.

In this period, Makhno, with portable printing equipment, was
raiding the occupying garrisons and troop trains in the
Southern Ukraine. Normal practice was to execute the
officers and free the troops. In this period the moral of
the occupying troops had crumbled and revolutionary propaganda
had made inroads into many units. This was also affecting the
nationalist troops and on 20 November the first nationalist
unit defected to the Makhnovists. This encouraged them to
return to Hulyai Pole on 27 December and there the
insurrectionary Staff was formed, this body was to lead the
army in the coming years and consisted initially of four old
and trusted friends and three political comrades. The Makhnovist
presence allowed the setting up of a local soviet and the
re-opening of the anarchist clubs. German forces started
pulling back to the major cities and on December 14 the
Hetman fled Kiyiv. In the resulting vacuum, the Makhnovists
rapidly expanded taking in most of the South East Ukraine
and setting up fronts against local whites. The Ukrainian
nationalists had taken power in the rest of the Ukraine under
Petliura and on the 15th December the Makhnovists agreed to
make common cause with them against the Whites. In return
for arms and ammunition they allowed the nationalists to
mobilise in the Makhnovist area (while engaging in propaganda
directed at the mobilised troops on their way by train to
Katerynoslav).

This was a temporary and pragmatic arrangement directed against
the greater enemy of the Whites. However, the nationalists were
no friends of working-class autonomy. The nationalists banned
elections to the Katerynoslav soviet on 6th of December and the
provincial soviet at Kharkiv meet with a similar fate on the 22nd.
[Malet, Op. Cit., p. 22] At the same time as their agreement
with the nationalists, the Makhnovista had set up links with
Bolshevik partisans to the south and before dawn on the 26th
the Bolshevik and Makhnovista forces launched a joint attack
on the nationalists at Katerynoslav. The city was taken but
held only briefly when a nationalist attack on the 29th drove
out all the insurgent forces with heavy losses. In the south,
White reinforcements led to the insurgents being pushed North
and losing Hulyai Pole.

1919 opened with the Makhnovists organising a congress of front-
unit delegates to discuss the progress of the struggle. Over
forty delegates attended and a committee of five was elected,
along with an operational staff to take charge of the southern
front and its rear. It was agreed that local soviets were to
be supported in every way, with no military violence directed
towards them permitted. [Malet, Op. Cit., p. 25]

By the end of January, white reinforcements were landing in the
ports of the south. On January 22nd, a worker, peasant and insurgent
congress was held at Velyka Mykhailivka. A resolution was passed
urging an end to conflict between Makhnovists, Nationalists and
Bolsheviks. An alliance was signed between the Makhnovists and
the Bolsheviks in early February. This agreement ensured that
the Partisan units entered the Red Army as distinct formations,
with their internal organisation (including the election of
commanders) intact, and the Red Army in the area formed a brigade
to be known as "the third Transdnieper Batko Makhno brigade" with
Makhno as commander. The Whites were repulsed and Hulyai Pole
retaken and the front pushed some distance eastwards.

Thus the military situation had improved by the time of the
second worker, peasant and insurgent congress held at Hulyai
Pole on February 12th. This congress set up a "Revolutionary
Military Soviet" to co-ordinate civilian affairs and execute
its decisions. The congress resolved that "the land belongs
to nobody" and should be cultivated without the use of hired
labour. It also accepted a resolution opposing anti-Jewish
pogroms. Also passed was a resolution which sharply attacked
the Bolsheviks, caused by their behaviour since their arrival
in the Ukraine. [Palij, Op. Cit., pp. 154-5] A report by the
commander of the 2nd Red Army, Skatchco, indicates the nature
of this behaviour:

"Little local Chekas are undertaking a relentless campaign
against the Makhnovists, even when they are shedding their
blood at the front. They are hunting them down from the rear
and persecuting them solely for belonging to the Makhnovist
movement . . . It cannot continue like this: the activity of
the local Chekas is deliberately ruining the front, reducing
all military successes to nothing, and contributing to the
creation of a counter-revolution that neither Denikin nor
Krasnov [Hetman of the Don Cossacks] could have achieved. . ."
[quoted by Alexander Skirda, _The Rehabilitation of Makhno_,
p. 346]

Unsurprisingly, the peasants reacted strongly to the
Bolshevik regime. Their "agricultural policy and terrorism" 
ensured that "by the middle of 1919, all peasants, rich and 
poor, distrusted the Bolsheviks." [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 156]
In April alone, there were 93 separate armed rebellions 
against the Bolsheviks in the Ukraine. The "more oppressive
the Bolshevik policy, the more the peasants supported Makhno.
Consequently, the Bolsheviks began to organise more 
systematically against the Makhno movement, both as an
ideology and as a social movement." [Palij, Op. Cit., 
p. 157]

In mid-March the Red Army attacked eastwards. In the course of
this Dybenko, commander of the Trandneiper division, recommended
one of Makhno's commanders for a medal. Then the Makhnovists
attacked the Donbas (east) to relieve the pressure on the Soviet
8th Army caused by a White advance. They took Mariupol following
a White incursion at the beginning of April. A White
counter-offensive resulted in the Red 9th division panicking,
allowing the Whites into Makhno's rear. Red Commander Dybenko
refused orders to come to the Makhnovists aid as he was more
interested in the Crimea (south). [Malet, Op. Cit., p. 31]

This period saw the most sustained freedom for the region around
Hulyai Pole. It had been free of enemy occupation since January,
allowing constructive activity to restart. The inhabitants of
the free region "created new forms of social organisation: 
free workers' communes and Soviets." [Voline, Op. Cit., p. 574]  
The Revolutionary Military Soviet (RMS) called a third 
regional worker, peasant and insurgent congresses had on 
April 10th to review progress and to look forward. This 
was the largest congress to date, with delegates from 72 
volosts containing two million people. The Bolshevik military 
commander Dybenko tried to ban it. The Makhnovists, needless 
to say, ignored him and the RMS made a famous reply to his 
arrogance (see section H.11.13 for more details). 

It was during this period (late 1918 and early 1919), that
the _Nabat_ anarchist federation was organised. "Anarchist 
influence was reported from Aleksandrovsk and other centres,"
notes David Footman, "Anarchists were holding a conference 
in Kursk at about the same time and in one of their resolutions 
it was stated that 'the Ukrainian Revolution will have great 
chances of rapidly becoming Anarchist in its ideas.' The 
position called for renewed Bolshevik measures against
the Anarchists. _Nabat_, the main Anarchist newspaper in the
Ukraine, was suppressed, and its editorial board dispersed
under threat of arrest." [Op. Cit., p. 270] Daniel Guerin
has reproduced two documents from the Nabat federation in
volume II of his _No Gods, No Masters_.

The anarchist influence in and around Hulyai Pole also worried
the Bolsheviks. They started a slander campaign against the
Makhnovists, to the alarm of Antonov, the overall front commander,
who replied in response to an article in Kharkiv Izvestiya:

"The article is the most perverted fiction and does not in
the least correspond to the existing situation. The insurgents
fighting the whites are on a level with the Red Army men, but
are in a far worse condition for supplies." [quoted by Malet,
Op. Cit., p. 33]

In a postscript, Antonov added that the press campaign had
certainly helped turn Makhno anti-Soviet (i.e. anti-Bolshevik,
as Makhno supported free soviets).

At the beginning of May, another partisan commander,
Hryhoriyiv, revolted against the Bolsheviks in the
central Ukraine. Hryhoriyiv, like the Makhnovists, had
joined with the Bolsheviks when they had re-entered the
Ukraine, however his social and political background was
totally different. Hryhoriyiv was a former Tsarist officer,
who had commanded numerous troops under the Petliurist
authority and joined the Bolsheviks once that that regime's
armed forces had disintegrated. Arshinov notes that he had 
"never been a revolutionary" and that there had been a 
"great deal of adventurism in his joining the ranks of 
the Petliurists and then the ranks of the Red Army." His 
temperament was mixed, consisting of "a certain amount 
of sympathy for oppressed peasants, authoritarianism, 
the extravagance of a Cossack chieftain, nationalist 
sentiments and anti-Semitism." [Op. Cit., p. 110]

Hryhoriyov started his revolt by issuing a Universal, or
declaration to the Ukrainian people, which contained a
virulent attack on the Bolsheviks as well as one explicit
anti-Semitic reference, but without mention of Makhno.
The height of the revolt was his appearance in the
suburbs of Katerynoslav, which he was stopped from
taking. He started a pogrom in Yelyzavethrad which
claimed three thousand victims.

Once the Makhnovists had been informed of this rebellion,
an enlarged staff and RMS meeting was held. A telegram was
sent to the soldiers at the front urging them to hold the
front and another to the Bolsheviks with a similar message.
A few days latter, when more information had been received, 
a proclamation was issued against Hyyhoriyiv attacking him 
for seeking to impose a new authority on the working class, 
for encouraging toiling people to attack each other, and 
for inciting pogroms. [Arshinov, Op. Cit., p. 112 and 
pp. 114-7]

While it took a fortnight for Red forces to contain Hryhoriyiv
without trouble, this involved using all available reverses
of all three Ukrainian armies. This left none for Makhno's
hard-pressed forces at the front. In addition, Dybenko withdrew
a front-line regiment from Makhno for use against the revolt
and diverted reinforcements from the Crimea which were
intended for Makhno. Despite this Makhnos forces (now numbering
20,000) were ordered to resume the attack on the whites. This
was due to "unremitting pressure from Moscow to take Taganrog
and Rostov." [Malet, Op. Cit., p. 36] The Makhnovist advance
stopped due to the non-fulfilment of an urgent order for 
ammunition.

On the 19th of May, a White counter-attack not only stopped 
the advance of the Red Army, it forced the 9th division 
(and then the Makhnovists) to retreat. On the 29th, the Whites 
launched a further offensive against the northern Donblas, 
opening a gap between the 13th and 8th Red Armies. Due 
to the gravity of the situation, the RSV summoned a 
fourth congress for June 15th. Trotsky not only banned 
this congress but took the lead in slandering the 
Makhnovists and calling for their elimination (see 
section H.11.13 for details). As well as "this deliberately 
false agitational campaign, the [Bolshevik] blockade of 
the region was carried to the limit . . . The provisioning 
of shells, cartridges and other indispensable equipment
which was used by daily at the front, ceased completely."
[Arshinov, Op. Cit., p. 118] Palij confirms this, noting
that "the supplies of arms and other war material to
Makhno was stopped, thus weakening the Makhno forces
vis-a-vis the Denikin troops." [Op. Cit., p. 175] David
Footman also notes that the Bolshevik "hold-back of supplies
for the Insurgents developed into a blockade of the area.
Makhnovite units at the front ran short of ammunition."
He also mentions that "[i]n the latter part of May the
*Cheka* sent over two agents to assassinate Makhno."
[_Civil War in Russia_, p. 271] 

Needless to say, Trotsky blamed this White success to the
Makhnovists, arguing it was retreating constantly before 
even the slightest attack by the Whites. However, this was
not the case. Analysing these events in July 1919, Antonov
(the commander of the Southern Front before Trotsky replaced
him) wrote:

"Above all, the facts witness that the affirmations about the
weakness of the most contaminated region -- that from Hulyai
Pole to Berdiansk -- are without foundation . . . It is not
because we ourselves have been better organised militarily,
but because those troops were directly defending their native
place . . . Makhno stayed at the front, in spite of the flight
of the neighbouring 9th division, following by the whole of
the 13th army . . . The reasons for the defeat on the
southern front do not rest at all in the existence of
'Ukrainian partisans' . . . above all it must be attributed
to the machinery of the southern front, in not keeping its
fighting spirit and reinforcing its revolutionary discipline."
[quoted by Alexander Skirda, _The Rehabilitation of Makhno_,
p. 348]

This, incidentally, tallies with Arshinov's account that
"hordes of Cossacks had overrun the region, *not through
the insurrectionary front but from the left flank where
the Red Army was stationed.*" [Op. Cit., p. 126] For what
it is worth, General Denikin himself concurs with this
account of events, noting that by the 4th of June his
forces "repulsed the routed and demoralised contingents
of the Eight and Thirteenth Soviet Armies . . . The
resistance of the Thirteenth Army being completely 
broken." He notes that an attempt by the Fourteenth
Army (which Makhno's troops were part of) to attack on 
the flank came to nothing. He only mentions Makhno when 
he recounts that "General Shkuro's division routed Makhno
at Hulyai Pole." [_The White Armies_, p. 272] With 
Whites broken through on their flank and with limited 
ammunition and other supplies (thanks to the Bolsheviks),
the Makhnovists had no choice but to retreat.

It was around this time that Trotsky, in a public meeting 
in Kharkov, "announced that it were better to permit the 
Whites to remain in the Ukraine than to suffer Makhno. The 
presence of the Whites, he said, would influence the Ukrainian 
peasantry in favour of the Soviet Government, whereas Makhno 
and his *povstantsi*, would never make peace with the 
Bolsheviki; they would attempt to possess themselves of 
some territory and to practise their ideas, which would be 
a constant menace to the Communist Government." [Emma Goldman,
_My Disillusionment in Russia_, p. 63]

Due to this Bolshevik betrayal, the Makhnovist sector was
in very grave danger. At Hulyai Pole, a peasant regiment
was scraped together in 24 hours in an attempt to save the
town. It encountered White Cossacks ten miles away from
the town and was mown down. The Whites entered Hulyai
Pole the next day (June 6th) and gave it a good going over.
On the same day, the Bolsheviks issued an order for Makhno's
arrest. Makhno was warned and put in his resignation, arguing
that it was "an inviolable right of the workers and peasants,
a right won by the revolution, to call congresses on their
own account, to discuss their affairs." Combined with the
"hostile attitude" of the Bolshevik authorities towards him,
which would lead "unavoidably to the creation of a special
internal front," Makhno believed it was his duty to do
what he could to avert it, and so he left his post. [quoted
by Arshinov, Op. Cit., p. 129] While Makhno escaped, his
staff was not so lucky. Five of them were arrested the
same day and shot as a result of Trotsky's order to ban
the fourth congress.

Leaving his troops in the frontline, Makhno left with a small
cavalry detachment. While leaving the rest under Red command,
Makhno made a secret agreement with his regimental
commanders to await a message from him to leave the Red
Army and join up against with the partisans. On the 9th and
10th of June, Hulyai Pole was retaken by Bolshevik forces,
who took the opportunity to attack and sack the Makhnovist
communes. [Arshinov, Op. Cit., p. 86f]

After intense fighting, the Whites finally split the Southern
Front into three on June 21st. Needless to say, Trotsky and
the Bolsheviks blamed this on the partisan forces (even
stating that they had "opened the front" to the Whites). This
was nonsense, as noted above. 

After leaving the front, Makhno took refuge in the
Chorno-Znamenski forest before continuing the retreat north
and skirmishing with Red Army units. This brought him into
the territory held by Hryhoriyiv and this, in turn, meant
they had to proceed carefully. While the Makhnovists had
made a public denunciation of Hryhoriyiv, Makhno was
approaching the centre of Hryhoriyov's remaining influence.
Surrounded by enemies, Makhno had little choice but to
begin discussions with Hryhoriyiv. This was problematic
to say the least. Hryhoriyiv's revolt had been tinged with
anti-Semitism and had seen at least one major pogrom. Being
faced with Hryhoriyov's anti-Semitism and his proposal for 
an alliance with the Whites against the Reds led the
Makhnovists to plot his downfall at a meeting planned
for the 27th July.

This meeting had originally been called to discuss the
current tasks of the insurgents in the Ukraine and was
attended by nearly 20,000 insurgents and local peasants.
Hryhoriyiv spoke first, arguing that the most urgent
task was to chase out the Bolsheviks and that they
should ally themselves with any anti-Red forces available
(a clear reference to the Whites under Denikin). The
Makhnovist Chubenko spoke next, declaring that the
"struggle against the Bolsheviks could be revolutionary
only if it were carried out in the name of the social
revolution. An alliance with the worst enemies of
the people -- with generals -- could only be a
counter-revolutionary and criminal adventure."
Following him, Makhno "demanded before the entire congress"
that Hryhoriyiv "immediately answer for the appalling
pogrom of Jews he had organised in Elisavetgrad in May,
1919, as well as other anti-Semitic actions." [Arshinov,
Op. Cit., p. 136]

Seeing that things were going badly, Hryhoriyiv went
for his revolver, but was shot by a Makhnovist. Makhno
finished him off. Makhnovist guards disarmed the leading
Hryhoriyivists. Then Makhno, Chubenko and others justified
the killing before the mass meeting, which approved the
act passing a resolution that stated that Hryhoriyiv's
death was "an historical and necessary fact, for his 
policy, acts and aims were counter-revolutionary and mainly
directed to helping Denikin and other counter-revolutionaries,
as is proved by his Jewish pogroms." [quoted by Malet,
Op. Cit., p. 42] The troops under Hryhoriyiv became part
of the general Insurrectionary Army.

At the end of July, Makhno recalled the troops he had earlier
left in the Red Army and by mid-August the forces met up,
becoming an army of some 15,000. At Mykolaiv, the Red Army units
were defecting to Makhno in large numbers due in part to the
feeling that the Red Army were abandoning the defence of the
Ukraine. This was the start of Denikin's massive push north and
Petliura's push east. By the end of August, Makhno felt strong
enough to go on the offensive against the Whites. Superior
White forces pushed the Makhnovists further and further west,
away from their home region. "Denikin," in Voline's words, "not
only made war on the army as such, but also on the whole
peasant population. In addition to the usual persecutions
and beatings, the villages he occupied were burnt and
wrecked. The greater part of the peasants' dwellings were
looted and wrecked. Hundreds of peasants were shot. The
women maltreated, and nearly all the Jewish women . . .
were raped." This repression "obliged the inhabitants of the
villages threatened by the approach of the Denikinists to
abandon their hearths and flee. Thus the Makhnovist army
was joined and followed in their retreat by thousands of
peaant families in flight from their homes with their
livestock and belongings. It was a veritable migration.
An enormous mass of men, women and children trailed after
the army in its slow retreat towards the west, a retreat
which gradually extended over hundreds of kilometres."
[Op. Cit., p. 607]

Meeting the Nationalists in mid-September, it was agreed on both
sides that fighting would only aid the Whites and so the Makhnovists
entered a non-aggression pact with Petliura. This enabled them to
offload over 1,000 wounded. The Makhnovists continued their
propaganda campaign against the Nationalists, however. By the
24th of September, intelligence reports suggested that White forces
had appeared to the west of their current position (i.e. where
the Nationalists where). The Makhnovists concluded that the only
way this could have happened was if the Nationalists had allowed
the Whites to cross their territory (the Nationalists disputed
this, pointing to the fighting that had started two days before
between them and the Whites).

This meant that the Makhnovists were forced to fight the 
numerically superior Whites. After two days of desperate fighting, 
the Whites were routed and two regiments were destroyed at the 
battle of Peregonovka village. Makhno's forces then conducted an 
incredibly rapid advance in three directions helped by their 
mobile cart-transported infantry, in three days smashing three 
reserve regiments and at the greatest point advancing 235 miles 
east. On the 6th October a drive to the south started which took 
key White ports and captured a huge quantity of equipment including 
600 trucks of British-supplied ammunition and an aeroplane. This 
was disastrous for Denikin whose forces had reached the northernmost 
point on their advance on Moscow, for these ports were key for his 
supply routes. The advance continued, cutting the railway route 
and so stopping all shells reaching Denikin's Moscow front.

Denikin was forced to send some of his best troops from the Moscow
front to drive back the Makhnovists and British boats were sent to
towns on the coast where Makhno might retreat through. The key
city of Katerinoslav was taken with the aid of a workers' uprising on
November 9th and held for a month before the advancing Whites and a
typhoid epidemic which was to devastate the Makhnovista ranks by the
end of the year forced them out of the city. In December, the Red Army
advance made possible by Makhno's devastation of Denikin's supply lines
continued.

Thus Voline:

"It is necessary to emphasise here the historic fact that the
honour of having annihilated the Denikinist counter-revolution
in the autumn of 1919, belongs entirely to the Makhnovist
Insurrectionary Army. If the insurgents had not won the decisive
victory of Peregonovka, and had not continued to sap the bases
in Denikin's rear, destroying his supply service for artillery,
food and ammunition, the Whites would probably have entered
Moscow in December 1919 at the latest." [Op. Cit., p. 625]

In December the Red Army advance made possible by Makhno's
devastation of Denikin's supply lines continued. By early
January the Reds had split White forces into three and their
troops had reached Katerynoslav. The attitude of the 
Bolsheviks to the Makhnovists had already been decided. 
On December 12th, 1919, Trotsky stated that when the two 
forces met, the Bolsheviks had "an order . . . from which 
we must not retreat one single step." While we discuss this 
secret order in more depth in section H.11.13, we will note 
here that it gave partisans the option of becoming "fully 
subordinate to [Bolshevik] command" or "be subjected to
ruthless punishment." [_How the Revolution Armed_, 
vol. II., pp. 110-1 and p. 442] Another secret order to
the 45th division issued on January 4th instructed them to
"annihilate Makhnovist bands" and "disarm the population."
The 41st was sent "into reserve" to the Hulyai Pole region.
This was "five days before Makhno was outlawed, and shows that
the Bolshevik command had a clear view of Makhno's future,
even if the latter did not." [Malet, Op. Cit., p. 54] 

Unaware of this, the Makhnovista put out propaganda leaflets
directed at the Red Army rank and file, appealing to them as
comrades. At Aleksandrovsk on December 5th talks occurred
between a representative of the Makhnovists and the commander
of the 45th division's 1st brigade. These broke down when
Makhno was ordered to the Polish front, which the Makhnovists
refused. On January 9th, Yegorov, commander of the Red Army
southern front, used this pretext to outlaw Makhno. This
outlawing was engineered deliberately by the Bolsheviks:

"The author of the order realised at that time there was no
real war between the Poles and the Bolsheviks at that time
and he also knew that Makhno would not abandon his region
.. . . Uborevich [the author] explained that 'an appropriate
reaction by Makhno to this order would give us the chance
to have accurate grounds for our next steps' . . . [He]
concluded: 'The order is a certain political manoeuvre and,
at the very least, we expect positive results from Makhno's
realisation of this.'" [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 210]

In addition, war with Poland did not break out until the
end of April, over three months later.

Needless to say, the Makhnovists *did* realise the political
motivations behind the order. As Arshinov notes, "[s]ending
the insurrectionary army to the Polish front meant
removing from the Ukraine the main nerve centre of the
revolutionary insurrection. This was precisely what the
Bolsheviks wanted: they would then be absolute masters of
the rebellious region, and the Makhnovists were perfectly
aware of this." Moreover, the Makhnovists considered the
move "physically impossible" as "half the men, the entire
staff and the commander himself were in hospital with
typhus." [Op. Cit., p. 163]

This was the signal for nine months of bitter fighting between
the Red Army and the Makhnovists. Military events in this period
are confused, with the Red Army claiming victory again and again,
only for the Makhnovists to appear somewhere else. Hulyai Pole
changed hands on a couple of occasions. The Bolsheviks did not
use local troops in this campaign, due to fear of fraternisation.
In addition, they used "new tactics," and "attacked not only
Makhno's partisans, but also the villages and towns in which
the population was sympathetic toward Makhno. They shot
ordinary soldiers as well as their commanders, destroying
their houses, confiscating their properties and persecuting
their families. Moreover the Bolsheviks conducted mass arrests
of innocent peasants who were suspected of collaborating in
some way with the partisans. It is impossible to determine
the casualties involved." They also set up "Committees of
the Poor" as part of the Bolshevik administrative apparatus,
which acted as "informers helping the Bolshevik secret police
in its persecution of the partisans, their families and
supporters, even to the extent of hunting down and executing
wounded partisans." [Palij, Op. Cit., pp. 212-3]

In addition to this suffering, the Bolshevik decision to
attack Makhno rather than push into the Crimea was also to
prolong the civil war by nine more months. The Whites
re-organised themselves under General Wrangel, who began a
limited offensive in June. Indeed, the Bolshevik "policy of
terror and exploitation turned almost all segments of Ukrainian
society against the Bolsheviks, substantially strengthened
the Makhno movement, and consequently facilitated the
advance of the reorganised anti-Bolshevik force of General
Wrangel from the Crimea into South Ukraine, the Makhno
region." [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 214]

It was widely believed on the White side that Makhno was ready
to co-operate with them and, desperate for men, Wrangel decided
to appeal to the Makhnovists for an alliance. Their response
was simple and direct, they decided to immediately execute his
delegate and publish both his letter and a response in the
Makhnovist paper "The Road to Freedom." [Malet, Op. Cit.,
p. 60] Of course, this did not stop the Bolsheviks later
claiming such an alliance existed!

Ironically enough, at a general assembly of insurgents, it
was decided that "the destruction of Wrangel" would "eliminate
a threat to the revolution" and so free "all of Russia"
from "the counter-revolutionary barrage." The mass of workers
and peasants "urgently needed an end to all those wars" and
so they proposed "to the Communists that hostilities between
them and the Makhnovists be suspended in order that they
might wipe out Wrangel. In July and August, 1920, telegrams
to this effect were sent to Moscow and Kharkov." There was
no reply and the Bolsheviks "continued their war against the
Makhnovists, and they also continued their previous campaign
of lies and calumnies against them." [Arshinov, Op. Cit.,
p. 176]

In July and August the Makhnovists went on the offensive,
raiding the Bolsheviks in three provinces and attacking the
Red Army infrastructure. Wrangel began another offensive in
September, driving the Red Army back again and again and
threatening the Makhnovist area. Faced with Wrangel's
success, the Bolsheviks started to rethink their position
on Makhno, although on the 24th of September the Bolshevik
commander-in-chief Kamenev was still declaring the need
for "the final liquidation of the Makhno band." [Malet,
Op. Cit., p. 62] A few days later, the Bolsheviks changed
their mind and negotiations began.

So, by October 1920, the success of the Wrangel offensive was
again forcing the Bolsheviks and Makhnovists to put aside
their differences and take on the common enemy. A deal was
reached and on October 2nd, Frunze, the new Red Army commander
of the Southern Front, ordered a cessation of hostilities
against the Makhnovists. A statement from the Soviet of
the Revolutionary Insurgent Army of the Ukraine (Makhnovists)
explained the treaty as necessitated by the White offensive
but also representing a victory over the "high-handed
communists and commissars" in forcing them to recognise
the "free insurrection." [Malet, Op. Cit., p. 64]

The agreement was signed between October 10th and 15th.
It consisted of two parts, a Political and a Military
agreement (see section H.11.13 for full details). The
Political agreement simply gave the Makhnovists and
anarchists the rights they should have had according to the
Soviet Constitution. The Military agreement resulted in
the Makhnovists becoming part of the Red Army, keeping
their established internal structure and, significantly,
stopped them from accepting into their ranks any Red Army
detachments or deserters therefrom. According to
Bolshevik sources, "there was never the slightest
intention on the Bolshevik side of keeping to the
agreement once its military value had passed."
[David Footman, Op. Cit., p. 296]

Even before the agreement came into effect, the Makhnovists
were fighting alongside the Bolsheviks and between October
4 and 17, Hulyai Pole was retaken by the Aleksandrovsk group,
which included 10,000 Makhnovista. On October 22, Aleksandrovsk
was taken with 4,000 white prisoners and from then to early
November the Makhnovists cut through Wrangel's rear, hoping to
cut off his retreat by seizing the Crimean passes. The Whites
fought a skilful rearguard which together with the new White
fortifications on the peninsula held up the advance. But by
the 11th, his hold in the Crimea gone, Wrangel had no choice
but to order a general retreat to the ports and an evacuation.
Even the Bolsheviks had to acknowledge that the "Makhnovist
units fulfilled their military tasks with no less heroism
than the Red Army units." [quoted by Malet, Op. Cit., p. 69]

On hearing this success on 16th November, the reaction of the
Makhnovista still at Hulyai Pole was cynical but realistic:
"It's the end of the agreement. I'll bet you anything that
the Bolsheviks will be on us within the week." [quoted by
Malet, Op. Cit., p. 70] They were not wrong. Already Frunze,
the Red Army commander, had ordered two entire cavalry armies
to concentrate near Hulyai Pole at the same time as he ordered
the Makhnovist forces to the Caucasus Front! By 24th November
Frunze was preparing for the treachery to come, in Order 00149
(which was not sent to the Makhnovist units) saying if they
had not departed to the Caucasus front by the 26th "the Red
regiments of the front, who have now finished with Wrangel,
will start speaking a different language to these Makhnovist
youths." [quoted by Malet, Op. Cit., p. 71]

Of course this treachery went right to the top, just before the
26th "deadline" (which Makhno, not having seen the orders, was
unaware of), Lenin urged Rakovski, head of the Ukrainian
government to "[k]eep a close watch on all anarchists and
prepare documents of a criminal nature as soon as possible,
on the basis of which charges can be preferred against them."
[quoted by Malet, Op. Cit., p. 71] Indeed, it later appeared
the treachery had been prepared from at least 14th or 16th
November, as prisoners captured later stated they had
received undated anti-Makhnovist proclamations on that
date. [Malet, Ibid.]

At 3am on the 26th the attacks on the Makhnovists started.
Alongside this one of the Makhnovist commanders was lured
to a meeting by the Bolsheviks, seized and shot. Some
Makhnovist forces managed to break through the encircling
Bolsheviks but only after taking heavy losses -- of the
2,000-4,000 cavalry at Simferopol, only 250 escaped. By the
1st December, Rakovsi reported the imminent demise of the
Makhnovists to the Kharkiv soviet only to have to eat his
words when Makhno routed the 42nd division on the 6th,
retaking Hulyai Pole and 6,000 prisoners, of whom 2,000
joined his forces. [Malet, Op. Cit., p. 72] Simultaneously 
with the attack on the Makhnovists, the Bolsheviks rounded 
up all known anarchists in the Ukraine (many of whom were 
in Kharkiv waiting for a legally organised _Nabat_ conference
to begin). 

In the resulting struggle between the two forces, 
as Palij notes, the "support of the population was a
significant advantage to Makhno, for they supplied 
the partisans with needed material, including horses
and food, while the Red troops operated among a foreign
and hostile people." The Bolsheviks found that the peasants 
not only refused to supply them with goods, they also 
refused to answer their questions or, at best, gave 
answers which were vague and confusing. "In contrast
to the Bolsheviks, Makhno partisans received detailed,
accurate information from the population at all times."
[Palij, Op. Cit., pp. 236-7] 

Frunze brought in extra forces and ordered both the
"annihilation of the Makhnovists" and total disarming of
the region. Plagued by desertions, it was also ordered that
all Makhnovist prisoners were to be shot, to discourage
the local population and Red Army soldiers thinking of
joining them. There is also evidence of unrest in the
Azov fleet, with acts of sabotage being carried out by
sailors to prevent their weapons being used against the
Makhnovists. [Malet, Op. Cit., p. 73] While it was common 
practice for the Bolsheviks to shoot all Makhnovist prisoners, 
the "existence of roundup detachments at the end of 1920, 
whose task was to re-collect prisoners freed by the Makhnovists" 
shows that the Makhnovists did not reciprocate in kind. 
[Malet Op. Cit., p. 129]

At the end of 1920, the Makhnovists had ten to fifteen
thousand troops and the "growing strength of the Makhno
army and its successes caused serious concern in the
Bolshevik regime, so it was decided to increase the
number of troops opposing Makhno." [Palij, Op. Cit.,
p. 237] All the pressure exerted by the Bolsheviks was
paying off. Although Makhno repeatedly broke through
numerous mass encirclements and picked up deserters from
the Red Army, his forces were being eroded by the far
greater numbers employed against them. In addition,
"the Red command worked out new plans to fight Makhno
by stationing whole regiments, primarily cavalry, in
the occupied villages, to terrorise the peasants and
prevent them from supporting Makhno. . . Also the
Cheka punitive units were constantly trailing the
partisans, executing Makhno's sympathisers and the
partisans' families." [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 238] In
spite of the difficult conditions, Makhno was still
able to attract some Red Army soldiers and even whole
units to his side. For example, "when the partisans
were fighting Budenny's Fourth Cavalry Division, their
First Brigade, commanded by Maslak, joined Makhno." 
[Palij, Op. Cit., p. 239]

Makhno was forced to leave his home areas of operations
and flee east, then west again. By early January his
forces had fought 24 battles in 24 days. This pattern
continued throughout March and April into May. In June, the
Bolsheviks changed their strategy to one of predicting where
Makhno was heading and garrisoning troops in that area. In
one battle on 15 June, Frunze himself was almost captured.
Despite this, the insurgents were very weak and their
peasant base was exhausted by years of war and civil war.
In the most sympathetic areas, Red Army troops were garrisoned
on the peasants. Thus Palij:

"[T]hrough combat losses, hardship, and sickness, the
number of Makhno partisans was diminishing and they 
were cut off from their main sources of recruits and 
supplies. The Ukrainian peasants were tried of the endless
terror caused by successive occupation of village after
village by the Red troops and the Cheka. The continuous
fighting and requisitions were leaving the peasants 
with little food and horses for the partisans. They could
not live in a state of permanent revolution. Moreover, 
there was extreme drought and consequently a bad harvest
in Ukraine, especially in the region of the Makhno movement."
[Op. Cit., pp. 240-1]

The state terrorism and the summer drought caused Makhno 
to give up the struggle in mid-August and instead fight
his way to the Dniester with the last of his forces and
cross into Romania on August 26. Some of his forces
which stayed behind were still active for a short time.
In November 1921 the Cheka seized 20 machine guns and
2,833 rifles in the new Zaporizhya province alone.

For more details of the history of the movement, Michael
Malet's _Nestor Makhno in the Russian Revolution_ is
an excellent summary. Michael Palij's _The Anarchism of
Nestor Makhno_ is also worth consulting, as are the
anarchist histories of Voline and Arshinov.

H.11.5 How were the Makhnovists organised?

Being influenced by anarchist ideas, the Makhnovists were
organised along libertarian lines. This meant that in both
civilian and military areas, self-management was practised.
This section discusses the military organisation, while
the next discusses the social aspect of the movement.

By practising self-management, the Makhnovists offered a
completely different model of military organisation to that
of both the Red Army and traditional military forces. While
the army structure changed depending on its circumstances,
the core ideas remained. These were as follows:

"The Makhnovist insurrectionary army was organised according
to three fundamental principles: voluntary enlistment, the
electoral principle, and self-discipline.

"*Voluntary enlistment* meant that the army was composed
only of revolutionary fighters who entered it of their
own free will.

"*The electoral principle* meant that the commanders of
all units of the army, including the staff, as well as
all the men who held other positions in the army, were
either elected or accepted by the insurgents of the unit
in question or by the whole army.

"*Self-discipline* meant that all the rules of discipline
were drawn up by commissions of insurgents, then approved
by general assemblies of the various units; once approved,
they were rigorously observed on the individual responsibility
of each insurgent and each commander." [Op. Cit., p. 96]

Voline paints a similar picture. He also notes that the
electoral principle was sometimes violated and commanders
appointed "in urgent situations by the commander himself,"
although such people had to be "accepted without reservation"
by "the insurgents of the unit in question or by the whole
army." [Op. Cit., p. 584]

Thus the Makhnovist army, bar some deviation provoked
by circumstances, was a fundamentally democratic organisation.
The guerrillas elected the officers of their detachments, and,
at mass assemblies and congresses, decided policy and discipline
for the army. In the words of historian Michael Palij:

"As the Makhno army gradually grew, it assumed a more
regular army organisation. Each tactical unit was
composed of three subordinate units: a division consisted
of three brigades; a brigade, of three regiments; a
regiment, of three  battalions. Theoretically commanders
were elected; in practice, however, the top commanders
were usually carefully selected by Makhno from among his
close friends. As a rule, they were all equal and if
several units fought together the top commanders
commanded jointly. The army was nominally headed by
a Revolutionary Military Council of about ten to
twenty members . . . Like the commanders, the council
members were elected, but some were appointed by Makhno
.. . . There also was an elected cultural section in the
army. Its aim was to conduct political and ideological
propaganda among the partisans and peasants." [Palij,
Op. Cit., pp. 108-9]

The Revolutionary Military Council was elected and directly
accountable to the regional workers, peasants and insurgent
congresses. It was designed to co-ordinate the local
soviets and execute the decisions of the regional congresses.

Hence Voline:

"This council embraced the whole free region. It was supposed
to carry out all the economic, political, social and military
decisions made at the congress. It was thus, in a certain
sense, the supreme executive of the whole movement. *But it
was not at all an authoritarian organ.* Only strictly
executive functions were assigned to it. It confined itself
to carrying out the instructions and decisions of the
congress. At any moment, it could be dissolved by the
congress and cease to exist." [Op. Cit., p. 577]

As such, when Palij notes that this council "had no decisive
voice in the army's actions," he misses the point of the
council. [Palij, Ibid.] It did not determine the military
affairs of the army, but rather the interaction of the
military and civilians and made sure that the decisions of
congresses were executed. Thus the whole army was nominally
under the control of the regional congresses of workers,
peasants and insurgents. At these congresses, delegates of
the toiling people decided upon the policy to be pursued by
the Makhnovist Army. The Revolutionary Military Soviet existed
to oversee that decisions were implemented, not to determine
the military activities of the troops.

It should also be noted that women not only supported the
Makhnovists, they also "fought alongside the men." [Arshinov,
Op. Cit., p. 145] However, "the participation of women in
the movement (by all accounts, quite substantial)" needs
"further investigation." [Serge Cipko, "Nestor Makhno: A
Mini-Historiography of the Anarchist Revolution in Ukraine,
1917-1921," pp. 57-75, _The Raven_, no. 13, p. 75]

At its height, the army was made up of infantry, cavalry,
artillery, machine-gun units, and special branches, including
an intelligence service. As the success of partisan warfare
depends upon mobility, the army gradually mounted its
infantry in light carts (called "tachanka") during 1918-19.
As Michael Malet notes, this was a "novel tactic" and Makhno
"could be described as the inventor of the motorised division
before the car came into general use." [Op. Cit., p. 85] The
tachanka was used to transport as many troops as possible,
giving the Makhnovists mobile infantry which could keep up
with the cavalry. In addition, a machine-gun was sometimes
mounted in the rear (in autumn 1919, the 1st machine-gun
regiment consisted of 120 guns, all mounted on tachanki).

For the most part the Makhnovist army was a volunteer army,
unlike all others operating in the Russian Civil War. However,
at times of crisis attempts were made to mobilise troops.
For example, the Second regional congress agreed that a
"general voluntary and equalitarian mobilisation" should
take place. This meant that this appeal, "sanctioned by the
moral authority of the congress, emphasised the need for
fresh troops in the insurrectionary army, no-one was compelled
to enlist." [Voline, Op. Cit., p. 577] The Congress itself
passed a resolution after a long and passionate debate that
stated it "rejected 'compulsory' mobilisation, opting for
an 'obligatory' one; that is, each peasant who is able to
carry arms, should recognise his obligation to enlist in
the ranks of the partisans and to defend the interests of
the entire toiling people of Ukraine." [quoted by Palij,
Op. Cit., p. 155] There were far more volunteers than
arms, the opposite of what occurred to both the Reds
and Whites during the Civil War. [Malet, Op. Cit., p. 106]

The third Congress decided to conduct a voluntary mobilisation
all those born between 1889 and 1898. This congress told them
to assemble at certain points, organise themselves and elect
their officers. Another mobilisation decided at the Aleksandrovsk
congress never took place. How far the Makhnovists were forced
to conscript troops is still a matter of debate. Paul Avrich,
for example, states that "voluntary mobilisation" in reality
"meant outright conscription, as all able-bodied men were
required to serve." [Op. Cit., p. 114] On the other side,
surviving leaflets from 1920 "are in the nature of appeals
to join up, not instructions." [Malet,Op. Cit., p. 105]
Trotsky, ironically, noted that "Makhno does not have
general mobilisations, and indeed these would be impossible,
as he lacks the necessary apparatus." [quoted by Malet,
Op. Cit., p. 106] It is probably right to say that the
Congresses desired that every able-bodied man join the
Makhnovist army, but they simply did not have the means
to enforce that desire and that the Makhnovists tried their
best to avoid conscription by appealing to the peasants'
revolutionary conscience, with some success.

As well as the military organisation, there was also an 
explicitly anarchist federation operating in the Ukraine 
at the same time. The first conference to organise a
"Confederation of Anarchist Organisations of the Ukraine"
was held between November 12th to 16th, 1918. The new
federation was named "Nabat" (Alarm) and had a six-person
Secretariat. Kharkiv was chosen as its headquarters, while
it had groups in other major Ukrainian cities (including
Kyiv, Odessa and Katerynoslav). The final organisation of
the Nabat was accomplished at a conference held in April
2-7, 1919. The federation aimed to form a "united anarchism"
and guaranteed a substantial degree of autonomy for every
participating group and individual. A number of newspapers 
appeared in a Ukrainian towns and cities (mostly entitled
_Nabat_), as did leaflets and pamphlets. There was a main
weekly paper (called _Nabat_) which was concerned largely
with anarchist theory. This completed the Makhnovist 
papers _Road to Freedom_ (which was often daily, sometimes
weekly and dealt with libertarian ideas, everyday problems 
and information on partisan activities) and _The Makhnovist 
Voice_ (which dealt primarily with the interests, problems,
and tasks of the Makhnovist movement and its army). The
Nabat organisation was also published a pamphlet dealing 
with the Makhnovist movement's problems, the economic 
organisation of the region, the free soviets, the social
basis of the society that was to be built, and the 
problem of defence. 

Unsurprisingly, the Nabat federation and the Makhnovists
worked together closely, with Nabat members worked in
the army (particularly its cultural section). Some of
its members were also elected to the Makhnovist Revolutionary
Military Soviet. It should be noted that the Nabat federation
gained a number of experienced anarchists from Soviet Russia,
who fled to the Ukraine to escape Bolshevik repression. The
Nabat shared the fortunes of the Makhno movement. It carried
on its work freely as long as the region was controlled by
the Makhnovist Army, but when Bolshevik or White forces 
prevailed, the anarchists were forced underground. The
movement was finally crushed in November 1920, when the
Bolsheviks betrayed the Makhnovists. 

As can be seen, the Makhnovists implemented to a large degree 
the anarchist idea of self-managed, horizontally federated
associations (when possible, of course). Both the two major
organisational layers to the Makhnovist structure (the army
and the congresses) were federated horizontally and the "top"
structure was essentially a mass peasant, worker and guerrilla
decision-making coalition. In other words, the masses took
decisions at the "top" level that the Revolutionary Military
Soviet and the Makhnovist army were bound to follow. The army
was answerable to the local Soviets and to the congresses of
soviets and, as we discuss in section H.11.7, the Makhnovists
called working-people and insurgent congresses whenever they
could.

The Makhnovist movement was, fundamentally, a working class
movement. It was "one of the very few revolutionary movements
to be led and controlled throughout by members of 'the toiling
masses.'" [David Footman, Op. Cit., p. 245] It applied its
principles of working class autonomy and self-organisation
as far as it could. Unlike the Red Army, it was predominantly
organised from the bottom up, rejecting the use of Tsarist
officers, appointed commanders, and other "top-down" ways of
the Red Army (see section H.11.14 for further discussion of
the differences between the two forces).

The Makhnovist army was not by any means a perfect model
of anarchist military organisation. However, compared to
the Red Army, its violations of principle are small and
hardly detract from their accomplishment of applying
anarchist ideas in often extremely difficult circumstances.

H.11.6 Did the Makhnovists have a constructive social programme?

Yes, they did. The Makhnovists spent a great deal of energy and
effort in developing, propagating and explaining their ideas on
how a free society should be created and run. As Michael Malet
noted, the "leading Makhnovists had definite ideas about the ideal
form of social organisation." [_Nestor Makhno in the Russian
Civil War_, p. 107] Moreover, as we discuss in the next section,
they also successfully applied these ideas when and where they
could.

So what was their social programme? Being anarchists, it comprised
two parts, namely political and economic aspects. The Makhnovists
aimed for a true social revolution in which the working classes
(both urban and rural) could actively manage their own affairs and 
society. As such, their social programme reflected the fact 
that oppression has its roots in both political and economic power 
and so aimed at eliminating both the state and private property. 
As the core of their social ideas was the simple principle of 
working-class autonomy, the idea that the liberation of 
working-class people must be the task of the working-class
people themselves. This vision is at the heart of anarchism
and was expressed most elegantly by Makhno:

"Conquer or die -- such is the dilemma that faces the Ukrainian
peasants and workers at this historic moment . . . But we will
not conquer in order to repeat the errors of the past years,
the error of putting our fate into the hands of new masters;
we will conquer in order to take our destinies into our own
hands, to conduct our lives according to our own will and
our own conception of the truth." [quoted by Peter Arshinov,
_The History of the Makhnovist Movement_, p. 58]

As such, the Makhnovists were extremely hostile to the idea
of state power, recognising it simply as a means by which the
majority are ruled by the few. Equally, they were opposed to
wage slavery (to private or state bosses), recognising that as
long as the workers do not manage their own work, they can
never be free. As they put it, their goals could only be
achieved by an "implacable revolution and consistent struggle
against all lies, arbitrariness and coercion, wherever they
come from, a struggle to the death, a struggle for free
speech, for the righteous cause, a struggle with weapons
in hand. Only through the abolition of all rulers, through
the destruction of the whole foundation of their lies, in
state affairs as well as in political and economic affairs.
And only through the social revolution can the genuine
Worker-Peasant soviet system be realised and can we arrive
at SOCIALISM." [contained in Arshinov, Op. Cit., p. 273]
They, like other anarchists and the Kronstadt rebels, termed
this programme of working class self-management the "third
revolution."

We will discuss the political aspect of the Makhnovist programme
first, then its economic one. However, the Maknovists considered
(correctly) that both aspects could not be separated. As they
put it: "We will not lay down our arms until we have wiped out
once and for all every political and economic oppression and
until genuine equality and brotherhood is established in the
land." [contained in Arshinov, Op. Cit., p. 281] We split the
aspects simply to aid the presentation of their ideas.

At the core of their ideas was what they termed the "Free
Soviet System" (or "free soviets" for short). It was this
system which would allow the working class to create and run
a new society. As they put it:

"[The] Makhnovists realise that the working people are no
longer a flock of sheep to be ordered about by anyone. We
consider the working people capable of building, on their
own and without parties, commissars or generals, their own
FREE SOVIET SYSTEM, in which those who are elected to the
Soviet will not, as now [under the Bolsheviks], command
and order us, but on the contrary, will be only the
executors of the decisions made in our own workers'
gatherings and conferences." [contained in Peter Arshinov,
Op. Cit., pp. 280-1]

Thus the key idea advocated by the leading Makhnovista for
social organisation and decision-making was the "free toilers'
soviet of peasant and worker organisations." This meant they
were to be independent of all central authority and composed
of those who worked, and not political parties. They were to
federate on a local, then regional and then national level,
and power within the federation was to be horizontal and not
vertical. [Michael Malet, Op. Cit., p. 107] Such a system
was in opposition to the Bolshevik practice of Soviets defined
and dominated by political parties with a vertical decision-
making structure that reached its highest point in the Bolshevik
Central Committee.

Thus, for the Makhnovists, the soviet system would be a "bottom-up"
system, one designed not to empower a few party leaders at the
centre but rather a means by which working people could manage
their own affairs. As the put it, the "soviet system is not the
power of the social-democratic Communist-Bolsheviks who now
call themselves a soviet power; rather it is the supreme form
of non-authoritarian anti-state socialism, which expresses itself
in the organisation of a free, happy and independent system of
social life for the working people." This would be based on the
"principles of solidarity, friendship and equality." This
meant that in the Makhnovist system of free soviets, the 
"working people themselves must freely choose their own soviets,
which will carry out the will and desires of the working
people themselvs, that is to say, ADMINISTRATIVE, not ruling
soviets." [contained in Arshinov, Op. Cit., pp. 272-3]

As David Footman summarises, Makhno's "ultimate aims were
simple. All instruments of government were to be destroyed.
All political parties were to be opposed, as all of them
were working for some or other form of new government in
which the party members would assume the role of a ruling
class. All social and economic affairs were to be settled
in friendly discussion between freely elected representatives
of the toiling masses." [Op. Cit., p. 247]

Hence the Makhnovist social organisation was a federation of
self-managed workers' and peasants' councils (soviets), which
would "be only the executors of the decisions made in our
workers' gatherings and conferences." [contained in Arshinov,
Op. Cit., p. 281] In other words, an anarchist system based
on mass assemblies and decision-making from the bottom up.

Economically, as is to be expected, the Makhnovists opposed 
private property, capitalism and wage-slavery. Their economic 
ideas were summarised in a Makhnovist declaration as follows:

"The lands of the service gentry, of the monasteries, of the
princes and other enemies of the toiling masses, with all
their livestock and goods, are passed on to the use of those
peasants who support themselves solely through their own
labour. This transfer will be carried out in an orderly
fashion determined in common at peasant assemblies, which
must remember in this matter not only each of their own
personal interests, but also bear in mind the common
interest of all the oppressed, working peasantry.

"Factories, workshops, mines and other tools and means of
production become the property of the working class as a
whole, which will run all enterprises themselves, through
their trade unions, getting production under way and striving
to tie together all industry in the country in a single,
unitary organisation." [contained in Arshinov, Op. Cit.,
p. 266]

They continually stressed that the "land, the factories, the
workshops, the mines, the railroads and the other wealth of
the people must belong to the working people themselves,
to those who work in them, that is to say, they must be
socialised." This meant a system of use-rights, as "the
land, the mines, the factories, the workshops, the
railroads, and so on, will belong neither to individuals
nor to the government, but solely to those who work with
them." [Op. Cit., p. 273 and p. 281]

In industry, such a system clearly implied a system of
worker's self-management within a system of federated
factory committees or union branches. On the land, it
meant the end of landlordism, with peasants being entitled
to as much land and equipment as they could cultivate
without the use of hired labour. As a Makhnovist congress
in 1919 resolved:

"The land question should be decided on a Ukraine-wide
scale at an all-Ukrainian congress of peasants on the
following basis: in the interests of socialism and the
struggle against the bourgeoisie, all land should be
transferred to the hands of the toiling peasants. According
to the principle that 'the land belongs to nobody' and
can be used only by those who care about it, who cultivate
it, the land should be transferred to the toiling peasantry
of Ukraine for their use without pay according to the norm
of equal distribution." [quoted by Palij, Op. Cit., p. 155]

In addition to advocating the abolition of private property
in land and the end of wage labour by distributing land to
those who worked it, the Makhnovists also supported the
forming of "free" or "working" communes. Like their policy
of land distribution, it also aimed to benefit the poorer
peasants and rural wage labourers. The "free commune" was
a voluntary association of rural workers who took over an
expropriated estate and managed the land in common. The
commune was managed by a general meeting of all its members
and based on the liberty, equality and solidarity of its members.

Clearly, in terms of their economic policies, the Makhnovists
proposed a clear and viable alternative to both rural and
urban capitalism, namely workers' self-management. Industry
and land would be socialised, with the actual management of
production resting in the hands of the workers themselves
and co-ordinated by federated workers' organisations. On the
land, they proposed the creation of voluntary communes which
would enable the benefits of co-operative labour to be applied.
Like their political ideas, their economic ideas were designed
to ensure the freedom of working people and the end of hierarchy
in all aspects of society.

In summary, the Makhnovist had a constructive social ideas which
aimed to ensure the total economic and political emancipation of
the working people. Their vision of a free society was based on
a federation of free, self-managed soviets, the socialisation of 
the means of life and workers' self-management of production by
a federation of labour unions or factory committees. As the
black flags they carried into battle read, "liberty or death"
and "the land to the peasants, the factories to the workers."

H.11.7 Did they apply their ideas in practice?

Yes, the Makhnovists consistently applied their political and social
ideas when they had the opportunity to do so. Unlike the Bolsheviks,
who quickly turned away from their stated aims of soviet democracy
and workers' control in favour of dictatorship by the Bolshevik party,
the Makhnovists did all in their power to encourage, create and defend
working-class freedom and self-management (see section H.11.14 for
further discussion). In the words of historian Christopher Reed:

"there can be no question that the anarchists did everything
they could to free the peasants and workers and give them the
opportunity to develop their own forms of collective control
over land and factories . . . [T]he Ukrainian anarchists fought
under the slogan of land to the peasants, factories to the
workers and power to the soviets. Wherever they had influence
they supported the setting up of communes and soviets. They
introduced safeguards intended to protect direct self-government
from organised interference . . . They conducted relentless
class war against landlords, officers, factory owners and the
commercial classes could expect short shrift from Makhno and
his men, especially if they had taken up arms against the
people or, like the Whites . . ., had been responsible for
looting, pogroms and vicious reprisals against unarmed peasants
on a colossal scale." [_From Tsar to Soviets_, p. 263]

As we discussed in the last section, the core ideas which
inspired the Makhnovists were working-class self-determination
and self-management. They aimed at the creation of a "free
soviet system" and the end of capitalism by rural and industrial
self-management. It is to the credit of the Makhnovists that
they applied these ideas in practice rather than talking about
high principles and doing the exact opposite.

In practice, of course, the war left little room for much
construction work. As Voline pointed out, one of the key
disadvantages of the movement was the "almost continual
necessity of fighting and defending itself against all
kinds of enemies, without being able to concentrate on
peaceful and truly positive works." [_The Unknown Revolution_,
p. 571] However, in the disruption of the Civil War the
Makhnovists applied their ideas when and where they could.

Within the army, as we discussed in section H.11.5, the
insurgent troops elected their own commanders and had
regular mass assemblies to discuss policy and the agreed
norms of conduct within it. In civilian matters, the
Makhnovists *from the start* encouraged working-class
self-organisation and self-government. By late 1917,
in the area around Hulyai Pole "the toiling masses
proceeded . . . to consolidate their revolution. The
little factories functioned . . . under the control of
the workers. The estates were split up . . . among the
peasants . . . a certain number of agricultural communes
were formed." [David Footman, Op. Cit., p. 248]

The aim of the Makhnovists was to "transfer all the lands
owned by the gentry, monasteries, and the state into the
hands of peasants or to organise, if they wished, peasant
communes." [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 70] This policy was
introduced from the start, and by the autumn of 1917, all
land, equipment and livestock around Hulyai Pole had been
expropriated from the gentry and kulaks and placed in the
hands of working peasants. Land reform had been achieved
by the direct action of the peasantry.

However, "many of the peasants understood that the task
was not finished, that it was not enough to appropriate
a plot of land and be content with it. From the hardships
of their lives they learned that enemies were watching
from all sides, and that they must stick together. In
several places there were attempts to organise social
life communally." [Arshinov, Op. Cit., p. 86]

In line with social anarchist theory, the Makhnovists
also tried to introduce collective forms of farming. These
experiments in collective working and living were called
"free" communes. Despite the difficult military situation
communes were established, principally near Hulyai Pole, in
the autumn of 1917. This activity was resumed in February to
March of 1918. They re-appeared in early 1919, once the threat
of counter-revolution had been (temporarily) defeated.

There were four of these communes within five miles of Hulyai
Pole itself and many more further afield. According to Makhno,
these agricultural communes "were in most cases organised by
peasants, though sometimes their composition was a mixture
of peasants and workmen [sic!]. Their organisation was based
on equality and solidarity of the members. All members of
these communes -- both men and women -- applied themselves
willingly to their tasks, whether in the field or the household."
Unlike many communes, people were given the personal space
they desired, so "any members of the commune who wanted
to cook separately for themselves and their children, or
to take food from the communal kitchens and eat it in their
own quarters, met with no objection from the other members."
The management of each commune "was conducted by a general
meeting of all its members." In addition, the communes
decided to introducing anarchist schooling based on the
ideas of Franciso Ferrer (see section J.5.13 for details).
Makhno himself worked on one for two days a week for a
period. [Makhno, quoted by Paul Avrich, _Anarchists in
the Russian Revolution_, pp. 131]

They were set up on the former estates of landlords, and
consisted of around 10 families or 100 to 300 people and
although each had peasant anarchist members not all the
members were anarchists. Makhno worked on Commune No. 1,
which was on the estate of former landlord Klassen. When
re-founded in 1919 this commune was named after Rosa
Luxemburg, the Marxist revolutionary who had recently
been murdered in the German revolution. It was a success,
for by the spring sowing it had grown from nine families
to 285 members working 340 acres of land. The communes
represented a way that poor and middle peasants could
pool resources to work estates that they could not have
worked otherwise and, as Michael Malet points out, "they
were organised from the bottom up, not the top down."
[Op. Cit., p. 121]

However, as Makhno himself acknowledged, while the "majority
of the toiling population saw in the organisation of rural
communes the healthy germ of a new social life" which
could provide a "model of a free and communal form of
life," the "mass of people did not go over to it." They
cited as their reasons "the advance of the German and
Austrian armies, their own lack of organisation, and their
inability to defend this order against the new 'revolutionary'
[Bolshevik] and counter-revolutionary authorities. For
this reason the toiling population of the district limited
their revolutionary activity to supporting in every way
those bold springs." [Makhno, quoted by Avrich, Op. Cit.,
p. 132] Given that the communes were finally destroyed
by White and Red forces in June 1919, their caution
was justified. After this, peace did not return long
enough for the experiment to be restarted.

As Michael Malet argues:

"Very few peasant movements in history have been able to
show in practice the sort of society and type of landholding
they would like to see. The Makhnovist movement is proof
that peasant revolutionaries can put forward positive,
practical ideas." [Op. Cit., p. 121]

The Makhnovist experiments, it should be noted, have strong
similarities to the rural revolution during the Spanish
Revolution of 1936 (see sections I.8.5 and I.8.6 for more
details).

As well as implementing their economic ideas on workers'
self-management, land reform and free communes, the
Makhnovists also organised regional congresses as well
as local soviets. Most of the activity happened in and
around Hulyai Pole, the focal point of the movement.This
was in accord with their vision of a "free soviet system."
Needless to say, the congresses could only be called
during periods of relative calm (i.e. the Makhnovist
home area was not occupied by hostile forces) and so
congresses of insurgents, peasants and workers were
called in early 1919 and another in October of that
year. The actual dates of the regional congresses were:

23 January 1919 at Velyka Mykhailivka

12 February 1919 at Hulyai Pole

10 April 1919 at Hulyai Pole

20 October 1919 at Aleksandrovsk

A congress for the fifteenth of June 1919 never met because
Trotsky unilaterally banned it, under pain of death to
anyone even *discussing* it, never mind calling for it
or attending as a delegate. Unlike the third congress,
which ignored a similar ban by Dybenko, the fourth congress
could not go ahead due to the treacherous attack by the
Red Army that preceded it. Four Makhnovist commanders were
executed by the Red Army for advertising this congress.
Another congress planned for Aleksandrovsk in November
1920 was also prevented by Bolshevik betrayal, namely the
attack after Wrangel had been defeated. [Malet, Op. Cit.,
p. 108] See section H.11.13 for further details.

The reason for these regional congresses was simple, to
co-ordinate the revolution. "It was indispensable," Arshinov
notes, "to establish institutions which unified first a
district composed of various villages, and then the
districts and departments which composed the liberated
region. It was indispensable to find general solutions for
problems common to the entire region. It was indispensable
to create organs suitable for these tasks. And the peasants
did not fail to create them. These organs were the regional
congresses of peasants and workers."  [Op. Cit., pp. 87-8]
These congresses "were composed of delegates of peasants,
workers and of the insurgent army, and were intended to
clarify and record the decisions of the toiling masses and to
be regarded as the supreme authority for the liberated area."
[David Footman, Op. Cit., p. 266]

The first congress, which was the smallest, discussed the
strengthening of the front, the adoption of a common
nomenclature for popular organisations (soviets and the
like) and to send a delegation to convince the draftees
in the Nationalist forces to return home. It was also
decided to organise a second congress. The second congress
was larger, having 245 delegates from 350 districts. This
congress "was strongly anti-Bolshevik and favoured a
democratic socio-political way of life." [Palij, Op. Cit.,
p. 153] One delegate made the issue clear:

"No party has a right to usurp governmental power into
its own hands . . . We want life, all problems, to be
decided locally, not by order from any authority above;
and all peasants and workers should decide their own
fate, while those elected should only carry out the
toilers' wish." [quoted by Palij, Op. Cit., p. 154]

A general resolution was passed, which acknowledged the
fact that the Bolshevik party was "demanding a monopoly of
the Revolution." It also stated:

"With deep regret the Congress must also declare that
apart from external enemies a perhaps even greater danger,
arising from its internal shortcomings, threatens the
Revolution of the Russian and Ukrainian peasants and
workers. The Soviet Governments of Russia and of the
Ukraine, by their orders and decrees, are making efforts
to deprive local soviets of peasants and workers'
deputies of their freedom and autonomy." [quoted by
Footman, Op. Cit., p. 267]

As noted in section H.11.5, the congress also decided to
issue an "obligatory" mobilisation to gather troops for
the Army. It also accepted a resolution on land reform,
stating that the land "belongs to nobody" and could be
used by anyone as long as they did not use wage labour
(see section H.11.6 for the full resolution). The
congress accepted a resolution against plunder,
violence, and anti-Jewish pogroms, recognising it as
an attempt by the Tsarist government to "turn the
attention of all toiling people away from the real
reason for their poverty," namely the Tsarist regime's
oppression. [quoted by Palij, Op. Cit., p. 155]

The second congress also elected the Revolutionary Military
Soviet of Peasants, Workers and Insurgents, which had "no
powers to initiate policy but designed merely to implement
the decisions of the periodic congresses." [Footman, Op. Cit.,
p. 267]

The third congress was the largest and most representative,
with delegates from 72 volosts (in which two million
people lived). This congress aimed to "clarify the
situation and to consider the prospects for the future
of the region." It decided to conduct a voluntary
mobilisation of men to fight the Whites and "rejected,
with the approval of both rich and poor peasants, the
Bolshevik expropriations." [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 158]
Toward the end of the congress, it received a telegram
from the Bolshevik commander Dybenko calling it
"counter-revolutionary," its organisers "outlaws" and
dissolving it by his order. The congress immediately
voted an indignant resolution in rely. This corrected
Dybenko's factual mistakes on who called it, informed
him why it was called, gave him a history lesson on
the Makhnovist region and asked him:

"Can there exist laws made by a few people who call
themselves revolutionaries which permit them to
outlaw a whole people who are more revolutionary
than they are themselves? . . .

"Is it permissible, is it admissible, that they should
come to the country to establish laws of violence,
to subjugate a people who have just overthrown all
lawmakers and all laws?

"Does there exist a law according to which a revolutionary
has the right to apply the most severe penalties to a
revolutionary mass, of which he calls himself the
defender, simply because this mass has taken the good
things which the revolution promised them, freedom
and equality, without his permission?

"Should the mass of revolutionary people perhaps be
silent when such a revolutionary takes away the
freedom which they have just conquered?

"Do the laws of the revolution order the shooting of
a delegate because he believes he ought to carry out
the mandate given him by the revolutionary mass
which elected him?

"Whose interests should the revolutionary defend;
those of the Party or those of the people who set
the revolution in motion with their blood?" [quoted
by Arshinov, Op. Cit., p. 103]

As we discuss in section H.11.13, Trotsky's order to
ban the fourth congress indicates that such laws
do exist, with the "entire peasant and labouring
population are declared guilty of high treason
if they dare participate in their own free congress."
[Arshinov, Op. Cit., p. 123]

The last congress was held between 20th and 26th of October
in Aleksandrovsk. One delegate was to be elected per 3000
people and one delegate per military unit. This gave 270
mostly peasant delegates. Only 18 were workers, of which 6
were Mensheviks, who walked out after Makhno called them
"lapdogs of the bourgeoisie" during the discussion on
"free socio-economic organisations"! [Malet, Op. Cit.,
p. 109] The congress passed a number of resolutions,
concentrating on the care of the wounded and the poorest
part of the population, a voluntary mobilisation, voluntary
peasant contributions to feed the army and forced levies on
the bourgeoisie.

According to Voline, the chairman, Makhnovist ideas were
freely discussed:

"The idea of free Soviets, genuinely functioning in the
interests of the working population; the question of
direct relationships between peasants and city workers,
based on mutual exchange of the products of their
labour; the launching of a libertarian and egalitarian
social organisation in the cities and the country; all
these question were seriously and closely studied by
the delegates themselves, with the assistance and
co-operation of qualified comrades." [Op. Cit., p. 640]

He notes that the congress "decided that the workers,
without any authority, would organise their economic,
political and administrative life for themselves, by
means of their own abilities, and through their own
direct organs, united on a federative basis." [Op. Cit.,
p. 641]

It is significant to note that the congress also discussed
the activities of the Makhnovists within the city itself.
One delegate raised the issue of the activities of the
Kontrrazvedka, the Makhnovist "counter-intelligence"
section. As noted in section H.11.5, the Makhnovists,
like all the armies in the Russian Civil War, had its
intelligence service. It combined a number of functions,
such as military reconnaissance, arrest and holding of
prisoners, counter-insurgency ("Originally it had a
punitive function, but because of improper treatment
of prisoners of war, it was deprived of its punitive
function." [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 300]). The delegate
stated that this "counter-espionage service" was
engaged in "arbitrary acts and uncontrolled actions
-- of which some are very serious, rather like the
Bolshevik Cheka." [quoted by Voline, Op. Cit., p. 643]
Immediately a commission of several delegates was
created to investigate the situation. Voline argues
that "[s]uch an initiative on the part of workers'
delegates would not have been possible under the
Bolshevik regime. It was by activity of this kind that
the congress gave a preview of the way in which a
society should function from the beginning if it
is based on a desire for progress and self-realisation."
[Voline, Ibid.] Sadly, the commission could not
complete its work due to the city being evacuated
soon after the congress.

Another incident shows that under the Makhnovists the
civilian population was in control. A delegate noted
that Klein, the Makhnovist military commander in the
city, had become publicly and riotously drunk after
issuing proclamations against drunkenness. Klein was
called before the congress, which accepted his apology
and his request to be sent to the front, away from
the boredom of desk work which had driven him to drink!
This, according to Voline, showed that the workers and
their congress were the masters and the army its servant.
[Voline, Op. Cit., pp. 645-7]

Outside of the congresses the work of local Soviets was to be
co-ordinated through the Revolutionary Military Soviet (RMS), the
first RMS was set up by the 2nd congress and consisted of one
delegate for each of the 32 volsts the Makhnovista had liberated.
The RMS was to be answerable to the congresses and limited to
implementing their decisions but the difficult military situation
meant this seldom happened. When it did (the 3rd Congress) the
Congress had no problems with its actions in the previous period.
After the Aleksandrovsk congress, the RMS consisted of 22 delegates
including three known Bolsheviks and four known Makhnovists, the
Bolsheviks considered the remaining delegates "anarchists or
anarchist sympathisers".

The military chaos of 1920 saw the RMS dissolved and replaced by
the Soviet of Revolutionary Insurgents of the Ukraine, which
consisted of seven members elected by the insurgent army. Its
secretary was a left Socialist Revolutionary. The RMS in addition
to making decisions between Congresses carried out propaganda work
including the editing of the Makhnovist paper "The Road to Freedom"
and collected and distributed money.

Lastly, we must discuss what happened when the Makhnovists
applied their ideas in any cities they liberated as this
gives a clear idea of the way they applied their ideas in
practice. Anarchist participant Yossif the Emigrant
stated that it was "Makhno's custom upon taking a city
or town to call the people together and announce to
them that henceforth they are free to organise their
lives as they think best for themselves. He always proclaims
complete freedom of speech and press; he does not fill
the prisons or begin executions, as the Communists do."
He stressed it was "the expression of the toilers themselves"
and "the first great mass movement that by its own efforts
seeks to free itself from government and establish economic
self-determination. In that sense it is thoroughly
Anarchistic." [Alexander Berkman, _The Bolshevik Myth_,
pp. 193-5]

Arshinov paints a similar picture:

"As soon as they entered a city, they declared that they
did not represent any kind of authority, that their armed
forces obliged no one to any sort of obligation and had
no other aim than to protect the freedom of the working
people. The freedom of the peasants and the workers,
said the Makhnovists, resides in the peasants and workers
themselves and may not be restricted. In all fields of
their lives it is up to the workers and peasants themselves
to construct whatever they consider necessary. As for the
Makhnovists -- they can only assist them with advice, by
putting at their disposal the intellectual or military
forces they need, but under no circumstances can the
Makhnovists prescribe for them in any manner." [Arshinov,
Op. Cit., p. 148]

In addition, the Makhnovists "fully applied the revolutionary
principles of freedom of speech, of thought, of the press,
and of political association. In all cities and towns
occupied by the Makhnovists, they began by lifting all
the prohibitions and repealing all the restrictions
imposed on the press and on political organisations by
one or another power." Indeed, the "only restriction that
the Makhnovists considered necessary to impose on the
Bolsheviks, the left Socialist-Revolutionaries and other
statists was a prohibition on the formation of those
'revolutionary committees' which sought to impose a
dictatorship over the people." They also took the
opportunity to destroy every prison they got their
hands on, believing that free people "have no use
for prisons" which are "always built only to subjugate
the people, the workers and peasants." [Op. Cit., p. 153,
p. 154 and p. 153]

The Makhnovists encouraged self-management. Looking
at Aleksandrovsk:

"They immediately invited the working population to
participate in a general conference of the workers
of the city. When the conference met, a detailed
report was given on the military situation in the
region and it was proposed that the workers organise
the life of the city and the functioning of the factories
with their own forces and their own organisations, basing
themselves on the principles of labour and equality. The
workers enthusiastically acclaimed all these suggestions;
but they hesitated to carry them out, troubled by their
novelty, and troubled mainly by the nearness of the
front, which made them fear that the situation of the
town was uncertain and unstable. The first conference was
followed by a second. The problems of organising life
according to principles of self-management by workers
were examined and discussed with animation by the masses
of workers, who all welcomed these ideas with the greatest
enthusiasm, but who only with difficulty succeeded in
giving them concrete forms. Railroad workers took the first
step in this direction. They formed a committee charged
with organising the railway network of the region . . .
 From this point, the proletariat of Aleksandrovsk began
to turn systematically to the problem of creating organs 
of self-management." [Op. Cit., p. 149]

Unfortunately, the Makhnovists occupied only two cities
(Alexandrovsk for four weeks and Katerinoslav for two
periods of one and five weeks respectively). As a rule
the Makhnovist rank and file had little or no
experience of life in the cities and this placed severe
limits on their ability to understand the specific problems
of the workers there. In addition, the cities did not
have a large anarchist movement, meaning that the Mensheviks
and Bolsheviks had more support then they did. Both parties
were, at best, neutral to the Makhnovists and anarchists,
so making it likely that they would influence the city
workers against the movement. As Voline noted, the
"absence of a vigorous organised workers' movement which
could support the peasant insurgents" was a disadvantage.
[Op. Cit., p. 571]

There were minor successes in both cities. In Alexandrovsk,
some trains were got running and a few factories reopened.
In Katerinoslav (where the city was under a state of siege
and constant bombardment by the Whites), the tobacco workers
won a collective agreement that had long been refused and
the bakers set themselves to preparing the socialisation of
their industry and drawing up plans to feed both the army
and the civilian population. Unsurprisingly, the bakers
had long been under anarcho-syndicalist influence. [Malet,
Op. Cit., p. 124]

Clearly, whenever they could, the Makhnovists practised their
stated goals of working-class self-management and supported
the organisational structures to ensure the control of and
participation in the social revolution by the toiling masses.
Equally, when they liberated towns and cities they did not
impose their own power upon the working-class population but
rather urged it to organise itself by setting up soviets,
unions and other forms of working-class power. They urged
workers to organise self-management of industry. True to the
anarchist vision of a free society, they advocated and practised
freedom of assembly, speech and organisation. In the words
of historian Christopher Reed:

"Makhno's Insurgent Army . . . was the quintessence of a
self-administered, people's revolutionary army. It arose
from the peasants, it was composed of peasants, it handed
power to the peasants. It encouraged the growth of communes,
co-operatives and soviets but distrusted all permanent
elites attempting to take hold within them. It would be
foolish to think that Makhno was supported by every
peasant or that he and his followers could not, on
occasions, direct their cruelty towards dissidents within
their own ranks, but, on the whole, the movement perhaps
erred on the side of being too self-effacing, of handing
too much authority to the population at key moments."
[_From Tsar to Soviets_, p. 260]

As such, Makhnovist practice matched its theory. This can
be said of few social movements and it is to their credit
that this is the case.

H.11.8 Weren't the Makhnovists just Kulaks?

According to Trotsky (and, of course, repeated by his followers),
"Makhno created a cavalry of peasants who supplied their
own horses. These were not the downtrodden village poor whom
the October revolution first awakened, but the strong and
well-fed peasants who were afraid of losing what they had.
The anarchist ideas of Makhno (ignoring of the state,
non-recognition of the central power) corresponded to the
spirit of this kulak cavalry as nothing else could." He
argued that the Makhnovist struggle was not the anarchist
struggle against the state and capitalism, but rather "a
struggle of the infuriated petty property owner against the
proletarian dictatorship." The Makhno movement, he stressed,
was just an example of the "convulsions of the peasant petty
bourgeoisie which desired, of course, to liberate itself from
capital but at the same time did not consent to subordinate
itself to the dictatorship of the proletariat." [Lenin and
Trotsky, _Kronstadt_, p. 80, p. 89 and pp. 89-90]

Unfortunately for those who use this kind of argument against
the Makhnovists, it fails to stand up to any kind of scrutiny.
Ignoring the sophistry of equating the Bolshevik party's
dictatorship with the "dictatorship of the proletariat,"
we can easily refute Trotsky's somewhat spurious argument
concerning the background of the Makhnovists.

Firstly, however, we should clarify what is meant by the 
term "kulak." According to one set of Trotskyist editors, 
it was "popularly used to refer to well-to-do peasants 
who owned land and hired poor peasants to work it." 
["glossary," Lenin and Trotsky, _Kronstadt_, p. 146] The 
term itself derives from the Russian for "fist," with 
appropriate overtones of grasping and meanness. In other 
words, a rural small-scale capitalist (employer of wage
labour and often the renter of land and loaner of money 
as well) rather than a well-off peasant as such. Trotsky, 
however, muddies the water considerably by talking about 
the "peasant petty bourgeoisie" as well. Given that a 
peasant *is* "petty" (i.e. petit) bourgeois (i.e. own 
and use their own means of production), Trotsky is blurring 
the lines between rural capitalist (kulak) and the middle 
peasantry, as occurred so often under Bolshevik rule.

Secondly, we could just point to the eyewitness accounts of
the anarchists Arshinov and Voline. Both stress that the
Makhno movement was a mass revolutionary movement of the
peasant and working poor in the Southern Ukraine. Arshinov
states that after Denikin's troops had been broken in 1919,
the Makhnovists "literally swept through villages, towns
and cities like an enormous broom" and the "returned
*pomeshchiks* [landlords], the *kulaks*, the police,
the priests" were destroyed, so refuting the "the myth
spread by the Bolsheviks about the so-called *kulak*
character of the Makhnovshchina." Ironically, he states
that "wherever the Makhnovist movement developed, the
*kulaks* sought the protection of the Soviet authorities,
and found it there." [Op. Cit., p. 145] Yossif the Emigrant,
another anarchist active in the movement, told anarchist
Alexander Berkman that while there was a "kulak" element
within it, "the great majority are not of that type."
[quoted by Berkman, _The Bolshevik Myth_, p. 187] According
to Gallina Makhno (Makhno's wife), when entering a town
or village it was "always Makhno's practice to compel
the rich peasants, the *kulaki*, to give up their surplus
wealth, which was then divided among the poor, Makhno keeping
a share for his army. Then he would call a meeting of the
villagers, address them on the purposes of the *povstantsi*
[partisan] movement, and distribute his literature." [Emma
Goldman, _My Disillusionment in Russia_, p. 149]

However, this would be replying to Trotsky's assertions
with testimony which was obviously pro-Makhnovist. As such,
we need to do more than this, we need to refute Trotsky's
assertions in depth, drawing on as many non-anarchist
sources and facts as possible.

The key to refuting Trotsky's argument that the Makhnovists
were just kulaks is to understand the nature of rural life
before and during 1917. Michael Malet estimates that in 1917,
the peasantry could be divided into three broad categories.
About 40 percent could no longer make a living off their land
or had none, another 40 per cent who could make ends meet,
except in a bad year, and 20 per cent who were relatively
well off, with a fraction at the very top who were very well
off. [Op. Cit., p. 117] Assuming that "kulak" simply meant
"rich" or "well-off" peasant, then Trotsky is arguing that 
the Makhnovist movement represented and was based on this 
top 20 per cent. However, if we take the term "kulak" to 
mean "small rural capitalist" (i.e. employer of wage labour) 
then this figure would be substantially smaller as few within
this group would employ hired labour or rent land. In fact, 
the percentage of peasant households in Russia employing 
permanent wage-labour was 3.3% in 1917, falling to 1% in
1920. [Teodor Shanin, _The Awkward Class_, p. 171] 

In 1917, the peasants all across the Russian Empire took 
back the land stolen by the landlords. This lead to two 
developments. Firstly, there was a "powerful levelling 
effect" in rural life. [Shanin, Op. Cit., p. 159] Secondly, 
the peasants would only support those who supported their 
aspirations for land reform (which was why the Bolsheviks 
effectively stole the Socialist-Revolutionary land policy 
in 1917). The Ukraine was no different. In 1917 the class 
structure in the countryside changed when the Hulyai Pole 
peasants were amongst the first to seize the landlords' 
land. In August 1917 Makhno assembled all the landed gentry 
("*pomeshchiks*") of the region "and made them give him 
all the documents relating to lands and buildings." After 
making an exact inventory of all this property and 
presenting a report to the local and then district 
congress of soviets, he "proceeded to equalise the rights 
of the *pomeshchiks* and *kulaks* with those of the poor 
peasant labourers in regard to the use of the land . . . 
the congress decided to let the *pomeshchiks* and *kulaks* 
have a share of the land, as well as tools and livestock, 
equal to that of the labourers." Several other peasant 
congresses nearby followed this example and adopted the 
same measure. [Peter Arshinov, Op. Cit., pp. 53-4]

Most of this land, tools and livestock was distributed to poor
peasants, the rest was used to set up voluntary communes where
the peasants themselves (and not the state) self-managed the
land. Thus the peasants' "economic conditions in the region of 
the Makhno movement were greatly improved at the expense of 
the landlords, the church, monasteries, and the richest 
peasants." [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 214] This redistribution was 
based on the principle that every peasant was entitled to as 
much land as their family could cultivate without the use of 
hired labour. The abolition of wage labour in the countryside 
was also the method the anarchists were to use in Spain to 
divide up the land some 20 years later.

We should also note that the Makhnovist policy of land reform
based on the abolition of wage labour was, as we noted in section
H.11.7, the position agreed at the second regional congress called
in 1919. The Makhnovists specifically argued with regards to
the kulaks:

"We are sure that . . . the kulak elements of the village will
be pushed to one side by the very course of events. The toiling
peasantry will itself turn effortlessly on the kulaks, first by
adopting the kulak's surplus land for general use, then naturally
drawing the kulak elements into the social organisation." [cited
by Michael Malet, Op. Cit., pp. 118-9]

As such, when Trotsky talks about the "downtrodden village poor
whom the October revolution first awakened," he is wrong. In the
area around Hulyai Pole it was *not* the October revolution which
"first awakened" them into action, it was the activities of
Makhno and the anarchists during the summer and autumn of 1917
which had done that (or, more correctly, it was their activities
which aided this process as the poor peasants and landless workers
needed no encouragement to expropriate the landlords).

Needless to say, this land redistribution reinforced Makhno's
popularity with the people and was essential for the army's 
later popularity and its ability to depend on the peasants for
support. However, the landlords and richer kulaks did not
appreciate it and, unsurprisingly, tried to crush the movement
when they could. Once the Austro-Germans invaded, the local
rich took the opportunity to roll back the social revolution
and the local *pomeshchiks* and *kulaks* formed a "special
volunteer detachment" to fight Makhno once he had returned
from exile in July 1918. [Arshinov, Op. Cit., p. 59]

This system of land reform did not seek to divide the village.
Indeed, the Makhnovist approach is sometimes called the "united
village" theory. Rather than provoke unnecessary and damaging
conflict behind the frontlines, land reform would be placed
in the hands of the village community, which would ensure that
even the kulaks would have a fair stake in the post-revolutionary
society as everyone would have as much land as they could till
without using hired labour. The Bolshevik policy, as we will see, 
aimed at artificially imposing "class conflict" upon the villages 
from without and was a disaster as it was totally alien to the 
actual socio-economic situation. Unsurprisingly, peasant
communities *as a whole* rose up against the Bolsheviks all
across Russia.

As such, the claim that the Makhnovists were simply "kulaks"
is false as it fails to, firstly, acknowledge the actual
pre-revolutionary composition of the peasantry and, secondly,
to understand the social-revolution that had happened in
the region of Hulyai Pole in 1917 and, thirdly, totally ignores
the actual Makhnovist position on land reform. As Michael Malet
argues, the Bolsheviks "totally misconstrued the nature of the
Makhno movement. It was not a movement of kulaks, but of the
broad mass of the peasants, especially the poor and middle
peasants." [Op. Cit., p. 122]

This was sometimes acknowledged by Bolsheviks themselves.
IAkovlev acknowledged in 1920 that in 1919 Makhno "was a
real peasant idol, an expression of all peasant spontaneity
against . . . Communists in the cities and simultaneously
against city capitalists and landowners. In the Makhno movement
it is difficult to distinguish where the poor peasant begins
[and] the 'kulak' ends. It was a spontaneous peasant movement
.. . . In the village we had no foothold, there was not one
element with which we could join that would be our ally in
the struggle against the bandits [sic!]." [quoted by Palij,
Op. Cit., p. 157]

According to a Soviet author present at the Makhnovist regional
congresses on January 23 and February 12: "In 1919 when I asked
the chairman of the two Congresses (a Jewish farmer) whether
the 'kulaks' were allowed to participate in the Congress, he
angrily responded: 'When will you finally stop talking about
kulaks? Now we have no kulaks among us: everybody is tilling
as much land as he wishes and as much as he can.'" [quoted
by Palij, Op. Cit., p. 293]

According to Christian Rakovskii, the Bolshevik ruler of
Ukraine, "three-fourths of the membership of the [partisan]
bands were poor peasants." He presented a highly original
and inventive explanation of this fact by arguing that "rich
peasants stayed in the village and paid poor ones to fight. 
Poor peasants were the hired army of the kulaks." [Vladimir
N. Brovkin, _Behind the Front the Lines of the Civil War_,
p. 112 and p. 328]

Even Trotsky (himself the son of a rich peasant!) let the cat
out of the bag in 1919:

"The liquidation of Makhno does not mean the end of the
Makhnovschyna, which has its roots in the ignorant popular
masses." [quoted by Malet, Op. Cit., p. 122]

Ultimately, all sources (including Bolshevik ones) accept that 
in the autumn of 1919 (at the very least) Makhno's support was
overwhelming and came from all sections of the population.

Even ignoring the fact there was a social revolution and the
eye-witness Bolshevik accounts (including Trotsky's!) which
contradict Trotsky's assertions, Trotsky can be faulted for
other reasons.

The most important issue is simply that the Makhnovist movement
could not have survived four years if (at best) 20 per cent of
the population supported it. As Christopher Reed notes, when
the Makhnovists were "in retreat they would abandon their weapons
and merge with the local population. The fact that they were able
to succeed shows how closely they were linked with the ordinary
peasants because such tactics made Makhno's men very vulnerable
to informers. There were very few examples of betrayal." [Op. Cit.,
p. 260] If Makhno's social base was as weak as claimed there
would have been no need for the Bolsheviks to enter into alliances
with him, particularly in the autumn of 1920 when the Makhnovists
held no significant liberated area. Even after the defeat of
Wrangel and the subsequent Bolshevik betrayal and repression,
Makhno's mass base allowed him to remain active for months.
Indeed, it was only when the peasants themselves had become
exhausted in 1921 due to worsening economic conditions and
state repression, were the Makhnovists finally forced into
exile.

In the attempt to "eradicate his influence in the countryside" the
Bolsheviks "by weight of numbers and consistent ruthlessness they
achieved a partial success." This was achieved by state terrorism:

"On the occupation of a village by the Red Army the *Cheka* would
hunt out and hang all active Makhnovist supporters; an amenable
Soviet would be set up; officials would be appointed or imported
to organise the poor peasants . . . and three or four Red militia
men left as armed support for the new village bosses." [David
Footman, Op. Cit., p. 292]

Moreover, in these "military operations the Bolsheviks 
shot all prisoners. The Makhnovists shot all captured 
officers unless the Red rank and file strongly interceded 
for them. The rank and file were usually sent home, though 
a number volunteered for service with the Insurgents. Red 
Army reports complain of poor morale . . . The Reds used 
a number of Lettish and Chinese troops to decrease the 
risk of fraternisation." [Footman, Op. Cit., p. 293] If 
the Makhnovists were made up of kulaks, why would the 
Bolsheviks fear fraternisation? Equally, if the Makhnovists 
were "kulaks" then how could they have such an impact on 
Red Army troops (who were mostly poor peasants)? After all, 
Trotsky had been complaining that "Makhnovism" had been 
infecting nearby Red Army troops and in August 1919 was 
arguing that it was "still a poison which has infected 
backward units in the Ukrainian army." In December 1919, 
he noted that "disintegration takes place in unstable 
units of our army when they came into contact with 
Makhno's forces." It seems unlikely that a movement 
made up of "kulaks" could have such an impact. Moreover,
as Trotsky noted, not all Makhnovists were anarchists,
"some of them wrongly regard themselves as Communists."
Again, why would people who regarded themselves as 
Communists join a movement of "kulaks"? [_How the 
Revolution Armed_, vol. II, p. 367, p. 110 and p. 137]

In addition, it seems highly unlikely (to say the least!) 
that a movement which is alleged to be either made up of 
or supported by the kulaks could have had a land policy 
which emphasised and implemented an equal share for the 
poorest peasantry, not just of land but also of live and 
dead stock as well as opposing the hiring of labour. This 
fact is reinforced when we look at the peasant reaction to 
the Bolshevik (and, presumably, anti-kulak and 
pro-"downtrodden village poor") land policy. Simply put,
their policies resulted in massive peasant unrest directed
against the Bolsheviks.

The Bolshevik land decrees of the 5th and 11th of February,
1919, stated that large landlord holdings would become
state farms and all stock was to be taken over by the
Ministry of Agriculture, with only between one third and
one half of the land being reserved for poor peasants.
This was "largely irrelevant, since the peasantry had
expected, and in some cases already controlled, all
of it. To them, the government was taking away their
land, and not seizing it from the landlords, then keeping
some of it and handing the rest over to its rightful
owners." [Malet, Op. Cit., p. 134] Thus the land was
to expropriated by the state, *not* by the peasants.
The result of this policy soon became clear:

"The Bolsheviks expropriation policy was countervailed by
the peasants' resistance based upon their assumption that
'the land belongs to nobody . . . it can be used only by
those who care about it, who cultivate it.' Thus the
peasants maintained that all the property of the former
landlords was now by right their own. This attitude was
shared not only by the rich and middle peasants but also
the poor and landless, for they all wished to be independent
farmers. The poorer the areas, the more dissatisfied were
the peasants with the Bolshevik decrees.

"Thus Communist agricultural policy and terrorism brought
about a strong reaction against the new Bolshevik regime.
By the middle of 1919, all peasants, rich and poor,
distrusted the Bolsheviks." [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 156]

The Bolshevik inspired Poor Peasant Committees were
"associated with this disastrous policy, were discredited,
and their reintroduction would need the aid of troops."
[Malet, Op. Cit., p. 135] The Makhnovists, in contrast,
did not impose themselves onto the villages, nor did they
attempt to tell the peasants what to do and how to divide
the land. Rather they advocated the formation of Free Soviets
through which these decisions could be made. This, along
with their support for land reform, helped win them mass
support.

After evacuating the Ukraine in mid-1919 due to the success
of Denikin's counter-revolution, the Ukrainian Communists
took time to mull over what had happened. The Central
Committee's November 1919 resolution on the Ukraine
"gave top priority to the middle peasant -- so often and
so conveniently lumped in together with the kulak and
dealt with accordingly -- the transfer of landlord land
to the poor peasants with only minimum exceptions for
state farms." These points were the basis of the new
Ukrainian land law of 5th of February, 1920. [Malet,
Op. Cit., p. 135] This new law reflected long standing
Makhnovist theory *and* practice. Therefore, the changing
nature of Bolshevik land policy in the Ukraine indicates
that Trotsky's claims are false. The very fact that the
Bolsheviks had to adjust their policies in line with
Makhnovist theory indicates that the later appealed to
the middle and poor peasants.

Equally, it seems strange that the "kulaks" who apparently
dominated the movement should have let themselves be led
by poor peasants and workers. Voline presents a list of
some of the participants of the movement and the vast
majority are either peasants or workers. [Op. Cit.,
pp. 688-91] As historian Michael Palij notes, "[a]lmost
to a man, they [the Makhnovist leadership] were of poor
peasant origin, with little formal education." [Op. Cit.,
p. 254] Exceptions to the general rule were usually
workers. Most were Anarchists or Socialist-Revolutionaries.
[Palij, Op. Cit., pp. 254-62]

Of course, it can be argued that the leadership of a
movement need not come from the class which it claims to
lead. The leadership of the Bolsheviks, for example, had
very few actual proletarians within it. However, it seems
unlikely that a class would select as its leaders members
of the population it oppressed! Equally, it seems as unlikely
that poor peasants and workers would let themselves lead a
movement of kulaks, whose aims would be alien to theirs.
After all, poor peasants would seek land reform while kulaks
would view this as a threat to their social position. As
can be seen from the Makhnovist land policy, they argued
for (and implemented) radical land reform, placing the land
into the hands of peasants who worked the land without hiring
labour (see section H.11.7)

As regards Trotsky's argument that the Makhnovists had to be
kulaks because they originally formed a cavalry unit, it is 
easy to refute. Makhno himself was the son of poor peasants,
an agricultural labourer and a worker in a factory. He was
able to ride a horse, so why could other poor peasants not do
so? Ultimately, it simply shows that Trotsky knew very little
of Ukrainian peasant life and society.

Given that the Bolshevik government was meant to be a 
"worker-peasant" power, it seems strange that Trotsky 
dismisses the concerns of the peasantry so. He should 
have remembered that peasant uprisings against the 
Bolshevik government occurred constantly under the
Bolsheviks, forcing them (eventually) to, first, recognise 
the false nature of their peasant policies in 1919 and, 
second, to introduce the NEP in 1921. As such, it seems 
somewhat ironic for Trotsky to attack the Makhnovists for 
not following flawed Bolshevik ideology as regards the 
peasantry!

The Bolsheviks, as Marxists, saw the peasants as "petit 
bourgeoisie" and uninterested in the revolution except as 
a means to grab their own plot of land. Their idea of land 
collectivisation was limited to state ownership. The initial 
Bolshevik land strategy can be summed up as mobilising the 
poor peasantry against the rest on the one hand and
mobilising the city worker against the peasants (through 
forced grain confiscation on the other). The lack of knowledge 
of peasant life was the basis of this policy, which was 
abandoned in 1919 when it was soon proven to be totally 
wrong. Rather than see wealth extremes rise, the 1917 
revolution saw a general levelling. 

As regards the peasantry, here as elsewhere the Bolsheviks claimed
their strategy was the objectively necessary (only possible) one
in the circumstances. And here again the Makhnovists demonstrate
this to be false, as the Bolsheviks themselves acknowledged in
practice by changing their agricultural policies and bringing 
them closer to the Makhnovist position.

Clearly, both factually and logically, Trotsky's arguments
are false. Ultimately, like most Bolsheviks, Trotsky uses
the term "kulak" as a meaningless term of abuse, with no
relation to the actual class structure of peasant life. It 
simply means a peasant opposed to the Bolsheviks rather than 
an actual social strata. Essentially, he is using the standard 
Leninist technique of specifying a person's class (or ideas) 
based on whether they subscribe to (or simply follow without 
question) Leninist ideology (see section H.2.12 for further
discussion of this). This explains why the Makhnovists went 
from being heroic revolutionaries to kulak bandits (and back 
again!) depending on whether their activity coincided with 
the needs of Bolshevik power or not. Expediency is not a sound 
base to build a critique, particularly one based simply on 
assertions like Trotsky's.

H.11.9 Were the Makhnovists anti-Semitic and pogromists?

No, they were not. Anyone who claims that the Mahnovist
movement was anti-Semitic or conducted pogroms against
Jews simply shows ignorance or a desire to deceive. As
we will show, the Makhnovists were both theoretically
and practically opposed to anti-Semitism and progroms.

Unsurprisingly, many Leninists slander the Makhnovists on
this score. Trotsky, for example, asserted in 1937 that
Makhno's followers expressed "a militant anti-Semitism."
[Lenin and Trotsky, _Kronstadt_, p. 80] Needless to say, the
Trotskyist editors of the book in question did not indicate
that Trotsky was wrong in the accusation. In this way a
slander goes unchecked and becomes "accepted" as being
true. As the charge of "militant anti-Semitism" is a
serious one, so it is essential that we (unlike Trotsky)
provide evidence to refute it.

To do so we will present a chronological overview of the
evidence against it. This will, to some degree, result in
some duplication as well as lengthy quotations, however
it is unavoidable. We are sorry to labour this point,
but this allegation is sadly commonplace and it is
essential to refute it fully.

Unsurprisingly, Arshinov's 1923 account of the movement takes
on the allegations that the Makhnovists were anti-Semitic. He
presents extensive evidence to show that the Makhnovists opposed
anti-Semitism and pogroms. It is worth quoting him at length:

"In the Russian press as well as abroad, the Makhnovshchina was
often pictured as a very restricted guerrilla movement, foreign
to ideas of brotherhood and international solidarity, and even
tainted with anti-Semitism. Nothing could be more criminal than
such slanders. In order to shed light on this question, we will
cite here certain documented facts which relate to this subject.

"An important role was played in the Makhnovist army by
revolutionaries of Jewish origin, many of whom had been
sentenced to forced labour for participation in the 1905
revolution, or else had been obliged to emigrate to Western
Europe or America. Among others, we can mention:

"_Kogan_ -- vice-president of the central organ of the
movement, the Regional Revolutionary Military Council of
Hulyai Pole. Kogan was a worker who, for reasons of principle,
had left his factory well before the revolution of 1917, and
had gone to do agricultural work in a poor Jewish agricultural
colony. Wounded at the battle of Peregonovka, near Uman, against 
the Denikinists, he was seized by them at the hospital at Uman 
where he was being treated, and, according to witnesses, the 
Denikinists killed him with sabres.

"_L. Zin'kovsky (Zadov)_ -- head of the army's counter espionage 
section, and later commander of a special cavalry regiment. A 
worker who before the 1917 revolution was condemned to ten years 
of forced labour for political activities. One of the most active
militants of the revolutionary insurrection.

"_Elena Keller_ -- secretary of the army's cultural and
educational section. A worker who took part in the syndicalist
movement in America. One of the organisers of the 'Nabat'
Confederation.

"_Iosif Emigrant (Gotman)_ -- Member of the army's cultural and
educational section. A worker who took an active part in the
Ukrainian anarchist movement. One of the organisers of the 'Nabat'
Confederation, and later a member of its secretariat.

"_Ya. Alyi (Sukhovol'sky)_ -- worker, and member of the army's
cultural and educational section. In the Tsarist period he was
condemned to forced labor for political activity. One of the
organisers of the 'Nabat' Confederation and a member of its
secretariat.

"We could add many more names to the long list of Jewish
revolutionaries who took part in different areas of the Makhnovist
movement, but we will not do this, because it would endanger their
security.

"At the heart of the revolutionary insurrection, the Jewish working
population was among brothers. The Jewish agricultural colonies
scattered throughout the districts of Mariupol, Berdyansk,
Aleksandrovsk and elsewhere, actively participated in the regional
assemblies of peasants, workers and insurgents; they sent delegates
there, and also to the regional Revolutionary Military Council.

"Following certain anti-Semitic incidents which occurred in the
region in February, 1919, Makhno proposed to all the Jewish colonies
that they organise their self-defence and he furnished the necessary
guns and ammunition to all these colonies. At the same time Makhno
organised a series of meetings in the region where he appealed to the
masses to struggle against anti-Semitism.

"The Jewish working population, in turn, expressed profound
solidarity and revolutionary brotherhood toward the revolutionary
insurrection. In answer to the call made by the Revolutionary
Military Council to furnish voluntary combatants to the Makhnovist
insurgent army, the Jewish colonies sent from their midst a large
number of volunteers.

"In the army of the Makhnovist insurgents there was an exclusively
Jewish artillery battery which was covered by an infantry detachment,
also made up of Jews. This battery, commanded by the Jewish insurgent
Shneider, heroically defended Hulyai Pole from Denikin's troops in
June, 1919, and the entire battery perished there, down to the last
man and the last shell.

"In the extremely rapid succession of events after the uprising of
1918-19, there were obviously individuals who were hostile to Jews,
but these individuals were not the products of the insurrection; they
were products of Russian life. These individuals did not have any
importance in the movement as a whole. If people of this type took
part in acts directed against Jews, they were quickly and severely
punished by the revolutionary insurgents.

"We described earlier the speed and determination with which the
Makhnovists executed Hryhoriyiv and his staff, and we mentioned
that one of the main reasons for this execution was their
participation in pogroms of Jews.

"We can mention other events of this nature with which we are
familiar.

"On May 12, 1919, several Jewish families - 20 people in all -
were killed in the Jewish agricultural colony of Gor'kaya, near
Aleksandrovsk. The Makhnovist staff immediately set up a special
commission to investigate this event. This commission discovered that
the murders had been committed by seven peasants of the neighbouring
village of Uspenovka. These peasants were not part of the
insurrectionary army. However, the Makhnovists felt it was impossible
to leave this crime unpunished, and they shot the murderers. It was
later established that this event and other attempts of this nature
had been carried out at the instigation of Denikin's agents, who had
managed to infiltrate the region and had sought by these means to
prepare an atmosphere favourable for the entry of Denikin's troops
into the Ukraine.

"On May 4th or 5th, 1919, Makhno and a few commanders hurriedly
left the front and went to Hulyai Pole, where they were awaited by
the Extraordinary Plenipotentiary of the Republic, L. Kamenev, who
had arrived from Khar'kov with other representatives of the Soviet
government. At the Verkhnii Tokmak station, Makhno saw a poster with
the words: 'Death to Jews, Save the Revolution, Long Live Batko
Makhno.'

"'Who put up that poster?' Makhno asked.

"He learned that the poster had been put up by an insurgent whom
Makhno knew personally, a soldier who had taken part in the battle
against Denikin's troops, a person who was in general decent. He
presented himself immediately and was shot on the spot.

"Makhno continued the journey to Hulyai Pole. During the rest of
the day and during his negotiations with the Plenipotentiary of the
Republic, he could not free himself from the influence of this event.
He realised that the insurgent had been cruelly dealt with, but he
also knew that in conditions of war and in view of Denikin's advance,
such posters could represent an enormous danger for the Jewish
population and for the entire revolution if one did not oppose them
quickly and resolutely.

"When the insurrectionary army retreated toward Uman in the summer
of 1919, there were several cases when insurgents plundered Jewish
homes. When the insurrectionary army examined these cases, it was
learned that one group of four or five men was involved in all
these incidents -- men who had earlier belonged to Hryhoriyiv's
detachments and who had been incorporated into the Makhnovist
army after Hryhoriyiv was shot. This group was disarmed and
discharged immediately. Following this, all the combatants who
had served under Hryhoriyiv were discharged from the Makhnovist
army as an unreliable element whose re-education was not possible
in view of the unfavorable conditions and the lack of time. Thus
we see how the Makhnovists viewed anti-Semitism. Outbursts of
anti-Semitism in various parts of the Ukraine had no relation
to the Makhnovshchina.

"Wherever the Jewish population was in contact with the
Makhnovists, it found in them its best protectors against
anti-Semitic incidents. The Jewish population of Hulyai Pole,
Aleksandrovsk, Berdyansk, Mariupol, as well as all the Jewish
agricultural colonies scattered throughout the Donets region, can
themselves corroborate the fact that they always found the
Makhnovists to be true revolutionary friends, and that due to the
severe and decisive measures of the Makhno visits, the anti-Semitic
leanings of the counter-revolutionary forces in this region were
promptly squashed.

"Anti-Semitism exists in Russia as well as in many other countries.
In Russia, and to some extent in the Ukraine, it is not a result of
the revolutionary epoch or of the insurrectionary movement, but is on
the contrary a vestige of the past. The Makhnovists always fought it
resolutely in words as well as deeds. During the entire period of the
movement, they issued numerous publications calling on the masses to
struggle against this evil. It can firmly be stated that in the
struggle against anti-Semitism in the Ukraine and beyond its borders,
their accomplishment was enormous." [Arshinov, Op. Cit., pp. 211-215]

Arshinov then goes on to quote an appeal published by Makhnovists
together with anarchists referring to an anti-Semitic incident
which took place in the spring of 1919. It is called _WORKERS,
PEASANTS AND INSURGENTS FOR THE OPPRESSED, AGAINST THE OPPRESSORS
-- ALWAYS!_:

"During the painful days of reaction, when the situation
of the Ukrainian peasants was especially difficult and
seemed hopeless, you were the first to rise as fearless and
unconquerable fighters for the great cause of the liberation
of the working masses. . . This was the most beautiful and
joyful moment in the history of our revolution. You marched
against the enemy with weapons in your hands as conscious
revolutionaries, guided by the great idea of freedom and
equality. . . But harmful and criminal elements succeeded
in insinuating themselves into your ranks. And the
revolutionary songs, songs of brotherhood and of the
approaching liberation of the workers, began to be disrupted
by the harrowing cries of poor Jews who were being tormented
to death. . . On the clear and splendid foundation of the
revolution appeared indelible dark blots caused by the
parched blood of poor Jewish martyrs who now, as before,
continue to be innocent victims of the criminal reaction,
of the class struggle . . . Shameful acts are being carried
out. Anti-Semitic pogroms are taking place.

"Peasants, workers and insurgents! You know that the workers
of all nationalities -- Russians, Jews, Poles, Germans, Armenians,
etc. -- are equally imprisoned in the abyss of poverty. You know
that thousands of Jewish girls, daughters of the people, are sold
and dishonoured by capital, the same as women of other nationalities.
You know how many honest and valiant revolutionary Jewish fighters
have given their lives for freedom in Russia during our whole
liberation movement. . . The revolution and the honour of workers
obliges all of us to declare as loudly as possible that we make war
on the same enemies: on capital and authority, which oppress all
workers equally, whether they be Russian, Polish, Jewish, etc. We
must proclaim everywhere that our enemies are exploiters and
oppressors of various nationalities: the Russian manufacturer,
the German iron magnate, the Jewish banker, the Polish aristocrat
.. . . The bourgeoisie of all countries and all nationalities is
united in a bitter struggle against the revolution, against the
labouring masses of the whole world and of all nationalities.

"Peasants, workers and insurgents! At this moment when the
international enemy -- the bourgeoisie of all countries --
hurries to the Russian revolution to create nationalist hatred
among the mass of workers in order to distort the revolution and
to shake the very foundation of our class struggle - the solidarity
and unity of all workers -- you must move against conscious and
unconscious counter-revolutionaries who endanger the emancipation
of the working people from capital and authority. Your revolutionary
duty is to stifle all nationalist persecution by dealing ruthlessly
with all instigators of anti-Semitic pogroms.

"The path toward the emancipation of the workers can be reached by
the union of all the workers of the world." [quoted by Arshinov,
Op. Cit., 215-7]

Arshinov also quotes an order issued by Makhno to "all
revolutionary insurgents without exception" which states,
in part, that the "goal of our revolutionary army, and
of every insurgent participating in it, is an honourable
struggle for the full liberation of the Ukrainian workers
from all oppression." This was "why every insurgent should
constantly keep in mind that there is no place among
us for those who, under the cover of the revolutionary
insurrection, seek to satisfy their desires for personal
profit, violence and plunder at the expense of the peaceful
Jewish population." [quoted by Arshinov, Op. Cit., pp. 217-8]

Unsurprisingly, as an anarchist, Makhno presents a class
analysis of the problem of racism, arguing as follows:

"Every revolutionary insurgent should remember that his
personal enemies as well as the enemies of all the people
are the rich bourgeoisie, regardless of whether they be
Russian, or Jewish, or Ukrainian. The enemies of the
working people are also those who protect the unjust
bourgeois regime, i.e., the Soviet Commissars, the
members of repressive expeditionary corps, the Extraordinary
Commissions which go through the cities and villages
torturing the working people who refuse to submit to
their arbitrary dictatorship. Every insurgent should
arrest and send to the army staff all representatives
of such expeditionary corps, Extraordinary Commissions
and other institutions which oppress and subjugate the
people; if they resist, they should be shot on the spot.
As for any violence done to peaceful workers of whatever
nationality - such acts are unworthy of any revolutionary
insurgent, and the perpetrator of such acts will be punished
by death." [quoted by Arshinov, Op. Cit., p. 218]

It should also be noted that the chairmen of three Makhnovist
regional congresses were Jewish. The first and second congresses
had a Jewish chairman [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 293], while Voline
was the chair for the fourth one held at Aleksandrovsk.
Similarly, one of the heads of the army's counter-espionage
section was Jewish. [Arshinov, Op. Cit., p. 212] Little wonder
both Arshinov and Voline stress that an important role was
played by Jews within the movement.

The Jewish American anarchists Alexander Berkman and Emma
Goldman were also in Russia and the Ukraine during the
revolution. Between 1920 and 1921, they were in contact
with anarchists involved with the Makhnovists and were
concerned to verify what they had heard about the movement
from Bolshevik and other sources. Berkman recounts meeting
the Jewish anarchist Yossif the Emigrant (shot by the
Bolsheviks in late 1920). Yossif stated that "Nestor
is merciless toward those guilty of Jew-baiting. Most
of you have read his numerous proclamations against
pogroms, and you know how severely he punishes such
things." He stressed that any stories of atrocities and
pogroms committed by the Makhnovists were "lies wilfully
spread by the Bolsheviks" who "hate Nestor worse than
they do Wrangel." For Yossif, "Makhno represents the
real spirit of October." [quoted by Berkman, Op. Cit.,
pp. 187-9] He also notes that Gallina Makhno, Nestor's
wife, would "slightly raise her voice in indignation
when reports of Jew-baiting by *povstantsi* [partisans]
were mentioned. These stories were deliberately spread
by the Bolsheviki, she averred. No-one could be more
severe in punishing such excesses than Nestor. Some of
his best comrades are Jews; there are a number of them
in the Revolutionary Soviet and in other branches of
the army. Few men are so loved and respected by the
*povstantsi* as Yossif the Emigrant, who is a Jew, and
Makhno's best friend." [Berkman, Op. Cit., pp. 238-9]
Both Goldman and Berkman became friends with Makhno
during his exile in Paris.

After his exile, Makhno himself spent time refuting
allegations of anti-Semitism. Two articles on this
subject are contained in _The Struggle Against the
State and other Essays_, a collection of Makhno's
exile writings. In the article "The Makhnovshchina
and Anti-Semitism" he recounts various examples of
the "uncompromising line on the anti-Semitism of
pogromists" which the Makhnovists took "throughout
its entire existence." This was "because it was
a genuinely revolutionary toilers' movement in the
Ukraine." He stressed that "[a]t no time did the
movement make it its business to carry out pogroms
against Jews nor did it ever encourage any." [_The
Struggle Against the State and Other Essays_, p. 38
and p. 34] He wrote another article (called "To the
Jews of All Countries"):

"In my first 'Appeal to Jews, published in the French
libertarian newspaper, _Le Libertaire_, I asked Jews in
general, which is to say the bourgeois and the socialist
ones as well as the 'anarchist' ones like Yanovsky, who
have all spoken of me as a pogromist against Jews and
labelled as anti-Semitic the liberation movement of the
Ukrainian peasants and workers of which I was the leader,
to detail to me the specific facts instead of blathering
vacuously away: just where and just when did I or the
aforementioned movement perpetrate such acts? . . .
Thus far, no such evidence advanced by Jews has come to
my attention. The only thing that has appeared thus far
in the press generally, certain Jewish anarchist organs
included, regarding myself and the insurgent movement I
led, has been the product of the most shameless lies and
of the vulgarity of certain political mavericks and their
hirelings." [Op. Cit., p. 28]

It should be noted that Yanovsky, editor of the Yiddish language
anarchist paper _Freie Arbeiter Stimme_ later admitted that 
Makhno was right. Yanovsky originally believed the charges of
anti-Semitism made against Makhno, going so far as ignoring
Makhno's appeal to him out of hand. However, by the time of
Makhno's death in 1934, Yanovsky had learned the truth:

"So strongly biased was I against him [Makhno] at that time I did
not think it necessary to find out whether my serious accusation
was founded on any real facts during the period of his great
fight for real freedom in Russia. Now I know that my accusations
of anti-Semitism against Makhno were built entirely on the lies
of the Bolsheviks and to the rest of their crimes must be added
this great crime of killing his greatness and the purity of
this fighter for freedom."

Due to this, he could not forgive himself for "so misjudg[ing]
a man merely on the basis of calumny by his bitter enemies who
more than once shamefully betrayed him, and against whom he
fought so heroically." He also notes that it had "become
known to me that a great many Jewish comrades were heart and
soul with Makhno and the whole Makhno movement. Amongst them
was one whom I knew well personally, Joseph Zutman of Detroit,
and I know that he would not have had anything to do with
persons, or a movement, which possessed the slightest leaning
towards anti-Semitism." ["appendix," _My Visit to the Kremlin_,
pp. 36-7]

However, by far the best source to refute claims of anti-Semitism
the work of the Jewish anarchist Voline. He summarises the
extensive evidence against such claims:

"We could cover dozens of pages with extensive and irrefutable
proofs of the falseness of these assertions. We could mention
articles and proclamations by Makhno and the Council of
Revolutionary Insurgents denouncing anti-Semitism. We could
tell of spontaneous acts by Makhno himself and other insurgents
against the slightest manifestation of the anti-Semitic spirit
on the part of a few isolated and misguided unfortunates in
the army and the population. . . One of the reasons for the
execution of Grigoriev by the Makhnovists was his anti-Semitism
and the immense pogrom he organised at Elizabethgrad . . .

"We could cite a whole series of similar facts, but we do not
find it necessary . . . and will content ourselves with
mentioning briefly the following essential facts:

"1. A fairly important part in the Makhnovist movement was
played by revolutionists of Jewish origin.

"2. Several members of the Education and Propaganda Commission
were Jewish.

"3. Besides many Jewish combatants in various units of the
army, there was a battery composed entirely of Jewish
artillery men and a Jewish infantry unit.

"4. Jewish colonies in the Ukraine furnished many volunteers
to the Insurrectionary Army.

"5. In general the Jewish population, which was very numerous
in the Ukraine, took an active part in all the activities of
the movement. The Jewish agricultural colonies which were
scattered throughout the districts of Mariupol, Berdiansk,
Alexandrovsk, etc., participated in the regional assemblies
of workers, peasants and partisans; they sent their delegates
to the regional Revolutionary Military Council.

"6. Rich and reactionary Jews certainly had to suffer from
the Makhnovist army, not as Jews, but just in the same way
as non-Jewish counter-revolutionaries." [_The Unknown
Revolution_, pp. 967-8]

However, it could be claimed that these accounts are from
anarchists and so are biased. Ignoring the question of why
so many Jewish anarchists should defend Makhno if he was, in
fact, a pogromist or anti-Semite, we can turn to non-anarchist
sources for confirmation of the fact that Makhno and the
Makhnovist movement were not anti-Semites.

First, we turn to Voline, who quotes the eminent Jewish
writer and historian M. Tcherikover about the question
of the Makhnovists and anti-Semitism. Tcherikover had, for
a number of years, had specialised in research on the
persecutions of the Jews in Russia. The Jewish historian
states "with certainty that, on the whole, the behaviour of
Makhno's army cannot be compared with that of the other armies
which were operating in Russian during the events 1917-21.
Two facts I can certify absolutely explicitly.

"1. It is undeniable that, of all these armies, including
the Red Army, the Makhnovists behaved best with regard
the civil population in general and the Jewish population
in particular. I have numerous testimonies to this. The
proportion of *justified* complaints against the Makhnovist
army, in comparison with the others, is negligible.

"2. Do not speak of pogroms alleged to have been organised by
Makhno himself. That is a slander or an error. Nothing of the
sort occurred. As for the Makhnovist Army, I have had hints
and precise denunciations on this subject. But, up to the
present, every time I have tried to check the facts, I have
been obliged to declare that on the day in question no
Makhnovist unit could have been at the place indicated, the
whole army being far away from there. Upon examining the
evidence closely, I established this fact, every time, with
absolute certainty, at the place and on the date of the
pogrom, no *Makhnovist* unit was operating or even located
in the vicinity. *Not once* have I been able to prove the
existence of a Makhnovist unit at the place a pogrom
against the Jews took place. Consequently, the pogroms
in question could not have been the work of the Makhnovists."
[quoted by Voline, Op. Cit., p. 699]

This conclusion is confirmed by later historians. Paul
Avrich notes that "[c]harges of Jew-baiting and of
anti-Jewish pogroms have come from every quarter, left,
right, and centre. Without exception, however, they are
based on hearsay, rumour, or intentional slander, and
remain undocumented and unproved." He adds that the
"Soviet propaganda machine was at particular pains to
malign Makhno as a bandit and pogromist." Wishing to
verify the conclusions of Tcherikover proved by Voline,
Avrich examined several hundred photographs in the
Tcherikover Collection, housed in the YIVO Library in
New York and depicting anti-Jewish atrocities in the
Ukraine during the Civil War. He found that "only one
[was] labelled as being the work of the Makhnovists,
though even here neither Makhno himself nor any of his
recognisable subordinates are to be seen, nor is there
any indication that Makhno had authorised the raid or,
indeed, that the band involved was in fact affiliated
with his Insurgent Army." Avrich then states that
"there is evidence that Makhno did all in his power
to counteract anti-Semitic tendencies among his
followers" and that "a considerable number of Jews took
part in the Makhnovist movement." He also points out
that the Jewish anarchists Alexander Berkman, Emma
Goldman, Sholem Schwartzbard, Voline, Senya Fleshin,
and Mollie Steimer did not criticise Makhno as an
anti-Semite, they also "defended him against the
campaign of slander that persisted from all sides."
[_Anarchist Portraits_, pp. 122-3] It should be noted
that Schwartzbard assassinated the Nationalist leader
Petliura in 1926 because he considered him responsible
for pogroms conducted by Nationalist troops during the
civil war. He shot Petliura the day after he, Makhno
and Berkman had seen him at a Russian restaurant in 
Paris. [Malet, Op. Cit., p. 189]

Michael Malet, in his account of the Makhnovists, states
that "there is overwhelming evidence that Makhno himself
was not anti-Semitic." [Op. Cit., p. 168] He indicates
that in the period January to September 1919, the Central
Committee of Zionist Organisations in Russia listed the
Nationalists as creating 15,000 victims of pogroms, then
the Denikinists with 9,500 followed by Hryhoriyiv,
Sokolovsky, Struk, Yatsenko and Soviet troops (500
victims). Makhno is not mentioned. Of the pogroms listed,
almost all took place on the western Ukraine, where the
local otamany (warlords) and the Nationalists were strong. 
Very few took place where Makhno's influence predominated, 
the nearest being in Katerinoslav town and Kherson province; 
none in the provinces of Katerinoslav or Tavria. It should
also be noted that the period of January to June of that
year was one of stability within the Makhnovist region,
so allowing them the space to apply their ideas. Malet 
summarises:

"Even granted the lower level of Jewish involvement in
left-bank trade, the almost total lack of anti-Semitic
manifestations would show that Makhno's appeals, at a
time when anti-Semitism was fast becoming fashionable,
did not go unheeded by the population. There were a
number of Jewish colonies in the south-east Ukraine."
[Op. Cit., p. 169]

Unsurprisingly, Malet notes that apart from certain
personal considerations (such as his friendship with
a number of Jews, including Voline and Yossif the
Emigrant), "the basis of Makhno's hostility to
anti-Semitism was his anarchism. Anarchism has always
been an international creed, explicitly condemning
all forms of racial hatred as incompatible with the
freedom of individuals and the society of equals."
And like other serious historians, he points to "the
continual participation in the movement of both
intellectual Jews from outside, and Jews from the
local colonies" as "further proof . . . of the low
level of anti-Semitism within the Makhnovshchina."
[Op. Cit., p. 171 and pp. 171-2]

Anarchist Serge Cipko summarises the literature by
stating that the "scholarly literature that discusses
Makhno's relationships with the Jewish population
is of the same opinion [that the Makhnovists were
not anti-Semitic] and concur that unlike the Whites,
Bolsheviks and other competing groups in Ukraine
during the Revolution, the Makhnovists did not engage
in pogroms." ["Nestor Makhno: A Mini-Historiography of
the Anarchist Revolution in Ukraine, 1917-1921," pp. 57-75,
_The Raven_, no. 13, p. 62]

Historian Christopher Reed concurs, noting that "Makhno
actively opposed anti-Semitism . . . Not surprisingly,
many Jews held prominent positions in the Insurgent
movement and Jewish farmers and villagers staunchly
supported Makhno in the face of the unrestrained
anti-Semitism of Ukrainian nationalists like Grigoriev
and of the Great Russian chauvinists like the Whites."
[Op. Cit., pp. 263-4] Arthur E. Adams states that 
"Makhno protected Jews and in fact had many serving 
on his own staff." [_Bolsheviks in the Urkaine_, p. 402]

We apologise again for labouring this point, but the lie
that Makhno and the Makhnovists were anti-Semitic is 
relatively commonplace and needs to be refuted. As noted, 
Trotskyists repeat Trotsky's false assertions without 
correction. Other repeat the lie from other sources. 
It was essential, therefore, to spend time making the 
facts available and to nail the lie of Makhnovist anti-
Semitism once and for all!

H.11.10 Did the Makhnovists hate the city and city workers?

For some reason the Makhnovists have been portrayed as being
against the city and even history as such. This assertion is
false, although sometimes made. For example, historian Bruce
Lincoln states that Makhno "had studied the anarchist writings
of Bakunin, whose condemnation of cities and large-scale 
industries fit so well with the anti-urban, anti-industrial
feelings of the Ukrainian peasants, and his program was 
precisely the sort that struck responsive chords in peasant
hearts." [_Red Victory_, p. 325] Lincoln fails to present 
any evidence for this claim. This is unsurprising as it is 
doubtful that Makhno read such condemnations in Bakunin as 
they do not, in fact, exist. Similarly, the Makhnovist
"program" (like anarchism in general) was not "anti-urban"
or "anti-industrial." 

However, Lincoln's inventions are mild compared to Trotsky's.
According to Trotsky, "the followers of Makhno" were marked by
"hatred for the city and the city worker." He later gives some
more concrete examples of this "hostility to the city" which,
as with the general peasant revolt, also "nourished the movement
of Makhno, who seized and looted trains marked for the factories,
the plants, and the Red Army; tore up railway tracks, shot
Communists, etc." [Lenin and Trotsky, _Kronstadt_, p. 80 and
p. 89]

Unsurprisingly, Trotsky simply shows his ignorance of the
Makhno movement by these statements. To refute Trotsky's
claim we can simply point to how the Makhnovists acted
once they occupied a city. As we discuss in section H.11.7,
the first thing the Makhnovists did was to call a conference
of workers and urge them to organise their own affairs
directly, using their own class organs of self-management
(soviets, unions, etc.). Hardly the activity of a group of
people who allegedly "hated" city workers!

We can also point to the fact that the Makhnovists arranged
direct exchanges of goods between the towns and country. In early
1918, for example, corn was shipped directly to a Moscow factory
in return for textiles (without state interference). In 1919, 1500
tons of grain (and a small amount of coal) was sent by train to
Petrograd and Moscow where the commander of the train was to
exchange it again for textiles. The initiative in both cases
came from the Hulyai Pole peasants. Again, hardly the work of
city-hating peasants. 

Peter Arshinov indicates the underlying theory behind the
Makhnovists as regards the relations between city and
country:

"The Makhnovshchina . . . understands that the victory and
consolidation of the revolution . . . cannot be realised
without a close alliance between the working classes of
the cities and those of the countryside. The peasants
understand that without urban workers and powerful
industrial enterprises they will be deprived of most
of the benefits which the social revolution makes possible.
Furthermore, they consider the urban workers to be their
brothers, members of the same family of workers.

"There can be no doubt that, at the moment of the victory
of the social revolution, the peasants will give their
entire support to the workers. This will be voluntary and
truly revolutionary support given directly to the urban
proletariat. In the present-day situation [under the
Bolsheviks], the bread taken by force from the peasants
nourishes mainly the enormous governmental machine. The
peasants see and understand perfectly that this expensive
bureaucratic machine is not in any way needed by them or
by the workers, and that in relation to the workers it
plays the same role as that of a prison administration
toward the inmates. This is why the peasants do not have
the slightest desire to give their bread voluntarily to
the State. This is why they are so hostile in their
relations with the contemporary tax collectors -- the
commissars and the various supply organs of the State.

"But the peasants always try to enter into *direct* relations
with the urban workers. The question was raised more than
once at peasant congresses, and the peasants always resolved
it in a revolutionary and positive manner." [Op. Cit.,
p. 258]

Simply put, Trotsky misinterprets hostility to the repressive
policies of the Bolshevik dictatorship with hostility to the
city.

Moreover, ignoring the *actual* relationships of the Makhnovists
with the city workers, we can fault Trotsky's arguments without
resource to such minor things as facts. This is because every one
of his "examples" of "hatred for the city and the city worker"
can be explained by more common sense arguments.

As regards the destruction of trains and railway tracks,
a far simpler and more plausible explanation can be found
than Trotsky's "hostility to the city." This is the fact
that a civil war was taking place. Both the Reds and Whites
used armoured trains to move troops and as bases of operations.
To destroy the means by which your enemy attacks you is
common sense! Equally, in the chaotic times of the war,
resources were often in low supply and in order to survive
the Makhnovists had to "loot" trains (needless to say, Trotsky
does not explain how the Makhnovists knew the trains were
"marked for the factories."). It should be noted that the
Bolsheviks "looted" the countryside, can we surmise that
the Bolsheviks simply expressed "hostility to the village"?

As regards the shooting of Communists, a far simpler and more
plausible explanation also exists. Rather than show "hostility
to the city," it shows "hostility" to the Communist Party,
its policies and its authoritarian ideas. Given that the
Bolsheviks had betrayed the Makhnovists on *three* occasions
(see section H.11.13) and attacked them, "hostility" to
Communists seems a sensible position to take! Equally, the
first Bolshevik attack on the Makhnovists occurred in
mid-1919, when the Bolsheviks began justifying their party
dictatorship as essential for the success of the revolution.
The other two occurred in 1920, when the Bolsheviks were announcing
to the whole world at the Communist International (to quote
Zinoviev) that "the dictatorship of the proletariat is at the
same time the dictatorship of the Communist Party." [_Proceedings
and Documents of the Second Congress 1920_, vol. 1, p. 152] 
Given this, perhaps the fact that the Makhnovists shot 
Communists can be explained in terms of defence against
Bolshevik betrayal and opposition to the dictatorship of the
Communist Party rather than "hostility to the city." Needless to
say, the Communists shot Makhnovists and anarchists. What does
that suggest a "hostility" to by the Bolsheviks? Working-class
autonomy and freedom?

Clearly, Trotsky was clutching at straws in his smearing of
the Makhnovist movement as haters of the city worker. The
"hostility" Trotsky speaks of can be far more easily explained
in terms of the necessities imposed upon the Makhnovists by
the civil war and the betrayals of the Bolsheviks. As such,
it would be fairer to state that the Makhnovists showed
"hostility" or "hatred" to the city or city workers only if
you equate both with the Bolshevik party dictatorship. In
other words, the Makhnovists showed "hostility" to the new
ruling class of the Communist Party hierarchy.

All this does not mean that there were not misunderstandings
between the Makhno movement, a predominantly rural movement,
and the workers in the cities. Far from it. Equally, it can
be said that the Makhnovists did not understand the workings
of an urban economy and society as well as they understood
their own. However, they made no attempt to *impose* their
world-view on the city workers (unlike the Bolsheviks, who
did so on both urban and rural workers). However, ignorance of
the city and its resulting misunderstandings do not constitute
"hostility" or "hatred."

Moreover, where these misunderstandings developed show that the
claims that the Makhnovists hated the city workers are simply
false. Simply put, the misunderstanding occurred when the
Makhnovists had liberated cities from the Whites. As we
discussed in section H.11.7, the first thing the Makhnovists
did was to call a conference of workers' delegates to discuss
the current situation and to urge them to form soviets, unions
and co-operatives in order to manage their own affairs. This
hardly shows "hatred" of the city worker. In contrast, the
first thing the Bolsheviks did in taking a city was to
form a "revolutionary committee" to govern the town and
implement Bolshevik policy.

This, needless to say, shows a distinct "hostility" to the
city workers on the part of the Bolsheviks.  Equally, the
Bolshevik advocacy of party dictatorship to overcome the
"wavering" of the working class. In the words of Trotsky
himself (in 1921):

"The Workers' Opposition has come out with dangerous
slogans, making a fetish of democratic principles!
They place the workers' right to elect representatives 
above the Party, as if the party were not entitled
to assert its dictatorship even if that dictatorship
temporarily clashed with the passing moods of the workers'
democracy. It is necessary to create amongst us the
awareness of the revolutionary birthright of the party.
which is obliged to maintain its dictatorship, regardless
of temporary wavering even in the working classes. This
awareness is for us the indispensable element. The
dictatorship does not base itself at every given moment
on the formal principle of a workers' democracy."
[quoted by Samuel Farber, _Before Stalinism_, p. 209]

Opposing workers' democracy because working people could
make decisions that the party thought were wrong shows a
deep "hostility" to the *real* city workers and their
liberty and equality. Equally, Bolshevik repression of
workers' strikes, freedom of speech, assembly, organisation
and self-determination shows far more "hostility" to the
city worker than a few Makhnovist misunderstandings!

All in all, any claim that the Makhnovists "hated" city
workers is simply false. While some Makhnovists may not
have liked the city nor really understood the complexities
of an urban economy, they did recognise the importance of
encouraging working-class autonomy and self-organisation
within them and building links between the rural and urban
toilers. While the lack of a large-scale anarcho-syndicalist
movement hindered any positive construction, the Makhnovists
at least tried to promote urban self-management. Given
Bolshevik authoritarianism and its various rationalisations, it
would be fairer to say that it was the Bolsheviks who expressed
"hostility" to the city workers by imposing their dictatorship
upon them rather than supporting working-class self-management
as the Makhnovists did!

H.11.11 Were the Makhnovists nationalists?

Some books on the Makhnovist movement try to present the
Makhnovists as being Ukrainian nationalists. A few discuss
the matter in order, perhaps, to increase the respectability
of the Makhnovist movement by associating it with a more
"serious" and "respectable" political theory than anarchism,
namely "Nationalism." Those who seriously investigate the
issue come to the same conclusion, namely that neither
Makhno nor the Makhnovist movement was nationalist (see,
for example, Frank Sysyn's essay _Nestor Makhno and the
Ukrainian Revolution_ which discusses this issue).

Therefore, any claims that the Makhnovists were nationalists
are incorrect. The Makhnovist movement was first and foremost
an internationalist movement of working people. This is to be
expected as anarchists have long argued that nationalism is a
cross-class movement which aims to maintain the existing class
system but without foreign domination (see section D.6 for
details). As such, the Makhnovists were well aware that
nationalism could not solve the social question and would
simply replace a Russian ruling class and state with a
Ukrainian one.

This meant that the aims of the Makhnovists went further
than simply national liberation or self-determination.
Anarchists, rather, aim for working-class self-liberation
and self-determination, both as individuals and as groups,
as well as politically, economically and socially. To quote
Makhno's wire to Lenin in December 1918, the Makhnovist
"aims are known and clear to all. They are fighting against
the authority of all political governments and for liberty
and independence of the working people." [quoted by Palij,
Op. Cit., p. 80]

From this class and anti-hierarchical perspective, it is
not unsurprising that the Makhnovists were not nationalists.
They did not seek Ukrainian independence but rather working-
class autonomy. This, of necessity, meant they opposed all
those who aimed to govern and/or exploit the working class.
Hence Arshinov:

"Composed of the poorest peasants, who were united by the
fact that they all worked with their own hands, the Makhnovist
movement was founded on the deep feeling of fraternity which
characterises only the most oppressed. During its entire history
it did not for an instant appeal to national sentiments. The
whole struggle of the Makhnovists against the Bolsheviks was
conducted solely in the name of the rights and interests of
the workers. Denikin's troops, the Austro-Germans, Petliura,
the French troops in Berdyansk, Wrangel -- were all treated by
the Makhnovists as enemies of the workers. Each one of these
invasions represented for them essentially a threat to the
workers, and the Makhnovists had no interest in the national
flag under which they marched." [Op. Cit., p. 210]

He stressed that "national prejudices had no place in the
Makhnovshchina. There was also no place in the movement
for religious prejudices . . . Among modern social movements,
the Makhnovshchina was one of the few in which an individual had
absolutely no interest in his own or his neighbour's religion or
nationality, in which he respected only the labour and the
freedom of the worker." [Op. Cit., p. 211]

The Makhnovists made their position on nationalism clear
in the 'Declaration' published by the Revolutionary Military
Council of the army in October, 1919:

"When speaking of Ukrainian independence, we do not mean national 
independence in Petliura's sense but the social independence of 
workers and peasants. We declare that Ukrainian, and all other, 
working people have the right to self-determination not as an 
'independent nation' but as 'independent workers'" [quoted by
Arshinov, Op. Cit., p. 210]

In other words, the Makhnovists "declared, that in their
option *Petlurovtchina* [the Petliura movement, Petliura
being the leader of the Nationalists] was a bourgeois
nationalist movement whose road was entirely different from
that of the revolutionary peasants, that the Ukraine should
be organised on a basis of free labour and the independence
of the peasants and the workers . . . and that nothing but
struggle was possible between the *Makhnovitchina*, the
movement of the workers, and the *Petlurovtchina*, the 
movement of the bourgeoisie." [Voline, Op. Cit., p. 572]

This does not mean that anarchists are indifferent to
cultural and national domination and oppression. Far from 
it! As we discussed in sections D.6 and D.7, anarchists
are against foreign domination and cultural imperialism,
believing that every community or national group has the
right to be itself and develop as it sees fit. This means
that anarchists seek to transform national liberation
struggles into *human* liberation struggles, turning any
struggle against foreign oppression and domination into
a struggle against *all* forms of oppression and domination.

This means that the Makhnovists, like anarchists in general,
seek to encourage local culture and language while opposed
nationalism. As Frank Sysyn argues, it "would be a mistake
. . . to label the Makhnivtsi as 'anti-Ukrainian.' Although
they opposed the political goals of most 'svidomi ukraintsi'
(nationally conscious Ukrainians), they accepted the existence
of a Ukrainian nation and used the terms 'Ukraine' and
'Ukrainian.'" [_Nestor Makhno and the Ukrainian Revolution_,
p. 288] It should be noted that opponents of Ukrainian
independence generally called it the "south of Russia" or
"Little Russia." 

Thus an opposition to nationalism did not imply a rejection
or blindness to foreign domination and free cultural expression.
On the question of the language to be taught in schools, the
Cultural-Educational Section of the Makhnovist Insurgent Army
wrote the following in October, 1919:

"The cultural-educational section of the Makhnovist army
constantly receives questions from school teachers asking
about the language in which instruction should be given in
the schools, now that Denikin's troops have been expelled.

"The revolutionary insurgents, holding to the principles of
true socialism, cannot in any field or by any measure do
violence to the natural desires and needs of the Ukrainian
people. This is why the question of the language to be
taught in the schools cannot be solved by our army, but can
only be decided by the people themselves, by parents, teachers
and students

"It goes without saying that all the orders of Denikin's
so-called 'Special Bureau' as well as General Mai-Maevsky's
order No. 22, which forbids the use of the mother tongue
in the schools, are null and void, having been forcibly
imposed on the schools.

"In the interest of the greatest intellectual development
of the people, the language of instruction should be that
toward which the local population naturally tends, and
this is why the population, the students, the teachers
and the parents, and not authorities or the army, should
freely and independently resolve this question." [quoted by
Arshinov, Op. Cit., pp. 210-1]

They also printed a Ukrainian version of their paper ("The 
Road to Freedom").

Clearly their opposition to Ukrainian nationalism did not
mean that the Makhnovists were indifferent to imperialism
and foreign political or cultural domination. This explains
why Makhno criticised his enemies for anti-Ukrainian actions
and language. Michael Malet summarises, for the Makhnovists
"Ukrainian culture was welcome, but political nationalism
was highly suspect." [Op. Cit., p. 143]

Given anarchist support for federal organisation from below
upwards, working-class self-determination and autonomy, plus
a healthy respect for local culture, it is easy to see why
some historians have fostered a nationalist perspective onto
the Makhnovists where none existed. This means that when
they agitated with the slogan "All to whom freedom and
independence are dear should stay in the Ukraine and
fight the Denikinists," it should be noted that "[n]owhere
.. . . nationalism openly advocated, and the line of
argument put forward can more easily be interpreted as
libertarian and, above all, anti-White." [Malet, Op. Cit.,
p. 146]

In 1928, Makhno wrote a rebuttal to a Soviet historian's
claim that Makhno became a Ukrainian Nationalist during
the 1920-21 period. He "totally dismissed the charges"
and argued that the historian "distorted anarchism's
espousal of local autonomy so as to create trumped-up
charges of nationalism." As Sysyn argues, while Makhno
"never became a nationalist, he did to a degree become
a Ukrainian anarchist." [Op. Cit., p. 292 and p. 303]

Thus while neither Makhno nor the movement were nationalists,
they were not blind to national and cultural oppression. They
considered nationalism as too narrow a goal to satisfy the
*social* aspirations of the working classes. As Makhno
argued in exile, the Ukrainian toilers had "asserted their
rights to use their own language and their entitlement
to their own culture, which had been regarded before the
revolution as anathema. They also asserted their right to
conform in their lives to their own way of life and specific
customs." However, "[i]n the aim of building an independent
Ukrainian State, certain statist gentlemen would dearly love
to arrogate to themselves all natural manifestations of
Ukrainian reality." Yet the "healthy instincts of the
Ukrainian toilers and their baleful life under the Bolshevik
yoke has not made them oblivious of the State danger in
general" and so they "shun the chauvinist trend and do not
mix it up with their social aspirations, rather seeking their
own road to emancipation." [_The Struggle Against the State
and Other Essays_, pp. 24-5]

In summary, the Makhnovists were opposed to nationalism
but supported culture diversity and self-determination
within a free federation of toilers communes and councils.
They did not limit their aims to national liberation, but
rather sought the self-liberation of the working classes
from every oppression -- foreign or domestic, economic or
political, cultural or social.

H.11.12 Did the Makhnovists support the Whites?

No, they did not. However, black propaganda by the Bolsheviks
stated they did. Victor Serge wrote about the "strenuous
calumnies put out by the Communist Party" against him
"which went so far as to accuse him of signing pacts with
the Whites at the very moment when he was engaged in a
life-and-death struggle against them." [_Memoirs of a
Revolutionary_, p. 122]

According to Arshinov, "Soviet newspapers spread the false
news of an alliance between Makhno and Wrangel" and in the
summer of 1920, a representative of the Kharkov government
"declared at the Plenary Session of the Ekaterinoslav
Soviet, that Soviet authorities had written proof of the
alliance between Makhno and Wrangel. This was obviously
an intentional lie." Wrangel, perhaps believing these
lies had some basis, sent a messenger to Makhno in July,
1920. "Wrangel's messenger was immediately executed"
and the "entire incident was reported in the Makhnovist
press. All this was perfectly clear to the Bolsheviks.
They nevertheless continued to trumpet the alliance
between Makhno and Wrangel. It was only after a
military-political agreement had been concluded between
the Makhnovists and the Soviet power that the Soviet
Commissariat of War announced that there had never been
an alliance between Makhno and Wrangel, that earlier
Soviet assertions to this effect were an error." [Op. Cit.,
pp. 173-5]

Needless to say, while the Bolsheviks spread the rumour
to discredit Makhno, the Whites spread it to win the
confidence of the peasants. Thus when Trotsky stated
that Wrangel had "united with the Ukrainian partisan
Makhno," he was aiding the efforts of Wrangel to learn
from previous White mistakes and build some kind of
popular base. [quoted by Palij, Op. Cit., p. 220] By
October, Trotsky had retracted this statement:

"Wrangel really tried to come into direct contact with
Makhno's men and dispatched to Makhno's headquarters
two representatives for negotiations . . . [However]
Makhno's men not only did not enter into negotiations
with the representatives of Wrangel, but publicly
hanged them as soon as they arrived at the headquarters."
[quoted by Palij, Ibid.]

Trotsky, of course, still tried to blacken the Makhnovists.
In the same article he argued that "[u]ndoubtedly Makhno
actually co-operated with Wrangel, and also with the Polish
*szlachta*, as he fought with them against the Red Army.
However, there was no formal alliance between them. All
the documents mentioning a formal alliance were fabricated
by Wrangel . . . All this fabrication was made to deceive
the protectors of Makhno, the French, and other imperialists."
[quoted by Palij, Op. Cit., p. 225]

It is hard to know where to start in this amazing piece of
political story-telling. As we discuss in more detail in
section H.11.13, the Makhnovists were fighting the Red Army
from January to September 1920 because the Bolsheviks had
engineered their outlawing! As historian David Footman points
out, the attempt by the Bolsheviks to transfer Makhno to Polish
front was done for political reasons:

"it is admitted on the Soviet side that this order was primarily
'dictated by the necessity' of liquidating _Makhnovshchina_ as an
independent movement. Only when he was far removed from his home
country would it be possible to counteract his influence" [Op.
Cit., p. 291]

Indeed, it could be argued that by attacking Makhno in January
helped the Whites to regroup under Wrangel and return later
in the year. Equally, it seems like a bad joke for Trotsky to
blame the victim of Bolshevik intrigues for defending themselves.
And the idea that Makhno had "protectors" in any imperialist
nation is a joke, which deserves only laughter as a response!

It should be noted that it is "agreed that the initiative for
joint action against Wrangel came from the Makhnovites." This was
ignored by the Bolsheviks until after "Wrangel started his big
offensive" in September 1920 [Footman, Op. Cit., p. 294 and
p. 295]

So while the Bolsheviks claimed that the Makhnovists had made a
pact with General Wrangel, the facts are that Makhnovists fought
the Whites with all their energy. Indeed, they considered the
Whites so great a threat to the revolution they even agreed to
pursue a pact with the Bolsheviks, who had betrayed them twice
already and had subjected both them and the peasantry to
repression.  As such, it could be argued that the Bolsheviks
were the only counter-revolutionaries the Makhnovists can be
accurately accused of collaborating with.

Every historian who has studied the movement has refuted
claims that the Makhnovist movement made any alliance with
the counter-revolutionary White forces. For example, Michael
Palij notes that Denikin "was the main enemy that Makhno fought,
stubbornly and uncompromising, from the end of 1918 to the end
of 1919. Its social and anti-Ukrainian policies greatly
antagonised all segments of Ukrainian society. The result
of this was an increased resistance to the Volunteer Army
and its regime and a substantial strengthening of the Makhno
movement." He also notes that after several months of "hard 
fighting" Denikin's troops "came to regard Makhno's army as 
their most formidable enemy." Makhno's conflict with Wrangel 
was equally as fierce and "[a]lthough Makhno had fought both 
the Bolsheviks and Wrangel, his contribution to the final 
defeat of the latter was essential, as is proved by the 
efforts of both sides to have him as an ally." [Op. Cit., 
p. 177, p. 202 and  p. 228] According to Footman, Makhno 
"remained to the end the implacable enemy of the Whites." 
[Op. Cit., p. 295] Malet just states the obvious: "The 
Makhnovists were totally opposed to the Whites." [Op. Cit., 
p. 140] 

We will leave the last word to the considered judgement of 
the White General Denikin who, in exile, stated that the 
Makhno movement was "the most antagonistic to the idea of 
the White movement." [quoted by Malet, Op. Cit., p. 140]

In summary, the Makhnovists fought the White counter-revolution
with all their might, playing a key role in the struggle and
defeat of both Denikin and Wrangel. Anyone who claims that
they worked with the Whites is either ignorant or a liar.

H.11.13 What was the relationship of the Bolsheviks to the movement?

The Makhnovists worked with the Bolsheviks in three periods. The
first (and longest) was against Denikin after the Red Army had
entered the Ukraine after the withdrawal of the Austro-Germans.
The second was an informal agreement for a short period after
Denikin had been defeated. The third was a formal political and
military agreement between October and November 1920 in the
struggle against Wrangel. Each period of co-operation ended
with Bolshevik betrayal and conflict between the two forces.

As such, the relationship of the Bolsheviks to the 
Makhnovists was one of, at best, hostile co-operation 
against a common enemy. Usually, it was one of conflict. 
This was due, fundamentally, to two different concepts of 
social revolution. While the Makhnovists, as anarchists,
believed in working-class self-management and autonomy,
the Bolsheviks believed that only a centralised state
structure (headed by themselves) could ensure the success 
of the revolution. By equating working-class power with 
Bolshevik party government (and from 1919 onwards, with 
the dictatorship of the Bolshevik party), they could not
help viewing the Makhnovist movement as a threat to their 
power (see section H.11.14 for a discussion of the political
differences and the evolving nature of the Bolshevik's
conception of party rule).

Such a perspective ensured that they could only co-operate
during periods when the White threat seemed most dangerous.
As soon as the threat was defeated or they felt strong enough,
the Bolsheviks turned on their former allies instantly. This
section discusses each of the Bolshevik betrayals and the
subsequent conflicts. As such, it is naturally broken up into
three parts, reflecting each of the betrayals and their
aftermath.

Michael Malet sums up the usual Bolshevik-Makhnovist relationship 
by arguing that it "will be apparent that the aim of the Soviet 
government from the spring of 1919 onwards was to destroy the 
Makhnovists as an independent force, preferably killing Makhno 
himself in the process . . . Given the disastrous nature of 
Bolshevik land policy . . . this was not only unsurprisingly,
it was inevitable." He also adds that the "fact that Makhno 
had a socio-political philosophy to back up his arguments only
made the Bolsheviks more determined to break his hold over
the south-east Ukraine, as soon as they realised that Nestor
would not surrender that hold voluntarily." [Op. Cit., p. 128
and p. 129]

The first betrayal occurred in June 1919. The Makhnovists had
been integrated with the Red Army in late January 1919,
retaining their internal organisation (including the election
of commanders) and their black flags. With the Red Army they
fought against Denikin's Volunteer Army. Before the arrival
of Red forces in their region and the subsequent pact, the
Makhnovists had organised a successful regional insurgent,
peasant and worker congress which had agreed to call a
second for February 12th. This second congress set up a
Revolutionary Military Soviet to implement the decisions
of this and following congresses. This congress (see
section H.11.7) passed an anti-Bolshevik resolution, which
urged "the peasants and workers to watch vigilantly the
actions of the Bolshevik regime that cause a real danger
to the worker-peasant revolution." Such actions included
the monopolisation of the revolution, centralising power
and overriding local soviets, repressing anarchists and
Left Socialist Revolutionaries and "stifling any
manifestation of revolutionary expression." [quoted by
Palij, Op. Cit., p. 154]

This change from the recent welcome was simply the behaviour
of the Bolsheviks since their arrival. The (unelected)
Ukrainian Bolshevik government had tried to apply the
same tactics as its Russian equivalent, particularly as
regards the peasants. In addition, the Bolshevik land
policy (as indicated in section H.11.8) was a complete
disaster, alien to the ideas and needs of the peasants
and, combined with grain requisitioning, alienating them.

The third congress was held on the 10th of April. By 
this time, Communist agricultural policy and terrorism
had alienated all the peasantry, who "rich and poor alike"
were "united in their opposition" to the Bolsheviks.
[Footman, Op. Cit., p. 269] Indeed, the "poorer the
areas, the more dissatisfied were the peasants with the
Bolshevik decrees." [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 156] As we 
indicated in section H.11.7, the third congress was 
informed that it was "counter-revolutionary" and banned 
by the Bolshevik commander Dybenko, provoking a famous 
reply which stressed the right of a revolutionary people 
to apply the gains of that revolution when they see fit. 
It is worth re-quoting the relevant section:

"Can there exist laws made by a few people who call
themselves revolutionaries which permit them to
outlaw a whole people who are more revolutionary
than they are themselves? . . .

"Is it permissible, is it admissible, that they should
come to the country to establish laws of violence,
to subjugate a people who have just overthrown all
lawmakers and all laws?

"Does there exist a law according to which a revolutionary
has the right to apply the most severe penalties to a
revolutionary mass, of which he calls himself the
defender, simply because this mass has taken the good
things which the revolution promised them, freedom
and equality, without his permission?

"Should the mass of revolutionary people perhaps be
silent when such a revolutionary takes away the
freedom which they have just conquered?

"Do the laws of the revolution order the shooting of
a delegate because he believes he ought to carry out
the mandate given him by the revolutionary mass
which elected him?

"Whose interests should the revolutionary defend;
those of the Party or those of the people who set
the revolution in motion with their blood?" [quoted
by Arshinov, Op. Cit., p. 103]

After the 3rd congress, the Bolsheviks started to turn
against Makhno:

"It was now that favourable mention of Makhno ceased to
appear in the Soviet Press; an increasingly critical 
note became apparent. Supplies failed to get through to 
Makhnovite units and areas." [Footman, Op. Cit., p. 271]

Lenin himself advised local Bolshevik leaders on Makhno,
stating in early May that "temporarily, while Rostov is
not yet captured, it is necessary to be diplomatic." 
[quoted by Arthur E. Adams, _Bolsheviks in the Ukraine_,
pp. 352-3] Thus, as long as the Bolsheviks needed cannon
fodder, Makhno was to be tolerated. Things changed when 
Trotsky arrived. On May 17th he promised a "radical and
merciless liquidation of partisanshchina [the partisan
movement], independence, hooliganism, and leftism." 
[quoted by Adams, Op. Cit., p. 360] According to one
historian, Trotsky "favoured a thorough-going annihilation 
of the partisan's ideological leaders as well as men like
Hryhoriyov who wielded political power." [Adams, Op. Cit.,
p. 360] Unsurprisingly, given Trotsky's stated mission,
Bolshevik hostility towards the Makhnovists became more
than mere words. It took the form of both direct and 
indirect aggression. "In the latter part of May," states 
Footman, "the *Cheka* sent over two agents to assassinate 
Makhno." Around the same time, the Red "hold-back of supplies 
for the Insurgents developed into a blockade of the area. 
Makhnovite units at the front ran short of ammunition." 
[Op. Cit., p. 271 and p. 272] This, obviously, had a 
negative impact the Makhnovists' ability to fight the
Whites. 

Due to the gravity of the military and political situations both
at and behind the front, the Makhnovist Revolutionary Military
Soviet decided to call an extraordinary congress of peasants,
workers, insurgents and Red soldiers. This congress was to
determine the immediate tasks and the practical measures to
be taken by the workers to remedy the mortal danger represented
by the Whites. On May 31st, a call was sent out which stated,
in part, "that only the working masses themselves can find a
solution [to the current problem], and not individuals or
parties." The congress would be based as follows: "elections of 
delegates of peasants and workers will take place at general 
assemblies of villages, towns, factories and workshops." 
[quoted by Arshinov, Op. Cit., p. 121]

The Bolshevik reply came quickly, with Trotsky issuing his
infamous Order no. 1824 on June 4th:

"This Congress is directed squarely against the Soviet Power
in the Ukraine and against the organisation of the southern
front, where Makhno's brigade is stationed. This congress can
have no other result then to excite some new disgraceful revolt
like that of Grigor'ev, and to open the front to the Whites,
before whom Makhno's brigade can only retreat incessantly on
account of the incompetence, criminal designs and treason of
its commanders.

"1. By the present order this congress is forbidden, and will
in no circumstances be allowed to take place.

"2. All the peasant and working class population shall be warned.
orally and in writing, that participation in the said congress
will be considered an act of high treason against the Soviet
Republic and the Soviet front.

"3. All delegates to the said Congress shall be arrested
immediately and bought before the Revolutionary Military
Tribunal of the 14th, formerly 2nd, Army of the Ukraine.

"4. The persons spreading the call of Makhno and the Hulyai
Pole Executive Committee to the Congress shall likewise be
arrested.

"5. The present order shall have the force of law as soon as
it is telegraphed. It should be widely distributed, displayed
in all public places, and sent to the representatives of the
executive committees of towns and villages, as well as to all
the representatives of Soviet authority, and to commanders and
commissars of military units." [quoted by Arshinov, Op. Cit.,
pp. 122-3]

Arshinov argues that this "document is truly classic" and
"[w]hoever studies the Russian revolution should learn it by
heart." He compares Trotsky's order to the reply the Makhnovists
had sent to the Bolsheviks' attempt to ban the third congress.
Clearly, Order No. 1824 shows that laws did exist "made by a
a few people who call themselves revolutionaries which permit
them to outlaw a whole people who are more revolutionary than
they are themselves"! Equally, the order shows that "a
revolutionary has the right to apply the most severe penalties
to a revolutionary mass . . . simply because this mass has
taken the good things which the revolution has promised them,
freedom and equality, without his permission"! Little wonder
Arshinov states that this order meant that the "entire peasant
and labouring population are declared guilty of high treason
if they dare to participate in their own free congress."
[Op. Cit., p. 123] 

According to Voline, in Alexandrovsk "all workers meetings 
planned for the purpose of discussing the call of the 
Council and the agenda of the Congress were forbidden under
pain of death. Those which were organised in ignorance of
the order were dispersed by armed force. In other cities
and towns, the Bolsheviks acted in the same way. As for 
the peasants in the villages, they were treated with still
less ceremony; in many places militants and even peasants
'suspected of acting in favour of the insurgents and the
Congress' were seized and executed after a semblance of 
a trial. Many peasants carrying the call were arrested,
'tried' and shot, before they could even find out about
Order No. 1824." [Op. Cit., pp. 599-600]

As Arshinov summarises:

"This entire document represents such a crying usurpation of
the rights of the workers that it is pointless to comment
further on it." [Op. Cit., p. 124]

Trotsky continued his usurpation of the rights of the workers
in a later order on the congress. In this, Trotsky called 
this openly announced workers, peasant and insurgent congress 
a "conspiracy against Soviet power" and a "congress of 
Anarchist-kulaks delegates for struggle against the Red 
Army and the Soviet power" (which explains why the congress 
organisers had asked that hotbed of kulakism, the Red Army
troops, to send delegates!). Trotsky indicated the fate of 
those workers and peasants who dared participate in their 
own revolution: "There can be only one penalty for these 
individuals: shooting." [_How the Revolution Armed_, 
vol. II, p. 293]

Trotsky also ordered the arrest of Makhno, who escaped but who
ordered his troops to remain under Bolshevik command to ensure
that the front against Denikin was maintained. However, five
members of his staff were shot for having distributed literature
concerning the banned fourth congress. This order was the first
step in the Bolshevik attempt to "liquidate the Makhnovist
movement." This campaign saw Bolshevik regiments invade the
insurgent area, shooting militants on the spot and destroying
the free communes and other Makhnovist organisations. [Arshinov,
Op. Cit., p. 121] It should be noted that during the Spanish
Revolution, the Stalinists acted in the same way, attacking
rural collectives while the anarchist troops fought against
Franco at the front.

Thus the participating event for the break between the
Makhnovists and Bolsheviks was Trotsky's banning of the
fourth regional congress. However, this was preceded by
an intense press campaign against the Makhnovists as well
as holding back of essential supplies from the frontline
troops. Clearly the Bolsheviks considered that the soviet
system was threatened if soviet conferences were called
and that the "dictatorship of the proletariat" was undermined
if the proletariat took part in the revolutionary process!

With the Makhnovist front weakened, they could not hold against
Denikin's attacks, particularly when Red Army troops retreated on
their flank. Thus, the front which the Makhnovists themselves had 
formed and held for more than six months was finally broken. 
[Arshinov, Op. Cit., p. 124] The Red Army was split into three 
and the Whites entered the Ukraine, which the Bolsheviks promptly 
abandoned to its fate. The Makhnovists, drawing stray Red Army 
and other forces to it, continued to fight the Whites, ultimately 
inflicting a decisive defeat on them at Peregonovka, subsequently 
destroying their supply lines and ensuring Denikin's defeat 
(see section H.11.4).

The Red Army re-entered the Ukraine at the end of 1919. 
Bolshevik plans with regard to the Makhnovists had already
been decided in a secret order written by Trotsky on 
December 11th. Red Army troops had to "be protected 
against infection by guerrilla-ism and Makhnovism" by 
various means, including "extensive agitation" which 
used "examples from the past to show the treacherous role 
played by the Makhnovites." A "considerable number of 
agents" would be sent "ahead" of the main forces to "join the
guerrilla detachments" and would agitate against "guerrilla-ism."
Once partisan forces meet with Red Army troops, the former 
"ceases to be a military unit after it has appeared on our
side of the line . . . From that moment it becomes merely 
material for processing, and for that purpose is to be sent
to our rear." To "secure complete subordination of the
detachments," the Red forces "must make use of the agents
previously set to these detachments." The aim, simply put,
was to ensure that the partisans became "fully subordinate 
to our command." If the partisans who had been fighting for
revolution and against the Whites opposed becoming "material
for processing" (i.e cannon fodder), "refuses to submit to 
orders, displays unruliness and self-will," then it "must
be subjected to ruthless punishment." Recognising the 
organic links the partisans had with the peasants, Trotsky
argues that "in the Ukraine, guerrilla detachments appear
and disappear with ease, dissolving themselves into the
mass of the armed peasant population" and so "a fundamental
condition for the success against guerrilla-ism is 
*unconditional disarmament of the rural population, 
without exception.*" [Trotsky, _How the Revolution Armed_, 
vol. II, pp. 440-2] As events would show, the Bolsheviks
implemented Trotsky's order to the letter.

On December 24th, Makhno's troops met with the Bolshevik 14th
army and its commander "admitted Makhno's service in defeating
Denikin." However, while "the Bolsheviks fraternised with the
Makhno troops . . . they distrusted Makhno, fearing the
popularity he had gained as a result of his successful
fighting against Denikin." The Bolsheviks had "no intention
of tolerating Makhno's independent policy, but hoped first to
destroy his army by removing it from its own base. With this
in mind, on January 8th, 1920, the Revolutionary Military
Council of the Fourteenth Army ordered Makhno to move to the
Polish Front . . . The author of the order realised that there
was no real war between the Poles and the Bolsheviks at the
time and he also knew that Makhno would not abandon his region.
.. . . Uborevich [the author] explained that 'an appropriate
reaction by Makhno to this order would give us the chance
to have accurate grounds for our next steps' . . . [He]
concluded: 'The order is a certain political manoeuvre and,
at the very least, we expect positive results from Makhno's
realisation of this.'" [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 209 and p. 210]
As can be seen, these actions fit perfectly with Trotsky's
secret order and with Bolshevik desire for a monopoly of
power for itself (see next section).

As expected, the Makhnovists refused to leave their territory.
They realised the political motivations behind the order. As
Arshinov notes, "[s]ending the insurrectionary army to the
Polish front meant removing from the Ukraine the main nerve
centre of the revolutionary insurrection. This was precisely
what the Bolsheviks wanted: they would then be absolute masters
of the rebellious region, and the Makhnovists were perfectly
aware of this." [Op. Cit., p. 163] As well as political
objections, the Makhnovists listed practical reasons for
not going. Firstly, "the Insurrectionary Army was subordinate
neither to the 14th Corps nor to any other unit of the Red Army.
The Red commander had no authority to give orders to the
Insurrectionary Army." Secondly, "it was materially impossible
to carry it out, since half the men, as well as nearly all
the commanders and staff, and Makhno himself, were sick
[with typhus]." Thirdly, "the fighting qualities and
revolutionary usefulness of the Insurrectionary Army were
certainly much greater on their own ground." [Voline, Op.
Cit., pp. 650-1]

The Bolsheviks refused to discuss the issue and on the 14th
of January, they declared the Makhnovists outlawed. They
then "made a great effort to destroy" Makhno. [Palij,
Op. Cit., p. 210] In summary, the Bolsheviks *started* the
conflict in order to eliminate opposition to their power.
This led to nine months of bitter fighting between the
Red Army and the Makhnovists. To prevent fraternisation,
the Bolsheviks did not use local troops and instead imported
Latvian, Estonian and Chinese troops. They also used other
"new tactics," and "attacked not only Makhno's partisans,
but also the villages and towns in which the population
was sympathetic toward Makhno. They shot ordinary soldiers
as well as their commanders, destroying their houses,
confiscating their properties and persecuting their families.
Moreover the Bolsheviks conducted mass arrests of innocent
peasants who were suspected of collaborating in some way
with the partisans. It is impossible to determine the
casualties involved." They also set up "Committees of
the Poor" as part of the Bolshevik administrative apparatus,
which acted as "informers helping the Bolshevik secret police
in its persecution of the partisans, their families and
supporters, even to the extent of hunting down and executing
wounded partisans." [Palij, Op. Cit., pp. 212-3]

This conflict undoubtedly gave time for the Whites to
reorganise themselves and encouraged the Poles to invade
the Ukraine, so prolonging the Civil War. The Makhnovists
were threatened by both the Bolsheviks *and* Wrangel. By
mid-1920, Wrangel appeared to be gaining the upper hand
and the Makhnovists "could not remain indifferent to
Wrangel's advance . . . Everything done to destroy him
would in the last analysis benefit the revolution." This
lead the Makhnovists to consider allying with the Bolsheviks
as "the difference between the Communists and Wrangel
was that the Communists had the support of the masses
with faith in the revolution. It is true that these masses
were cynically misled by the Communists, who exploited
the revolutionary enthusiasm of the workers in the interests
of Bolshevik power." With this in mind, the Makhnovists
agreed at a mass assembly to make an alliance with the
Bolsheviks against Wrangel as this would eliminate the
White threat and end the civil war. [Arshinov, Op. Cit.,
p. 176]

The Bolsheviks ignored the Makhnovist offer using
mid-September, when "Wrangel's success caused the Bolsheviks
leaders to reconsider." [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 223] Sometime
between the 10th and 15th of October the final agreement was
signed:

"Part I -- Political Agreement.

"1. Immediate release of all Makhnovists and anarchists imprisoned
or in exile in the territories of the Soviet Republic; cessation
of all persecutions of Makhnovists or anarchists, except those
who carry on armed conflict against the Soviet Government.

"2. Complete freedom in all forms of public expression and
propaganda for all Makhnovists and anarchists, for their
principles and ideas, in speech and the press, with the
exception of anything that might call for the violent
overthrow of the Soviet Government, and on condition that
the requirements of military censorship be respected. For
all kinds of publications, the Makhnovists and anarchists,
as revolutionary organisations recognised by the Soviet
Government may make use of the technical apparatus of the
Soviet State, while naturally submitting to the technical
rules for publication.

"3. Free participation in elections to the Soviets; and the
right of Makhnovists and anarchists to be elected thereto.
Free participation in the organisation of the forthcoming
Fifth Pan-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets . . .

"Part II -- Military Agreement.

"1. The Ukrainian Revolutionary Insurrectionary Army (Makhnovist)
will join the armed forces of the Republic as a partisan army,
subordinate, in regard to operations, to the supreme command of
the Red Army; it will retain its established internal structure,
and does not have to adopt the bases and principles of the
regular Red Army.

"2. When crossing Soviet territory at the front, or going between
fronts, the Insurrectionary Army will not accept into its ranks
neither any detachments of, nor deserters from, the Red Army . . .

"3. For the purpose of destroying the common enemy -- the White
Army -- the Ukrainian Revolutionary Insurrectionary Army
(Makhnovists) will inform the working masses that collaborate
with it the agreement that has been concluded; it will call upon
the people to cease all military actions hostile to the Soviet
power; and for its part, the Soviet power will immediately
publish the clauses of the agreement.

"4. The families of combatants of the Makhnovist Revolutionary
Insurrectionary Army living in the territory of the Soviet
Republic shall enjoy the same rights as those of soldiers of
the Red Army . . ." [quoted by Arshinov, Op. Cit., p. 178]

This agreement was agreed by both sides, although the Bolsheviks
immediately broke it by publishing the military agreement first,
followed by the political agreement a week later, so obscuring
the real meaning of the pact. As it stands, the political clause
simply gave anarchists and Makhnovists the rights they should
have already had, according to the constitution of the Soviet
state. This shows how far the Bolsheviks had applied that
constitution.

The agreement is highly significant as in itself it disproves
many of the Bolsheviks slanders about the Makhnovists and it
proves the suppression of the anarchist press to have been on
political grounds.

However, the Makhnovists desired to add a fourth clause to
the Political Agreement:

"Since one of the essential principles of the Makhnovist movement
is the struggle for the self-management of the workers, the
Insurrectionary Army (Makhnovist) believes it should insist on
the following fourth point of the political agreement: in the
region where the Makhnovist Army is operating, the population
of workers and peasants will create its own institutions of
economic and political self-management; these institutions will
be autonomous and joined in federation, by means of agreement,
with the government organs of the Soviet Republic," [quoted by
Arshinov, Op. Cit., pp. 179-80]

Unsurprisingly, the Bolsheviks refused to ratify this clause.
As one Bolshevik historian pointed out, the "fourth point was
fundamental to both sides, it meant the system of free Soviets,
which was in total opposition to the idea of the dictatorship
of the proletariat." [quoted by Malet, Op. Cit., p. 108] As
we discuss in the next section, the Bolsheviks had equated
the "dictatorship of the proletariat" with the dictatorship
of their party and so working-class self-management could not
be allowed. It should be noted that this fourth clause was the
cause of Lenin and Trotsky's toying with the idea of allowing
the Makhnovists south-eastern Ukraine as an anarchist
experiment (as mentioned by both Victor Serge and Trotsky in
later years).

Once Wrangel had been defeated by Makhnovist and Red Army
units, the Bolsheviks turned on the movement. Makhno had
"assumed that the coming conflict with the Bolsheviks could
be limited to the realm of ideas, feeling that the strong
revolutionary ideas and feelings of the peasants, together
with their distrust of the foreign invaders, were the best
guarantees for the movement's territory. Moreover, Makhno
believed that the Bolsheviks would not attack his movement
immediately. A respite of some three months would have
allowed him to consolidate his power [sic!] and to win
over much of the Bolshevik rank and file." [Palij,
Op. Cit., p. 231] From the wording of the second clause
of the military agreement (namely, to refuse Red Army
deserters or units), it is clear that the Bolsheviks were
aware of the appeal of Makhnovist politics on the Red
Army soldiers. As soon as Wrangel was defeated, the Red
Army attacked. Makhnovist commanders were invited to
meetings, arrested and then shot. The Red Army surrounded
Makhnovist units and attacked them. At the same time,
anarchists were arrested all across the Ukraine. Hulyai
Pole itself was attacked (Makhno, despite overwhelming
odds, broke out). [Malet, Op. Cit., pp. 71-2]

In the words of Makhno:

"In this difficult and responsible revolutionary position
the Makhno movement made one great mistake: alliance with
the Bolsheviks against a common enemy, Wrangel and the
Entente. In the period of this alliance that was morally
right and of practical value for the revolution, the Makhno
movement mistook Bolshevik revolutionism and failed to
secure itself in advance against betrayal. The Bolsheviks
and their experts treacherously circumvented it." [quoted
by Palij, Op. Cit., p. 234]

While the Bolsheviks continuously proclaimed the final defeat
of the Makhnovists, they held out for nearly a year before
being forced to leave the Ukraine in August 1921. Indeed,
by the end of 1920 his troops number ten to fifteen thousand
men and the "growing strength of the Makhno army and its
successes caused serious concern in the Bolshevik regime."
More Red troops were deployed, "stationing whole regiments,
primarily cavalry, in the occupied villages to terrorise
the peasants and prevent them from supporting Makhno. . .
Cheka punitive units were constantly trailing the partisans,
executing Makhno's sympathisers and the partisans' families."
[Palij, Op. Cit., p. 237 and p. 238] Combined with this
state terrorism, economic conditions in the villages got
worse. The countryside was exhausted and 1921 was a famine
year. With his rural base itself barely surviving, the
Makhnovists could not survive long.

It should be noted that during the periods after the Bolsheviks
had turned on the Makhnovists, the latter appealed to rank-and-file 
Red Army troops not to attack them. As one of their leaflets
put it: "Down with fratricidal war among the working people!"
They urged the Red Army troops (with some success) to rebel
against the commissars and appointed officers and join with
the Makhnovists, who would "greet [them] as our own brothers
and together we will create a free and just life for workers
and peasants and will struggle against all tyrants and 
oppressors of the working people." [contained in Arshinov,
Op. Cit., p. 276 and p. 283] 

Even after the defeat of the Makhnovists, the Bolsheviks did not
stop their campaign of lies. For example, Trotsky reported to
the Ninth Congress of Soviets on December 26th, 1921, that
the Makhnovists were "in Romania," where Makhno had "received
a friendly welcome" and was "liv[ing] comfortably in Bucharest."
The Makhnovists had picked Romania because it was, like Poland,
"a country where they . . . felt secure" due to the way they
treated "Russian counter-revolutionary bands." [_How the 
Revolution Armed_, vol. IV, p. 404] In reality, the "Romanian
authorities put Makhno, his wife, and his followers in an
internment camp." The Bolsheviks were not unaware of this, 
as they "sent a series of sharp diplomatic notes demanding 
Makhno's extradiction." They expelled Makhno and his wife
to Poland on April 11, 1922. The Poles also interned them
and, again, the Bolsheviks demanded Makhno's extradition 
"on the ground that he was a criminal and not entitled to
political asylum." [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 242] Trotsky's lies
come as no surprise, given his and his party's track record
on slandering anarchists.

As can be seen, the relationship of the Makhnovists to the
Bolsheviks was one of constant betrayal of the former by the
latter. Moreover, the Bolsheviks took every opportunity to
slander the Makhnovists, with Trotsky going so far as to 
report Makhno was living well while he was rotting in a
capitalist prison. This is to be expected, as the aims of the 
two groups were at such odds. As we discuss in the next section, 
while the Makhnovists did whatever they could to encourage 
working-class self-management and freedom, the Bolsheviks had 
evolved from advocating the government of their party as the 
expression of "the dictatorship of the proletariat" to stating 
that only the dictatorship of their party could ensure the 
success of a social revolution and so *was* "the dictatorship 
of the proletariat." As the Makhnovist movement shows, if need be,
the party would happily exercise its dictatorship *over* the
proletariat (and peasantry) if that was needed to retain its
power.

H.11.14 How did the Makhnovists and Bolsheviks differ?

Like chalk and cheese.

Whereas the Bolsheviks talked about soviet democracy while
exercising a party dictatorship, the Makhnovists not only
talked about "free soviets," they also encouraged them with
all their ability. Similarly, while Lenin stated that
free speech was "a bourgeois notion" and that there could
be "no free speech in a revolutionary period," the Makhnovists
proclaimed free speech for working people. [Lenin quoted by
Goldman, _My Disillusionment in Russia_, p. 33] While the
Bolsheviks ended up arguing for the necessity of party
dictatorship during a revolution, the Makhnovists introduced
free soviets and organised peasant, worker and insurgent
congresses to conduct the revolution.

We have discussed the Makhnovist ideas in both theory and
practice in sections H.11.5, H.11.6 and H.11.7. In spite of
the chaos and difficulties imposed upon the movement by
having to fight the counter-revolution, the Makhnovists
applied their ideals constantly. The Makhnovists were a mass
movement and its constructive efforts showed that there was
an alternative route the Russian revolution could have followed
other than the authoritarian dictatorship that Leninists, then
and now, claimed was inevitable if the revolution was to be saved.

To see why, we must compare Bolshevik ideology and practice
to that of the Makhnovists in three key areas. Firstly, on
how a revolution should be defended. Secondly, on the role of
the soviets and party in the revolution. Thirdly, on the question
of working-class freedom.

Early in 1918, after the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty the
Bolsheviks re-introduced Tsarist officers into the army alongside
bourgeois military discipline. As Maurice Brinton correctly
summarises:

"Trotsky, appointed Commissar of Military Affairs after
Brest-Litovsk, had rapidly been reorganising the Red Army. The
death penalty for disobedience under fire had been restored. So,
more gradually, had saluting, special forms of address, separate
living quarters and other privileges for officers. Democratic
forms of organisation, including the election of officers, had
been quickly dispensed with." [_The Bolsheviks and Workers'
Control_, p. 37]

Officers were appointed rather then elected. They argued this had to
be done to win the war. The "principle of election," stated Trotsky,
"is politically purposeless and technically inexpedient and has been,
in practice, abolished by decree." Thus the election of officers
and the creation of soldiers' committees was abolished from the top,
replaced by appointed officers. Trotsky's rationale for this was
simply that "political power is in the hands of the same working
class from whose ranks the Army is recruited." In other words, the
Bolshevik Party held power as power was actually held by it, *not*
the working class. Trotsky tried to answer the obvious objection:

"Once we have established the Soviet regime, that is a system
under which the government is headed by persons who have been
directly elected by the Soviets of Workers', Peasants' and
Soldiers' Deputies, there can be no antagonism between the
government and the mass of the workers, just as there is no
antagonism between the administration of the union and the
general assembly of its members, and, therefore, there cannot
be any grounds for fearing the *appointment* of members of the
commanding staff by the organs of the Soviet Power." [_Work,
Discipline, Order_]

He repeated this argument in his 1919 diatribe against the
Makhnovists:

"The Makhnovites shout raucously: 'Down with appointed commanders!'
This they do only so as to delude the ignorant element among their
own soldiers. One can speak of 'appointed' persons only under the
bourgeois order, when Tsarist officials or bourgeois ministers
appointed at their own discretion commanders who kept the soldier
masses subject to the bourgeois classes. Today there is no authority
in Russia but that which is elected by the whole working class and
working peasantry. It follows that commanders appointed by the
central Soviet Government are installed in their positions by the
will of the working millions. But the Makhnovite commanders reflect
the interests of a minute group of Anarchists who rely on the kulaks
and the ignorant." [_The Makhno Movement_]

Of course, most workers are well aware that the administration
of a trade union usually works against them during periods of struggle.
Indeed, so are most Trotskyists as they often denounce the betrayals
by that administration. Thus Trotsky's own analogy indicates the
fallacy of his argument. Equally, it was not "the will of the working
millions" which appointed anyone, it was a handful of leaders of the
Bolshevik party (which had manipulated the soviets to remain in
power). Needless to say, this was a vast change from Lenin's
comments in _State and Revolution_ opposing appointment and calling
for election of *all* officials!

Moreover, the explanation that "the ignorant" were to blame for
Makhnovist opposition to appointed officers had a long legacy
with Trotsky. In April 1918, when justifying Bolshevik introduction
of appointed officers, he had argued that the "Soviet government
is the same as the committee of a trade union. It is elected by
the workers and peasants and you can at the All-Russian Congress
of Soviets, at any moment you like, dismiss that government and
appoint another. But once you have appointed it, you must give
it the right to choose the technical specialists." He stressed
that this applied "in military affairs, in particular." Using the
trade union analogy, he argued that the workers had "entrusted
us [the Bolshevik leaders] with the direction of the union" and
this meant that the Bolshevik leaders, not the workers, should
decide things as "we are better able to judge in the matter" than
them! The workers role was stated clearly: "if our way of conducting
the business is bad, then throw us out and elect another committee!"
[_Leon Trotsky Speaks_, p. 113] In other words, like any bureaucrat,
for Trotsky working-class participation in the affairs of the
revolution  was seen as irrelevant: the masses had voted and
their role was now that of obeying those who "are better able to
judge."

Using an argument the Tsar could have been proud of, Trotsky 
defended the elimination of soldier democracy:

"How could soldiers who have just entered the army choose the
chiefs! Have they any vote to go by? They have none. And therefore
elections are impossible." [Ibid.]

Equally, how could workers and peasants who have just entered
political or economic struggle in 1917 choose the chiefs? Had
they any vote to go by? They had none. And therefore political
and workplace elections are impossible. Unsurprisingly, Trotsky
soon ended up applying this logic to politics as well, defending
(like all the leaders of Bolshevism) the dictatorship of the
party *over* working class. How could the "ignorant" workers
be expected to elect the best "chiefs" never mind manage their
own affairs!

Ironically, in 1936 the Stalinist Communist Party in Spain was
to make very similar arguments about the need for a regular army
and army discipline to win the war. As Aileen O'Carroll in her
essay "Freedom and Revolution" argues:

"The conventional army structure evolved when feudal kings or
capitalist governments required the working class to fight its
wars for them. These had to be authoritarian institutions, because
although propaganda and jingoism can play a part initially in
encouraging enlistment, the horrors of war soon expose the futility
of nationalism. A large part of military organisation is aimed at
ensuring that soldiers remain fighting for causes they do not
necessarily believe in. Military discipline attempts to create an
unthinking, unquestioning body of soldiers, as fearful of their
own side as of the other." [_Red & Black Revolution_, no. 1]

In short in both Russia and Spain the Bolsheviks wanted an army
that would obey them regardless of whether the individual soldiers
felt they were doing the correct thing, indeed who would obey
through fear of their officers even when they knew what they were
doing was wrong. Such a body would be essential for enforcing
minority rule over the wishes of the workers. Would a self-managed
army be inclined to repress workers' and peasants' strikes and
protests? Of course not.

The Makhnovists show that another kind of revolutionary army
was possible in the Russian Revolution and that the "ignorant"
masses could choose their own officers. In other words, the
latter-day justifications of the followers of Bolshevism are
wrong when they assert that the creation of the top-down,
hierarchical Red Army was a result of the "contradiction
between the political consciousness and circumstantial
coercion" and "a retreat" because "officers were appointed
and not elected," it was a conscript army and "severe
military discipline." [John Rees, "In Defence of October",
_International Socialism_, no. 52, pp. 3-82, p. 46] As can
be seen, Trotsky did not consider it as a "retreat" or caused
by "circumstances." Equally, the Makhnovists managed to
organise themselves relatively democratically in the
circumstances created by the same civil war.

As such, the differences between the Makhnovists and the
Bolsheviks as regards the internal organisation of a
revolutionary army are clear. The Bolsheviks applied
top-down, bourgeois methods of internal organisation and
discipline. The Makhnovists applied democratic internal
organisation and discipline as far as possible.

From our discussion of the Bolshevik justifications for its
system of appointed officers in the Red Army, it will come
as no surprise that as regards the relationship of the
soviets to the revolutionary organisation (party) the
Makhnovists and Bolsheviks were (again) miles apart. While
we discuss this in greater detail in section H.6.14, we will 
give a flavour of Bolshevik ideology on this subject here.

 From the start, Lenin identified soviet (or working class)
power with the power of their own party. In October 1917,
Lenin was equating party and class: "the power of the
Bolsheviks -- that is, the power of the proletariat."
[_Will the Bolsheviks Maintain Power?_, p. 102] After the
October Revolution, the Bolsheviks were clear that the
soviets would not have "all power." Rather, the first act
of soviet sovereignty was to alienate it into the hands of
a Bolshevik government. In response to a few leading
Bolsheviks who called for a coalition government, the
Bolshevik Central Committee stated that it was "impossible
to refuse a purely Bolshevik government without treason
to the slogan of the power of the Soviets, since a majority
at the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets . . .
handed power over to this government." [quoted by
Robery V. Daniels, _A Documentary History of Communism_,
vol. 1, pp. 127-8] How can the "power of the Soviets"
exist when said soviets immediately "handed power" over
to another body? Thus the only "power" the soviets had
was simply the "power" to determine who actually held
political power.

The question of who held power, the soviets or the party,
came into focus when the soviet elections resulted
in non-Bolshevik majorities being elected. After the
initial honeymoon period, soviet elections started to go
badly for the Bolsheviks. Ever since taking power in 1917,
the Bolsheviks had become increasingly alienated from the
working class. The spring and summer of 1918 saw "great
Bolshevik losses in the soviet elections" in all provincial
city elections that data is available for. The Mensheviks were
the main beneficiaries of these election swings (Socialist
Revolutionaries also gained) The Bolsheviks forcibly
disbanded such soviets. They continually postponed elections
and "pack[ed] local soviets once they could no longer count
on an electoral majority" by giving representation to the
organisations they dominated which made workplace elections
meaningless. [Samuel Farber, _Before Stalinism_, pp. 22-4
and p. 33] In Petrograd, such packing swamped the actual
number of workplace delegates, transforming the soviets and
making elections irrelevant. Of the 700-plus deputies to the
"new" soviet, over half were elected by Bolshevik dominated
organisations so ensuring a solid Bolshevik majority even
before the factory voting began.

Thus, the regime remained "soviet" in name only. Faced with a
defeat in the soviets, the Bolsheviks simply abolished them
or changed them to ensure their position. This process, it
should be noted, started *before* the outbreak of Civil War
in late May 1918, implying that Bolshevik authoritarianism
cannot be explained as reactions to difficult objective
circumstances.

Unsurprisingly, Bolshevik ideology started to adjust to the
position the party found itself in. As Samuel Farber argues,
in the "period of March to June 1918, Lenin began to make
frequent distinctions *within* the working class, singling
out workers who could still be trusted, denouncing workers
whom he accused of abandoning the working class and
deserting to the side of the bourgeoisie, and complaining
about how the working class had become 'infected with the
disease of petty-bourgeois disintegration.'" [Op. Cit.,
p. 25] Combined with the vision of "working-class" or
"soviet" power expressed by the power of his party, this
laid the foundations for what came next. In 1919 Lenin
fully and explicitly argued that the "dictatorship of
the proletariat" was, in fact, the dictatorship of the
Bolshevik party:

"we are reproached with having established a dictatorship of
one party . . . we say, 'Yes, it is a dictatorship of one
party! This is what we stand for and we shall not shift
from that position . . . '" [_Collected Works_, vol. 29,
p. 535]

This quickly become Bolshevik orthodoxy. Trotsky argued in
his infamous work _Terrorism and Communism_ that there was
"no substitution at all" when "the power of the party"
replaces "the power of the working class." Zinoviev argued
this point at the Second Congress of the Communist International.
As he put it:

"Today, people like Kautsky come along and say that in Russia
you do not have the dictatorship of the working class but the
dictatorship of the party. They think this is a reproach against
us. Not in the least! We have a dictatorship of the working
class and that is precisely why we also have a dictatorship of
the Communist Party. The dictatorship of the Communist Party
is only a function, an attribute, an expression of the
dictatorship of the working class . . . [T]he dictatorship
of the proletariat is at the same time the dictatorship of
the Communist Party." [_Proceedings and Documents of the
Second Congress, 1920_, vol. 1, pp. 151-2]

Neither Lenin nor Trotsky disagreed. By the end of the civil
war, Lenin was arguing that "the dictatorship of the proletariat
cannot be exercised through an organisation embracing the whole
of the class, because in all capitalist countries (and not only
over here, in one of the most backward) the proletariat is still
so divided, so degraded, and so corrupted in parts . . . that
an organisation taking in the whole proletariat cannot directly
exercise proletarian dictatorship. It can be exercised only by
a vanguard . . . the dictatorship of the proletariat cannot be
exercised by a mass proletarian organisation." [_Collected Works_,
vol. 32, p. 21]

This places the Bolshevik betrayals of the Makhnovists in 1919
and 1920 into *political* context. It also explains the Bolshevik
opposition to the proposed fourth clause of the 1920 political
and military agreement (see last section). Simply put, at the
time (and long afterwards) the Bolsheviks equated the revolution
with their own power. As such, Makhnovist calls for soviet
self-management threatened the "dictatorship of the proletariat"
(i.e. dictatorship of the party) by encouraging working people
to participate in the revolution and giving the radically false
idea that working-class power could be exercised by working
people and their own class organisations.

Lenin, Trotsky and Zinoviev held this position until their deaths.
Trotsky, for example, was arguing in 1923 that "[i]f there is one
question which basically not only does not require revision but
does not so much as admit the thought of revision, it is the
question of the dictatorship of the Party, and its leadership
in all spheres of our work." [_Leon Trotsky Speaks_, p. 158]
Even after the rise of Stalinism, he was still arguing for the
"objective necessity" of the "revolutionary dictatorship of a
proletarian party" in 1937. He stressed that the "revolutionary
party (vanguard) which renounces its own dictatorship surrenders
the masses to the counter-revolution . . . Abstractly speaking,
it would be very well if the party dictatorship could be replaced
by the 'dictatorship' of the whole toiling people without any
party, but this presupposes such a high level of political
development among the masses that it can never be achieved
under capitalist conditions." [Trotsky, _Writings 1936-37_,
pp. 513-4]

This suggests that the later Trotskyist argument that the Bolsheviks
were forced by "objective factors" to replace the dictatorship of
the proletariat by that of the party is false. At the time, and
afterwards, the Bolsheviks did not argue in these terms. The
end of soviet democracy was not considered a problem or a retreat
for the revolution. The opposite was the case, with the elimination
of democracy being raised to an ideological truism to be applied
everywhere. Equally, the fact that the Makhnovists did all they
could to promote soviet self-management and actually called
regional congresses of workers, peasants and insurgents suggests
that "objective factors" simply cannot explain Bolshevik actions.
Simply put, like the Bolshevik betrayals of the Makhnovists, the
Bolshevik elimination of soviet democracy by party dictatorship
can only be fully understood by looking at Bolshevik ideology.

Little wonder the Makhnovists argued as followed:

"Since the arrival of the Bolsheviks the dictatorship of their
party has been established here. As a party of statists, the
Bolshevik Party everywhere has set up state organs for the
purpose of governing the revolutionary people. Everything has
to be submitted to their authority and take place under their
vigilant eye. All opposition, protest, or even independent
initiative has been stifled by their Extraordinary Commissions
[the secret police, the Cheka]. Furthermore, all these
institutions are composed of people who are removed from
labour and from revolution. In other words, what has been
created is a situation in which the labouring and
revolutionary people have fallen under the surveillance
and rule of people who are alien to the working classes,
people who are inclined to exercise arbitrariness and
violence over the workers. Such is the dictatorship of the
Bolshevik-Communist Party  . . .

"We again remind the working people that they will liberate
themselves from oppression, misery and violence only
through their own efforts. No change in power will help
them in this. Only by means of their own free worker-peasant
organisations can the workers reach the summit of the
social revolution -- complete freedom and real equality."
[quoted by Arshinov, Op. Cit. pp. 116-7]

Which brings us to the next issue, namely working-class
freedom. For anarchists, the key point of a revolution is
to increase working-class freedom. It means the end of
hierarchy and the direct participation in the revolution
by the working classes themselves. As Bakunin put it,
"revolution is only sincere, honest and real in the hands
of the masses, and that when it is concentrated in those
of a few ruling individuals it inevitably and immediately
becomes reaction." [_Michael Bakunin: Selected Writings_,
p. 237] For this reason, the Makhnovists (like Bakunin)
argued for a revolutionary society based on free federations
of worker and peasant organisations (free soviets).

This means that actions which consolidated rule by a few
cannot be revolutionary, even if the few are made up of
the most revolutionary of the revolutionaries. Thus working
class power cannot be equated to the power of a political
party, no matter how "socialist" or "revolutionary" its
ideas or rhetoric. This means that Bolshevik restrictions
on working class freedom (of speech, assembly, press,
organisation) struck at the heart of the revolution. It
did not signify the defence of the revolution, but rather
its defeat. Ultimately, as Emma Goldman quickly recognised,
what the Bolsheviks called "defence of the Revolution"
was "really only the defence of [the] party in power."
[_My Disillusionment in Russia_, p. 57]

Anarchists had long argued that, to quote Goldman again,
there is "no greater fallacy than the belief that aims
and purposes are one thing, while methods and tactics
are another. This conception is a potent menace to social
regeneration. All human experience teaches that methods
and means cannot be separated from the ultimate aim.
The means employed become, through individual practice,
part and parcel of the final purpose; they influence it,
modify it, and presently the aims and means become
identical." [Op. Cit., p. 260] The evolution of Bolshevik
practice and theory reinforces this argument. The means
used had an impact on the course of events, which in turn
shaped the next set of means and the ideology used to
justify it.

This explains the Makhnovist and Bolshevik differences in
relationship to working-class freedom. For anarchists, only
freedom or the struggle for freedom can teach people to be
free (and so is genuinely revolutionary). This explains why
the Makhnovists not only proclaimed freedom of election, speech, 
press, assembly and organisation for working people, which
was an essential revolutionary position, they also implemented
it (see section H.11.7). The Bolsheviks did the reverse, clamping
down on the opposition at every occasion (including workers'
strikes and protests). For the Makhnovists, working-class freedom
was the key gain of the revolution, and so had to be introduced,
practised and defended. Hence Makhno:

"I consider it an inviolable right of the workers and peasants,
a right won by the revolution, to call congresses on their
own account, to discuss their affairs. That is why the
prohibitions of such congresses, and the declaration
proclaiming them illegal . . . , represent a direct and
insolent violation of the rights of the workers." [quoted
by Arshinov, Op. Cit., p. 129]

For the Bolsheviks, working-class freedom was something to
fear. Back in 1903, Lenin laid the groundwork for this by
arguing that the "*spontaneous* development of the labour
movement leads to it being subordinated to bourgeois ideology."
He stressed that "the working class, exclusively by their own
effort, is able to develop only trade union consciousness . . .
the theoretical doctrine of Social-Democracy arose quite
independently of the spontaneous growth of the labour movement;
it arose as a natural and inevitable outcome of ideas among the
revolutionary socialist intelligentsia." This meant that "Social
Democratic [i.e. socialist] consciousness . . . could only be
brought to them from without." [_Essential Works of Lenin_,
p. 82 and pp. 74-5] Clearly, if the workers turned against
the party, then the workers were "being subordinated to
bourgeois ideology." It was in their own interests, therefore,
for the party to subordinate the workers and so soviet
democracy became not an expression of working-class power
but rather something which undermined it!

This perspective can be seen when the Makhnovists liberated
cities. In Alexandrovsk and Katerinoslav, the Bolsheviks
proposed to the Makhnovists spheres of action - their *Revkom*
(Revolutionary Committee) would handle political affairs and
the Makhnovists military ones. Makhno advised them "to go and
take up some honest trade instead of seeking to impose their
will on the workers." Instead, the Makhnovists called upon
"the working population to participate in a general conference
.. . . and it was proposed that the workers organise the life
of the city and the functioning of the factories with their
own forced and their organisations." [Arshinov Op. Cit., p. 154
and p. 149] The differences between the Bolsheviks and
Makhnovists could not be clearer.

Lastly, we should note that while Lenin and the leading
Bolsheviks wholeheartedly opposed working-class economic
self-management by factory committees and instead urged
"efficient" top-down one-man management, the Makhnovists
supported working-class self-management of production.
Under the Bolsheviks, as Arshinov argued, the 
"nationalisation of industry, [while] removing the 
workers from the hands of individual capitalists, 
delivered them to the yet more rapacious hands of a 
single, ever-present capitalist boss, the State. The 
relations between the workers and this new boss are 
the same as earlier relations between labour and capital, 
with the sole difference that the Communist boss, the 
State, not only exploits the workers, but also punishes
them himself . . . Wage labour has remained what it was
before, except that it has taken on the character of an
obligation to the State . . . It is clear that in all this
we are dealing with a simple substitution of State 
capitalism for private capitalism." [Op. Cit., p. 71]
The Makhnovist propaganda, in contrast, stressed the 
need for workers to socialise the means of production 
and place it under their direct management by their own 
class organs. In other words, the abolition of wage 
slavery by workers' self-management of production.

Unsurprisingly, the Makhnovists supported the Kronstadt rebellion
(see section H.7 for more on Kronstadt). Indeed, there is
significant overlap between the Kronstadt demands and the
ideas of the Makhnovist movement. For example, the Makhnovist
idea of free soviets is almost identical to the first three
points of the Kronstadt programme and their land policy the
same as point 11 of the Kronstadt demands. The Kronstadt
rebels also raised the idea of "free soviets" and the "third
revolution," common Makhnovist slogans (see section H.7.3
for details). As one Bolshevik writer notes, it is "characteristic
that the anarchist-Makhnovists in the Ukraine reprinted the appeal
of the Kronstadters, and in general did not hide their sympathy
for them." [quoted by Malet, Op. Cit., p. 108] Voline also
noted that the "ideas and activities of the Makhnovist peasants
were similar in all respects to those of the Kronstadt rebels
in 1921." [Op. Cit., p. 575]

In summary, the major difference between the Makhnovists and
the Bolsheviks is that the former stuck by and introduced their
stated aims of "soviet power" and working-class freedom while
the latter rejected them once they clashed with Bolshevik party
policies.

H.11.15 How do the modern followers of Bolshevism slander the
        Makhnovists?

Many modern-day supporters of Bolshevism, on the rare occasions
when they do mention the Makhnovist movement, simply repeat the
old Bolshevik (and Stalinist) slanders against them.

For example, this is what Joseph Seymour of the U.S. _Spartacus
League_ did. Their newspaper _Workers Vanguard_ ran a series
entitled "Marxism vs. Anarchism" and in part 7, during his
discussion of the Russian Revolution, Seymour claimed:

"The most significant counter-revolutionary force under the banner
of anarchism was the Ukrainian peasant-based army of Nestor Makhno,
which carried out pogroms against Jewish communities and collaborated
with White armies against the Bolsheviks." [_Workers Vanguard_,
8/30/1996, p. 7]

Seymour, needless to say, made these accusations without providing
any documentation, and with good reason, for outside of Stalinist
hagiographies, no evidence exists to support his claims. As we
indicated in section H.11.9, the Makhnovists opposed anti-Semitism
and did *not* conduct pogroms. Equally, section H.11.12 proves
that the Makhnovists did *not* collaborate with the Whites in
any way (although this did not stop the Bolshevik press 
deliberately spreading the lie that they had).

More recently, the UK Leninist _Revolutionary Communist Group_
asserted in their paper that the Makhnovists "joined with 
counter-revolutionary White and imperialist armies against 
socialist Russia. This band of brigands also carried out 
pogroms against Jewish communities in the Ukraine." [_Fight 
Racism! Fight Imperialism!_, issue no. 174, p. 12] No evidence
for such a serious claim was presented in the original review 
article. When an anarchist pointed out their assertion was 
"falling back on a long tradition of Stalinist lies" and asked
for "any historical references" to support it, the paper replied 
by stating that while there were "several" references, it would
give two: "E.H. Carr refers to it in his history of the
civil war. Also the anarchist historian Paul Avrich mentions
it in his work _The anarchists in the Russian Revolution_."
[Op. Cit., no. 175, p. 15]

In reality, neither work says any such thing. Looking at the 
first (unnamed) one, assuming it is E.H. Carr's _The Bolshevik 
Revolution_ there is no reference to pogroms carried out by the 
Makhnovists (looking in the index for "Makhno"). Which, perhaps,
explains why the paper refused to provide a book title and 
page number. As far as the second reference goes, Avrich made
no such claim in _The Anarchists in the Russian Revolution_. 
He *did* address the issue in his _Anarchist Portraits_, 
concluding such charges are false. 

And the name of the original article? Ironically, it was entitled
"The anarchist school of falsification"!

However, more sophisticated slanders, lies and distortions have
been levelled at the Makhnovists by the supporters of Bolshevism.
This is to be expected, as the experience of the Makhnovists
effectively refute the claim that the Bolsheviks had no choice
but to act as they did. It is hard to maintain a position that
"objective conditions" made the Bolsheviks act as they did
when another mass revolutionary army, operating in the same
environment, did not act in the same way. This means that the
Makhnovists are strong evidence that Bolshevik politics played
a key role in the degeneration of the Russian Revolution.
Clearly such a conclusion is dangerous to Bolshevism and so
the Maknovist movement must be attacked, regardless of the
facts.

A recent example of this is John Rees' essay "In Defence of
October" (_International Socialism_, no. 52, pp. 3-82). Rees,
a member of the UK Socialist Workers' Party (SWP) is at
pains to downplay the role of Bolshevik ideology in the
degeneration of the Russian Revolution. He argues that
"objective factors" ensured that the Bolsheviks acted
as they did. The "subjective factor" was simply a choice
between defeat and defence against the Whites: "Within
these limits Bolshevik policy was decisive." [Op. Cit.,
p. 30] This explains his attack on the Makhnovist movement.
Faced with the same "objective factors" as the Bolsheviks,
the Makhnovists did not act in the same way. As such, the
"subjective factor" amounts to more than Rees' stark
choice and so objective conditions cannot explain everything.

Clearly, then, the Makhnovists undermine his basic thesis.
As such, we would expect a less than honest account of the
movement and Rees does not disappoint. He talks about the
"muddled anarchism" of Makhno, dismissing the whole movement
as offering no alternative to Bolshevism and being without
"an articulated political programme." Ultimately, for Rees,
Makhno's "anarchism was a thin veneer on peasant rebellion"
and while "on paper" the Makhnovists "appeared to have a more
democratic programme" there were "frauds." [p. 57, p. 58, p. 61
and p. 70]

The reality of the situation is totally different. Ignoring
the obvious contradiction (i.e. how can the Makhnovists have
the appearance of a "democratic programme" and, simultaneously,
not articulate it?) we shall analyse his account of the
Makhnovist movement in order to show exactly how low the
supporters of Bolshevism will go to distort the historical
record for their own aims (see section H.7 for Rees's
distortions about the Kronstadt revolt). Once the selective
and edited quotations provided by Rees are corrected, the
picture that clearly emerges is that rather than the
Makhnovists being "frauds," it is Rees' account which
is the fraud (along with the political tradition which
inspired it).

Rees presents two aspects of his critique of the Makhnovists.
The first is a history of the movement and its relationships
(or lack of them) with the Bolsheviks. The second is a
discussion of the ideas which the Makhnovists tried to put
into practice. Both aspects of his critique are extremely
flawed. Indeed, the errors in his history of the movement
are so fundamental (and, indeed, so at odds with his
references) that it suggests that ideology overcame objectivity
(to be polite). The best that can be said of his account is that
at least he does not raise the totally discredited accusation
that the Makhnovists were anti-Semitic or "kulaks." However,
he more than makes up for this by distorting the facts and
references he uses (it would be no exaggeration to argue
that the only information Rees gets correct about his sources
is the page number).

Rees starts by setting the tone, stating that the "methods used
by Makhno and Antonov [a leader of the "Greens" in Tambov]
in their fight against the Red Army often mirrored those
used by the Whites." [Op. Cit., p. 57] Strangely enough,
while he lists some for Antonov, he fails to specify any
against Makhno. However, the scene is set. His strongest
piece of evidence as regards Makhno's "methods" against
the Red Army come from mid-1920 after, it should be noted,
the Bolsheviks had engineered the outlawing of the
Makhnovist movement and needlessly started the very conflict
Rees uses as evidence against Makhno. In other words, he
is attacking the Makhnovists for defending themselves
against Bolshevik aggression!

He quotes reports from the Ukrainian Front to blacken the
Makhnovists, using them to confirm the picture he extracts
from "the diary of Makhno's wife." These entries, from
early 1920, he claims "betray the nature of the movement"
(i.e. after, as we shall see, the Bolsheviks had engineered
the outlawing of the Makhnovists). [Op. Cit., p. 58] The
major problem for Rees' case is the fact that this diary
is a fake and has been known to be a fake since Arshinov
wrote his classic account of the Makhnovists in 1923:

"After 1920, the Bolsheviks wrote a great deal about the
personal defects of Makhno, basing their information on
the diary of his so-called wife, a certain Fedora Gaenko
.. . . But Makhno's wife is Galina Andreevna Kuz'menko. She
has lived with him since 1918. She *never* kept, and therefore
never lost, a diary. Thus the documentation of the Soviet
authorities is based on a fabrication, and the picture
these authorities draw from such a diary is an ordinary
lie." [Arshinov, _History of the Makhnovist Movement_,
p. 226f]

Ironically enough, Rees implicitly acknowledges this by lamely
admitting (in an end note) that "Makhno seems to have had two
'wives'" [Op. Cit., p. 78] And we should note that the source
Rees uses for the fake diary entries (W.H. Chamberlin's _The
Russian Revolution_) uses as *his* source the very Bolshevik
documentation that Arshinov quite correctly denounced over
70 years before Rees put pen to paper. Little wonder Michael
Palij, in his detailed account of the movement (_The Anarchism
of Nestor Makhno, 1918-1921_), fails to use it. So, in summary,
a major part of his account is based on falsehoods, falsehoods
exposed as such decades ago. This indicates well the quality
of his case against the Makhnovist movement.

As regards the "evidence" he extracts from this fake diary
and Red Army reports, it simply shows that Bolsheviks were
shot by Makhno's troops and Red Army troops died in combat.
This went both ways, of course. In "military operations the
Bolsheviks shot all prisoners. The Makhnovists shot all
captured officers unless the Red rank and file strongly
interceded for them. The rank and file were usually sent
home, though a number volunteered for service with the
Insurgents." Equally, "[o]n the occupation of a village by
the Red Army the Cheka would hunt out and hang all active
Makhnovite supporters; an amenable Soviet would be set up;
officials would be appointed or imported to organise the
poor peasants . . . and three or four Red militia men left
as armed support for the new village bosses." [David Footman,
Op. Cit., pp. 292-3] As such, Rees' account of Makhnovist
"terror" against the Bolsheviks seems somewhat hypocritical.
We can equally surmise that the methods used by the Bolsheviks 
against the Makhnovists also "often mirrored those used by the 
Whites"! And Rees lambastes socialist Samuel Farber for 
mentioning the "Red Terror, but not the Green Terror" in 
Farber's discussion of the Tambov revolt! All in all, pretty 
pathetic.

Rees' concern for the truth can be seen from the fact that
he asserts that Makhno's "rebellion" was "smaller" than
the Tambov uprising and distinguished from it "only by
the muddled anarchism of its leader." [Op. Cit., p. 58]
In fact, the Makhnovist movement was the bigger of the
two. As Michael Malet notes:

"The differences between them explain why the Makhnovshchina
lasted over four years, the Antonovshchina less than one
year. The initial area of the Makhno movement was larger,
and later expanded, whereas the Antonov region was restricted
to the southern half of one province throughout its existence.
The Makhno movement became established earlier, and was
well-known before its break with the soviet regime. A
crucial factor was the period of peace between the Bolsheviks
and Makhno during the first half of 1919, something Antonov
never had. It allowed for political and social development
as well as military build-up. It followed from this that
Makhno attracted much more support, which was increased
and deepened by the positive ideology of Makhno and the
anarchists who came to help him. This was not a matter of
being anti-State and anti-town -- all the Greens, including
Antonov, shared this view in a less sophisticated form --
but a positive land policy and a realisation of the need
to link up with the towns on a federal basis in the
post-revolutionary society." [Op. Cit., p. 155]

Even in terms of troops, the Makhno movement was larger.
The Antonov rebellion had "a peak of around 20,000" troops.
[Read, Op. Cit., p. 268] Makhno, in comparison, had a peak 
of about 40,000 in late 1919 [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 112] (Read
states a peak of around 30,000 [Op. Cit., p. 264]). Even by 
the end of 1920, a few months into the Tambov rebellion 
(it started in August of that year), the Makhnovists still 
had 10 to 15 thousand troops. [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 237]

In summary, the movement which lasted longer, covered a
larger area and involved more troops is classed by Rees
as the smaller of the two! Incredible -- but it does give
a flavour of the scholarship involved in his essay. Perhaps 
by "smaller" Rees simply meant that Makhno was physically 
shorter than Antonov?

After getting such minor details as size wrong, Rees
turns to the actual history of the movement. He looks at
the relations between the Makhnovists and the Bolsheviks,
accurately stating that they "were chequered." However,
he is wrong when he tries to explain what happened by
stating they "reflect[ed] the fast changing military
situation in the Ukraine throughout the civil war."
[Op. Cit., p. 58] In fact, as we will prove, the
relationships between the two forces reflected the
military situation refracted through the ideology and
needs of Bolshevik power. To ignore the ideological
factor in the Makhnovist-Bolshevik relationships cannot
be justified as the military situation does *not* fully
explain what happened.

The Makhnovists co-operated with the Red Army three times.
Only two of these periods were formal alliances (the first
and last). Discussing the first two pacts, Rees alleges that
the Makhnovists broke with the Bolsheviks. The truth is the
opposite -- the Bolsheviks turned on the Makhnovists and
betrayed them in order to consolidate their power. These
facts are hardly unknown to Rees as they are contained in
the very books he quotes from as evidence for his rewritten
history.

The first pact between the Makhnovists and the Red Army
ended June 1918. According to Rees, "[c]o-operation
continued until June 1919 when the Insurgent Army broke
from the Red Army" and quotes Michael Palij's book _The
Anarchism of Nestor Makhno_ as follows: "as soon as Makhno
left the front he and his associates began to organise new
partisan detachments in the Bolsheviks' rear, which
subsequently attacked strongholds, troops, police, trains
and food collectors." [Op. Cit., p. 58] Rees is clearly
implying that Makhno attacked the Bolsheviks, apparently
for no reason. The truth is totally different. It is easy
to show this -- all we need to do is look at the book he
uses as evidence.

Rees quotes Palij on page 177. This page is from chapter
16, which is called "The Bolsheviks Break with Makhno."
As this was not enough of a clue, Palij presents some
necessary background for this Bolshevik break. He notes
that before the break, "the Bolsheviks renewed their
anti-Makhno propaganda. Trotsky, in particular, led a
violent campaign against the Makhno movement." He also
mentions that "[a]t the same time, the supplies of arms
and other war materials to Makhno were stopped, thus
weakening the Makhno forces vis-a-vis the Denikin troops."
In this context, the Makhnovists Revolutionary Military
Council "decided to call a fourth congress of peasants,
workers, and partisans" for June 15th, 1919, which Trotsky
promptly banned, warning the population that "participation
in the Congress shall be considered an act of state treason
against the Soviet Republic and the front." [Op. Cit., p. 175
and p. 176]

The Bolsheviks had, of course, tried to ban the third
congress in April but had been ignored. This time, they
made sure that they were not. Makhno and his staff
were not informed of Trotsky's dictatorial order and
learned of it three days later. On June 9th, Makhno
sent a telegram informing the Bolsheviks that he was
leaving his post as leader of the Makhnovists. He
"handed over his command and left the front with a
few of his close associates and a cavalry detachment"
while calling upon the partisans to "remain at the
front to hold off Denikin's forces." Trotsky ordered
his arrest, but Makhno was warned in advance and
escaped. On June 15-16th, members of Makhno's staff
"were captured and executed the next day." *Now* Palij
recounts how "[a]s soon as Makhno left the front he
and his associates began to organise new partisan
detachments in the Bolsheviks' rear, which
subsequently attacked strongholds, troops, police,
trains and food collectors." [Op. Cit., p. 177]

Palij "subsequently" refers to Makhno after Denikin's
breakthrough and his occupation of the Ukraine. "The
oppressive policy of the Denikin regime," he notes,
"convinced the population that it was as bad as the
Bolshevik regime, and brought a strong reaction that
led able young men . . . to leave their homes and join
Makhno and other partisan groups." [Op. Cit., p. 190]
As Makhno put it, "[w]hen the Red Army in south Ukraine
began to retreat . . . as if to straighten the front
line, but in reality to evacuate Ukraine . . .  only
then did my staff and I decide to act." [quoted by
Palij, Op. Cit., p. 190] After trying to fight Denikin's
troops, Makhno retreated and called upon his troops to leave
the Red Army and rejoin the fight against Denikin. He "sent
agents amongst the Red troops" to carry out propaganda
urging them to stay and fight Denikin with the Makhnovists,
which they did in large numbers. This propaganda was
"combined with sabotage." Between these two events,
Makhno had entered the territory of pogromist warlord
Hryhoryiv (which did *not* contain Red troops as they
were in conflict) and assassinated him. [Op. Cit., p. 191
and p. 173]

It should also be noted that Palij states that it was the
Whites who "were the main enemy that Makhno fought, stubbornly
and uncompromisingly, from the end of 1918 to the end of 1919."
[Op. Cit., p. 177]

Clearly, Rees's summary leaves a lot to be desired! Rather
than Makhno attacking the Bolsheviks, it was they who broke
with him -- as Palij, Rees's source, makes clear. Indeed,
Makhno made no attempt to undermine the Red Army's campaign
against Denikin (after all, that would have placed his troops
and region in danger). Rather, he waited until the Bolsheviks
showed that they would not defend the Ukraine against the
Whites before he acted. As such, Rees misuses his source
material and used Palij as evidence for a viewpoint which is
the exact opposite of the one he recounts. The dishonesty is
obvious. But, then again, it is understandable, as Trotsky
banning a worker, peasant and partisan congress would
hardly fit into Rees' attempt to portray the Bolsheviks
as democratic socialists overcome by objective circumstances!
Given that the Makhnovists had successfully held three such
congresses to discuss the war against reaction, how could
objective circumstances be blamed for the dictatorial
actions of Trotsky and other leading Red Army officers in
the Ukraine? Better not to mention this and instead rewrite
history by making Makhno break with the Bolsheviks and attack
them for no reason!

Rees moves onto the period of co-operation between the
insurgents and the Bolsheviks. His version of what happened
is that "Denikin's advance against Makhno's territory in
autumn 1919 quickly forced a renewal of the treaty with the
Bolsheviks. Makhno harassed Denikin's troops from the
rear, making their advance more difficult." [Op. Cit.,
p. 58]

A more accurate account of what happened would be that
Makhno reorganised his troops after the Bolsheviks had
retreated and evacuated the Ukraine. These troops included
those that had been left in the Red Army in June, who now
left to rejoin him (and brought a few Red Army units along
too). After conducting quick and demoralising raids against
Denikin's forces, the Makhnovists were forced to retreat to
the West (followed by White forces). In late September, near
Peregonovka, Makhno inflicted a major defeat against the
following Whites and allowed the Makhnovists to attack
across Denikin's supply lines (which stopped his attack
on Moscow thus, ironically, saving the Bolshevik regime).
Makhno's swift attack on the rear of the Whites ensured
their defeat. As the correspondent of _Le Temps_ observed:

"There is no doubt that Denikin's defeat is explained
more by the uprising of the peasants who brandished
Makhno's black flag, then by the success of Trotsky's
regular army. The partisan bands of 'Batko' tipped
the scales in favour of the Reds." [quoted by Palij,
Op. Cit., p. 208]

Palij argues that it was the "rapidly changing military
situation [which] soon caused a change in the Bolsheviks'
attitude toward Makhno." The two forces meet up on
December 24th, 1919. However, "[a]lthough the Bolsheviks
fraternised with the Makhno troops and the commander
even offered co-operation, they distrusted Makhno,
fearing the popularity he had gained as a result of
his successful fight against Denikin." [Op. Cit., p. 209]
It should also be stressed that *no* formal treaty
was signed.

Clearly, Rees' summary leaves a lot to be desired!

This is not the end of it. Rees even attempts to blame
the Makhnovists for the attack of General Wrangel. He
argues that "by the end of 1919 the immediate White
threat was removed. Makhno refused to move his troops to
the Polish front to meet the imminent invasion and
hostilities with the Red Army began again on an even
more widespread scale." [Op. Cit., p. 58]

This, needless to say, is a total distortion of the facts.
Firstly, it should be noted that the "imminent" invasion
by Poland Rees mentions did not, in fact, occur until
"the end of April" (the 26th, to be precise). The break
with Makhno occurred as a result of an order issued in
early January (the 8th, to be precise). [Michael Palij,
Op. Cit., p. 219 and p. 210] Clearly, the excuse of
"imminent" invasion was a cover, as recognised by a
source Rees himself uses, namely Palij's work:

"The author of the order realised at that time there was no
real war between the Poles and the Bolsheviks at that time
and he also knew that Makhno would not abandon his region
.. . . Uborevich [the author] explained that 'an appropriate
reaction by Makhno to this order would give us the chance
to have accurate grounds for our next steps' . . . [He]
concluded: 'The order is a certain political manoeuvre and,
at the very least, we expect positive results from Makhno's
realisation of this.'" [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 210]

This is confirmed by Rees' other references. David Footman,
whom Rees also uses for evidence against the Makhnovist
movement, notes that while it was "true there were military
reasons for reinforcing" the Polish frontier (although he
also notes the significant fact that the war "was not to
break out for another four months"), it was "admitted on
the Soviet side that this order was primarily 'dictated
by the necessity' of liquidating *Makhnovshchina* as an
independent movement. Only when he was far removed from
his home country would it be possible to counteract his
influence, and to split up and integrate his partisans
into various Red Army formations." He notes that there
were "other occasions (notably in Siberia) of the Soviet
authorities solving the problem of difficult partisan
leaders by sending them off to fight on distant fronts"
and, of course, that "Makhno and his staff . . . were
perfectly aware of the underlying Soviet motives." Footman
recounts how the Makhnovist staff sent a "reasoned reply" to
the Bolsheviks, that there "was no immediate response" from
them and in "mid-January the Central Committee of the
Ukrainian Communist Party declared Makhno and his force
to be outside the law, and the Red Army attacked." [_The
Russian Civil War_, pp. 290-1]

In other words, according to the sources Rees himself
selects, the Bolsheviks *started* the conflict in order
to eliminate opposition to their power!

Needless to say, the Makhnovists *did* realise the political
motivations behind the order. As Arshinov notes, "[s]ending
the insurrectionary army to the Polish front meant removing
from the Ukraine the main nerve centre of the revolutionary
insurrection. This was precisely what the Bolsheviks wanted:
they would then be absolute masters of the rebellious region,
and the Makhnovists were perfectly aware of this." In addition,
"neither the 14th Corps nor any other unit of the Red Army
had any ties with the Makhnovist army; least of all were
they in a position to give orders to the insurrectionary
army." Nor does Rees mention that the Makhnovists considered
the move "physically impossible" as "half the men, the entire
staff and the commander himself were in hospital with typhus."
[Op. Cit., p. 163]

Consider what Rees is (distortedly) accounting. The beginning
of 1920 was a time of peace. The Civil War looked like it was
over. The White Generals had been defeated. Now the Bolsheviks
turn on their allies after issuing an ultimatum which they
knew would never be obeyed. Under the circumstances, a stupider
decision cannot be easily found! Moreover, the very logic of
the order was a joke. Would be it wise to leave the Ukraine
undefended? Of course not and if Red Army units were to stay
to defend the region, why not the Makhnovists who actually
came from the area in question? Why provoke a conflict when
it was possible to transfer Red Army units to the Polish
front? Simply put, Rees presents a distorted picture of
what was happening in the Ukraine at the time simply so he
can whitewash the Bolshevik regime and blacken the Makhnovists.
As he himself later notes, the Bolshevik-Makhnovist conflict
gave the White General Wrangel the space required to restart
the Civil War. Thus the Bolshevik decision to attack the
Makhnovists helped prolong the Civil War -- the very factor
Rees blames the degeneration of the Russian Revolution and
Bolshevik ideology and practice on!

It is *now* that Rees presents his evidence of Makhnovist
violence against the Bolsheviks (the Red Army reports and
entries from the fake diary of Makhno's wife). Arguing
that the entries from the fake diary "betray the nature
of the movement in this period," he tries to link them
with Makhnovist theory. "These actions," he argues, "were
consistent with an earlier resolution of the Insurgent
Army which declared that it was 'the actions of the
Bolshevik regime which cause a real danger to the
worker-peasant revolution." [Op. Cit., p. 59]

Firstly, given a true account of the second break between the
Makhnovists and Bolsheviks, it would be fair to conclude that
the resolution was, in fact, correct! However, such facts
are not mentioned by Rees, so the reader is left in ignorance.

Secondly, to correct another of Rees' causal mistakes, it
should be noted that this resolution was *not* passed by
the Insurgent Army. Rather it was passed at the Second
Regional Congress of Peasants, Workers and Insurgents held
at Hulyai Pole on February 12th, 1919. This congress had
245 delegates, representing 350 districts and was one of
four organised by the Makhnovists. Unsurprisingly, these
regional congresses are not even mentioned by Rees in his
account. This is for obvious reasons -- if the Makhnovists
could organise congresses of workers, peasants and
insurgents to discuss the progress of the revolution, then
why could the Bolsheviks not manage it? Equally, to mention
them would also mean mentioning that the Bolsheviks tried to
ban one and succeeded in banning another.

Thirdly, the tone of the congress was anti-Bolshevik simply
because the Ukraine had had a taste of Bolshevik rule. As Rees
himself acknowledges in a roundabout way, the Bolsheviks
had managed to alienate the peasantry by their agricultural
policies.

Fourthly, the Bolsheviks had engineered the outlawing of
the Makhnovists. Thus the actions of the Makhnovists were
*not* "consistent" with the earlier resolution. They were,
in fact, "consistent" with self-defence against a repressive
state which had attacked them first!

Looking at the congress where the resolution was passed,
we find that the list of "real dangers" was, quite
simply, sensible and, in fact, in line with Leninist
rhetoric. The resolution acknowledged the fact that 
the Bolshevik party was "demanding a monopoly of the
Revolution." As we discussed in section H.11.14, it
was during this period that the Bolsheviks explicitly
started to argue that the "dictatorship of the party"
*was* the "dictatorship of the proletariat." The
resolution also stated:

"With deep regret the Congress must also declare that
apart from external enemies a perhaps even greater danger,
arising from its internal shortcomings, threatens the
Revolution of the Russian and Ukrainian peasants and
workers. The Soviet Governments of Russia and of the
Ukraine, by their orders and decrees, are making efforts
to deprive local soviets of peasants and workers'
deputies of their freedom and autonomy." [quoted by
Footman, Op. Cit., p. 267]

It also stated:

"the political commissars are watching each step of the
local soviets and dealing ruthlessly with those friends
of peasants and workers who act in defence of peoples'
freedom from the agency of the central government . . .
The Bolshevik regime arrested left Socialist Revolutionaries
and anarchists, closing their newspapers, stifling any
manifestation of revolutionary expression."

Delegates also complained that the Bolshevik government
had not been elected, that it was "imposing upon us its
party dictatorship" and "attempting to introduce its
Bolshevik monopoly over the soviets." [quoted by Palij,
[Op. Cit., p. 154]

The resolution noted that the current situation was
"characterised by the seizure of power by the political
party of Communists-Bolsheviks who do not balk at anything
in order to preserve and consolidate their political power
by armed force acting from the centre. The party is
conducting a criminal policy in regard to the social
revolution and in regard to the labouring masses." To
top it off, point number three read:

"We protest against the reactionary habits of Bolshevik
rulers, commissars, and agents of the Cheka, who are
shooting workers, peasants, and rebels, inventing all
kinds of excuses . . . The Cheka which were supposed to
struggle with counterrevolution . . . have turned in the
Bolsheviks' hands into an instrument for the suppression
of the will of the people. They have grown in some cases
into detachments of several hundred armed men with a
variety of arms. We demand that all these forces be
dispatched to the front." [quoted by Vladimir N. Brovkin,
_Behind the Front Lines of the Civil War_, pp. 109-10]

We should also point out that Rees selectively quotes the
resolution to distort its meaning. The resolution, in fact,
"urges the peasants and workers to watch vigilantly the
actions of the Bolshevik regime that cause a real danger
to the worker-peasant revolution." [quoted by Palij, Op.
Cit., p. 154] We have listed some of the actions of the
Bolsheviks that the congress considered as a "real danger."
Considering the truth of these complaints, only someone
blinded by Bolshevik ideology would consider it strange
that worker and peasant delegates should agree to "watch
vigilantly" those actions of the Bolsheviks which were
a "real danger" to their revolution!

Lenin (before taking power, of course) had argued that
elections and recall to soviets were essential to ensure
that the workers control the "workers' state" and that
socialism required the elimination of "special bodies of
armed men" by an armed population. To this day, his followers
parrot his claims (while, simultaneously, justifying the exact
opposite in Lenin's Russia). Now, is Rees *really* arguing
that the Bolshevik monopoly of power, the creation of a
secret police and the clamping down on working people's
freedom were *not* dangers to the Russian Revolution
and should not be watched "vigilantly"? If so, then his
conception of revolution includes the strange notion that
dictatorship by a party does not threaten a revolution!
Then again, neither did the Bolsheviks (indeed, they
thought calling worker, peasant and partisan congresses
to discuss the development of the revolution as the real
danger to it!). If not, then he cannot fault the regional
congress resolution for pointing out the obvious. As such,
Rees' misquoting of the resolution backfires on him.

Significantly, Rees fails to mention that during this period
(the first half of 1920), the Bolsheviks "shot ordinary 
soldiers as well as their commanders, destroying their houses, 
confiscating their properties, and persecuting their families. 
Moreover the Bolsheviks conducted mass arrests of innocent 
peasants who were suspected of collaborating in some way 
with the partisans. It is impossible to determine the 
casualties involved." The hypocrisy is clear. While Rees 
presents information (some of it, we stress, from a fake
source) on Makhnovist attacks against the Bolshevik 
dictatorship, he remains silent on the Bolshevik tactics,
violence and state terrorism. Given that the Bolsheviks had 
attacked the Makhnovists, it seems strange that that Rees 
ignores the "merciless methods" of the Bolsheviks (to use 
Palij's phrase) and concentrates instead on the acts of
self-defence forced onto the Makhnovists. Perhaps this 
is because it would provide too strong a "flavour" of
the Bolshevik regime? [Op. Cit., pp. 212-3 and p. 213]

Rees makes great play of the fact that White forces took
advantage of the conflict between the Makhnovists and the
Bolsheviks, as would be expected. However, it seems like
an act of ideological faith to blame the victims of this
conflict for it! In his attempts to demonise the Makhnovists,
he argues that "[i]n fact it was Makhno's actions against
the Red Army which made 'a brief return of the Whites possible.'"
In defence of his claims, Rees quotes from W. Bruce Lincoln's
_Red Victory_. However, looking at Lincoln's work we discover
that Lincoln is well aware who is to blame for the return
of the Whites. Unsurprisingly, it is *not* the Makhnovists:

"Once Trotsky's Red Army had crushed Iudenich and Kolchak and
driven Deniken's forces back upon their bases in the Crimea
and the Kuban, it turned upon Makhno's partisan forces with
a vengeance . . . [I]n mid-January 1920, after a typhus
epidemic had decimated his forces, a re-established Central
Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party declared Makhno
an outlaw. Yet the Bolsheviks could not free themselves
from Makhno's grasp so easily, and it became one of the
supreme ironies of the Russian Civil War that his attacks
against the rear of the Red Army made it possible for the
resurrected White armies . . . to return briefly to the
southern Ukraine in 1920." [_Red Victory_, p. 327]

Ignoring the fact that Rees does not bother to give the
correct quote (a problem that re-occurs frequently in his
essay), it can be seen that he does paraphrase the last
sentence of Lincoln's work correctly. Strange, then, that
he ignores the rest of his account which clearly indicates
that the Bolsheviks "turned upon" the Makhnovists and
"declared Makhno an outlaw." Obviously such trivial facts
as the initial Bolshevik attacks against the Makhnovists
are unimportant to understanding what actually happened in
this period. Informing his readers that it was the Bolsheviks'
betrayal of the Makhnovists which provoked the resistance
that "made it possible for . . . the White armies . . . to
return briefly" would confuse them with facts and so it
goes unmentioned.

Lincoln, it must be stressed, concurs with Rees's other main
sources (Palij and Footman) on the fact that the Bolsheviks
betrayed the Makhnovists! Clearly, Rees has rewritten history
and distorted *all* of his main references on the Makhnovist
movement. After reading the same fact in three different
sources, you would think that the Bolshevik betrayal of the
Makhnovists which provoked their resistance against them would
warrant *some* mention, but no! In true Stalinist fashion,
Rees managed to turn a Bolshevik betrayal of the Makhnovists
into a stick with which to beat them with! Truly amazing.

Simply put, if the Bolsheviks had not wanted to impose their
rule over the Ukraine, then the conflict with the Makhnovists
need not have taken place and Wrangel would not have been in a
position to invade the Ukraine. Why did the Bolsheviks act
in this way? There was no "objective factor" for this action
and so we must turn to Bolshevik ideology.

As we proved in section H.11.14, Bolshevik ideology by this time
identified Bolshevik party dictatorship as the only expression
of "the dictatorship of the proletariat." Does Rees *really*
believe that such perspectives had no impact on how the Bolsheviks
acted during the Revolution? The betrayal of the Makhnovists can
only be understood in terms of the "subjective factor" Rees seeks
to ignore. If you think, as the Bolsheviks clearly did, that the
dictatorship of the proletariat equalled the dictatorship of
the party (and vice versa) then anything which threatened the
rule of the party had to be destroyed. Whether this was soviet
democracy or the Makhnovists did not matter. The Makhnovist idea
of worker and peasant self-management, like soviet democracy,
could not be reconciled with the Bolshevik ideology. As such,
Bolshevik policy explains the betrayals of the Makhnovists.

Not satisfied with distorting his source material to present
the Makhnovists as the guilty party in the return of Wrangel,
he decides to blame the initial success of Wrangel on them
as well. He quotes Michael Palij as follows: "As Wrangel
advanced . . . Makhno retreated north . . . leaving behind
small partisan units in the villages and towns to carry out
covert destruction of the Bolshevik administrative apparatus
and supply bases." [Op. Cit., p. 59] He again sources Palij's
work on the "effective" nature of these groups, stating
that White Colonel Noga reported to headquarters that
Makhno was critical to Wrangel's advance.

As regards the claims that Makhno was "critical" to Wrangel's
advance, Colonal Noga actually states that it was "peasant
uprisings under Makhno and many other partisan detachments"
which gave "the Reds no rest." [quoted by Palij, Op. Cit.,
p. 214] However, what Rees fails to mention is that Palij
argues that it was the Bolshevik "policy of terror and
exploitation" which had "turned almost all segments of
Ukrainian society against the Bolsheviks, substantially
strengthened the Makhno movement, and consequently
facilitated the advance of the reorganised anti-Bolshevik
force of General Wrangel from the Crimea into South Ukraine,
the Makhno region." [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 214] Again, Makhno
is blamed for the inevitable results of Bolshevik policies
and actions!

It should also be reported that Noga's comments are dated
25th March 1920, while Palij's summary of Makhno's activities
retreating from Wrangel was about June 1920 -- 2 months
later! As regards this advance by Wrangel, Palij argues
that it was the "outbreak of the Polish-Bolshevik war
at the end of April" which "benefited Wrangel" and
"enabled him to launch an offensive against the Bolsheviks
in Tavriia on June 6th." Indeed, it was after a "series
of battles" that Wrangel "penetrated north, forcing a
general Bolshevik retreat." Now, "[a]s Wrangel advanced
deeper into the Left Bank, Makhno retreated north to
the Kharkiv region, leaving behind small partisan units
in the villages and towns to carry on covert destruction
of the Bolshevik administrative apparatus and supply
bases." [Op. Cit., p. 219] Again, Rees' account has
little bearing to reality or the source material he
uses.

Rees continues to re-write history by arguing that "Makhno did
not fight with the Reds again until October 1920 when Wrangel
advanced on Makhno's base." [Op. Cit., p. 59] In fact, it
was the *Makhnovists* who contacted the Bolsheviks in July
and August in 1920 with a view to suspending hostilities
and co-operating in the fight against Wrangel. This decision
was made at a mass assembly of insurgents. Sadly, the
Bolsheviks made no response. Only in September, after
Wrangel had occupied many towns, did the Bolsheviks
enter into negotiations. [Arshinov, Op. Cit., pp. 176-7]
This is confirmed by Footman, who states that it is "agreed
that the initiative for joint action against Wrangel came
from the Makhnovists" [Op. Cit., p. 294], as well as by Palij,
who notes that "Makhno was compelled to seek an understanding
with the Bolsheviks" but "no reply was received." It was
"Wrangel's success [which] caused the Bolshevik leaders to
reconsider Makhno's earlier proposal." [Op. Cit., pp. 222-3]
Obviously indicating that the Makhnovists placed the struggle
against the White counter-revolution above their own politics
would place the Bolsheviks in a bad light, and so Rees fails
to give the details behind the agreement of joint action
against Wrangel.

As regards this third and final break, Rees states that it was
("unsurprisingly") a "treaty of convenience on the part of both
sides and as soon as Wrangel was defeated at the end of the
year the Red Army fought Makhno until he have up the struggle."
[Op. Cit., p. 59] Which, as far as it goes, is true. Makhno,
however, "assumed [that] the forthcoming conflict with the
Bolsheviks could be limited to the realm of ideas" and that
they "would not attack his movement immediately." [Palij,
Op. Cit., p. 231] He was wrong. Instead the Bolsheviks
attacked the Makhnovists without warning and, unlike the
other breaks, without pretext (although leaflets handed
out to the Red Army stated that *Makhno* had "violat[ed]
the agreement"! [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 236]).

It would be a good idea to reproduce the agreement which the
Bolsheviks ripped up. There were two parts, a military and a
political one. The military one is pretty straight forward
(although the clause on the Makhnovists refusing to accept
Red Army detachments or deserters suggests that the
Makhnovists' democratic army was seen by many Red Army
soldiers as a better alternative to Trotsky's autocratic
structure). The political agreement was as follows:

"1. Immediate release, and an end to the persecution of
all Makhno men and anarchists in the territories of the
Soviet Republics, except those who carry on armed
resistance against Soviet authorities.

"2. Makhno men and anarchists were to have complete
freedom of expression of their ideas and principles,
by speech and the press, provided that nothing was
expressed that tended to a violent overthrow of
Soviet government, and on condition that military
censorship be respected. . .

"3. Makhno men and anarchists were to enjoy full rights
of participation in elections to the soviets, including
the right to be elected, and free participation in the
organisation of the forthcoming Fifth All-Ukrainian
Congress of Soviets . . ." [cited by Palij, Op. Cit.,
p. 224]

Needless to say, the Bolsheviks delayed the publication
of the political agreement several until several days
after the military one was published -- "thus blurring
its real meaning." [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 225] Clearly,
as it stands, the agreement just gave the Makhnovists
and anarchists the rights they should have had according
to the Soviet Constitution! Little wonder the Bolsheviks
ignored it -- they also ignored their own constitution.
However, it is the fourth point of the political agreement
which gives the best insight into the nature of Bolshevism.
This last point was never ratified by the Bolsheviks as
it was "absolutely unacceptable to the dictatorship of
the proletariat." [quoted by Palij, Ibid.] This clause
was:

"One of the basic principles of the Makhno movement
being the struggle for the self-administration of the
toilers, the Partisan Army brings up a fourth point:
in the region of the Makhno movement, the worker and
peasant population is to organise and maintain its
own free institutions for economic and political
self-administration; this region is subsequently
federated with Soviet republics by means of agreements
freely negotiated with the appropriate Soviet
governmental organ." [quoted by Palij, Op. Cit.,
p. 224]

Clearly, this idea of worker and peasant self-management,
like soviet democracy, could not be reconciled with the
Bolshevik support for party dictatorship as the expression
of "the dictatorship of the proletariat" which had become
a Bolshevik ideological truism by that time. Little wonder
the Bolsheviks failed to ratify the fourth clause and
violated the other agreements. Simply put, a libertarian
alternative to Bolshevism would give the Russian and
Ukrainian working masses hope of freedom and make them
harder to control. It is unsurprising that Rees fails to
discuss the treaty -- it would, yet again, undermine his case
that the Bolsheviks were forced by objective circumstances
to be dictatorial.

And, of course, let us not forget the circumstances in
which this betrayal took place. The country was, as Rees
reminds us, in a state of economic disruption and collapse.
Indeed, Rees blames the anti-working class and dictatorial
actions and policies of the Bolsheviks on the chaos caused
by the civil war. Yet here are the Bolsheviks prolonging
this very Civil War by turning (yet again!) on their allies.
After the defeat of the Whites, the Bolsheviks preferred
to attack the Makhnovists rather than allow them the freedom
they had been fighting for. Resources which could have been
used to aid the economic rebuilding of Russia and the Ukraine
were used to attack their former allies. The talents and
energy of the Makhnovists were either killed or wasted in a
pointless conflict. Should we be surprised? After all, the
Bolsheviks had preferred to compound their foes during the
Civil War (and, indirectly, aid the very Whites they were
fighting) by betraying their Makhnovist allies on two
previous occasions (once, because the Makhnovists had
dared call a conference of working people to discuss the
civil war being fought in their name). Clearly, Bolshevik
politics and ideology played a key role in all these
decisions. They were *not* driven by terrible objective
circumstances (indeed, they made them worse).

Rees obviously distorted the truth about the first two
agreements between the Makhnovists and the Bolsheviks. He
portrayed the Makhnovists as the guilty party, "breaking"
with the Bolsheviks when in fact it was (in both cases)
the Bolsheviks who broke with and betrayed the Makhnovists.
That explains why he fails to present any information on
*why* the first break happened and why he distorts the
events of the second. It cannot be said that he was unaware
of these facts -- they are in the very books he himself
references! As such, we have a clear and intended desire
to deceive the reader. As regards the third agreement,
while he makes no pretence that the Makhnovists were the
guilty party however, he implies that the Bolsheviks had
to act as they did before the Makhnovists turned on them.
Little wonder, then, that he does not provide the details
of the agreement made between the Bolsheviks and Makhnovists
-- to do so would have been to expose the authoritarianism
of the Bolsheviks. Simply put, Rees'distortions of the
source material he uses comes as no surprise. It undermines
his basic argument and so cannot be used in its original
form. Hence the cherry-picking of quotations to support his
case.

After distorting Makhnovist relations with the Bolsheviks,
Rees moves on to distorting the socio-political ideas and
practice of the Makhnovists. As would be expected from his
hatchet-job on the military history of the movement, his
account of its social ideas leaves much to be desired.
However, both aspects of his critique have much in common.
His account of its theoretical ideas and its attempts to
apply them again abuse the source material in disgraceful
ways.

For example, Rees states that under the Makhnovists
"[p]apers could be published, but the Bolshevik and Left
Socialist Revolutionary press were not allowed to call for
revolution" and references Michael Palij's book. [Op. Cit.,
p. 60] Looking at the page in question, we discover a somewhat
different account. According to Palij's work, what the
Makhnovists *actually* "prohibited" was that these parties 
should "propagate armed uprisings against the Makhnovist 
movement." A clear rewriting of the source material and an 
indication of how low Leninists will sink. Significantly, 
Palij also notes that this "freedom of speech, press, assembly 
and association" was implemented "[i]n contrast to the Bolshevik
regime" and its policy of crushing such liberties. [Op. Cit.
pp. 152-3] Ironically, the military-political agreement of
late 1920 between the Reds and Makhnovists included a similar
clause, banning expression that "tended to a violent overthrow
of the Soviet government." [quoted by Palij, OP. Cit., p. 224]
Which means, to use Rees' distorted terminology, that the
Bolsheviks banned calls for revolution!

However, this distortion of the source material *does* give
us an insight into the mentality of Leninism. After all,
according to Palij, when the Makhnovists entered a city
or town they "immediately announced to the population that
the army did not intend to exercise political authority."
The workers and peasants were to set up soviets "that would
carry out the will and orders of their constituents" as well
as "organis[e] their own self-defence force against
counter-revolution and banditry." These political changes
were matched in the economic sphere as well, as the
"holdings of the landlords, the monasteries and the state,
including all livestocks and goods, were to be transferred
to the peasants" and "all factories, plants, mines, and other
means of production were to become property of all the workers
under control of their professional unions." [Op. Cit.,
p. 151]

In such an environment, a call for "revolution" (or, more
correctly, "armed uprisings against the Makhno movement")
could only mean a Bolshevik coup to install a Bolshevik party
dictatorship. As the Makhnovists were clearly defending working-
class and peasant self-government, then a Bolshevik call for
"armed uprisings" against them also meant the end of such free
soviets and their replacement with party dictatorship. Little
wonder Rees distorts his source! Arshinov makes the situation
clear:

"The only restriction that the Makhnovists considered
necessary to impose on the Bolsheviks, the left
Socialist Revolutionaries and other statists was a
prohibition on the formation of those 'revolutionary
committees' which sought to impose a dictatorship over
the people. In Aleksandrovsk and Ekaterinoslav, right
after the occupation of these cities by the Makhnovists,
the Bolsheviks hastened to organise *Revkoms*
(*Revolutionary Committees*) seeking to organise their
political power and govern the population . . .
Makhno advised them to go and take up some honest trade
instead of seeking to impose their will on the
workers . . . In this context the Makhnovists' attitude
was completely justified and consistent. To protect the
full freedom of speech, press, and organisation, they
had to take measures against formations which sought to
stifle this freedom, to suppress other organisations,
and to impose their will and dictatorial authority on
the workers." [Op. Cit., p. 154]

Little wonder Rees distorts the issues and transforms
a policy to defend the *real* revolution into one which
banned a "call for revolution"! We should be grateful
that he distorted the Makhnovist message for it allows
us to indicate the dictatorial nature of the regime
and politics Rees is defending.

All of which disproves Rees' assertion that "the movement
never had any real support from the working class. Neither
was it particularly interested in developing a programme
which would appeal to the workers." [Op. Cit., p. 59] Now,
Rees had obviously read Palij's summary of Makhnovist ideas.
Is he claiming that workers' self-management and the
socialisation of the means of production do not "appeal"
to workers? After all, most Leninists pay lip-service to
these ideas. Is Rees arguing that the Bolshevik policies
of the time (namely one-man management and the militarisation
of labour) "appealed" to the workers more than workers'
self-management of production? Equally, the Makhnovists
argued that the workers should form their own free soviets
which would "carry out the will and orders of their
constituents." [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 151] Is Rees *really*
arguing that the Bolshevik policy of party dictatorship
"appealed" to the workers more than soviet democracy?
If so, then heaven help us if the SWP ever get into power!

Luckily, as Jonathan Aves' book _Workers Against Lenin_ proves,
this was not the case. Working-class resistance to Bolshevik
policies was extremely widespread, increasing in intensity until
the near revolutionary general strike of early 1921. This 
opposition was, from the start, collective in nature and was 
often expressed by strikes and mass meetings by workers. It 
should be noted that the wave of strikes all across Russia
which preceded the Kronstadt revolt also raised the demand
for soviet democracy. The call for "free soviets" was raised
by the Kronstadt revolt itself and during the "mini-Kronstadt"
in Katerinoslav in June 1921 where the demands of the workers
"were very similar in content with the resolutions of the
Kronstadt rebels" and telegraph operators sent "messages 
throughout the Soviet Republic calling for 'free soviets.'"
[Jonathan Aves, _Workers Against Lenin_, p. 172 and p. 173]

Clearly, the Makhnovists *did* create a "programme that would
appeal to the workers." However, it is true that the Makhnovists
did fail win over more than a minority of workers. This may
have been due to the fact that the Makhnovists only freed two
cities, both for short periods of time. As Paul Avrich notes,
"he found little time to implement his economic programs."
[_Anarchist Portraits_, p. 121] Given how Rees bends over
backwards to justify Bolshevik policies in terms of "objective
factors," it is significant that in his discussion of the
Makhnovists such "objective factors" as time fail to get a
mention!

Thus Rees's attempt to paint the Makhnovists as anti-working
class fails. While this is the core of his dismissal of them
as a possible "libertarian alternative to the Bolsheviks,"
the facts do not support his assertions. He gives the example
of Makhno's advice to railway workers in Aleksandrovsk "who
had not been paid for many weeks" that they should "simply
charge passengers a fair price and so generate their own
wages." He states that this "advice aimed at reproducing
the petit-bourgeois patterns of the countryside." [Op. Cit.,
p. 59] Two points can be raised to this argument.

Firstly, we should highlight the Bolshevik (and so,
presumably, "proletarian") patterns imposed on the
railway workers. Trotsky simply "plac[ed] the railwaymen
and the personnel of the repair workshops under martial
law" and "summarily ousted" the leaders of the railwaymen's
trade union when they objected." The Central Administrative
Body of Railways (Tsektran) he created was run by him
"along strictly military and bureaucratic lines." In other
words, he applied his ideas on the "militarisation of
labour" in full. [M. Brinton, _The Bolsheviks and Workers'
Control_, p. 67] Compared to the Bolshevik pattern, only
an ideologue could suggest that Makhno's advice (and it
was advice, not a decree imposed from above, as was
Trotsky's) can be considered worse. Indeed, by being
based on workers' self-management it was infinitely
more socialist than the militarised Bolshevik state
capitalist system.

Secondly, Rees fails to understand the nature of
anarchism. Anarchism argues that it is up to working
class people to organise their own activities. This
meant that, ultimately, it was up to the railway
workers *themselves* (in association with other
workers) to organise their own work and industry.
Rather than being imposed by a few leaders, *real*
socialism can only come from below, built by working
people, through their own efforts and own class 
organisations. Anarchists can suggest ideas and solutions,
but ultimately its up to workers (and peasants) to organise
their own affairs. Thus, rather than being a source of
condemnation, Makhno's comments should be considered as
praiseworthy as they were made in a spirit of equality
and were based on encouraging workers' self-management.

Ultimately, the best reply to Rees is simply the fact
that after holding a "general conference of the workers
of the city" at which it was "proposed that the workers
organise the life of the city and the functioning of the
factories with their own forces and their own organisations"
based on "the principles of self-management," the "[r]ailroad
workers took the first step in this direction" by "form[ing]
a committee charged with organising the railway network of
the region." [Arshinov, Op. Cit., p. 149]

Even more amazing (if that is possible) is Rees' account of
the revolution in the countryside. Rees argues that the "real
basis of Makhno's support was not his anarchism, but his
opposition to grain requisitioning and his determination not
to disturb the peasant economy" [Op. Cit., p. 59] and quotes
Palij as follows:

"Makhno had not put an end to the agricultural inequalities.
His aim was to avoid conflicts with the villages and to
maintain a sort of united front of the entire peasantry."
[M. Palij, Op. Cit., p. 214]

However, here is the actual context of the (corrected) quote:

"Peasants' economic conditions in the region of the Makhno
movement were greatly improved at the expense of the estates
of the landlords, the church, monasteries, and the richest
peasants, but Makhno had not put an end to the agricultural
inequalities. His aim was to avoid conflicts within the
villages and to maintain a sort of united front of the
entire peasantry." [M. Palij, Op. Cit., p. 214]

Clearly, Rees has distorted the source material, conveniently
missing out the information that Makhno had most definitely
"disturbed" the peasant economy at the expense of the rich!
And, we are sure that Rees would have a fit if it were suggested
that the real basis of Bolshevik support was not their socialism,
but their opposition to the war and the Whites!

Amazingly, Rees also somehow manages to forget to mention the
peasant revolution which had started in 1917 in his attack
against Makhno:

"Makhno and his associates brought socio-political issues
into the daily life of the people, who in turn supported the
expropriation of large estates . . . On the eve of open
conflict [in late 1917], Makhno assembled all the landowners
and rich peasants (kulaks) of the area and took from them
all official documents relating to their land, livestock,
and equipment. Subsequently an inventory of this property
was taken and reported  to the people at the session of
the local soviet, and then at the regional meeting, It
was decided to allow the landlords to share the land,
livestock, and tools equally with the peasants." [Palij,
Op. Cit., p. 71]

Obviously, Rees considers the expropriating of the
landlords and kulaks as an act which "did not disturb
the age-old class structure of the countryside"!

Let us not forget that the official Makhnovist position was
that the "holdings of the landlords, the monasteries, and
the state, including all livestock and goods, were to be
transferred to the peasants." [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 151]
At the second congress of workers, peasants and insurgents
held in February, 1919, it was resolved that "all land be
transferred to the hands of toiling peasants . . . according
to the norm of equal distribution." [quoted by Palij, Op. Cit.,
p. 155] This meant that every peasant family had as much
land as they could cultivate without the use of hired labour.
The Makhnovists argued with regards to the kulaks:

"We are sure that . . . the kulak elements of the village
will be pushed to one side by the very course of events.
The toiling peasantry will itself turn effortlessly on the
kulaks, first by adopting the kulak's surplus land for
general use, then naturally drawing the kulak elements
into the social organisation." [cited by Michael Malet,
Op. Cit., pp. 118-9]

Thus, just to stress the point, the Makhnovists *did*
"disturb" the "age-old class structure of the countryside."

Clearly, Rees is simply taking nonsense. When he states that
Makhnovist land policies "did not disturb the age-old class
structure of the countryside," he is simply showing his utter
and total disregard for the truth. As the Bolsheviks themselves
found out, no mass movement could possibly exist among the
peasants without having a positive and levelling land policy.
The Makhnovists were no exception.

Rees then states that "[i]n 1919 the local Bolshevik
authorities made mistakes which played into Makhno's hands."
Unsurprisingly enough, he argues that this was because
they "tried to carry through the socialisation of the
land, rather than handing it over to the peasants."
[Op. Cit., p. 60] In fact, the Bolsheviks did *not* try
to implement the "socialisation" of land. Rather, they
tried to *nationalise* the land and place it under state
control -- a radically different concept. Indeed, it was
the Makhnovists who argued that the "land, the factories,
the workshops, the mines, the railroads and the other
wealth of the people must belong to the working people
themselves, to those who work in them, that is to say,
they must be socialised." [contained in Arshinov, Op. Cit.,
p. 273] The Bolsheviks, in contrast, initially "decreed
that all lands formerly belonging to the landlords should
be expropriated and transformed into state farms." [Palij,
Op. Cit., p. 156] The peasants quite rightly thought that
this just replaced one set of landlords with another,
stealing the land which rightfully belonged to them.

After distorting the source material by selective quoting,
Rees does it again when he argues that "by the spring of 1920
they [the Bolsheviks] had reversed the policy towards the
peasants and instituted Committees of Poor Peasants, these
'hurt Makhno . . . his heart hardened and he sometimes ordered
executions.' This policy helped the Bolshevik ascendancy."
[Op. Cit., p. 60]

Rees quotes Palij as evidence. To refute his argument we need
simply quote the same pages:

"Although they [the Bolsheviks] modified their agricultural
policy by introducing on February 5, 1920, a new land law,
distributing the former landlords', state and church lands
among the peasants, they did not succeed in placating them
because of the requisitions, which the peasants considered
outright robbery . . . Subsequently the Bolsheviks decided
to introduce class warfare into the villages. A decree was
issued on May 19, 1920, establishing 'Committees of the
Poor' . .  . Authority in the villages was delegated to the
committees, which assisted the Bolsheviks in seizing the
surplus grain . . . The establishment of Committees of the
Poor was painful to Makhno because they became not only
part of the Bolshevik administrative apparatus the
peasants opposed, but also informers helping the Bolshevik
secret police in its persecution of the partisans, their
families and supporters, even to the extent of hunting
down and executing wounded partisans . . .  Consequently,
Makhno's 'heart hardened and he sometimes ordered
executions where some generosity would have bestowed
more credit upon him and his movement. That the Bolsheviks
preceded him with the bad example was no excuse. For he
claimed to be fighting for a better cause.' Although the
committees in time gave the Bolsheviks a hold on every
village, their abuse of power disorganised and slowed
down agricultural life . . . This policy of terror and
exploitation turned almost all segments of Ukrainian
society against the Bolsheviks, substantially strengthened
the Makhno movement, and consequently facilitated the
advance of the reorganised anti-Bolshevik force of General
Wrangel from the Crimea into South Ukraine, the Makhno
region." [M. Palij, Op. Cit., pp. 213-4]

Amazing what a ". . ." can hide, is it not! Rees turns
an account which clearly shows the Bolshevik policy was
based on informers, secret police and the murder of
rebels as well as being a total disaster into a victory.
Moreover, he also transforms it so that the victims are
portrayed as the villains. Words cannot do this re-writing
of history justice. Yes, indeed, an organisation of
informers to the secret police in every village can aid
the "ascendancy" of a one-party dictatorship (aided,
of course, by overwhelming military force), but it
cannot aid the ascendancy of freedom, equality and
socialism.

Given the actual record of the Bolsheviks' attempts to break
up what they considered the "age-old class structure" of the
villages with the "Committees of the Poor," it is clear why
Rees distorts his source.

It does seem ironic that Rees attacks the Makhnovists for not
pursuing Bolshevik peasant policies. Considering the absolute
*failure* of those policies, the fact that Makhno did not follow
them is hardly cause for condemnation! Indeed, given the numerous
anti-Bolshevik uprisings and large-scale state repression they
provoked, attacking the Makhnovists for not pursuing such insane
policies is equally insane. After all, who, in the middle of a
Civil War, makes matters worse for themselves by creating more
enemies? Only the insane -- or the Bolsheviks!

That Makhnovist land policy was correct and the Bolshevik
one wrong can be seen from the fact that the latter
changed their policies and brought them into line with
the Makhnovist ones. As Palij notes, the Bolsheviks
"modified their agricultural policy by introducing on
February 5, 1920, a new land law, distributing the
formers landlords', state, and church lands among the
peasants." This, of course, was a vindication of
Makhnovist policy (which dated from 1917!). Makhno
"initiated the peasants' movement, confiscating and
distributing landlords' land and goods" (and, unlike
the Bolsheviks, "encouraging the workers to take over
factories and workshops"). As regards the Bolsheviks
attempts to break up what they considered the "age-
old class structure" of the villages with the "Committees
of the Poor," it was, as noted above, a complete
disaster and counter-productive. [Op. Cit., p. 213
and p. 250] All in all, the Makhnovist policies were
clearly the most successful as regards the peasantry.
They broke up the class system in the countryside
by expropriating the ruling class and did not create
new conflicts by artificially imposing themselves
onto the villages.

Lastly, we must also wonder just how sensible it is to
"disturb" the economy that produces the food you eat.
Given that Rees, in part, blames Bolshevik tyranny on
the disruption of the economy, it seems incredible that
he faults Makhno for not adding to the chaos by failing
to "disrupt the peasant economy"! However, why let logic
get in the way of a good rant!

As well as ignoring the wealth of information on Makhnovist
land policy, Rees turns to their attempts to form free agrarian
communes. He argues that Makhno's attempts "to go beyond the
traditional peasant economy were doomed" and quotes Makhno's
memoirs which state "the mass of the people did not go over"
to his peasant communes, which only involved a few hundred
families. [Op. Cit., p. 59]

Looking at Makhno's memoirs a somewhat different picture appears.
Firstly, Makhno states that there were "four such agricultural
communes within a three- or four-mile radius of Hulyai-Pole,"
but in the whole district "there were many" in 1918 (the period
being discussed in his memoirs). Makhno recounts how each "commune
consisted of ten families of peasants and workers, totalling a
hundred, two hundred or three hundred members" and the "management
of each commune was conducted by a general meeting of all its
members." He does state that "the mass of people did not go over
to it" but, significantly, he argues that this was because of
"the advance of the German and Austrian armies, their own lack
of organisation, and their inability to defend this order against
the new 'revolutionary' and counter-revolutionary authorities.
For this reason the toiling population of the district limited
their real revolutionary activity to supporting in every way
those bold spirits among them who had settled on the old estates
[of the landlords] and organised their personal and economic life
on free communal lines." [quoted by Paul Avrich, _The Anarchists
in the Russian Revolution_, pp. 130-2]

Of course, failing to mention the time period Makhno was
recounting does distort the success of the communes. The
Bolsheviks were evacuating the Ukraine as part of their
treaty with German and Austrian Imperialism when the
communes were being set up. This left them in a dangerous
position, needless to say. By July, 1918, the area was
occupied by Austrian troops and it was early 1919 before
the situation was stable enough to allow their
reintroduction. One commune was named "Rosa Luxemburg"
(after the Marxist revolutionary martyr) and was
mostly destroyed by the Bolsheviks in June 1919 and
completely destroyed by the Whites a few days later.
In such circumstances, can it be surprising that only
a minority of peasants got involved in them? Rather
than praise the Makhnovists for positive social
experimentation in difficult circumstances, Rees shows
his ignorance of the objective conditions facing the
revolution. Perhaps if the peasants did not have to
worry about the Bolsheviks as well as the Whites,
they would have had more members?

All in all, Rees account of Makhnovist ideas on the peasant
economy are, to put it mildly, incorrect. They paint a
radically different picture of the reality of both Makhnovist
ideas and practice as regards the peasantry. Ironically, the
soundness of Makhnovist policy in this area can be seen from
the fact that the Bolsheviks changed their land policy to
bring it into line with it. Not, of course, that you would know
that from Rees' account. Nor would you know what the facts
of the Bolsheviks' land policy were either. Indeed, Rees
uses Michael Palij's book to create a picture of events
which is the exact opposite of that contained in it! Very
impressive!

Intent on driving the final nail into the coffin, he tries
to apply "class analysis" to the Makhnovists. Rees actually
states that "given this social base [i.e the Makhnovists'
peasant base] . . . much of Makhno's libertarianism amounted
to little more than paper decrees." [Op. Cit., p. 60]

Ironically enough, the list of "paper decrees" Rees presents
(when not false or distorted) are also failings associated with
the Bolsheviks (and taken to even more extreme measures by the
Bolsheviks)! As such, his lambasting of the Makhnovists seems
deeply hypocritical. Moreover, his attempt to ground the few
deviations that exist between Makhnovist practice and Makhnovist
theory in the peasant base of the army seems an abuse of class
analysis. After all, these deviations were also shared by the
Bolsheviks. As such, how can Rees justify the Bolshevik deviations
from socialist theory in terms of "objective factors" yet
blame Makhnovist ones on their "social base"? Do "objective
factors" only afflict Leninists?

Take for example his first "paper" decree, namely the election
of commanders. He states that "in practice the most senior
commanders were appointed by Makhno." In other words, the
Makhnovists applied this principle extensively but not
completely. The Bolsheviks abolished it by decree (and did
not blame it on "exceptional circumstances" nor consider it
as a "retreat", as Rees asserts). Now, if Rees' "class analysis"
of the limitations of the Makhnovists were true, does this mean
that an army of a regime with a proletarian base (as he considers
the Bolshevik regime) cannot have elected commanders? This
is the logical conclusion of his argument.

Equally, his attempt to "give a flavour of the movement" by
quoting one of the resolutions adopted by a mass meeting of
partisans also backfires (namely, "to obey the orders of
the commanders if the commanders are sober enough to give 
them"). Firstly, it should be noted that this was, originally, 
from a Red Army source. Secondly, drunkenness was a big 
problem during the civil war (as in any war). It was one of 
the easiest ways of forgetting reality at a time when life 
was often unpleasant and sometimes short. As such, the 
"objective factor" of civil war explains this resolution 
rather than the social base of the movement! Thirdly, Rees 
himself quotes a Central Committee member's comment to the 
Eighth Party Congress that there were so many "horrifying 
facts about drunkenness, debauchery, corruption, robbery 
and irresponsible behaviour of many party members that 
one's hair stands on end." [Op. Cit., p. 66] The Eighth
Congress was in 1919. Does this comment give a "flavour"
of the Bolshevik regime under Lenin? Obviously not, as Rees
defends it and blames this list of horrors on the objective
factors facing the Bolsheviks. Why does the drunkenness of
the Makhnovists come from their "social base" while that of
the Bolsheviks from "objective factors"? Simply put, Rees is
insulting the intelligence of his readers.

The Makhnovist resolution was passed by a mass assembly
of partisans, suggesting a fundamentally democratic
organisation. Rees argues that the civil war resulted in
the Bolshevik vices becoming institutionalised in the power
of the bureaucracy. However, as can be seen, the Makhnovists
practised democracy during the civil war, suggesting that
the objective factors Rees tries to blame for the Bolshevik
vices simply cannot explain everything. As such, his own
example (yet again) backfires on his argument.

Rees claims that "Makhno held elections, but no parties
were allowed to participate in them." [Op. Cit., p. 60]
This is probably derived from Palij's comment that the
free soviets would "carry out the will and orders of their
constituents" and "[o]nly working people, not representatives
of political parties, might join the soviets." [Op. Cit.,
p. 151] This, in turn, derives from a Makhnovist proclamation
from January 1920 which stated:

"Only labourers who are contributing work necessary to
the social economy should participate in the soviets.
Representatives of political organisations have no place
in worker-peasant soviets, since their participation in
a workers' soviet will transform the latter into deputies
of the party and can lead to the downfall of the soviet
system." [contained in Peter Arshinov's _History of the
Makhnovist Movement_, p. 266]

Rees' comments indicate that he is not familiar with the
make-up of the Russian Soviets of 1917. Unlike the soviets
from the 1905 revolution, those in 1917 allowed "various
parties and other organisations to acquire voting
representation in the soviet executive committees."
Indeed, this was "often how high party leaders became
voting delegates to" such bodies. It should "be
underlined that these party delegates were selected
by the leadership of each political organisation, and
not by the soviet assembly itself. In other words, these
executive committee members were not directly elected by
the representatives of the producers" (never mind by the
producers themselves). [Samuel Farber, _Before Stalinism_,
p. 31]

In addition, Russian Anarchists had often attacked the
use of "party lists" in soviet elections, which turned
the soviets from working-class organs into talking-shops.
[Paul Avrich, _The Russian Anarchists_, p. 190] This use
of party lists meant that soviet delegates could be anyone.
For example, the leading left-wing Menshevik Martov recounts
that in early 1920 a chemical factory "put up Lenin against
me as a candidate [to the Moscow soviet]. I received seventy-six
votes he-eight (in an open vote)." [quoted by Israel Getzler,
_Martov_, p. 202] How would either of these two intellectuals
actually know and reflect the concerns and interests of the
workers they would be "delegates" of? If the soviets were
meant to be the delegates of working people, then why should
non-working class members of political parties be elected
to a soviet?

Given that the people elected to the free soviets would be
*delegates* and *not* representatives, this would mean that
they would reflect the wishes of their workmates rather
than the decisions of the party's central committee. As
such, if a worker who was a member of a political party
could convince their workmates of their ideas, the delegate
would reflect the decisions of the mass assembly. As such,
the input of political parties would not be undermined in any
way (although their domination would be!).
As such, the Makhnovist ideas on soviets did not, in fact,
mean that workers and peasants could *not* elect or send
delegates who were members of political parties. They had
no problems as such with delegates who happened to be working-
class party members. They did have problems with delegates
representing only political parties, delegates who were not
workers and soviets being mere ciphers covering party rule.

That this was the case can be seen from a few facts.
Firstly, the February 1919 congress resolution "was
written by the anarchists, left Socialist Revolutionaries,
and the chairman." [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 155] Similarly,
the Makhnovist Revolutionary Military Soviet created
at the Aleksandrovsk congress in late 1919 had three
Communists elected to it. There were 18 delegates
from workers at that congress, six were Mensheviks
and the remaining 12 included Communists [Malet,
Op. Cit., p. 111, p. 124] Clearly, members of political
parties were elected to both the congresses and
the Revolutionary Military Soviet. As such, the idea
that free soviets excluded members of political
parties is false -- they simply were not dominated
by them (for example, having executives made up of
members of a single party or delegating their power
to a government as per the national soviet in Russia).
This could, of course, change. In the words of the
Makhnovist reply to Bolshevik attempts to ban one of
their congresses:

"The Revolutionary Military Council . . . holds itself
above the pressure and influence of all parties and only
recognises the people who elected it. Its duty is to
accomplish what the people have instructed it to do,
and to create no obstacles to any left socialist party
in the propagation of ideas. Consequently, if one day
the Bolshevik idea succeeds among the workers, the
Revolutionary Military Council . . . will necessarily
be replaced by another organisation, 'more revolutionary'
and more Bolshevik." [quoted by Arshinov, Op. Cit.,
pp. 103-4]

As such, the Makhnovists supported the right of working-
class self-determination, as expressed by one delegate
to Hulyai Pole conference in February 1919:

"No party has a right to usurp governmental power
into its hands . . . We want life, all problems,
to be decided locally, not by order from any
authority above; and all peasants and workers
should decide their own fate, while those elected
should only carry out the toilers' wish." [quoted
by Palij, Op. Cit., p. 154]

Thus, Rees fails to present an accurate account of Makhnovist
theory and practice as regards "free soviets." Rather than
oppose party participation within their soviets and congresses,
the Makhnovists opposed the domination of soviets and
congresses by political parties, a radically different
concept. Like the Kronstadt rebels, they argued for all
power to the soviets and not to parties.

Lastly, Rees attacks the Makhnovists for having two security
forces, the Cheka-like *razvedka* and the Punitive Commission.
How this is an expression of the Makhnovist "social base"
is hard to explain, as both the Bolsheviks and Whites also
had their security forces and counter-intelligence agencies.

While Rees quotes Footman's statement that "we can safely
assume [!] these services were responsible for frequent
injustices and atrocities," he fails to mention that
Footman does not provide any examples (hence his comment
that we can "assume" they occurred!). Footman himself
notes that "[o]f the Makhnovite security services . . .
we know very little." [David Footman, Op. Cit., p. 288]
Rees himself only lists one, namely the summary shooting
of a Bolshevik cell discovered in the Army. Given the
bloody record of the Bolshevik Cheka (which, again, Rees
defends as necessary to defend against the Whites!), this
suggests that the crimes of the Makhnovist counter-intelligence
pale in comparison.

Rees also quotes the historian Chamberlin that "Makhno's 
private Cheka . . . quickly disposed of anyone who was 
suspected of plotting against his life." [Op. Cit., 60] 
Strangely enough, Rees fails to mention the Bolshevik 
attempts to assassinate Makhno, including the one in the 
latter part of May 1919 when, it should be noted, the 
Makhnovists and Bolsheviks were meant to be in alliance. 
Nor does he mention that the Cheka "would hunt out and 
hang all active Makhnovites." [David Footman, _Civil War 
in Russia_, p. 271 and p. 293] 

As regards the last conflict with the Red Army, it should 
be noted that while "generalised accusations of Makhnovist 
atrocities are common" the facts are it was "the Makhnovists 
who stood to gain by liberating prisoners, the Bolsheviks by 
shooting them." This was because "the Red Army soldiers had 
been conscripted from elsewhere to do work they neither liked 
nor understood" and the "insurgents had their own homes to 
defend." [Malet, Op. Cit., p. 130] Thus, while Rees quotes 
Footman's opinion that "Makhno's later campaigns [were] 
among the most bloody and vindictive," these facts suggest 
that we *cannot* "safely assume that these [security] services 
were responsible for frequent injustices and atrocities." 
Clearly, if the Makhnovists were releasing Red Army prisoners
(and many of whom were joining Makhno), the picture of an 
atrocity inflicting army can hardly be a valid picture.

And it should be stressed that Bolshevik terror and violence 
against the Makhnovists is strangely absent from Rees's account.

Rees presents just *one* concrete example of Makhnovist 
"Cheka-like" violence, namely, the execution of a 
Bolshevik cell in December, 1919. It should be noted 
that the Bolsheviks had been explicitly arguing for
Party dictatorship for some time by then. The reason why
the Bolsheviks had been "denied an open trial" was because
they had already been shot. Unfortunately, Makhno gave two
contradictory reasons why the Bolsheviks had been killed.
This led to the Makhnovist Revolutionary Military Soviet
setting up a commission of three to investigate the issue.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the commission exonerated Makhno
although Voline, out of the members, seemed to have been
genuinely embarrassed by the affair. [Malet, Op. Cit.,
pp. 51-2] Needless to say, Rees fails to comment on the
Bolshevik summary killing of Makhnovist staff in June
1919 or, indeed, any other summary executions conducted
by the Bolsheviks against the Makhnovists (including the
shooting of prisoners).

Given the summary justice handed out by the Bolshevik Cheka,
it seems strange that Rees dismisses the Makhnovist movement
on assumptions and one event, yet he does. Obviously, the
large-scale and continuous Bolshevik killings of political
enemies (including Makhnovists) is irrelevant compared to
this one event.

All in all, Rees' attempts to blame the few deviations
the Makhnovists had from anarchist theory on the "social
base" of the movement are a joke. While justifying the
far more extreme deviations of Bolshevik theory and practice
in terms of "objective factors," he refuses to consider this
possibility for the Makhnovists. The hypocrisy is clear, if
not unexpected.

One last point. Taking Rees' "class analysis" of the Makhnovists
seriously, the logical conclusion of his argument is clear.
For Rees, a movement which compromises slightly with its
principles in the face of extreme "objective factors" is
"petty bourgeois." However, a movement which compromises
totally (indeed introduces and justifies the exact opposite
of its original claims) in face of the same "objective
factors" is "proletarian." As such, his pathetic attempt
at "class analysis" of the Makhnovists simply shows up
the dictatorial nature of the Bolsheviks. If trying to
live up to libertarian/democratic ideals but not totally
succeeding signifies being "petty-bourgeois" while dismissing
those ideals totally in favour of top-down, autocratic
hierarchies is "proletarian" then sane people would
happily be labelled "petty-bourgeois"!

And Rees states that "[n]either Makhno's social programme
nor his political regime could provide an alternative
to the Bolsheviks"! [Op. Cit., p. 60] Little wonder he
distorts that social programme and political regime -- an
honest account of both would see that Rees is wrong. The 
Makhnovist movement clearly shows that not only did Bolshevik 
policies have a decisive impact on the development of the
Russian Revolution, there was a clear alternative to 
Bolshevik authoritarianism and party dictatorship.

In summary, Rees' attack on the Makhnovists fails. It can
be faulted on both factual and logical grounds. His article
is so riddled with errors, selective quoting and downright
lies that it is factually unreliable. Similarly, his attempt
to attack the Makhnovist political theory and practice is
equally factually incorrect. His attempt to explain the
deviations of Makhnovist practice from its theory in terms
of the "social base" is simply an insult to the intelligence
of the reader and an abuse of class analysis.

A far more compelling analysis would recognise that the
Makhnovists were not a perfect social movement but that
the deviations of its practice from its theory can be
explained by the objective factors it faced. Equally, the
example of the Makhnovists shows the weakness of Rees'
main argument, namely that the objective factors that
Bolshevism faced can solely explain its authoritarian
politics. That the Makhnovists, facing the same objective
factors, did not act in the same manner as the Bolsheviks
shows that Bolshevik ideology played a key role in the
failure of the revolution. This explains Rees' clumsy
attempts to rewrite the history and theory of the
Makhnovshchina.

H.11.16 What lessons can be learned from the Makhnovists?

The Makhnovist movement was one of the most important
events of the Russian Revolution. It was a mass movement
of working people who tried and succeeded to implement
libertarian ideas in extremely difficult circumstances.

As such, the most important lesson gained from the experience
of the Makhno movement is simply that "objective factors" cannot
and do not explain the degeneration of the Russian Revolution or
Bolshevik authoritarianism. Here was a movement which
faced the same terrible circumstances as the Bolsheviks faced
(White counter-revolution, economic disruption, and so on)
and yet did not act in the same manner as the Bolsheviks.
Where the Bolsheviks completely abolished army democracy,
the Makhnovists extensively applied it. Where the Bolsheviks
implemented party dictatorship *over* the soviets, the Makhnovists
encouraged and practised soviet self-management. While the
Bolsheviks eliminated freedom of speech, press, assembly, the
Makhnovists defended and implemented them. The list is endless
(see section H.11.14).

This means that one of the key defences of the Bolshevik Myth,
namely that the Bolsheviks had no choice but to act as they
did due to "objective factors" or "circumstances" is totally
undermined. As such, it points to the obvious conclusion:
Bolshevik ideology influenced the practice of the party,
as did their position within the "workers' state," and so
influenced the outcome of the Revolution. This means that to
play down Bolshevik ideology or practice in favour of "objective
factors", one fails to understand that the actions and ideas
generated during the revolution were not "objectively"
determined but were *themselves* important and sometimes
decisive factors in the outcome.

Take, for example, the Bolshevik decision to betray the Makhnovists
in 1920. Neither betrayal was "objectively determined" before-
hand. However, it did make perfect sense from a perspective
which equated the revolution with the "dictatorship of the
party." That the first betrayal undoubtedly extended the length
of the Civil War by allowing the Whites the space to reorganise
under Wrangel also had its impact on Bolshevik theory and
practice as well as the "objective factors" it had to face.

As such, the Makhnovists give a counter-example to the common
pro-Bolshevik argument that the horrors of the Civil War
were responsible for the degeneration of the Bolshevik Party
and the revolution. In the words of one historian:

"[The] Insurgent Army . . . was organised on a voluntary basis
and respected the principle of election of commanders and
staff. The regulations governing conduct were drawn up by
commissions of soldiers and approved by general meetings of
the units concerned. In other words, it embodied the principles
of the soldiers' movement of 1917, principles rejected by
the Bolsheviks when they set up the Red Army, supposedly
because of their harmful effects on fighting efficiency, a
characteristic of them discovered by the Bolsheviks only
after they had come to power on the basis of promoting them.
But the Insurgent Army, given its size and equipment, was
very effective. Some have even credited it with greater
responsibility than the Red Army for the defeat of Denikin.
It took enormous efforts by the Bolsheviks, including the
arrest or shooting of thousands of people, in order to
pacify the region . . . even after the Insurgent Army
was militarily broken, it took six months to mop up the
remnants. . . Within its area of operations, which consisted
of only two to three per cent of the total population of
European Russia, the Insurgent Army was undoubtedly highly
effective. While one can never know how history might have
turned out had things been different, the Insurgent Army
gives plenty of grounds for thinking that a people's
revolutionary war of the kind it represented might have
been at least as effective on a national scale with
nationwide resources at its disposal as Trotsky and the
Red Army's ruthless centralisation. It would not, however,
have been compatible with the imposition from above of
the Bolshevik leadership's vision of revolution. When
the Insurgent Army drove the enemy out of an area they
encouraged the local population to solve their own
problems. Where the Red Army took over, the Cheka quickly
followed. The Bolsheviks themselves were energetically
snuffing out the ideals of 1917.

"Given such considerations it may be, though it cannot be
logically proven one way or the other, that the Bolsheviks'
deeply rooted authoritarianism rather than the civil war
itself led to the construction of a highly centralised
system that aimed at 'complete control' over political and
many other aspects of social life. It could even be argued,
though it is equally unprovable, that the tendency to
authoritarianism, far from ensuring victory, nearly led
to catastrophe. For one thing, it helped alienate many
workers who felt cheated by the outcome of the revolution,
and support for the regime was . . . far from even in this
core group . . . [It] may, indeed, have been becoming
more alienated as a result of Bolshevik measures depriving
it of the means of expression of its growing catalogue of
grievances. . . Far from being 'necessary' or even functional,
the Bolshevik leadership's obsession with externally imposed
discipline and authority might even have made the task of
victory in the war more difficult and more costly. If the
counter-example of Makhno is anything to go by then it
certainly did." [Christopher Read, _From Tsar to Soviets_,
pp. 264-5]

As such, another key lesson to be learned from the Makhno
movement is the importance of practising during a
revolution the ideas you preach before it. Means and ends
are linked, with the means shaping the ends and the ends
inspiring the means. As such, if you argue for working-class
power and freedom, you cannot dump these aims during a
revolution without ensuring that they are never applied
after it. As the Makhnovist movement showed, even the most
difficult situations need not hinder the application of
revolutionary ideas.

The importance of encouraging working-class autonomy also
shines through the Makhnovist experience. The problems
facing a social revolution are many, as are the problems
involved in constructing a new society. The solutions to
these problems cannot be found without the active and full
participation of the working class. As the Makhnovist
congresses and soviets show, free debate and meaningful
meetings are the only means, firstly, to ensure that
working-class people are "the masters of their own lives,"
that "they themselves are making the revolution," that
they "have gained freedom." "Take that faith away,"
stressed Alexander Berkman, "deprive the people of power
by setting up some authority over them, be it a political
party or military organisation, and you have dealt a fatal
blow to the revolution. You will have robbed it of its
main source of strength, the masses." [_ABC of Anarchism_,
p. 82]

Secondly, it allows the participation of all in solving
the problems of the revolution and of constructing
the new society. Without this input, *real* socialism
cannot be created and, at best, some form of oppressive
state capitalist regime would be created (as Bolshevism
shows). A new society needs the freedom of experimentation,
to adapt freely to the problems it faces, to adjust to the
needs and hopes of those making it. Without working-class
freedom and autonomy, public life becomes impoverished,
miserable and rigid as the affairs of all are handed over
to a few leaders at the top of a social hierarchy, who cannot
possibility understand, let alone solve, the problems affecting
society. Freedom allows the working class to take an active
part in the revolution. Restricting working-class freedom
means the bureaucratisation of the revolution as a few
party leaders cannot hope to direct and rule the lives of
millions without a strong state apparatus. Simply put,
the emancipation of the working class is the task of the
working class itself. Either working class people create
socialism (and that needs workers' autonomy and freedom
as its basis), or some clique will and the result will
not be a socialist society.

As the experience of the Makhnovist movement shows, working-
class freedom can be applied during a revolution and when
it is faced with the danger of counter-revolution.

Another key lesson from the Makhnovist movement is that of
the need for effective anarchist organisation. The Makhnovists
did not become anarchist-influenced by chance. The hard
effort by the local anarchists in Hulyai Pole before and
during 1917 paid off in terms of political influence
afterwards. Therefore, anarchists need to take a leading
role in the struggles of working people (as we indicated
in section I.8.2, this was how the Spanish anarchists gained
influence as well). As Voline noted, one of the advantages
the Makhnovist movement had was "the activity of . . .
libertarian elements in the region . . . [and the] rapidity
with which the peasant masses and the insurgents, despite
unfavourable circumstances, became acquainted with libertarian
ideas and sought to apply them." [Op. Cit., p. 570]

Arshinov expands on this issue in a chapter of his history
("The Makhnovshchina and Anarchism"), arguing that many
Russian anarchists "suffered from the disease of
disorganisation," which led to "impoverished ideas and
futile practice." Moreover, most did not join the
Makhnovist movement, "remained in their circles and
*slept through* a mass movement of paramount importance."
[Op. Cit., p. 244 and p. 242]

Indeed, it was only in May 1919 that the "Nabat" Ukrainian
anarchist confederation was organised. This federation
worked closely with the Makhnovists and gained influence
in the villages, towns and cities within and around the
Makhnovist region. In such circumstances, the anarchists
were at a disadvantage compared to the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks
and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who had been organised far
longer and so had more influence within the urban workers.

While many anarchists did participate effectively and
organisationally within many areas of Russia and the
Ukraine (gaining influence in Moscow and Petrograd, for
example), they were much weaker than the Bolsheviks. This
meant that the Bolshevik idea of revolution gained influence
(by, it should be noted, appropriating anarchist slogans and
tactics). Once in power, the Bolsheviks turned against their
rivals, using state repression to effectively destroy the
anarchist movement in Russia in April 1918 (see section H.6.24
for details). This, incidentally, led to many anarchists
coming to the Ukraine to escape repression and many joined
the Makhnovists. As Arshinov notes, the Bolsheviks "knew
perfectly well that . . . anarchism in Russia, lacking any
contact with a mass movement as important as the
Makhnovshchina, did not have a base and could not threaten
nor endanger them." [Op. Cit., p. 248] Waiting till *after*
a revolution starts to build such a base is a dangerous
tactic, as the experience of the Russian anarchists shows.
As the experience of the Moscow anarchists active in the
bakers' union shows, organised working-class support can
be an effective deterrent to state repression (the Moscow
bakers' union continued to have anarchists active in it
until 1921).

It should be noted that this lesson was recognised by the main
anarchists associated with the Makhnovists. In exile, Voline 
argued for the need to build a "synthesis" anarchist federation
(see section J.3.2) while Arshinov and Makhno both associated
themselves with the Platform (see section J.3.3). 

Another key lesson is the need to combine rural and urban
organisation. As Voline argued, the "absence of a vigorous
organised workers' movement which could support that of the
peasant insurgents" was a major disadvantage for the Makhno
movement. [Voline, Op. Cit., p. 571] If there had been a
workers' movement influenced by anarchist or syndicalist
ideas within the Ukrainian towns during the Russian
Revolution, the possibilities of constructive work would
have been increased immensely. Take the example of when the
Makhnovists liberated Aleksandrovsk and organised two
workers' conferences. It was only at the insurgents'
insistence that the unions agreed to send delegates, but
for information only. This was undoubtedly due to the fact
that Mensheviks had some influence in the unions and
Bolshevik influence was increasing. Both parties may have
preferred the Makhnovists to the Whites, but neither
accepted anarchist ideas of workers' self-management and
so constructive work was limited to the railway workers.
In contrast, when Katerinoslav was liberated, the bakers
set themselves to preparing the socialisation of their
industry and drawing up plans to feed both the army
and the civilian population. Unsurprisingly, the bakers
had long been under anarcho-syndicalist influence.
[Malet, Op. Cit., p. 123 and p. 124]

As the Makhnovists themselves realised, their movement
had to be complemented by urban working-class self-activity
and self-organisations. While they did all they could
to encourage it, they lacked a base within the workers'
movement and so their ideas had to overcome the twin
barriers of workers' unfamiliarity with both them and
their ideas and Marxist influence. With a strong working-
class movement influenced by anarchist ideas, the possibilities
for constructive work between city and village would have
been helped immensely (this can be seen from the example
of the Spanish Revolution of 1936, where rural and urban
collectives and unions made direct links with each other).

Lastly, there is the lesson to be gained from Makhnovist
co-operation with the Bolsheviks. Simply put, the experience
shows the importance of being wary towards Bolshevism.
As Voline put it, another disadvantage of the Makhnovists
was a "certain casualness, a lack of necessary distrust,
towards the Communists." [Op. Cit., p. 571] The Makhnovists
were betrayed three times by the Bolsheviks, who continually
placed maintaining their own power above the needs of the
revolution. The anarchists were simply used as cannon fodder
against the Whites and once their utility had ended, the
Bolsheviks turned their guns on them.

Thus a lesson to be learned is that co-operation between
anarchists and Bolsheviks is fraught with danger. As many
activists are aware, modern-day supporters of Bolshevism
constantly urge everyone to unite "against the common
enemy" and not to be "sectarian" (although, somehow this
appeal to non-sectarianism does not stop them printing
lying accounts of anarchism!). The Makhnovists took them at
their word in early 1919 and soon found out that "unity"
meant "follow our orders." When the Makhnovists continued
to apply their ideas of working-class self-management, the
Bolsheviks turned on them. Similarly, in early 1920 the
Bolsheviks outlawed the Makhnovists in order to break their
influence in the Ukraine. The Makhnovist contribution to
the defeat of Denikin (the common enemy) was ignored.
Lastly, in mid-1920 the Makhnovists placed the need of the
revolution first and suggested an alliance to defeat the
common enemy of Wrangel. Once Wrangel had been defeated,
the Bolsheviks ripped up the agreement they had signed
and, yet again, turned on the Makhnovists. Simply put,
the Bolsheviks continually placed their own interests
before that of the revolution and their allies. This is
to be expected from an ideology based on vanguardism
(see section H.5 for further discussion).

This does not mean that anarchists and Leninists should not
work together. In some circumstances and in some social
movements, this may be essential. However, it would be wise
to learn from history and not ignore it and, as such, modern
activists should be wary when conducting such co-operation.
Ultimately, for Leninists, social movements are simply a means
to their end (the seizing of state power by them on behalf of
the working class) and anarchists should never forget it.

Thus the lessons of the Makhnovist movement are exceedingly
rich. Simply put, the Makhnovshchina show that anarchism is
a viable form of revolutionary ideas and can be applied
successfully in extremely difficult circumstances. They show
that social revolutions need not consist of changing one set
of bosses for another. The Makhnovist movement clearly shows
that libertarian ideas can be successfully applied in a
revolutionary situation.

